


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
Staff Memorandum

ADJUSTMENT OF CHINESE SOLDIERS
TO THE COMMUNIST DEMAND
FOR IDEOLOGICAL PARTICIPATION:
An Exploratory Study Based on the CCF in the Korean War

by

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Task TICK II

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FOREWORD

This Staff Memorandum is the last in a series of research papers which deal principally with the processes and effects of thought reform as applied to Chinese soldiers by the Chinese Communist regime. They are based on analyses of interviews with Chinese prisoners of war during the Korean conflict, by a HumRRO research team.

The TICK research was under the general direction of the late Dr. William C. Bradbury. In addition to the authors of this paper, other members of the TICK staff who assisted with the analyses on which this report is based were Samuel M. Meyers and Richard P. Harris.

The research was conducted by HumRRO's Psychological Warfare Division, which was deactivated in June 1956. The Director of Research for the Division while the TICK studies were under way was Dr. Carleton F. Scofield.

Chapter I

FOCUS OF THE RESEARCH

THE PROBLEM: Adjustment to Demand for Ideological Participation

A distinctive feature of modern totalitarian regimes is their emphasis on remaking the whole of the society over which they rule. The victory of the Communists in China marked the beginning of such an effort: In their few years of rule, the Chinese Reds have shown a vigorous determination to replace traditional Chinese values with new values ostensibly derived from the basic ideological postulates of Communism. The ability of the most determined and ruthless rulers to remake society is, of course, not unlimited. The long-range program of molding men in accordance with the Communist model is tied to the growth of a new and malleable generation. Even in current Chinese society, however, some groups -- with the armed forces as a notable example -- are subjected to controls that are impressively intense and coordinated, and the political rulers' effort to remake men in the Communist image appears likely to have effects which are both quick and deep.

This report concerns one part of this effort -- what the authors call the demand for ideological participation. Like previously published reports in the TICK research series 1/, this paper is based on analyses of 43

1/ Among these reports are the following: William C. Bradbury and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Determinants of Loyalty and Disaffection in Chinese Communist Soldiers During the Korean Hostilities: An Exploratory Study, HumRRO Special Report 7, October 1956 (CONFIDENTIAL), Task TICK I; Samuel M. Meyers and William C. Bradbury, The Political Behavior of Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War in the Korean Conflict: A Historical Analysis, HumRRO Technical Report 50, August 1958 (For Official Use Only), Task TICK III; Samuel M. Meyers, The Role of Traditional Orientations Toward Social Relations in Chinese Responses to Communist Military-Political Control, Staff Memorandum, Psychological Warfare Division, November 1958, Task TICK II; William C. Bradbury, Motivations of Chinese Communist Soldiers: Research Notes in Support of Military Psychological Warfare, Staff Memorandum, Psychological Warfare Division, May 1958 (For Official Use Only), Task TICK II; William C. Bradbury, Methodological Considerations Involved in an Exploratory Study of the Motivation of Soldiers From the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea, Staff Memorandum, Psychological Warfare Division, October 1956.

interviews conducted with Chinese prisoners of war in Korea by a HumRRO research team.

All totalitarian regimes proclaim ideologies and all require at least some lip service to them; all exercise, or try to exercise, rigid control over many areas of private life. The distinguishing feature of political training in the Chinese Communist Forces is the persistent linkage of these two demands. Not only are soldiers required to know and approve the ideology of the Communist revolution, and not only must they obey every demand of their rulers; they must also be able to explain, justify, or condemn the smallest detail of their daily behavior on the basis of criteria derived from the official party line. This leads, of course, to an extreme emphasis on political indoctrination in the ordinary sense of the term. But it also leads to an almost continuous process of self-analysis in which the individual must openly examine every act, thought, and wish and interpret it in approved ideological terms.

The pressure for ideological participation may be defined, then, as the demand that the totality of an individual's verbal and nonverbal communications conform to a system of social norms derived from official Communist ideology. In other words, all the writing, speech, gestures, acts -- even moods -- that have meaning for others are required to be consistent with the Communist way of life. To the extent that this demand is fulfilled, the individual becomes a carrier and exemplar of the new Communist culture although at the same time he may remain internally a product and reflection of the traditional society.

The nature of ideological participation is of direct interest to planners of military psychological warfare, for it involves factors that

are important in determining whether enemy soldiers identify with their roles. An earlier report of the TICK project 1/ suggested that with soldiers from the CCF such identification was determined by two general kinds of factors:

- (1) Those bearing primarily on soldiers' loyalty to their leaders and to the symbols of authority in general.
- (2) Those bearing on soldiers' psychological comfort in the performance of their everyday tasks.

In accordance with the objectives of the Task, the various TICK studies dealt with the specifically Communist features of life in the CCF before and during the Korean war, and not with attitudes toward or adjustment to inherent features of military life. TICK I dealt mainly with factors determining loyalty -- that is, determining whether soldiers shared or rejected the values of their military and political authorities. This report is limited to one group of factors that bear more closely on how "comfortable" these soldiers were in this relationship; more specifically, it is restricted to the problem of adjustment or adaptation to the demand for ideological participation. Before proceeding, however, some of the assumptions and considerations that underlie the description and analysis must be clarified.

IDEOLOGICAL PARTICIPATION AS A TECHNIQUE FOR RE-SOCIALIZATION

The particular importance of ideological participation to soldiers in the CCF is suggested by two distinct but related functions which it performs or is meant to perform. It is, first of all, a major technique of social

1/ Bradbury and Kirkpatrick, op. cit.

control intended to ensure complete conformity. But it is a control technique with a fundamentally pedagogical purpose, in the sense that its ultimate aim is to bring about the internalization of Communist values in the pupil or "patient." This aim is perhaps a natural development of the Communist view of ideology.

The Communist View of Ideology

In Communist literature, ideology as a concept resembles in some respects the concept of culture as used in American social science. Perhaps the best-known statement of this view is one by Marx himself:

Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence rises an entire superstructure of distinct and characteristically formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations. The single individual who derives them through tradition and education may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting point of his activity.^{1/}

In Marxist terms, then, ideology is a subculture, not created or imposed by kings, philosophers, artists, or priests, but the natural, inevitable outgrowth and rationalization of the interests of a particular economic class.

A significant modification of this theory -- and one that is suggestive for our problem -- was basic to Lenin's interpretation of Marxism. In Leninist theory the working classes themselves tended toward "trade-unionism" and could never develop a truly political proletarian outlook. The ideology for the "inevitable" revolution must therefore be developed by an intellectual and political elite which, organized as the "vanguard" of the proletariat, would transmit it to or impose it on the masses, to bring

^{1/} Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonapart, English translation edited by C. P. Dutt, New York, 1935, p. 40.

about revolution and a new world.

In theory, the success of a Communist revolution means the victory of the working classes -- represented by the Party. And the victory of the working classes means the supremacy of "their" ideology. This last point, however, must be qualified, for Communist ideology is victorious only in the sense that it is the ideology of what has become the ruling class. This does not mean that a new Communist culture suddenly and completely replaces older cultures or ideologies. Two reasons for this complex situation may be found in Communist literature.

First, the Communist seizure of power cannot immediately and completely alter or lead to the replacement of all old forms of production. Residues of older economic institutions continue to exist side by side with the new economy which is gradually created by the Communist state. These older forms of economic relations are accompanied by their own characteristic ideologies.

Second, even where older economic and social forms have been replaced by new institutions, many individuals remain whose ideological formation took place under the old regime. These individuals then perpetuate the ideology of the former exploiting classes and may even "contaminate" others with their obsolete cultural heritage.

Under such conditions, the Communist rulers aim to "complete" the revolution by gradually eradicating all remnants of the old culture that are not in harmony with Communist ideology. This means, in practice, a totalitarian revolution, in the sense that the shift in political power is followed by radical changes in the social system and eventually by fundamental changes in the whole system of values.

It is possible to see in Communist theory and policy two basic processes for advancing the desired cultural revolution. First, as the economic relations of society approach the Communist ideal, the rising generations of men presumably will gradually acquire the ideological (cultural) superstructure which reflects these new relations. This, however, is a long-term process. In the meantime something must be done about those individuals or groups who live and function in the new society but who are in fact bearers of the old and condemned ideology and, as such, dangerous to the new order. The solution adopted by the Chinese Communists is intensive political indoctrination. In essence, this means that adult human beings must be stripped of old habits, values, and world views, and remade in the image of Communist Man. This involves, as the TICK material illustrates, a process of intense "re-socialization."^{1/}

Re-Socialization

The effort to transmit a new culture by means of intense indoctrination involves the Chinese soldier who is subjected to it in a learning process in which he must acquire new values, new goals, new concepts about himself and others. The amount and kind of learning required for such a transformation is comparable to that of the initial socialization period, which takes place in infancy and childhood. In other words, the Communists attempt what may properly be called the re-socialization of the individual.

But the CCF soldiers involved in this learning process are adults or

^{1/} For an elaboration of the Chinese Communist view on the relationship between economic class and ideology, see Chapter IV of Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, February 1952.

near adults; they have already been socialized through the acquisition of a traditional, pre-Communist Chinese culture. Instead of the tabula rasa of the infant, who learns from parents, siblings, and nurses what he must do to get along in his social group, they already had a fully developed frame of reference at the time they came under Communist control. They had a picture of themselves and their world. They had values, habits, and attachments to people and objects; they had a fully developed set of expectations about the behavior and responses of others. Because they lacked the plasticity of the infant, it must be assumed that some formidable obstacles to re-socialization are inherent in the process itself.

Additional obstacles are created by the nature of the relationship between soldiers and their political mentors. First, of course, is the absence of the affective relationship that exists between infant and parents. Perhaps equally important, the very people responsible for transmitting the orientations, values, and goals of the new culture are themselves products of a previous culture; remnants of the former culture live inside the men charged with eradicating it. This may have important consequences: The agents of re-socialization may themselves commit errors, or fail to perceive the errors of their charges. Furthermore, the soldier who is being indoctrinated may sometimes doubt that the indoctrinator himself believes in the ideology he is trying to transmit.^{1/}

Ideological Participation as a Technique

The authors have indicated that in one sense ideology, when used by

^{1/} Some of these observations may also apply to the relationship between child and parents, of course, but differences of degree give them relevance at this point.

the Communists, really means "culture." Therefore, in a situation where the ruling power has a fully developed ideology and the means to create a totalitarian social order, what is involved is an attempt to replace an entire culture in a relatively brief passage of time. Since the cultural revolution cannot wait on the slow growth of new generations, the Chinese Communists are engaged in a dramatic effort to re-socialize those who have fallen under their rule.

In the CCF at the time of the Korean war, this effort took the form of a persistent demand for ideological participation. As will be shown, this went far beyond casual attempts at political indoctrination as this process is sometimes understood in the West. In time alone, political training in the CCF formed a major part of the soldier's total training. But what is distinctive about this indoctrination was its thoroughness and intensity. The CCF soldier had to know the ideology of his rulers and indicate agreement with it; more than that, he had to apply it constantly and explicitly to judge his own behavior and that of his fellows. The pressures for participation were such that all soldiers in the CCF not only had to constantly verbalize the principles of Communism, but also had to constantly act as if they believed in them.

The degree of control required for such ideological participation can be attained only in thoroughly disciplined groups. The demand for ideological participation in the CCF was applied in an "ideal" situation, and the effectiveness these techniques may have in bringing about conformity or re-socialization could only be approximated in nonmilitary situations.

THE NATURE OF ADAPTATION

Adaptation as Learning

The degree and kinds of adaptation to the demand for ideological participation will suggest the relative success or failure of the attempted re-socialization. As used in this study, adaptation implies learning (1) the forms and content of ideological participation and (2) the consequences of conformity and nonconformity. The first of these categories must be examined more closely, for it raises problems of definition.

In a study such as this, it is important not to identify "learning" with any one kind of acquired behavior. In approaching the problems posed by the Communist efforts to re-socialize adults or near adults, it is convenient to distinguish among three kinds of things that are "learned" in the process of socialization:

- (1) Attachments to specific persons and basic values.
- (2) Culturally acceptable ways of expressing these values or attachments.
- (3) Culturally acceptable ways of behaving toward objects that are defined as value objects by those with the power to enforce social norms, but not accepted as such by the individual.

The ways of expressing values and attachments tend themselves to acquire intrinsic value status. Such ways of behaving tend to be unreflective and habitual, and gradually take on the qualities of permanence and desirability. Furthermore, in a given culture, a value and the approved way of expressing that value are normally not easily distinguished;

for example, in oriental societies respect for parents and the specific ways of expressing such respect tend to become indistinguishable.

In relation to the third category of things learned, it must be emphasized that "correct" behavior toward non-value objects is usually instrumental to the achievement of some value held by the individual. For example, the child entering school may conform to rules, not because he believes in the value of classroom discipline but because he does not wish to displease his mother. Similarly, a Chinese soldier may engage in self-criticism, not because he believes in the value of public exposure but because in doing so he protects himself from punishment.

The distinctions among the three categories are important as a means of emphasizing the variant relationship between values and ways of behaving. Human behavior is purposive; men calculate ways of achieving or protecting values. They are capable of ingratiation, of acting as though they valued a particular person or thing when in reality they have some other value which ingratiation will serve. The existence of words like sly, deceitful, tricky, and insincere reflects the capacity of people to behave in ways that do not indicate their true feelings. The "confidence" man, found in every complex society, is a living reminder of human ability to successfully play roles and manipulate values that one has not internalized. In thinking about the assimilation of Communist roles and values, the reader will do well to keep in mind the capacity of people to learn without internalizing, to speak without believing.

Three Aspects of the Respondents' Adaptation

The preceding observations suggest some of the main problems treated in later chapters. In TICK I, where the research staff was concerned primarily

with a description of the values or motives revealed by the respondents, it was established that the degree of successful adaptation to the Communist system by individual respondents had no relation to the degree of loyalty. Nevertheless, it may reasonably be assumed that the Chinese Communists aim not only at overt conformity, but at the internalization of their new system of values. Consequently, the discussion which follows is centered around three main topics relating to soldiers' adaptation to the Communist demands for ideological participation:

- (1) The degree and kinds of overt conformity and non-conformity exhibited by the TICK respondents.
- (2) The major areas of conflict between the old values and attitudes and the behavior required by the Communists.
- (3) The possible long-range effects of the demand and all its ramifications on both the individual "pupil" and the operation of the Communist-controlled social system.

Chapter 2

BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR IDEOLOGICAL PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

On coming under Communist control, the HumRRO respondents were confronted with a situation which required the development of entirely new conceptions of politics. The Communist insistence on continuous and explicit understanding and application of political ideology in day-to-day activities was a completely novel demand in Chinese society. Initially, in expounding the rudiments of Marxist ideology or stating even the simplest propositions about individual welfare and government policy or reform, the Communists usually were dealing with questions which had never before been raised in China. This chapter will sketch the pre-Communist political experience of the HumRRO respondents and discuss the meaning of "ideological participation."

All the men interviewed in this study had lived a large part of their lives in a pre-Communist environment, most of them in circumstances that encouraged a parochial, nonpolitical view of their world. Despite the conventional picture of Asiatic masses being moved by a virulent nationalism, the notion of membership in a nation seems to have been virtually meaningless for many of the TICK interviewees. It is true that most of the "intellectuals" (men with more than 10 years of education) did exhibit a fairly developed feeling of concern for the nation, and informants with previous Nationalist Army service fighting against the Japanese had gotten some feeling for the nature of a "foreign enemy." Nevertheless, it can be said that among TICK respondents nationalism as a concept and as a feeling was limited both in extent and in intensity.

Knowledge about political issues was similarly limited among the men interviewed. For more than a decade China had been rent by a civil war which had affected many parts of the country and the lives of millions of people, yet few among the HumRRO informants had a clear conception of the issues. Some of the intellectuals were well aware that the civil war had been fought for control of the government, and therefore the power to make policy for China; they had been familiar with salient slogans embodying proposed reforms. Apart from this group, however, there was little understanding of the relationship between the civil war and the government.

Even among former Nationalist officers there were individuals who said that before coming under Communist power they "knew nothing about the Communists," and conceived them only as "bandits" and "cruel" lawbreakers. They had not pictured the Kuomintang -- for which they fought -- as standing for one kind of government and one kind of social organization, and the Communists as standing for an alternative. They therefore had no particular feelings of loyalty to the ideology or programmatic aspects of the Nationalist cause, though they were, in varying degrees, loyal as fighting men in the Nationalist Army.

Such political ignorance and indifference cannot be attributed entirely to the undemocratic character of pre-Communist Chinese political life. Even in nondemocratic societies, it is possible to acquire experience in thinking about and influencing politics. In Bismarckian Germany, for example, the trade unions provided a kind of training ground for political consciousness at a stage where members of the working class had no direct means for participating in national government. However, very few TICK informants had had a comparable kind of membership which could have sensitized them to large political issues and to the stakes of political power.

A small number had belonged to student political organizations. As for the rest, their affiliations had been restricted to the family, the army, and, in a few cases, secret societies. The secret societies were concerned with securing privileges for individuals as individuals, not with influencing general policy; Army commanders did constitute a political elite, but the officers and men of the CNA seem to have been unself-conscious representatives of a political position. In short, although familiar with local, manipulative politics, the Chinese masses had little or no experience with politics of a national, programmatic type.

Both a cause and a consequence of this inexperience was that, in pre-Communist days, few of the interviewees had either seen or felt any relation between national public policy and their personal fates. They had not perceived their disappointments and problems as having political or social causes which might be "cured" by the government. The Communists were the first to make wide and effective efforts to instill such consciousness in the masses. In the words of one respondent:

The Communists are very successful in giving them reasons why. In the beginning not all of the people understood; some said that they are being oppressed and they are poor because it is their fate. But it was through the Communists that they saw that that was not the case, they saw that they were being exploited. They saw that their sufferings and their hardships and poverty were due to these different classes existing and that the Nationalist soldiers represented the force which defended those particular classes. (R-3)1/

It is against this background of ignorance and inexperience that the Communist demands for "positive loyalty and ideological conformity" must

1/ The symbol R refers to prisoners who chose to repatriate to Communist China, N refers to non-repatriates, and F to Chinese sent to the United States by the Nationalist government and interviewed in this country.

be examined. Membership in traditional Chinese society implied not national political participation but habitation of an area that fell within the territorial boundaries of China. Large-scale government impinged on the average citizen's life only when he was drafted into the army, when tax collectors descended on the village, or when the entrance of warring troops turned his village into a battleground. In these contacts, obedience rather than loyalty (i.e., internalized emotional or intellectual commitment) was the issue. The Chinese in pre-Communist society does not seem to have been required to "agree" with the actions of his rulers. No pretense was made that in obeying the ruler he was following his own will. Such demands for symbolic or actual participation -- through consent -- in government occur only in political societies where "democratic" doctrines and/or forces have demanded the reality, or the facade, of government "by the people."

Communism is a pre-eminent example of such a body of doctrine. Its ideological basis rests partly on the historical prediction that the masses "will" rule themselves in the political, economic, and social realms, and partly on the ethical imperative that the masses "should" rule themselves. The development of a political structure in which the people are represented only through an assumed identity of rulers and ruled has not lessened, in the Communist view, the importance of popular support. However, this view of the central importance of "the people's will" is manifested not by an effort to form policy to correspond to the public will but by an attempt to re-form the public will to correspond to policy.

Consequently, a Chinese coming under Communist rule was confronted with the demand for continuous positive support of the social revolution engineered by Communist leaders. He was required to know -- with varying

degrees of completeness and sophistication -- the intellectual basis, the value hierarchy, the friends and enemies of these leaders; to agree with their evaluations; and to conform his whole behavior to these considerations. Although the demand that he obey was not new, the demand that he know, agree, and self-consciously conform his every act to the standards provided by a novel political ideology was new indeed.

THE MEANING OF IDEOLOGICAL PARTICIPATION

What Participation Involves

As a process, ideological participation contains three important elements which may, for analytic purposes, be distinguished: (1) knowledge, (2) expression of agreement, and (3) repeated justification or rationalization of all behavior in appropriate ideological terms.

Knowledge

The first requirement in ideological participation was, of course, knowledge of Communist ideology. As has been noted, the very effort to transmit knowledge of political principles and ideals to the soldier was in itself a break with Chinese tradition. Nevertheless, not only was the CCF soldier expected to know the social and political aims of the revolution of which the Communist party and the People's Army were instruments, but the everyday details of his military tasks and discipline were related to these broad goals. Ideological knowledge, in other words, involved both a knowledge of the revolutionary ideals of Communism, and an understanding of the relationship of these ideals to the soldier's daily behavior.

The average person was, however, seldom exposed to ideology in its "pure" form. Knowledge of ideology was in most cases limited to

knowledge of Communist slogans and programmatic goals. This "knowledge" normally included three elements: (1) a general picture of the revolutionary struggle, presented largely in terms of opposed forces of good and evil; (2) a justification of particular Communist policies such as land reform and the Korean war; (3) rationalizations, in terms of these broader considerations, of the particular demands placed on soldiers. The range in ideological sophistication was, of course, considerable.

Agreement

Ideological participation involved not only knowledge but full agreement. The Communists would prefer to create real conviction, and their first step in this direction was always extensive reasoned argument. Nevertheless, whether or not there was such conviction, the whole process of ideological participation aimed to ensure that all overt expression conformed to Communist norms.

Agreement, first of all, must be verbal agreement. As one respondent put it, "If the Communists say something is good, you say it is good" (N-19). Those who attempted to argue soon learned that "You can never win by showing hostility to them. We tried our best to do whatever we were ordered to do - to say the things we were ordered to say" (F-6).

The Communists were also sensitive to nonverbal evidence of agreement or disagreement. "They not only observe your actions, your behavior, but they also observe your attitude, your mood" (N-13). The reasons for this were expressed as follows by one repatriate, a general and political commissar: "A man's behavior is always guided by his thinking. Therefore, when his actions exhibit deviation, his thinking must be deviating in the same manner" (R-1).

Communication in formal situations was, however, only one of

several areas where control was exercised. Even his dreams could subject a soldier to criticism or more severe punishment. Discouragement of private friendships largely eliminated opportunities for expressing deviant opinion in informal situations. Interpersonal relationships outside official political or unit ties were discouraged, and men found to be forming such relationships were punished. Criticism and mutual surveillance were designed to prevent the formation of interpersonal ties, and generally were quite effective in so doing. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons that personal relationships were discouraged was the desire to prevent the expression of dissident sentiments among the individuals; it is probably for this reason that, while non-work-connected talking among individuals was discouraged in all cases, it was considered especially dangerous in the case of men of "doubtful" social origin.

There are two categories the Communists observe the closest. One is the more educated, intellectual classes. The other is the so-called upper bourgeois class or landlord class. For instance, if two college students are caught talking together they will be in serious trouble, or if two people both from the same kind of upper-class background were caught talking they would be in serious trouble. (N-25)

Continuous Application of Ideological Principles

The third requirement of ideological participation meant that a soldier's whole range of behavior was constantly and openly interpreted in ideological terms, both by others and by himself. At discussions and criticism meetings, everyone was expected to take an active part:

Everyone is forced to express his opinion about the discussion topic. If two or three men in the assembly don't express their opinions about the topic, the Communist instructors will claim that they are reactionary agents and will punish them. (N-23)

The discussion seems to be very active. Even if one didn't want to discuss, one had to pretend to be interested and to speak. (N-5)

Reasons for Communist Emphasis

Although there can be no doubt about the intensity and persistence of the demand for ideological participation, the Communists' motives or aims must be largely inferred. An important reason for this demand is surely the desire to use military service as a school for training individuals to live in a Communist society. The CCF served as a major training ground for Communist citizenship as well as for service in battle.^{1/} Chinese Communist leaders appear to take very seriously the Leninist precept relating performance to ideological orthodoxy. The belief that how a man does his job will be determined by his total ideological development leads to a heavy emphasis on political morale, that is, on indoctrination and general ideological training. According to this view, the requirements for the good citizen and the good soldier are in large measure identical -- as are those for the good citizen and the good peasant, industrial worker, or university student. Conversely, failure or bad performance even in technical tasks is often interpreted politically -- that is, as resulting from ideological inadequacies.

The conflict of roles between Communist and pre-Communist society suggests another reason for the emphasis on ideological training in the CCF. Almost all social roles have been changed by the Communists in their unprecedented experiment in social engineering. Therefore, the fulfillment of any single new role (that of soldier, for example) often precludes the fulfillment of other, traditional roles. For the man entering the CCF,

^{1/} Until 1948-49, of course, the CCF very largely was the Communist society.

becoming a good Communist soldier necessitated becoming a new kind of citizen, son, husband, and so forth. Because he was expected to adopt roles that had not been acquired and internalized in the normal process of socialization, he had to be taught the principles that were to replace habit and spontaneous feeling as a guide to conduct.

The HumRRO informants had been exposed to differing amounts of ideological training. Several of the highly educated -- chiefly those who were university students at the time their city or province fell under Communist control and a few former Nationalist officers -- were subjected to intensive indoctrination in military-political universities, special centers set up for the purpose of "re-forming" selected representatives of the old order. These informants had been exposed to ideology in a more elaborate, sophisticated, and complete form than were those trained in regular army units. However, the basic propositions and emphases on ideological training were identical.

What, then, were these propositions and what, precisely, did ideological participation involve for the CCF soldier? How did the Communists attempt to communicate the new value system, the policies, and the criteria by which men were henceforth to be judged? How did they seek to persuade their subjects of the moral and intellectual superiority and the tactical astuteness of Communist valuations and policy? In short, what was it that the interviewees had been required to learn?

THE CONTENT OF INDOCTRINATION

For the purposes of this study, the content of the indoctrination to which all new members of the Communist forces were exposed may be viewed under two major categories: First, the Communists explained to them what

Communism was, what it stood for in the domestic and international struggles. From such propositions about the nature of their mission, the Communists derived the duties and obligations of individual soldiers.

The Meaning of the Communist Struggle

Slogans, particular proposals for social reform, and simple ideological tenets were all combined to create a picture of the Communists and their struggles. The idea of struggle appears in all parts of the Communist effort to inculcate the minimal ideological consciousness in their soldiers. For as good Marxists, who see history in terms of dialectical oppositions, the Communists defined their mission as much in terms of who or what they were against, as who or what they were for.

Thus, while the civil war was still being fought, in explaining the character of the group in which the new CCF member was expected to fight, and to which he was expected to grant total obedience, the Communists stressed their opposition to the existing society and the Nationalist government. Since in most cases the soldiers were unaware of a struggle between opposing social conceptions, the Communists had first to explain that such a struggle existed. This they did by positing the existence of two classes -- proletariat and capitalist. They then explained that members of "the proletariat always work hard and do an honest day's labor, whereas the capitalists are eating the fruit of the laborer and taking life easy" (N-10). The capitalists were variously defined as the "landlords," the "rich," the "exploiters," the "Kuomintang reactionaries."

The Chinese Communist mission was, of course, to defeat these "enemies of the people." Land reform -- a central programmatic slogan of the Communists in the years preceding their triumph -- was to bring about a state

in which "the rich and the poor would be the same. Everyone would be comfortable" (N-12). As summarized by one TICK respondent, the basic items in the pre-Korea catechism for CCF soldiers were as follows:

The purpose of the revolution is to help the proletarians. The Nationalists or the Kuomintang protect the enemies of the proletariat. As the cause of the proletariat, revolution is invincible and victory is inevitable. (N-10)

After the outbreak of the Korean hostilities new propositions were added, to explain to each soldier why he must fight in Korea:

They told how . . . the reason we [China] were poor and the United States was rich was that we were being exploited, just as they had told poor farmers that their suffering was the responsibility of rich landlords. (N-26)

They told us how in the whole world the strongest nations invade the weak nations. That, for instance, in the first World War the Germans attacked Soviet Russia and in the second war Japan invaded China. And in this war American imperialists invade Korea. Maybe after they occupy all of Korea they may enter Manchuria and occupy all of China, so all Chinese people will be under the cruel control of the American people. So we must assist the Koreans to defend our nation. (N-19)

The Communists passed out books . . . saying that Americans wanted to conquer the world, and their first step was to invade China, and then the Soviet Union. (N-11)

As these quotations show, in their treatment of both the domestic and the international scene, the Communists sought to present themselves simultaneously as representatives of the downtrodden and helpless, and as the preordained victors in the struggles against oppression. This point is made specifically by another HumRR0 respondent:

In teaching what the Communist army was, emphasis was also laid on its invincibility. They told a story of how a band of a few tens of thousands of men eventually conquered the whole country and became an army of five million. They stressed the inevitability of the success of Communism not only in China but in the whole world. (N-26)

It is interesting to note here how readily the concept of dialectical opposition is converted into a "devil theory" of politics when popularized for mass consumption. Whatever qualifications appear in the writings of Marx and Lenin on the moral qualities of the proletariat and the capitalists were discarded in the formulation of a view which divided the world into forces of good and forces of evil. The fundamental premise to be inculcated in all new subjects was the identification of the Communists and their allies with good and the identification of their enemies with evil. It is then in the name of this good which the party represents that sacrifices are demanded from the individual.

The Role of the Individual in the Chinese Communist Struggle

The insistence on the application of ideology to everyday behavior -- a significant characteristic of Chinese Communist political indoctrination -- means that the individual is constantly aware both of his expectations under the new order and of his precise duties and obligations.

Expectations

In the Communists' cosmic struggle, some of those who fell under Red control inevitably belonged to the condemned classes. Some -- for example, older landlords, high Nationalist officials -- who were too deeply compromised by their past were, of course, to be liquidated, often executed. Others were unmistakably "proletarian" and had reason to expect favored treatment. But for a large number of people, the consequences of the Red victory remained for some time ambiguous: First, because the line between the "good" proletarians and the "evil" capitalists was flexible; and second, because the treatment to be accorded members of the former "exploiting" classes was not immediately clear.

Because of such ambiguities in Red propaganda many HumRRO respondents first encountered the Communists with a certain amount of anxiety. They soon discovered, however, that not all the "exploiters" were equally condemned. For the most part the men in the HumRRO study, regardless of background, had been given the opportunity to ally themselves with the forces of "good." As one, the general and political commissar previously quoted, put it:

When the Communists took over Chinese society, it was made up of divergent peoples; these people had different background; it will take time for the non-proletarians to be converted to the Communist ideology. The Communists recognize this, and they are not forcing them -- they know it will take time -- but they believe that by actions, by effect, and by time they will be won over.
(R-1)

Class background did not necessarily preclude acceptance or even advancement in the Communist army. Individuals were evaluated in multifarious ways, not least among which was a willingness or apparent willingness to conform.

It's hard to say which classes are reliable to the party. As long as a man agrees with the Communists, he is reliable. If he disagrees with the Communists, he is unreliable. (N-4)

The Communists considered me reliable not because my family were farmers, but because I could fight better at the battle front. (N-19)

Nevertheless, class background and previous political activity did influence an individual's place in the new order, for the Communist revolution meant somewhat different things for the "exploited" and the "exploiters." Furthermore, these differences were not simply inferred from the treatment experienced by individuals representative of the old classes; they were explicitly spelled out in all indoctrination programs.

(1) The "exploited." Two groups of respondents -- "volunteers"

from poor farmer backgrounds and former CNA enlisted men -- may be listed as members of the "exploited" classes to whom the Communist revolution was represented as meaning "liberation" and new opportunities. To the first group, the Communists presented the simple appeal of working for the people who worked for them. In addition to the chance to ally themselves with the proletarian revolution, these people were offered new physical comforts, more food, and greater respect. It is this group, among HumRRO respondents, which showed least anxiety about its fate under the new regime.

The former Nationalist enlisted men, on the other hand, did experience considerable anxiety. They too, like the poorest farmers, were described as victims of the old ruling class. But they had been compromised by their "alliance" with this ruling class in much the same way that Lenin described the workers of imperialist countries as compromised by their benefits from colonial territories. Consequently, before they could be fully accepted by the new order, they must "air their grievances" against former rulers, confess their own parts in "crimes" against the people, and devote themselves wholeheartedly to the new order. For members of this group, the successful revolution meant both the release from "exploitation" and the necessity for an expiation of their own past "crimes."

(2) The "exploiters." To members of the old "exploiting" classes -- intellectuals, sons of wealthy families, and former Nationalist officers -- the Communists could not immediately offer new material benefits or higher status. Instead, to these groups they stressed the necessity of seeking redemption by sharing the hardships of the classes from whose labor they had formerly lived.

It is true that considerable effort was devoted to winning students over to the revolution by promises of rewarding careers in the new

society;

One of the things [the Communists] stressed . . . was the uncertainty of the professional futures of the students under the Nationalist government. They pointed to the fact that highly trained students had great difficulty getting jobs when they left the university and often ended by doing menial chores. They said that this was simply an example of the uneconomical use of China's resources by the Nationalists. They said that under the Communists, students would get good jobs, would have a secure and happy future under the new government and that China would grow powerful because her resources would be fully used. (F-5)

Nevertheless, even to those intellectuals who collaborated willingly, the revolution meant an abolition of former privileges and a reduction in status in an effort to "make them live and think like the proletariat" (N-26). One former student described his own experience as follows:

Naturally when the family assets were confiscated I had no more source of income and could not continue my studies at the university. The Communists in the university talked to me and said that I should not feel badly -- that I had always received the benefits of the rich and that I must learn under the new regime to share the hardships of the people I was assigned to hard labor in order to gain a proletarian point of view and to help purge me of class consciousness. (F-5)

The treatment of former Nationalist officers was even more severe. They were expected to confess their "crimes" and "errors," to criticize themselves and their fellow officers intensively, and to repeatedly renounce their old ties. Their eventual acceptance depended on the degree of their personal commitment to the old society and on the strength of their real or apparent commitment to the new.

It is important to point out, however, that none of these groups ever really succeeded in dispelling the suspicion that surrounded it: A student soon learned that "the Communists stressed the fact that intellec-

tuals were not trustworthy, that the party did not trust intellectuals" (F-5). And a repatriate found that his "mistakes" were easily attributed to his tainted background: "They criticized me because I came from a background which is nonproletarian, so they told me that I had to be more careful." (R-7)

Duties and Obligations

From this struggle between the old order and the revolution both within China and on the battlefields of Korea, and from the "fact" that every individual was involved -- consciously or not -- in the struggle and represented and aided either one side or the other, the Communists deduced the obligations of CCF soldiers. In the army, and in the military-political universities where some of the men in this study had been introduced to military service, political instructors placed particular emphasis on the implications of the ideological postulates for the life of each individual Chinese. From ideology was derived, in addition to a political rationale for military discipline, certain general moral qualities and many specific role demands. In fact, as the following few pages will illustrate, these ideological "implications" were largely identical with the requirements of the jobs that the respondents were expected to fill.

The soldier had to learn concern for the general welfare: "To serve the people and the country, even to die is good." The "nation," "the people," and the "revolution" must be given priority over personal interest and all other obligations: "The nation comes first" (R-9), and "one must work very hard for the people" (R-4). Even family life was "a personal privilege and must be sacrificed for the revolution" (N-7); "in a socialist society, personal problems should never block one from his endeavor for the party or public interest" (R-1).

Since the particular ways of serving the people were of course defined by the Communist leadership, the first requirement of such service was unquestioning obedience to the Communist party. The very definition of the counterrevolutionary is "anyone who does not agree with the Communists" (N-18). The authority of the party spread to the military hierarchy, and the importance of discipline as a political duty of the CCF soldier seems to have been emphasized.

The respondents, both repatriates and non-repatriates, also revealed the stress placed on the propagation of certain general moral qualities. Individuals were expected to be courageous, unselfish, honest, just, democratic, and fair to the people, and the specifics of these qualities were constantly spelled out in detail. In answer to a question as to how officials are known to be undemocratic, a respondent supplied the criteria: "They take money and they never tell the people how they spend it. They beat the people. They force the people to labor. They never serve the people. This is undemocratic." (R-9) The qualities of good Communist leaders and soldiers were summarized as follows: "They are not corrupt can stand a hard life will take care of the lives of soldiers, and are willing to fight to their death" (N-19).

The pains taken to relate specific aspects of the role of soldier to general ideological principles are illustrated by this quotation:

Mostly in my unit we violated these things: (1) want to go home; (2) want women; (3) quarrel among selves; (4) insubordination; (5) corruption; (6) not progressive enough; (7) fear when fighting When we were homesick they the Communists said, 'Well the revolution is not over. There is no time to be concerned with homesickness.' Second, with women. They explained it like this. 'You have your own sisters and wives, and you are taking advantage of somebody else's sister or wife.' About personal quarrels they said, 'These are your comrades,

you are fighting against a common enemy, conserve your strength.' Thus all men must adhere to the regulations, must obey the organization. Discipline is most important. When you come to corruption they said, 'You are harboring thoughts which lead to exploiting other people. Being proletarians you cannot exploit.' If you were not progressive they said, 'Your stand is not firm. You do not understand the principles of revolutionary forces.' As far as fear is concerned, they said that you place self-interest higher than the common welfare. (R-3)

This indicates the basic requirements for all soldiers. Some, by virtue of social background, previous experience, or current position, had special obligations, also deduced from the basic ideological tenets. Intellectuals were expected to "remake themselves into a type of worker [in order to] understand the principles and aspirations of the proletariat" (N-26); and the obligation of the CNA officer was similar. The party member, on the other hand, acquired special duties by virtue of his superior status. In return for the privileges of party membership, greater selflessness, zeal, and efficiency were required:

Everybody who joins the Communist Party must give up his own rights and all relationships with his parents and brothers and sisters and friends, and all your thoughts must be for the nation and for the people. There is no personal feeling -- you should have feeling only for the whole nation and for the people. (N-14)

The material in this section indicates the way in which ideological generalizations were applied to specific aspects of the soldier role. By tying the general principle to concrete rules of conduct an operational definition of the general principle is provided. For example, "putting the nation first," or "serving the revolution," means that the soldier will not be homesick, will avoid women, will not quarrel with his fellows, and will respect superiors. Conversely, tying the specific rule of conduct to a general principle or goal provides a rationale for the

specific rule of conduct.

Here, then, are the political axioms and their corollaries. The basic principles, unadorned, might be nothing more than the Communist version of what every soldier hears in orientation lectures. It is their use, rather than their content, which is crucial, for it is this which gives operational importance to the principles themselves, and which ensures their impact on the lives of Chinese soldiers. Simply as ideas or exhortations they might or might not affect the lives of those who came into contact with them. But as axioms whose corollaries are enforced rules of conduct, their influence is as wide as the arc of power which enforces them. In the CCF the soldier or officer is forced, by a series of devices which reinforce each other, to keep the Communist frame of reference and orienting principles in the forefront of his attention. It is required that he learn these principles; that he be able to articulate them; that he relate his activities and thoughts to them; that he judge his behavior and that of his fellows in these terms; that he continuously reaffirm his loyalty to Communist goals, rules, and values.

The organizational techniques and the incentives that are manipulated to ensure such intensive participation are described in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

THE ENFORCEMENT OF PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

For most of the HumRRO informants, entrance into a Communist army marked their entrance into the Communist world. Indoctrination in Communist values and goals was woven into the lives of CCF personnel to such an extent that a period of army service might be described as a preparation for life in a Communist society. The program for restructuring the ideology of the individual began almost immediately after his entry into the army. In describing the ways in which the TICK respondents learned their rulers' expectations and techniques for enforcing compliance, we will focus on several situations in which the learning process is most central, and therefore most clear. The "airing of grievances" sessions organized for captured Nationalist soldiers, the criticism meetings which were a regular part of a soldier's life, the lectures and discussion groups whose purpose was more nearly "indoctrination" as that term is commonly understood -- all were directed at communication of the new culture and role requirements. These situations are therefore ideal for revealing the crucial elements in the process of learning and adapting to the new ideological demands. But it should be remembered that such learning experiences did not take place in isolation. The soldier's whole life was organized to reinforce the expectations and responses learned in these formal situations.

THREE LEARNING SITUATIONS

Airing of Grievances

The HumRRO interviews indicate that "airing of grievances" or "speak bitterness" meetings, organized to hear individuals' complaints against

the Nationalist army, were a regular, institutionalized part of the process for inducting captured Nationalist troops into the Communist army. Generally CNA enlisted men and noncommissioned officers were separated from their officers before this process began. The purpose of the meetings is explained by their name: They were held to hear the Nationalist soldier recite his sufferings at the hands of the organization and leaders from whom he had been "liberated." The crimes of the officers against their men were to be fully exposed; the evils of the landlord clique which governed the army were to be explicated. Soldiers were encouraged to articulate every resentment, and every injustice and hardship they had experienced in the CNA. Former officers were forced to admit their own crimes, real or imagined, under the old regime.

According to one informant, the meetings sometimes became quite emotional as soldiers indicted their former leaders. Others said that they recognized the justice of some of the charges against the Nationalist army. Still others stated that "nobody believed the charges," that "they felt badly to say such things" but that they "had to do it."

This last type of response brings us to the function of the "speak bitterness" meetings in acquainting men, newly under Communist control, with the twofold concept of "correct thinking" and "correct speaking." Every individual was quickly given to understand that he was supposed to condemn the army of which he had been a part. Failure to do this, or refusal to agree with another's condemnation, was evidence of "incorrect thinking," and "incorrect thinking" was an offense of major proportions against the new rulers.

Nor did passivity -- that is, acceptance without participation -- escape censure. The requirement for "positive" loyalty meant that the

individual had to do something; namely, relate his own sufferings or sympathize with those who had suffered:

In the complaining meetings, if one of them complained about how his superior officer in the Nationalist Army oppressed him or persecuted him or beat him and another man said he was never persecuted or beaten by his superiors in the Nationalist Army, then the Communist leaders wanted the man who had never been persecuted and had never been beaten by his superior officers to sympathize with the man who was persecuted or beaten in the Nationalist Army. (N-22)

Doing either of these things implied already cutting ties with previous loyalties, in the name of principles of conduct expounded by the new rulers.

In the respondents' reactions to these meetings can be seen the genesis of different modes of adaptation to the demand for verbal agreement and participation, and some of the reasons for these differences. In general the demand that former CNA soldiers articulately sever ties with that army produced three types of reactions: agreement, disagreement, or indifference.

Although there were some who believed the complaints, and whose participation was characterized by agreement with the procedure, more reacted negatively and resented "being forced" to participate. One basis for the negative response of some CNA men was their knowledge that certain statements condemning the Nationalist Army were untrue. Since the meetings were in part "staged" affairs, in which CCF cadres and political officers also participated, by no means all of the charges made grew out of the experience of the new captives. For example, the charge that the Nationalist Army never fought the Japanese was sometimes made in a group composed largely of men who had participated in campaigns against the Japanese.

Finally, some seem to have reacted out of neither agreement nor disagreement; they simply did what they felt was required of them without any

significant feelings about the truth or falsity of the charges. This purely passive conformity was relatively rare (as compared, for example, to the passive compliance of peasant soldiers who had not taken an active part in the Japanese war).

It is significant that all three groups conformed verbally. Even charges that the respondents knew to be false were rarely contradicted, either by them or by their fellows. This suggests that verbal conformity was already the dominant pattern of behaving. In the rare cases when an individual expressed disagreement with prescribed views in these meetings, he brought strong censure on himself -- and generally became convinced that nonconforming speech was unwise. The data strongly suggest, however, that for most captives direct punishment was not required in order to induce them not to disagree.

Another striking aspect of the response of captured Nationalists to the "speak bitterness" meetings is the apparently guilt-free nature of their conformity. Verbal denunciation of the organization and leaders they had formerly served appears to have caused virtually no anguish of the kind associated in the West with betraying loyalty. We would not, of course, expect to find a sense of guilt in men who agreed with the condemnation; however, with two possible exceptions, there is no indication that the fairly large number of respondents who disagreed with what they considered false statements felt any guilt or shame about affirming them. The feeling that they were "forced" to do it was regarded as adequate justification for their behavior; the idea that their action might require any further justification seems not to have occurred to them.

Despite their overt conformity, however, some who felt they had been coerced into agreement were strongly resentful. This resentment was,

naturally, most pronounced in those who had disagreed with the complaints against the CNA and had been punished before they capitulated. Those who reacted in this fashion began early to feel that the Communist system was coercive and that its representatives were all "deceivers." In the TICK I report 1/ these two charges -- deceit and coercion -- are shown to have been important factors in final disaffection from the regime.

Lectures and Discussion Groups

A schedule for the period of basic training, supplied by one of the TICK informants, reveals the heavy emphasis placed on political indoctrination in the CCF: 2/

0530-0550	Reveille
0550-0750	Physical training
0820-0850	Breakfast
0850-1050	<u>Political training</u> <u>3/</u>
1100-1200	<u>Political examination</u>
1200-1400	<u>Discussion on political training and critique of examination</u>
1400-1530	Rest period
1530-1600	Supper
1600-1830	Physical training
1830-1900	Roll call and report
1930-2030	<u>Analysis of day's work</u>
2100	<u>Bed check</u>

Considerable time was allotted to orientation lectures on Communism and its goals, and to group discussions whose purpose was to test the agreement and understanding of the listeners. The lectures treated such broad topics as "Why We Must Annihilate the American Imperialists," "On the Principles of Revolution," and "The Superiority of the Proletarian Class."

1/ Bradbury and Kirkpatrick, op. cit.

2/ For additional information on the amount of training time devoted to political indoctrination, see Technical Memorandum ORO T-44 (FEC) of the Operations Research Office (SECRET).

3/ Emphasis supplied.

They were an important means of communicating basic Communist orientations to those new to Communism, and of communicating additional new aims as they arose. Lectures were generally followed by discussion periods, for which the listeners were organized into small groups. In the discussions, the new CCF soldier met once again the demand for participation and active agreement. Again, he learned that "you had to speak," "you could not be silent," and again he learned that agreement was the only course open to him if he wanted to stay out of trouble.

The techniques used to induce agreement were sometimes imaginative and always persistent. Great pains were taken to convince the soldiers through rational persuasion, as this quotation illustrates:

This is the process of education which is applied to all cases. First, they explain to a man why he must not serve the cause of the capitalist and why he should serve the cause of the proletariat. That is fundamental. They will assign men with a greater knowledge than yourself to talk to you, to explain the things individually. After going through this process and talking and reasoning and explaining, then you go into group discussion to discuss the whole problem. First, his explanation why, the reason why, then if it still doesn't penetrate in the group discussion then we have individual interviews. In the beginning you are assigned to somebody who is more or less equal in intelligence to explain things to you. Then if he still can't win you over then you are assigned somebody with a superior intelligence than you. Well, in the long run they have so many that he will work on you and you are bound to see the light. (R-3)

Again the responses of informants fell into three major groups. Some agreed, and "believed it all very much." A larger group disagreed strongly. Finally, a few neither agreed nor disagreed strongly; they received the lectures simply as cues to what they were now expected to say, without much reaction one way or the other to the truth content of the lectures.

In fact, of course, the "disbelievers" as well as the passive con-

formers responded to the lectures as cues. For the disbelievers the lectures provided a means of learning what they were expected to say, and once this group had become convinced of the futility of disagreement most of them assiduously cultivated "correct speaking." Informants reported carefully "memorizing the slogans," "learning the slogans so I could say what they wanted me to say," and similar efforts toward conformity. However, those who disagreed resented the programs as one more means of arbitrarily controlling thinking.

As in the case of captured Nationalists in grievance sessions, those who believed what they were told escaped the pressures of feeling personally coerced. These soldiers approved the programs of lectures and discussions themselves, and saw them as evidence that the Communists cared what they thought and were "reasonable" men:

When the Communists came we noticed one thing --
the Communists would permit the people to talk.
They gave the people a chance to reason and they
wouldn't penalize the people without a reason.
(R-5)

Nevertheless, even they were aware that agreement with the "lessons" was required.

In lectures and discussions, as in "airing of grievances" meetings, all informants adapted quickly to the demand for active agreement. And again, conformity did not create significant conflict, even for those who disagreed with the content of the propositions to which they gave assent. Their nonbelief, by making them more alert to determine the requirements and more assiduous in their detailed fulfillment, may even have served a positive function in their advancement. Several informants who report "never having believed it at all" made successful careers in the CCF.

Criticism

A third situation in which the recruit learned the meaning and application of ideological participation was the self- and mutual criticism meeting, which in most cases was held daily. 1/ The criticism meeting is perhaps the most striking example of a Communist institution serving the dual goals of control and re-education. Fundamentally, criticism, self- and mutual, is a group process in which each individual is expected to examine orally the thoughts, feelings, and behavior of himself and other members of the group, and to criticize these in the light of Communist social norms.

Criticism meetings are perhaps the crucial institution in the enforcement of conformed speech. Every individual in the Communist army is a member of a criticism group. Since such a group is composed of men who live together continuously, it is the level at which an individual's total life becomes subject to state power. Anything a man says is likely to become the subject of discussion at a criticism meeting. His moods, his dreams, his remarks about his work, and his conversations with others are all subject to exposure.

Criticism is a multi-function institution, the point at which instruction, surveillance, and punitive sanctions intersect. From one perspective, the criticism meeting is an important part of the system for instructing persons in correct thinking and correct speaking. From another, it is an important component of the security system, the institutional guarantor of the system of mutual surveillance. From still another perspective, it is the lowest court of the Chinese Communist judicial system. Although its

1/ See last item on training schedule.

function in all of these areas would have to be considered in any comprehensive study of the Chinese Communist control system, here we will limit our attention to the ways in which the criticism meeting instructed recruits in the meaning of the demand for ideological participation, and the way it encouraged conformity to this demand.

The first contact with criticism meetings was, for all informants, a shocking experience.

The first time I was criticized I could not stand it. I felt it was better to be killed in battle than to be criticized by other persons in the meetings. (N-15)

I felt very miserable before this group. (N-19)

At the mutual criticism session I felt very embarrassed at first (R-2)

The first time you criticize yourself you feel you have lost face. (N-23)

The pain of the experience naturally generated attempts to understand the kinds of behavior which called forth the punishment and the ways of avoiding or mitigating it.

One of the chief errors for which men were criticized was failure to "speak correctly." "Incorrect" speaking opened the way to a range of errors included in the general charge of "improper understanding." It might mean that a man had complained about hard work, or failed to participate in discussion groups or criticism meetings themselves; it might mean he had disparaged a party or army policy when speaking to an associate, or failed to accept criticism in a "progressive spirit." It might even mean he had revealed an apathetic mood or talked in his sleep. All these crimes and misdemeanors resulted from "incorrect speaking" in the sense that they resulted either from saying something that should not have been said, or failing to

say something that should have been said. They could therefore be avoided by changing speaking.^{1/}

The interviewees quickly learned the price of nonparticipation:

You have to listen carefully and point out the mistakes of another. If you do not do so, you will be criticized yourself, so you have to criticize others. (N-26)

In case you lag behind in criticizing a man, in case you don't ask questions and don't participate in the criticism you will be observed and criticized yourself. (N-25)

If you don't criticize another man you will be asked about your connection with him. (N-8)

They also learned the price of failure to criticize themselves:

It is better to criticize yourself in spite of losing face, because if you don't criticize yourself the other people will criticize you. It is much worse than if you criticize yourself. (N-23)

The most severe thing is when everybody jumps on you. That has to be prevented. (R-3)

Such considerations as these led them to decide it was better to conform their speech to Communist demands:

At first the Communists criticized me for lack of understanding proletarian principles, and not having a firm stand. I had to follow along with this and I memorized all the terms and the processes very well. (N-26)

During the criticism meetings there is only one way, the only thing you can do is promise them you would do what they wanted you to do. (N-22)

^{1/} The Communists classified these as errors of thinking. The authors have categorized them as crimes of speaking rather than thinking because they became crimes, operationally, when the thought or attitude was communicated, verbally or nonverbally, and because this is the level at which most of the respondents received them. Furthermore, it was possible, at least in the short run, to fulfill the requirement by changing only the overt expression of the thought or feeling, not the thought or feeling itself.

After a while you develop certain protective instincts In the first place, in actual work you will be the most aggressive worker. In case there are meetings, you will be the first to voice all the slogans. You become a master in deception, and even then you might make mistakes at times. Then, the moment you discover you made a mistake, you are the first one to admit that you made a mistake. (N-2)

They learned quickly that talking must be controlled all the time, that careless speech to anyone anywhere might make one a target of a criticism meeting:

When we /fellow villagers in the same army unit/ talked to each other freely, somebody was bound to expose something once in a while, then we would all get criticized. (R-7)

There is no chance to talk with friends. Everybody is afraid of talking with other people. You trust no one. (N-23)

Thus, the pattern of anxiety, error, punishment, and conformity was similar to that in "speak bitterness" meetings and discussions. Again, conformity came quickly on the heels of learning the rules; again, the reasons for conformity varied. Some who agreed with Communist goals and values saw criticism as "good for work because it helped avoid future errors" (R-2), as a way of "increasing the efficiency of the people, the group organization and the group movement" (R-9). Those who disagreed conformed from reasons of fear or expediency. In criticism meetings as elsewhere the fear of punishment was crucial to learning the demands and conforming to them. However, it should be remembered that, despite their prominence, punitive sanctions were combined at every stage with a range of other inducements to learning and conformity. The man guilty of "wrong" thinking or speaking was censured; simultaneously, the man who "spoke correctly" was praised as progressive and might eventually be rewarded with promotion, or a chance

to join the party.

Most HumRRO informants were more sensitive to the punishments than to the rewards associated with criticism meetings; conformity to the demand for "correct speaking" was motivated more purely and directly by fear than was conformity to other aspects of the demand for ideological participation. The explanation for this is found in the extreme dislike of being criticized felt by almost all informants.^{1/} Self- and mutual criticism, consequently, played an exceedingly important part in convincing the recruit that "you must say what they want you to say," both in the criticism meeting itself and outside it. Painful experience in a criticism meeting was a crucial factor in leading an individual to new efforts to conform his speaking to the Communist demands. To understand the crucial role of criticism in the adaptation process we should bear in mind these facts:

- (1) Within the criticism sessions themselves, correct speaking is correct behavior.
- (2) Criticism sessions were the chief arena in which all errors in speaking and acting were exposed and discussed.
- (3) Correct speaking in criticism sessions depended on appropriate application of Communist ideological tenets.

The criticism meeting, therefore, constituted a kind of continuous examination of the participant's learning. In the meetings he had to prove his ability to identify "reactionary" thinking or behavior in himself and

^{1/} For most, "gradually the pain lessened" (N-15), but this lessening was probably as much a consequence of increasingly effective conformity to the expected behavior as of habituation.

others and explain its causes and consequences in acceptable "Marxist" terms.

COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF INCENTIVES

General Pressures

As the preceding material has shown, the Communists do not limit the process of indoctrination to the repetition of goals or values by cadres and political officers alone. On the contrary, they create situations in which the individual is continuously forced to participate in discussion groups where ideological tenets are explored on both the abstract level and in their concrete implications.

One of the most important factors in the CCF indoctrination was its context. The soldiers learned as a group, and the group was manipulated to reflect consensus on Communist goals and values. The controls over everyone's speech had the effect of rigorously censoring the communications the individual received from his group. All these communications were supposed to reflect enthusiastic acceptance of the Communist roles and norms (and, as we have seen, most did). From the time a man entered the army there was little possibility of his being exposed to contrary views. By isolating individuals, mutual surveillance and criticism effectively inhibited the formation of friendship groups where dissident views might be expressed. Censorship of mail was intended to ensure that the individual would receive no communications from outside which would contradict the indoctrination he received in the army. Severely restricted contact with the civilian world further reduced the possibility of contamination from that source.

Supplementing the pressures which an individual felt as directed at

himself was the pressure resulting from living in an environment where examples of the consequences of conformity and nonconformity were constantly before him. In punishing individuals, the Communists appear to have devoted the greatest possible effort to exploiting the pedagogic possibilities of each individual's errors. Trials were often public. Criticism meetings involved public criticism. Expulsion from the party climaxed group investigation of the errors of the expelled member. Executions, also, were often public. More than one HumRRO informant described his personal terror at witnessing the trial and execution of a condemned man. Each man's punishment instilled fear in others, and each man's success carried its own explicit explanation.

These facts have one important consequence: The manipulation of group consensus is such that heterodoxy is punished and inhibited by the apparent disapproval of the whole group. While an individual member who disagrees or doubts may suspect that the expression of group disapproval is only a response to the same pressures which he feels himself, he can never really know whether it is coerced or spontaneous; he cannot confirm his doubts or opposition through conversation with others. Therefore, he must live with the assumption not only that all his actions, from dreams to casual conversation, are known, but that any heterodoxy will bring upon him the disapproval of his peers and superiors.

Let us now examine the major factors that operated to create conformity -- the control techniques utilized by the Communists and found in all the learning situations described earlier. 1/

1/ Conformity was also induced by certain character traits which appear to be rather persistent and common in men who reached maturity in traditional Chinese society. For a detailed description of these and an analysis of their role in molding the behavior of Chinese soldiers, see Bradbury and Kirkpatrick, op. cit., and Meyers, op. cit.

Control Techniques

Rationalization

As was indicated in the section on lectures and discussions, the demand for affirmation of and conformity to the goals and values of the new China included a systematic effort to explain and justify this new ideology. The painstaking efforts to convince men of the rational and moral superiority of Communism attest to both the intensity of the new leaders' desire to induce consent (internalized belief) and their seriousness of purpose in engineering a cultural revolution.

To believe that the revolution proceeds simply "by giving people orders" would be to underestimate the ambition of the revolutionary aims. The HumRRO informants were agreed that a chief characteristic of Communist leadership is that it "gives reasons for everything." The request for volunteers, for example, followed on the heels of elaborate explanations of the nature of the enemy, the stakes of the war, the war aims of the Communists, and the meaning of the war to the individual. Likewise, the demand that men criticize themselves and others was founded on repeated explicit explanation of the functional purpose of criticism in a Communist society. The smallest policy or event was explicitly related to fundamental premises of the new society. The operational aim was achievement of perfect "understanding" and acceptance of the goals and policies, general and particular, and their relations to the individual.

When a man gave evidence, through passivity or disagreement, of "misunderstanding" any aspect of the role requirements or values, various techniques were utilized to correct his mistake. The political officer might talk to him individually and attempt to explain the basis of his error. All the members of a discussion group or a criticism group dis-

cussed possible explanations of his misunderstanding and were overtly united in the desire to persuade him of his error. These efforts continued until the individual either was convinced or decided to appear to be convinced in order to escape the pressure of the teaching. Where normal efforts at explanation failed, political officers at higher levels were called in to speak to the heretic. Criticism meetings composed of higher level officials or party members might be called for the same purpose. According to one informant quoted earlier, men of progressively greater intelligence attempted to satisfy an individual's doubts, until he was finally convinced.

Approval and Disapproval

Other positive techniques were utilized to motivate consent and voluntary support. Interviewees mentioned several rewards available to those who showed an interest in and knowledge of ideology, and who demonstrated zeal in cultivating progressive thinking in themselves and propagating it in others. One of these was simply praise by authorities. Informants related anecdotes which described their own and others' sensitivity to praise. The susceptibility of the masses to manipulation through their eagerness for praise was described as follows:

Most of the Chinese people are ignorant and with a little pat on the back they will do anything. All you have to do is pat them sometimes and they really give their lives to you, and the Communists know just how to do it. (N-25)

Informants who had at one time supported the Communists, as well as those who still supported them at the time of the interview, revealed their pleasure at receiving praise in such a way that it is clear that praise compensated them importantly for their painful experiences in self-criticism meetings, and motivated them to try hard to fulfill Communist

ideals. The informants who had never supported the Communists revealed a similar sensitivity to praise, but they appeared to value not so much the good opinion of the authorities as the feeling of security associated with being approved by authorities whom they fear:

Every member in the camp where we were had been praised at one time or another for his manual effort at labor. No matter how hard I worked, they did not praise me. I was the last one and still not praised. I became very worried and fearful because I knew that this was bad not to be praised. To be praised, one is then sure that one is in good standing. (N-1)

In evaluating their responses, however, it will be well to keep in mind that in their completely controlled environment, the only possibility of finding approval, from either authority figures or peers, was by behavior which reflected and confirmed Communist norms. The series of social-control mechanisms devised to manipulate group opinion ensured that failure to learn and adequately apply ideology met with the apparent disapproval of the entire group. The individual who failed to participate adequately in group discussions or criticism meetings, or who in his work failed to express proper understanding of its relation to general goals, was met (1) by disapproval from authorities (political and military officers, party members, and cadres) and (2) by expressions of disapproval from his peers. The Chinese sensitivity to disapproval made the simple expression of approval and disapproval a more effective spur to conformity than might be the case in other cultures.

Status and Power

In addition, all the means of acquiring status, security, power, and prestige were controlled by the Communists. Like the carrot on the proverbial stick, these universal social goods were held out as rewards --

in this case for ideological zeal combined with hard work. The man who demonstrated "progressive" thinking and actions could be expected to have his efforts crowned by promotion or an invitation to party membership. These rewards in turn made available to him various goods associated with higher status in the new society. For example, during the Korean conflict soldiers below the rank of regimental commander were not permitted to marry. Men were told repeatedly that if they wanted to marry they must work hard and serve the revolution, in order to rise to the required rank. Better living conditions were likewise a prerogative of rank. And perhaps most important of all, superior rank was felt to increase personal security.

Punishment

For men newly under Communist control, filled with anxiety and fear for their future, probably the greatest reward for conformity to the demand for ideological participation was escaping punishment for nonconformity. The sanctions against speech that reflected former roles or former values, or passivity toward new roles and values, were meshed so as to provide increasingly severe penalties for deviant communications behavior. Together these constituted an elaborate and efficient system for the control of speech and, to some extent, thought.

The immediate punishment for deviant communication was that of group disapproval, which the individual feels acutely. Anxiety, humiliation, terror were all associated by the informants with being "instructed" by a criticism group after having fallen into error. When deviant communications were exposed, they could meet only with the united disapproval of the group, since disapproving another's actions was the price of every man's safety. The presence of low-level officials representing the party and army added the threat of further punishment. The combination of sensitivity

to disapproval and awareness of one's insecurity made serious criticism a dreaded punishment.

A second punishment which threatened an individual who persisted in "reactionary speaking" was assignment to especially hard work. Such assignments were also meted out to men judged "unreliable" from the outset. The level of work demanded of all personnel in the CCF made any addition unpleasant indeed. Furthermore, discriminatory work assignments placed an additional burden of speaking correctly on the individuals, for complaints were taken as additional indications of "reactionary speaking" and lack of "progressive spirit."

After I joined the Communist army, I was sent to a squad. In this squad only I had been in the Nationalist army, and they ordered me to do all the hard work. If I complained about the hard labor, the Communist leader accused me again. They said, "You do not want to do the hard labor and you do not want to do something good for the army, so you are a reactionary agent." (N-22)

Beyond these relatively mild punishments lay imprisonment, deportation to forced-labor camps, and finally execution. HumRRO informants reported that relatively short periods of imprisonment were a common punishment for failure to speak correctly.

Captured Nationalist soldiers often conceived execution as an imminent threat. Certainly part of the explanation for this lies in the Communists' systematic effort to dramatize the penalties of nonconformity through public executions. The interviewees were unanimous in affirming that "incorrect speaking" did in fact bring on drastic punishments in certain situations. An interesting disparity exists, however, between the accounts of different individuals about the extent to which extreme punishments were related explicitly by Communist political officers to "in-

correct speaking." Some informants reported witnessing executions of individuals who were accused of no greater crime than "reactionary thinking."

One man reported the execution of a squad member for the contents of a dream:

There was a soldier in my company. One night that man dreamt and cried out, and it was heard by all the soldiers in my unit, and it was reported by one party member to his company political instructor. And the company political instructor asked that man, "Why did you cry out?" And the man told the company political instructor that he dreamt about a very big cat that bit him, so he cried. He was frightened, but the company political instructor accused him of being a Nationalist spy and shot him to death. (N-4)

The occurrence of drastic punishments for minor offenses is partially confirmed by a report (by N-22) of a man's imprisonment for sleep-talking. Still other informants reported instances of deportation where the stated reason was "incorrect speaking." However several interviewees suggested that the Communists were reluctant to have it known that they punish men severely for "crimes of speaking." They stated that in such cases the Communists invented or seized on some overt act as the reason for the punishment.

Special Pressures on Subgroups

Certain subgroups of the CCF were subjected to special pressures. For party members and officers, the loss of status was an important deterrent to passivity or disagreement. The threat of expulsion from the party was serious for those who associated party membership with security. Demotion in rank seems to have held less terror than loss of party membership. However, a number of officer informants gave evidence of a strong desire to "protect their position." To this desire they ascribed the performance

of such unpleasant chores as exhorting men to volunteer for battlefield heroism and criticizing friends.

Other special pressures were exerted on captured Nationalist officers and men being trained in military-political universities. These groups were subjected to more intensive "thought reform" programs. Perhaps the most dreaded and most effective tool utilized in these programs was the "autobiography." Its purpose was to relate ideological understanding of the connection between a man's former economic and social status and his thinking and valuing, and to explain his "turnover" -- his gradual acceptance of Communist doctrine and values. The TICK informants, like captured American flyers, described the writing of these autobiographies as a shaking experience. They had to be rewritten repeatedly; the desire to be free of rewriting an autobiography became an important motivation to "see your life as they wanted you to see it":

In writing my personal history, I would claim that "I had bourgeois habits, I felt shy about criticism, but now I will reveal my whole life because I realize there is no need for shame." I would say that I have no such thing as personal friendships any more. "That is bourgeois. Now all are working for the same cause. I have enlarged my friendship to all and to Mao Tse-tung." I denounced the old idea I had of personal liberty. "I confess now that I must realize I must always identify myself with the group. I have begun to appreciate the new society, so now I have the spirit of learning." (N-1)

Chapter 4

PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT

INTRODUCTION

Normally, adults cannot say how they acquired the values and orientations that are reflected in their day-to-day speaking and behaving. These unconscious premises of behavior are so taken for granted that they are rarely examined or articulated. Most adults do not remember the pressures that were exerted to secure their acceptance of and conformity to these values and orientations, nor are they aware of the reinforcing pressures that operate continuously throughout society. Conformity is largely automatic.

The HumRRO informants were, of course, in no such happy situation. The new requirement to conform all speech to Communist values was explicit; so were the rules governing the specific ways this demand should be fulfilled, and the pressures that enforced it. This chapter describes how they adapted to the new demands for ideological participation and to the enforcing pressures that were exerted; it deals with both objective and subjective reactions. Specifically, it describes how informants felt about the content of the demands, about the enforcing sanctions, and about their own reactions.

As has been shown, different individuals adjusted to the demand for ideological participation in markedly different ways. Some informants adapted smoothly and quickly prepared for themselves a "future" under the Communist regime. Others had more difficulty and felt conflicts of varying intensity and consequences. Later in this chapter some of these different patterns of adaptation will be described, and an attempt made

to account for them. First, however, let us consider those features of adaptation which were shared by all or almost all informants.

COMMON PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT

Since the informants were products of the same general culture and were confronted with the same general demands, it is not surprising that there should be common reactions and patterns of adaptation.

No Acceptable Alternatives

The situation faced by the informants was inescapable. One could neither remain indifferent to the demands of the new society nor withdraw physically from the situation in which one was confronted with the demands. In the words of one informant, "I was afraid, but what could I do? I couldn't run away -- there was no place to run" (N-30). The new requirements had the full force of state law, and each man had to come to terms with them. Therefore, the ways in which the interviewees perceived their situation had much in common.

All respondents saw the objective necessity of making peace with the Communists; and this necessity was perhaps reinforced by the traditional Chinese view of life as a process of compromise and adaptation to a given reality. Where many Westerners see nature and society as things that can be conquered and changed, many Chinese tend to see them as things that must be accepted and adapted to. One of the attributes of a wise man is the ability to appraise accurately the forces outside him, and work out a compromise with them which preserves his interests.

Self-Conscious Adaptation

All of the informants came under Communist control as adults, with

formed habits -- ways of thinking and behaving. In adapting to the demand for ideological participation, therefore, they were confronted with the necessity of becoming self-conscious about everything they said and did. They could not speak spontaneously, as out of habit, since they had not been trained from infancy in the type of "correct" speaking required by the Communists. Consequently, another universally shared reaction to the new situation was a high degree of self-consciousness about the new demands and the relation of these demands to themselves; they also shared a detailed conception of what they must and must not do.

A man did not simply act; he thought before he acted. For this reason, his behavior may be described as rational and purposive -- that is, consciously directed toward the accomplishment of a particular purpose. Although normally only a very small percentage of human behavior is rational in this sense, Communist behavioral requirements could be met only through such rational behavior. The individual had to keep in the forefront of his attention what he was supposed to be like, and how he was supposed to feel and to think.

Behavior had to at least appear "rational" in another sense. Communism required that the soldier be guided by abstract moral imperatives: One should serve the revolution, rid oneself of bourgeois habits, work for the people unselfishly. Reared in a society organized and operated in terms of subtly personal relationships, the informants did not habitually pattern their behavior on such principles. Therefore, all were confronted with the necessity for behaving in ways which, at least superficially, satisfied the requirement for giving principles precedence over personality.

Conformity

Extent of Conformity

(1) Rapid Adaptation. Both the traditional inclinations of Chinese and the objective facts of Communist power help to account for the speed with which informants, almost without exception, conformed actively to the demand for ideological participation. A few resisted the demands originally, but quickly capitulated in the face of the coercive sanctions attached to them. The following account is illustrative:

I argued with them on the question of the proletariat and the capitalist classes. I said if a country is prosperous everybody will attain a high level of culture and material comfort like the capitalist classes. I said what you Communists want to do is to level all the people to the level of the proletariat classes. I asked whether they wouldn't need the high level of the intellectual classes to uphold the culture and the civilization of China. All that talk got me into serious trouble I was locked up in isolation for five days. Finally, I took the usual course. They interviewed me every day. I decided it was better to say what they wanted me to say, and in time they released me. (N-10)

Few such informants had to be punished more than once, and most never had to be subjected to coercion directly and personally. Among HumRRO informants, there were men profoundly alienated from the regime but there were no persistent troublemakers. 1/

The swift punishment for resistance and opposition does not

1/ It is true that the respondent group necessarily excluded men who resisted very strongly, since they had probably been deported to forced labor camps or executed. It is also true that the group could not, by definition, include anyone who internalized all Communist requirements and acted upon them, since such men would never have allowed themselves to be captured; following Communist orders, they would have died in battle before permitting themselves to become prisoners of war. These reservations, however, probably do not seriously affect the general findings: It should be noted, for example, that N-10, quoted above, stated that by submitting he "took the usual course."

fully explain the speed and completeness with which informants conformed. Some felt great anxiety and fear and had compelling objective reasons for doing so. But all of them demonstrated a striking degree of flexibility. The desire to "protect oneself" consistently dominated hostility and habit; no emotion was so strong as the desire to get along. Informants were alert to cues for required behavior, quick to "learn the ropes," and quick to apply their knowledge. Most of them did not clash with Communist authority and suffer defeat before they began to conform; they began to conform from the first.

(2) Deviant Behavior. The foregoing statements do not mean, of course, that conformity was perfect. But cases of nonconformity were usually brief and often impulsive. Such cases were of four main types:

(a) Nonconformity resulting from inexperience: Unconformed speaking was most apt to occur very soon after a man came under Communist control, before he was clearly aware of what he was supposed to say and the penalty for failing to do so. Although the Communists seem to have made allowances for the learning period, mistakes did not go uncorrected. A single such mistake, however, would not normally get the soldier into serious difficulty.

(b) Dreams and fantasies: Another type of error which led to speaking that disagreed -- sometimes strongly -- with the prescribed rules was a dream in which the dreamer cried out against the Communists. Such an unconscious action not only revealed his feelings but sometimes constituted as serious a ground for punishment as defiance consciously conceived and executed.^{1/} The fact that a man did not "intend" to speak against the Communists did not mitigate the seriousness of his crime.

^{1/} The most striking instance of this sort was reported by N-4, and quoted in Chapter 3. Other respondents mentioned similar occurrences.

Neither did a misunderstanding or a slip of the tongue which might reveal negative attitudes.

(c) Outbursts: Other instances of deviant behavior occurred when some Communist action touched the individual at such a sensitive point that he lost all caution and spoke out positively and strongly against the Communists. This type of nonconformity never occurred because of ideo-logical provocation, but happened in response to such things as the execution of parents, failure to keep a commitment made to an individual, or refusal of a request which was terribly important to the man concerned.

This type of expressive nonconformity again illustrates the relative unimportance of abstract ideology as compared to other factors. Among the respondents, there was no instance of a soldier contradicting the Communists because of their stated views about relationships between a man and his family. One informant described being extremely pained to witness and to hear the denial of filial piety and family obligation, but he was not provoked to overt disagreement. Another described his disagreement with the Communist view of family, according to which the soldier who does not wave to his mother is lauded, but he was not led to overt disagreement. Still another described swearing loyalty to the party and silently withholding assent to the oath to renounce his family, but this part of the oath did not prevent him from becoming a party member. However, when the same individual learned that his parents had been executed, he "lost his temper" and denounced the Communists loudly and publicly. A similar example is provided by a Red Army hero who very quickly adapted to all requirements, rose rapidly in the party and the army, and explosively rejected party discipline when he was refused permission to remarry.

(d) Informal communication: Most unconformed speech occurred

in informal situations, which the Communists, in spite of their attempts to directly supervise all the activities and contacts of their soldiers, were not able to eliminate completely. The interviews make it evident that the rule against informal communication was from time to time evaded: "In my group I sometimes talked with other people at the risk of my neck but I couldn't help it, I had to talk. But we had to be absolutely cautious." (N-25) Another informant described his formula for feeling out the loyalties of another before approaching him to talk "freely":

They split us up; we were not with our former comrades. I had no new friends. I couldn't talk with the others at all. I didn't know whether the others were good Communists or not and would report me. When we were fighting inside China some new boys came into the army. Some of them were schoolboys. I watched: if he worked hard I couldn't talk. If he was sometimes lazy, he might be OK; then I would ask him about his home and so on. Then one day while we were working, I would say "the work is hard." If he said "yes," then I could talk to him. If he did not, then I had to watch out. Even so, we could only talk a few minutes -- for example, about the hard work, or how bad the Communists were, or about how some officer was no good, and so forth. The others who were not schoolboys never complained about the officers. I was afraid of the officers -- I always smiled when they came around. I never could talk to another man unless he was a proved friend. (N-9)

The danger of unconformed speaking to other individuals is illustrated by the following:

I took up the problem of escaping from the People's Liberation Army with a friend by the name of Liu. Liu, also a member of the army, of middle-class background, lived nearby. I gave him the money and asked him to purchase civilian clothes. I planned to go to Nanking. I did not know that Liu was a member of the Youth Group, and he betrayed me. They gave me the works. I really became a target. (N-1)

For every informant who described somehow evading surveillance to talk freely with another, there were two or three who described this as impossible because of the Communist system of social control. Most of the respondents projected their feeling that it was impossible to speak outside prescribed limits even to their conception of marriage:

So far as I know if the husband is a party member and wife also is a party member then they talk about the revolution . . . the husband always has to be very careful what he says when he talks to his wife. (N-4)

Generally informants agreed that it is very difficult "to find a friend in the Communist system":

This political indoctrination produced three results. The first is mutual suspicion, you don't trust anybody anymore; two, mutual cheating of one another, even lying; and three, mutual spreading of terror regarding the party organization. You scare the others and the others scare you about the terror of the party organization. (N-25)

Some Subjective Correlates of Conformity

The conformity of HumPRO respondents did not, of course, await their acceptance or internalization of their new roles. As soon as a man fell under Communist control, he was faced with sanctions intended to prevent the acting out of his old system of roles, and to enforce conformity to new ones. In short, the situation was so organized that learning took place in the context of behavior which already conformed to the principles being learned. Some informants lived the "life of proletarians" in military-political universities so that they would come to "feel and think like workers and peasants."

One of the fascinating questions raised by the whole system of education and social control in Communist China is whether the rulers them-

selves believe that acting as if something is so makes it so. As suggested previously, the whole system of indoctrination is evidence of the rulers' desire to gain consent to and understanding of the new goals, norms, and roles. At the same time, the creation of a situation in which conformity is prerequisite to personal security means that men must act out roles they could not conceivably yet have internalized, and affirm values with which they could not conceivably yet identify, because they have not had enough time to do so. One obvious and important consequence of these procedures is the creation of a society and social groups which objectively reflect Communist culture. The subject consequences, however, are more in doubt.

(1) Compartmentalization. One psychological mechanism which may account in part for the flexibility with which informants conformed to new ways of thinking and speaking is the device of compartmentalization. Most interviewees appear to have largely insulated their experience under Communism from their previous lives and to have insulated their behavior under Communist control from their previous selves. Thus they reacted to many Communist demands (e.g., the demand for affirmation of particular attitudes toward their families) as though these reactions existed apart from the remainder of their lives and attitudes. Dealing with every experience as an isolated segment helped to minimize conflicts in values, and ipso facto created a barrier to the total integration of the personality around the new values. The exhausting, physically insulated character of the soldier's environment probably contributed to this compartmentalization. A man who is busy all day long and exhausted at night has little opportunity to relate his current experience to his past, his specific actions to his total self.

One striking characteristic of the informants' attitudinal

histories is the apparent lack of psychological need for consistency in their responses to the Communist regime from one point in time to the next. An interviewee who was attracted by Communist promises of economic reform rejected Communism because of the intolerable nature of his personal environment. Another came to hate the Communists for executing his family, after having been attracted by abstract promises of social, political, and economic reform. Still another hated them because of the experience of a public trial, joined them when he was partly persuaded of their "desire to help people" and was offered the chance for promotion, then deserted them when the opportunity arose because he "never believed them" at all (N-14). None seemed to feel a need for explaining his reactions to himself in such a way as to make them consistent

(2) Guilt-Free Conformity. Another widely shared subjective aspect of adjustment -- the guilt-free nature of the adaptation of most informants -- may be explained in part by compartmentalization and lack of a felt need for consistency. Their conformity to Communist demands was not inhibited by "principle." Although informants who "agreed" with Communist values would be expected to feel no guilt in affirming their belief, the lack of guilt in men who did not believe the values they affirmed is striking. Virtually without exception the HumPRO informants explained and justified their behavior by the words "I had to." The possibility that this might be regarded by others as a morally inadequate justification clearly never occurred to them; in their view, superior force is a pressure that no conscience is expected to resist. This ability to compromise without guilt is undoubtedly another important explanation for the remarkable flexibility already commented on.

(3) Attitudes Toward Political Ideas. Still another factor con-

tributing to the informants' flexibility appears to be the attitudes they brought to their exposure to political ideas. Examination of reaction and adaptation to specific aspects of the demand for ideological participation confirms and casts new light upon their indifference to abstract ideas, disclosed by an earlier TICK analysis.^{1/} Common to almost all was a definite range of intensity of reaction to different aspects of the demands for conformed speech; different kinds of "correct" speech can be ranked from those that informants minded least to those they minded most.

First, there were propositions which informants may have found either reasonable or unreasonable but about which they had no strong feelings. In this category were doctrines of social revolution, dialectical materialism, and other such abstractions. None of the group felt strongly enough about one conception of history versus another, one conception of economics versus another, or for that matter, any conception of abstract morality, to resent or feel anxious about having to enunciate a different one.

Second, there were propositions at a lower level of abstraction which informants sometimes felt resentment at having to affirm -- such items as "The Nationalists did not fight against the Japanese" or "No respect is owed to parents." Some informants apparently identified strongly enough with the Nationalist struggle against the Japanese or the idea of filial piety that affirming such statements created some internal conflict. Another example is one informant's resentment at the statement that all landlords became rich through exploitation of the poor. Landlords were identified in his mind with his father, who, he felt, had not exploited others but had simply worked hard. His resentment at having to agree with

^{1/} See Bradbury and Kirkpatrick, op.cit.

this item in his indoctrination contrasted markedly with his reaction to the "Darwinian" conception of human evolution "from monkeys to men" with which he said he "disagreed very much." It was clear that his response to the latter proposition was not emotional, not actively resentful.

A third category of propositions which individuals were expected to affirm carried a very strong emotional content. These were statements which referred personally and directly to the individual. Statements which necessitated confessions of personal crimes and descriptions of personal feelings and intentions were by all odds the points at which the most serious difficulties arose in the adaptation of communication behavior. It was the necessity to make such self-derogatory statements which aroused strong emotions such as anguish, hate, and desire for revenge. Here the authors do not mean that all individuals felt negative reactions to either of the two types of propositions embodied in this category; but where problems arose in adapting to the demand for ideological participation, the propositions in this category generally posed the greatest ones.

So much for the patterns of adaptation common to nearly all informants. Let us now consider the differences.

VARIATIONS IN ADJUSTMENT

General

As the preceding chapters have shown, the HumRRO informants displayed a variety of orientations toward the Communist rulers and life in a Communist society. At the time they were interviewed, some men were "on balance"; they agreed with Communist aims and methods and felt that "generally speaking, in spite of the fact that the Communists do some things which are quite unreasonable, the reasonable things outweigh the unreasonable

things" (R-5). Others were alienated at some stage of their careers and tended to disapprove much of what the Communists said and did. Their general views are expressed as follows by one respondent:

I never really believed what the Communists said, but for the sake of saving my life I had to agree with them. In my mind, I was always against the Communists, but in my speaking I always agreed with them. It was very painful in that period.
(N-23)

Still others simply followed where they were led, without much thought or feeling about whether they approved or disapproved, agreed or disagreed. They felt that "You just have to follow just like you have to pay taxes. There is no other way. You always have to pay your taxes." (R-6)

Neither the respondents' basic orientations toward the Communists nor their adjustment to ideological participation, however, was as simple as these statements suggest. In many cases the soldier's alienation from or identification with the regime underwent drastic changes over time. Furthermore, only rarely were the general attitude toward the regime and the reaction to every specific item of ideology wholly congruent. Men who voluntarily supported the Communists and approved their policies in general sometimes did not agree with specific ideological tenets. Similarly, even informants with the most thoroughly negative view of the regime and its ideology felt that some things the Communists said were true.

These complexities make it difficult to classify the HumRRD respondents precisely, either with regard to their basic orientations or with regard to their attitude toward ideological participation. In the following sections adjustments to the demand for ideological participation are discussed under two categories reflecting certain tendencies in basic orientation -- "sympathetic" to the Communists or "unsympathetic." Since the orientation of

many respondents shifted at different periods of their careers, the categories refer not to fixed groups of respondents but simply to two directions of basic orientation.

Sympathizers

General Assent Facilitates Conformity

Informants with a sympathetic orientation toward the regime identified sufficiently with Communist values and goals to be willing to work for them and speak about them positively; they therefore did not feel coerced. Even recognition that there was no alternative to overt loyalty to these values and goals did not alter such soldiers' feeling that they were doing what they wanted to do in supporting these values. Conflicts between their own views and those of the party on specific items, such as family loyalty, caused no difficulty so long as the individual was required only to speak as though he agreed with the Communists.

General agreement with the Communists also made it easier for such informants to adapt to the procedures of ideological participation, especially criticism meetings. Identification with the general goals, or with the rulers, led sympathizers to feel that:

This process of confession and self-criticism increases the efficiency of the people, the group organization and the group movement . . . and so is very good, not only for the military organization but also in civilian life. (R-9)

Although criticism was to some extent painful to most soldiers, those who agreed were susceptible to appeals based on the values with which they agreed:

You are a fighter of the people and you must think for the benefit of the whole nation, so you will have to admit your mistakes and you must criticize yourselves. (N-4)

The Meaning of Agreement

The informants who sympathized with the Communists also tended to "agree" with the contents of Communist ideology. This does not mean that they understood and accepted the whole body of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism; in most cases they were ignorant of these writings. But it does mean that they thought they agreed with the ideology embodied in Communist writings, and more specifically that they did agree with the general values and policies advocated by the Communists.

It would be a mistake to assume that men who "on balance" agreed with what they understood of Communist ideology were necessarily dedicated or "hard-core" types; only one among the HumRRO informants could be so described at the time he was interviewed. He was also the only one thoroughly knowledgeable about Communist ideology, and more important, the only one who had thoroughly explored the implications of Communist culture for his own life:

When you become a member of the Communist party you accept not only the faith but you accept the discipline; so even if you have a different viewpoint you must submit your viewpoint to the organization. Once you accept that, it is not so difficult to follow the directives of the party. You must accept this, for the party is acting for the general welfare of the people.
(R-1)

This informant gave evidence of believing this almost literally and being psychologically prepared to accept the consequences. However, most of the sympathetic respondents unconsciously or consciously placed definite limitations on their acceptance of ideology, particularly its more concrete elements.

(1) Reservations. Some who agreed that one ought to be willing to accept the party's position on everything had reservations about specific

items of ideology. One informant described the oath he was asked to take at the time he became a party member:

If you wish to join the Communist party you must sacrifice yourself and devote your life to the party and you can no longer take care of your family, your parents, your sisters or your brothers. All your life will be devoted to the party, to the people. If you wish to join the party you must be in tune with the regulations. (N-4)

This informant stated that he had been willing to join the party, because at that time he "believed what the Communists said very much"; however, he said that he never accepted their view about family, "about giving up his brothers, sisters, and parents." Another, a former Nationalist soldier, declared that he never believed what the Communists said about the Nationalist Army, although he "believed it all about the land reform making the poor and rich the same, and that everyone would be comfortable" (N-12).

(2) Failure to See Implications. Other informants, including party members, who agreed with the general body of ideology as they understood it, did so only superficially. That is, they were willing to subscribe to it verbally, without having explored what practical meaning it might have in their lives. As has been suggested, they could hold attitudes and beliefs which conflicted with Communist ideology without being fully aware of the conflict. Thus, one of the stauncher Communist supporters expressed an attachment to his family and a desire to return home which are in fact inconsistent with Communist discipline. He was somewhat concerned about whether he would be allowed to go home when repatriated, but he had never had to face the conflict on a practical level and had rationalized it out of existence.

Changes in Basic Orientation Toward the Regime

The developmental history of informants' attitudes often included a movement from one basic orientation to another; there are numerous examples of men who moved from conformity based on agreement to conformity based on fear, and several examples of informants who ceased to "agree" when something made them aware of the concrete, personal implications of ideological tenets they had verbally accepted or simply ignored. The execution of parents, observation of extreme punishment and "unnecessary brutality," the disappointment of expectations for professional advancement, or simply concluding that "the Communists consistently did things very differently than they said" precipitated the change of several informants from sympathizers to nonsympathizers.

Whenever this happened, the psychological problems faced by the individual became similar to those of people whose adaptation had been complicated by disagreement from the beginning. They were then confronted with the necessity of affirming goals they did not approve and demonstrating loyalty to an organization they disliked. In short, they were forced to deceive. A party member, described this transition as follows:

In the beginning when I was just a simple recruit I believed everything they said and I did everything from the bottom of my heart No deception was necessary But in time you find that when the organization tries to teach the people they use deceit, and in time you learn deception yourself. (N-2)

Nonsympathizers

Problems in Adjustment Created by Nonagreement

At the same time that men were confronted with the demand to "say what the Communists want them to say," they also faced the demand to "do

what the Communists want them to do," and even the requirement to "always look very happy." Informants did not react or adapt to the demand for conformed communications in isolation from other aspects of Communist control; they reacted and adapted to the totality of the demands made upon them. However, here we will limit our attention to the demand for conformed communications and to the problems which arose in adapting to it, keeping in mind that these problems were often, if not usually, complicated or simplified by other demands.

The feelings that accompanied the realization that communications must be controlled on pain of punishment were often strong. They also led quickly to conformity. Soldiers whose conformity was based on fear reacted both to the content of ideology and to the procedures which enforced participation.

(1) Content of Ideology. For the man who did not agree, difficulty in disciplining his communications behavior depended on how closely what he had to say impinged on his life. Abstract ideological content created few problems, but the Communist insistence on the application of general principles to everyday acts often led to significant conflict. Generally, men disliked charging themselves or groups with which they identified (e.g., the Nationalist Army) with crimes for which they were not responsible, or giving assent to propositions they believed to be wrong. While "lip service" was granted readily in most cases, instances occurred in which the demand that an informant say or write some specific thing assumed a very great importance to him and increased resentment against the regime. A former Nationalist officer described such an instance as follows:

I . . . wrote a . . . letter to my old squad members in my old unit /who were also undergoing indoctrination at the hands of the Communists/. I urged these men to accept the Communist program, so that they might benefit and work for the people. I told them I had given up everything to work and to learn under the new Communist system. The Communists used . . . /the letter/ to convince my former soldiers to follow their bidding. They are diabolically clever. They destroy all personal relationships and feelings. After such an action, I could no longer reorganize my men to resist even if I tried. I am convinced the men would not respond after the letter I wrote. The loyalty that used to be between us was destroyed.

I knew that . . . the men . . . would not hold me strictly responsible for the letter I had written, because they too had realized that I had been forced to do what I did. Nevertheless, it broke up something between us.

I felt a great bitterness growing in me toward the whole system, and my desire for revenge was strengthened At the time of writing the letter, I knew there was no alternative. I must write it or perish. I became aware then of the great deception by the Communists. From that time on . . . my resolve was strengthened to fight the Communists with everything I had. (N-1)

(2) Procedures for Enforcing Participation. While sympathizers tended to approve not only the content of ideology but also the procedures for insuring participation, for nonsympathizers the reverse is true. To the latter, such procedures as the "airing of grievances" and criticism meetings were distasteful as such, quite apart from the content of their communications. In other words, while sympathizers tended to view such meetings as valuable and instructive, even when they led to personal embarrassment or discomfort, nonsympathizers tended to view them as one more part of the Communist effort to control their lives and reduce them to helplessness. Their failure to identify with the aims of the meetings

made participation in them additionally painful, although the initial shock diminished gradually in the process of adjustment.

Overt Adjustments

Regardless of their feelings about the content or the mechanisms of ideological participation, all HumPRO informants agreed on the futility of opposition. All became extremely alert to ways and means of protecting themselves. Unsympathetic respondents quickly developed "protective instincts" (N-2) which enabled most of them to stay out of serious trouble:

In the first place, in actual work you must be a most aggressive worker. That is easy. When you are told to do something you just jump right up and do it; in case there are meetings you will be the first to voice all the slogans. The most important thing is that you learn to deceive. You become a master in deception, and even then you might make a mistake at times. If you do, the moment you discover you have made a mistake, you are the first one to admit you made a mistake.
(N-2)

Overt conformity, as the above passage suggests, involves several elements. Essentially, the soldiers who were unsympathetic to Communism had to deceive their masters. A first and important way of doing this was by becoming a vigorous and uncomplaining worker. This led to the paradoxical situation in which the very process of alienation drove soldiers to devote more intense effort to their assigned tasks -- a reaction whose immediate consequences were obviously favorable to the regime.

In addition, the nonsympathizers had to learn to control both their speech and their emotions. As they became more accustomed to the requirements and absorbed "correct speaking" from every side, the possibilities of making mistakes were diminished; conformity became less difficult.

Familiarity also led to increased skill in self-protection. In

criticism meetings, for example, informants learned to speak in such a way that they avoided the more painful aspects of criticism. In short, they learned to manipulate the system to some extent -- even if only by conforming or humiliating themselves further.

It is clear, however, that unsympathetic informants never mastered the process of criticism to such a degree that it no longer threatened them. Nor did confession and criticism ever become so habitual that they no longer constituted a psychological threat. These men were able to take the edge off fear chiefly by so behaving that they did not incur disapproval; only within that framework were they able to manipulate the control machinery.

Subjective Adjustments

Inevitably, the constant effort to censor one's own speaking and the anxiety which accompanied it increased the dissident individual's general feeling of insecurity under Communist control. It became one more factor contributing to the "fearful state" in which many of our informants described themselves as having lived.

The impossibility of overtly expressing disagreement led to its suppression; sometimes it reappeared in fantasies, dreams, and slips of the tongue. One informant said that during the period of intensive thought reform he preserved hope by endlessly repeating to himself a fantasy.

There was a captive prince who had to eat the feces of the conquering prince for 10 years. Eventually he was returned by the victorious prince as supposedly a defeated and completely degraded man. But 10 years later the former captive prince came back with an army and defeated the former conquering prince. (N-1)

At the same time that he drove himself to extreme exhaustion in his efforts to win security through hard physical labor and through confessions that humiliated him greatly, he

fortified myself repeatedly with an old historical story that gave me faith in the future, that made me believe I could preserve myself, escape Communism, and eventually get revenge. I had this faith in the future and that was all I had to live by.

Also expressed in dreams was the feeling of being "boxed in," threatened, without means of escape; in addition, such dreams exposed the hostility of informants to their new masters.

The confrontation with a totally new world view and the necessity of affirming it in all speaking and overt behavior made some informants "miserable," "fearful," and "dumb and feelingless." The "assault on our emotions" which this entailed did not, however, result in paralyzing the individuals with conflicts too intense for them to handle. While one informant described former Nationalist officers who "lost their senses" or committed suicide in intensive indoctrination schools (N-1), this reaction seems not to have been widespread even in these schools and is not reported at all in other circumstances.

SUMMARY

By all odds the most impressive aspect of the adjustment to the demand for ideological participation is the near-universality and the high degree of conformity with which that demand was met. From the perspective of much of our Western psychological theory the respondents' ability to conform without serious psychic disturbance is somewhat surprising. They were required to control their speaking and even their facial expressions at the same time that other severe and total demands were made on them, and all in a context of punishment for nonconformity. The goals, values, and orientations they were asked to affirm and reflect in their speech were disharmonious and inconsistent with those of traditional Chinese culture and, we may therefore

assume, with those embodied in the "basic personalities" of the informants. But neither this demand nor the combination of demands nor their contrariety to traditional culture nor the pressure applied to secure their fulfillment "broke" the individuals in the respondent group. They did not create the psychic disorganization which would have made the informants unable to function; they did not produce psychosis.

Nor, it should be pointed out, is there any evidence that they had any consequences which were not objectively desirable from the point of view of the Communists. As long as disagreement led to redoubled efforts to conform in order to "allay suspicion," disagreement did the regime no real harm. To the contrary, more zealous efforts by individuals actually reinforced the power of the regime. If anything, criticism meetings functioned better, surveillance was conducted more meticulously, and work was performed more adequately by the man anxious for his personal security. Nor was the regime weakened ideologically through overt disagreement with its tenets and principles; only very rarely did disaffection result in nonconformed communications.

Chapter 5

A LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE

The TICK respondents whose patterns of reaction and adaptation have been described in this report were members of an age and occupational group that experienced the full impact of the cultural revolution which accompanied the Communist seizure of power. Younger men recruited into present and future armies of Communist China will be more familiar with Communist views, practices, and requirements. By the time they enter military service they will have lived longer under Communist rule; their surprises will be fewer, their responses more habitual. Nevertheless, since culture and personality alike resist profound change, no group of "social engineers," no matter how ruthless and ingenious, can completely eradicate traditional ways of thinking, valuing, and perceiving in a decade or two. Soldiers in Chinese Communist armies of the next 10 to 15 years will differ from TICK informants in many ways, but similarities may still be expected in their basic values and orientations. For these reasons the findings in this report have more than historical interest.

For the psychological warfare planner responsible for operations against future Chinese armies, the important questions concern the respects in which the character of future troops can be expected to differ from that of the respondents, and the degree to which these future armies can be expected to share the psychological makeup of troops who participated in the Korean conflict. On these matters, the TICK research has provided tentative conclusions based on (1) intensive analysis of one group of Chinese soldiers under pressure to change and (2) the theories and hypotheses derived from study of culture, personality, and social change.

The ability of the Chinese Communists to mold the character and outlook

of their subjects increases over time. It was pointed out in this report that the detailed Communist control over the total environment made soldiers more susceptible to indoctrination. It insulated the recruit, shutting him off from information contrary to that presented to him by the regime, preventing him from comparing and confirming his doubts with those of other people.

The longer the Communists control China, the more the whole population is thus insulated. Through their monopoly of press, theater, radio, and educational institutions, and their control of contact with foreigners, the rulers cut the people off from information which contradicts Communist positions and "facts"; at the same time, all these communications media are mobilized in a gigantic effort to advertise these views and "facts," and to impress them on the population.

This monopoly will not prevent individuals from forming dissident views on the basis of their own experience, but it can be expected to greatly increase the speed and thoroughness with which the Communist outlook will come to dominate the intellectual environment of the nation. Gradually, even individuals who do not favor the Communist regime will come to "think like Communists" in many respects, perceiving the world and themselves through the cultural blinders of their rulers. As this happens indoctrination will become easier, the total cultural environment more and more harmonious with Communist requirements. The element of shock will disappear; conflicts between old and new ways of thinking will become less intense.

Army recruits who have been to school under the Communists will already be grounded in a Marxist-Leninist view of history, society, and the world. Unlike many "intellectuals" educated before the Communist rise to power, they will not reject these views out of hand. This younger group will

therefore not have the same convictions about the falsity and deceitfulness of what they are required to believe, nor will they have the same feeling of being coerced to agree with these views.

On the other hand, certain basic orientations can be expected to withstand pressure to some extent for the next decade or two, and perhaps longer. Through their family contacts young individuals will still learn about a way of life that gives personal well-being and security priority over impersonal, universal "rules." People with such a personal orientation learn the lessons of school teachers and political instructors well, but are less likely to give unconditional loyalty to any creed. Like the TICK interviewees they can be expected to see ideology as instrumental, and to lack the convictional certainty of true believers; they will be relatively immune to guilt feelings and will possess a high degree of personal flexibility. So also will they be highly susceptible to group pressures. They will be no slower to conform, no more ready to risk disapproval or harm by nonconformity.

In general, the experience of young men entering the Communist army after living a number of years under Communist control is likely to have more in common with the experience of the uneducated villagers among the TICK group than with that of the intellectuals and former Nationalists. Like the villagers, they will not be subjected to intensive "thought reform" as such, since there will not be the necessity, from the Communist point of view, for totally "remaking" them. They will therefore not suffer the feelings of shock, resentment, and unacceptability, common among TICK interviewees who were "remade into proletarians" in special indoctrination centers.

Nevertheless, some of the strains and resentments growing out of the demand for total ideological conformity will continue to exist in armies comprised of younger Chinese. As long as Communism makes demands on the

totality of individuals' lives, it multiplies the areas of possible conflict between the subject and his rulers. Young men of the next few military generations are not likely to agree with the demand that they be indifferent to the welfare of their families. Nor will they be so thoroughly indoctrinated that "correct speech" will be reliably spontaneous under all circumstances. As long as the Communist demand for "positive" loyalty requires that speaking be carefully censored and moods controlled, the feeling of mutual suspicion and coercion will persist, though in a gradually less intense form.

The findings as to the role of ideology in the Chinese Communist armies that fought in Korea, and the ways soldiers of different backgrounds adapted to the demand that all their communications reflect Communist views, have implications for the conduct of psychological warfare against Chinese Communist troops. These implications have been discussed in other TICK publications,^{1/} but some pertinent points can be summarized here.

(1) Failure of personnel to identify with Communist goals, even widespread opposition to these goals and to the government, does not lessen the organizational strength of Communist armies in situations where individual soldiers see no practicable means of escape. They tend to perform the tasks expected of them with perseverance and competence regardless of their subjective feelings about the masters they serve. Except in rare instances, the urge to stay out of trouble is controlling.

For these reasons, it should not be assumed that disaffection -- even if it appears to be very high among captured enemy personnel -- will be reflected in inferior battlefield performance. As long as units remain

^{1/} See Bradbury and Kirkpatrick, op. cit., and Meyers and Bradbury, op. cit.

intact this will probably not be the case. Conversely, it should not be assumed that excellent battlefield performance indicates a high level of political morale, dedication, or loyalty among individual soldiers. By the same token, captured troops' expressions of disaffection should not be discounted as insincere merely because the Communists had considered these men reliable or because they had fought well, even heroically, before capture.

(2) To incite Chinese troops to commit hostile acts against their rulers would be virtually impossible unless the organizational control were seriously impaired. The unwillingness of individuals to risk conflict with "the organization" means that surrender-mission psychological warfare would be more apt to succeed than appeals to commit disruptive acts.

(3) Since the effectiveness of Communist organizational control greatly inhibits the communication of hostile sentiments (although in crisis situations soldiers did take chances in order to get comrades in desertion), psy-war appeals aimed at persuading soldiers to "talk over" their dangerous situation would not be likely to have much effect until the party-controlled military organization has been seriously and visibly impaired.

(4) Success in utilizing captured personnel for psychological warfare purposes would depend primarily on the extent to which the organizational structure of CCF units would be broken down inside PW compounds.

(5) The susceptibility of Chinese troops to organized controls suggests that encouraging or permitting organized anti-Communist groups among PW's would enhance the success of possible anti-Communist indoctrination efforts and increase the number of PW's willing to help U.S. forces.

(6) It cannot be assumed that Chinese troops -- including officers and party members -- are "true" Communists, much less hard-core, highly

dedicated Communists. Among the non-repatriates of the Korean war were many individuals who had won rank and party membership without internalizing Communist goals; the data indicate a wide disparity between saying and believing for soldiers at a number of different levels. The flexibility and ingenuity demonstrated in satisfactorily "acting out" roles would make it difficult for Communist army leaders to distinguish between "true believers" and careerists who seek to make the best of a situation they cannot control. This leaves most levels of the army and party open to penetration by individuals who do their jobs well but without loyalty.

(7) The data strongly suggest that many Chinese have deep predispositions that militate against their becoming highly disciplined, subjectively dedicated Communists of the "ideal Bolshevik" type. On the contrary, the TICK studies indicate widespread indifference to ideology, as such, among Chinese Communist troops. Thus, discussions about the relative merit of the abstract principles of democratic government versus Communism are not apt to have broad appeal. Psywar messages directed to Chinese troops need not be rationalized in terms of basic Communist values (as might be wise with a "hard core" audience). The values to which the most positive response may be expected are personal well-being, physical security, and dignity, rather than values related to classes, movements, or "history."

(8) An important consequence of the Communist demand that all speaking reflect a "positive" Communist attitude is increased tension within and between individuals and the feeling of being isolated, coerced. The resultant strain in interpersonal relations, the widespread feeling that "you can't find a friend" in the Communist army, should be a useful theme for exploitation by psychological warfare as an example of why it is impossible to lead a "comfortable," "natural" life under Communist control.