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July 1965

P-3179

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Having weathered seven turbulent years of economic crisis and deepening estrangement from the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist leadership currently displays a mood of renewed self-confidence and restrained optimism. This outlook contrasts sharply with both the manic assurance of the Great Leap Forward in 1957-59 and the depressive uncertainty which accompanied its disastrous collapse in 1960-61. However, the asceticism, caution, and pragmatism that characterized the domestic scene during the more recent years of "readjustment and consolidation" are still very much in evidence.

Peking's present mood has been shaped by at least two major considerations: its evaluation of past achievements and its assessment of future problems and tasks. The "first generation" Communist leaders are intensely proud of their accomplishments. After decades of political fragmentation, internecine warfare, and national impotence extending back through Nationalist, Warlord, and Manchu regimes, China has a strong, uncorrupted central government. Despite the imposition of Draconian totalitarian controls, it has realized the

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This article is to be published in substantially the present form in the September 1965 issue of Current History.

age old dream of evicting all foreign imperialist influence. While demanding of the populace heavy personal and material sacrifices, it has given new hope to certain formerly submerged social groups and, on balance, made considerable progress toward modernization and industrialization.

The failure of the Great Leap Forward (still not explicitly admitted) and the concomitant withdrawal of Soviet amity and assistance, shocked and tested the mettle of the Chinese Communist leadership. As late as 1962 it had to contend with severe food shortages, widespread popular apathy and disaffection, an armed Minority revolt in Sinkiang, and threatened isolation within the Communist world. Though still haunted by the unsolved problem of chronic poverty and secular stagnation, the regime now appears to have gotten the economy moving again. Premier Chou En-lai was able to tell the National People's Congress last December that preparations would soon be under way to launch a third Five-Year Plan in 1966 -- some three years behind schedule.[1]

In addition to the renewed hopes for economic advance, other developments have buoyed Peking's self-confidence. Successive nuclear detonations have dramatically attested China's previously underrated scientific and technological capabilities. Although it may require a decade to achieve the status of a militarily

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[1]Chou's announcement came in the course of his wide-ranging "Report on the Work of the Government" delivered on December 21-22, 1964, at the First Session of the Third National People's Congress. See Peking Review, No. 1 January 1, 1965, p. 10.

significant nuclear power, China has already derived immense psychological and political advantages from becoming the first non-Western member of the nuclear club. Having accomplished this feat in good time despite the withdrawal of Soviet assistance, Peking's leaders probably feel their difficult and, at times, painful policy of self-reliance more than vindicated. Meanwhile, the downfall of Nikita S. Khrushchev in the U.S.S.R. almost certainly reinforced their belief in the correctness of the militant ideological position of Mao Tse-tung and the inevitability of its ultimate triumph.

While these domestic and international gains have given the Chinese leaders cause for satisfaction, if not rejoicing, they seem for the most part unable or unwilling to abandon the sober, somber demeanor of more difficult times. Since this incongruity does not appear to rise from a devaluation of their past achievements or present performance, perhaps it may best be explained in terms of a preoccupation with anticipated future problems. Besides disquieting international uncertainties on the immediate scene (e.g., the war in Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet dispute), the Malthusian spectre of geometric population increases outstripping food supplies hangs on the distant horizon.[2]

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[2]In January 1964 Chou En-lai told the American journalist, Edgar Snow, that China's rate of population increase has risen to 2.5 per cent. With unofficial population estimates (which, unfortunately, are virtually unverifiable) now running between 700 and 750 million people, this may mean that as many as 17 million persons are added to the population each year. At this rate the total population could reach 1 billion by 1980. Meanwhile, despite relatively good harvests in recent years, domestic grain production remains inadequate to feed the existing population. A text of Snow's interview with Chou En-lai appeared in the Washington Post on February 3, 1964.

However, the Peking elite has never been known to develop inordinate anxieties over the prospects either of war or isolation, and only in recent times have individuals within the leadership acknowledged that it might be possible for China to have a population problem.

Twofold Succession Problem

Present evidence suggests that perhaps the single overriding concern of the aging leadership in Peking is the twofold problem of succession. On the one hand, preparations must be made for an individual or group to replace Mao Tse-tung following the inevitable event of his death or retirement. In addition, a whole new generation of leaders must be recruited and trained to succeed the present "first generation" rulers.

Although public discussion of Mao's replacement is inhibited by the obvious delicacy of the subject, it is possible to infer Peking's wider concern in numerous frank statements on the "cultivation of successors." As a People's Daily editorial put the matter:

> It is the leadership nucleus that determines the direction of advance of the revolutionary cause. Whether the nucleus of leadership at all levels of our Party and state is composed of genuine proletarian revolutionaries or not is a decisive matter for the success or failure of our entire revolutionary cause.[3]

Viewing the future in terms of a protracted and bitter struggle between socialism and capitalism, the Peking

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[3]"Cultivating and Training Millions of Successors to the Proletarian Revolution," Jen-min jih-pao, August 3, 1964.

regime -- as acute economic pressures have eased -- has laid increasing stress on the maintenance of political purity and ideological control. There are good reasons for this, given its radically revolutionary vision and goals.

Mao and his lieutenants, sensitive to the lessons of history, are mindful of the eroding effects of time on other revolutionary movements. In particular, they are genuinely disturbed at what they consider the corruption and degeneration of Soviet society, which they believe threatens to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R.[4]

At the same time they are painfully aware of -- and may tend to exaggerate -- China's inherent weaknesses and limitations for the task of establishing a revolutionary socialist society. Despite 15 years of frenzied Communist assaults on Chinese society and culture, vast sections of the peasant and urban masses still cling stubbornly to a host of deep-rooted traditional loyalties and practices. During the famine-threatened "three hard years" of 1959-61, when Peking in desperation resorted to private incentives and greater personal freedom to spur production, the leadership was evidently shocked at the resulting widespread "spontaneous tendency towards capitalism" and loss of "socialist consciousness" among

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[4]For a polemical but probably sincere Chinese analysis see On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World: ninth comment by the editorial departments of People's Daily and Red Flag on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964).

the people.[5] Previously, in 1957, it had received a similar jolt when, in a mood of overweening self-confidence, it invited the intellectual community to "boldly criticize" its defects in the spirit of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend."[6] Mao and his battle-scarred senior cadres now tend to see "bourgeois remnants" or "class enemies" under almost every bed, threatening if unchecked to corrupt the masses and undo the revolution.

The Political Backdrop

Peking's response to the problem of "fostering revolutionary heirs" is best understood when viewed against the background of internal political developments over the last few years. During the difficult period of retreat from the Leap Forward the Communist leadership undertook a series of political purification and control measures in an attempt to reassert Party authority, dispel cadre apathy and disillusionment, and to combat Soviet-inspired "revisionist" tendencies.

In January 1961 the Ninth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, while ushering in an economic program remarkably akin to the Soviet N.E.P. (New Economic Policy)

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[5] Acute concern over these trends was manifested in the Communique published after the CCP Central Committee's Tenth Plenum in September 1962. See Jen-min jih-pao, September 29, 1962.

[6] Vivid examples of the consequent "blooming and contending" may be found in Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Hundred Flowers" Campaign and the Chinese Intellectual (New York: Praeger, 1960), and Dennis J. Doolin, Communist China: The Politics of Student Opposition (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1964).

of the 1920's,[7] called for a major rectification campaign. Designed to help cadres raise their political consciousness and improve their style and method of work, as well as to purge the impure elements alleged to have infiltrated Party and government organs, the campaign was to proceed "stage by stage and area by area" throughout the nation.[8] Meanwhile, Minister of Defense Lin Piao unleashed a series of rectification movements in the army to cope with sagging morale and disorder.[9] The Tenth plenary session of the CCP Central Committee in late 1962 resolved "to strengthen at all levels the work of the Party Control Commissions" (constitutionally charged with supervising discipline) and to elect additional members to the Central Control Commission.[10]

In the spring of 1963, the Party and armed forces having presumably been purified, the regime focused attention on the general population. In an attempt to spark a new revolutionary blaze, particularly among

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[7] On the striking similarities see Franz Schurmann, "China's 'New Economic Policy' - Transition or Beginning," The China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March 1964), pp. 65-91.

[8] Jen-min jih-pao, January 21, 1961, p. 1.

[9] Issues of a secret military journal, Kung-tso T'ung-hsün (Bulletin of Activities), made available by the U.S. State Department in 1963, document these rectification campaigns and the conditions within the armed forces which gave rise to them. For an analysis see John W. Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers: 'Continuities' and 'Revelations,'" The China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June 1964), pp. 68-78.

[10] Tenth Plenum Communique, op. cit.

the apathetic younger generation, a campaign was begun to "learn from Lei Feng."[11] The latter (if, indeed, he ever existed in the flesh) was portrayed as an "ordinary but great" young soldier who had found adventure and meaning in life by fully trusting Chairman Mao and rendering dedicated service to the revolutionary cause -- before his untimely death in a routine accident in 1962. Early in 1964 the tempo of indoctrination activities was again stepped up as the regime evinced growing concern over the persisting gap between Party authority ("redness") and professional management ("expertness"), previously regarded as a temporary evil dictated by the economic crisis. A massive "socialist education" campaign was undertaken to instill revolutionary traditions, imbue the people with renewed proletarian consciousness, and stimulate struggle -- perhaps, mainly for its own sake -- against "class enemies." Soon afterward, a parallel movement was launched to "learn from the People's Liberation Army."[12]

Increasingly the PLA has been viewed not only as the highest model for political and ideological emulation,

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[11] During 1963 there was also a series of mass movements primarily designed to improve production, better economic management, and advance technology -- but inevitably also bearing a political message. These included an economic emulation campaign to "compare with, learn from, and catch up with the advanced, and help the backward," and other drives subsumed under the slogan of the "Three Revolutionary Movements" (i.e., the class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experiment).

[12] See Ralph L. Powell, "Commissars in the Economy: "'Learn From The PLA' Movement in China," Asian Survey, V, No. 3 (March 1965), pp. 125-138.

but as the best example of mass organizational and production techniques. As a result, in the spring of 1964 an extremely significant program was begun to create PLA-style political departments in all industrial, commercial, and financial organs of the government from the national ministries down to enterprises at the local level. Corresponding departments for economic affairs have been established in the Party apparatus from the Central Committee down to the local Party committees. This arrangement gives the CCP a larger measure of direct involvement in vital sectors of the economy and, besides offering new opportunities to stimulate and regulate production, provides an institutional framework to sustain a high level of political indoctrination.

Present indications are that the campaigns for "socialist education" and "learning from the PLA" are continuing, albeit with periods of slackening or upsurge in activities. In February this year the People's Daily reported that the "socialist education" drive was under "vigorous development in rural and urban areas" and Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien urged commercial workers to take an active part in it, struggling resolutely "against the comeback of capitalism."[13] In June the People's Daily advised: "The nationwide effort to emulate the PLA has become a mass campaign for revolutionizing various trades and services."[14] In July, T'ao Chu, Deputy

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[13] Jen-min jih-pao, February 16, 1965, pp. 1, 2.

[14] Jen-min jih-pao, June 8, 1965, p. 1.

Premier and First Secretary of the Party's Central-South Bureau, announced that the "socialist education" movement would soon be extended to many new districts in his important five-province domain, viewing this as a prelude to a "second revolutionary soaring leap" in production.[15]

The recent mass campaigns, though often employing language reminiscent of the heady Leap Forward period, have exhibited important differences in practice. While promising to "carry the revolution through to the end," they have shown a chastened sensitivity to the ambivalent relationship between politics and production. The Communist leaders undoubtedly hope for a steady rise in production to get the third Five-Year Plan off to a good start in 1966, but their economic programs are unlikely to be either as ambitious or as poorly managed as in 1958.

Another difference may be observed in the more practical political goals of today's mass movements. Although greatly improved communications (e.g., an expanding network of wired broadcast systems serving 95 per cent of China's cities and rural districts)[16] now assure Peking an immense captive audience, the leadership has not slanted its political and ideological efforts primarily toward immediate conversion of the general population to socialism. Rather, the main emphasis seems

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[15]Quoted in New York Times, July 6, 1965, p. 3.

[16]U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report (Far East), No. 230, November 25, 1964, p. ccc-3. The effectiveness of this network was eloquently attested by one peasant who reportedly exclaimed: "As soon as I hear loudspeakers crackling, my mind is clarified!" New York Times, December 4, 1964.

to be on the cadre level and on the preparation of a disciplined populace which will be responsive to cadre leadership. In the interest of creating a responsive popular environment "socialist education" has exorted the masses to cultivate personal habits of hard work and frugality and to "study the thought of Mao Tse-tung." Meanwhile, the PLA emulation drive has served to instruct and guide cadres in their leadership role. Its emphasis has been on the mastery of techniques developed in the armed forces for conducting political and ideological work, particularly the PLA's "three-eight" work style (i.e., hard work, plain living, flexible tactics, unity, vigor, seriousness, and liveliness) and "four firsts" (i.e., man over material things, ideological work over routine tasks, political work over other types, and integrated practice and theory over bookishness).[17]

In sum, the Peking regime appears, on the whole, to have realistically tailored its current efforts to insure political purity and control, recognizing the present impossibility of totally eradicating from society either the drag of tradition or the dangerous pull of "spontaneous" capitalism and "modern revisionism." The main emphasis, rather, is on the molding of a reliable and effective successor elite to lead the masses toward a fulfillment of Mao's revolutionary vision.

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[17] For explanations of these and other major slogans by the editorial department of the People's Liberation Army Daily see Current Background, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 732 (May 1964), pp. 38-43.

Cultivating a Successor Generation

In mid-1964, as a result of mounting concern among Peking's aging leaders, efforts to deal with the problems of transferring power to a new generation were accorded the highest priority. For a long time top Party leaders had feared that the younger generation, untested in war and unsteeled by the hardships of the Long March or the Yenan caves, would fail to appreciate fully the accomplishments of the revolution -- or even be lured away from the correct but arduous path of struggle by the corrupting influences of capitalism and "revisionism." Predictably, the eminences grises had been stung in December 1963 by a widely circulated speech of Roger Hilsman, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, which alluded to a "more sophisticated second echelon of leadership" in Communist China and suggested that evolutionary developments could "eventually profoundly erode the present simple view with which the [present] leadership regards the world."[18] After a long silence People's Daily replied:

> This amounts to a public declaration by U.S. imperialism of its intention to promote "peaceful evolution" in China, to subvert its people's regime and to restore capitalism. [19]

When the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League convened in Peking in June 1964, five of the nation's highest leaders were in attendance:

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[18] Department of State Bulletin, Volume L, No. 1280, (January 6, 1964), pp. 13-14.

[19] Article by "Observer," Jen-min jih-pao, February 19, 1964, p. 1.

Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Successive speakers warned that "modern revisionism" and capitalism threatened to engulf the younger generation and called for new measures to "win over youth." On August 3 a front-page editorial in People's Daily presented perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative statement to date on the whole problem of the cultivation of successors. It declared that the latter must be carefully selected on the basis of class origin and political attitudes and then tempered through periodic rectification campaigns and class struggles. Five criteria were established for those worthy of being successors: they must be "genuine Marxist-Leninists," true revolutionaries, "proletarian political leaders capable of rallying and working with the overwhelming majority"; they must be exemplary practitioners of the Party's system of democratic centralism, and must be "humble and prudent," possessed of the spirit of self-criticism.

To ensure a favorable environment for cultivating revolutionary heirs and silence any false prophets who might lead them astray, the Party hierarchy in subsequent months launched a series of limited but severe attacks against politically deviant intellectuals and academics -- the most notable heresy hunt since 1958. In the summer and autumn of 1964 a violent campaign of hair-splitting criticism was unleashed against Yang Hsien-chen, a Moscow-trained theoretician, member of the Central Committee, and former head of the Higher Party School. Yang and a few academic adherents had argued that the

fundamental trend in the evolution of matter or in social development is for "two to merge into one" -- i.e., a tendency toward eventual reconciliation of contending forces. His critics charged that this completely misinterpreted the process of dialectical materialism in which, according to the Maoist view, struggle is the basic factor and "one divides into two." The implications of Yang's heresy were said to go far beyond the plane of relatively harmless abstract theory, amounting rather to a dangerous advocacy of unity with the "revisionist" leaders of the U.S.S.R., acceptance of a gradual reconciliation of antagonisms between Communist and capitalist states, and resignation to a general easing of class struggle.[20]

Following the attack on Yang, similar limited but intense campaigns were waged against other prominent intellectuals and unidentified "teachers of political theory." The well-known, and hitherto respected, philosopher Feng Ting was censured for his sympathy toward the idea that personal happiness is a legitimate goal in life. The historian Chou Ku-ch'eng was mercilessly upbraided by a chorus of nit-picking and unreasonable critics who found everything wrong with his work from its neglect of Marxist themes currently in fashion to its "bourgeois aesthetic" interpretations of cultural history. In the field of literature, the writer Shao Ch'uan-lin was

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[20]For a more detailed analysis of the anti-Yang campaign see "Yang Hsien-chen: Unity or Division," China News Analysis, No. 535, October 2, 1964; also John W. Lewis, "Revolutionary Struggle and the Second Generation in Communist China," The China Quarterly, No. 21 (January-March, 1965), pp. 136-145.

reproved for regarding non-revolutionary "people in the middle" (i.e., neither "decadent" nor "progressive") as worthy of portrayal. At the beginning of 1965, the scope of these attacks was broadened to include an unspecified number of middle school and college teachers of political theory who were accused of harboring "revisionist" views and, horror of horrors, "distorting and obliterating" the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Though presumably less prominent than the deviationists previously censured, these hapless pedagogues evidently merited high-level attention because of their key role in molding future Communist successors.

In addition to attacks on suspect individuals and groups, the CCP hierarchy has sought to battle corrupting influences in cultural media and economic life and to further steel the coming generations by exposure to rural hardships. Dramatic productions, motion pictures, folk songs, children's books, and stories told at street corner gatherings have been subjected to close scrutiny and a relentless campaign to increase their revolutionary content. Not even the traditional Peking Opera, one of the most prized jewels of Chinese culture, has escaped. In the economy a major "Four Cleanouts" movement has been launched to combat corruption among rural cadres (e.g., bribery, embezzlement, cheating, "tyranny"). A feature of this drive has been the transfer of thousands, if not millions, of urban students, office workers, and Party officials to the rural communes for periods of six months or longer. In contrast with the previous hsia fang campaigns which sent hordes of city-dwelling youths and professional people down to the countryside for labor, the present movement appears to emphasize living with the

peasantry, sharing hardships, and thoroughly investigating work habits and political views.

Looking toward the future, there is every likelihood that campaigns of varying scope and intensity will occur at intervals to assist the present ruling elite in the cultivation of a worthy successor generation. There is the considerable danger, of course, that in severely penalizing dissent, the regime will succeed in rearing a sterile and uncreative stock, incompetent to deal with the tremendous problems which lie ahead. Moreover, one wonders whether continued singular emphasis on political indoctrination can long suffice either to inspire the efforts necessary from the next generation to develop passably skilled and productive leaders, or to ensure that the inevitable successors maintain a loyalty to the hard, demanding revolutionary path envisioned by Mao.

Finding a Successor for Mao

Although preparations against Mao's inevitable death or retirement are not publicly discussed in the manner of the generational succession problem, there is no reason to doubt that this is a central concern of the top leadership. Mao is now seventy-one years old. While officially portrayed as vigorous and alert, the state of both his physical health and mental acuity has been in question for some time. Recurrent rumors of a stroke (one in May of this year) have been denied and, in support, Mao has kept to a fairly heavy schedule of public appearances, interviews, and at least symbolic participation in meetings. In January he twice remarked to Edgar Snow that he was "getting ready to see God very

soon," but one of his physicians assured Snow, on another occasion, that Mao had no organic troubles and suffered only the fatigue normal for his age.[21] Other recent foreign visitors have noticed Mao's dependence on an attendant in moving about, his slight difficulty in coordinating gestures, and "a bad case of smoker's cough."[22] Except for brief, cliché-laced denunciations of the United States, Mao's formerly impressive literary production has been virtually nil in recent years -- for one reason or another.

Regardless of the extent to which age and infirmity have reduced Mao's direct exercise of power, he continues to enjoy a position of unique, unprecedented, and pervasive authority in China. He is regarded as the supreme arbiter, not only in politics, but in all areas of life. He is considered the guardian-genius of the revolution, the symbol and conscience of the "New China," and the source of popular inspiration and power in the building of socialism. Since 1959, when he relinquished the Chairmanship of the People's Republic to Liu Shao-ch'i (but retained the more important post of CCP Chairman), Mao has been the object of a growing campaign of adulation which now approaches the Stalinist "cult of personality" in its intensity and hyperbole. To be sure, his birthdays go uncelebrated, streets are not named after him, and he has not taken advantage of his position to engage in

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[21] Edgar Snow, "Interview with Mao," New Republic, February 27, 1965, pp. 17, 23.

[22] See New York Times, May 31, 1965.

widespread purges of political opponents. However, he is venerated as a Communist immortal -- on the same plane with Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin -- and his thought is proclaimed as a guide to the solution of virtually all human problems. Soldiers, labor heroes, and even ping-pong champions almost invariably attribute their successes to the study of Mao's tactics and ideology (especially its ethical precepts). While he may live on indefinitely in teachings and legend, the removal of his direct inspiration and authority from the Peking regime will probably increase the possibilities of internal division and eventual dilution of revolutionary militancy.

The problem of succession to Mao is rendered more acute by the similar advancing age and declining vigor of most of the inner circle of Peking's top officials. Within the Politburo, the Party's highest ruling organ, most members are well into their 60's or 70's.[23] Of the 19 full members elected at the last (Eighth) CCP Congress, three have died (Lin Po-ch'ü in 1960, Lo Jung-huan in 1963, and K'o Ch'ing-shih in 1965) and several others probably are unable to play an active role because of age or illness. Ironically, the youngest, Minister of Defense Lin Piao (age 57) apparently has been forced to reduce his activities sharply in recent years because of a chronic illness, possibly tuberculosis.

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[23]For a detailed, though somewhat dated, analysis of the age problem in the central leadership, see Donald W. Klein, "The 'Next Generation' of Chinese Communist Leaders," The China Quarterly, No. 12 (October-December 1962), pp. 57-60.

Although the advanced ages of the top Chinese Communist leaders make them one of the world's oldest ruling groups, they are also remarkable for their continuity in power over the years and their maintenance of an almost unbroken united front despite the vicissitudes of the internal and external situation. For over thirty years this small, seemingly tight-knit circle has led the burgeoning Chinese Communist movement. Seldom in history have so few led so many for so long. While we know little of the inner workings of the ruling elite, its longevity and apparent unity would suggest the perfection of a rather unique operational style. Its long, relatively purge-free record lends support to the much publicized claim of exercising a genuine "collective leadership" -- though undoubtedly also a highly personalized one.

Mao's departure from the scene will inevitably introduce new tensions into the leadership and may accentuate present sub-surface differences. While there is no hard evidence of existing factionalism among the top leaders -- in the sense of competing, disciplined groups -- it would seem unlikely that lively disagreements, opposed viewpoints, persistent dissent, and, perhaps, even personal animosities have been totally avoided. Despite the close ties forged over the years since their epic Long March, it would seem incredible that the Chinese leaders all now think exactly alike on policy issues or possess the perfect virtue required to accept all adverse decisions without enmity or reservation.

It is possible to infer even from our limited evidence that sharp debates have arisen in recent years

over the ill-advised and ultimately disastrous Leap Forward policies[24] and, possibly as well, over the decision to sever historic and valuable ties with the U.S.S.R. The dismissal of former Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai and other high military officials in 1959 and the political eclipse of economic planner Ch'en Yün (both members of the Politburo) suggest serious unresolved disagreements.[25] In his December 1964 report to the National People's Congress Chou En-lai, while claiming regime support from over 95 per cent of the population, warned that subversive elements continued to creep into Party and governmental organs, seeking to cultivate protectors and agents even in the higher echelons of the leadership. The removal of Mao's restraining influence and power to arbitrate may

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[24]For interesting, though perhaps overstated, analyses of possible factionalism,arising out of the Leap Forward debates see Harold C. Hinton, "Intra-Party Politics and Economic Policy in Communist China," World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (July 1960), pp. 509-524; and Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4 (December 1958), pp. 323-335.

[25]See David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," The China Quarterly, No. 8 (October-December 1961), pp. 63-76. In addition to P'eng, other prominent leaders have been removed from important military, governmental, and Party posts since 1959. These include: Huang K'o-ch'eng, PLA Chief of Staff under P'eng and T'an Cheng, long time head of the PLA's General Political Department -- both men also dropped from the Party Secretariat; Chang Wen-t'ien, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs (possibly feared to be too friendly to the U.S.S.R.); Hsi Chung-hsün, a former Vice-Premier and Secretary General of the State Council; and, most recently, Li Wei-han, former director of the CCP Central Committee's United Front Work Department and Vice-Chairman of the NPC.

allow future differences or dissent within the leadership to broaden into overt factionalism, significantly affecting the cohesion and stability of the regime. However, we can only speculate on this possibility.

Open preparations for the succession to Mao may be traced back to the first session of the CCP's Eighth National Congress in 1956. At that time the post of honorary chairman of the Central Committee was created, presumably in anticipation of Mao's eventual retirement from active participation in Party affairs. Two years later Mao announced his decision not to seek re-election to the Chairmanship of the People's Republic, thereby opening the way for a transfer of power by installments to his faithful lieutenant and heir apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i.

Though the CCP Constitution makes no clear provision for succession to the Party chairmanship, it seems likely that the Politburo (or perhaps only its Standing Committee) in consultation with a few of the most powerful non-members will make the ultimate decision in behalf of the Central Committee. The latter, or possibly even a Party Congress, might then be called into session to ratify the choice. The exact circumstances of Mao's departure -- whether by sudden death or planned, phased withdrawal -- will, of course, have an important bearing on the mechanics and smoothness of transition. So, too, will the interplay of political forces between representatives of the three main institutions through which power is channeled in the Communist regime: the Party apparatus, the government, and the armed forces. (It remains unclear whether the public security forces constitute a primary and independent agency of power or come under the control

of one or more of the three named above.)

"Après [Mao] le déluge?"

While CCP history strongly suggests that the transition after Mao will be relatively peaceful and free of blood-letting, it cannot be assumed that the top leadership will maintain its traditional unity or that the second and third generation of leaders will continue either as submissive or militant as in the past. According to present indications, Liu Shao-ch'i will be the choice to succeed Mao as Party Chairman. However, Liu is a pale and uninspiring replacement by any standard, and his age (over 65) alone would seem to preclude long tenure in office. If Liu proves unable to maintain the previous high degree of cohesion among the top leadership, as would seem likely, the task of preparing for his succession will become much more complicated.

In both the period immediately after Mao and the more chaotic time of selecting a second successor, two personalities seem destined to play a dominant role: Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Chou (age 68) is both a veteran Party leader (enjoying the longest continuous service of any Politburo member) and an unusually skilled and able governmental administrator. While he has long been a faithful executor of CCP policies, however extreme, he appears to be more consistently flexible, realistic, and pragmatic in outlook than Mao, Liu or others primarily identified with the Party apparatus. Among the prominent leaders apparently associated by service or political temperament with Chou are Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi,

Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien, and economics planners Li Fu-ch'un and Po I-po.

In contrast to Chou, Teng Hsiao-p'ing (who is about 65) has had a relatively recent rise to high position within the CCP hierarchy and his experience has been largely confined to the Party apparatus. As CCP General Secretary and only member of both the Politburo Standing Committee and the Secretariat, Teng's power and authority approach that enjoyed by Chou. Tough-minded and ambitious but intelligent, Teng has evinced a preference for "hard line" solutions, a strongly nationalistic anti-Soviet zeal, and a crusading devotion to ideological orthodoxy. However, it should not be forgotten that, in contrast to Liu Shao-ch'i, he inveighed against "the cult of the individual" at the Eighth Party Congress (September 1956). Among those who appear to share Teng's present ultra-orthodox viewpoint (in addition to Liu) are Politburo member P'eng Chen and alternate K'ang Sheng.

It is often assumed that the problem of succession simply involves replacing Mao with another single, authoritative leader and that the process will only falter if a quarrel breaks out as to who shall be the One. On reflection, it is obvious that no individual can replace Mao. The next leader will be more dependent on the close cooperation of other leaders representing significant power constituencies (i.e., the bureaucracy, military, etc.). The succession at the top will not be, except in name perhaps, an exchange of one for one, but rather a replacement of the One with a small group of his present high-ranking lieutenants. The group leader,

given the present choice of personalities and balance of political forces, will probably be little more than primus inter pares.

In a larger sense, however, the succession problem will be one of generations. Its resolution will affect not only the personalities and working style of the regime, but the whole future tone of the revolution. In view of the numerous problems and uncertainties posed by the inevitable twofold succession -- to Mao and to the "first generation" -- one wonders whether, in occasional lapses of faith, members of the present Peking elite do not echo the lament of Louis XV: "After me (us) the deluge!" In this case, of course, the frightening vision is not one of violent anti-Communist upheaval amid street barricades and bloody guillotines, but rather one of internal disunity and a gradual mellowing and dilution of Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary dream. Perhaps in the despair of Peking's aging leaders those of a different political persuasion may find their greatest hope.