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THE NEAR SYSTEM:
A STUDY IN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE

BY
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A STUDY IN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE**

By

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For

**Office of Civil Defense
Department of Defense**

**OCD-OS-63-48
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This report has been reviewed in the Office of Civil Defense and is approved for publication. This approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office of Civil Defense.

SCOPE OF THIS STUDY

In this research we sought to determine the acceptability of a NEAR receiver to the American public. Thus, in principle, we had to consider evaluations of the present warning system, the concept of a home alerting device, and then responses to the specific instrument presented to the respondents.

Furthermore, we sought to assess acceptability under varying modes and costs of distribution: first, receptivity to the system if it were issued free by the Government with varying provisions regarding use; second, if the instrument were available under leasing arrangements; and third, if it were marketed for purchase by the public. Both with regard to leasing and buying, alternative costs were considered--from 15 cents to \$1.00 monthly for the leasing choices, and from \$5.00 to \$25.00 per unit cost for the buying possibility.

We also probed into acceptability of dual and multiple uses of the receiver, specifically if it were employed also to provide warning of natural disasters or impending dangers; and we considered the possibility of a device to be used in cars.

The public responses are contingent upon their evaluations of the larger Cold War environment and of civil defense in more general terms. They, also, are often affected by characteristics of the respondents. Therefore, appropriate items were also involved in this research. This included the consideration of likely terminations of the Cold War, and of desirable endings of the conflict. It included the evaluation, as to likelihood and desirability, of several civil defense systems--five of these options were those identified by Secretary Pittman before the hearing of the Armed Services Subcommittee in mid-1963.

A block sample of 1,500 Americans was included in the research. The field work was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, and the interviews were performed in December, 1963, and early January, 1964.

ABSTRACT

The NEAR System study reported here was conducted in late 1963 and early 1964 in a sample of 1,402 Americans interviewed on behalf of the University of Pittsburgh by National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago.

The study reveals high receptivity to the idea of a home alerting system, and to the specific NEAR receiver tested. Americans claim that they would be likely to acquire such a device. Differences among various population subgroups are only subtle, and none run in entirely opposing directions.

In fact, the actual NEAR receiver, once shown, generates a more favorable response than does the concept of a home alerting system as such.

As might be expected, the public is most responsive to the idea of free distribution by the Government. Yet, somewhat to our surprise, it is as receptive to free distribution with no further requirements to use the instrument as it is to free distribution with legal requirement to use the device.

With increasing costs of leasing arrangements, favorableness of response declines. The likelihood of acquisition by lease is thus related to monthly cost.

Similarly, as purchase price increases, the likelihood of acquisition declines for all segments of our population. But even at the highest leasing and buying costs studied, substantial portions of our populace claim that they would seek to get the device.

In lower socio-economic groups in the population, cheaper leasing alternatives are preferred over outright purchase. And in general, in these groups leasing tends to be favored over purchase. In higher socio-economic groups, the reverse holds. But these are not differences in direction of response (such that one segment might be favorable and another unfavorable); they are differences in magnitude of favorableness.

Duality of function appears to be favored, and the respondents claim a willingness to spend additional money for these added purposes of the home alerting system. Coupling of the function with some appropriate home appliance, however, is less favorably received than are other alternatives. The response is still positive, but less so than for a separate piece of equipment with some dual or multiple purposes.

The results permit us to make a basic projection. We have concluded that if the receiver were brought to people's homes, its functions explained, and leasing or buying arrangements could be made right there and then (thus replicating somewhat the research situation), approximately somewhere between a low of 19,895,000 households (for the \$1.00 lease and \$25.00 buy choice) and a high of 42,916,000 households (for the 15-cent lease and \$5.00 buy option) might be likely to acquire the device. This assumes some 57 million households around January 1, 1964. The projection makes sense with confidence .95 on the premise of a sample design which lends itself to such inferences. A block sample is not precisely that, but experience has shown the agreement between block and probability samples, so that the results can be taken quite seriously with some caution in mind.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the NEAR system. It does not seek to solve the purely technical issues of feasibility, effectiveness or cost. Rather, it addresses itself to the problems of acceptability of NEAR devices to the American public. This is a question of social and political feasibility of any system the eventual performance of which depends, in part or largely, upon public support.

As part of its larger responsibility to provide the nation with a system which might help protect lives and property in the event of an enemy attack upon the United States, the Office of Civil Defense has also undertaken developmental effort with an aim of improving the current warning system. Indeed, if lives and property are to be protected, reliable and rapid warning of impending attack is essential as a prerequisite to other appropriate actions which people may have to take.

Needless to say, the researchers as much as the Office of Civil Defense and others in and out of Government hope that these systems will never have to be put to reality tests. But this is a troubled world. The prospects for war may be diminishing; but they are still with us. An attack upon the United States is not impossible. If the nation seeks to avert the disaster of a thermonuclear war, it must also have the capability of winning if such a war were to be imposed upon us; and if winning is impossible or very unlikely, there are only few who doubt that we would rather "tie" than lose.

Hence, the question is not whether we should have peace or war. On this, just about all agree. The question is of how the nation might survive if all aspirations for a peaceful world should prove false.

At this time a warning system is in operation. The 1962 Annual Report of the Office of Civil Defense identifies seven OCD warning centers which feed information to 454 civilian, and 46 federal warning points. At the state and local levels, Americans receive warning of danger through sirens, bells, horns and other electronic devices. The NEAR system instrumentation seeks to provide warning to each American home directly.

Yet, even if devices which can generate alert signals in American homes are in existence, the question remains whether the public would avail itself of them. The main objective of this study is to consider how the American public views the NEAR system, and whether systems based on this concept are likely to find the needed public support.

II. THE NEAR STUDY

This research was initiated in November, 1963. Its focus has been upon acceptability of the NEAR device to the nation's public.

Patterns of acceptance of the NEAR home alerting system may, of course, be dependent upon the manner in which the device is made available to the public. While other alternatives may be conceivable, the basic modes whereby the equipment may be procured include its purchase, lease, or Government issue.

The system may perform a single function or it may have a role to play in alerting the public to disasters other than an enemy attack. Hence, patterns of acceptance may vary depending on the single-purposeness or some dual or multiple purpose of the system. In the latter sense, an alerting system may warn the nation - and more appropriately, the relevant regions - against hurricanes, tornadoes, or other expected natural disasters.

Furthermore, the alert function may be packaged as a separate piece of equipment or it may be designed into other home appliances. Thus the NEAR system could be coupled, for instance, with the radio, television set, refrigerator, electric door-bell or other appliances which utilize existing public power lines.

Once installed, the system may have to be tested on occasions to insure that it is in working condition. The testing requirement, too, may affect acceptance of the device to begin with or else, it may influence its continued acceptability.

Nor is acceptance of any program whatsoever entirely universal, or non-acceptance altogether general. Hence, it is essential as it is customary in studies of this type to identify the population segments who respond to the program differentially. Acceptance thus may depend upon the characteristics of the respondents, where they live, who they are, and how much information they have about issues particularly relevant to the study. A new system, such as the NEAR device, may be considered acceptable yet unneeded. On one hand, this may involve beliefs that the currently operational warning system is entirely adequate or adequate enough to do the necessary job. On the other hand, this may reflect beliefs that warning systems will simply not be needed at all because war is not going to happen.

Hence, responses to the system, and actual behavior related to it, are affected also by the perceptions of the present warning system and the expectations associated with the Cold War environment.

The NEAR warning system is an aspect of larger civil defense programs and systems. Therefore, attitudes toward civil defense, too, are relevant in interpreting the acceptability of the warning system - itself a prerequisite to other measures whereby the nation could be protected under conditions of attack.

The NEAR system study encompassed these various major dimensions of the problem. Questions in an instrument to be utilized in a sample of the public become further operational expressions of the underlying axes in terms of which we may expect different behavior toward the NEAR system. The questionnaire is given in Appendix A.

The field work in this research was done by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The 1,402 interviews on which this report is based were completed in December 1963, and early January, 1964.

A sample of this size implies that if the reported percentage of respondents were 50, we might be willing to say with confidence .95 that the parameter lies between 47.4 and 52.6 percent. That is to say, the sampling error to be exceeded with a probability of .05 is 2.6 percent when the sample percentage is 50 percent. This is, of course, not precisely the case because the sampling design called for a block sample - a probability sample to the nearest block of residence but not for each individual respondent - so that in entirely rigorous terms the sampling error is unknown. But experience with block samples and probability samples suggests that the same results can be expected although former samples cannot be defended with the precise tools of mathematical sampling theory as can probability samples.

With this limitation in mind, we can present the approximate intervals within which, with confidence .95, the population percentages lie when the sample (of 1,402 Americans) yield a given percentage.

<u>Observed Percentage</u>	<u>Confidence .95</u>	
	<u>Lower Limit</u>	<u>Upper Limit</u>
90	88.4	91.6
80	77.9	82.1
70	67.6	72.4
60	57.4	62.6
50	47.4	52.6
40	37.4	42.6
30	27.6	32.4
20	17.9	22.1
10	8.4	11.6

This report is limited to the analysis of the data as relevant to the NEAR system problem alone. Thus we shall not consider the response patterns regarding civil defense alternatives, or expectations and desires associated with the Cold War, or any of the other main dimensions included in the study. These variables will be considered here only in so far as they bear upon the evaluation of the NEAR receiver.

III. ACCEPTABILITY OF NEAR SYSTEM

1. Home Device and NEAR Device

People may be receptive to the idea of a home alerting device. Yet, faced with an actual product--the implementation of the concept in the form of an actual instrument--they may react quite differently. This is so because their notion of what such a device might be like may be at variance with the reality.

By the same token, people may be reluctant about having some unknown device in their homes but change their minds positively when they actually see the instrument.

On these premises, we wanted to know first of all how people might respond to the underlying concept of the NEAR system. And secondly, we sought to expose them to a casing of the NEAR receiver to see whether exposure to a more realistic instrument will alter their evaluation of the concept itself. The sight of the instrument itself, of course, could make up for increased or lessened receptivity; or it might have no effect on the initial acceptance or lack of it.

There are numerous ways in which we could measure receptivity. Our decision was to probe into the likelihood that the individual respondent would actually wish to acquire one of the devices if and when available. This does not force the respondent to say either that he wants the device or does not; it simply seeks to ascertain how probable it seems to him at the time that he would wish to get the instrument.

The scale which we used ranges from zero to ten. On the scale, the zero response implies certainty or near-certainty that the respondent would not want the instrument at all. It is thus zero likelihood of getting the home alerting device or the specific NEAR receiver subsequently displayed to the subject. Five mirrors indecision--a fifty-fifty likelihood of getting or not getting it. And ten, of course, is meant to imply a strong commitment, or actual certainty, that the respondent will, in fact, acquire the instrument when it becomes available. Other values on the scale represent varying likelihood estimates--the act of procuring the device being more likely (values 6,7,8,9) than not, or being increasingly less likely (values 4,3,2,1).

Some 49 percent of the sampled respondents are likely to acquire a home alerting device. In turn, 28.9 percent are unlikely to do so. Indeed, 28.7 percent of the interviewees assign a likelihood of ten to the prospects of getting such an instrument, whereas 16.0 percent give the zero answer.

Asked about the NEAR receiver specifically--after the casing has been shown to them and the system very briefly explained--65.1 percent of the respondents give answers in excess of the fifty-fifty likelihood; whereas only 18.8 percent give answers lower than even odds. Actually, there are 41.2 percent respondents who now express a certainty or near-certainty that they would acquire the device, and 10.3 percent assign zero probability to this action. Table 1 summarizes the results.

Table 1.

RESPONDENTS LIKELY AND UNLIKELY TO ACQUIRE
(a) A HOME ALERTING DEVICE, AND (b) NEAR RECEIVER

		<u>In Percent</u>	
<u>Scale Value</u>		<u>Home Device</u>	<u>NEAR Receiver</u>
10	Certain or near-certain to get	28.7	41.2
6,7,8,9	Likely to get	20.4	23.9
5	As likely as not	22.0	16.2
4,3,2,1	Unlikely to get	12.9	8.5
0	Certain or near-certain not to get	16.0	10.3
		(1388)*	(1372)*

* The percentages are based on those respondents who answered the question. Thus, there are 14 interviewees who did not respond to the probe regarding the general idea of a home alerting device; and 30 respondents failed to answer to the NEAR receiver question. Of the total sample, N=1402, the former group amounts to 1 percent; and the latter to 2.1 percent.

There is no doubt that the actual appearance of the NEAR receiver increases acceptance on the part of the respondents. This must be interpreted to mean that the image which people may have of what a home alerting device would look like is different from the way the NEAR receiver does look. Specifically, we read into the results the implication that the respondents anticipated a device which looks somewhat, or even considerably, less appealing than the NEAR receiver in reality does. Unfortunately, we did not have the foresight to probe into the way in which the image of

a home alerting device was at variance with the reality--this could have added interpretative value to the difference between the results.

2. Effect of Exposure to NEAR Receiver

Of course, we cannot assume that favorableness of response to the system increased throughout the sample after respondents had been exposed to the device. Some people may have reacted in the opposite manner. Table 2. gives the results. It shows that 1360 respondents altogether answered both questions; and by far most of them expressed greater probability of getting the specific NEAR receiver than a general device of unknown characteristics.

It is important to note that people who answered that they would be "certain" or "near-certain" (scale value 10) to get the home alerting device are basically also "certain" or "near-certain" of acquiring the specific NEAR receiver. In fact, 83.1 percent of them remain stable in that they give the ten likelihood answer to both items. Similarly, people who attach zero probability to the generalized home alerting system tend to remain in the zero likelihood group for the NEAR receiver; among them, 46.1 percent remain stable.

Reversing the argument somewhat, we can say that of the people who are certain to get a home alerting system, 16.9 percent change their minds once exposed to the actual NEAR device--and they, of course, respond with decreased probability of getting the instrument. Among the people almost certain not to want a home alerting device, 53.9 percent express enhanced chances of doing so when the NEAR receiver was shown to them.

Table 2.

CHANGES IN LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING DEVICE AS A FUNCTION
OF EXPOSURE TO NEAR RECEIVER

	<u>Percent</u>
Likelihood increased	40.1
Ceiling stability*	23.8
Stability**	15.9
Floor stability***	7.5
Likelihood decreased	12.7
	(1360)

*Ceiling stability refers to people who were in the ten likelihood group regarding home alerting device, and remain there for the NEAR receiver. These people cannot change except downward, hence "ceiling" stability.

**Stability refers to people who gave answers 1,2,3,4,5, 6,7,8, or 9 to the home alerting device and exactly the same answers to the NEAR receiver after seeing the instrument. These people are truly "stable" in that they could have gone up or down the scale--although, of course, not the same number of steps (this depends on their initial position).

***Floor stability pertains to people who gave a zero answer to the home alerting device and also a zero answer to the NEAR receiver. These people could not have gone down in their likelihood answer, and any change would have to be upward.

In only 2.0 percent of the cases, the initial likelihood in excess of fifty-fifty goes below this indifference point upon exposure to the NEAR device. In 8.7 percent of the cases, the respondents who initially (regarding the general home alerting system) have responses lower than fifty-fifty move beyond the indifference point (and therefore, give answers of likelihood of 6,7,8,9, or 10).

Hence, no matter how we look at the data, we must conclude that seeing the actual NEAR receiver has an important positive effect on the willingness to acquire it.

In connection with the unspecified home alerting device, there are 221 respondents, or 16.5 percent of the total sample (N=1402),

who give a zero likelihood answer to procuring such an instrument. Of these respondents, 16.3 percent shift from zero probability to certainty (probability of ten) of getting the NEAR receiver once it had been shown to them.

Table 3. provides the basic data about shifts from the attitude toward the generalized device to the NEAR receiver.

Table 3.

STABILITIES AND SHIFTS IN ACCEPTABILITY OF GENERAL HOME ALERTING SYSTEM TO NEAR RECEIVER, ONCE SHOWN*

<u>Home Device</u>	<u>NEAR Receiver</u>					
	Certain, Near-Certain (10)	Likely (9,8,7,6)	Fifty- Fifty (5)	Unlikely (4,3,2,1)	Certain Not to Get (0)	
Certain, Near-Certain (10)	83.1	10.3	3.1	1.2	2.3	(394)
Likely (9,8,7,6)	36.5	51.7	6.5	4.3	1.0	(277)
Fifty-Fifty (5)	24.1	28.2	40.3	5.0	2.5	(298)
Unlikely (4,3,2,1)	15.5	24.1	14.3	36.7	8.9	(174)
Certain, Near-Certain Not to Get (0)	16.5	7.7	20.7	9.0	46.1	(221)
	(560)	(326)	(221)	(116)	(137)	(1360)

*The percentages add up to 100 for each row: thus, given position regarding home alerting system, or contingent upon such position, what percentage of people change their opinion (or remain stable) upon exposure to the NEAR receiver?

To what extent are these results general for various segments of the population? Table B-1/A-U (Appendix B) provides the basic data in terms of averages for various subgroups. It is clear from these tables (A-U) that the NEAR system does better in all groups than the general and unknown home alerting system.

There is one sole exception to this: the very few individuals (0.8 percent of the total sample) who think that the Cold War might end by a United States surrender without war (Table B-1/T) attach a somewhat greater likelihood to getting the "home device" than the NEAR device. But even among these respondents this does not amount to a negative shift: for these few individuals are so positive to begin with (averaging 83.1 on the 0-100 scale) that the decline to an average of 81.8 cannot be construed as opposition to the NEAR device.

All in all, there is ample evidence that the concept of a home alerting system is quite acceptable; and even more, that the NEAR device is actually more acceptable to all basic segments of the population.

3. Modes of Distribution

Our question about likelihood of acquiring the NEAR device (or for that matter, the prior question about the "home" device) deliberately ignores any indication of how the respondent might accomplish this. To this end, a series of questions was designed to test acceptability of the NEAR device (a) under variable costs of renting it, (b) under variable costs of purchasing it, and (c) under variable modes of obtaining the instrument free of charge from the Government.

It seems reasonable to postulate that the free issue concept would be more acceptable than either purchase or rental. Thus we expect greatest receptivity to this mode of acquisition. In turn, renting a piece of equipment may be generally more favored than buying it, at least for some time to come. This seems too sensible to hypothesize because a leasing arrangement does not commit the respondent to continue having the instrument, even should he turn out to be dissatisfied with it. Buying, on the other hand, implies a commitment from the outset.

Therefore, we thought that the free Government issue items will be most acceptable, the leasing alternatives next most, and purchase possibilities least of all. Furthermore, within each of these basic modes, we think that it is natural that the greater the cost (of either leasing or buying) the lesser the likelihood that the respondent will make the necessary investment.

4. Government Issue

Table 4. gives the percentages of respondents who, under each mode of free Government issue, express varying degrees of likelihood that they would get one of the devices for their homes.

Table 4.

PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS WITH VARYING LIKELIHOOD
OF GETTING NEAR DEVICE UNDER THREE MODES
OF FREE ISSUE BY GOVERNMENT

<u>Scale Value</u>		<u>In Percent</u>		
		<u>Free Issue</u> <u>of Device</u>	<u>Free Issue Upon</u> <u>Promise to Use</u>	<u>Free Issue, Use</u> <u>Legally Required</u>
10	Certain, Near-Certain To Get	81.2	81.1	84.4
9,8,7,6	Likely	6.0	7.6	5.9
5	Fifty-Fifty	4.7	5.0	3.2
4,3,2,1	Unlikely	2.0	1.7	2.4
0	Certain, Near-Certain Not to Get	6.0	4.7	4.0
		(1396)	(1397)	(1395)

The result is, in some ways, both as expected and at the same time somewhat surprising. It is, to be sure, obvious that given free issue of the instrument, by far most people claim that they would accept one. The percentages are very high indeed. They amount to nearly 90 percent of people who say that they would be more likely than not to go along with such a plan.

What seems a little surprising, however, is the fact that receptivity to the device given its free issue but use required by law (once the respondents presumably had the device) is even greater than for the other alternatives. We expected this mode of distribution to be the least acceptable one of the free issue choices. Yet, it turns out to be most acceptable of all.

The result reflects then a general disposition of the public to abide by the laws of the land. The question as worded did not tap the potential underlying controversy whether such a law should be passed to begin with. The issue therefore is not whether the public would accept the NEAR system and use it if such usage were required by law: the public would clearly do so. Rather, the problem is whether before such a law would be enacted, or could be passed, the controversy about infringement of privacy would not become quite vigorous. Our data cast no light on this point.

Table B-4/A-U (Appendix B) documents the underlying similarity of attitude of the various segments of the population. As was

the case with responses regarding the likelihood of acquiring a home alerting system, or the specific NEAR instrument shown to the respondents, the interviewees are quite homogeneous with regard to their receptivity to each of the three modes of free distribution of the device.

5. Leasing Alternatives

In randomized order, the respondents were asked about the likelihood that they might lease the NEAR receiver for 15 cents, 25 cents, 50 cents, or a dollar a month. Table 5. gives the basic responses.

Table 5.

PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS WITH VARYING LIKELIHOOD
OF LEASING NEAR DEVICE AT VARIABLE MONTHLY COST

<u>Scale Value</u>		<u>In Percent</u>			
		<u>15 ¢</u>	<u>25 ¢</u>	<u>50 ¢</u>	<u>\$1.00</u>
10	Certain, Near-Certain To Get	48.9	40.4	33.3	26.1
9,8,7,6	Likely to Get	15.9	20.6	20.8	18.4
5	Fifty-Fifty	10.1	10.7	11.8	12.8
4,3,2,1	Unlikely to Get	7.7	9.2	11.2	14.0
0	Certain, Near-Certain Not to Get	17.5	19.0	22.9	28.8
		(1392)	(1392)	(1392)	(1393)

As might be expected, with increasing rental cost the percentages of respondents who would acquire the device keeps decreasing. At 15 cents a month, close to 50 percent of the interviewees claim that they would be just about certain to get the NEAR receiver into their homes; at \$1.00 monthly, a quarter of the population gives the same response.

Appendix B, Table B-2/A-U, details the responses on the part of the various subgroups of the population. For each segment of the sample the average likelihood of procuring the device declines with increasing cost. Although some differences in

receptivity do exist among the various population groups, there is an underlying homogeneity of response throughout.

6. Purchase Alternatives

Table 6. deals with propensities to buy the NEAR receiver at variable cost. On the whole, the respondents seem somewhat less inclined to buy, at least over the range of prices suggested, than to lease the device--again, at least with respect to the rental costs considered.

Table 6.

PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS WITH VARYING LIKELIHOOD
OF BUYING NEAR RECEIVER AT VARIABLE COST

<u>Scale Value</u>		<u>In Percent</u>			
		<u>\$5.00</u>	<u>\$10.00</u>	<u>\$15.00</u>	<u>\$25.00</u>
10	Certain, Near-Certain to Get	44.4	32.1	23.8	18.1
9,8,7,6	Likely to Get	19.2	20.3	20.9	16.7
5	Fifty-Fifty	11.3	12.4	12.0	11.9
4,3,2,1	Unlikely to Get	8.0	12.2	15.3	15.4
0	Certain, Near-Certain Not to Get	17.1	23.0	27.9	37.0
		(1395)	(1393)	(1389)	(1389)

At \$1.00 per month, the percentage of respondents who are almost certain not to lease the NEAR receiver exceeds the percentage of those who say that they are just about sure to get one at that cost. When it comes to purchase acquisition, the cutting point comes at \$15.00. At the cost of \$25.00 for the instrument, the overall percentages of people unlikely to get one exceed the numbers of those who remain likely to do so. Details for various subgroups are given in Table B-3/A-U of the corresponding Appendix.

Although receptivity declines with cost--whether rental or purchase--it seems inescapable that the responses are quite favorable over the whole range of prices suggested. Even at \$1.00 per month, some 26 percent of the respondents express a certainty or near-

certainty to lease the device; even at \$25.00 per unit, 18.1 percent are similarly sure to want to get one. At the lowest costs (15 cents in rental or \$5.00 in outright purchase), nearly two out of three Americans are more likely to want the device than not; and nearly one out of two are just about certain that they would do so.

On the other hand, the percentages of those who would be nearly sure not to want the device increase with rising costs. About one in five are disinterested even at the lowest rental or purchase price; about one in three are disinterested at the highest cost considered in the study.

Regardless of cost, and whether rental or purchase, one in ten Americans give even odds to acquiring the receiver or not acquiring it.

7. Estimates of Acquisition

Table 7. gives the lower and upper limits of the interval within which, with confidence .95, lie the population likelihood averages if the sample averages are those as shown in Table B-2 in the Appendix.

Table 7.

INTERVAL WITHIN WHICH POPULATION AVERAGE
IS LIKELY TO LIE WITH CONFIDENCE .95
FOR THE LEASE ALTERNATIVES*

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Lower Limit</u>	<u>Upper Limit</u>
Lease for 15 ¢	66.1	70.3
Lease for 25 ¢	62.0	66.2
Lease for 50 ¢	56.0	60.2
Lease for \$1.00	47.7	51.9

*Stretching the 0-10 observed scale into a 0-100 range, the standard deviations which lead to this result are: 39.4 for the 15¢ alternative; 39.5 for 25¢; 40.3 for 50¢ and 40.6 for \$1.00, all yielding as standard error of the mean approximately 2.1.

On the basis of the Bureau of the Census reports, we can assume some 57 million households in the United States by late 1963.

The expected numbers of households likely to lease the NEAR receiver at varying monthly costs are then given in Table 8.

Table 8.

EXPECTED NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT
MIGHT LEASE NEAR RECEIVER AS ESTIMATED
FROM SAMPLE DATA
(CONFIDENCE INTERVAL .95)
ASSUMING 57 MILLION HOUSEHOLDS JAN. 1, 1964

In Thousands

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Lower Estimate</u>	<u>Higher Estimate</u>
Lease for 15 ¢	37,677	40,071
Lease for 25 ¢	35,340	37,734
Lease for 50 ¢	31,920	34,314
Lease for \$1.00	27,189	29,588

The corresponding interval estimates for the purchase alternatives are contained in Table 9.

Table 9.

INTERVAL WITHIN WHICH POPULATION AVERAGE
IS LIKELY TO LIE WITH CONFIDENCE .95
FOR THE PURCHASE ALTERNATIVES*

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Lower Limit</u>	<u>Upper Limit</u>
Buy for \$5.00	64.9	68.9
Buy for \$10.00	55.0	59.2
Buy for \$15.00	47.4	51.6
Buy for \$25.00	38.4	42.2

*The standard deviations are 38.6 for \$5.00; 40.0 for \$10.00; 39.6 for \$15.00; and 39.3 for \$25.00. Given the sample size, these yield 2.0 as standard error of the mean for the \$5.00 and \$25.00 alternatives, and approximately 2.1 for the other two cost levels.

In the same manner in which the numbers of households were estimated in terms of the distinct leasing alternatives, we can present the estimates for the purchase choices. (Table 10.)

Table 10.

EXPECTED NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT MIGHT
PURCHASE NEAR DEVICE AS ESTIMATED FROM SAMPLE
DATA (CONFIDENCE INTERVAL .95)
ASSUMING 57 MILLION HOUSEHOLDS JAN. 1, 1964

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>In Thousands</u>	
	<u>Lower Estimate</u>	<u>Higher Estimate</u>
Buy for \$5.00	36,993	39,273
Buy for \$10.00	31,350	33,744
Buy for \$15.00	27,018	29,412
Buy for \$25.00	21,888	24,054

How seriously can these estimates be taken? First of all, they pertain to discrete alternatives: the receiver is, implicitly, assumed available either on a lease or purchase basis. And it is available at a certain monthly or total purchase price.

The likelihood statements come from respondents who were (a) visited in their own homes, (b) shown the NEAR receiver, (c) briefly explained its functioning and use. Apart from possible problems associated with the sampling design--the extent to which the sample does not actually reproduce the public (and some deviations from the design occur in the course of study implementation simply because of unavailability of certain respondents or other sources of difficulty)--the estimates should be validated if the conditions hold under which the questions were asked. Thus, if Americans become aware of the device; if they see it; if they are told about its use; and if they can make an arrangement to lease or buy it right on the spot.

Departures from these conditions are likely to deflate the estimates. Hence, we would expect fewer households than those indicated to actually acquire the NEAR receiver.

There are several important reasons for this. Quite a few people may not become aware of the device at all; and quite a few only after considerable time. There is no question that such respondents cannot act--to lease or buy it--until they know of the alternative. Secondly, even among those who may have learned about it, many will not understand its precise purpose or functioning. If some expenditure of energy is required to learn more about

the device, many additional people will not be motivated enough to do so.

Next, even if quite a few people may understand the system, many might not be prompted to find out where to go to get it, or having found out, actually go and make the necessary arrangements. Quite a strong motivation would be required for people to try to find out where to go, to decide to go there, to make the needed arrangements.

If leasing and buying are not distinct choices but both are possible, many people will postpone decision (even among those who will have found out all that is necessary) because it will not be altogether clear to all whether they wish to lease or buy it.

Now, furthermore, even among those who will know about the device, its functions and use, and will want to get one and know where and how to do so, they may forget to implement their decision unless they can act immediately after they will have decided.

Some people may not forget. They simply postpone action (even though they may be decided to acquire the receiver) because it may lack urgency at that time; or because the urgency is not matched by their pocketbook at that moment.

Finally, publicity about the device is likely to stir up controversies. The same arguments which have been employed against civil defense programs in general will likely be utilized (by the same people) against the home alerting system. Prominent among these will be emphasis upon "death symbolism", "anxiety arousal", "sense of complacency" or "false sense of security", and "acceptance of thermonuclear war as a possibility". These arguments may affect a few of the otherwise favorably disposed individuals. They may not become opposed to the NEAR system either in principle or in implementation; but they, too, are more prone to postpone action until they will have seen whether the device finds acceptance among their friends and neighbors--until some degree of community consensus crystallizes about it.

We would therefore conclude that a matter-of-fact house-to-house distribution coupled with an explanation of the system should produce receptivity at about the levels estimated from this research. Other procedures will, however, yield a much reduced number of households likely to acquire the instrument. The amount of degradation due to the various factors previously mentioned, and perhaps several more factors not explicitly stated here, cannot be estimated. Experimental or near-experimental studies in several otherwise matched communities would permit such an assessment.

Table 11
POPULATION GROUPS ABOVE (A), AT (=), OR BELOW (B) NATIONAL NORM
IN RECEPTIVITY

	Home device	Near device	G1	G2	G3	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	Percent above norm
A. Norm: National total	58.4	70.0	88.9	90.2	91.5	68.2	64.1	58.1	49.8	66.9	57.1	49.5	40.4	
B. New England	B	B	B	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	7.7
Middle Atlantic	A	=	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B	=	A	A	69.2
East North Central	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
West North Central	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	B	69.2
South Atlantic	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	100.0
East South Central	=	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	B	A	61.5
West South Central	A	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	61.5
Mountain States	A	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	84.6
Pacific	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	=	B	0.0

By census region

	Home device	Near device	G1	G2	G3	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	Percent above norm
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C. Standard metropolitan area (2,000,000 or more)

Other metropolitan areas
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more

County with no city of 10,000 or more

D. Whites

Negroes

E. Men

Women

F. Younger people (Up to 50)

Older people (Over 50)

	Home device	Near device	G1	G2	G3	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	Percent above norm
G. Single, never married	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	76.9
Married	=	A	A	A	A	=	B	=	=	A	A	A	A	61.5
Divorced	B	A	B	B	A	B	B	B	B	A	B	B	B	23.1
Widowed	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
Separated	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	76.9
H. Republicans	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
Democrats	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	100.0
Others	B	B	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	=	B	23.1
No party preference	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
I. Protestants	B	B	A	A	B	A	A	=	B	B	B	B	B	30.8
(Baptist)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(B)	92.3
(Methodist)	(B)	(B)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	61.5
(Episcopalian)	(B)	(B)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	69.2
(Presbyterian)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	7.7
(Lutheran)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)	100.0
(Congregational)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(A)	(A)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	15.5
(Fundamentalist)	(A)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(A)	(A)	(A)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	30.8
Catholics	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	100.0
Jews	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	53.9

By marital status
By party
By religion

By religiosity	Home device	Near device	G1	G2	G3	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	Percent above norm
J. Very strongly religious	A	A	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	69.2
Strongly religious	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	=	B	A	A	A	A	76.9
Moderately religious	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	A	A	69.2
Not strongly religious	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	7.7
Not religious	B	B	B	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	7.7

K. No schooling	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
Grammar school	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	23.1
Some high school	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	100.0
Completed high school	B	B	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	46.2
Some college	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	92.3
College	B	A	A	B	B	B	B	A	=	A	A	A	A	53.9
Beyond college	B	A	B	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	23.1

By education

By occupation	Home device		Near device	G1	G2	G3	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	Percent above norm
L. Professionals	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	7.7
Farmers, farm managers	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
Managers, officials, proprietors	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	61.5
Clerical workers	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	38.5
Sales workers	B	B	B	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	23.1
Craftsmen, foremen	A	B	B	A	=	A	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	B	38.5
Operatives	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	A	B	B	B	61.5
Service workers	A	A	A	A	A	=	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	92.3
Farm laborers	A	A	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	46.2
Laborers	A	A	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	84.6
M. Under \$3,000	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	7.7
\$3,000-\$4,999	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	92.3
\$5,000-\$7,499	B	B	B	A	=	=	B	B	B	B	A	A	=	=	23.1
\$7,500-\$9,999	B	=	=	=	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	61.5
\$10,000-\$14,999	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	69.2
\$15,000-\$24,999	B	A	A	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	76.9
\$25,000 and over	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	46.2

By income

By occupation

	Home device	Near device	G1	G2	G3	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	Percent above norm
N. Own	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
Rent	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	100.0
O. Upper class	A	A	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	84.6
Middle class	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	7.7
Working class	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	92.3
Lower class	A	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B	53.8
P. Served in armed forces	A	=	A	A	A	B	B	=	B	A	A	A	A	61.5
Did not serve	B	=	B	B	B	A	A	B	=	B	B	B	B	15.5
Q. In combat	A	A	=	A	B	A	A	A	A	B	B	A	A	69.2
Never in combat	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	B	=	A	A	A	A	69.2
R. Living alone	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
Smaller households (two to five)	B	B				B	B	B	B					
Larger households (six or more)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	100.0

By
ownership

By class

By
military
serviceBy
combat
experienceBy
household
size

	Home device	Near device	G1	G2	G3	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	Percent above norm
T. Status quo continued	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
Acceptance of Communism	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	0.0
Communist victory by revolutions	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	61.5
Communist victory in war	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	B	A	A	A	38.5
Destructive war	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	69.2
U.S. war victory	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	84.6
Communist defeat by revolutions	B	B	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	23.1
Communist evolution to democracy	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	84.6
Disarmament	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	100.0
Third Force emergence	B	B	B	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	=	A	B	15.5
U.S. surrender without war	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	100.0
Soviet surrender with- out war	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	46.2

By present warning
system rating

	Home device	Near device	G1	G2	G3	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	Percent above norm
U. Present system very good	B	A	=	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	15.5
Present system good	B	B	=	A	A	=	B	B	B	A	=	B	B	23.1
Present system fair	=	A	A	=	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	76.9
Present system poor	A	A	A	B	=	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	84.6

8. Disposition of Various Population Groups

Now using national averages as a norm, we can summarize the results of the various questions. In Table 11/A-U, each group is identified as being above (A) or below (B) the national norm on each item. When it lies within (± 0.1) of the average, we have marked it as being just about at the norm (=). Hence, those population segments which are characterized by the letter A predominantly or entirely are more favorable to the home alerting device concept, the NEAR receiver, the leasing, buying, and free issue alternatives than the nation as a whole. The groups where the B mark predominates are, on the other hand, below the national average.

The table identifies certain population segments as being above and below the national norm. This, however, must be interpreted in the light of the overriding fact that all groups are quite favorable throughout, and that the differences around the national norm are rarely substantial. Nonetheless, relative importance can be attributed to the situation in which a particular group is consistently either above or below the national average even if item by item differences fail to be statistically significant. Patterns particularly favorable and unfavorable by this criterion are listed in Table 12. below.

Table 12.

PATTERNS OF PARTICULARLY HIGH AND PARTICULARLY LOW RECEPTIVITY

<u>Percent In Sample</u>	<u>Characteristics of Particularly Receptive Respondents</u>	<u>Percent In Sample</u>	<u>Characteristics of Somewhat Less Receptive Respondents</u>
	South Atlantic East South Central West South Central Mountain		New England East North Central Pacific
40.7	Large metropolitan areas (but less than 2,000,000)	23.6	Largest metropolitan areas (2,000,000 and over)
16.1	Urbanized counties	19.6	Rural counties
13.1	Negroes	86.9	Whites
51.7	Women	48.2	Men
66.3	Younger people	33.7	Older people
58.6	Democrats	28.5 4.1	Republicans No party preference

Table 12./continued

<u>Percent In Sample</u>	<u>Characteristics of Particularly Receptive Respondents</u>	<u>Percent In Sample</u>	<u>Characteristics of Somewhat Less Receptive Respondents</u>
23.6	Catholics	4.8	Presbyterians
6.7	Lutherans		
21.9	Baptists	3.3	Not strongly religious
		2.6	Not religious
23.6	Some high school		
12.4	Some college	1.0	No schooling
9.7	Service workers	13.5	Professionals
		6.9	Farmers, farm managers
21.8	Income \$3,000-\$4,999		
		19.2	People with incomes below \$3,000
2.0	Upper class		
50.6	Working class	44.6	Middle class
37.3	People who rent	62.7	People who own
17.4	One child families		
13.0	Two children		No young children
3.3	Larger families		
16.3	Larger households		
25.5	Expect Cold War to end by disarmament	21.4	Expect Cold War to go on
8.0	People who expect Communist regimes to evolve into democratic governmental forms	1.1	People who expect the world to become Communist
		16.9	People who think the the present warning system is very good
20.3	People who consider present warning system poor		

9. Relations of Alternatives

After the respondents were shown the NEAR receiver, they were asked the general question about the device: how likely would they acquire it. Thus cost was in no way considered directly in the initial probe. Only subsequently--and following the randomized free issue sequence (outright issue, issue upon promise,

issue and legal requirement on use)--were the respondents exposed to the prospects of leasing at various monthly rates, and then to buying at various rates.

We know already that all groups were more receptive to the NEAR instrument after they saw the receiver than they were to a general home alerting system. We may now consider the effect of introducing the cost-free issue, and the various lease and purchase alternatives.

All groups in the sample are more likely to accept the NEAR receiver under all three modes of free Government issue than they are to acquire it without the distribution mode or cost being specified.

All groups are more likely to claim that they would acquire the device without knowledge of distribution mode or cost (the general NEAR device question) than they would lease it for either \$1.00 or 50¢ per month.

Only very few groups are an exception to this when it comes to the 25¢ alternative: people in the South Atlantic states, people without party preference, Episcopalians, and lower class respondents. These subgroups rate the likelihood of leasing the device for both 25¢ and 15¢ higher than the corresponding probability of getting it before cost considerations entered into the questioning.

In addition to these groups, several other segments of the sample would be more likely to pay 15¢ per month than would aspire to get the device apart from cost considerations: these groups include respondents from East and West South Central states, and from Mountain states; they include Negroes; widowed and separated people; Baptists and people with fundamentalist religious preferences as well as people who claim not to be religious; people with no schooling or with grammar school education only; operatives, service workers and industrial laborers; people in the two lowest income groups (below \$3,000, and \$3,000-\$4,999); people who rent their place of residence; those who identify with the working class; people who live alone; and people who expect the Cold War to end through a victorious world war.

All other subgroups in the sample respond less favorably to even the cheapest lease alternative (15¢ per month) than they do to the device in principle.

The \$25.00, \$15.00 or \$10.00 alternative does not produce a higher likelihood than the general NEAR question in any group in the sample. Only a few groups attach higher probabilities to buying the receiver for \$5.00 than to the general willingness of acquiring it: residents of the West North Central states, Episcopalians, people who are not religious, farmers and farm managers, and people in the \$7,500-\$9,999 income group.

Average probabilities of leasing the NEAR device for segments of the American public are given in Table B-1/A-U, and the likelihood of buying the instrument at variable prices is similarly given in Table B-1/A-U. These tables contain 104 population segments. It is now possible to compare the probabilities for all groups for all lease and purchase arrangements. Table 13. is a summary without differentiating the groups in any manner.

Table 13.

NUMBERS OF GROUPS DEPENDING ON WHETHER SPECIFIC
LEASING OR PURCHASE ALTERNATIVE YIELDS
HIGHER LIKELIHOOD OF ACQUISITION*

(Groups from Appendix B, Tables)

		P(\$5.00)	P(\$10.00)	P(\$15.00)	P(\$25.00)
P(15¢)	<	41	2	0	0
	>	63	102	104	104
P(25¢)	<	81	8	2	1
	>	23	96	102	103
P(50¢)	<	99	43	6	1
	>	5	61	98	103
P(\$1.00)	<	103	98	59	2
	>	1	6	45	102

*Read P(15¢) > , for instance, as follows: the probability average for the 15¢ lease is greater than the probability average for purchase--P(\$5.00), P(\$10.00)...--in as many groups as indicated in the appropriate intersection of the row and column.

In turn, P(15¢) < means that the 15¢ lease likelihood average is lower than some other alternative in as many groups as shown for that alternative.

Thus there are 41 population segments that would rather pay \$5.00 in outright purchase than spend 15¢ monthly on a rental basis. There are only two groups that would prefer to spend \$10.00 than lease the device at 15¢ a month; and no groups would like to spend either \$15.00 or \$25.00 than 15¢ in monthly lease.

There are, along the same lines, twenty-three groups which prefer to pay 25¢ each month than \$5.00 to purchase the NEAR receiver; ninety-six groups would pay 25¢ each month rather than \$10.00; two groups would pay the \$15.00 in purchase price in preference over 25¢ each month; and one group would pay \$25.00 cost rather than 25¢ monthly.

A 50¢ rental is preferable to five groups over \$5.00 purchase cost; to sixty-one groups over \$10.00; to ninety-eight groups over \$15.00; and to all but one very small group over the \$25.00 potential cost.

The last lease alternative, \$1.00 monthly, is wanted only by one group more than a purchase at \$5.00; by six groups over the \$10.00 price tag; by forty-five groups over \$15.00; and by all but two groups over \$25.00.

These then are people, by and large, in somewhat better socio-economic positions in our society. In terms of the criterion used here, they would rather spend \$5.00 outright than 15 cents on a monthly basis. Furthermore, people with incomes in excess of \$25,000 would also spend \$10.00 in purchase price in preference over 15-cent rental fee per month (the difference is 3.7 units). So would the very few respondents who think that the Cold War might end in Communist victory in a violent conflict (the difference is 6.3 for these people).

Hence, people in somewhat lower socio-economic positions would generally rather pay 15 cents every month than spend \$5.00. As a matter of fact, Table 15. shows that these individuals would also prefer to spend 25 cents monthly rather than \$5.00, whereas people particularly with higher incomes would spend \$10.00 in preference to a monthly fee of 25 cents (and we already know that they would also spend \$5.00 rather than 15 cents).

People with large incomes (over \$25,000) would rather pay \$10.00 than 15 cents--although not \$15.00 or \$25.00. They would also rather pay \$15.00 than 25 cents monthly--but not \$25.00. The few respondents who think the Communists might win in a war like to spend \$10.00, \$15.00, and even \$25.00 more than pay 25 cents in monthly rentals.

Of these groups, however, only five would also have a preference for 50 cents on a monthly basis over \$5.00 total cost. These are respondents from East South Central states (difference 2.8), people of fundamentalist religious affiliations (difference 1.6), without schooling (2.7), with seven or more young children (22.0), and those who think the Cold War will end in Communist victory by revolutions and civil wars throughout the world (6.1).

Table 14.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE WHO PREFER \$5.00
PRICE OVER 15 cents MONTHLY RENTAL**

<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference*</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>
New England	0.1	Professionals	3.4
East North Central	1.1	Farmers	2.7
West North Central	4.3	Managers	1.
Pacific	3.1	Sales workers	1.1
Rural counties	0.1	\$5,000-\$7,499	0.3
Younger people	0.5	\$7,500-\$9,999	4.2
Divorced	2.7	\$10,000-\$14,999	6.6
		\$15,000-\$24,999	6.6
		\$25,000-and over	11.8
Republicans	1.9	Owners of residence	0.4
Methodists	0.2	Upper class	0.4
Episcopalians	3.0	Middle class	1.0
Presbyterians	2.4		
Lutherans	0.6	In armed forces but	
Congregationalists	2.0	not in combat	2.1
Roman Catholics	0.8		
Jews	0.7	Larger households	2.9
Not strongly religious	0.5	Two young children	1.8
		Three young children	2.9
Completed high school	1.8	Four young children	9.2
Some college	2.2	Six young children	3.7
College	0.5		
Beyond College	3.5	Expect Cold War to end:	
		by destructive war	2.4
		by disarmament	2.7
		by Third Force inter- vention	7.0

*The difference is given in units over the range from 0-100. It represents the excess in average likelihood, on this range, of paying \$5.00 rather than leasing for 15 cents.

For practical purposes, many of the differences are very small.

Table 15.

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD RATHER
LEASE NEAR RECEIVER FOR 25 cents THAN BUY
IT FOR \$5.00

<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>
South Atlantic	4.3	Under \$3,000	5.6
East South Central	6.8	Rent residence	0.2
Older people	0.9	Upper class	1.0
Widowed	4.8	Lower class	6.8
Separated	1.8	Living alone	5.0
No party preference	3.0	Five young children	4.7
Fundamentalist religion	8.2	Seven or more children	16.0
No schooling	15.8	Cold War will end:	
Grammar school	0.4	by Communism's acceptance	5.3
Clerical workers	0.5	by Communist victory	
Service workers	2.2	through revolutions	6.7
Farm laborers	5.6	by U.S. victory in war	3.7
		by Soviet surrender	0.1

A purchase at \$10.00 over 50 cents on a monthly basis is preferred, in principle, by the same groups that also like the \$5.00 alternative against 15 cents a month. That is, respondents in somewhat better socio-economic positions. Table 16. gives their characteristics.

Table 16.

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD RATHER BUY
NEAR RECEIVER FOR \$10.00 THAN SPEND 50 cents
MONTHLY

<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>
New England	0.7	High school	1.9
East North Central	0.6	Some college	4.4
West North Central	4.4	College	0.8
Mountain	4.9	Professionals	2.8
Pacific	2.0	Farmers	3.8
Men	0.4	Sales workers	0.5

Table 10./continued

<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Married	0.4	\$5,000-\$7,499	1.9
		\$7,500-\$9,999	4.9
Republicans	3.6	\$10,000-\$14,999	6.5
People with preference		\$15,000-\$24,999	1.7
other than Democratic		\$25,000 and over	11.3
or Republican	0.2		
Younger people	0.9	Owners	0.5
Methodists	3.9	Middle class	0.4
Episcopalians	2.8	Larger households	1.9
Presbyterians	5.3	Two young children	3.0
Lutherans	1.1	Three young children	2.7
Catholics	0.5	Four young children	4.7
Strongly religious	0.5	Six young children	8.1
Not strongly religious	1.4		
Not religious	0.6	Cold War will end:	
		by Communism's accept-	
Present warning system		ance	5.8
good	1.2	by Communist war victory	15.0
		by destructive war	3.1
		through disarmament	0.5
		by Third Force	7.7
		by U.S. surrender	2.7

Respondents with incomes higher than \$10,000 annually also would prefer to pay \$15.00 rather than keep spending 50 cents a month. Similarly, people who anticipate the world to turn Communist either voluntarily or through war are inclined to favor this option. Finally, people who expect a world war with the Communists winning it also choose the \$25.00 alternative more than the 50-cent rental option.

Finally, we may consider the \$1.00 lease alternative against the various purchase cost levels. Only people with very large families (seven children or more) would pay \$1.00 rather than \$5.00 outright. People in South Atlantic states, widowed and separated respondents, people with very large families (seven or more young children), and those who either expect the United States to surrender or else, the Communists to win through revolutions, would prefer the \$1.00 monthly option over \$10.00.

At the other extreme, only two groups would prefer to spend \$25.00 in purchase price over the \$1.00 monthly lease alternative: people with incomes between \$10,000-14,999 and people who think

the Communists will win in a world war, thus ending the present conflict. In addition to these groups, people with incomes above \$15,000 give the same likelihood to buying the receiver at \$25.00 or leasing it for \$1.00 a month.

The major split in the sample comes between those who prefer to pay \$15.00 rather than a monthly charge of \$1.00 and those who have the opposite view. Table 17. is a summary of the data.

Table 17.

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD RATHER PAY \$1.00
IN MONTHLY LEASE THAN \$15.00 PURCHASE PRICE

<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Middle Atlantic	1.5	Rent residence	3.5
South Atlantic	8.8		
East South Central	4.3	Working class	1.7
West South Central	1.9		
		No service in armed	
Large metropolitan	1.6	forces	1.8
Urbanized counties	0.7		
Rural counties	0.3	If service, in combat	
		before	0.5
Older people	2.7		
		Living alone, or	3.1
Negroes	3.4	Smaller households	0.3
Widowed	9.0	No young children	0.7
Separated	11.6	One child	2.0
		Five children	0.7
Democrats	2.6	Seven or more children	24.0
No party preference	7.4		
		Expect the Cold War to end:	
Presbyterians	0.6	by Communist victory in	
Fundamentalists	2.3	revolutions	15.5
Jews	2.0	U.S. war victory	4.9
		by U.S. surrender, or	6.4
Very religious people	0.2	Soviet surrender	5.8
Not religious people	5.1		
		Expect the Cold War to	
No schooling	3.1	go on indefinitely	1.8
Grammar school	5.3		
Some high school	1.0	Present warning system	
		good,	1.3
Clerical workers	1.6	fair, or	0.3
Service workers	4.9	poor	0.9
Farm laborers	5.7		
Laborers	0.4		
Under \$3,000	8.6		
\$3,000-\$4,999	5.4		

Three persistent themes run through these tables. One has to do with gross socio-economic differences. The other, with what might be termed degrees of alienation, or at least, lack of typicality. The third theme bears out consistent regional differences.

People in higher socio-economic positions

- prefer to pay \$5.00 over 15-cent lease costs
- but 25 cents rather than \$10.00 in purchase price
- except for higher income people who would spend \$10.00 in preference to 25 cents on a monthly basis;
- however, \$10.00 is preferred over 50 cents in rental fees
- although \$15.00 is not preferred over 50 cents except for people with high incomes
- and \$25.00 is definitely not preferred over the 50-cent lease option;
- \$15.00, however, is preferred over \$1.00 in monthly rentals
- although not \$25.00 except for people with very high incomes.

People in lower socio-economic positions

- prefer the 15-cent lease over \$5.00 purchase
- and also the 25-cent lease over \$5.00 purchase
- by implication, these options are also preferred over \$10.00, \$15.00, and \$25.00 as might be expected;
- even 50 cents is preferred over \$5.00 by a few groups in this general category;
- and 50 cents is preferred over \$10.00 as it is over the costlier alternatives;
- the \$1.00 lease possibility, in turn, is seen better than purchase at \$15.00.

People who give responses which are not shared with great frequency by others--such as expectation of Communism's acceptance; or Communist victory through revolutions, or U.S. or Soviet surrender--tend to match the pattern of the lower socio-economic groups in terms of the lease/buy interactions. People who anticipate more typical endings of the Cold War--disarmament, emergence of a Third Force, a world war with no winners or losers--tend to respond like the higher socio-economic status groups.

Similarly, respondents who are somewhat atypical (relative to national distributions) in other terms are more like the lower socio-economic groups in their evaluation of the lease or buy alternatives. These are people who are widowed or separated; who live alone or in very large families; who have no political party preference; who are members of fundamentalist religious groups.

Finally, people from the basic Southern belt of census regions--South Atlantic, East South Central and West South Central--yield the same pattern as the respondents in lower socio-economic positions; whereas respondents from New England, East North Central, West North Central, Mountain states, and the Pacific region answer more like subjects from higher socio-economic groups.

10. Leasing and Buying: Greatest Likelihood

Knowing how various basic population groups respond, consider now individual respondents. Each interviewee was asked to assess the likelihood of leasing or buying the NEAR receiver at the several alternative costs. Of necessity, each respondent attached some greatest likelihood value to one or more of these alternatives save only for those few subjects (in fact, five in the total sample) who failed to answer any of these questions.

This "greatest likelihood" value could, indeed, be ten, or nine, or eight, and so on. Apart from the value itself, it could be associated with one of 255 patterns of response--since there are eight alternatives (four leasing and four buying choices). The basic tabulation is given in Table B-7.

There are 11.8 percent of all respondents who would lease as well as buy the NEAR receiver at all the cost levels with a likelihood of ten. These people can be considered as "certain" renters or buyers of the receiver over the range of costs: up to \$1.00 in monthly fees, and up to \$25.00 in total purchase price.

There are also 11.9 percent of all respondents who assign a likelihood of zero to any of the leasing and buying alternatives. These interviewees, in turn, can be construed as unwilling to spend any of the amounts of money suggested in the study.

There are also some respondents who would only lease the receiver; and others, who would only buy it. Table 18. gives a summary.

Table 18.

RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD ONLY LEASE OR ONLY BUY
NEAR RECEIVER AT VARIOUS COSTS

	<u>In Percent</u>
<u>Lease</u> Lease at 15¢, 25¢, 50¢ or \$1.00 but not buy	3.7
Lease at 15¢, 25¢, 50¢ but not at \$1.00 and also not buy	5.4
Lease at 15¢, 25¢, but not at 50¢, \$1.00, nor buy at any price	7.8
Lease at 15¢, but not at 25¢, 50¢ \$1.00, nor buy at any price	12.3
<u>Buy</u> Buy at \$5.00, \$10.00, \$15.00 or \$25.00 but not lease	1.7
Buy at \$5.00, \$10.00, \$15.00 but not at \$25.00, nor lease at any monthly rate	2.8
Buy at \$5.00, \$10.00, but not at \$15.00 or \$25.00, nor lease at any monthly rate	5.3
Buy at \$5.00, but not at \$10.00, \$15.00, or \$25.00, nor lease at any monthly rate	8.3

(1402)

11. Leasing and Buying: Estimates of Action

An analysis of all the patterns permits us to make new estimates of the numbers of households, or percentages of the nation's households, that might acquire the NEAR receiver for various combinations of lease and purchase costs. Specifically, we may wonder how many people might prefer to lease the receiver for 15 cents a month over buying it for \$5.00, and how many might wish to buy it at that price rather than lease it for this monthly fee. As before, we may prefer to consider the lower and upper limits at some reasonable level of confidence rather than to seek to assess the probable household numbers (or percentages) without such interval qualifications. A discussion of the estimation procedure is given in Appendix D of this report.

Table 19. provides the estimates. The alternatives are ordered in terms of the numbers of total households likely to acquire the NEAR receiver under the specified conditions. The summary also includes the contribution to this total made by leasing, and the expected contribution made by purchases.

Table 19.

ESTIMATES, WITH CONFIDENCE .95, OF NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS
IN THE NATION, AND PERCENTAGES OF SUCH HOUSEHOLDS
LIKELY TO ACQUIRE NEAR RECEIVER AT VARIOUS
LEASE/PURCHASE COST ALTERNATIVES
(ASSUMING 57 MILLION HOUSEHOLDS AS OF JAN. 1, 1964)

In Thousands

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Mode</u>	<u>Lower Limit</u>	<u>Upper Limit</u>	<u>Lower Percent</u>	<u>Upper Percent</u>
A. 15 cents versus \$5.00	Total	41,144	42,916	72.2	75.2
	Lease	24,171	25,192	42.2	44.2
	Buy	16,973	17,724	30.0	31.0
B. 15 cents versus \$10.00	Total	37,927	39,451	66.5	69.2
	Lease	30,208	31,253	53.0	54.8
	Buy	7,719	8,198	13.5	14.4
C. 25 cents versus \$5.00	Total	37,277	38,930	65.4	68.3
	Lease	22,248	23,117	39.0	40.6
	Buy	15,029	15,813	26.4	27.7

Table 19./continued

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Mode</u>	<u>In Thousands</u>		<u>Lower Percent</u>	<u>Upper Percent</u>
		<u>Lower Limit</u>	<u>Upper Limit</u>		
D. 15 cents versus \$15.00	Total	35,999	37,406	63.2	65.6
	Lease	31,895	33,003	56.0	57.9
	Buy	4,104	4,403	7.2	7.7
E. 15 cents versus \$25.00	Total	35,270	36,659	61.9	64.3
	Lease	32,768	33,908	57.5	59.5
	Buy	2,502	2,751	4.4	4.8
F. 50 cents versus \$5.00	Total	35,183	36,766	61.7	64.5
	Lease	9,134	9,756	16.0	17.1
	Buy	26,049	27,010	45.7	47.4
G. \$1.00 versus \$5.00	Total	33,918	35,237	59.5	61.8
	Lease	5,636	6,245	9.9	11.0
	Buy	28,282	28,992	49.6	50.8
H. 25 cents versus \$10.00	Total	31,776	33,598	55.7	58.9
	Lease	21,846	22,764	38.3	39.9
	Buy	9,930	10,834	17.4	19.0
I. 25 cents versus \$15.00	Total	29,766	31,042	52.2	54.4
	Lease	25,743	26,695	45.2	56.8
	Buy	4,023	4,347	7.0	7.6
J. 25 cents versus \$25.00	Total	28,903	30,430	50.7	53.4
	Lease	25,924	27,004	45.5	47.4
	Buy	2,979	3,426	5.2	6.0
K. 50 cents versus \$10.00	Total	28,259	29,597	49.6	51.9
	Lease	14,807	15,564	26.0	27.3
	Buy	13,452	14,033	23.6	24.6
L. \$1.00 versus \$10.00	Total	25,962	27,326	45.5	47.9
	Lease	9,516	10,179	16.7	17.8
	Buy	16,446	17,147	28.8	30.1

Table 19./continued

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Mode</u>	<u>In Thousands</u>		<u>Lower Percent</u>	<u>Upper Percent</u>
		<u>Lower Limit</u>	<u>Upper Limit</u>		
M. 50 cents versus \$15.00	Total	25,327	26,636	44.4	46.7
	Lease	18,386	19,233	32.2	33.7
	Buy	6,941	7,403	12.2	13.0
N. 50 cents versus \$25.00	Total	23,843	25,000	41.8	43.8
	Lease	20,067	20,945	35.2	36.7
	Buy	3,776	4,055	6.6	7.1
O. \$1.00 versus \$15.00	Total	22,140	23,407	38.8	41.1
	Lease	12,726	13,508	22.3	23.7
	Buy	9,414	9,899	16.5	17.4
P. \$1.00 versus \$25.00	Total	19,895	21,033	34.9	36.9
	Lease	14,860	15,697	26.1	27.5
	Buy	5,035	5,336	8.8	9.4

As before, the estimates of Table 19. can be taken seriously only to the extent to which the conditions under which the NEAR receiver is introduced into the nation's homes approximate the circumstances under which our questions were asked. That is, if a home canvass of the nation were made and the NEAR receiver brought into each household, shown to the resident, and an arrangement to buy or lease could be made just about right there and then. Even then we might expect the results to come closer to the lower than to the upper limit, and perhaps even go below it: some respondents may wish to consult their spouses first; some may be without immediate cash; or some may not wish to implement their decision--at least not right then.

Under these conditions of distribution, however, we should anticipate the response to come close to the data presented--and, in fact, it should validate the data. Thus, for instance, if the respondents have the option to either lease the receiver for 25 cents a month or buying it for \$10.00 (Table 19/H), we expect some 55.7 percent to 58.9 percent of the households to act on the stimulus (we expect this with confidence of .95); and we would expect that there would be more than twice as many leasing arrangements than outright purchases.

Nor do we expect these estimates to "hold" (within the limits specified) independent of the international environment immediately prior to, and at, the time of distribution. Under crises conditions, our estimates might well prove to be too low. Under drastic changes indicating further decrements in the risk of war, the estimates may prove to be somewhat high. But in an environment which does not drastically depart from the world conditions which prevailed in December, 1963, and early January, 1964, the data justify the projections indicated.

Notice that the maximum expected numbers of purchases occur when the rental fee is relatively high, but the purchase price is rather low: \$1.00 against \$10.00, and particularly, against \$5.00. The reverse is true, as seems intuitively obvious, about maximizing the numbers of leases: the purchase price may be made fairly high (\$15.00 or \$25.00), but the lease price kept low (15 cents or 25 cents).

12. Correlations of NEAR Assessment Items

Thirteen items have been used as basic to the NEAR system evaluation. One concerns a generalized concept of a "home alerting device". One deals with the NEAR system specifically but with no consideration of cost or manner in which the respondent might acquire the receiver. Four alternatives have to do with leasing arrangements, four with purchase, and three options involve free issue of the device by the Government.

As Table B-6 shows, all these items intercorrelate with each other positively. All of the coefficients are highly significant against the hypothesis that such correlations might have come from an underlying population in which zero correlations exist. Most of the correlations are not only significantly different from zero; they are also quite high substantively.

People who express high likelihood for one option tend to also express high likelihood for the other options; and people who are not likely to acquire the system respond so basically with regard to all the alternatives. The lowest, but statistically very significant (at beyond .001 level), correlations refer to the free issue alternative in which legal provisions exist governing the use of the receiver. We may say that, relative to the other alternatives, this possibility is more independent of the evaluation of the NEAR receiver itself than are any of the other choices from each other.

Table 20. sums up the average intercorrelation of each item as a simple index of the manner in which the specific evaluation questions are linked with all others.

Table 20.

AVERAGE CORRELATION OF EACH NEAR RECEIVER
EVALUATION ITEM WITH ALL OTHERS

	<u>Average Correlation</u>
Lease for 25 cents	.610
Buy for \$5.00	.609
Buy for \$10.00	.602
Lease for 50 cents	.600
Acquire NEAR receiver	.599
Lease for 15 cents	.594
Buy for \$15.00	.576
Lease for \$1.00	.566
Buy for \$25.00	.520
Free Government issue	.460
Free Government issue: promise to use	.446
Acquire some home device	.441
Free Government issue: law requiring to use	.317

Because all population groups are basically quite favorably disposed to all the options--although this acceptance level declines with increasing costs of leasing or buying as might be anticipated --correlations of these alternatives with respondent characteristics are generally low. True enough, many are statistically significant (that is, different from zero correlations) but this is only natural because with a sample of 1,402 it takes but an extremely low coefficient to be statistically significant. Substantively, however, these coefficients are unimpressive, and thus no clear-cut preferences by one group over another or over several others run through the data.

Table 21. gives the correlation coefficients for the various options by selected characteristics of the respondents. The most consistent relationship links age with evaluation of the system. The younger the respondent, the more he is inclined to assign high probabilities to acting in the manner which the question option suggests to him. Income and education produce a somewhat similar result: the leasing possibilities yield negative correlations (though very low ones indeed), whereas the purchase alternatives lead to positive correlations. Thus the greater the income, the more the respondent is likely to buy the receiver, but the less is he likely to lease it; and the more education the respondent has, the more likely will he buy, whereas the less education he has, the more likely is he to lease. But the coefficients are low throughout.

Table 21.

CORRELATION OF LIKELIHOOD RATINGS OF HOME AND NEAR ALERTING SYSTEM OPTIONS
WITH RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

	Home Device	Near Device	<u>Lease</u>					<u>Purchase</u>			<u>Free Issue</u>		
			<u>15c</u>	<u>25c</u>	<u>50c</u>	<u>\$1.00</u>	<u>\$5.00</u>	<u>\$10.00</u>	<u>\$15.00</u>	<u>\$25.00</u>	<u>G.I.</u>	<u>G.I. with promise to use</u>	<u>G.I. use required by law</u>
Race	.097	.079	.104	.084	.101	.104	.074	.087	.077	.115	.055	.037	.001
Sex	.052	.020	.055	.064	.073	.073	.049	.041	.056	.044	.034	.030	.029
Household size	.093	.111	.073	.072	.089	.081	.141	.150	.137	.139	.090	.087	.037
Education	-.020	.028	-.055	-.040	-.016	.007	.026	.052	.092	.096	.019	.014	.008
Income	.002	.023	-.077	-.066	-.016	-.002	.074	.117	.149	.151	.007	.044	.055
Age	-.125	-.155	-.081	-.081	-.112	-.116	-.144	-.180	-.158	-.152	-.117	-.096	-.053
<u>Explanation:</u>													

Explanation:

Race - positive correlation indicates greater favorableness of Negroes; negative correlation, that of whites.

Sex - positive correlation means that women somewhat more than men give higher likelihood to acquisition; negative correlation is the reverse.

Household size - the relation here is direct; positive correlation means that the larger the household the greater the likelihood; negative correlation would mean that as household size declines, the likelihood of acquisition increases.

Education - positive correlation means that the more education people have the more likely they are to get the device; negative correlation implies that the less education they have they will so do.

Income - direct correlations are involved; the greater the income the greater the likelihood (positive correlation).

Age - positive correlation would mean that the older the respondent the more likely he is to get the system.

The questionnaire included six basic shelter system postures. We asked the respondents to evaluate the likelihood that the nation will actually have the corresponding shelter system within about five years. And we probed into the desirability of this happening.

Table 22. shows that both probabilities and desirabilities of civil defense protection systems correlate with the likely action the respondent might take given one of the options on the warning system. But again: these correlations are low even though they are generally highly significant in statistical terms against the appropriate null hypothesis. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn on this basis because of the consistency of the responses. The more likely are various shelter system postures, the more likely will the respondents seek to acquire, or accept, the NEAR device. This holds throughout with the exception of the last civil defense alternative: that one, in turn, postulates no need for shelters at all because arms control or disarmament measures will make nuclear war impossible. This alternative yields slightly negative correlations --but these are not significantly different from zero correlations even in strictly statistical terms. Hence, there is slight propensity for people who anticipate that disarmament measures will make war impossible, and thus shelters unnecessary, to assign lower likelihood to acquiring a home alerting device or the NEAR receiver.

Table 22.

CORRELATIONS OF ALERTING SYSTEM OPTIONS AND PROBABILITIES AS WELL AS
DESIRABILITIES OF SHELTER SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES

Likelihood:	Home Device	Near Device	Lease				Purchase				Free Issue		
			15¢	25¢	50¢	\$1.00	\$5.00	\$10.00	\$15.00	\$25.00	G.I.	G.I. with promise to use	G.I. use required by law
CD-1 Available spaces marked and stock- ed.	.114	.141	.141	.167	.149	.148	.175	.180	.181	.170	.139	.140	.077
CD-2 Fallout shelters for all Americans.	.153	.129	.149	.156	.145	.145	.135	.133	.131	.126	.142	.134	.094
CD-3 People evacuated from strategic places.	.122	.111	.161	.159	.142	.150	.123	.109	.124	.133	.139	.132	.102
CD-4 Shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents.	.132	.126	.167	.175	.158	.157	.145	.169	.169	.182	.169	.141	.099
CD-5 Large cities and military installations will have defenses against ballistic missiles.	.055	.112	.099	.089	.082	.083	.141	.107	.098	.114	.114	.124	.069
CD-6 Disarmament steps will make nuclear war impossible.	-.060	-.004	.001	-.007	-.005	.013	-.006	-.026	-.037	-.027	.007	.021	.016

Table 22./continued

	Home Device	Near Device	<u>Lease</u>				<u>Purchase</u>			<u>Free Issue</u>		
			15¢	25¢	50¢	\$1.00	\$5.00	\$10.00	\$15.00	\$25.00	G.I. with promise to use	G.I. use required by law
<u>Desirability:</u>												
CD-1 Available spaces marked and stock- ed.	.122	.138	.136	.136	.134	.135	.130	.168	.155	.153	.146	.158 .100
CD-2 Fallout shelters for all Americans.	.113	.135	.151	.164	.163	.159	.110	.131	.126	.129	.137	.157 .092
CD-3 People evacuated from strategic places.	.112	.109	.116	.114	.096	.120	.114	.111	.107	.112	.162	.168 .094
CD-4 Shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chem- ical and bio- logical agents.	.101	.119	.117	.122	.110	.110	.126	.127	.112	.094	.136	.135 .079 4 8 1
CD-5 Large cities and military instal- lations will have defenses against ballistic missiles.	.097	.113	.103	.100	.093	.120	.116	.117	.118	.110	.131	.149 .115
CD-6 Disarmament steps will make nuclear war impossible.	.033	-.001	.005	-.003	.008	.023	-.024	-.008	-.004	.004	-.009	.017 .067

There are also low correlations associated with the fifth civil defense option which assumes current active defenses along with ABM systems to defend the larger cities and military installations. This can be construed to mean that the home warning systems seem less critical to those people who expect ABM defenses to become operational.

Furthermore, likelihood of civil defense postures, option by option, tends to correlate better with acceptability of the home alerting system than does desirability of the various shelter alternatives. This means that the decision whether to acquire the NEAR receiver will be more affected by the expectations associated with other integral civil defense systems than with the fact that the respondent desires, or fails to desire, various protective options. Both likelihood and desirability, however, correlate positively with acceptability of the NEAR system; yet, expectations are somewhat more important than desires, particularly as one moves toward more demanding civil defense postures (strategic evacuation coupled with fallout shelters in receiving areas; fallout as well as blast shelters).

In spite of these results which can be derived more from the pattern of responses than from individual correlation coefficients, it is surprising that the likely actions regarding the NEAR receiver do not correlate much more with attitudes toward civil defense systems in general.

For one, we know that people are quite receptive to various shelter systems. For this, ample evidence exists in the several recent, as well as past, studies and the documentation need not be provided in this report. Secondly, we have found that people are quite receptive to the idea of a home alerting system, and even to the specific NEAR receiver which they were shown in the course of the interview. At the same time, the relations between shelter systems and warning systems are low (even though, we repeat, they are statistically significant).

We must, therefore, draw the following important conclusion: this evidence seems to support the notion that people consider warning systems and protection systems in something of a trade-off manner. At least, they do not view both as integral aspects of one and the same, highly interdependent, fabric of relationships. People seem to think of "shelters", or of "warning" as separate concepts. They are receptive to both ideas, and cognizant of the needs. But they do not reflect an understanding of the relationship between the two--warning as a prerequisite to (certain levels of) protection capabilities, and protection capabilities as a prerequisite for making good use of warning. This might well turn out to be a crucial area in which public enlightenment is essential.

13. Effect of Question Sequence

When people are asked about varying costs of an item, it may well be that the order in which the questions are presented has an effect upon their answers. It seems reasonable to postulate that it might make a difference whether people are asked first about a 15-cent monthly lease, and then about 25 cents, subsequently about 50 cents, and finally, about \$1.00. Similarly, if the order were reversed, somewhat different effects could be anticipated.

To insure that no systematic bias enters the data because of this sequence of costs problem, the items within each basic question (leasing and buying) were randomized. Thus some respondents were asked first about the 15-cent option; but others were first asked about 25 cents; or 50 cents; or \$1.00. And identical procedures were used for the purchase alternatives so that all sequences of the four cost levels occur.

While randomization increases the prospects that systematic bias can be avoided, we also wanted to consider the effect of the question order specifically. Hence, the interviewers were instructed to record the order in which the items followed each other.

This is useful for two reasons, one methodological and one substantive. From a methodological vantage point, we would still want to know whether different orders yield important differences in response, because if they do, we could not treat the whole sample analytically in the same manner. We would then have to control for order of questions in the processing of the data not to obscure important conclusions.

But substantively the problem may be even more interesting. We anticipated that if people are asked about leasing the NEAR receiver at ever increasing costs, they will differ from those who are asked in order of decreasing costs. We thought that people who were first exposed to the higher costs (\$1.00 in the leasing sequence) and finally to the lowest costs (15 cents) may give a substantially higher likelihood of spending 15 cents than people who are first asked about the 15-cent option.

This we believed likely because the \$1.00 alternative presented first provides a kind of anchorage; and as people are asked subsequently about less costly possibilities, they should become more receptive to them by contrast with the initial, relatively high, alternative. To begin with, they have no idea how much the receiver might cost. The \$1.00 option establishes a frame of reference; and they are expected to be pleased by

noting, due to subsequent questions, that the cost alternatives are going down rather than up.

Similarly, people who first think in terms of 15 cents might find the eventual option of \$1.00 more prohibitive than if they had begun thinking in terms of \$1.00 initially. Therefore, we also thought that people who are first asked about 15 cents will give lower probabilities to the \$1.00 alternative than people who were asked about this option first.

If this were so, then it would follow that one would gain an increment in renters or buyers simply by starting with higher anticipated costs but leasing or selling the product eventually for less than the public may have come to expect.

Tables B-8, B-9, and B-10 present the data for the free issue, leasing and buying sequences. Only the extreme alternatives are considered--that is, moving from low to high lease costs, and from high to low. Similarly, for the purchase alternatives. In the case of Government issue, the sequences move from the least restrictive (outright free issue) to the most restrictive one (legal requirement to use upon receipt), and vice versa.

These tables do not substantiate our hypotheses. The differences are small. And they run in different directions for the leasing than for the purchase alternatives. We must conclude that regardless of the initial cost framework in terms of the subsequent costs, just about the same public response can be expected. This holds at least within the range of the costs considered explicitly in this research.

14. Effect of Testing

To what extent will the respondents be affected in their receptivity to the NEAR receiver if the system has to undergo periodic tests? Two items in the study questionnaire probed into this problem. One assumes an annual test; and the second item, a quarterly check-out of the system. The conclusion is inescapable: people are quite receptive to the testing concept. In fact, most of them find both annual and quarterly tests desirable in that they claim that the NEAR receiver would be either much more, or more, acceptable to them if such tests were conducted.

Table B-5 details the results. It shows that annual testing is slightly preferred over quarterly tests. But both alternatives find a great deal of receptivity in the public. In both instances, annual and quarterly testing, the respondents who

claim that the device would become less, or much less, acceptable to them are very few indeed. The national norm for annual testing is 3.9 percent; and for quarterly testing, 6.2 percent.

By and large there are more people who say that testing would make the system even more, or much more, acceptable than there are even people who say that it would make no difference to them one way or another.

Underlying attitudes toward the NEAR receiver are merely further expressed in attitudes toward testing. Thus groups somewhat less receptive to the system to begin with are also somewhat less receptive to testing; and population segments most inclined to acquire the device are also most favorably affected by the idea that the instrument may undergo periodic testing. But there are some important differences.

The higher the social class identification of the respondent, the more favorable he tends to be to annual testing; but the higher the class identification, the less favorable he is to quarterly check-outs. Men favor testing more than women; although we know from the previous data that women are more in favor of acquiring the device than are men. While the patterns of increased receptivity as related to educational levels is irregular, the more education the respondents have the greater the proportion who are negatively affected by the testing prospects, both annual and quarterly. Similarly, people with higher incomes tend to be more often less receptive than people with lower incomes when testing is considered.

Whether or not it should be argued that testing is actually positively valued--at least when we think of annual or quarterly tests only--seems somewhat less important than the fact that it is possible to conclude with a great deal of confidence that the notion of occasional tests would not have any substantial degrading effects on receptivity to the NEAR system. Indeed, the data support the opposite conclusion.

What the pattern of responses might be if monthly, or even weekly, tests were considered cannot be estimated at all. One conclusion, however, seems clear: inasmuch as the percentages of people negatively affected increase from annual to quarterly tests, it is very likely that these negative effects would further increase with rising frequency of tests. The study made no provisions to determine the testing frequency which would become prohibitive in that substantially more people would then view the system as less, or much less, acceptable than might otherwise be the case.

Finally, we cannot tell whether even annual or quarterly testing will have the positive effects--or will fail to have any negative effects--on receptivity which the data suggest. This depends on the conditions surrounding such testing. In particular, we think it important to point out that in asking the questions, the respondents were told that testing would help insure that the NEAR receiver is in good working order. Hence, the answers may reflect an attitude toward the desirability of a reliable device, and a willingness to pay the negligible cost of check-outs to guarantee continued reliability.

This means that if NEAR system testing is communicated to the public in terms of guaranteeing reliability of the device, the data should provide a good estimate of public response. If the relationship between testing and warning reliability were not explained, or the explanation were unknown to, or misunderstood by, many people, the data cannot be taken on their face value.

IV. NEAR SYSTEM EVALUATION: COMPARISONS OF EXTREME VIEWS

1. Introduction

Let us now consider the people who would acquire the NEAR receiver either by lease or by purchase at all the cost levels into which we inquired. And at the same time, those individuals who claim that they would not lease or buy the receiver at any of the costs cited. In the former group, 12.2 percent of the total sample attach likelihood of ten to their action--they are certain or just about certain that they would lease the receiver at 15 cents, and also at 25 cents, 50 cents, \$1.00 or buy it at \$5.00, \$10.00, \$15.00 and \$25.00. The latter group, 11.9 percent of the total sample, includes those respondents who give zero likelihood to acquiring the receiver for each of these costs, both under the lease mode and the purchase mode of distribution.

Roughly then, twelve in one hundred Americans are extremely favorable to the NEAR system; and twelve in one hundred are extremely unfavorable to it. The remainder of the population, and this is the bulk of it, is by far more favorable than not. These extreme groups can be viewed as deviant from the general population expression in that their views form distinct minority positions.

A comparison of these two extreme groups might further refine the underlying patterning of the data. Who are these people? What do they think?

2. Other Views of Home Alerting System

Table 23 shows that the least favorable respondents in terms of leasing and buying alternatives differ significantly and importantly from the most favorable interviewees in their other attitudes regarding the NEAR system.

Table 23

**COMPARISON OF EXTREME GROUPS: HOW THEY REACT TO
OTHER HOME ALERTING SYSTEM ITEMS**

<u>Item</u>	<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)	
	<u>Extremely Favorable*</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable**</u>
Likelihood of getting some home alerting device	83.6	17.9
Likelihood of getting NEAR receiver (without cost or mode of distri- bution consideration)	96.4	13.6
Likelihood of accepting free Government issue	98.6	18.8
Likelihood of accepting free Government issue on promise to use	97.8	22.8
Likelihood of accepting free Government issue and legal requirement to use	98.1	54.1

*Give likelihood 10 to all leasing and buying
options.

**Give likelihood 0 to all leasing and buying
options.

These then are major differences indeed. Although in the sample as a whole, and in all the population segments within the sample, the likelihood of getting the NEAR receiver is greater after the instrument was shown to the respondents than is the probability of acquiring an unspecified home alerting device, the least favorable respondents go against the overall trend.

The only item in terms of which even the least favorably disposed Americans are inclined to get the NEAR receiver has to do with the free issue and legal requirement to use it. This again underscores the implication that an

attitude toward the law and its saliency in national life is being tapped here--perhaps more so than the attitude toward a warning system.

3. Civil Defense Attitudes

To what extent do the two groups differ in their attitudes toward shelter systems? It might be suspected that the least favorably inclined respondents can well constitute the focus of opposition to civil defense in general; whereas the most favorable respondents may be a major source of support. Table 24 shows that the people who are least favorable regarding the NEAR receiver consider the various civil defense options less likely; and also less desirable. But the desirability pattern does not run contrary to that of the most favorably inclined interviewees, and the differences, while consistent, are not statistically significant.

This points once more to a major conclusion previously reported: people do not view shelter systems and warning systems as parts of the same larger system at least in that there is no evidence that they would understand the interaction between warning and protection.

Table 24

**EXPECTATIONS AND DESIRES ASSOCIATED WITH CIVIL DEFENSE
SHELTER SYSTEMS AS A FUNCTION OF
EXTREME VIEWS ABOUT THE NEAR RECEIVER**

<u>Likelihood:</u>	<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
CD-1 Available spaces marked and stocked	72.7	57.5
CD-2 Fallout shelters for all Americans	53.4	43.0
CD-3 People evacuated from strategic places	68.9	53.7
CD-4 Shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents	67.1	51.5
CD-5 Large cities and military installations will have defenses against ballistic missiles	76.3	63.3
CD-6 Disarmament steps will make nuclear war impossible	31.8	34.4
<u>Desirability:</u>	<u>Average Desirability</u> (Range -3.00 to + 3.00)	
CD-1 Available spaces marked and stocked	+2.25	+1.27
CD-2 Fallout shelters for all Americans	+1.98	+1.01
CD-3 People evacuated from strategic places	+1.59	+0.86
CD-4 Shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents	+1.89	+1.18
CD-5 Large cities and military installations will have defenses against ballistic missiles	+2.24	+1.38
CD-6 Disarmament steps will make nuclear war impossible	+0.76	+0.74

Table 25

EXPECTED AND DESIRED COLD WAR TERMINATION* AS A FUNCTION
OF EXTREME VIEWS ON THE NEAR SYSTEM

Cold War Termination	In Percent			
	Expected Cold War End		Desired Cold War End	
	Extremely Favorable	Extremely Unfavorable	Extremely Favorable	Extremely Unfavorable
F-1 Cold War continued indefinitely	15.2	24.8	0.0	.6
F-2 Communism's acceptance	.6	3.3	0.0	.6
F-3 Communist victory in revolutions	1.2	1.3	.6	0.0
F-4 Communist victory in war	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-5 War with no losers or winners	10.3	7.2	1.8	1.3
F-6 U.S. victory in war	8.5	7.2	5.4	8.3
F-7 Communist defeat in revolutions	9.7	13.1	5.4	3.2
F-8 Democratization of Communist systems	9.1	6.5	22.6	27.6
F-9 Disarmament, reconciliation	28.5	24.2	43.5	48.7
F-10 Third Force emergence	4.8	5.9	5.4	5.8
F-11 U.S. surrender without war	1.8	.7	1.2	0.0
F-12 Soviet surrender without war	9.1 (100)	5.9 (100)	14.3 (100)	3.8 (100)

*Respondents were given cards with each alternative, and were asked to select the most likely way in which the Cold War will end; the least likely way (not reported here); the most wanted way; the way most wanted by Soviets and by the U.S. (the latter two not reported here).

4. Images of the Cold War

Nor do sharp differences exist between the two extreme groups in the manner in which they expect, or desire, the Cold War to end. The data are given in Table 25. The least favorable respondents anticipate somewhat more that the Cold War might go on indefinitely; and they are less optimistic than are the more favorable respondents about the prospects that disarmament might end the conflict. But, in turn, they choose disarmament slightly more frequently than do the very favorable respondents, who, on the other hand, select Soviet surrender as most desirable with greater frequency.

The extremely favorable group of respondents assigns somewhat greater likelihood to the occurrence of another world war within the next five years; and the same respondents also thought that the likelihood of such a war was higher six months prior to the interview (around June, 1963) than did the least favorable people. At the same time, however, the respondents who are most favorable to the NEAR system anticipate effective disarmament measures within the next five years more than do the least favorable subjects. Table 26 gives the appropriate averages.

Table 26

LIKELIHOOD OF WORLD WAR AND LIKELIHOOD OF DISARMAMENT WITHIN FIVE YEARS

	<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
World War: estimate at time of interview	34.7	27.6
Disarmament: estimate at time of interview	43.2	33.3
World War: how it seemed six months ago	45.9	33.3
Disarmament: how it seemed six months ago	32.0	28.8

Hence, as the respondents recall the situation of about June, 1963, prospects for war were greater and prospects for disarmament lesser than the corresponding chances in late 1963 and early 1964. This characterizes both groups. The respondents who are most favorably disposed to the NEAR system, we have pointed out, consider both war and disarmament more likely--and both at the time of the interview and by recall in mid-1963.

Thus the extremely favorable respondents seem to be saying that while the risks of the world situation are greater, so are the opportunities for a non-violent settlement. The differences, however, are not significant.

5. Consequences of Nuclear War

The most favorable respondents are somewhat more optimistic about the consequences of a thermonuclear war. But as is the case throughout the data, the differences between the two groups so different in favorableness to the NEAR system are not substantively large nor are they statistically significant. The results are given in Table 27.

Table 27

ANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR*
AS A FUNCTION OF EXTREME VIEWS ABOUT
THE NEAR SYSTEM

In Percent

<u>Consequence of War</u>	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
A nuclear war would mean the end of the world and all life in it	12.7	13.9
A nuclear war would mean the end of civilization as we know it	19.9	20.9
If nuclear war does come, people in the U.S. will make the best of the situation	28.3	32.3
Although nuclear war would be a terrible thing, it would be possible to survive as a nation	22.9	20.3
Enough people would survive a nuclear war to pick up the pieces and carry on with a good chance of rebuilding a system that lives under American values, as we know them	16.3	12.7

*Provided with a list of these alternatives, each respondent was asked to select the one which comes closest to his view what the situation might be like.

6. Characteristics of the Extreme Groups

A comparison of the characteristics of respondents with the two extreme positions regarding acquisition of the NEAR receiver shows that only several large differences exist.

For one, the most favorable respondents are younger than the least favorable subjects. Age is by far the single best predictor of the underlying attitude.

Secondly, the most favorable respondents come from larger households much more frequently than do the most unfavorable interviewees.

Thirdly, they have at least one young child or more much more frequently than do the least favorable respondents, although families with three young children are more frequent in the negative, than in the positive, group (and this was true about comparisons of averages in the previous section of the report as well).

Fourth, the most favorable respondents include a disproportionate number of Negroes by contrast with the unfavorable group.

Fifth, many more respondents from East North Central states (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin) are in the least favorable, than in the most favorable groups.

Sixth, there are more Democrats among the most favorable subjects than among the least favorable ones.

Finally, the least favorable group contains substantially more people in the lowest (up to \$3,000) income bracket than the most favorable group does. The results are presented in Table 28/A-R.

Table 28

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS WHO TAKE EXTREME VIEWS
ON THE NEAR DEVICE

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
A. New England	3.5	6.5
Middle Atlantic	22.8	20.2
East North Central	10.5	22.0
West North Central	14.0	8.9
South Atlantic	15.8	10.7
East South Central	2.9	3.0
West South Central	9.4	11.9
Mountain states	8.8	3.0
Pacific	12.3	13.7
B. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	26.3	26.2
Other metropolitan	40.7	35.1
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	13.5	14.9
County with no city of 10,000	19.3	23.8
C. Whites	81.8	95.8
Negroes	18.2	4.2
D. Men	50.3	50.6
Women	49.7	49.4

Table 28/continued

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
I. Protestants	63.7	65.5
(Baptist)	(36.1)	(23.6)
(Methodist)	(23.1)	(15.5)
(Episcopalian)	(7.4)	(4.5)
(Presbyterian)	(2.8)	(13.6)
(Lutheran)	(9.3)	(8.2)
(Congregationalist)	(1.9)	(2.7)
(Fundamentalist)	(5.6)	(10.0)
Catholics	24.6	21.4
Jews	5.8	3.0
J. Very strongly religious	44.4	39.0
Strongly religious	28.8	27.9
Moderately religious	22.5	22.7
Not strongly religious	1.9	4.5
Not religious	2.5	5.8
K. Republicans	26.6	31.1
Democrats	62.1	51.5
Others	5.3	7.2
No party preference	5.9	10.2
L. No schooling	.6	1.8
Grammar school	20.5	28.0
Some high school	25.7	22.6
Completed high school	26.9	28.6
Some college	16.4	11.9
College	5.3	2.4
Beyond college	4.7	4.8

Table 28/continued

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
M. Professionals	15.2	16.1
Farmers, farm managers	7.0	8.9
Managers, officials, proprietors	12.3	9.5
Clerical workers	6.4	10.1
Sales workers	3.5	4.2
Craftsmen, foremen	15.8	20.8
Operatives	12.3	14.3
Service workers	14.0	10.1
Farm laborers	2.9	2.4
Laborers	10.5	3.6
N. Up to \$3,000	14.9	28.5
\$3,000 - \$4,999	21.7	12.7
\$5,000 - \$7,499	24.2	27.8
\$7,500 - \$9,999	19.9	13.9
\$10,000 - \$14,999	10.6	13.9
\$15,000 - \$24,999	6.2	1.9
\$25,000 and over	2.5	1.3
O. Own	60.6	70.8
Rent	39.4	29.2

Table 28/continued

		<u>In Percent</u>	
		<u>Extremely Favorably</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
E.	Single	7.0	4.2
	Married	76.6	76.8
	Divorced	3.5	3.6
	Widowed	9.4	11.9
	Separated	3.5	3.6
F.	Younger people (Up to fifty)	85.4	51.7
	Older people (Fifty and over)	14.6	48.3
G.	No child under 12	48.5	64.7
	One child	21.1	10.8
	Two children	12.9	11.4
	Three children	4.7	7.8
	Four children	8.2	3.0
	Five children	2.3	1.8
	Six children	1.2	.6
	Seven or more children	1.2	0.0
H.	Living alone	7.6	12.5
	Smaller households (two to five)	69.6	69.2
	Larger households (five or more)	22.9	8.4

Table 28/continued

<u>In Percent</u>		
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
P. Upper class	4.7	1.8
Middle class	48.8	53.7
Working class	44.7	40.9
Lower class	1.8	3.7
Q. Served in armed forces (respondent or spouse)	55.8	50.9
Did not serve	44.2	49.1
R. In combat	42.2	39.0
Never in combat	57.8	61.0

Apart from the differences that do exist, and that run through the data in general, there is little evidence of crystallization of attitudes toward the NEAR system along lines which customarily differentiate attitude positions in the nation. Studies of other civil defense systems similarly indicate lack of cleavages in terms of which the population is divided both by their views of civil defense and some other social and cultural characteristics.

Class differences, for instance, do not correlate with the NEAR system attitudes in a consistent manner; nor do we get clearer results when only the extreme groups are taken into account. Income or educational differences, themselves very good predictors of many attitudes, are not systematically related either to the NEAR system views or to civil defense systems evaluations in general. There are, of course, indications that the least education respondents are somewhat more opposed; but this relation does not hold uniformly at all.

People have clear-cut views. Perhaps these opinions are based on knowledge or stem from ignorance. But they are expressed unequivocally, and an underlying pattern is observable. Yet, this pattern does not correlate with the customary social and cultural variables which otherwise differentiate our population. Hence, we must conclude that the attitudes regarding civil defense systems in general, and the NEAR system in particular, are still in the process of formation in that individual positions do exist on all points, but consensus in groups and in various socio-cultural categories of the population is lacking.

But then, there is consensus, and the results must be interpreted along such lines until contrary evidence becomes available, if ever: there is national agreement--of the order of two thirds to three fourths of the populace--on the issues of the study. This consensus favors the NEAR system as much as other studies show that it also favors various protective systems. The point is above all that there are no (save for the few exceptions cited) strong socio-cultural correlates of this consensus, and by implication, of the view which deviates from the national norm.

A study of the two extreme groups, the most and least favorable respondents, further underscores these conclusions.

V. EVALUATION OF NEAR SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES

1. Introduction

This section of the report considers several alternatives which it seemed worth exploring in the course of this research. One of these alternatives has to do with dual or multiple use of the NEAR receiver. In addition to its basic function to provide warning of impending enemy attack, the system could generate signals to inform the relevant portions of the public of other threats--floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and so on.

Such coupling of purposes may involve increased cost. Hence, we sought to find out not only whether dual or multiple purpose systems would be preferred, and by whom, but also whether Americans might be willing to spend additional funds for such functions.

Nor is it necessary to think of the NEAR receiver as a separate piece of equipment. It might be coupled with other household appliances--perhaps, in principle, with any appliance operating on electric current. Again, we wanted to find out whether people might be willing to pay additional money for such appliances if the NEAR receiver unit were built right into them.

At any given time, a large portion of the public is neither in their place of work or in their home. Indeed, it is on the road. And more often than not, people who are moving from one point to another are in an automobile. It seemed therefore well worth the time to probe whether an alerting system for automobiles would be acceptable if one were to be developed and marketed.

These are the issues of this section of the present report.

2. Dual or Multiple Purposes

Over two thirds of the respondents claim that coupling of other warning functions (against natural disasters) with the primary purpose would actually make the NEAR system much more, or at least more, acceptable to them. Very few respondents indeed, only 6.7 percent of the total sample, answer that such combination of purposes would make the receiver less, or much less, acceptable.

Table E-1 (Appendix E) gives the results for the various population segments. In summary, those population groups which are already favorably disposed to the NEAS system are affected favorably by the notion of dual or multiple purposes. At the same time, those segments of the population which are somewhat less favorably inclined to the acquisition of the device to begin with are also somewhat less positive about the opportunity to use the device under peacetime conditions for other purposes. But there are no major differences; in each instance the same majorities lean toward favorable evaluation of duality of functions.

The respondents who thought that coupling of purposes would make the system much more, or more, acceptable were also asked how much more they would be willing to pay in added cost for the added functions. On the average, these interviewees (who constitute 68.4 percent of the sample to begin with) are willing to spend \$4.40 more for the additional alerting functions.

Actually, 3.9 percent of the respondents would not only spend no additional money: they would not buy the device "under any circumstances". This means, therefore, that although these respondents claim that the added warning functions, chiefly against natural disasters, would make the NEAS system more, or even much more, acceptable, the acceptability level is insufficient to prompt them to desire it. A further 12.2 percent of the subjects, who are otherwise favorably disposed to the idea of duality of purpose, will be unwilling to spend anything more for the additional services suggested by the question. Table E-2/A-S gives the percentage distributions for the various population segments.

While there are more people in the largest metropolitan areas who would not buy the device under any conditions even though the additional warning functions seem acceptable to them, respondents from these highly urbanized national complexes would pay more for such added services (\$4.40 on the average) than would people in rural counties (\$3.59). The relationship between proportions of people willing to act in specific ways and the average dollars and cents that they might spend in the process suggests that a greater division of opinion exists in the urban centers than in the less urbanized areas.

Younger people are more favorably disposed not only in terms of the percentage distributions but also in the average money they would be willing to invest. More younger people would spend five or ten dollars (and an average of \$4.62) than older people (an average of \$4.02).

Jewish respondents would be inclined to spend more--an average of \$5.88--than either Protestants (\$4.43) or Catholics (\$4.15). In terms of occupations, there is a tendency for the people who might be able to afford it least to say that they would invest additional money into the device: farm laborers, \$6.42; laborers, \$5.07; service workers, \$4.76. People in sales occupations are least willing to make any additional investments (average of \$2.93). Professionals (\$4.01) and farm managers and farmers (in sharp contrast with farm laborers) also yield low averages.

As has been the case throughout the study, people who live in larger households are also most willing to use additional resources for the further warning services (\$5.60 on the average) than people in smaller households (\$4.23), who, in turn, are more favorable than respondents who are living alone (\$3.77).

That the underlying attitude to the NEAR system is a major determinant of acceptability of alternative versions of the system becomes quite clear when we again consider only the most and least favorable respondents: that is, the people who would lease or buy the receiver at all the costs proposed, and those who give a likelihood of zero to such actions on their part.

Table 29.

EFFECT OF ADDITIONAL WARNING FUNCTIONS ON ACCEPTABILITY
OF NEAR RECEIVER ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS
WITH EXTREME VIEWS TOWARD BUYING AND LEASING

<u>Dual or Multiple Purpose would Make NEAR System:</u>	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
Much more acceptable	50.3	21.1
More acceptable	21.1	26.7
No difference	18.1	48.4
Less acceptable	7.0	.6*
Much less acceptable	3.5	3.1*

*In these people, the acceptability is so low to begin with that the "floor effect" operates: the system is already so unacceptable that nothing can make it more so (at least not for many respondents).

The differences are particularly striking in terms of added costs. Although 62.2 percent of the most favorable respondents might be willing to spend up to \$10.00 more for added warning functions, only 19.2 percent of the least favorably disposed respondents would do so. Yet, there is some evidence that even the least favorable interviewees might become somewhat more likely to acquire the system if it provided other services than those which an attack environment would call for.

Table 30.

WHAT WOULD RESPONDENTS BE WILLING TO SPEND IN ADDED FUNDS EVEN THOUGH OTHER WARNING FUNCTIONS MAKE THE SYSTEM MUCH MORE, OR MORE, ACCEPTABLE:
RESPONDENTS WITH EXTREME VIEWS

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
Would not buy under any circumstances	1.7	32.9
Would spend no additional money for added warning	5.0	17.8
Would spend \$1.00 more	5.0	9.6
Would spend \$2.00 more	4.2	9.6
Would spend \$5.00 more	21.8	11.0
Would spend \$10.00 more	62.2	19.2

This means that, on the average, the most favorable respondents would spend about \$7.44 for added system functions; whereas the least favorable respondents, \$2.76. It is, of course, of particular importance that altogether 49.3 percent of the least favorable subjects might be willing to spend some money for the system if it were to be coupled with peace time warning functions as well. Since initially these are respondents unwilling to spend anything, it seems reasonable to interpret this that the coupling of purposes might amount to a small increment of buyers who would otherwise not behave in this manner at all. Relative to the total sample, people willing to spend at least \$1.00 and up to \$10.00 account for 2.5 percent of all respondents.

2. Coupling with Household Appliances

There is less receptivity to the idea of building the NEAR receiver into other household appliances. This alternative, of course, raises issues well beyond the scope of this particular study. These have to do, for instance, with the nature of the appliance replacement cycle and the problems associated with a market already fairly well saturated with most household appliances of recent vintage. Indeed, this mode of distribution of the NEAR receiver, even if contemplated, may be ruled out on grounds other than simply public indifference.

Actually, our research shows that the respondents are not in opposition: but more of them would not want to pay anything more for such appliances if the receiver were built into them --and if, in the first place, they were in the market for these appliances (this was not considered in our research, a limitation imposed by time constraints regarding the length of interviews). Table E-3/A-S is a summary of the results.

In terms of averages, the respondents would be willing to add \$4.08 to the cost of the appliances mentioned to them. This is not a very good estimate, however, because our question lumped together appliances of varying costs to begin with (for instance, refrigerators versus radio receivers). Nonetheless: each appliance mentioned has a higher overall cost than the prices suggested for the NEAR receiver. People were willing to pay \$4.40 (as an average figure) for duality of purposes of the NEAR receiver--hence, a substantial percentage of the potential NEAR receiver costs (over 80 percent of the \$5.00 suggestion; over 40 percent of the \$10.00 alternative; some 30 percent of \$15.00, and almost 18 percent of \$25.00). Relative to costs of household appliances, the average of \$4.08 constitutes generally a much smaller percentage.

Some 84 percent of the most favorable respondents would pay \$5.00 or \$10.00 more for a dual purpose system. The same increment in costs of appliances is favored by 75 percent of the most favorable respondents. And while 50.7 percent of the least favorable interviewees would spend nothing more for a dual purpose instrument, 72.1 percent would be unwilling to pay anything more for household appliances with a built-in warning buzzer.

Table 31.

AVERAGE ADDITIONAL MONEY RESPONDENTS ARE WILLING TO SPEND
FOR HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES WITH A BUILT-IN WARNING DEVICE

	<u>Dollars</u>
Total sample	4.08
Most favorable*	6.83
Least favorable*	1.11

*In terms of leasing and buying alternatives as previously discussed.

Negro respondents tend to be willing to spend more (\$5.52) than whites (\$4.01) as they were more inclined to pay added money for dual-purpose NEAR receiver (\$4.84 in contrast with \$4.36); young people (\$4.32) are more favorable than older people (\$3.57); household size, as before, is another variable in terms of which differences are more pronounced than is otherwise the case. People who live alone are least willing to invest added money for household appliances equipped with a NEAR receiver, or else, are willing to spend least money for such purchases (average, \$3.39). People in smaller households yield an average of \$4.05; whereas respondents living in households with four or more additional people, \$4.53. The patterns therefore reproduce the results of other aspects of this study.

4. Alerting System for Cars

Some 12.4 percent of the respondents do not have a car. Of all respondents, including those without an automobile, 50.7 percent claim that they would like to acquire an alerting device for their car(s) if one were available. Respondents in New England, the Pacific states, and East North Central region are least inclined to want an alerting system for their car; whereas people in the Mountain states and the Southern belt are substantially more receptive.

The percentage of respondents without cars is greatest in the largest metropolitan areas; and smallest, as might be expected, in the rural counties. Yet, both rural counties and largest metropolitan areas are less receptive to the receiver than are other metropolitan areas or urbanized counties. Hence, the

percentage of people without cars is not a good predictor of acceptability and the same variables in terms of which the respondents differ in their attitudes toward the NEAR system enter into the picture.

Although a much larger proportion of Negroes is without cars, many more Negroes than whites would like an alerting device for their cars; in fact, 79.3 percent of Negroes who do have a car would want the system; whereas 54.9 percent of whites with cars would do so. Younger people are much more favorable than are older people. Of the younger people with cars (93.8 percent of all younger people in the sample), 70.4 percent would like the idea; whereas among the older people with cars (75.4 percent have cars), 45.8 percent find the notion acceptable.

More than half of the widowed respondents in the sample do not have automobiles. They are also least receptive to having an alerting device in their cars even if they do have a car. Single people are most favorable: 84.9 percent have cars, and of these, 70.9 percent favor the concept.

While respondents in sales occupations were among the least responsive groups with regard to the home alerting device, and they did not find the idea of dual purposes, or coupling with household appliances, particularly appealing, an alerting system for cars is quite favored by them. This should, of course, not be surprising in the light of the nature of work of many people who are classified in the sales worker category. Only 5.7 percent of them do not have a car. And of those who do have it, 62.0 percent would want the device. However, laborers and operatives are even more receptive. In the former group, 14.6 percent do not own cars. Of those who do (85.4 percent), 71.2 percent favor the idea of an alerting instrument for their cars; and of the operatives with cars (85.7 percent of all), 61.1 percent would want the device. Farm laborers have fewer cars (35.7 percent do not have one); and they are also least interested in the device even though they own a car (38.9 percent of them would be interested). Similarly, while people who rent their place of residence have fewer cars than people who own their residence, they are more likely to want an instrument such as the one suggested for their car than property owners.

Table E-4/A-S gives the detailed information about the various population categories. The logic of the underlying result is, of course, inescapable: among people who are more likely to be using their cars, receptiveness to an alerting device for the car is greater than in groups where cars may not be put to as frequent usage. A sharp difference exists between the most and least favorable respondents. Table 32. provides the evidence.

Table 32.

RECEPTIVITY TO AN ALERTING SYSTEM FOR CARS ON THE PART
OF RESPONDENTS WITH EXTREME VIEWS ON BUYING AND LEASING
NEAR RECEIVER OPTIONS

	<u>In Percent</u>		<u>In Percent of Car Owners</u>	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
No car	7.8	16.6	XXX	XXX
Would get device	75.3	15.9	81.7	19.1
Would not get device	16.9	67.5	18.3	80.9
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

Among respondents who would lease or buy the NEAR receiver across the cost spectrum suggested in the questionnaire, by far most would also want an instrument for their car. In fact, four out of five make this claim. Among the people who fail to be interested in a home alerting device at any cost, four out of five are also uninterested in a device for their car.

VI. PRESENT WARNING SYSTEM

1. Introduction

We thought that the willingness to acquire a home alerting system in general, or the NEAR receiver specifically, should in part relate to the views which an individual has of the present alerting system.

Hence, the respondents were asked about their present source of initial attack warning; and they were asked to evaluate the present alerting system on a crude quality scale--from "very good" to "poor".

2. Source of Warning

Although our question specifically inquired into how the respondent would "first learn" about an enemy attack threatening the United States, air raid sirens are referred to just about by one out of four Americans (actually, 23.1 percent). Most people expect to receive warning by radio (71.6 percent) or television (53.3), and only very few think that no alert of any kind would be available (0.9 percent).

There are a few sharp differences in the response patterns among the various segments of the population. The details are given in Appendix C, Table C-1/A-U. In the mountain states, radio is cited as an initial source of warning by 81.1 percent of the respondents, whereas sirens are mentioned by 7.5 percent only; by contrast with this, respondents from New England expect warning through radio in 61.2 percent of the instances, and by sirens in 34.3 percent of the cases. In Middle Atlantic, both radio and sirens are mentioned more often than they are nationally (76.3 percent radio, 30.4 percent sirens), whereas in West South Central states both are cited less frequently than in the nation as a whole (60.9 percent radio, 15.8 percent sirens).

The less urban the sample area, the more often is television referred to as initial source of alert information. Whereas the larger the sample area in terms of urbanization, the more often are sirens cited. At the extremes, 9.1 percent of the respondents in rural counties quote sirens, whereas 34.7 percent of people from largest metropolitan areas do so. But no other differences in Table C-1/A-U are very large nor are they consistently related to various characteristics of the respondents.

Obviously, initial warning could not be received by radio if it were either unavailable or else not turned on. Hence, the radio related responses might be interpreted to mean that, on the whole, people have radios turned on about 71.6 percent of the time--some 17 hours per day. Or else, that 71.6 percent of the people implicitly claim that their radios are on all the time. Neither of these interpretations is quite satisfactory. Rather, we would suspect that the question evoked responses which deal partially with impending attack warning, and partially with something close to strategic warning.

It is indeed imaginable that under tense conditions in the international environment in which an attack seemed possible at all, the nation's radios and television sets might be turned on just about all the time. Under these circumstances, the response percentages do not seem surprising.

This would then seem to mean that people do not expect an entirely unanticipated, sudden attack but rather, if at all, an attack following some period of heightened threat recognition. Alternatively, this could mean that the estimates of warning sources are simply unreliable. But in the light of other data, and the overall consistency of all results of the study, this is less appealing as an explanation.

3. Rating of Current Warning System

More people (20.3 percent) believe that the existing alerting system is poor than believe that it is very adequate (16.9 percent). All in all, the respondents are split. Some 46.1 percent claim that the current warning system is very good or good; whereas 53.9 percent rate it fair or poor.

Only a few major differences among various population subgroups are noticeable from Table C-2/A-I which gives the details in Appendix C. In East North Central states where least receptivity to the home alerting systems was noticed, the current system is rated worse than in other regions of the nation. Altogether, 65.5 percent of the respondents in these states consider the present system either fair or poor; whereas in New England and Middle Atlantic states, the current system is believed to be better than other national regions are prone to indicate (53.8 percent in New England rate it very good or good; and 53.5 percent in Middle Atlantic).

The simple quality rating of the existing alerting system does not yield major or even systematic differences dependent on

the type of residential area--whether the respondents are drawn from largest metropolitan areas, other large metropolitan complexes, urbanized counties, or rural counties. Nor does race or sex differentiate in these terms.

Jewish respondents (70 percent think the system fair or poor) and people who claim to be least religious (73.4 percent so answer) are least impressed with the present situation. This is also the case with the more educated respondents. People with more than college education are least favorable (73.2 percent), and people with completed college education are also more unfavorable than the national average or the other educational categories (64.5 percent of "fair" or "poor" responses). A consistent difference exists by class: the higher the class the lower the overall evaluation of the present system. Using the system ratings as scores, thus violating some assumptions about the underlying scale at the gain of simplicity, we find that the present system evaluations do not yield any high correlations of any kind.

Indeed, the relationship between system rating and educational level is (-.122)--the higher the education the lower the rating; and the correlation of the rating with information about civil defense is (-.177), again indicating that the more information people believe to have the less they are impressed with the current warning system. These coefficients are significantly different from zero correlations; but they are far too low to be of substantive relevance.

In the way of an example, the current system rating does not correlate with expectations of war (correlation of .027 only!), nor does it correlate with probabilities of effective disarmament in the next five years (correlation -.065). Nor are there any but similar correlations between the current warning system evaluation and the various shelter system alternatives--whether they are likely or not, or whether they are desirable or not. This means, of course, that while respondents have views about the present system and can express them, thereby suggesting some standard of quality the system does, or fails to, meet--these judgements are not apparently patterned along any lines of socio-cultural characteristics, nor do they correlate with peace and war expectations, or other attitudes toward civil defense alternatives.

There are, of course, probably underlying "reasons" for which some respondents believe the present system to be adequate and others are dissatisfied with it. But the variables which we have expected as potential explanations of the evaluation do not improve our interpretation. We must, therefore, conclude

that we do not know why some people say that the existing alert system is very good or very poor, good or fair, and that we do not even have a clear-cut clue to this answer.

4. Current System Rating and NEAR System

The correlations between present system evaluations and acceptability of a home alerting system, the NEAR receiver, its lease at varying costs, or its purchase at several price levels, are all negative but very low. Thus there is a slight tendency for people who believe the present system to be poor to be more receptive to the home alerting options. Yet, the coefficients are of such magnitude as to lead to the conclusion that the respective evaluations are basically uncorrelated. Table 33. gives the several coefficients.

Table 33.

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PRESENT SYSTEM RATING AND VARIOUS NEAR SYSTEM OPTIONS

<u>Likelihood of Acquiring</u>	<u>Correlation*</u>
Home alerting device	-.045
Near receiver	-.020
Lease for 15 cents	-.036
Lease for 25 cents	-.046
Lease for 50 cents	-.067
Lease for \$1.00	-.054
Buy for \$5.00	-.036
Buy for \$10.00	-.049
Buy for \$15.00	-.051
Buy for \$25.00	-.051

*This is to be read: the higher the rating of the present system, the lower the likelihood of acquiring alternative systems for each option cited. But, of course, the relation "holds" only to the extremely small extent indicated and is even statistically not significant (in that the hypothesis that population correlations are actually zero could not be rejected--particularly not at .01 level).

Tables B-1/T, B-2/T and so on, contain the breakdown of average likelihood of acquiring alternative systems by evaluation of the current warning system. No pronounced differences emerge in these percentage terms (as is already clear from the correlations) nor are there consistent patterns observable. There is a tendency (Table B-1/T) for the likelihood of wanting a home alerting system to be greater for the people who think the present warning system is poor; but the relation all but disappears upon exposure to the NEAR receiver. All groups (by present system rating) become more likely to get the receiver, and all groups reach just about the same average level of probability.

We suspected that the better people liked the present system, the more they might be inclined to oppose the NEAR options because they could conclude that a new alerting system is simply not needed. The data do not substantiate this conclusion at all. The likelihood with which people claim they would act on the NEAR system options is basically independent of what they think of the current warning.

We might, of course, dismiss the problem by saying that this simply means that people do not know what they are talking about--that they give some answer or other to the various questions, and the result is a series of uncorrelated and unpatterned answers for the aggregate of respondents. This interpretation is not very plausible, however. The main reason for which we cannot disregard the answers has to do with the fact that many other items do correlate with one another; and they yield even very high correlations.

Indeed, since the questions about NEAR options were asked in random order within each basic distribution mode (lease, purchase, Government issue), there would be no reason to expect high correlations among these items if people were simply giving an entirely unreliable answer throughout. And furthermore: all population segments tend to behave in the same manner, and not merely people among whom lack of knowledge and/or interest in these issues might lead to arbitrariness in responding to the questions.

Substantively then, what might the results mean? The one interpretation which is compatible with the data would suggest that the NEAR system (or even a general home alerting device) is seen as a considerable improvement upon the present system by the respondents who think the current system is poor or fair; and that it is seen as less of an improvement, but one still, among people who are rather well satisfied with the current system. The result would then be similarity of response to the NEAR system even though answers to the current system split the population quite differently.

The results can also be interpreted, in part, in terms of complementarity of various systems. Thus the respondents may be simply voicing a view that the NEAR system is acceptable as an augmentation to the existing, however rated, alerting system. That this may be to some extent so is indicated by the fact that in answer to the question about sources of warning, many respondents cite several alternatives--radio, television as well as sirens, or any two of them. Yet, they also are quite receptive to the home alerting system options. Therefore, the various ways in which warning is received may be seen as complementing each other, or supporting one another.

That sharp differences in NEAR system evaluation do not exist as a function of variable ratings of the present system is underscored by data on the extreme respondents: those who would lease or buy the NEAR receiver with likelihood of ten over the respective cost ranges, and those who attach zero probability to its acquisition.

Table 34.

EVALUATION OF PRESENT WARNING SYSTEM BY RESPONDENTS
WITH EXTREME VIEWS ON NEAR RECEIVER

<u>Present System Rating</u>	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>Extremely Favorable</u>	<u>Extremely Unfavorable</u>
Very good	17.0	20.9
Good	24.8	52.7
Fair	33.9	26.8
Poor	24.2	19.6

Clearly, the most favorable respondents consider the present warning system somewhat less adequate than the respondents who are least receptive to the NEAR acquisition options. Yet, considering that these are the polar groups of the sample (and this polarity, in turn, was seen relatively unrelated to other socio-cultural characteristics), these differences are not as large as would be expected if the hypothesis that people who think the present system is good might not like to get it because it is not needed were to be supported.

VII. COLD WAR FUTURES

1. Introduction

The larger context in which warning systems against plausible attacks against the United States must be contemplated has to do with problems of resolving the Cold War conflict. This is particularly so in that under certain conditions of the international environment there may be no need for measures of protection for civilians; and under other, less favorable, circumstances, no measure may seem quite enough.

The NEAR system study therefore included variables pertinent to the Cold War conflict itself. For one, the respondents were asked how the Cold War might eventually end. Secondly, how they would like to see it end. Thirdly, how they believed the United States would desire the Cold War to end. And also, how the Soviets might prefer for the Cold War to terminate.

To facilitate the orientation of respondents, they were provided with a roster of alternative ways in which the conflict could end. Perhaps the list includes the most plausible alternatives; but there is no necessary assumption that it incorporates all possibilities, or all at the same level of detail. They were also asked when the Cold War might terminate.

We shall not analyze these Cold War related attitudes in any detail here. Rather, only a basic portrait will be provided to permit assessment of the NEAR system acceptability in the light of such data.

2. Cold War Terminations

Table 35. summarizes the responses. One in four Americans expect that the Cold War might end in disarmament measures or due to reconciliation. One in five (21.4 percent) anticipate that the conflict might continue indefinitely--no end is in sight, at least not yet. One in ten respondents believe that the Communist regimes will collapse in the wake of internal upheavals; and one in ten think that a war might occur in which the United States would prevail. All in all, 17.2 percent of the respondents expect international violence of major magnitude, but only 0.6 percent admit the possibility that the United States may wind up at the short end of the war.

That the world would become Communist by gradual conversion of people (whether all of them or substantial majorities) to the Communist world view, is expected but by 1.1 percent of the respondents; and it is the most frequent answer (23.3 percent) to

the question which probed into the least likely Cold War ending. Similarly, some 19.3 percent of the interviewees think it least likely that the United States might find itself in a position to have to surrender (without war), and 12.9 percent expect a destructive war (without "losers" or "winners") as the least likely alternative. This, in turn, is expected by 6.3 percent of the respondents as the most probable prospect.

Table 35.

ANTICIPATED AND DESIRED COLD WAR TERMINATIONS

	<u>In Percent</u>			<u>Most Desirable to</u>	
	<u>Most Likely</u>	<u>Least Likely</u>	<u>Most Desirable</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>
Indefinite continuation	21.4	2.5	0.4	0.4	1.6
Acceptance of Communism	1.1	23.3	0.3	0.4	38.5
Pro-Communist revolutions	1.3	2.2	0.3	0.4	9.1
Central war in which Communist nations win	0.6	8.0	0.4	0.1	11.9
Central war in which level of destruction prevents thinking in terms of "winners" or "losers"	6.3	12.9	1.0	0.6	1.7
Central war in which the United States wins	10.0	2.4	6.6	5.5	0.6
Anti-Communist revolutions	10.6	2.1	4.4	4.1	0.7
Evolution of democratic forms in Communist nations	8.0	10.3	25.4	24.3	2.1
Disarmament	25.5	5.5	43.2	42.2	6.8
Third Force Emergence	5.0	5.9	3.8	1.3	1.9
U.S. surrender without war	0.8	19.3	0.7	1.6	23.4
Soviet surrender without war	7.4	5.6	13.4	18.9	1.8
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)
	(1344)	(1344)	(1356)	(1334)	(1331)

Disarmament is also the most desired alternative. The only option which is singled out by the respondents with considerable frequency other than disarmament is the desire to see the Communist regimes gradually change into democratic governments. And perhaps one in eight respondents (13.4 percent) would like to see the Soviets in a position in which surrender becomes necessary. These are also objectives attributed to the United States: disarmament is seen most wanted (42.2 percent); liberalization of Communist systems next (24.3 percent); and Soviet surrender third (18.9 percent). This means that rather few respondents desire anti-Communist revolutions (4.4 percent) or believe that this is the most wanted way on the part of the United States (4.1 percent). Only 6.6 percent of the respondents desire a world war in which the United States would win; and 5.5 percent think that this is what the nation as a whole wants most. And very few respondents, indeed, desire the status quo to continue indefinitely (0.4 percent)--and the same percentage attributes maintenance of the Cold War environment as a desired objective by the United States.

The Soviets are seen as wanting Communism's acceptance above all (38.5 percent); or a capability to force the United States to surrender (23.4 percent). But more respondents, though actually not very many, believe that the Soviet Union would desire a victorious war most of all (11.9 percent). Yet, that a degree of mistrust is in excess of this percentage, is indicated by the fact that only 6.8 percent actually single out disarmament as the most desirable Soviet objective.

Although only 5.5 percent of the respondents think that disarmament is the least likely way for the Cold War to end, Table 36 shows that within five years disarmament is considered very unlikely, if not impossible, by 17.4 percent of the respondents.

Table 36.

LIKELIHOOD OF CENTRAL WAR AND OF DISARMAMENT
WITHIN FIVE YEARS
(ABOUT 1968)

<u>Scale Value</u>		<u>In Percent</u>	
		<u>Central War</u>	<u>Disarmament</u>
10	Certain or near-certain	3.2	4.0
6, 7, 8, 9	Likely	10.2	18.9
5	As likely as not	33.4	33.9
4, 3, 2, 1	Unlikely	27.4	25.8
0	Certain or near-certain not to happen	25.7	17.4

At the same time, if the respondents are not optimistic about prospects for effective arms control or disarmament measures within five years, they are not expecting a major war either. If anything, the probabilities associated with a central war are lower than those connected with disarmament as a possibility.

3. NEAR System Evaluations and Cold War Futures

It is obvious from the basic data that receptivity to the NEAR system out-paces expectations of war of any kind--whether measured in terms of likelihood within five years, or as a way for the Cold War to end at some time in the future. Furthermore, the correlations between expected arms control and disarmament measures within five years and probabilities associated with wanting a NEAR receiver under the various options are actually higher than the correlations between war expectations and NEAR system assessments. And above all: they are all positive in that there is simply no evidence, and some contrary evidence, that a conflict between even expected (not to speak of desired) disarmament and an adequate warning system exists. Table 37. gives the coefficients for the basic NEAR system options and the war or disarmament anticipations within the five-year time frame.

Table 37.

CORRELATIONS OF NEAR SYSTEM OPTION PROBABILITIES
AND ESTIMATES OF WAR AND DISARMAMENT
WITHIN FIVE YEARS

<u>Likelihood of getting:</u>	<u>Central War</u>	<u>Disarmament</u>
Home alerting device	.119	.084
Near receiver	.067	.105
Lease at 15 cents	.092	.115
Lease at 25 cents	.087	.112
Lease at 50 cents	.091	.121
Lease at \$1.00	.078	.113
Buy for \$5.00	.062	.107
Buy for \$10.00	.051	.091
Buy for \$15.00	.037	.083
Buy for \$25.00	.031	.087
Accept free issue	.049	.055
Accept free issue on promise to use	.047	.065
Accept free issue and legal requirement to use	.033	.045

Table B-1/T furthermore shows that even those respondents who expect the Cold War to terminate due to arms control and disarmament measures (25.5 percent of the sample as was shown in Table 35.) are receptive to the home alerting system and the NEAR receiver is even more acceptable to them. In this regard, they are very little different from the respondents who anticipate a violent termination of the Cold War conflict.

People who expect disarmament to end the Cold War are as likely as people who think that a major war will occur to pay 15 cents, 25 cents, 50 cents or \$1.00 in monthly rentals (Table B-2/T). This holds equally for the purchase alternatives (Table B-3/T).

What do these types of results mean? First of all, we know that quite a few people expect disarmament to end the Cold War--and fewer people than that anticipate international violence in the form of a central war. Secondly, we know that they desire this Cold War ending--many more respondents would like to see disarmament to terminate the conflict than even expect it to. Thirdly, they do not expect disarmament of any adequate kind within five years--at least, they are less optimistic about the five-year time frame than about the eventual resolution of the Cold War (but this is not to say that they are pessimistic for the next five years: for that conclusion could not be supported by our data either). Fourthly, they find the NEAR system quite acceptable--indeed, as acceptable as other people. Thus the receptivity to the NEAR system is not degraded by anticipating effective disarmament, or wanting it.

All in all, this suggests that people view the next several years as a kind of holding operation. They do not see at all that it would be inconsistent to wish to be alerted if their expectations of, or desires for, peaceable solutions were to turn false.

The sense we get from the data is therefore one of people unwilling to gamble altogether--either on their expectations (hopes) or their desires (wishes). In any event, it is impossible to conclude from our results that any perception of incompatibility between home alerting systems and hopes and desires for measures which will make the use of thermonuclear weapons impossible, or at least highly improbable.

The points are even underscored if we compare the extreme groups of respondents: those most favorably disposed and least favorably disposed to the NEAR system. Table 38. provides the overall data.

Soviet Surrender	
9.1	4.0
4.2	2.0
14.3	4.5
15.6	4.5
1.2	41.4
5.9	0.7
6.6	9.9
3.8	0.0
18.9	1.4
1.4	20.3

Table 38.

EXPECTATIONS AND DESIRES ASSOCIATED WITH COLD WAR TERMINATION
AS A FUNCTION OF EXTREME VIEWS ON NEAR SYSTEM

	<u>Extremely Favorable to NEAR</u>					<u>Extremely Unfavorable to NEAR</u>				
	<u>Expect Most</u>	<u>Expect Least</u>	<u>Desire Most</u>	<u>Most U.S.</u>	<u>Desirable to U.S.S.R.</u>	<u>Expect Most</u>	<u>Expect Least</u>	<u>Desire Most</u>	<u>Most U.S.</u>	<u>Desirable to U.S.S.R.</u>
Indefinite continuation	15.2	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	24.8	2.0	0.6	0.7	3.4
Communism's acceptance	0.6	22.6	0.0	1.2	38.1	3.3	27.6	0.6	0.0	37.2
Pro-Communist revolutions	1.2	1.2	0.6	0.0	7.1	1.3	3.9	0.0	0.0	12.2
Central war with Communist victory	1.2	7.7	0.0	0.0	14.9	0.0	7.9	0.0	0.0	10.8
Destructive central war	10.3	13.1	1.8	0.0	1.8	7.2	16.4	1.3	0.7	1.4
Central war with U.S. victory	8.5	3.0	5.4	4.8	0.6	7.2	3.3	8.3	4.7	0.7
Anti-Communist revolu- tions	9.7	1.8	5.4	4.2	1.2	13.1	3.9	3.2	2.7	0.7
Liberalization of Communist system	9.1	8.3	22.6	29.9	3.0	6.5	8.6	27.6	26.4	2.0
Disarmament	28.5	5.4	43.5	42.5	8.9	24.2	4.6	48.7	41.9	6.8
Third Force	4.8	7.1	5.4	0.6	1.8	5.9	5.3	5.8	2.7	3.4
U.S. Surrender	1.8	25.0	1.2	1.2	21.4	0.7	9.9	0.0	1.4	20.3
Soviet Surrender	9.1	4.2	14.3	15.6	1.2	5.9	6.6	3.8	18.9	1.4

What are some of the main differences? The respondents who are least favorable to the NEAR system are, on the whole, more pessimistic about the future than are the more receptive interviewees. They expect the Cold War to go on indefinitely more than do the most favorable respondents; and they are equally clear in their estimate that this is not one of the most desirable alternatives either to them personally, or to the United States, or to the Soviet Union for that matter. The least favorable respondents expect disarmament to end the Cold War somewhat less than do the most favorable respondents. They desire disarmament slightly more; but then, the Americans who favor the NEAR system option most believe that the United States prefers disarmament to end the Cold War more than do the respondents who are least favorable about the NEAR system. A sharp difference exists in expectations of the least likely Cold War termination: the most favorably disposed respondents cite very frequently (25.0 percent) U.S. surrender as the least likely possibility; whereas the unfavorable respondents refer to this possibility much less often (9.9 percent). Furthermore, the interviewees most inclined to acquire the NEAR receiver prefer a Soviet surrender (14.3 percent) much more frequently than do the unfavorably disposed respondents (3.8 percent); but the latter group attributes this as a major objective to the United States more often (18.9 percent) than do the respondents who favor the NEAR system (15.6 percent). Both groups project similar objectives to the Soviet Union. And in this respect, they do not differ in any manner from all other respondents in the sample.

Although the interviewees who are least prone to leasing or buying the NEAR receiver do not expect war (apart from who might win it) as often as do the more favorably inclined respondents (14.4 percent for the former group; 20.0 percent for the favorable group), they desire it more often than do the most favorable respondents (9.6 percent as opposed to 7.2 percent).

First, even the data from the extreme groups of respondents cannot lead to the conclusion that peaceful alternatives to the Cold War, when expected or desired, run contrary to provisions to know about possible dangers of enemy attack. No conflict exists between expectations or desires pertaining to disarmament as a Cold War ending and NEAR system evaluation even if we look only at people who are either completely in favor of the NEAR system and those who are entirely opposed to it.

Secondly, there is enough evidence that the respondents who are least favorable to the NEAR system are also more pessimistic about the outcomes of the Cold War rather than the reverse.

Thirdly, there is evidence that the least favorably inclined respondents view the objectives of the United States as more different from their own subjective desires than do the most favorable respondents. They are more out of the main stream of the thinking of our sample subjects than are the extremely favorable interviewees.

None of the data at our disposal support the conclusion that people who are receptive to the home alerting system are considering a thermonuclear engagement more likely. None of the data would support the conclusion that they consider a thermonuclear war more desirable--even if it might be a war which they think the United States would win. None of the data support the conclusion that people who expect disarmament are opposed to the NEAR system; or for that matter, that people who are favorably disposed to the NEAR alerting system would be less desirous of peaceful solutions to the world conflict than other subjects might be.

Above all: regardless of anticipations regarding the way the Cold War might eventually end, people are inclined to favor provisions which would help them in the event of the unwanted possibilities involving international violence.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The most salient results of the study may now be summed up.

1. People are favorably disposed to the idea of a home alerting system.
 - a. More people claim that they would be likely to acquire such a device than say that they would be unlikely to do so.
 - b. More people state that they are certain or just about certain to get such an instrument for their homes than say that they would be certain not to do so.
 - c. No population segment can be singled out as being drastically at variance with this underlying view.
2. Upon exposure to the NEAR receiver, and a brief explanation of its purpose and function, receptivity to this type of a home alerting system increases.
 - a. Two out of three respondents state that they are likely or nearly certain to acquire such a device.
 - b. Two out of ten respondents are unlikely, or certain not to, procure one.
 - c. The likelihood of acquisition is greater for the specific NEAR receiver than for the general "home alerting device" in all population groups.
3. Four out of five respondents would accept the NEAR receiver if it were free issue by the Government.
 - a. This result holds even if the people were expected to promise to use such free issue instruments.
 - b. And it also holds if a legal requirement existed regarding the use of the device.
 - c. No population groups depart from this basic response in a major way.
4. Leasing alternatives are quite acceptable to the respondents but the likelihood of acquisition declines with increasing cost.

- a. One in two Americans might lease the NEAR receiver for 15 cents in that they are almost certain to do so; two in five would act so if the cost were 25 cents; one in three at 50 cents; and about one in four at \$1.00.
 - b. Only at the \$1.00 cost level is the proportion of respondents certain not to want the device greater than the proportion of respondents certain to get it.
5. Purchase alternatives are also rather acceptable but the likelihood of acquiring the instrument tends to be lower than for corresponding leasing alternatives.
- a. For increasing purchase costs, the likelihood of getting the device keeps declining.
 - b. At \$15.00, there are more people certain not to get the instrument than there are people who claim that they would certainly buy one; and this holds even more for the \$25.00 option.
6. Although no major subgroup differences exist, and all population segments considered are equally favorable to the options, a few persistent differences establish something of a pattern:
- a. Younger people are consistently more receptive than are older people.
 - b. Negroes are more favorably disposed than are whites.
 - c. Respondents from smaller households or living alone are less willing to acquire the NEAR receiver than are people from larger households.
 - d. With increasing numbers of young children, receptivity increases except for people with three children under twelve who fall consistently below the national norm in receptivity (but like all others, are still quite favorable to the system).
 - e. People who are renting their places of residence tend to be somewhat more favorable than people who own their residence.
 - f. People in large metropolitan areas and in urbanized counties are more favorably disposed

to the NEAR system than are people in the largest metropolitan complexes (of 2,000,000 or more inhabitants) or in rural counties (with no city of 10,000 or more inhabitants).

7. Among people in lower socio-economic positions in our society, there is a consistent, but not large, preference for leasing over buying options; whereas among people in somewhat higher socio-economic positions, buying tends to be preferred over leasing.
 - a. In higher socio-economic positions, the cutting points of the relationship are: \$5.00 is preferred over 15 cents; \$10.00 is preferred over 25 cents; \$15.00 is favored over \$1.00 in monthly costs.
 - b. In lower socio-economic positions; \$5.00 is preferred over 50 cents; \$10.00 is preferred over \$1.00 in monthly costs.
 - c. In this respect, people who are somewhat atypical are more like people in lower socio-economic positions in terms of the leasing/buying options; whereas people whose characteristics and attitudes are more characteristic of the sample are somewhat more like the respondents in higher socio-economic positions.
8. Assuming 57 million households around January 1, 1964, the estimates of NEAR receiver acquisition range, with confidence .95, between a low of 19,895,000 (if the choice were between \$1.00 lease or \$25.00 in purchase price, and both leasing and buying were possible) and a high of 42,916,000 (if the choice were 15 cents in lease money or \$5.00 in purchase costs and both leasing and buying options were available).
 - a. Leasing options alone yield a low estimate of 27,189,000 households (\$1.00 option) and a high estimate of 40,071,000 households (15-cent option).
 - b. Buying options alone yield a low estimate of 21,888,000 (\$25.00 option) and a high estimate of 39,273,000 (\$5.00 option).
9. Lease-buy combinations which are most equivalent in that they yield substantially similar estimates of numbers of households that might be expected to acquire the device given the option are:

- a. 15 cents versus \$25.00 on one hand, and 50 cents versus \$5.00 on the other hand; this is a trade-off at about the level of 35,000,000 households.
 - b. 25 cents versus \$15.00; or 25 cents versus \$25.00; or 50 cents versus \$10.00; these alternatives come as a reasonable trade-off at about the level of 28,000,000 - 29,000,000 households acquiring the device.
 - c. At about the 25,000,000 level, the trade-off is between \$1.00 and \$10.00 on one hand, and 50 cents and \$15.00 on the other hand.
10. The respondents generally claim that testing of the NEAR receiver would actually enhance its acceptability, and only very few respondents think that periodic check-outs would make the system less acceptable to them.
- a. Annual testing is more acceptable than quarterly testing.
 - b. Both annual and quarterly testing, however, have a favorable effect on acceptability although the effect is smaller for the more frequent testing option.
11. The respondents are also favorably disposed to the idea of dual or multiple purposes - the coupling of the primary alerting function with warning against other dangers (floods, tornadoes, hurricanes).
- a. The respondents indicate a willingness to spend an average of \$4.40 in additional money for such supplementary functions of the system.
 - b. Very few respondents claim that duality of purpose would make the device less acceptable than it otherwise might be.
 - c. One out of two respondents who like the idea of a dual or multiple purpose device would be willing to spend some additional money for the instrument as a result of such coupling of functions.
12. While still favorable, the respondents are less receptive to the idea of building the device into household appliances.
13. One in two respondents in the total sample would like to acquire a warning device, if one were available, for his car.

14. People are split in their evaluation of the present warning system.
 - a. About as many respondents consider current warning systems "very good" or "good" as view them "fair" or "poor".
 - b. Regardless of evaluation of the present warning system, the respondents are favorable to the NEAR receiver and the NEAR system.
15. Images of Cold War futures do not differentiate among the respondents in terms of their favorableness to the NEAR system.
 - a. There is no evidence of a conflict between: expectations of disarmament, or desirability of disarmament, and willingness to acquire the NEAR system.
 - b. There is no evidence that people who think that the Cold War might climax in international violence, or the few people who desire a major war, are more favorable to the NEAR system than are others - including particularly those respondents who expect, and wish for, peaceful solutions to the current conflict.

APPENDIX A

NEAR Study Questionnaire

APPENDIX A

The Questionnaire

Here is a sort of simple scale. HAND RESPONDENT CARD A. On this scale, zero stands for a situation in which there are no world tensions at all, and ten represents extreme tensions in the world. POINT TO THE NUMBERS WHILE EXPLAINING.

1. What number would you say best represents the amount of world tensions just about now?

(Enter number here)

2. Which number on the card best represents the world tensions that you personally expect by about 1965--that is, just about two years from now?

(Enter number here)

3. How about five years from now -- which number stands best for the level of tensions in the world which you think might exist then?

(Enter number here)

4. And which number represents best your opinion as to world tensions just about two years ago--about the end of 1961?

(Enter number here)

CARD A

WORLD SITUATION

-10- Extremely high tensions

- 9-

- 8-

- 7-

- 6-

- 5-

- 4-

- 3-

- 2-

- 1-

- 0- No tensions at all

A/2

Here is a card. HAND RESPONDENT CARD B. Printed on it are various possible ways in which the Cold War might end.

5. Will you please look at this list and tell me which you personally think is the most likely way for the Cold War to come to an end? You can take your time on this one. CODE BELOW.
6. And which is the least likely in your opinion? CODE BELOW.
7. In which of these ways would you personally most desire the Cold War to end? CODE BELOW.
8. How about the Soviet Union? Which end to the Cold War do you think the Soviet Union wants most? CODE BELOW.
9. Which one does the United States want most? CODE BELOW.

	Q. 5 Most Likely	Q. 6 Least Likely	Q. 7 Most Desirable	Q. 8 USSR Most	Q. 9 USA Most
F-1.....	01	01	01	01	01
F-2.....	02	02	02	02	02
F-3.....	03	03	03	03	03
F-4.....	04	04	04	04	04
F-5.....	05	05	05	05	05
F-6.....	06	06	06	06	06
F-7.....	07	07	07	07	07
F-8.....	08	08	08	08	08
F-9.....	09	09	09	09	09
F-10.....	10	10	10	10	10
F-11.....	11	11	11	11	11
F-12.....	12	12	12	12	12
D.K.....	88	88	88	88	88
N.A.....	99	99	99	99	99

CARD B

- F-1 The Cold War will continue indefinitely; no end is in sight at all.
- F-2 The whole world will become Communistic by people accepting Communism.
- F-3 By revolutions, civil wars and small wars, the Communists will come to power in the whole world.
- F-4 The Communist powers will be victorious in a world war.
- F-5 World War III will take place, resulting in such destruction that it makes no sense to speak of "winners" or "losers."
- F-6 The United States and its allies will win in a world war.
- F-7 The Communists are going to lose due to revolutions, civil wars and small wars in Communist nations.
- F-8 The Communists will accept the Western way of life, and the Communist powers will become like the United States, Great Britain or Sweden.
- F-9 The Cold War will end through disarmament or reconciliation.
- F-10 A Third Force will emerge in the world able to control the actions of the Communist nations as well as of the United States.
- F-11 The United States will have to surrender without war because of the development of such new weapons by Communist nations that the U.S. could not possibly win.
- F-12 The Communist nations will have to surrender without war because of the development of such new weapons by the United States that the Communists could not possibly win.

10. I would now like you to look at another card. HAND RESPONDENT CARD C. On it, 10 stands for something that is just about certain. Zero represents something that is not likely at all. Five means that the odds are about fifty-fifty, that is, something is as likely to happen as not. You may, of course, use any number on this scale.

Given this scale, how likely is it that there will be a major war involving nuclear weapons in the next five years or so?

(Enter number here)

11. Try to think back about six months. How likely did such a war seem to you some six months ago?

(Enter number here)

RETRIEVE CARD. (We'll be using this card again later.)

CARD C

PROBABILITY

-10-	Very likely
- 9-	
- 8-	
- 7-	
- 6-	
- 5-	Maybe
- 4-	
- 3-	
- 2-	
- 1-	
- 0-	Not likely

12. The way it looks to you today, when, would you say, is the Cold War going to end? In the next two years, in two to five years, in 10 years, 10 to 20 years, 50 years, or even later?

Within two years1
 More than two to five years2
 More than five to 10 years3
 More than 10 to 20 years4
 More than 20 to 50 years5
 Over 50 years6
 Never0
 D.K.8

13. Now here are some cards. HAND RESPONDENT SHUFFLED CD SERIES OF "CIVIL DEFENSE" CARDS. On these cards are printed various possible future situations which may exist in our civil defense.

On this folder (SHOW FOLDER, OPENING UP ONLY THE LIKELIHOOD COLUMN) are pockets which show how likely something is.

As before, the zero pocket on the bottom of the folder stands for something that is impossible or nearly impossible.

The top pocket--10--stands for something you consider certain or just about certain to happen.

Five means that something is as likely to happen as not--the chances are about fifty-fifty. POINT TO POCKETS DURING EXPLANATION.

Would you please put these cards into the pockets according to how likely it is that each situation will come about in five years or so--about 1968? You may use as many pockets as you want, and any number of cards may go into any pocket.

WHEN LIKELIHOOD SORTING IS COMPLETED, LEAVE CARDS IN POCKETS. NO RECORDING IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.

14. On some of these cards (POINT TO SORTED CARDS) are written things you personally might like very much to happen. On other cards are things you might like less, and on still others may be things you would dislike very much.

Please take the cards from the first pocket (POINT TO THE HIGHEST POCKET WHICH CONTAINS CARDS) and sort them into this row of pockets--on the line that is next to it. OPEN FOLDER AND SHOW "DESIRABILITY" ROWS.

Sort them into this row according to how much you want the thing written on the card to happen. The pockets in each row have numbers written on them.

A/6

Minus 3 stands for something that you would dislike very much.

Plus 3 stands for those things which you would very much want to happen.

Zero stands for those situations that you don't particularly care about one way or another. You may use any of these seven pockets you wish.

AFTER HIGHEST ROW IS COMPLETED: Now please do the same for all the other cards.

AS RESPONDENT IS SORTING THE CARDS, ENTER THE POCKET NUMBER CAREFULLY BELOW FOR EACH CARD.

Card Number	Pocket into which Sorted (ENTER 2-DIGIT NUMBER BELOW)	For Office Use Only	
		Likely	Wanted
CD-1			
CD-2			
CD-3			
CD-4			
CD-5			
CD-6			

CD CARDS

- CD-1 All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival.
- CD-2 There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.
- CD-3 In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases - plus some large cities will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.
- CD-4 There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.
- CD-5 In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.
- CD-6 There will be no shelters against nuclear weapons because arms control and disarmament steps will make nuclear war impossible.

Here is the same scale that you have seen before. HAND RESPONDENT CARD C AGAIN. Ten, five, and zero mean the same things as before. They stand for things that are just about certain, those that have fifty-fifty chances, and those that are just about impossible.

15. How likely is it that there will be disarmament with adequate controls in the next five years?

(Enter number here)

16. Try to think a few months back again. About six months ago, how likely did you think disarmament was?

(Enter number here)

17. If an enemy attack threatened the United States, how would you first learn about it? DO NOT READ CATEGORIES. CIRCLE ONE OR MORE CODES BELOW.

Sirens	1
Bells.....	1
Radio	1
T.V.	1
Telephone.....	1
Friends	1
Other (SPECIFY)	1
Not at all	1
Don't know	1

18. How good do you believe the present system for alerting people to enemy attack is around here? Would you say that it is very good, good, fair, or poor?

Very good	1
Good	2
Fair	3
Poor	4
D.K.	5

19. There has been discussion of providing each American home with some convenient instrument which would not cost a lot, to give an alert in case of an attack on the United States.

Using the likelihood scale that you have (CARD C), how likely is it that you would get such a device for your own home, that is, some convenient instrument that would alert you in the event of an attack on the United States?

(Enter number here)

20. Actually, the Office of Civil Defense is now developing such a new instrument to alert the population if the United States were to be attacked by an enemy. This is how this device might look. HAND CASE TO RESPONDENT. Every American home that has electricity can receive warning through this instrument. When the device is plugged into an outlet (POINT OUT PRONGS), it can be set off by a special signal that goes through the regular community power system.

When this happens, the instrument makes a loud buzzing sound that will alert people to turn on their radio for emergency information. The device would be triggered by electricity in a matter of seconds after warning is received.

Everything considered, how likely is it that you would get an instrument like this for your house? HAVE RESPONDENT ANSWER FROM THE LIKELIHOOD SCALE CARD C.

(Enter number here)

21. Suppose it were possible to lease one of these instruments. How likely would you be to lease one of the instruments at (EACH COST BELOW) per month?

ASK A-B-C-D IN RANDOM ORDER, AND ENTER QUESTION SEQUENCE AND RESPONDENT'S ANSWER FROM CARD C IN APPROPRIATE COLUMNS BELOW.

<u>Question Sequence</u>		<u>Enter Number</u>
_____	A. 15¢ per month?	_____
_____	B. 25¢ per month?	_____
_____	C. 50¢ per month?	_____
_____	D. \$1.00 per month?	_____

22. How about if these instruments were for sale? How likely would you be to buy one of these instruments if the cost were (EACH COST BELOW)?

ASK A-B-C-D IN RANDOM ORDER, AND ENTER QUESTION SEQUENCE AND RESPONDENT'S ANSWER FROM CARD C IN APPROPRIATE COLUMNS BELOW.

<u>Question Sequence</u>		<u>Enter Number</u>
_____	A. \$5.00?	_____
_____	B. \$10.00?	_____
_____	C. \$15.00?	_____
_____	D. \$25.00?	_____

23. And finally, how likely would you be to accept one of these instruments if . . . (EACH STATEMENT)?

ASK A-B-C IN RANDOM ORDER AND ENTER QUESTION SEQUENCE AND RESPONDENT'S ANSWER FROM CARD C IN APPROPRIATE COLUMNS BELOW.

<u>Question Sequence</u>		<u>Enter Number</u>
_____	A. The government gave it to you at no charge?	_____
_____	B. The government gave it to you at no charge and asked your promise to use it?	_____
_____	C. The government gave it to you at no charge and you were required by law to use it?	_____

24. As you know, civil defense sirens are occasionally being tested to insure that they are in working order. Similarly, there are occasional tests of the emergency signal over the radio. To insure that an alerting device in your home would be in working order at all times, it may also be necessary to test it on occasion. This means that a random signal would go through the device just for test purposes. Such tests would probably not take more than a few seconds.

If a test signal were sent through the instrument for a few seconds at a pre-determined time once a year, would this make it much more acceptable, more acceptable, less acceptable, or much less acceptable than it otherwise would be or would it make no difference to you?

Much more1
 More2
 No difference3
 Less4
 Much less5
 Don't know8

25. Suppose such tests might have to be conducted about every three months? Would this make it much more acceptable, more acceptable, less acceptable, or much less acceptable than it otherwise would be or would it make no difference to you?

Much more1
 More2
 No difference3
 Less4
 Much less5
 Don't know8

26. Of course, the main purpose of this device is to provide each American home with direct alert in the event of enemy attack. But it might be possible to combine this purpose with some other things. Suppose this instrument also gave an alert of tornadoes, hurricanes, or floods, in addition to an alert of enemy attack. Would that make it much more acceptable to you, more acceptable, less acceptable or much less acceptable, or would it make no difference to you?

Much more1 ASK A
 More2 ASK A
 No difference3
 Less4
 Much Less5
 Don't know8

A. IF MORE ACCEPTABLE:

Suppose this instrument cost about \$10.00 to buy, and only provided warning of enemy attack. How much more might you be willing to spend for it if it were to give you hurricane, tornado or flood warnings in addition to its main purpose? A dollar more, a couple of dollars more, five dollars, or ten dollars more?

Wouldn't buy it under any circumstances1
 Wouldn't pay more for other warnings2
 \$1.003
 \$2.004
 \$5.005
 \$10.006
 Don't know8

27. It is possible that a device will be developed which could be used outside the home--for example-- in cars. Would you want to have such an instrument for your car?

Yes1
 No2
 No car3
 Undecided8

28. The device we have talked about is a separate piece of equipment. It may be possible to adapt it in such a way that it is part of another household appliance like a radio, refrigerator, electric clock, and so on. If this were done, how much more would you be willing to spend for a radio or other appliance, in addition to its regular cost --one dollar more, two dollars more, five dollars, or ten dollars over the usual cost of the item?

Nothing more1
 \$1.002
 \$2.003
 \$5.004
 \$10.005
 Don't Know8

29. Here are several statements about the effects of a nuclear (or atomic) war. HAND RESPONDENT CARD D (A-B-C-D-E AS BELOW). Which of these statements comes closest to representing your view, if such a war were to happen?

- A. Enough people would survive a nuclear war to pick up the pieces and carry on with a good chance of rebuilding a system which lives under American values, as we know them1
- B. A nuclear war would mean the end of civilization as we know it2
- C. Although nuclear war would be a terrible thing, it would be possible to survive as a nation3
- D. If nuclear war does come, people in the U.S. will make the best of the situation.....4
- E. A nuclear war would mean the end of the world and all life in it5
- Don't know8

30. This is the last scale. HAND RESPONDENT CARD E. In this instance, 10 means that an individual knows all, or practically all, there is to be known about a given issue. Five represents a medium amount of information. Zero means that he has no knowledge of the issues at all. Everything considered. . .

ENTER NUMBER
SELECTED BELOW

- A. How well do you consider yourself informed about issues of the Cold War in general? _____
- B. How well are you informed about the effects of nuclear weapons?..... _____
- C. How well do you consider yourself informed about civil defense in America?..... _____
- D. And finally, how much information do you feel you have about arms control and disarmament efforts?..... _____

CARD E	
<u>AMOUNT OF INFORMATION</u>	
-10-	Know all or practically all about given issues
- 9-	
- 8-	
- 7-	
- 6-	
- 5-	Medium knowledge
- 4-	
- 3-	
- 2-	
- 1-	
- 0-	No knowledge of the issue

31. What is your marital status?

Single, never married1
 Married2
 Divorced3
 Widowed4
 Separated5

32. What is the total number of people living in this household, including yourself?

One01
 Two02
 Three03
 Four04
 Five05
 Six06
 Seven07
 Eight08
 Nine09
 Ten or more10
 Don't know88

33. A. In what country were you born? _____
 B. And where was your father born? _____
 C. And your mother? In which country was she
 born? _____

34. A. What is the last school grade or year you completed?
CIRCLE CODE BELOW.

- B. What is the last school grade your spouse completed?
 IF SINGLE, NEVER MARRIED, CODE 7 BELOW.

	SELF	SPOUSE
No schooling	0	0
Grammar school (1-8 years).....	1	1
Some high school (9-11 years)...	2	2
Completed high school (12 years)	3	3
College, incomplete	4	4
College graduate	5	5
Higher than college	6	6
Don't know	8	8
Never-married respondent	-	7

35. Who is the main earner in this household?

Respondent1
 Spouse2
 Other (SPECIFY)3

36. What sort of work (does, did) (main earner) do?

Occupation: _____

Industry: _____

37. Counting rents, interest, and things like that, in which one of the groups on this card (HAND CARD H) did your total family income fall, before taxes, last year?

A. Under \$3,0001
 B. \$3,000 - \$4,9992
 C. \$5,000 - \$7,4993
 D. \$7,500 - \$9,9994
 E. \$10,000 - \$14,9995
 F. \$15,000 - \$24,9996
 G. \$25,000 or more7
 Don't know8

38. Do you own your own home here, or do you rent it?

Own1
 Rent2

39. Which social class do you believe yourself to be in--the lower class, working class, middle class, or upper class?

Upper1
 Middle2
 Working3
 Lower4
 Don't know8

40. Which political party do you generally support?

Republican1
 Democratic2
 Other (SPECIFY)3
 None4
 Don't know8

41. What is your religious preference?

Protestant 1 ASK A
 Roman Catholic 2
 Jewish 3
 Other 4
 None 5

A. IF PROTESTANT: What denomination?42. OMIT IF NO RELIGION: How strongly do you feel about your religious beliefs--very strongly, strongly, moderately, not so strongly, or not strongly at all?

Very strongly 1
 Strongly 2
 Moderately 3
 Not so strongly 4
 Not strongly at all 5
 Don't know 8

43. OMIT IF RESPONDENT IS NEVER-MARRIED WOMAN: (Have you) (Has your husband) ever served in the armed forces?

Yes 1 ASK A
 No 2
 Don't know 8

A. IF YES: (Were you) (Was he) ever in combat?

Yes 1
 No 2
 Don't know 8

44. What is your age? _____

45. A. How many children do you have that are 12 years old or less? RECORD BELOW.

B. How about children 13-21 years of age? RECORD BELOW.

C. Over 21 years of age? RECORD BELOW.

	A 0-12	B 13-21	C 21-up
None	0	0	0
One	1	1	1
Two	2	2	2
Three	3	3	3
Four	4	4	4
Five	5	5	5
Six	6	6	6
Seven or more	7	7	7

Thank you very much.

TIME INTERVIEW ENDED: _____

=====	
A. Sex of respondent:	B. Race of respondent:
Male 1	White 1
Female 2	Negro 2
=====	

S. U. _____

Interviewer's Signature _____

Respondent's Address

Date Interview Obtained

APPENDIX B

NEAR System Evaluation

Table B-1

LIKELIHOOD OF ACQUIRING A HOME ALERTING DEVICE
AND LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING NEAR DEVICE

HOME DEVICE

There has been discussion of providing each American home with some convenient instrument which would not cost a lot, to give an alert in case of an attack on the United States.

Using the likelihood scale that you have, how likely is it that you would get such a device for your own home, that is, some convenient instrument that would alert you in the event of an attack on the United States?

NEAR DEVICE

Actually, the Office of Civil Defense is now developing such a new instrument to alert the population if the United States were to be attacked by an enemy. This is how this device might look. HAND CASE TO RESPONDENT. Every American home that has electricity can receive warning through this instrument. When the device is plugged into an outlet (POINT OUT PRONGS), it can be set off by a special signal that goes through the regular community power system.

When this happens, the instrument makes a loud buzzing sound that will alert people to turn on their radio for emergency information. The device would be triggered by electricity in a matter of seconds after warning is received.

Everything considered, how likely is it that you would get an instrument like this for your house? HAVE RESPONDENT ANSWER FROM THE LIKELIHOOD SCALE CARD C.

Average likelihood (0-100 range)			
	<u>Home Device</u>	<u>Near Device</u>	<u>Difference</u>
A. Total	58.4	70.0	+ 11.6
B. New England	57.3	69.4	+ 12.1
Middle Atlantic	61.1	70.1	+ 9.0
East North Central	54.9	67.8	+ 12.9
West North Central	54.0	72.1	+ 18.1
South Atlantic	61.1	72.9	+ 11.8
East South Central	58.3	71.8	+ 13.5
West South Central	59.7	69.4	+ 9.7
Mountain states	72.6	77.4	+ 14.8
Pacific	55.0	65.8	+ 10.8

B-1/2

	<u>Home Device</u>	<u>Clear Device</u>	<u>Difference</u>
C. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	56.7	65.2	+ 8.5
Other Metropolitan	60.7	72.6	+ 11.9
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	61.1	71.5	+ 10.4
County with no city of 10,000	53.4	69.0	+ 15.6
D. Whites	57.0	68.8	+ 11.8
Negroes	67.6	76.9	+ 9.3
E. Men	56.4	69.3	+ 12.9
Women	60.2	70.6	+ 10.4
F. Younger people (Up to 50)	60.7	71.8	+ 10.9
Older people (50 and over)	54.0	66.3	+ 12.3
G. Single, never married	55.6	70.6	+ 15.0
Married	58.4	70.6	+ 12.2
Divorced	65.0	70.5	+ 5.5
Widowed	53.5	61.5	+ 8.0
Separated	72.0	74.4	+ 2.4
H. Republicans	56.0	69.6	+ 13.6
Democrats	60.8	71.4	+ 10.6
Others	53.7	67.3	+ 13.6
No party preference	55.0	61.6	+ 6.6

	<u>Home Device</u>	<u>Near Device</u>	<u>Difference</u>
I. Protestants	57.6	69.1	+ 11.5
(Baptist)	(62.7)	(72.6)	(+ 10.1)
(Methodist)	(56.0)	(69.9)	(+ 13.9)
(Episcopalian)	(55.1)	(66.1)	(+ 11.0)
(Presbyterian)	(51.5)	(57.8)	(+ 6.3)
(Lutheran)	(62.2)	(76.0)	(+ 13.8)
(Congregational)	(47.6)	(70.0)	(+ 22.4)
(Fundamentalist)	(58.6)	(68.2)	(+ 9.6)
Catholics	60.7	73.6	+ 12.9
Jews	61.2	70.6	+ 9.6
J. Very strongly religious	60.1	71.2	+ 11.1
Strongly religious	57.9	71.2	+ 13.4
Moderately religious	57.3	69.5	+ 12.2
Not strongly religious	59.8	69.8	+ 10.0
Not religious	45.9	48.5	+ 2.6
K. No schooling	48.3	50.8	+ 2.5
Grammar school	57.8	68.9	+ 11.1
Some high school	62.6	72.7	+ 10.1
Completed high school	56.4	67.7	+ 11.3
Some college	59.0	73.2	+ 14.2
College	55.8	70.8	+ 15.0
Beyond college	54.8	72.0	+ 17.2

B-1/4

	<u>Home Device</u>	<u>Neer Device</u>	<u>Difference</u>
L. Professionals	56.2	69.3	+ 13.1
Farmers, farm managers	48.5	65.6	+ 17.1
Managers, officials, proprietors	59.6	72.0	+ 12.4
Clerical workers	53.6	67.6	+ 14.0
Sales workers	54.0	63.1	+ 9.1
Craftsmen, foremen	58.8	68.9	+ 10.1
Operatives	60.1	70.4	+ 10.3
Service workers	66.2	72.5	+ 5.6
Farm laborers	62.5	78.9	+ 16.4
Laborers	58.6	73.1	+ 14.5
M. Under \$3,000	56.7	66.0	+ 9.3
\$3,000 - \$4,999	60.2	73.1	+ 12.9
\$5,000 - \$7,499	57.3	69.1	+ 11.8
\$7,500 - \$9,999	58.2	70.1	+ 11.9
\$10,000 - \$14,999	58.5	70.3	+ 11.8
\$15,000 - \$24,999	53.1	71.4	+ 18.3
\$25,000 and over	63.8	72.5	+ 8.7
N. Own	56.6	68.6	+ 12.0
Rent	61.5	72.3	+ 10.8
O. Upper class	61.8	76.8	+ 15.0
Middle class	57.3	69.5	+ 12.2
Working class	59.5	70.6	+ 11.1
Lower class	60.5	65.4	+ 4.9

B-1/5

	<u>Home Device</u>	<u>Near Device</u>	<u>Difference</u>
P. Served in Armed Forces (Respondent or spouse)	60.0	70.1	+ 10.1
Did not serve	57.2	69.8	+ 12.6
Q. In combat	59.0	70.3	+ 11.3
Never in combat	61.0	70.5	+ 9.5
R. Living alone	53.5	61.0	+ 7.5
Smaller households (Two to five)	57.6	69.7	+ 12.1
Larger households (Six or more)	64.2	75.5	+ 11.3
S. No child under 12	54.7	66.5	+ 11.8
One child	64.3	77.3	+ 13.0
Two children	62.4	72.1	+ 9.7
Three children	54.7	66.7	+ 12.0
Four children	66.3	75.8	+ 9.5
Five children	67.9	74.0	+ 6.1
Six children	70.0	82.7	+ 12.7
Seven or more	74.0	88.0	+ 14.0

	<u>Home Device</u>	<u>Near Device</u>	<u>Difference</u>
T. Status quo continued	57.8	67.1	+ 9.3
Acceptance of Communism	45.7	55.3	+ 9.6
Communist victory by revolutions	47.1	76.5	+ 29.4
Communist victory in war	45.0	74.3	+ 29.3
Destructive war	64.4	72.8	+ 8.4
U.S. war victory	68.4	71.3	+ 2.9
Communist defeat by revolutions	54.8	68.0	+ 13.2
Communist evolution to democracy	57.3	74.4	+ 17.1
Disarmament	60.7	74.0	+ 13.3
Third Force emergence	52.3	63.5	+ 11.2
U.S. surrender without war	83.6	81.8	- 1.8
Soviet surrender without war	52.8	67.7	+ 14.9
U. Present system very good	57.0	70.3	+ 13.3
Present system good	57.8	69.1	+ 11.3
Present system fair	58.5	71.0	+ 12.5
Present system poor	62.3	71.7	+ 9.4

Table B-2

AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD OF LEASING NEAR DEVICE AT VARIABLE
MONTHLY COST
(15¢; 25¢; 50¢; \$1.00.)

LEASE

Suppose it were possible to lease one of these instruments. How likely would you be to lease one of the instruments at (EACH COST BELOW) per month?

		Average Likelihood (Range 0-100)			
		15¢	25¢	50¢	\$1.00
A	Total	68.2	64.1	58.1	49.8
B	New England	60.8	60.2	50.2	38.0
	Middle Atlantic	69.0	62.9	58.9	52.5
	East North Central	60.5	56.5	51.2	43.7
	West North Central	69.4	65.1	55.8	47.6
	South Atlantic	77.0	73.8	67.4	59.2
	East South Central	73.4	69.8	65.8	53.0
	West South Central	71.6	66.9	61.3	52.1
	Mountain	80.8	74.9	64.7	58.5
	Pacific	61.4	58.8	53.3	44.4
C	Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	63.0	58.0	54.2	48.2
	Other metropolitan	71.4	68.0	61.4	52.4
	Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	71.0	67.2	60.9	51.4
	County with no city of 10,000	65.7	60.7	53.5	45.0

B-2/2

		15¢	25¢	50¢	\$1.00
D	Whites	66.7	62.8	56.5	48.2
	Negroes	78.9	72.6	68.6	60.7
E	Men	66.0	61.5	55.0	46.7
	Women	70.3	66.5	60.9	52.7
F	Younger people (Up to 49)	70.0	64.7	60.3	52.3
	Older people (50 and over)	65.1	60.8	53.6	44.9
G	Single, never married	69.1	65.4	60.0	51.6
	Married	68.3	63.9	58.0	49.9
	Divorced	65.9	63.6	53.9	42.7
	Widowed	66.0	62.5	56.6	45.8
	Separated	75.4	71.0	63.3	60.3
H	Republicans	63.0	58.7	52.2	44.6
	Democrats	71.3	67.3	61.8	53.5
	Others	63.2	58.2	51.7	41.0
	No party preference	67.2	63.1	55.7	47.5
I	Protestants	68.4	64.5	58.1	49.6
	(Baptist)	(75.3)	(71.3)	(64.8)	(55.6)
	(Methodist)	(68.8)	(62.8)	(55.7)	(49.1)
	(Episcopalian)	(69.8)	(67.0)	(59.2)	(39.7)
	(Presbyterian)	(50.2)	(46.8)	(40.0)	(37.7)
	(Lutheran)	(72.6)	(68.1)	(61.7)	(50.8)
	(Congregational)	(58.0)	(56.0)	(52.0)	(44.0)
	(Fundamentalist)	(69.7)	(66.8)	(60.2)	(48.1)
	Catholics	69.9	64.4	58.7	50.0
	Jews	65.2	63.9	62.4	58.2

B-2/3

		15¢	25¢	50¢	\$1.00
J	Very strongly religious	70.0	65.4	59.1	50.3
	Strongly religious	68.5	64.4	58.0	49.5
	Moderately religious	68.4	64.9	58.8	50.2
	Not strongly religious	65.5	59.3	54.6	48.8
	Not religious	50.9	46.5	41.8	36.2
K	No schooling	51.5	50.8	37.7	24.6
	Grammar school	70.9	65.6	58.7	49.2
	Some high school	72.0	67.9	61.1	51.9
	Completed high school	64.1	60.4	55.8	48.8
	Some college	69.2	65.7	58.6	52.3
	College	67.1	63.4	59.2	49.9
	Beyond College	57.6	54.8	52.2	45.2
L	Professionals	61.0	57.3	53.0	46.5
	Farmers, farm managers	64.1	57.4	51.3	44.1
	Managers, officials, proprietors	67.8	63.8	59.6	51.3
	Clerical workers	67.6	65.3	61.3	52.6
	Sales workers	61.0	60.5	51.6	45.2
	Craftsmen, foremen	67.6	63.4	57.4	48.8
	Operatives	70.8	66.6	57.9	48.4
	Service workers	75.2	71.8	66.0	57.6
	Farm laborers	73.9	69.6	64.3	53.0
	Laborers	74.2	67.4	61.5	53.4

B-2/4

		15¢	25¢	50¢	\$1.00
H	Under \$3,000	69.2	63.2	55.3	45.4
	\$3,000-\$4,999	74.0	70.4	63.5	55.2
	\$5,000-\$7,499	67.7	63.8	55.8	48.0
	\$7,500-\$9,999	66.3	63.4	59.8	53.3
	\$10,000-\$14,999	60.4	54.4	53.1	43.3
	\$15,000-\$24,999	65.7	64.3	62.9	55.7
	\$25,000 and over	58.8	55.6	51.2	46.2
N	Own	65.0	60.8	55.2	46.8
	Rent	73.6	69.5	62.7	54.5
O	Upper class	67.5	68.9	65.7	57.9
	Middle class	64.1	60.2	55.5	47.9
	Working class	72.1	67.5	60.2	51.5
	Lower class	77.5	71.7	63.0	50.3
P	Served in armed forces (respondent or spouse)	67.2	63.4	58.2	49.7
	Did not serve	69.4	64.6	57.8	49.8
Q	In combat	69.8	65.0	59.9	50.7
	Never in combat	66.1	63.1	57.6	49.8
R	Living alone	62.9	60.2	53.8	41.8
	Smaller households (Two to five)	68.1	62.8	57.4	49.1
	Larger households (Six or more)	71.4	67.3	63.2	54.7

B-2/5

	15¢	25¢	50¢	\$1.00
S No child under 12	65.4	61.2	54.2	45.8
One child	76.1	72.1	67.2	57.6
Two children	69.3	64.8	60.2	53.0
Three children	64.4	59.9	54.7	47.8
Four children	66.5	63.3	59.3	51.9
Five children	76.0	74.7	65.7	57.7
Six children	80.9	74.6	67.3	58.2
Seven or more children	98.0	98.0	94.0	90.0
I Status quo continued	66.4	63.0	57.0	48.7
Acceptance of Communism	57.3	56.0	41.3	32.7
Communist victory by revolutions	71.1	66.7	66.1	52.2
Communist victory in war	66.3	55.0	57.5	55.0
Destructive war	67.3	63.5	54.1	46.2
U.S. war victory	76.5	72.6	65.9	56.1
Communist defeat by revolutions	65.4	61.3	53.5	45.4
Communist evolution to democracy	74.1	66.7	61.2	49.1
Disarmament	69.2	65.0	61.0	52.3
Third Force emergence	57.7	56.1	49.4	42.6
U.S. surrender without war	85.5	75.5	62.7	66.4
Soviet surrender without war	70.7	66.0	59.6	53.1
Present system very good	65.7	61.4	54.2	46.8
Present system good	68.2	63.0	55.8	47.3
Present system fair	70.6	67.0	61.7	53.1
Present system poor	69.5	65.8	60.7	51.3

Table B-3

**AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD OF PURCHASING NEAR DEVICE AT VARIABLE
SALES COST**

(\$ 5.00; \$ 10.00; \$ 15.00; \$ 25.00)

BUY

How about if these instruments were for sale? How likely would you be to buy one of these instruments if the cost were (EACH COST BELOW)?

	<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
	\$ 5.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 25.00
A. Total	66.9	57.1	49.5	40.4
B. New England	60.9	50.9	46.2	36.7
Middle Atlantic	66.7	57.0	51.0	43.2
East North Central	61.6	51.8	44.6	35.9
West North Central	73.7	60.2	50.4	39.1
South Atlantic	69	58.4	50.4	41.2
East South Central	63.0	62.1	48.7	44.7
West South Central	69.2	59.5	50.2	39.4
Mountain	76.0	69.6	62.1	53.6
Pacific	64.2	55.3	49.6	39.4
C. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	61.8	52.4	46.6	38.9
Other metropolitan	69.6	61.2	53.0	45.0
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	69.1	58.5	50.7	38.9
County with no city of 10,000	65.8	53.2	44.7	33.6

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		<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
		\$ 5.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 25.00
D.	Whites	65.7	55.7	48.3	38.5
	Negroes	74.2	66.0	57.3	52.0
E.	Men	65.0	55.4	47.2	38.6
	Women	63.7	58.7	51.7	42.0
F.	Up to 20	66.7	60.0	63.3	53.3
	20 - 29	71.2	64.3	56.3	47.3
	30 - 39	69.9	59.5	51.3	42.7
	40 - 49	70.4	60.1	52.2	41.6
	50 - 59	69.7	61.7	52.0	41.7
	60 - 69	54.9	41.5	37.3	27.6
	70 - 79	48.1	37.2	30.8	25.5
	80 - 89	46.5	24.4	14.4	10.6
G.	Single, never married	66.3	59.3	54.3	46.5
	Married	67.8	58.4	50.5	41.0
	Divorced	68.6	53.9	47.0	40.2
	Widowed	57.7	43.9	36.8	29.7
	Separated	69.2	57.7	48.7	39.5
H.	Republicans	64.7	55.8	49.2	39.9
	Democrats	69.0	59.4	50.9	41.9
	Others	61.6	51.9	49.4	39.1
	No party preference	60.1	47.0	40.1	32.0

B-3/3

		<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
		\$ 5.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 25.00
I. Protestants		66.4	56.9	48.7	39.7
	(Baptist)	(71.4)	(60.8)	(49.8)	(40.2)
	(Methodist)	(69.0)	(59.6)	(54.4)	(46.9)
	(Episcopalian)	(72.3)	(62.0)	(55.0)	(45.2)
	(Presbyterian)	(52.6)	(45.3)	(37.1)	(28.4)
	(Lutheran)	(73.2)	(62.8)	(52.1)	(40.5)
	(Congregational)	(60.0)	(46.4)	(47.6)	(35.2)
	(Fundamentalist)	(58.6)	(51.1)	(45.8)	(36.7)
Catholics		70.7	59.2	52.6	42.1
Jews		65.9	62.1	56.2	52.4
J.	Very strongly religious	69.6	59.0	50.1	40.0
	Strongly religious	67.6	58.5	50.0	41.3
	Moderately religious	65.4	55.9	50.2	41.2
	Not strongly religious	66.0	56.0	43.7	34.4
	Not religious	50.0	42.4	37.1	30.9
K.	No schooling	35.0	26.2	21.5	14.6
	Grammar school	65.2	53.6	43.9	33.9
	Some high school	69.5	58.8	50.9	42.7
	Completed high school	66.2	57.7	50.5	41.3
	Some college	71.4	63.0	57.0	47.2
	College	67.6	59.8	55.6	45.6
	Beyond college	61.1	51.5	48.3	41.1

B-3/4

	<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
	\$ 5.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 25.00
L. Professionals	64.4	55.8	49.6	42.0
Farmers, farm managers	66.8	55.1	46.0	36.6
Managers, officials, proprietors	69.5	58.5	53.5	42.7
Clerical workers	64.8	58.7	51.0	43.5
Sales workers	62.8	52.1	46.2	38.4
Craftsmen, foremen	66.8	57.4	50.3	39.1
Operatives	67.4	55.8	45.0	36.6
Service workers	69.6	60.3	52.7	44.5
Farm laborers	63.2	51.8	48.2	33.9
Laborers	68.2	60.8	53.0	44.5
M. Under \$ 3,000	57.6	45.8	36.8	28.5
\$ 3,000 - \$ 4,999	70.7	58.4	49.8	40.0
\$ 5,000 - \$ 7,499	68.0	57.7	49.6	40.5
\$ 7,500 - \$ 9,999	70.5	64.7	57.5	47.2
\$ 10,000 - \$ 14,999	67.0	59.6	53.5	45.7
\$ 15,000 - \$ 24,999	72.3	64.6	63.1	55.7
\$ 25,000 and over	70.6	62.5	56.2	46.2
N. Own	65.4	55.7	48.6	39.2
Rent	69.3	59.5	51.0	42.3
O. Upper class	67.9	63.2	61.5	58.9
Middle class	65.1	55.9	49.2	40.6
Working class	69.3	58.4	49.8	40.0
Lower class	64.9	61.1	51.4	37.8

B-3/5

	<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
	\$ 5.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 25.00
P. Served in armed forces (respondent or spouse)	67.1	57.8	50.7	41.4
Did not serve	66.8	56.6	48.0	38.6
Q. In combat	66.4	56.8	50.2	40.9
Never in combat	68.2	59.2	51.5	42.1
R. Living alone	55.2	44.6	38.7	31.2
Two people in household	58.4	48.0	41.3	32.8
Three	68.4	58.5	50.9	40.8
Four	72.0	63.6	55.8	44.8
Five	71.0	60.2	49.7	42.0
Six	76.8	65.3	58.1	48.6
Seven	70.4	64.0	54.6	44.7
Eight	74.8	68.3	61.0	53.8
Nine	75.7	60.7	59.3	51.4
Ten or more	68.6	66.4	58.6	55.0
S. No child under 12	62.2	51.9	45.1	36.4
One child	74.3	64.8	55.6	45.1
Two children	71.1	63.2	54.8	43.8
Three children	67.3	57.4	48.3	41.4
Four children	75.7	64.0	57.9	49.1
Five children	70.0	64.7	57.0	47.0
Six children	84.6	75.4	60.9	46.4
Seven or more children	72.0	62.0	66.0	64.0

B-3/6

	<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
	\$ 5.00	\$ 10.00	\$ 15.00	\$ 25.00
T. Status quo continued	64.1	54.9	46.9	37.7
Acceptance of Communism	50.7	47.1	43.6	31.4
Communist victory by revolution	60.0	46.1	36.7	27.2
Communist victory in war	58.8	72.5	66.2	62.5
Destructive war	69.7	57.2	50.3	43.2
U.S. war victory	68.9	59.2	51.2	38.8
Communist defeat by revolutions	64.4	52.7	46.2	36.1
Communist evolution to democracy	70.6	61.1	51.3	42.8
Disarmament	71.9	61.5	53.9	45.5
Third force emergence	64.7	57.1	50.0	34.7
U.S. surrender without war	77.3	65.4	60.0	48.2
Soviet surrender without war	65.9	55.6	47.3	40.0
U. Present system very good	64.2	54.0	45.5	35.8
Present system good	67.8	57.0	48.9	39.7
Present system fair	68.8	59.4	52.8	44.4
Present system poor	68.8	59.8	50.9	40.7

Table B-4

**AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD OF ACCEPTING GOVERNMENT ISSUED DEVICE
AT NO COST BUT WITH VARYING USE REQUIREMENTS**

GOVERNMENT ISSUE

And finally, how likely would you be to accept one of these instruments if....(each statement)?

	Government Issue	Govt. Issue on Promise to Use	Govt. Issue Use Required by Law
A. Total	88.9	90.2	91.5
B. New England	80.6	83.8	91.8
Middle Atlantic	90.2	92.3	92.9
East North Central	86.8	88.0	91.0
West North Central	91.2	90.6	92.1
South Atlantic	92.4	94.8	95.0
East South Central	90.6	90.0	87.0
West South Central	88.4	90.0	88.2
Mountain States	89.8	89.2	90.9
Pacific	86.7	87.9	90.7
C. Standard Metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	85.1	88.8	90.6
Other Metropolitan	90.9	91.3	92.5
Non-Metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	92.6	92.8	92.5
County with no city of 10,000	86.2	87.6	89.7

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		Government Issue	Govt. Issue on Promise to Use	Govt. Issue Use Required by Law
D	Whites	88.3	89.8	91.5
	Negroes	92.8	92.6	91.4
E	Men	87.9	89.4	90.8
	Women	89.8	90.9	92.2
F	Up to 20	100.0	93.3	83.3
	20 - 29	91.9	92.4	93.2
	30 - 39	90.7	91.2	90.7
	40 - 49	89.5	92.2	93.3
	50 - 59	86.6	89.6	92.0
	60 - 69	82.8	85.6	87.8
	70 - 79	81.4	83.9	87.3
	80 - 89	71.8	79.4	88.2
G	Single, never married	89.6	90.5	90.8
	Married	89.3	90.5	91.7
	Divorced	86.8	89.8	94.1
	Widowed	83.1	85.5	86.5
	Separated	84.1	95.6	98.2
H	Republicans	87.2	88.8	89.8
	Democrats	89.8	90.9	92.7
	Others	91.1	91.9	92.5
	No party preference	86.8	88.8	88.0

	Government Issue	Govt. Issue on Promise to Use	Govt. Issue Use Required by Law
I Protestants	89.1	90.6	91.2
(Baptist)	(90.0)	(91.3)	(92.0)
(Methodist)	(92.7)	(92.3)	(91.5)
(Episcopalian)	(86.3)	(93.4)	(93.9)
(Presbyterian)	(84.9)	(84.8)	(91.9)
(Lutheran)	(91.5)	(93.4)	(91.3)
(Congregational)	(86.0)	(90.4)	(94.0)
(Fundamentalist)	(81.9)	(85.3)	(87.2)
Catholics	89.8	90.8	92.6
Jews	87.6	86.2	90.6
J Very strongly religious	87.6	89.4	90.2
Strongly religious	89.8	90.5	93.7
Moderately religious	91.5	92.5	92.5
Not strongly religious	85.8	88.8	89.5
Not religious	84.8	86.2	92.4
K No schooling	78.6	81.4	80.0
Grammar school	86.9	88.1	90.4
Some high school	90.0	92.7	93.1
Completed high school	89.9	90.4	92.5
Some college	91.1	91.9	90.6
College	89.2	88.5	87.6
Beyond College	82.2	86.7	94.4

B-4/4

		Government Issue	Govt. Issue on Promise to Use	Govt. Issue Use Required by Law
L	Professionals	87.2	88.2	89.9
	Farmers, farm managers	85.4	85.5	91.2
	Managers, Officials, proprietors	87.8	89.4	90.1
	Clerical workers	86.8	88.4	90.7
	Sales workers	92.2	95.3	92.9
	Craftsmen, foremen	89.5	90.1	93.3
	Operatives	91.2	93.6	93.0
	Service workers	91.1	91.8	91.5
	Farm laborers	75.5	82.5	86.4
	Laborers	89.4	89.7	90.5
M	Under \$3,000	85.5	86.4	87.8
	\$3,000-\$4,999	91.3	92.4	92.3
	\$5,000-\$7,499	89.9	90.3	91.6
	\$7,500-\$9,999	89.0	91.1	92.3
	\$10,000-\$14,999	89.4	91.5	93.4
	\$15,000-\$24,999	83.7	92.9	95.1
	\$25,000 and over	84.4	88.1	87.5
N	Own	88.2	89.6	90.9
	Rent	89.9	91.2	92.6

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		Government Issue	Govt. Issue on Promise to Use	Govt. Issue Use Required by Law
O	Upper class	87.5	97.5	97.5
	Middle class	87.7	89.3	91.1
	Working class	90.6	91.2	92.0
	Lower class	86.6	87.9	90.8
P	Served in armed forces (respondent or spouse)	89.5	91.0	92.1
	Did not serve	88.0	89.3	90.8
Q	In combat	88.8	90.6	90.8
	Never in combat	90.2	91.4	92.8
R	Living alone	81.5	83.6	86.0
	Two people in household	86.0	87.7	90.8
	Three	90.5	90.1	91.6
	Four	89.0	92.1	92.2
	Five	90.3	91.7	92.8
	Six	96.1	96.6	97.9
	Seven	90.5	91.0	90.5
	Eight	90.0	90.0	77.9
	Nine	86.4	86.4	92.1
	Ten or more	95.0	95.0	95.0

B-4/6

		Government Issue	Govt. Issue on Promise to Use	Govt. Issue Use Required by Law
S	No child under 12	86.8	88.2	90.6
	One child	92.2	93.5	93.7
	Two children	89.6	92.6	91.9
	Three children	89.4	90.0	90.9
	Four children	94.9	93.9	93.7
	Five children	89.3	91.0	87.3
	Six children	90.9	90.9	100.0
	Seven or more children	88.0	88.0	86.0
T	Status quo continued	86.0	88.4	87.5
	Acceptance of Communism	80.0	78.7	86.7
	Communist victory by revolutions	94.4	94.4	97.2
	Communist victory in war	78.8	80.0	82.5
	Destructive war	91.6	93.7	93.6
	U.S. war victory	90.9	91.2	90.5
	Communist defeat by revolutions	91.7	92.2	94.4
	Communist evolution to democracy	92.9	92.0	91.7
	Disarmament	90.1	91.6	94.8
	Third Force Emergence	82.7	85.2	94.5
	U.S. surrender without war	92.7	100.0	99.1
	Soviet surrender with- out war	90.5	92.0	95.0

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	Government Issue	Govt. Issue on Promise to Use	Govt. Issue Use Required by Law
U Present system very good	88.8	89.9	91.9
Present system good	89.0	91.2	92.7
Present system fair	89.1	90.2	91.1
Present system poor	89.1	89.8	91.4

Table 3-5

IMPACT OF YEARLY AND QUARTERLY TESTING
ON ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY TESTING

ANNUAL TESTING

As you know, civil defense sirens are occasionally being tested to insure that they are in working order. Similarly, there are occasional tests of the emergency signal over the radio. To insure that an alerting device in your home would be in working order at all times, it may also be necessary to test it on occasion. This means that a random signal would go through the device just for test purposes. Such tests would probably not take more than a few seconds.

If a test signal were sent through the instrument for a few seconds at a pre-determined time once a year, would this make it much more acceptable, more acceptable, less acceptable, or much less acceptable than it otherwise would be or would it make no difference to you?

QUARTERLY TESTING

Suppose such tests might have to be conducted about every three months? Would this make it much more acceptable, more acceptable, less acceptable, or much less acceptable than it otherwise would be or would it make no difference to you?

	Yearly Tests		In Percent	Quarterly Tests		
	More Acceptable	Less Acceptable	n	More Acceptable	Less Acceptable	n
A. Total	60.5	3.9	1387	54.1	6.2	1386
B. New England	43.1	1.5	65	37.5	4.7	64
Middle Atlantic	55.1	4.9	267	49.1	6.7	267
East North Central	52.5	6.6	242	45.6	8.7	242
West North Central	61.0	3.9	154	50.0	7.8	154
South Atlantic	59.8	2.0	192	63.5	5.8	192
East South Central	66.0	0.0	53	57.9	0.0	53
West South Central	74.9	2.8	179	63.7	4.5	179
Mountain states	71.7	7.5	53	69.8	3.8	53
Pacific	54.4	3.2	182	43.6	5.6	182

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	Yearly Tests			<u>In Percent</u>			Quarterly Tests		
	More Acceptable	Less	N	More Acceptable	Less	N	More Acceptable	Less	N
C. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	51.5	7.1	325	43.0	8.3	325			
Other metropolitan	65.0	3.7	564	58.0	5.5	563			
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	55.3	2.6	224	50.2	6.7	225			
County with no city of 10,000	63.8	1.9	273	55.0	4.4	273			
D. Whites	59.0	3.4	1206	51.9	6.8	1205			
Negroes	70.0	7.3	177	57.2	5.1	177			
E. Men	61.9	3.7	669	55.6	5.0	668			
Women	59.1	4.2	718	52.6	7.1	718			
F. Up to 20	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	3			
20-29	64.2	3.2	304	54.3	5.3	304			
30-39	61.2	5.3	325	55.1	9.3	323			
40-49	61.5	4.1	291	55.8	6.2	292			
50-59	63.2	3.0	198	58.3	4.1	197			
60-69	53.3	4.7	150	52.3	5.3	151			
70-79	54.4	1.1	92	42.4	1.1	92			
80-89	37.5	5.3	16	43.8	0.0	16			
G. Single, never married	61.5	2.0	96	48.5	7.2	97			
Married	61.2	4.4	1100	55.0	6.3	1097			
Divorced	57.1	4.8	43	55.8	4.7	43			
Widowed	52.3	0.0	109	45.0	4.6	109			
Separated	61.1	5.2	39	54.1	5.1	39			

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<u>In Percent</u>						
	Yearly Tests			Quarterly Tests		
	More Acceptable	Less	N	More Acceptable	Less	N
H. Republicans	58.0	5.4	388	50.7	7.3	387
Democrats	62.8	3.4	801	57.4	4.9	801
Others	52.5	2.6	80	43.8	10.1	80
No party preference	59.1	1.1	93	47.3	6.5	93
I. Protestants	63.7	4.1	935	55.7	5.9	936
(Baptist)	(69.5)	(3.9)	(305)	(63.6)	(4.9)	(305)
(Methodist)	(64.8)	(4.5)	(179)	(56.6)	(7.3)	(180)
(Episcopalian)	(53.6)	(7.3)	(41)	(41.5)	(12.2)	(41)
(Presbyterian)	(52.2)	(3.0)	(67)	(34.3)	(6.0)	(67)
(Lutheran)	(60.3)	(2.2)	(93)	(53.8)	(7.5)	(93)
(Congregational)	(60.0)	(8.0)	(25)	(52.0)	(0.0)	(25)
(Fundamentalist)	(65.6)	(0.0)	(64)	(56.3)	(3.2)	(64)
Catholics	57.1	3.3	329	52.2	6.7	328
Jews	29.4	11.8	34	29.4	17.7	34
J. Very strongly religious	63.2	4.0	495	57.9	5.5	494
Strongly religious	57.8	3.5	372	51.6	7.3	372
Moderately religious	59.9	4.2	356	52.1	5.4	355
Not strongly religious	66.6	4.8	42	55.8	7.0	43
Not religious	61.7	5.9	34	47.1	11.8	34
K. No schooling	25.0	0.0	12	25.0	0.0	12
Grammar school	63.0	3.6	362	61.3	2.2	361
Some high school	63.7	2.4	325	55.6	6.7	326
Completed high school	59.1	3.6	387	51.3	6.0	386
Some college	60.4	4.6	172	50.0	9.9	172
College	58.0	8.6	81	49.4	11.1	81
Beyond college	45.7	10.9	46	43.5	13.0	46

3-1/4

	Yearly Tests			Quarterly Tests		
	More Acceptable	Less	N	More Acceptable	Less	N
<u>In Percent</u>						
L. Professionals	52.4	7.0	187	43.8	12.3	187
Farmers, farm managers	57.9	3.2	95	51.1	3.1	95
Managers, officials, proprietors	59.6	2.9	173	52.9	4.7	172
Clerical workers	52.2	5.7	90	52.2	5.9	90
Sales workers	50.0	5.6	58	43.1	10.3	58
Craftsmen, foremen	62.6	3.4	238	55.5	6.3	238
Operatives	56.1	3.2	200	57.9	4.3	200
Service workers	64.2	1.4	134	61.9	4.4	134
Farm laborers	66.6	3.7	27	66.6	0.0	27
Laborers	55.7	2.9	105	57.7	3.8	104
M. Under \$3,000	58.3	2.8	247	54.9	3.3	246
\$3,000 - \$4,999	53.8	2.7	290	57.6	4.1	290
\$5,000 - \$7,499	60.9	3.1	383	54.1	5.5	384
\$7,500 - \$9,999	60.9	5.0	202	53.0	7.9	202
\$10,000 - \$14,999	55.2	5.9	146	52.8	6.2	146
\$15,000 - \$24,999	65.8	5.6	35	52.9	17.6	34
\$25,000 and over-	62.8	5.3	16	62.5	12.6	16
N. Own	60.2	4.2	359	53.4	6.5	869
Rent	61.0	3.6	515	55.3	5.7	514
O. Upper class	64.3	3.6	23	50.0	14.2	28
Middle class	50.0	4.8	513	51.4	6.8	613
Working class	61.4	3.2	692	57.0	4.9	590
Lower class	58.3	2.8	36	52.4	5.6	36

1-5/0

	Yearly Tests			Quarterly Tests		
	More Acceptable	Less	N	More Acceptable	Less	N
P. Served in armed forces (Respondent or spouse)	59.9	4.2	374	54.4	7.1	374
Did not serve	60.5	3.3	348	54.0	4.9	646
Q. In combat	50.7	4.1	269	54.6	7.1	269
Never in combat	60.9	4.1	391	54.2	7.1	391
R. Living alone	52.1	2.0	96	43.7	2.1	96
Two people in household	53.7	5.8	346	50.6	5.2	346
Three	52.0	1.8	276	54.6	7.3	276
Four	60.5	5.4	260	53.0	8.2	268
Five	65.3	2.9	173	50.9	5.4	173
Six	72.6	3.5	113	64.3	5.3	112
Seven	64.9	0.0	57	57.9	1.8	57
Eight	65.5	5.3	29	55.1	10.3	29
Nine	50.0	0.0	14	42.9	7.1	14
Ten or more	70.6	0.0	14	71.5	0.0	14
S. No child under 12	55.6	4.1	733	50.6	5.1	732
One child	64.8	1.2	241	57.9	7.4	242
Two children	63.2	7.5	182	57.7	3.5	132
Three children	58.9	4.7	107	55.1	3.4	107
Four children	73.3	2.6	75	63.5	5.8	74
Five children	73.3	0.0	30	53.3	3.3	30
Six children	63.7	0.0	11	45.5	0.0	11
Seven or more children	60.0	0.0	5	60.0	0.0	5

2-5/6

	Yearly Tests			<u>In Percent</u>			Quarterly Tests		
	More Acceptable	Less	N	More Acceptable	Less	N	More Acceptable	Less	N
T. Status quo continued	56.4	3.6	202	43.9	8.5	282			
Acceptance of communism	53.3	0.0	15	33.3	0.0	15			
Communist victory by revolutions	52.9	0.0	17	47.0	0.0	17			
Communist victory in war	75.0	0.0	8	75.0	0.0	8			
Destructive war	64.8	3.6	111	55.9	6.3	111			
U. S. war victory	61.7	3.1	133	63.0	4.5	133			
Communist defeat by revolutions	53.5	5.6	142	51.4	4.9	142			
Communist evolution to democracy	67.0	1.9	106	57.9	4.7	107			
Disarmament	62.7	2.3	341	53.2	6.2	340			
Third Force Emergence	67.2	10.5	67	53.3	10.5	67			
U.S. surrender without war	63.7	12.2	11	63.7	0.0	11			
Soviet surrender without war	64.3	6.1	98	57.7	5.2	97			
U. Present system very good	61.2	5.0	222	57.2	4.5	222			
Present system good	64.9	2.9	334	56.7	3.6	331			
Present system fair	57.0	4.6	440	49.7	3.2	441			
Present system poor	63.7	3.8	264	50.2	7.5	265			

TABLE B-6
INTERCORRELATIONS OF NEAR SYSTEM EVALUATION ITEMS

	NEAR	L1	L2	L3	L4	B1	B2	B3	B4	G1	G2	G3*
Home Device	.624	.466	.469	.461	.436	.530	.509	.475	.435	.359	.329	.202
Near Device		.645	.625	.607	.546	.726	.666	.609	.535	.520	.484	.304
L1. Lease for 15¢			.929	.838	.728	.674	.599	.539	.470	.473	.460	.303
L2. Lease for 25¢				.907	.814	.655	.629	.588	.528	.457	.438	.296
L3. Lease for 50¢					.903	.620	.634	.618	.581	.405	.352	.282
L4. Lease for \$1.00						.569	.625	.635	.623	.344	.330	.242
B1. Buy for \$ 5.00							.355	.750	.628	.520	.476	.304
B2. Buy for \$10.00								.383	.773	.416	.386	.243
B3. Buy for \$15.00									.394	.360	.342	.225
B4. Buy for \$25.00										.302	.278	.189
G1. Govt. Issue-No Restrictions												
G2. Govt. Issue-Promise to use										.817	.550	.661

*G3. Required by law to use

Table 5-7
THE GREATEST LIKELIHOOD RESPONSES AND PATTERNS
ASSOCIATED WITH THEM

A. <u>Substantively Consistent</u> <u>Patterns</u>	10	9	8	7	Likelihood						
					6	5	4	3	2	1	0
1. L1 L2 L3 L4 B1 B2 B3 B4	167	8	4	1	1	25	0	1	7	5	168
2. L1 L2 L3 L4 B1 B2 B3	41	2	0	1	1	3	0	0	0	1	0
3. L1 L2 L3 B1 B2 B3 B4	13	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
4. L1 L2 L3 L4 B1 B2	36	3	1	0	0	4	0	1	0	1	0
5. L1 L2 B1 B2 B3 B4	6	0									
6. L1 L2 L3 B1 B2 B3	18			1							
7. L1 L2 L3 L4 B1	42	1		1		9		1		2	
8. L1 B1 B2 B3 B4	7										
9. L1 L2 L3 L4											
10. B1 B2 B3 B4	52	7	1	1		8		1	2	5	
11. L1 L2 L3 B1 B2	24	3	1	1	2	5	1	1			2
12. L1 L2 L1 B2 B3	20	1				2					
13. L1 L2 B1 B2	12					2			1	1	
14. L1 L2 L3 B1	19	1				1					
15. L1 B1 B2 B3	21		1		1	3	1			1	
	3					1					1

5-2/2

A. Substantively Consistent
Patterns

		10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
16. L1 L2 L3		24	4	4	1		5		1			
17.	B1 B2 B3	16	2	1	1					1		
18. L1 L2	B1	25	6	1	3	1	9		1	1		
19. L1	B1 B2	9		1	1					1	1	
20. L1 L2		34	5	7	4	2	6		1	3	1	
21.	B1 B2	34	4	4			6		1	1	1	
22. L1	B1	41	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	3	1	
23. L1		62	16	12	3	4	6	4	1	2	2	
24.	B1	42	17	18	7	5	9		1	1	2	
		763	83	60	34	19	107	8	12	23	24	170

(92.5)
(827)

8-7/3

B. Substantively Inconsistent
Patterns

		10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
1.	L2	1			2	1	1	1				
2.	L3	1	1	1		1						
3.	L4	2	4	1		1						
4.	B2		1	3			1					
5.	B3	4										
6.	B4	3										
7.	L1 L3	2	1									
8.	L2 L3	1										
9.	L3 L4	1						1				
10.	L1 L4										1	
11.	L1 B2	1										
12.	L2 B1	1										
13.	L2 B1 B2	1										
14.	L2 B2	1										
15.	L2 B3	1										1
16.	L1 L2 B3			1								1

LikelihoodLikelihood[illegible]

B-7/6

B. Substantively Inconsistent
Patterng

Likelihood

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

51.

B1 B2 B3

1

52.

L3 B1

1

59 7 8 3 4 4 3 0 0 1 0

TOTAL OF A and B

827 90 68 37 23 111 11 12 23 25 170

B-7/2.

There are eight alternatives altogether. The greatest likelihood which the respondent gives may be associated with any one of the eight alternatives singly (L1, L2, L3, L4, B1, B2, B3, or B4) or it may be associated with any pair (such as L1, B1; or L1, L2; and so on); or with any three, four...eight of them.

Thus there are $2^8 - 1$, or 255, patterns possible in toto. Of these possible patterns, 76 actually occur in the study, hence 29.8 percent. Some are substantively not very logical: people who attach their greatest likelihood, for instance, to leasing at 15 cents and then for buying for \$15.00. The substantively logical patterns are scalar in character: unless \$10.00 and \$5.00, for instance, has also greatest likelihood, the \$15.00 option should not have it. And so on.

There are 24 such substantively logical patterns, 9.4 of all possible ones and 31.6 percent of those which actually occur (76 total). But these 24 logical patterns account for 93.3 percent of all responses; whereas the 52 illogical responses contribute but 6.3 of all answers - the remainder are no answer respondents. In other words, the interviewees in the sample are quite consistent in their responses even though the questions within each mode (free issue, lease, buy) were asked in random sequences.

Table B-8

LIKELIHOOD OF ACCEPTING NEAR DEVICE UNDER VARYING
MODES OF FREE ISSUE BY GOVERNMENT
AS A FUNCTION OF QUESTION SEQUENCE*

		<u>Average Likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
		<u>Sequence</u> <u>G1-G2-G3</u>	N	<u>Sequence</u> <u>G3-G2-G1</u>	N
G1	Free issue by Government	87.9	407	89.4	375
G2	Free issue by Government on promise to use	89.6	407	90.8	376
G3	Free issue by Government and legal requirement to use	89.7	407	92.0	376

*Only the two extreme sequences are considered here:
from free issue without strings attached to legal
requirement governing use; and the reverse.

Table B-9

LIKELIHOOD OF LEASING NEAR RECEIVER AT VARYING
MONTHLY COSTS
AS A FUNCTION OF QUESTION SEQUENCE*

		<u>Average likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
		<u>Sequence:</u> <u>L1-L2-L3-L4</u>	N	<u>Sequence</u> <u>L4-L3-L2-L1</u>	N
L1	Lease for 15 cents	71.2	311	66.2	347
L2	Lease for 25 cents	67.3	311	62.5	347
L3	Lease for 50 cents	59.2	310	56.9	348
L4	Lease for \$1.00	50.1	310	49.5	348

*Only the two extreme sequences are considered here:
from least monthly cost to the highest one; and the
reverse.

Table B-10

LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING NEAR RECEIVER AT VARYING
PRICES
AS A FUNCTION OF QUESTION SEQUENCE*

		<u>Average likelihood</u> (Range 0-100)			
		<u>Sequence</u> <u>G1-G2-G3-G4</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Sequence</u> <u>G4-G3-G2-G1</u>	<u>N</u>
G1	Buy at \$5.00	68.1	360	72.3	312
G2	Buy at \$10.00	55.7	359	62.8	311
G3	Buy at \$15.00	45.0	358	54.6	310
G4	Buy at \$25.00	35.5	358	46.2	310

*Only the two extreme sequences are considered here:
from least price to the highest one; and the reverse.

APPENDIX C

Present Warning System Ratings

Table C-1

HOW A THREAT OF ATTACK IS EXPECTED TO BE RECEIVED

EXERCISE A.1.11G If an enemy attack threatened the United States, how would you first learn about it?

	In Percent		
	RADIO	TELEVISION	SIRENS
A. Total	71.6	53.3	23.1
B. New England	61.2	29.9	34.3
Middle Atlantic	76.3	57.3	30.4
East North Central	75.5	59.2	25.7
West North Central	71.6	49.7	23.2
South Atlantic	67.4	49.7	21.2
East South Central	77.4	60.4	20.8
West South Central	60.9	57.6	15.8
Mountain states	81.1	43.4	7.5
Pacific	74.2	56.6	19.2
C. Standard Metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	77.0	47.4	34.7
Other metropolitan	71.1	51.1	23.3
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	65.0	50.8	22.6
County with no city of 10,000	71.6	60.4	9.1
D. Whites	70.9	54.1	21.9
Negroes	76.0	40.6	31.1
E. Men	75.0	52.2	20.6
Women	68.5	54.3	25.5
F. Younger people (up to 30)	74.3	52.6	23.8
Older people (30 and over)	65.7	54.3	21.8

C-1/2

In Percent

	RADIO	TELEVISION	SIRENS
G. Single, never married	68.4	42.9	22.4
Married	72.8	55.1	23.3
Divorced	77.3	47.7	18.2
Widowed	63.2	50.9	20.2
Separated	64.1	43.6	30.8
H. Republicans	73.2	56.4	21.4
Democrats	71.6	52.8	24.8
Others	73.8	52.5	17.5
No party preference	62.2	46.9	23.5
I. Protestants	72.2	55.2	20.7
(Baptist)	(74.4)	(56.2)	(18.8)
(Methodist)	(72.4)	(54.7)	(19.9)
(Episcopalian)	(61.0)	(31.7)	(26.8)
(Presbyterian)	(64.7)	(63.2)	(29.4)
(Lutheran)	(77.7)	(50.0)	(25.5)
(Congregational)	(76.0)	(52.0)	(28.0)
(Fundamentalist)	(70.3)	(53.1)	(14.1)
Catholics	71.0	49.8	30.5
Jews	61.8	58.8	32.4
J. Very strongly religious	71.9	53.7	23.4
Strongly religious	72.9	54.5	21.5
Moderately religious	72.2	53.4	24.7
Not strongly religious	72.1	53.5	16.3
Not religious	55.9	44.1	23.5

	In Percent		
	RADIO	TELEVISION	SIRENS
K. No schooling	20.6	35.7	21.4
Grammar school	71.4	51.0	23.7
Some high school	73.3	57.3	21.8
Completed high school	72.4	57.7	24.0
Some college	75.1	50.3	22.0
College	63.4	47.6	24.4
Beyond college	71.7	30.4	21.7
L. Professionals	72.0	51.9	25.9
Partners, farm managers	74.2	56.7	6.2
Managers, officials, proprietors	74.1	50.0	18.4
Clerical workers	76.9	49.5	25.3
Sales workers	70.7	60.3	25.9
Craftsmen, foremen	70.3	55.6	24.7
Operatives	73.0	53.4	26.3
Service workers	66.9	54.4	22.8
Farm laborers	71.4	57.1	14.3
Laborers	66.1	40.5	20.4
M. Under \$3,000	63.7	57.4	20.7
\$3,000 - \$4,999	75.6	52.2	22.0
\$5,000 - \$7,499	70.7	55.4	29.0
\$7,500 - \$9,999	77.8	54.7	17.7
\$10,000 - \$14,999	75.3	52.1	19.2
\$15,000 - \$24,999	65.7	37.1	31.4
\$25,000 and over	62.5	25.0	31.3

C-1/4

	In Percent		
	RADIO	TELEVISION	SINCE
11. Own	72.9	56.9	19.5
Rent	62.3	47.3	29.3
12. Upper class	64.3	32.1	25.0
Middle class	71.6	46.3	23.7
Working class	74.1	50.4	22.3
Lower class	44.7	55.3	20.9
13. Served in armed forces (respondent or spouse)	73.5	51.3	24.9
Did not serve	70.3	55.3	21.5
14. In combat	76.1	46.1	24.5
Never in combat	69.8	54.6	25.1
15. Living alone	64.0	50.0	15.0
Smaller households (Two to five)	72.2	53.5	24.1
Larger households (Six or more)	73.1	54.2	53.3
16. No child under 12	71.0	51.1	21.0
One child	74.1	56.8	23.5
Two children	70.9	54.4	20.0
Three children	70.4	62.0	25.0
Four children	62.0	50.7	25.3
Five children	60.0	53.3	26.7
Six children	60.9	54.5	27.3
Seven or more	60.0	40.0	40.0

C-1/5

	In Percent		
	RADIO	TELEVISION	SIGFIS
T. Status quo continued	53.6	52.3	27.2
Acceptance of communism	56.7	46.7	13.3
Communist victory by revolutions	72.2	50.0	16.7
Communist victory in war	62.5	50.0	12.5
Destructive war	74.8	61.3	26.1
U. S. war victory	69.4	50.0	22.4
Communist defeat by revolutions	72.5	53.5	19.7
Communist evolution to democracy	76.9	54.6	19.4
Disarmament	73.5	51.3	21.6
Third force emergence	30.6	50.7	28.4
U.S. surrender without war	63.6	45.5	36.4
Soviet surrender without war	68.0	59.0	22.0
U. Present system very good	73.1	58.3	26.9
Present system good	72.8	57.5	22.5
Present system fair	71.2	49.1	22.5
Present system poor	71.6	50.7	21.6

Table C-2

EVALUATION OF PRESENT SYSTEM

EVALUATION

How good do you believe the present system for alerting people to enemy attack is around here? Would you say that it is very good, good, fair, or poor?

(In Percent)				
	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor
A. Total	16.9	29.2	33.6	20.3
B. New England	16.9	36.9	35.4	10.8
Middle Atlantic	19.8	33.7	30.2	16.3
East North Central	12.5	22.0	42.7	22.8
West North Central	19.7	36.7	29.9	13.6
South Atlantic	18.0	26.8	31.7	23.5
East South Central	13.7	25.5	51.0	9.8
West South Central	23.2	27.7	29.4	19.8
Mountain states	6.0	38.0	34.0	22.0
Pacific	12.2	25.6	29.9	32.3
C. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	16.8	25.5	34.2	23.5
Other metropolitan	20.3	28.1	30.7	20.9
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	9.9	35.6	42.3	12.2
County with no city of 10,000	15.9	30.6	31.4	22.1
D. Whites	16.3	29.4	33.7	20.6
Negroes	20.7	27.9	33.5	17.9

Table C-2

EVALUATION OF PRESENT SYSTEM

EVALUATION

How good do you believe the present system for alerting people to enemy attack is around here? Would you say that it is very good, good, fair, or poor?

		(In Percent)			
		Very good	Good	Fair	Poor
A.	Total	16.9	29.2	33.6	20.3
B.	New England	16.9	36.9	35.4	10.8
	Middle Atlantic	19.8	33.7	30.2	16.3
	East North Central	12.5	22.0	42.7	22.8
	West North Central	19.7	36.7	29.9	13.6
	South Atlantic	18.0	26.8	31.7	23.5
	East South Central	13.7	25.5	51.0	9.8
	West South Central	23.2	27.7	29.4	19.8
	Mountain states	6.0	38.0	34.0	22.0
	Pacific	12.2	25.6	29.9	32.3
C.	Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	16.8	35.5	34.2	23.5
	Other metropolitan	20.3	28.1	30.7	20.9
	Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	9.9	35.6	42.3	12.2
	County with no city of 10,000	15.9	30.6	31.4	22.1
D.	Whites	16.3	29.4	33.7	20.6
	Negroes	20.7	27.9	33.5	17.9

C-2/2

	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor
E. Men	18.9	27.4	33.5	20.2
Women	14.9	30.9	33.7	20.4
F. Younger people (Up to 50)	16.4	28.9	33.2	21.5
Older people (50 and over)	17.9	29.9	34.4	17.9
G. Single, never married	13.8	23.4	41.5	21.3
Married	17.3	29.6	32.9	20.2
Divorced	22.5	27.5	32.5	17.5
Widowed	9.6	30.8	38.5	21.2
Separated	27.8	27.8	22.2	22.2
H. Republicans	15.9	30.5	35.6	18.1
Democrats	17.2	29.1	32.5	21.1
Others	19.7	23.7	32.9	23.7
No party preference	16.5	28.2	36.5	18.8
I. Protestants	17.2	28.6	36.1	18.2
(Baptist)	(21.1)	(27.1)	(32.4)	(19.4)
(Methodist)	(11.5)	(32.1)	(35.8)	(20.6)
(Episcopalian)	(7.7)	(23.1)	(48.7)	(20.5)
(Presbyterian)	(14.1)	(29.7)	(37.5)	(18.8)
(Lutheran)	(17.8)	(33.3)	(35.6)	(13.3)
(Congregational)	(16.7)	(37.5)	(33.3)	(12.5)
(Fundamentalist)	(16.4)	(31.1)	(37.7)	(14.8)
Catholics	17.7	30.6	29.3	22.4
Jews	20.0	10.0	36.7	33.3

G-2/3

	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor
J. Very strongly religious	19.5	32.2	29.1	19.2
Strongly religious	15.7	26.4	37.2	20.7
Moderately religious	17.2	28.4	36.0	18.4
Not strongly religious	15.4	33.3	35.9	15.4
Not religious	10.0	16.7	36.7	36.7
K. No schooling	10.0	40.0	20.0	30.0
Grammar school	20.2	32.9	31.4	15.6
Some high school	16.4	30.9	36.1	16.7
Completed high school	17.6	27.5	30.8	24.2
Some college	12.7	27.8	37.3	22.2
College	13.2	22.4	39.5	25.0
Beyond college	9.8	17.1	36.6	36.6
L. Professionals	12.9	26.9	34.5	25.7
Farmers, farm managers	21.7	34.8	29.3	14.1
Managers, officials, proprietors	12.8	27.4	36.0	23.8
Clerical workers	18.4	20.7	43.7	17.2
Sales workers	11.3	28.3	43.4	17.0
Craftsmen, foremen	19.7	29.4	29.8	21.1
Operatives	17.5	31.4	33.2	17.9
Service workers	14.7	34.9	31.0	19.4
Farm laborers	18.5	22.2	40.7	18.5
Laborers	21.7	27.4	29.2	21.7

C-2/4

		Very good	Good	Fair	Poor
H.	Under \$3,000	17.7	30.5	31.3	20.6
	\$3,000 - \$4,999	22.7	25.2	35.3	16.9
	\$5,000 - \$7,499	17.2	31.7	31.7	19.4
	\$7,500 - \$9,999	11.3	27.8	36.6	24.2
	\$10,000 - \$14,999	14.0	28.7	35.3	22.1
	\$15,000 - \$24,999	3.0	33.3	30.3	33.3
	\$25,000 and over	20.0	13.3	40.0	26.7
N.	Own	15.3	30.1	33.1	21.5
	Rent	19.8	27.9	34.3	18.1
O.	Upper class	7.1	21.4	39.3	32.1
	Middle class	18.5	26.3	34.8	20.4
	Working class	15.6	32.4	31.9	20.1
	Lower class	22.9	25.7	42.9	8.6
P.	Served in armed forces (respondent or spouse)	15.5	27.0	32.3	25.2
	Did not serve	18.2	32.0	34.4	15.4
Q.	In combat	18.0	26.6	30.9	24.6
	Never in combat	13.7	27.2	33.4	25.6
R.	Living alone	16.5	28.6	34.1	20.9
	Smaller households (Two to five)	15.9	26.5	32.1	19.1
	Larger households (Six or more)	16.3	32.6	30.0	18.5

C-2/5

	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor
S. No child under 12	17.0	27.9	36.2	18.8
One child	21.9	27.6	31.6	18.9
Two children	11.0	31.4	30.8	26.7
Three children	14.7	32.4	27.5	25.5
Four children	15.1	28.8	41.1	15.1
Five children	14.3	35.7	21.4	28.6
Six children	9.1	72.7	0.0	18.2
Seven or more	40.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
T. Status quo continued	13.2	24.8	36.8	22.2
Acceptance of Communism	0.0	41.7	33.3	25.0
Communist victory by revolutions	22.2	27.8	22.2	27.8
Communist victory in war	12.5	12.5	50.0	25.0
Destructive war	17.6	28.7	34.3	19.4
U.S. war victory	21.6	29.6	28.8	20.0
Communist defeat by revolutions	21.1	31.6	29.3	18.0
Communist evolution to democracy	14.4	32.7	29.8	23.1
Disarmament	15.2	28.5	36.2	20.1
Third Force emergence	12.3	38.5	23.1	26.2
U.S. surrender without war	27.3	36.4	36.4	0.0
Soviet surrender without war	28.4	25.3	30.5	15.8

APPENDIX D

On Estimation Procedures

Appendix D

NOTE ON ESTIMATION PROCEDURE

1. Each respondent was taken and the maximum or greatest likelihood for one or more of the leasing and buying alternatives recorded.
2. This produced Table B-7 which gives the distribution by frequencies of respondents in each pattern and in each greatest likelihood response.
3. Estimation of households or percentages of, say, the 15 cent lease against the \$5.00 purchase choice now proceeds by retabulating the respondents from Table B-7: first all those are taken, for each specific greatest probability, who attach this maximum likelihood to both the 15 cent and the \$5.00 alternative - regardless of how they respond about other cost levels. This is all patterns where L1 and B1 both appear.
4. Next, the tabulation includes, by greatest likelihood, those people where L1 appears (15 cent lease) but not B1.
5. And finally, people where B1 (\$5.00 purchase) has greatest likelihood but L1 is not included.
6. For 15 cents as against \$5.00, this leads to a table such as the one below, Table D-1.

Table D-1

DISTRIBUTION BY GREATEST LIKELIHOOD OF PEOPLE
RESPONDING TO 15 CENT LEASE AND
\$5.00 PURCHASE

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Pattern</u>	<u>Greatest Likelihood</u>												<u>Total</u>
		10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0		
Both	L1-B1	490	26	12	11	6	62	2	5	13	13	168	808	
15 cents, not \$5.00	L1	187	32	26	14	7	27	4	3	7	9	0	316	
\$5.00, not 15 cents	B1	127	26	24	9	7	20	3	3	3	3	2	227	

D-2

7. Now we assume that people who would both lease and buy at these costs with the likelihood expressed (and this likelihood is the greatest one of all probability estimates for these individuals) will eventually divide in the same ratio as people who would only lease against those who would only buy. Thus we assume that $(187/187+127)$ of the 490 L1-B1 people will lease, and the remainder will buy.
8. This is done for each likelihood level so that the estimate of those who prefer leasing over buying reflects the ratio of renters to buyers for each likelihood. Table D-2 pursues the example. The estimates are correct within rounding errors.

Table D-2

RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD LEASE ONLY OR BUY ONLY WHEN THOSE WHO WOULD DO BOTH ARE DISTRIBUTED IN PROPORTION TO L1 AND B1 TO BEGIN WITH											
	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	<u>Total</u>
Lease	479	46	32	21	10	63	5	6	16	19	697
Buy	325	38	30	13	10	46	4	5	9	6	486

9. The respondents with zero likelihood as maximum can be ignored because they are expected to neither buy nor lease.
10. The average probability for the newly estimated lease respondents becomes 87.1 (on a 0-100 range); and for the respondents more interested in a purchase, 87.8.
11. The standard error of these averages is then calculated; it becomes $s_{\bar{x}} = .9$ upon rounding for leasing, and $s_{\bar{x}} = .99$ for buying.
12. The .95 confidence level is then $1.96 s_{\bar{x}}$ which becomes 1.8 and 1.9 respectively.
13. The average, with confidence .95, therefore lies between
 $C(85.3 \leq \mu \leq 88.9) = .95$ for leasing, and
 $C(85.9 \leq \mu \leq 89.7) = .95$ for buying.

14. How many people are there in each of the groups though? There are 697/1402 (hence, to the basis of the whole sample) or 49.7 percent of people who express greatest likelihood for leasing at 15 cents; and there are 34.7 percent of those who would buy. This implies also that there are $100 - (49.7 + 34.7)$ percent, or 15.6 percent, of those who would neither lease nor buy at the costs being compared.
15. Now assuming that the "likelihood" expressions can be interpreted as such, we can say that on the whole of the people who prefer to lease (or buy), the proportion who would actually do so is given by the product of the percentage of such people and the probability with which they will act in the expected manner. Thus, 49.7 (85.3) will produce the lower limit percentage of people who are expected to lease (wherein the probability is taken into account and the percentages of sample respondents in the group are, therefore, adjusted by it); and 49.5 (88.9) will be the upper limit. This leads to Table D-3.

Table D-3

ESTIMATED PERCENTAGES OF THOSE WHO WILL LEASE
AND THOSE WHO WILL BUY
(PROBABILITY OF SO DOING TIMES THE PERCENTAGE
OF SUCH PEOPLE IN THE SAMPLE)

	<u>Lower Percent</u>	<u>Upper Percent</u>
Lease	42.4	44.2
Buy	29.8	31.0
Total	72.2	75.2

16. These percentages appear then in the last two columns of Table 19 (A).
17. Finally, to convert the estimates into numbers of households, the percentages are multiplied by the estimated 57 million households.

18. If a different number of households is involved, that number will yield the final estimates (for instance, June 1, 1964, there might be 58 million households).
19. If another confidence interval were desired, for instance, .99 instead of .95, the standard error of the mean would be multiplied by the appropriate factor instead: $2.21 s_{\bar{x}}$ in each case; and the rest of the procedure remains the same.

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APPENDIX E

NEAR System Alternatives

Table E-1

EFFECT ON ACCEPTABILITY OF NEAR SYSTEM OF THE
ADDITION OF OTHER WARNING FUNCTIONS

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>More Acceptable</u>	<u>Less Acceptable</u>
A. Total	68.4	6.7
B. New England	60.3	9.5
Middle Atlantic	61.4	7.5
East North Central	72.6	6.6
West North Central	69.0	7.1
South Atlantic	69.3	2.6
East South Central	79.2	1.9
West South Central	80.0	6.8
Mountain states	69.8	3.8
Pacific	59.1	11.1
C. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	60.7	8.4
Other Metropolitan	70.3	6.9
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	73.7	4.8
County with no city of 10,000	69.1	5.5
D. Whites	66.0	7.1
Negroes	83.8	4.5
E. Men	67.6	7.7
Women	69.0	5.7

E-1/2

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>More Acceptable</u>	<u>Less Acceptable</u>
F. Younger people (Up to 50)	69.7	7.4
Older people (50 and over)	65.8	5.4
G. Single, never married	74.5	6.1
Married	68.7	7.2
Divorced	69.8	4.6
Widowed	61.5	3.6
Separated	64.1	5.1
H. Republicans	67.0	7.8
Democrats	70.1	6.0
Others	61.3	8.8
No party preference	67.1	5.3
I. Protestants	70.7	6.8
(Baptist)	(76.2)	(5.9)
(Methodist)	(70.5)	(7.2)
(Episcopalian)	(73.1)	(7.3)
(Presbyterian)	(62.7)	(9.0)
(Lutheran)	(67.8)	(4.4)
(Congregational)	(68.0)	(8.0)
(Fundamentalist)	(60.9)	(12.5)
Catholics	65.4	6.4
Jews	55.9	5.8

E-1/3

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>More</u> <u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Less</u> <u>Acceptable</u>
J. Very strongly religious	60.5	7.0
Strongly religious	69.8	5.7
Moderately religious	65.0	7.1
Not strongly religious	69.8	7.0
Not religious	70.6	8.8
K. No schooling	50.0	0.0
Grammar school	73.9	2.8
Some high school	68.7	8.3
Completed high school	65.4	7.3
Some college	71.5	7.0
College	57.2	12.3
Beyond college	58.7	13.1
L. Professionals	61.9	8.9
Farmers, farm managers	70.8	3.1
Managers, officials, proprietors	69.6	9.9
Clerical workers	74.4	4.4
Sales workers	53.4	13.7
Craftsmen, foremen	64.1	6.8
Operatives	71.7	4.0
Service workers	67.3	7.7
Farm laborers	77.8	0.0
Laborers	77.5	6.7

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>More Acceptable</u>	<u>Less Acceptable</u>
M. Under \$3,000	63.1	3.6
\$3,000 - \$4,999	76.8	6.5
\$5,000 - \$7,499	66.1	7.0
\$7,500 - \$9,999	65.5	6.4
\$10,000 - \$14,999	66.2	10.3
\$15,000 - \$24,999	71.4	5.7
\$25,000 and over	56.3	18.8
N. Own	67.1	7.0
Rent	70.4	6.3
O. Upper class	71.4	10.7
Middle class	69.1	7.2
Working class	69.2	7.0
Lower class	63.9	11.1
P. Served in Armed Forces (Respondent or spouse)	67.9	8.0
Did not serve	68.2	5.9
Q. In combat	69.4	7.8
Never in combat	67.3	7.9
R. Living alone	60.0	5.3
Smaller households (Two to five)	68.8	7.2
Larger households (Six or more)	70.0	4.8

E-1/5

	<u>In Percent</u>	
	<u>More</u> <u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Less</u> <u>Acceptable</u>
S. No child under 12	67.2	5.7
One child	67.5	10.0
Two children	66.5	9.8
Three children	72.9	6.6
Four children	74.7	2.7
Five children	70.0	0.0
Six children	81.8	0.0
Seven or more	100.0	0.0

Table E-2

RESPONDENTS WHO SAY THAT NEAR RECEIVER WOULD BE MUCH MORE,
OR MORE ACCEPTABLE AS A MULTI-PURPOSE DEVICE:
WOULD THEY PAY MORE?

	Would not Buy Anyway	Would pay Nothing More	In Percent			
			\$1.00 More	\$2.00 More	\$5.00 More	\$10.00 More
A. Total	3.9	12.2	13.8	15.8	29.0	25.3
B. New England	2.6	10.5	10.5	13.2	28.9	34.2
Middle Atlantic	3.2	14.7	14.7	21.2	24.4	21.8
East North Central	6.4	14.6	9.9	15.2	29.2	24.6
West North Central	2.0	7.8	15.7	20.6	33.3	20.6
South Atlantic	5.3	19.8	9.8	19.7	31.1	24.2
East South Central	0.0	10.0	38.1	9.5	33.3	19.0
West South Central	2.8	10.6	12.1	12.1	30.5	31.9
Mountain states	5.6	22.2	8.3	2.8	36.1	25.0
Pacific	3.9	15.7	17.6	11.8	22.5	28.4
C. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	5.8	12.6	12.0	15.2	29.3	25.1
Other Metropolitan	4.4	13.3	14.3	14.1	28.9	25.0
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	2.5	11.7	11.1	18.5	34.6	21.6
County with no city of 10,000	2.2	9.8	16.9	17.5	24.0	29.5
D. Whites	4.2	12.9	13.4	16.3	28.6	24.7
Negroes	2.7	8.8	15.6	12.9	31.3	28.6

E-2/2

	Would Not Buy Anyway	Would Pay Nothing More	\$1.00 More	\$2.00 More	\$5.00 More	\$10.00 More
E. Men	5.5	12.3	13.4	14.6	27.1	27.1
Women	2.5	12.1	14.1	16.8	30.8	23.7
F. Younger people (Up to 50)	3.5	11.8	11.3	15.4	31.8	26.1
Older people (50 and over)	4.8	13.0	19.2	16.4	22.9	23.6
G. Single, never married	5.6	16.9	9.9	12.7	29.6	25.4
Married	3.4	11.5	13.6	16.5	29.7	25.2
Divorced	10.0	10.0	16.7	3.3	36.7	23.5
Widowed	4.8	16.1	21.0	14.5	17.7	25.8
Separated	4.2	12.5	8.3	20.8	25.0	29.8
H. Republicans	3.6	14.9	13.7	18.1	26.1	25.1
Democrats	3.8	11.0	14.3	13.5	30.0	27.1
Others	8.7	6.5	10.9	30.4	28.3	15.8
No party preference	3.2	14.5	11.3	17.7	32.3	21.0
I. Protestants	4.0	10.8	14.4	16.4	29.4	24.0
(Baptist)	(2.2)	(8.3)	(13.6)	(17.1)	(32.5)	(25.8)
(Methodist)	(1.7)	(12.5)	(13.3)	(15.0)	(31.7)	(25.8)
(Episcopalian)	(13.8)	(0.0)	(3.4)	(10.3)	(48.3)	(24.2)
(Presbyterian)	(12.5)	(10.0)	(17.5)	(25.0)	(17.5)	(17.5)
(Lutheran)	(1.6)	(14.3)	(20.6)	(19.0)	(25.4)	(19.0)
(Congregational)	(11.8)	(17.6)	(0.0)	(23.5)	(35.3)	(11.8)
(Fundamentalist)	(8.3)	(8.3)	(19.4)	(11.1)	(16.7)	(36.1)
Catholics	2.9	15.9	12.6	16.4	29.5	22.7
Jews	0.0	5.6	22.2	5.6	22.2	44.0

J.

K.

L.

F.

M.

P.

C.

S.

C.

O.

S.

F.

L.

E-2/3

	Would Not Buy Anyway	Would Pay Nothing More	\$1.00 More	\$2.00 More	\$5.00 More	\$10.00 More
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J. Very strongly religious	4.7	11.7	15.8	14.3	27.2	26.3
Strongly religious	3.6	10.7	14.3	17.9	30.6	23.0
Moderately religious	2.7	14.8	12.1	17.5	30.5	22.4
Not strongly religious	7.4	11.1	11.1	18.5	25.9	25.9
Not religious	4.3	13.0	4.3	13.0	30.4	34.8

K. No schooling	0.0	16.7	16.7	0.0	33.3	33.3
Grammar school	4.7	9.0	22.3	19.5	23.0	21.5
Some high school	2.8	12.0	10.1	12.0	32.7	30.4
Completed high school	2.8	12.0	12.9	15.7	32.5	24.1
Some college	6.8	16.9	7.6	16.9	29.7	22.0
College	2.1	14.9	8.5	8.5	27.7	38.3
Beyond college	7.7	15.4	7.7	23.1	23.1	23.1

L. Professionals	8.9	14.3	11.6	16.1	26.8	22.3
Farmers, farm managers	3.1	6.2	20.0	18.5	30.8	21.5
Managers, officials, proprietors	4.3	11.2	14.7	17.2	25.9	26.7
Clerical workers	1.5	22.4	9.0	11.9	29.9	25.4
Sales workers	3.3	30.0	10.0	16.7	30.0	10.0
Craftsmen, foremen	4.1	6.8	13.7	21.2	24.7	29.5
Operatives	2.5	11.2	17.3	13.7	34.0	21.3
Service workers	2.3	18.4	9.2	16.1	26.4	27.6
Farm laborers	5.3	0.0	15.8	10.5	15.8	52.6
Laborers	3.7	8.6	12.3	9.9	35.8	29.6

E-2/4

	Would Not Buy Anyway	Would Pay Nothing More	\$1.00 More	\$2.00 More	\$5.00 More	\$10.00 More
M. Under \$3,000	5.6	14.8	23.5	15.4	20.4	20.4
\$3,000 - \$4,999	2.3	11.9	16.5	12.8	30.7	25.7
\$5,000 - \$7,499	2.4	12.5	10.9	20.6	31.9	21.8
\$7,500 - \$9,999	4.7	12.5	7.0	14.1	32.8	28.9
\$10,000 - \$14,999	4.3	3.5	11.7	18.1	27.7	29.8
\$15,000 - \$24,999	8.3	8.3	12.5	4.2	25.0	41.7
\$25,000 and over	11.1	11.1	0.0	0.0	33.3	44.4
N. Own	5.3	13.4	14.4	16.2	25.9	24.8
Rent	1.7	10.3	12.6	14.9	34.4	26.1
O. Upper class	10.5	31.6	26.3	0.0	15.8	15.8
Middle class	5.4	10.1	13.3	16.5	27.4	27.2
Working class	2.4	13.0	13.7	15.6	30.6	24.8
Lower class	0.0	15.0	20.0	10.0	40.0	15.0
P. Served in Armed Forces (Respondent or spouse)	4.3	11.9	13.2	16.8	27.4	26.5
Did not serve	3.5	11.3	14.9	14.6	30.9	24.8
Q. In combat	3.3	12.2	13.9	17.2	28.3	25.0
Never in combat	4.7	11.7	12.8	16.3	27.2	27.2
R. Living alone	5.6	16.7	22.2	11.1	22.2	22.2
Smaller households (Two to five)	4.2	13.0	13.3	17.5	28.7	23.1
Larger households (Six or more)	2.0	6.5	13.1	9.1	32.7	36.6

E-2/5

	Would Not Buy Anyway	Would Pay Nothing More	\$1.00 More	\$2.00 More	\$5.00 More	\$10.00 More
S. No child under 12	5.1	13.7	15.0	17.1	25.5	23.6
One child	1.2	13.0	8.6	12.3	36.4	28.4
Two children	5.0	10.1	12.6	19.3	31.1	21.8
Three children	1.3	13.2	17.1	14.5	35.5	18.4
Four children	1.9	1.9	23.1	13.5	17.3	42.3
Five children	5.0	0.0	10.0	15.0	30.0	40.0
Six children	0.0	22.2	0.0	0.0	66.7	11.1
Seven or more	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	60.0

Table E-3

WILLINGNESS TO PAY ADDED COST FOR HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES
WITH NEAR ALERTING FUNCTION

	<u>In Percent</u>				
	<u>Nothing More</u>	<u>\$1.00 More</u>	<u>\$2.00 More</u>	<u>\$5.00 More</u>	<u>\$10.00 More</u>
A. Total	27.4	10.7	10.8	27.1	24.0
B. New England	31.0	10.3	8.6	25.9	24.1
Middle Atlantic	27.3	8.0	14.1	26.9	23.7
East North Central	29.7	9.3	13.6	27.5	19.9
West North Central	27.1	10.4	14.6	29.2	18.8
South Atlantic	22.6	13.4	9.1	29.6	25.3
East South Central	9.4	30.2	1.9	28.3	30.2
West South Central	31.4	8.7	7.6	25.0	27.3
Mountain states	26.9	7.7	3.8	25.0	36.5
Pacific	30.6	10.4	9.8	24.9	24.3
C. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	26.6	7.1	15.7	29.2	21.5
Other Metropolitan	26.3	10.5	8.4	27.8	27.0
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	32.4	10.3	9.9	24.4	23.0
County with no city of 10,000	26.8	15.5	10.6	25.3	21.9
D. Whites	29.7	9.8	9.9	27.1	23.6
Negroes	12.7	16.8	16.8	27.2	26.6

E-3/2

	<u>Nothing More</u>	<u>\$1.00 More</u>	<u>\$2.00 More</u>	<u>\$5.00 More</u>	<u>\$10.00 More</u>
E. Men	27.8	11.8	9.6	26.9	23.9
Women	27.1	9.6	11.9	27.2	24.2
F. Younger people (Up to 50)	25.3	8.9	10.2	30.4	25.1
Older people (50 and over)	31.7	14.2	11.9	20.2	21.8
G. Single, never married	19.1	10.6	12.8	37.2	20.2
Married	27.0	10.6	10.5	27.4	24.6
Divorced	39.0	9.8	12.2	19.5	19.5
Widowed	32.0	14.0	12.0	19.0	23.0
Separated	35.9	5.1	10.3	23.1	25.6
H. Republicans	30.8	11.8	8.6	24.7	24.1
Democrats	24.5	10.6	11.9	28.3	24.6
Others	34.2	6.8	9.6	31.5	17.8
No party preference	31.9	8.8	12.1	24.2	23.1
I. Protestants	26.8	12.0	10.4	25.7	25.1
(Baptist)	(22.1)	(12.2)	(11.6)	(27.6)	(26.5)
(Methodist)	(26.9)	(13.5)	(9.9)	(22.2)	(27.5)
(Episcopalian)	(17.5)	(2.5)	(15.0)	(27.5)	(37.5)
(Presbyterian)	(33.8)	(13.8)	(9.2)	(23.1)	(20.0)
(Lutheran)	(23.6)	(11.2)	(16.9)	(23.6)	(24.7)
(Congregational)	(39.1)	(0.0)	(8.7)	(30.4)	(21.7)
(Fundamentalist)	(36.7)	(16.7)	(5.0)	(23.3)	(18.3)
Catholics	25.4	8.4	14.1	31.5	20.6
Jews	25.0	9.4	0.0	28.1	37.5

E-3/3

	<u>Nothing More</u>	<u>\$1.00 More</u>	<u>\$2.00 More</u>	<u>\$5.00 More</u>	<u>\$10.00 More</u>
J. Very strongly religious	26.1	11.9	11.1	26.7	24.2
Strongly religious	25.8	10.6	11.2	29.4	23.0
Moderately religious	28.0	8.7	11.7	27.4	24.1
Not strongly religious	34.2	13.2	7.9	23.7	21.1
Not religious	40.6	12.5	9.4	15.6	21.9
K. No schooling	40.0	10.0	10.0	20.0	20.0
Grammar school	26.7	17.0	13.2	22.9	20.2
Some high school	23.8	7.4	12.9	28.0	28.0
Completed high school	28.8	9.4	9.9	29.3	22.6
Some college	27.7	9.6	7.8	28.3	26.5
College	25.3	9.3	6.7	28.0	30.7
Beyond college	45.7	2.2	4.3	28.3	19.6
L. Professionals	29.9	9.0	4.0	31.6	25.4
Farmers, farm managers	31.6	10.5	9.5	28.4	20.0
Managers, officials, proprietors	33.1	7.8	10.8	25.3	22.9
Clerical workers	24.4	8.1	14.0	25.6	27.9
Sales workers	34.0	7.5	11.3	26.4	20.8
Craftsmen, foremen	27.4	11.5	10.6	26.5	23.9
Operatives	25.3	14.0	9.8	27.9	23.0
Service workers	22.7	9.4	18.0	25.0	25.0
Farm laborers	23.1	11.5	7.7	23.1	34.6
Laborers	21.8	12.9	15.8	24.8	24.8

E-3/4

	<u>Nothing More</u>	<u>\$1.00 More</u>	<u>\$2.00 More</u>	<u>\$5.00 More</u>	<u>\$10.00 More</u>
M. Under \$3,000	29.2	20.2	14.2	23.2	13.3
\$3,000 - \$4,999	22.2	11.8	11.5	26.9	27.6
\$5,000 - \$7,499	25.1	8.5	11.5	30.6	24.3
\$7,500 - \$9,999	28.0	7.8	8.8	26.4	29.0
\$10,000 - \$14,999	34.3	4.3	8.5	29.8	22.7
\$15,000 - \$24,999	32.4	2.9	2.9	29.4	32.4
\$25,000 and over	33.3	13.3	6.7	13.3	33.3
N. Own	28.8	11.3	10.4	25.7	23.8
Rent	25.3	9.4	11.4	29.5	24.4
O. Upper class	33.3	18.5	0.0	25.9	22.2
Middle class	28.9	9.6	10.3	25.7	25.5
Working class	25.7	11.2	11.3	28.2	23.6
Lower class	21.9	9.4	15.6	34.4	18.8
P. Served in Armed Forces (Respondent or spouse)	28.9	8.4	10.5	27.7	24.5
Did not serve	26.5	12.8	11.0	25.8	23.9
Q. In combat	28.1	10.7	12.3	25.3	23.7
Never in combat	29.4	7.0	9.6	28.9	25.1
R. Living alone	37.1	10.1	10.1	23.6	19.1
Smaller households (Two to five)	27.3	11.0	10.5	27.0	23.8
Larger households (Six or more)	21.7	7.4	12.7	28.8	27.4

E-3/5

	<u>Nothing More</u>	<u>\$1.00 More</u>	<u>\$2.00 More</u>	<u>\$5.00 More</u>	<u>\$10.00 More</u>
S. No child under 12	29.5	12.4	10.6	24.9	22.6
One child	26.7	8.6	9.5	29.3	25.9
Two children	26.7	9.3	9.9	27.3	26.7
Three children	24.8	8.6	13.3	32.4	21.0
Four children	21.4	10.0	17.1	27.1	24.3
Five children	17.9	7.1	7.1	32.1	35.7
.. Six children	27.3	0.0	9.1	45.5	18.2
Seven or more	0.0	0.0	33.3	33.3	33.3

Table E 4

ACCEPTABILITY OF ALERTING SYSTEM FOR CARS

	<u>In Percent</u>		
	<u>Would get</u>	<u>Would not get</u>	<u>No car</u>
A. Total	50.7	36.9	12.4
B. New England	45.9	37.7	16.4
Middle Atlantic	50.8	30.0	19.2
East North Central	48.5	42.4	9.1
West North Central	53.4	42.6	4.1
South Atlantic	50.5	31.0	18.5
East South Central	62.7	23.5	13.7
West South Central	50.8	36.2	13.0
Mountain states	64.7	25.5	9.8
Pacific	45.5	48.3	6.2
C. Standard metropolitan (2,000,000 or more)	46.2	37.2	16.7
Other Metropolitan	53.0	35.6	11.4
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	55.3	33.0	11.6
County with no city of 10,000	47.7	42.4	9.9
D. Whites	48.9	40.2	10.9
Negroes	61.7	16.1	22.2
E. Men	47.5	42.2	10.2
Women	53.7	31.9	14.4

E-2/2

	<u>Would get</u>	<u>Would not get</u>	<u>No car</u>
F. Younger people (Up to 50)	59.0	34.8	6.1
Older people (50 and over)	34.8	40.5	24.6
G. Single, never married	60.2	24.7	15.1
Married	53.2	39.9	6.9
Divorced	43.2	31.8	25.0
Widowed	21.1	27.5	51.4
Separated	51.4	16.2	32.4
H. Republicans	47.7	44.3	8.0
Democrats	52.7	32.8	14.6
Others	48.6	43.2	8.1
No party preference	49.5	34.1	16.5
I. Protestants	50.8	37.2	12.0
(Baptist)	(57.3)	(27.7)	(15.0)
(Methodist)	(51.4)	(37.6)	(11.0)
(Episcopalian)	(46.2)	(38.5)	(15.4)
(Presbyterian)	(43.1)	(40.0)	(16.9)
(Lutheran)	(50.6)	(47.1)	(2.3)
(Congregational)	(41.7)	(54.2)	(4.2)
(Fundamentalist)	(39.7)	(46.0)	(14.3)
Catholics	51.3	35.5	13.2
Jews	58.3	32.4	8.8
J. Very strongly religious	56.8	30.4	12.9
Strongly religious	48.0	39.2	12.8
Moderately religious	48.5	42.9	8.5
Not strongly religious	42.5	30.0	27.5
Not religious	41.2	50.0	8.8

E-4/3

	<u>Would get</u>	<u>Would not get</u>	<u>No car</u>
K. No schooling	7.7	15.4	76.9
Grammar school	44.7	33.1	22.2
Some high school	55.0	31.0	14.1
Completed high school	50.8	43.2	6.0
Some college	57.2	39.0	3.3
College	53.8	42.5	3.8
Beyond college	51.2	46.5	2.3
L. Professionals	50.6	43.2	6.3
Farmers, farm managers	44.6	43.5	12.0
Managers, officials, proprietors	56.7	37.4	5.8
Clerical workers	45.9	41.2	12.9
Sales workers	58.5	35.8	5.7
Craftsmen, foremen	45.7	45.2	9.0
Operatives	52.4	33.3	14.3
Service workers	40.6	23.2	27.1
Farm laborers	25.0	39.3	35.7
Laborers	61.2	24.3	14.6
M. Under \$3,000	36.7	27.8	35.5
\$3,000 - \$4,999	54.7	29.1	16.2
\$5,000 - \$7,499	53.2	41.9	4.9
\$7,500 - \$9,999	54.5	42.3	3.2
\$10,000 - \$14,999	53.2	46.0	.7
\$15,000 - \$24,999	59.4	40.6	0.0
\$25,000 and over	40.0	60.0	0.0

E-4/4

	<u>Would get</u>	<u>Would not get</u>	<u>No car</u>
N. Own	48.8	43.6	7.6
Rent	53.6	25.9	20.5
O. Upper class	44.4	33.3	22.2
Middle class	52.6	40.2	7.1
Working class	50.5	35.0	14.5
Lower class	37.8	13.5	48.6
P. Served in Armed Forces (Respondent or spouse)	52.8	39.2	8.0
Did not serve	48.0	35.8	16.2
Q. In combat	50.0	40.6	9.4
Never in combat	54.7	38.5	6.8
R. Living alone	23.2	24.2	52.6
Smaller households (Two to five)	51.8	38.6	9.5
Larger households (Six or more)	57.3	34.3	8.4
S. No child under 12	43.6	38.3	18.1
One child	62.8	32.0	5.2
Two children	58.0	36.8	5.2
Three children	48.5	41.7	9.7
Four children	56.5	39.1	4.3
Five children	71.4	28.6	0.0
Six children	60.0	30.0	10.0
Seven or more	80.0	0.0	20.0