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# TRAINING FOR CULTURE-CONTACT AND INTERACTION SKILLS



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## FOREWORD

This study was initiated as part of the in-service research program of the Personnel and Training Requirements Branch, Training Research Division, Behavioral Sciences Laboratory. The research was conducted under Project 1710, "Training, Personnel and Psychological Stress Aspects of Bio-astronautics," and Task 171008, "Training for Culture-Contact and Interaction Skills in Counter-insurgency." Dr. Donald B. Haines, Personnel and Training Requirements Branch, was the Task Scientist. This is a preliminary report of a continuing study initiated February 1963. This report covers work from initiation of the Task through August 1964.

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This technical report has been reviewed and is approved.

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## ABSTRACT

Air Force participation in counterinsurgency (COIN) and pre-COIN missions requires a new emphasis in preparing the airman. Success in COIN depends upon the ability of the USAF individual to interact effectively with people in other societies. The cross-cultural training required differs markedly from the traditional Air Force stress on the operation and maintenance of hardware. Many USAF training missions abroad are short in duration and depend upon close, intensive interaction between the American advisor and his counterpart. These requirements make it necessary for the American to establish rapport quickly and to communicate efficiently with his counterpart. Up to the present it was assumed if the American were skilled in his job and in the language of the host country that with the correct motivation he could successfully carry out his mission. Such is not the case; skill is also required in the other person's customs, habits, taboos, mannerisms, and gestures. Traditionally, the American is prepared for these by briefings or lectures sometimes called "area studies." Unfortunately, knowledge about behavior does not guarantee skill in carrying out that behavior—knowing what to do is not the same as doing what you know. This report outlines a procedure for collecting in the field those cross-cultural behaviors most critical for the success of the advisory mission. A means of categorizing these behaviors for incorporation into a training program is described. Those behaviors requiring passive knowledge may be easily taught by traditional lectures and handbooks. Other behaviors may be taught by programed instructional materials while some require such subtleties of skill and motor facility that they require more elaborate teaching methods. A new method for teaching interaction skills through the use of a video tape recorder is also presented. Subjects are placed in a simulated cross-cultural situation requiring interaction skills known to be critical in the advisor-advisee relationship. They learn these skills through self-confrontation with video-aural playback of their behavior.

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## INTRODUCTION

> "I felt like running over to the little Cambodian who had fought all his life for my country, and apologizing for my countrymen here who didn' t care about him, and for my countrymen in France who didn' t even care about their countrymen fighting in Indochina - and in one single blinding flash, I knew that we were going to lose the war." (Bernard Fall in Street Without Joy, p. 263)

Bernard Fall describes the cavalier manner in which a French officer in Vietnam treats a Cambodian who had had long service in the French Army. Earlier in his account of the Indochina war of 1946-54, he graphically portrays the skills required by a French leader of an advanced commando unit. According to Fall, the commander "...would have to observe dozens of taboos, any violation of which would cost him his life and jeopardize his mission, but which would find a poor reception in Hanoi or Saigon as a reason for the postponement of an operation. All this required a practical knowledge of ethnology and anthropology which could not be acquired in colleges, training camps, or manuals." (op cit p. 244). Fall emphasizes two facts about today's military operations in brushfire war and counterinsurgency. First, there are marked changes in the traditional role of the soldier and the airman. No longer is he sweeping enmass over clearly delineated battlelines but instead is in daily, close contact with native peoples. These people are often his counterparts and do the actual fighting, leaving the soldier in an advisory or guiding role. What these native people think and feel is vitally important; thus the modification of attitudes and motivations of the indigenous personnel is as crucial as the proper employment of weapons or the execution of battlefield tactics. Second, this new, quasi-political role of the airman indicates a wholly new approach to his training. In addition to his primary specialty (Air Force Specialty Code), he should have a firm ideological base, an expert knowledge of insurgency, and understanding of the culture, goals, and aspirations of the people with whom he is working. This report deals with the last of the issues above - the training requirements for culture-contact and interaction skills. In particular, this report places culture-contact research in the context of USAF participation in counterinsurgency (COIN) and pre-COIN operations. The research problems and approaches described herein, however, are sufficiently generalizable to be of interest to any agency responsible for training Americans for overseas assignments.

The report is divided into three sections: (1) statement of the need for research in cross-cultural training, (2) description of research task established by the Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories for developing effective culture-contact skills, and (3) listing of the progress, accomplishment and future plans for the task. The report includes several appendices which describe a typical USAF mission in COIN, the nature of other research efforts in cross-cultural studies, and the design of a critical-incident study planned for a field trip to Northeast Africa.

## SECTION II

## THE NEED FOR RESEARCH IN CROSS-CULTURAL TRAINING

### BACKGROUND

Late in the fall of 1962, the Training Research Division of the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, along with other Air Force Systems Command groups, was asked to contribute ideas and suggestions for human factors support of the USAF mission in COIN. Since the Air Force was using modifications of World War II aircraft (B-26, C-46, AD-6, etc.) in their COIN mission in Vietnam, we thought that the most direct contribution could be made by providing information on crew training, maintenance training, low-slow flight simulation, etc. However, a preliminary literature search

suggested an entirely different area of research need. The USAF participation in COIN and pre-COIN operations involved USAF personnel in activities largely political and sociopsychologic in nature.

In the past, the U.S. military contacted local nationals only in sharply limited ways - the foreign nationals were either refugees, an occupied people, or allies. In any event, the American soldier tended to live quite apart from the local inhabitants isolated by the PX, the commissary, the language barrier, and by cultural differences. The American was self-sufficient, his supplies coming either from the U.S. or indirectly from the local residents. Our GI could concentrate on his hardware and the business at hand of fighting a war across well-drawn battle lines.

His modern role is markedly different. He is expected to work directly and individually with a native counterpart, who may be somewhat opposed to his presence (although the American was requested to be there by the native's government). The American's counterpart may be equivalent to him in prestige and rank in the local military structure, which means the American cannot enjoy the status of occupier or badly needed ally. Further, the American finds that, although trained to "do," he is expected to teach and advise, a switch in roles which can prove frustrating. This new role strongly underlines the importance of solidly based and effective interpersonal relationships between the American and his counterpart.

In April 1962, the RAND Corporation (ref. 2) sponsored a symposium on counterinsurgency, in which the crucial importance of interaction skills was emphasized. The symposium was notable since only those people who had participated in a successful counterinsurgency effort were invited to participate and share ideas. The symposium speakers criticized military psychologists for concentrating either on hardware or on psychological warfare and mass-media of communication, neither emphasis being appropriate for COIN. R. C. Phillips, a Military Assistant Advisory Group (MAAG) advisor to the Army of South Vietnam said: "... one ill-advised deed by a single soldier can undo the good of much thoughtful action; it requires careful indoctrination of the military to instill in them the needed respect for the local civilians as well as a willingness to help these people in other than military ways" (p. 75, ref. 2).

An Army-sponsored symposium (ref. 3) on limited war and social science research held a month earlier than the RAND meeting arrived at similar recommendations for redirecting and increasing research on culture-contact problems. The literature search showed also that the USAF shared these sentiments. This new concern was even reflected recently in the Air Force regulation series 900 which governs the observation of local customs and protocol while USAF personnel are in a host country (ref. 4). The regulation requires each overseas major air commander to insure that all USAF personnel and their dependents be oriented in local customs and practices. Further, the regulation directs that the commander conduct any necessary additional training programs to accomplish the orientation.

The literature search and its findings prompted the Training Research Division to conduct a year-long planning study which included visits to military training and staging areas for USAF units participating in COIN and pre-COIN operations. Sites visited were the Special Air Warfare Center (1st Air Commando Wing and Combat Applications Group) at Eglin AFB, and the U.S. Strike Command at MacDill AFB. The Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) supplies USAF personnel for COIN operations, COIN readiness and civic action programs in a number of overseas locations. Training consists of aircrew preparation (i.e., transition to special COIN aircraft such as the C-46, T-28, Helio, etc.), jungle survival, hand-to-hand combat, and some area orientation. Combat-ready commandos are turned over to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the theatre requesting troops. Strike Command at MacDill is a joint Army-USAF training and deployment area and prepares Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Continental Army Command (CONARC) units for operations ranging from civic action to general war. Their principal mission is to have a strike-ready group poised for instant response to a limited war threat. Both SAWC and STRIKE personnel indicated a definite need for training the U.S. military in COIN for contact and work with people of other societies. Their experience and comments verified the tentative conclusions from the literature search. The planning study was completed by visiting other DOD and government agencies to see what research was being done on this critical new requirement for training.

## NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Various government agencies and research organizations were visited and were asked what problems all have in common when they prepare Americans for contact and work with native personnel overseas. Our survey asked each agency for the goals of their culture-training program, the kinds of things taught, the methods used, and the problems faced by the training groups in achieving their aims. Two general findings came out of the survey: First, there is a definite requirement for rapid and effective training in cross-cultural skills.[1] "Ugly American" incidents continue to damage American prestige and the U.S. image abroad. Current programs of intelligence briefings, remote area orientations and lectures on customs and habits are inadequate and sometimes cause more harm than good. In short, knowing what to do is not equivaler to doing what you know. Giving a man a lecture on do's and don'ts in a foreign country is equivalent to giving him a lecture on how to fly the B-52; in each case he might easily get a passing grade on a written test but his actual performance would be unacceptable.

Language barriers are not the main problem; instead, lack of cross-cultural know-how is the critical factor. As an example, one study showed that American officers trained intensively for a year in Turkish language made a poorer adjustment than those who went directly to their Turkish overseas assignment.[2] The supposition was that the Turks expected the Americans to be as conversant with Turkish customs as they were with the Turkish language. The disparity between language and cross-cultural skills got the American into trouble. Lebanese students speaking colloquial American English (learned at the American University at Beirut) encountered the same adjustment problems when they visited the U.S. for the first time. Second, the American does not recognize his needs for cross-cultural skills. He assumes that his high motivation and his job-proficiency are enough. He feels competent at instructing and at socializing here in the U.S., consequently, he sees no reason why he should not be equally successful with his indigenous counterparts. By the time he learns through bitter experience, his tour of duty is usually finished.[3]

## THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COIN AND PRE-COIN

Detailed discussions with personnel in the agencies visited verified the conclusions drawn from the literature search and from interviewing returning veterans of COIN and pre-COIN operations. In general, these conclusions are: (1) future military operations undoubtedly will continue to be of the "Twilight War" variety and consequently will involve soldiers in a political role whether they desire it or not; (2) future soldiers will not be doing the actual fighting in many cases (despite the fact that an enemy bullet does not distinguish between advisor and advisee), instead they will be guiding and instructing natives of another culture; (3) effective personal interaction between U.S. military personnel and their native counterparts will become extremely crucial. These three conclusions are discussed below.

### The Political Role of the Military.

The military services are fast recognizing the broad impact of the large number of U.S. military deployed abroad. Little of a systematic or planned nature was done in the past to exploit the advantages of this contact.

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1. For example: The most recent recruiting brochure for the Army Special Forces places strong emphasis on the teaching role the American soldier will play in his operations in remote areas. The Special Forces require the dual qualifications of fighting and teaching ability (ref. 5, p. 1-11).

2. Personal communication. Dr. Paul Spector, Institute for Internation Studies, A.I.R., Georgetown, Washington, D.C., May 1964.

3. This does not mean that language skill is less important than either technical proficiency or cultural behavior. All three are equally vital to mission success and should figure prominently in training programs.

The Army responded by investing in the social sciences to bring about the change. A variety of Army-sponsored projects are devoted to studies of target populations and to devising means of achieving contact with native populations. Another factor is the realization that insurgents and guerrilla elements depend heavily upon support from the native population (a study by the Special Operations Research Office showed that for some 24 revolutions and insurgencies studied there was an average of nine active but unknown supporters for every guerrilla). Also, the strength of the "enemy" is nonmaterial, with no industrial complex, no elaborate supply lines, few or no fixed bases, etc. The consequence is that the U.S. military enters into the struggle for the minds of the population. This involves the Army in programs of civic action, persuasion and achievement of goals by nonviolent means, in addition to their more accustomed roles. Future war seems destined to be a series of shadowy paramilitary operations and the Army is preparing to train soldiers to accept equivocal roles and expect ambiguous campaigns.

The Air Force faces the same set of problems. The political role of the soldier makes his attempts to become self-sufficient hazardous to the success of his mission. The more the American attempts to improve maintenance and logistics so that he is not dependent upon native support, the wider the gulf between himself and the native he is "helping."

Emphasis on Teaching and Advising:

One of the "limits" in future limited war is that the U.S. soldier or airman, trained for everything from hand-to-hand combat to sophisticated, computerized command-and-control, will be prohibited from firing at all. He will be sent to another culture as a guide, instructor, trainer, and advisor. Many special training problems (as well as selection difficulties) arise in this context. Perhaps there is negative transfer when you train a man to be an excellent fighter or an expert in napalm bombing then frustrate him with a civic action assignment as a teacher. A particularly thorny problem is that instructional methods successful here in the U.S. can interact unfavorably with cultural variables in other societies and thus cause mission failure. In an article titled "Why are We Losing in South Vietnam?" Russell Hawkes says, "The trouble is that no two people could be as divergent as the Vietnamese and Americans. Given a problem, an American will try to solve it quickly. A Vietnamese will attempt to outlive it or find a way around it. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) is sincere about wanting to win the war, but has trouble taking deadlines seriously" (ref. 6, p. 27). There is the other person's view too. Hawkes' continues in the same article with this statement, "Exasperation is not all on one side and it may be contributing to the erosion of resistance the VC seeks. The mere fact that ARVN officers are assigned advisors offend many. Some advisors believe that the ARVN and Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) know as much or more about counter-insurgency warfare than anyone because they have been at it for so long. The constant stream of conventionally trained U.S. officers coming in for six month tours are really the students for a large part of their stay. Possibility of a conflict between the U.S. learning procedure and the conduct of the war deserve study" (ref. 6, p. 27).

One of the most difficult barriers the American faces is the difference in attitude toward work. Americans automatically assume that other cultures will value work in the same dedicated or puritanical manner we do. They don't. Some societies dislike work or else consider it demeaning. Working with their hands or with tools is out of the question for members of certain castes. One government agency coped successfully with this problem. The Civilian Research Division of USAF Headquarters developed a "Pay-Skill-Progression" program for training Arab nationals in Libya to work on the USAF Base at Tripoli. The emphasis in the program was on minute subdivisions of status which could be earned incrementally and displayed as certificates on the walls of the home back in the Arab village. Pay increased with the skill level, of course, but the important factor was the steady increase in prestige. Arabs advanced to senior mechanic levels without being literate. Recently, an off-duty literacy program was started there for the Arabs and is currently reported to be a success. The Arab mayor of Tripoli commended the USAF "for educating his people" and spoke so highly of the program that the Civilian Research Division feels his support to be a principal factor in keeping the air base in Libya (unlike Morocco where the USAF was forced to pull out). USAF supervisors discovered their most successful experiences occurred when they discovered themselves some feature of the other culture which genuinely interested them and which they could sincerely respect. Native personnel were quick to note this and it led quickly to rapport.

The Role of Culture-Contact and Interaction Skills:

Edward Hall (ref. 8, p. 194) states, "We have to learn to take foreign cultures seriously. The British are ahead of us on this, and the Russians so far ahead that it isn't even funny. We, in the United States, are in the Stone Age of human relations in the overseas field." The American's failure lies in his propensity to culture-shock and in the meager repertoire of interaction skills. Most Americans sent on overseas assignments experience culture-shock to some degree and all the government agencies visited reported this phenomenon high on their list of training and orientation problems. "Culture-shock" as a term was popularized by Dr. Kalervo Oberg (ref. 7), an anthropologist with the State Department. Oberg describes culture-shock in these terms:

> Culture shock is precipitated by the anxiety that results from losing all our familiar signs and symbols of social intercourse. These signs or cues include the thousand and one ways in which we orient ourselves to the situations of daily life: when to shake hands and what to say when we meet people, when and how to give tips, how to give orders to servants, how to make purchases, when to accept and when to refuse invitations, when to take statements seriously and when not. Now these cues which may be words, gestures, facial expressions, customs, or norms are acquired by all of us in the course of growing up and are as much a part of our culture as the language we speak or the beliefs we accept. All of us depend for our peace of mind and our efficiency on hundreds of these cues, most of which we are not consciously aware. Now when an individual enters a strange culture, all or most of these familiar cues are removed. He or she is like a fish out of water. No matter how broadminded or full of good will he may be, a series of props have been knocked from under him. This is followed by a feeling of frustration and anxiety. People react to the frustration in much the same way. First they reject the environment which causes the discomfort: "the ways of the host country are bad because they make us feel bad." When Americans or other foreigners in a strange land get together to grouse about the host country and its people you can be sure they are suffering from culture shock. Another phase of culture shock is regression. The home environment suddenly assumes a tremendous importance. To an American everything American becomes irrationally glorified. All the difficulties and problems are forgotten and only the good things back home are remembered. It usually takes a trip home to bring one back to reality (ref. 7, p. 1).

Culture-shock and adaptation are well illustrated by a brief summary of the experiences of three government agencies that constantly grapple with the problem. The agencies are the Agency for International Development, the Civilian Research Division of the U.S. Air Force, and the Peace Corps.

The Experience of Agency for International Development (AID) in Dealing with Cross-cultural Training: One division of AID, the Office of Public Safety (OPS), has the responsibility of bringing foreign personnel to the United States and training them in various aspects of police work and internal security measures. Training in technical skills is contracted while problems of cultural adjustment and acclimation are handled in-service by AID. Looking at the reverse problem of our theme (training for culture-contact and interaction skills) can provide fresh perspectives and helpful insights; i.e., in reviewing the OPS experience in bringing foreign nationals to U.S. shores, it is possible to study adaptation through the other's eyes. The OPS is unlike most other agencies in their training requirements. Other agencies concentrate either on preparing the American for work in other societies or on dealing with the foreign student upon his arrival in the U.S. The OPS experience is particularly valuable to study, since they occasionally prepare teams of American specialists for training missions abroad. Either group faces remarkably similar varieties of culture shock and orientation. One distinctive feature is the

characteristic form it takes with different national groups. OPS noticed that participants from one regional area tend to withdraw physically from our society, even refusing to eat and sometimes to sleep (the response is severe enough to result in the hurried return of the participant to his own country). Note that this reaction is not necessarily a mark of "weakness" or squeamishness - the OPS participants are all highly selected policemen or secret-service men who were earmarked for the U.S. training because of their success in what everyone will agree is a "tough" profession. Participants from another region showed a different pattern of culture-shock; their ability to budget their stipend and to conduct their financial affairs seemed to deteriorate (OPS gave illustrations of frugal police officers from one of these areas who handled their spending so badly that AID had to revise their payment schedule—thenceforth the participant received frequent payments of small amounts). The participants from yet another region displayed weakening of their moral fabric. The American overseas may also suffer moral laxity ranging from lackadaisical girl-chasing to energetic black-marketing. Americans frequently become obsessed with cleanliness, finding everything dirty and unfit for use. Interestingly enough, the tendency to see the new environment and its people as filthy is a common feature of culture shock. The Middle-Easterner considers as dirty the American habit of wearing street shoes in the home (especially when young children are playing about on the rug), our rather sketchy habits of washing after use of the toilet, and, finally, arm-pit commercials on TV make the Middle-Easterner turn ill.

OPS personnel felt that the USAF and OPS dealt with similar populations in their respective missions. Both the OPS participant and the AF Air Commando are selected primarily for technical competence and rarely for cultural adaptability. OPS experience shows that the most important predictor of culture-shock tendency is whether the individual was job-oriented or self-oriented. Men selflessly dedicated to their job, who enthusiastically and keenly shared their knowledge, seldom suffered the full range of culture-shock. Other causes of culture-shock commonly recognized by the social scientist are: (1) pronounced ethnocentrism, (2) contempt for foreigners and minority groups (in fact, anyone "different" from self), (3) a background of provincial life with little change and few new experiences, (4) a rigid structure of absolute values and mores untempered by any realization of cultural relativism, and (5) in general, an authoritarian and conservative outlook on life. Despite suggestions that tendencies for culture-shock might well be an enduring part of personality, an area training program and specific preparations for culture interaction definitely are valuable and are needed. There are three aspects of area training: goals, current problems faced in reaching these goals, and the OPS emphasis used in training.

Goals: The most useful goal identified was training a man to tolerate foreign people and their ways for a short time period. OPS strives to teach their people to simply suspend judgment of any kind for 30 days (this is analogous to counting 10 when angry) when they first encounter strange customs and different people. OPS personnel believe this is a realistic, trainable goal, and a most important one. They have discovered the ability to take people as they are as the greatest aid to establishing rapport.

Another goal is to make an orientation lecture an integrated, useful, and meaningful guide for the new environment. Often, orientation lectures concentrate upon what is fascinating, colorful, dramatic, or startling in the new culture, thus leaving the trainee with an unconnected, unsystematized collection of disturbing (or intriguing) impressions of little practical value. In fact, some of these may cause harm or painful and embarrassing self-awareness. The trainee will fit into the new environment only if he is confident and secure in how he is to approach life there. A related goal is the ability to successfully discriminate between those cultural behaviors which require acceptance and change on the part of the trainee and those which do not. This is a crucial and delicate training problem. The trainee only hurts himself and his culture by "going native" or by retreating to a "little America" compound. The compromise he makes is a finely balanced blend of behaviors. He adapts his own cultural values to some native customs. Other behaviors and customs of his own he firmly retains (and even advocates). New behaviors peculiar to "visitors" in the host country he learns outright. Maintaining this balance enables him to enjoy respect both from himself and from his native counterparts.

A final goal, well summed up by AID's motto: ADAPT, NOT ADOPT, is that the trainees' behavior be an amalgamation of technical skills, area understanding, and cross-cultural communication. Participants from other countries are warned that what they learn in the U.S. is not to be

ruthlessly forced on their society at home; rather, the considered adaptation of skills and knowledge to local requirements is desired.

Problems: A nettling problem in preparing trainees for cultural interaction is the baffling and elusive nature of culture. No systematic, concrete theory of culture exists; hence the teaching of culture remains an "art." Pioneering work of linguists (e.g., Sapir) made it possible to objectify the teaching of language; equivalent progress is needed in culture studies. A beginning is the work of Hall (ref. 8). A hint of what kind of culture training is required is evidenced by the success of Air Force Mobile Training Team members. One team member weathered a social crisis in the Middle East when he suddenly found himself facing a cooked eyeball of a sheep offered to him as the rightful due of the guest of honor. The American officer remembered his experience in survival school eating rabbits eyes; the sergeant in charge of training had passed around to all trainees an olive jar filled with rabbit eyes packed in blood. The "skill" was transferrable. We may conclude that the need for training in cultural skills is real but as yet is not formally recognized and certainly has not appeared in any curricula. Any agency has a struggle with overcoming stereotypes, some of which are unusually resistant to change (notably the popular U.S. notion that people in emerging nations are "retarded and backward" or that such people have little to offer us). The fact is that Americans overlook fine heritages of philosophy and culture lying within their grasp. Other persistent stereotypes are the common racial and religious prejudices, attitudes picked up by foreign personnel from watching U.S. movies, and different conceptions of health and sickness.

Training emphasis: AID training and orientation has three underlying themes. The first concerns stress on similarities rather than extremes; the AID approach is to look first at the similarities and commonalities between the host and visitor cultures. This provides an important basis for confidence by showing the new person the many places where he may act unconsciously according to his own dictates of taste and tact. The usual briefing consisted of a list of do's and don' ts which concentrated attention on the principal differences between the cultures, thus left the trainee somewhat shaken.

The second concerns the provision of positive and unified guides for behavior. Many orientation programs give a vast number of prohibitions and fragments of advice - seldom organized (either as to level of generality or to importance). Furthermore, there usually is no indication whether the "do's" are those things the natives do and expect foreigners to do likewise or are behaviors appropriate for natives but either ridiculous or insulting when followed by a foreigner (e.g., street-bowing in Indochina). AID strives for a useful guide, with cultural examples and illustrations selected for aptness and utility rather than color or dramatic interest.

The third is to provide information about one's own culture. This is important so that the trainee can handle critical questions with confidence and ease (or at least not get caught flat-footed). AID gives the American the answers to frequently asked questions plus some basic facts about our own society which can help the American get through an otherwise embarrassing social session.

Some of AID's illustrations are:

Discrimination: More American Negroes have degrees than do Englishmen.

Woman's Role: In the U.S., machines make work light enough for women to do it; also, prosperity creates enough jobs for men and women both to take part.

Bargaining: The American puts a high price on his time - does not want to spend his time in this way; in fact, some stores value the salesman's time so highly they have the customer wait upon himself.

Supervision: The American supervisor not only asks for obedience and gives orders but looks to his subordinates for ideas, suggestions, and criticisms.

These illustrations are part of AID's orientation and are detailed in Howard's Strange New Land, an AID publication (ref. 9). The important area of communism requires even more thorough orientation. One training officer at AID felt that orientation programs are not the correct place to

learn about communism; by that time it is too late. He suggests that we should begin earlier (high school or college) and learn not only what Marx said and intended but learn intensively about what has become of communism, what are the current goals of the communist ideology, what are their tactics and how to recognize them, in short, why communism is a danger to us. However, he saw one risk in designing a training or orientation program to incorporate ideology and attitudinal material - that is, too much may be expected of a 6 to 12 week program in cultural orientation; that years of provincial conditioning and thinking cannot be undone that quickly (nor perhaps should they be).

Cross-cultural Skills Investigated by Hq USAF, Civilian Research Division (CRD): Two major responsibilities of the CRD are: (1) overcoming problems of adjustment and preparing USAF civilians for work overseas as supervisors of foreign nationals, and (2) preparing foreign nationals in technical skills and attitudes for work with USAF airmen and civilians. In meeting these goals, the CRD faced several areas of difficulty. One of these was in training for adjustment. The other was in the inadequacy of lectures and orientation.

Problems of adjustment and training: One of the severest barriers to adjustment was the American civilian's unconscious assumption that anything American was necessarily superior to its native counterpart (including the man himself). USAF civilians also have difficulty comprehending local laws. An example is the tendency in the Middle East to assign percentages of blame; thus one civilian whose wife was killed in an accident caused by the other vehicle was charged 20% responsibility which made him liable for 20% of the penalty for manslaughter. Another example is that misunderstanding of the laws led USAF personnel to take dangerous risks. Americans had to be trained, virtually to hit and run, contrary though it was to everything they believed moral and proper. Americans who stopped to give aid after accidents were attacked and either badly beaten or killed by the local townspeople. The writer himself has experienced less serious but equally stark consequences of following what he thought were universal rules of common conduct when stranded in a remote Anatolian village. He saw a woman struggling in the mire with an ox-cart, and tried to help extricate it. The woman's husband was watching the whole episode and became volubly hostile (after the cart was out, however). The writer learned that where women do the work, they do all the work. Another typical problem of orientation and training was inducing Americans to leave their gadgets and possessions at home and learn to use the cooking, cleaning, and living facilities of the host country. Paul Spector in the Peace Corps Handbook, Working Effectively Overseas (ref. 10), gives several illustrations of critical situations arising out of the American's fondness for his kitchen materialism, sometimes with a crippling effect upon the whole advisory mission. Harlan Cleveland in the Overseas Americans (ref. 11) places much of the blame for mission failure upon the newly-arrived American's concern for his gadgets: "Even in the best houses, of course, the little things creep up on you, as a woman Foreign Service officer told us, the bargaining over prices, the ever-present danger of being robbed in some countries, the struggle to maintain modern household appliances in underdeveloped areas." Cleveland concludes by observing: "Under conditions like these, the clue to survival in overseas service is the kind of relax-and-enjoy it adaptability that takes life as it comes. The professionals in career service abroad are well-nigh unaimous in charging the amateurs with worrying about trifles. 'They become too preoccupied with living conditions,' said one veteran, 'it's simply part of the job'" (ref. 11, p. 40).

Personnel at AID verified these observations and said that a sure fire way of arousing hostility and resentment was for Americans to arrive on the local scene with deep-freezes, automatic toothbrushes, and electric can openers. Closely linked to this sore point was the sensitive area of food habits and preferences. U.S. personnel created incidents and short-circuited much good will by turning up their noses at local food; especially when dishes were prepared at some sacrifice of money and time specifically for the new arrivals.

Orientation difficulties: Little was done to orient either the U.S. civilian or his native counterpart in the initial wave of Americans going overseas after the war. During the late 50's the growing rate of "incidents" between Americans and local-hire personnel caused alarm. The result was the "People-to-People Program;" an effort to relieve tensions and avert community frictions. The program consisted of three portions: local charity drives (e.g., collections of clothing, toys, etc. for native orphanages, children's hospitals, etc.), off-duty language courses and the formation of German-American clubs, Turkish-American associations, etc. The hope was

that Americans would develop better relationships, contact and understanding with the local population and they, in turn, could come to know and respect the U.S. personnel (both military and civilian). The program was not fully successful for several reasons: off-duty language courses started vigorously but quickly fizzled, the clubs and associations worked for the dedicated few who attended them regularly but these were not the kind of people who were incident-prone in the first place, and the existence of on-base housing and large "American-compounds" reduced the opportunity for continuous off-cuty contact with the local people.

Present emphasis: The CRD instituted several changes in the orientation of both U.S. and foreign personnel. All Americans now receive an intensive 3-day orientation at the USAF base upon their arrival in the new country. The orientation follows an outline standard for all overseas installations - viz, requirements that the orientation cover customs, religious habits and practices, nature of the government, local and national labor laws, cultural background (food, clothing, housing, hygiene, economy, etc.) and the structure of the local workforce. This last is important because it provides some notion of the local attitude toward work. CRD's orientation differs from AID's in that AID personnel go through less orientation in the host country and instead receive much more training in the U.S. AID stateside training consists of 6 weeks of lectures and guided reading, chiefly at AID headquarters and the Foreign Service Institute. While in the U.S., the participants work on the language of the country (but on their own time-the Foreign Service Institute provides them with laboratories facilities). Another point of difference between AID and CRD is that AID provides two specialists as consultants for the trainee. One is a specialist in the culture, customs, economy, etc. of the foreign area receiving the participant; the other is an expert in the participant's skill or profession. Both specialists meet with the participant throughout his training period. Neither had provision for giving trainees anything but lecture-room information on the culture being entered; cross-cultural skills were neither identified nor practiced. Both groups are concerned with the inadequacy of criterion measures. The methodological and practical problems of assessing effectiveness of orientations and cross-cultural briefings remain immense.

Peace Corps Experience in Training for Culture Contact: Personnel engaged in training and orientation programs for Peace Corps volunteers were interviewed at Peace Corps headquarters in Washington. The goals of their training programs, the training approach used, and their problems with training volunteers for work in different cultures were discussed. Two main areas were mentioned: content of the training program and method of training. One training officer felt that culture-contact training was a less demanding task for the Peace Corps than for other government agencies due to the special characteristics of the volunteer. He said that the typical volunteer is so highly selected that he enters training with considerable sensitivity for cultural differences and a profound, sincere willingness to make the best of any difficult situation.

One problem was language; in some cases it is almost better to speak none of the native language than it is to speak with an accent identified with a hated group (for example, in one portion of Africa an eroded creole is acceptable dialect among the natives, but not if a foreigner speaks it). On the other hand, where the volunteer is expected to teach classes in one of the main languages of the country (e.g., French on the Ivory Coast), he can hardly be expected to pick up language skill on the scene. At present, the volunteer receives from 300 to 350 hours of language training.[4]

4. Emphasis on language training received much attention and discussion at the 1964 Convention of the American Psychological Association (Los Angeles, California, 5-9 September 1964). In some Peace Corps training areas the language program has tripled in number of hours while at the same time doubt was raised whether increased fluency did not bring its own difficulties in the form of reduced tolerances on the part of host peoples. He who speaks colloquially is expected to behave colloquially (unfortunately, the "silent language" of a culture is not yet in the tape libraries of the language laboratories). George Guthrie of Pennsylvania State University reported at the convention that he recorded discouragingly low correlations between ratings for command of language and for cultural adaptation. This suggested to him that learning the language was not as important a factor as many assume it to be in making a successful adjustment to another society.

Another content problem is the effort to introduce concepts of cultural relativism into the training program, especially where morality and ethics are concerned. Many volunteers come into training with strong, idealistic frameworks of absolute values and seldom realize that right or wrong can be relative to the culture. Unless the volunteer develops some perspective, he may doom his mission in advance. Therein lies the advantage of the lecture method for the Peace Corps—the confrontation of the volunteer with a view of American life and ideals through the eyes of people from other societies. Parts of the program are aimed at stirring up set ideas of the volunteer, thus giving him an opportunity to gage and assess his whole outlook.

The Peace Corps' one-month training camp in Puerto Rico is designed to do the same for the volunteer's concept of his physical self. By extensive experiences in climbing, survival, walking, "drown-proofing," etc., the participant discovers his own limits and gets a realistic, useful appraisal of his abilities. The Peace Corps learned that the more idealistic the individual, the more he needs this kind of experience. Volunteers may find, for example, that they cannot walk 25 miles over rough terrain but can walk 15; an important discovery which stands them in good stead when they tackle their mission. The Peace Corps follows the philosophy of the Outward Bound training camps in Great Britain. These groups train boys in nature and sea craft with the primary goal of giving them realistic views of their own abilities and potentials.

For the Peace Corps, selection and training are integral. By far, the bulk of the screening takes place before training, but selection goes on throughout their 16-week training program with up to 15% of the volunteers washed out by the end of the period. Overall selection is rigorous;[5] of 60,000 applicants, less than 6000 are finally sent to the field. Despite the rigorous screening and training, some volunteers still face extremely trying conflicts of value in their assignments. This is particularly true where the volunteer fails to see that his values are not as clear-cut and unambiguous as he thinks they are. A good illustration is the culture-conflict experienced by Catholic volunteers when they went to South America. Often they found the real power in the village or barrio to be the local priest and that much effort had to be spent in learning to work with him and in utilizing the power structure that existed in the community. The volunteers quickly discovered that bucking the system only resulted in resistance and hostility. The notion of church and state separation is well-rooted in the American volunteer, and it requires vigorous mental gymnastics to work in situations where church and state are one.

The training goals of the Peace Corps reflect their mission in general: (1) to provide native peoples with middle skills, (2) to give people in other countries a good opportunity to learn something about Americans other than the occasionally repugnant and unrepresentative types they may already have met, and (3) to give Americans a chance to share life with other societies.[6] Two obstacles confront the volunteer: how to deal with the long period of static living and monotony typical of life in underdeveloped countries, and how to tolerate slow progress, bureaucratic inefficiencies and the ubiquitious "manana" attitude.

In the author's opinion, the Peace Corps has the most intensive and well-rounded training program. Like the other agencies, there is heavy reliance upon lectures and briefings and little effort is made to identify or inculcate those cross-cultural skills most crucial to mission success. As with the CRD and AID, there are few criteria of training effectiveness, although the Peace Corps has an ambitious plan of research aimed at this problem.[7] Unfortunately, the Peace Corps training methods do not include such techniques as role-playing, automated instruction, stimulated-recall, self-confrontation, and sensitivity-training. These methods are not used, apparently because

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5. The Peace Corps selection program still requires good criteria of performance in the field before much can be said of its validity. Selection has been validated partially against <u>failure</u> in the field (involuntary returnees) and recent work in Hawaii is going in the development of an artificial criterion of success.

6. (Personal communication) Dr. Joseph Colmen, Director of Research, Peace Corps Headquarters, Washington, D. C., 1964.

7. Joseph Colmen Op Cit.

the training people either know little about the methods or because they have had bad personal experiences with them. Most of the staff psychologists working for the organization are involved in selection and evaluation; the training section is largely administrative and operational (the actual training is contracted to universities). Training officers vary in background from specialists in industrial training to academic lecturers in political science. They hew strictly to traditional methods of lecture and discussion.[8]

Summary of the Training Research Division (TRD) Planning Study: A clear picture of a pressing requirement for applied research emerged from the literature survey, visits to operational commands and to other government agencies. The need for new and better methods of cross-cultural training is broad in scope and applied to every organization, government or private, which sends American advisors abroad. This summary, however, narrows the concern to the needs of the Air Force in general and to the training requirements of the USAF Air Commandos and area survey teams in particular. In brief, these are the lessons learned from the planning study:

The most important and immediate problem is that Americans are inadequately prepared for contact and work with people in other cultures. USAF personnel receive little or no background in the language, customs, traditions, attitudes and behaviors of the countries they enter. The typical Air Force officer or airman is nauseated by foods commonplace in the Near East. He is offended by the rank body odor of his native counterparts and is repelled by differences in toilet behavior. He becomes irritated and distracted by oriental fatalism and lack of punctuality. Communication failures, bureaucratic ineptitude and elaborate concern with face-saving frustrate the American advisor all the more. He is consequently unprepared for interpersonal relations with people other than fellow Americans.

Another problem is preparing the USAF airman for a training role in other societies; especially in COIN and pre-COIN operations. The essence of USAF participation in COIN is that we do not do the fighting directly. Our main role is to guide, train, advise and instruct. In the past, the USAF relied on skill proficiency and high motivation to assist the airman in his teaching role (primarily in giving on-the-job training to fellow airmen); these qualities are not enough to overcome the cultural barrier present in most COIN situations. The situation is worsened by the failure of instructional techniques to work effectively in the foreign setting. An informal briefing style enjoyed by trainees in the U.S. can be both threatening and insulting in the Middle East.

The third problem is that American Air Force personnel come into direct, personal contact with the local military personnel they are advising. In many cases they work, eat, socialize, and risk their lives with these counterparts. This relationship places critical importance upon the rapid establishment of rapport, the maintenance of mutual respect and the effective exchange of ideas. Hall (ref. 8, p. 10) argues eloquently for training in cross-cultural communication: "... formal training in the language, history, government, and customs of another nation is only the first step in a comprehensive program. Of equal importance is an introduction to the nonverbal language which exists in every country of the world and among the various groups within each country. Most Americans are only dimly aware of this silent language even though they use it every day. They are not conscious of the elaborate patterning of behavior which prescribes our handling of time, our spatial relationships, our attitudes toward work, play, and learning. In addition to what we say with our verbal language, we are constantly communicating our real feelings in our silent language—the language of behavior. Sometimes this is correctly interpreted by other nationalities, but more often, it is not." In brief; the special character of training requirements for culture-contact and interaction skills poses a problem of critical import for the U.S. Air Force. The cultural training required differs significantly from the usual technical training now provided. COIN operations require training concepts and training research to develop these

8. One exception is the stimulating program carried out by John Stalker at the University of Hawaii at the Peace Corps training site on the Island of Hilo. There, an energetic attempt is being made to utilize a model village approach. This was reported during the 1964 APA Convention at Los Angeles, California in a symposium titled "Training for Transition to a New Culture."

concepts unavailable anywhere in the Air Force today. The traditional emphasis on hardware is inappropriate for this new form of warfare as is the traditional emphasis on propaganda and psychological warfare.

## SECTION III

## THE RESEARCH TASK IN TRAINING FOR CULTURE-CONTACT AND INTERACTION SKILLS

Following the staff study of training requirements for a USAF role in counterinsurgency, a new task was initiated. The basic aim of the task is to improve the capability of Air Force personnel in training and advising personnel from other cultures in the use of U.S. military concepts and in the operation and maintenance of U.S. equipment. The primary concern is with situations where these functions are carried out in the foreign culture itself in a COIN or pre-COIN atmosphere. Such situations have several characteristics which have been influential in molding our approach to the problem:

1. Much of the training and advising is carried out in on-the-job programs and in the context of actual operations rather than in a formal classroom.

2. Modification of the attitudes and motivations of the indigenous personnel is as important as the imparting of knowledge and skills.

3. The "U.S. Image" is inextricably related to the training and advising function.

It is our judgment that the effectiveness with which Air Force personnel carry out their training and advisory missions is based, to a large degree, upon their skill in personal interaction with their counterparts in the foreign culture. This judgment has been confirmed by discussions with personnel at the Special Air Warfare Center and the U.S. Strike Command. We intend to further verify it with a job and critical incident analysis conducted in the field.

In view of the above, our program is being directed toward the development of improved techniques and methods for training Air Force personnel in culture-contact and interaction skills. Our approach is based upon a belief that it is unlikely that these skills can be acquired solely through the learning of facts and figures about a given culture.

Three main steps constitute the technical approach:

1. An on-the-site analysis of those culture-contact and interaction skills critical for the accomplishment of the Air Force mission in pre-COIN and COIN.

2. The design and conduct of experiments leading to the development of cross-cultural training methods. These methods will prepare the USAF airman for an advising and teaching role in a foreign setting, will help lessen or prevent culture-shock, and will equip him with the interaction skills necessary for the enhancement of the U.S. image abroad.

3. Provision of a technical advisory service to facilitate the application of the research findings in actual operations.

These steps are discussed in detail below:

On-the-site task analysis and critical-incident survey: Arrangements were made with the Special Air Warfare Center for a representative of the Training Research Division to accompany a SAWC mobile training team (MTT) to a field site. The principal goal of the field work will be to analyze the role and duties of the MTT and thereby identify the critical behaviors required for mission success. This analysis will be the basis for determining the specific content of the experimental research described under Item 2 below. The representative will actively participate in the

MTT mission (i.e., not just function as an observer) and will train with the team before departure. In this way some initial support of a cross-cultural nature can be given. See Appendix I for a suggested format for the critical behaviors survey. This was adapted from the Critical Incident Technique of Flanagan (ref. 12) and Spector (ref. 10).

Experimental research in training for culture-contact: A direct outcome of Step 1 will be the identification of critical behaviors which lead to culture-shock and other forms of breakdown in cross-cultural communication leading to impairment of the USAF mission. This will lead to determination of the "trainability" of the critical factors. Some factors will be important in specific cultures while others will be general to all foreign cultures. Only factors critical for mission success and modifiable through training will be selected for experimentation and implementation. Once identified, these factors and behaviors will be categorized according to the scheme presented in Appendix IV and the training media or approach most appropriate for each category will be determined. Some of these training techniques exist already (i.e., use of programed presentation, straight lecture, analytic discussion, etc.) while others remain to be developed experimentally (such as the self-confrontation technique mentioned in detail below). The discussion of our approach to the experimental research is under three headings: categorization of critical behaviors, selection of appropriate training techniques, and the development of the self-confrontation method.

1. Categorization of critical behaviors: The Air Commando often does not know where his next assignment will be until a few weeks before he leaves. This means he has no time for the elaborate grounding in language, customs, and habitual behaviors of the foreign culture that a missionary or an anthropologist receives. This places a high priority on acquainting the Commando with those behaviors and values of the local personnel which are essential for establishing rapport. Therefore, a useful distinction in listing the customs and mores of a potential COIN area is to identify the kinds of people the USAF advisor is likely to contact and to list those taboos and behaviors he must be aware of. The remaining behaviors (by far the majority) can be learned on the scene. A second level of classification is then to divide the critical behaviors into acts of avoidance and acts of rapport. Appendix II carries the classification even further (into refinements of taboos which apply inside the society but not outside, etc.).

An example of the three basic divisions above can be drawn from the writer's experience with Turkish Air Force personnel. These divisions are: Avoidance, rapport and commonplace acts. A critical act of avoidance necessary for the American is proper behavior in a mosque (since he will be invited to attend but not instructed how to act). He must remove his shoes just as his counterparts do, but he must not go through the Islamic praying ritual since this would be insulting to his hosts and an obvious mark of insincerity. A critical act of rapport would be any feat of bravery and endurance highly valued by the local personnel and recognized as applicable to anyone, regardless of his culture. An American MTT in one foreign setting was unable to induce the local military pilots to fly night missions with cargo craft until the team members took part in a game of soccer with the local personnel. The game was played under somewhat disagreeable and hazardous conditions and the efforts of the Americans to meet the spirit of the play completely won over their counterparts. Later, the counterparts took part in the night missions.[9] Note that it is not necessary to do well in these acts of rapport. In fact, to excell can be defeating. This means of establishing rapid rapport and respect is consistent with the theory of French and Raven (ref. 13) who have shown experimentally that the most effective relationships in a competitive-cooperative situation exist when the power dependencies permit counter-power strategies. In short, the American is not particularly welcome if he is good in all things, but is much more readily accepted if there are at least some important areas where he plays second fiddle to his hosts. Finally, the areas of the commonplace. In Turkey there are wide latitudes permitted in the style and quality of dress. The American neither gains nor loses respect by his attempts to conform to these expectations. (Dress (within limits) happens to be neutral in value and can be left to experience on the scene; therefore, it should not occupy any valuable time in the culture-training curricula. This is an important point because the variations in dress are interesting and make a colorful and fascinating lecture—they are simply irrelevant to the purpose at hand - namely, efficiently and quickly preparing the American for a crucial role as a military advisor.

9. Interview with MTT leaders at 1st Air Commando Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida, 1964.

2. Selection of appropriate training techniques: Once the critical behaviors are classified the next problem is to select those training regimes best suited for teaching them. Traditionally, the lecture method is used the most. Our planning study suggested that it is limited in its utility. However, some behaviors and values are best transmitted that way (for example, the portrayal of what not to do, since personnel usually do not need skill in not doing what they have never done before anyway - e.g., bowing to Mecca). Another technique is the use of programed instruction, audio-visual devices such as films, records, tapes, etc. This would be useful for familiarizing the trainee with facts about the host country but would not necessarily provide him with any skills. Some techniques used by other agencies are automatically ruled out because of the time involved. Examples of these are: simulated villages, temporary duty assignments in the community of a friendly country whose mores approach those of the host country, living with a family from the host country but who is now residing in the U.S., and other long-term procedures.

Also ruled out is OJT since the USAF MTT mission is usually too short in duration. One possible technique being considered is accelerated acclimation through direct experience. The idea came from the experience of USAF personnel going through Air Force survival schools. Men who learned to eat raw snake and grubs as a means of saving their lives later found that their experience transferred haply to social situations where they were expected to eat at ceremonies honoring them but presenting them with strange and revolting food. The American overseas can easily offend his native host by refusing to eat exotic foods. Where this behavior becomes a critical act of rapport and is essential to mission success, then there will be a definite need for a training program. A number of experimental methods can promote food acceptability. One is to vary the amount of deprivation (different degrees of hunger) in an atmosphere of social commitment and social reinforcement. For example, a very hungry person who publically commits himself to trying unusual food is more likely to take the plunge than a less hungry man under no social pressure. Another method is to vary adaptation in atmospheres of social commitment and reinforcement. An example of this is presenting the unfamiliar food in progressively larger quantities, thus allowing the person to get used to what he is eating (starting with tiny bite-sizes and concluding with substantial, plate-size helpings). Another experimental variation is to expose the person to the sight, sound, smell, and company of others eating the food but without expecting him to eat any at first. When the novelty begins to wear off, he will be more able to sample some; e.g., he sees other people eating frogs' legs daily and enjoying them; finally, he gets the urge to try them too.

The last method of cross-cultural training mentioned here is that of simulation and self-confrontation. This method is the most important contribution we hope to make through this task to the problem of training for cross-cultural contact. The technique is described in the next section.

3. Simulation of cross-cultural environment: Learning to eat unusual foods is only an example of a rapport-establishing skill. Many other cross-cultural skills will be necessary and require training techniques tailored to produce them. This is particularly true for those non-verbal behaviors making up the wide range of social communication vital for effective exchange of ideas and information. Most of these behaviors have a large motoric or gestural component which the advisor is mostly unaware of, since he cannot see himself as others do - expecially during the very act of communication. An example is the critical role of facial and postural expressiveness in an ordinary conversation. Since our only source of feedback in conversation is the reaction of our audience (which may be rigidly controlled or greatly delayed), we have difficulty in learning how and when to modify our behavior for more effective presentation and interaction. This is aggravated when we deal with people from an unfamiliar culture who present us with unfamiliar patterns of facial and postural response. What is needed is a kind of "ego-mirror." Simulation of critical moments in cross-cultural situations plus the phenomenon of self-confrontation are being exploited for such a purpose.

Methods of training traditionally available to the Air Commandos could only provide passive knowledge of cross-cultural skills. The development of simulation and the self-confrontation technique into an effective method of cross-cultural training is one of the primary goals of the Task. Basically, the procedure consists of 6 steps: (a) The trainee is given a short lecture on the proper procedure for working with his counterpart in the host country. (b) A video tape is

then shown the trainee, giving in detail each event in a successful briefing or advising session. (c) Another tape is shown, this time of a briefing which begins to go badly (for example, when briefing a group of Middle-Eastern officers of different ranks, it is fatal to assume that the briefing is going well when you see nods of assent, because this is precisely the technique used by them to keep the instructor from realizing that they do not understand. To be called on because you look puzzled can cause much loss of face). The trainee watches the taped briefings as the depicted scene gets steadily worse. At a critical moment, the experimenter stops the tape and gets the trainee to role-play to completion the situation as he thinks best. Presumably, the trainee will put into action those principles he received in the lecture and the first tape. (d) While the trainee is role-playing the briefing situation with actors procured for that purpose, his actions are being recorded on video tape. (e) Directly after the briefing, the trainee is confronted with an immediate playback of his behavior. This may be accomplished in full sound and life-size (using a Schmidt-type video projector and large screen); or it may be played back with an ordinary monitor screen. Part of our in-service research program is aimed at determining the best mode of playback. Sometimes viewing oneself may be upsetting to the point that a small screen or partial playbacks are advisable until the subject adapts to the technique. The video equipment used permits slow motion and stop-frame runs. Therefore, it is possible for the subject to re-live and witness again and again his every motion and action. (f) The self-confrontation is combined with a critique by a briefer already skilled in the appropriate critical behaviors for the host country. Thus, the subject is confronted with an immediate, visual, and aural playback of his behavior in a cross-cultural training situation, simulated in the laboratory. This procedure is only one of several ways of using simulation and confrontation. The interrupted film plus-role-playing technique alone is an effective means of teacher training as has been experimentally demonstrated by Kersh (ref. 17).

The self-confrontation technique with film instead of video tape is a dramatically successful means of persuasion. The Denver Police Department (ref. 14) uses the method in getting drunken-driving convictions; suspects photographed during their attempts to walk a chalkline blanch when they see the films later. Self-confrontation with films is also successful in the rapid acquisition of table manners; L. H. Ricker of the MacDonald Training Center (ref. 15) used the method with retarded subjects. The technique has a long and successful history in the teaching of foreign languages. The "sound mirror" or immediate playback of subject speech is a common feature of most language laboratories today. The procedure with the sound mirror is similar to experimental technique outlined above - the subject hears a statement on how to pronounce a sentence, then he hears the sentence spoken by a native, the subject tries the sentence himself by speaking into a microphone recording on a dual track, then he hears himself played back and can compare his efforts with the model sentence. The technique involves another psychological principle useful in rapid learning - the phenomenon of stimulated-recall. By replaying the behavioral situation on video tape, the trainee relives the whole scene and therefore can bring to mind what was going through his thoughts just at the moment of the critical behavior. Bloom (ref. 18) and Siegel (ref. 19) have used the technique of stimulated-recall with tape-recordings of college lectures in attempting to assess student attentiveness and teacher effectiveness. Both approaches, self-confrontation and stimulated-recall, depend critically upon the amount of time elapsed between the training session and the viewing of the film. Coaches notice this phenomenon with films of games or scrimmages. Dr. Gerhardt Nielsen of the Copenhagen Psychological Laboratory (ref. 16) reports that the greater the elapsed time, the greater the detachment of the subject, thus, a loss in the value of confrontation. These effects are aggravated by the amount of time required for the developing and processing of film. Video tape has the singular advantage of immediate, full aural and video playback with no processing required. This permits complete utilization of the psychological impact of self-confrontation.

Another advantage lies in the simulation of the cross-cultural situation. The results of the critical incident survey will give the basis for the construction of video taped scenarios. Thus, the construction of the model tapes and later the interrupted scenarios can be carried out inexpensively and rapidly in the laboratory. Fortunately, there are a number of colleges and universities in the vicinity of Wright-Patterson AFB all of which have students from Africa, Panama, Southeast Asia and other areas where the USAF has special units. Thus, "native experts" are readily available. The format and description of the experimental program utilizing the video tape facility for self-confrontation and stimulated-recall is presented in Appendix III.

Should the design and the attendant research prove successful, it would serve effectively as a training device but in addition could easily function as a selection procedure. The video-confronter might serve well as a means of screening personnel for susceptibility to culture shock.

## SECTION IV

## PROGRESS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FUTURE PLANS

Progress to date includes the following: (1) Tentative arrangements for a representative to accompany an MTT to a field assignment. This will permit the direct collection of critical acts of rapport and briefing variables for design of the training experiments. (2) Initial arrangements for procuring the video tape facility. (3) Survey of the literature on self-confrontation and stimulated-recall. (4) Construction and demonstration of a portable presentation aid for use in COIN training in the field. This was developed by Smith and Roberts (ref. 20) and demonstrated to the Strike Command and 1st Air Commando Wing in March 1964. (5) A small-scale pilot study was conducted of the self-confrontation technique.

A situation was sought which had some of the elements of the cross-cultural briefing scene. Teaching an amateur diver how to properly execute a front dive from the high springboard was selected because: (1) As in the briefing situation, there is considerable interaction between fear and performance. (2) The diving maneuver and a person's motoric expressions and nuances of behavior in the classroom are equally unaccessible to memory - i.e., in neither case can the person "see" himself as others do. (3) The critical behaviors or critical acts are well known in diving - i.e., the crucial portion of the dive can be described. (4) There is a standard rating scale for quality of a dive; therefore, a ready-made criterion of the efficacy of the self-confrontation. The procedure consisted of telling the diver what he should do, letting him watch an expert go through the maneuver, taking a polaroid shot of the expert in the critical phase and having the trainee study the model thereby generated, having the trainee then make a dive, and presenting him immediately with a polaroid shot of himself in the critical position. Then the dive with self-confrontation (with critique) was repeated several times. Appendix IV shows the results of the repeated confrontations. The study was done informally and merely as an attempt to get a feeling for the procedure. No conclusions above the subjective and anecdotal level can be drawn, but the experience strongly suggests the power of the self-confrontation technique. One unexpected by-product is that the presence of the camera and the rapid feedback of knowledge of results has an intensely motivating effect; so much so that fear of the dive was temporarily suspended. If this effect transfers to the cross-cultural situation, it will be a boom indeed because the toughest air commando sometimes admits to queasiness when he finds himself as an instructor facing a group of foreign nationals.

A more elaborate pilot study now in progress uses an actual videotape facility. This study is controlled and much closer to the cross-cultural situation, hence should give a good idea of the utility of the self-confrontation technique. Appendix V illustrates how the video equipment will be used. Other future plans include the conducting of a survey among USAF operational units engaged in COIN and pre-COIN to see if there is agreement on a sufficiently narrow and specialized audience of foreign counterparts to permit the construction of an Atlas of counterpart values. Such an Atlas would be very valuable in designing programs for training personnel in culture-contact and interaction skills. The Atlas also would be valuable as a guide not only for USAF COIN advisors but more broadly for the MAAG, MAP, and technical assistance groups. In another area of Task 171008, arrangements were made with the Biospecialties Branch of the AMRL to collaborate in the design of experiments for enhancing the acceptability of unusual foods. The Biospecialties Branch is interested in training people to tolerate the special foods being contemplated for long, extra-terrestrial flights. Should the early work with self-confrontation and critical acts of rapport turn out to be successful, then the food acceptability research might be a rewarding area of investigation for the future.

The advent of twilight war and counterinsurgency brought new missions to the Air Force and with them a unique set of training requirements. The Air Commando finds himself more a teacher

and advisor than a fighter, and consequently, he needs preparation in teaching and interaction skills appropriate to the local cultural setting. The research task in training for culture contact and interaction skills in counterinsurgency was initiated to meet these requirements. The first training technique to be investigated hinges on the phenomenon of self-confrontation - a new and potentially rapid means of providing cross-cultural skills as well as passive knowledge about the host culture. Behavioral incidents which are critical to USAF mission success will be gathered and then used in a video-confrontation procedure for training Air Commandos.

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APPENDIX I

SAMPLE OUTLINE FOR CRITICAL INCIDENT INTERVIEW
(Adapted from: Flanagan, J. The critical incident technique. Psych. Bulletin, July 1954)

A. Obtaining the General Aim for Cross-Cultural Contact and Interaction.

1. Introductory Statement: We (Training Research Division) are making a study of how USAF personnel interact with their counterparts in giving them advice, training them, and in getting along with them socially. We believe you are especially well qualified to tell us about these aspects of your civic action (counterinsurgency) (other) operations.

2. Request for General Aim: What would you say was the primary purpose in your advisory and guiding role in counterinsurgency?

3. Request for Summary: In a few words, how would you summarize the general aim of the Air Commando (or Mobile Training Team member, etc.)?

B. Specifications Regarding Observations.

1. Persons to make the observations.

a. Knowledge concerning the activity.

b. Relation to those observed.

c. Training requirements.

2. Groups to be observed.

a. General description.

b. Location.

c. Persons.

d. Times.

e. Conditions.

3. Behaviors to be observed.

a. General type of activity.

b. Specific behaviors.

c. Criteria of relevance to general aim.

d. Criteria of importance to general aim (critical points).

C. Collecting Effective Critical Incidents.

"Think of the last time you saw another advisor or you yourself doing something which was very helpful in getting the counterpart's attention, respect, and cooperation" (pause until you are certain he has such an incident in mind). "Did this action have a really important effect on the relationship between the advisor and counterpart - enough so that it significantly helped the mission accomplishment?" (If his answer is "No," say: ) "I wonder if you can think of the last time that

someone did something that did have this much of an effect" (when he indicates he has such a situation in mind, say)

1. What were the general circumstances leading up to this incident?
2. Tell me exactly what this person did that was so helpful at that time.
3. Why was this so helpful in establishing a good relationship with the advisor?
4. When did this incident happen?
5. What was this advisor's mission?
6. How long had he been out here?
7. How old is he?

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NOTE: This procedure is designed to elicit critical incidents for effective relationships between American advisors and their counterparts. A similar procedure exists for getting incidents which were critical in causing bad or ineffective relationships between American advisor and counterpart.

Also: This procedure is designed for getting the incidents as seen through the eyes of the American advisor. Another set of incidents could be collected by interviewing the American advisor's counterpart (or by interviewing the advisor's supervisor and the counterpart's supervisor). The method outlined is currently being adapted for field use by in-service and consultant personnel.

APPENDIX II

SCHEME FOR CATEGORIZING CRITICAL BEHAVIORS, VALUES AND TABOOS

-Example-

| Kind of Behavior | American | Mid-East | Training Regime |
|---|---|---|---|
| Universally taboo | desecration of a holy place | Same | lecture |
| Thought to be universally taboo, but actually practiced in other society | public nose-picking | chewing finger nails on left hand | lecture and role-playing to recognition |
| Commonplace or neutrally-valued | variability in dress | Same | None |
| Known to be of value or practiced outside of the society but taboo inside | eating eyeballs | eating fresh pork | film and audio-visual programed instruction |
| Known to be taboo outside of the society but practiced and valued within | (Catholic) crossing oneself | (Islam) bowing to Mecca | film and audio-visual |
| Highly valued within the society and expect other societies to feel the same (critical acts of rapport) | rough contact sports, parachuting, flying, hunting large game | soccer, free diving, wrestling, cold endurance | partial training transferable skills lecture |
| Critical approaches to teaching and briefing | Informal discussion, quizzing and challenges | Formal memorization, concern for loss of face | self-confrontation, role-playing, stimulated-recall interrupted scene |

NOTE: The classification is a partial one and confuses actions, attitudes, ideas and beliefs; the purpose of the classification model here is simply to show the value of compartmentalizing groups of behaviors (or attitudes, etc.) so that the most appropriate training procedure may be assigned. This portion of Task 171008 is still in progress.

The classification scheme, when properly worked out, could serve as a model for collecting and constructing an atlas or compendium of midstrata values and actions useful as a guide and handbook for COIN trainees.

## APPENDIX III

## EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM FOR SELF-CONFRONTATION

The video tape facility is the prime device for the experimental development of a training procedure for culture-contact and interaction skills in counterinsurgency. The phenomena involved are self-confrontation and stimulated-recall. The first study will compare an "optimized" experimental technique with the standard orientation now used.

| Experimental Groups | Criterion |
|---|---|
| A. Training technique (experimental)<br><br>Step I (gets brief lecture on the customs, habits, and cross-cultural skills required)<br><br>Step II (watches enactment of correct cultural behavior)<br><br>Step III (participates after interruption of critical behavior scenerio; gets full video-aural feedback and critique using stimulated-recall)<br><br>(successive groups experience variations in self-confrontation: viz, delay, aural only, visual only, edited confrontation, etc.) | (Note: The criterion will be success of each subject as scored by trained judges as he acts in a simulated cross-cultural situation. There can be three aspects of the criterion situation: (1) Will the person behave as required? (2) Can the person behave as required? (3) How well does the person behave in the situation?) |
| B. Control Group<br><br>(Will receive the standard TAC briefing given by Air Commando Wing at Eglin AFB; the total training time kept equal to that for the Experimental Group.) | |

The design is given in a general form to indicate the approach planned; left out are the specifications of the criterion situation, the rating procedure used by the judged (for example, the trainee could be rated on a scale ranging from "Superior Performance" to "bound to create an international incident"), operational definitions of "correct cultural behavior" and the procedure used for selecting judges. Note that the design permits a test not only of the effectiveness of immediate feedback as a t aining technique, but assesses the relative importance of delay in feedback. The basic ques ion answered by the research is: given a set of critical behaviors required by advisors in cross-cultural situations, what is the best use of training time and resources to teach the behaviors? One preliminary study is completed and results will be reported in a subsequent technical report.

## APPENDIX IV

## ILLUSTRATION OF THE SELF-CONFRONTATION PHENOMENON

The photographs below illustrate the self-confrontation phenomenon. See page 16 for a description of the procedure. The phenomenon was demonstrated as follows: Step 1. The learning task was verbally described to the trainee (viz, improving his performance of a front dive) and then performed by an expert. Step 2. The trainee attempted the dive after watching the expert and observing a polaroid snapshot of the expert. By the time the trainee had reached the side of the pool, the polaroid picture of his own dive was ready and presented to him. Step 3. The trainee observed his own errors while being verbally critiqued and repeated the dive. Upon completion of the dive, he again saw a snapshot. Step 4 and Step 5 were repetitions of Step 3. Step 6 is a comparison between the trainee's final performance and the model dive.

Critical variables in the self-confrontation are:

A. The trainee's heightened awareness of minor cues and changes due to his ego-involvement with his own picture. Not only is perception enhanced but so also are his motivation to do well and his memory of the sequence.

B. The rapid confrontation permits the recall of kinesthetic, facial and bodily variations which otherwise fade quickly from memory.

C. The integration of visual and aural feedback in the critiquing session following each performance.

D. Confrontation permits "reliving" the experience; hence, stimulates the recall of impressions, decisions, attitudes, and other concomitants of the act.

Step 1



Step 2



Step 3



Step 4



Step 5



Step 6

## APPENDIX V

## BRIEFING TRAINING WITH VIDEO TAPE EQUIPMENT

The two photographs below illustrate how the videotape equipment will be used in training American advisors through self-confrontation. In the first photograph, an American officer is briefing a group of foreign nationals on the operation of maintenance checkout equipment. His briefing is being recorded on video tape from a studio control room. What the trainee instructor is saying is recorded on a dual soundtrack (the other track is used by the critiquer for comments, reminders, and cues for the later playback). The second photograph shows the trainee being critiqued immediately after his briefing session. The critiquer is pointing our nuances of expression, errors in timing, cross-cultural differences in use of hands, how close to stand to students, etc. The replay is coming through a Schmidt-type TV projector, which casts the picture upon a screen.

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13 ABSTRACT Air Force participation in counterinsurgency (COIN) and pre-COIN missions requires a new emphasis in preparing the airman. Success in COIN depends upon the ability of the USAF individual to interact effectively with people in other societies. The cross-cultural training required differs markedly from the traditional Air Force stress on the operation and maintenance of hardware. Many USAF training missions abroad are short in duration and depend upon close, intensive interaction between the American advisor and his counterpart. These requirements make it necessary for the American to establish rapport quickly and to communicate efficiently with his counterpart. Up to the present it was assumed if the American were skilled in his job and in the language of the host country that with the correct motivation he could successfully carry out his mission. Such is not case; skill is also required in the other person's customs, habits, taboos, mannerisms, and gestures. Traditionally, the American is prepared for these by briefings or lectures sometimes called "area studies." Unfortunately, knowledge about behavior does not guarantee skill in carrying out that behavior—knowing what to do is not the same as doing what you know. This report outlines a procedure for collecting in the field those cross-cultural behaviors most critical for the success of the advisory mission. A means of categorizing these behaviors for incorporation into a training program is described. Those behaviors requiring passive knowledge may be easily taught by traditional lectures and handbooks. Other behaviors may be taught by programed instructional materials. While others require more elaborate teaching methods. A method for teaching interaction skills using a video tape recorder is presented. Subjects placed in simulated advisor-advisee roles learn critical skills through self-confrontation with video-aural playback of their behavior.

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