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NOTES ON THE SECOND EDITION
MARSHAL V. D. SKOLOVSKI
"MILITARY STRATEG

Leon G.

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**NOTES ON THE SECOND EDITION OF
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Leon Goure

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is the latest in a continuing series of RAND studies on Soviet military doctrine that have appeared over the past ten years. The last report, R-416-PR, Soviet Military Strategy, made widely available a carefully translated and annotated text of a Soviet book edited by Marshal Sokolovskii, which was the most comprehensive work on Soviet strategy to appear in the Soviet Union since 1926. The "Analytical Introduction" assessed the significance of that work.

When, in October 1963, a new and revised edition of the Sokolovskii volume appeared in the Soviet Union, it seemed useful, in view of U.S. military interest in the first edition, to identify and interpret any changes in Soviet military thinking that seemed to be indicated by alterations in the text of the second edition. This task has been accomplished in two separate parts by two of the authors of R-416-PR, L. Gouré and T. W. Wolfe.

The present Memorandum, RM-3972-PR, by Leon Gouré represents a preliminary appraisal. It concentrates on the differences between the two Soviet editions and makes minimal reference to other Soviet writings on military doctrine. A forthcoming RAND study by T. W. Wolfe draws on all the available doctrinal materials, including of course both Sokolovskii editions, to evaluate the present state of Soviet military thought and the major underlying factors which influence its development.

SUMMARY

The second edition of 'Military Strategy' by Marshal Sokolevskii and others, published in October 1963, contains about fifty pages of new material and numerous changes in the original text. Some of these changes are intended to update the account of Western military postures, to take account of recent world events, or to incorporate the lessons of speeches and publications by Soviet leaders. Others reflect developments in technology, improvements in military capability, or greater realism in considering the problems of war. Domestic and foreign criticism of the first edition evidently has led to a number of revisions. Finally, a few changes may be interpreted as the result of doctrinal developments. It is difficult to say how far any of these revisions were made for the purpose of influencing Western opinion.

A comparison of selected passages from the two editions indicates:

(1) Sensitivity to Western analysis of the first edition (particularly to comments in the RAND version) and a special emphasis on the denial of aggressive Soviet intentions.

(2) A reassertion, in the face of unofficial Soviet criticism, of the orthodox view that strategy depends on politics and that military science has a "party character."

(3) A new Soviet claim to superiority in both missiles and nuclear warhead yields.

(4) A new assertion that Western aggressive plans force the socialist states to maintain armed forces

sufficient not only to repel the aggressor but also to defeat him completely.

(5) The interesting omission of an earlier statement that the key to destruction of the enemy's defense-economic potential is a large number of nuclear weapons to achieve "decisive results in destroying the enemy economy." (This may be linked to the current stress on large-yield nuclear weapons.)

(6) Full recognition of recent increases in the actual and planned growth of U.S. military strength.

(7) Emphasis on the difficulties of attempting to implement a counterforce strategy.

(8) The Soviet estimate of the requirements of a counterforce strategy:

- (a) a widespread shelter system;
- (b) a reliable and adequate reconnaissance capability;
- (c) large numbers of accurate reliable missiles;
- (d) reliable command and control, warning and communication;
- (e) careful planning by the whole imperialist coalition;
- (f) surprise.

(9) The Soviet view that a counterforce strategy is eyewash and that the U.S. militarists are planning to use nuclear weapons against cities, the peaceful population, and the economy.

(10) A Soviet contention that U.S. military experts see the possibility of strategic surprise as growing less and less, owing to modern detection methods; that the USSR will get little warning, but enough to launch its weapons. (The aggressor would have to initiate his

surprise attack with the small, more rapid-acting portion of his force, and hence sufficient forces would survive for a devastating retaliatory attack -- Larionov in International Affairs.)

(11) A greater interest in problems of limited war, but continuing ambiguity about it.

(12) The view that the U.S. hope of limiting the objectives and scope of limited war is illusory; that escalation is inevitable if one or another of the nuclear powers is drawn into the war; but that limitation is possible if the nuclear powers stay out.

(13) Evidence that there has been a debate in the Soviet Union over the scale and character of the use of ground forces in a general war.

(14) A strategic exchange, according to the authors, would be rapid and brief, and its results are presently unpredictable.

(15) The first nuclear strikes might produce "a profound moral shock."

(16) General victory is the "result of the immediate application of all the might of the state, stockpiled before the war."

(17) Missile-carrying submarines would support theater operations, and the navy must be ready to assure naval landings.

(18) Airborne landings in great depth may follow retaliatory nuclear strikes, and the role of such landings will be "considerably" increased.

(19) Fighter-bombers have an important role on the battlefield in support of the ground forces, and the role of fighters in defense against aircraft continues.

(20) Defense against Polaris submarines is "the most important task" of the Soviet navy, and these vessels are vulnerable to submarines armed with homing missiles and torpedoes, to strategic missiles, and to bombers.

(21) A technical solution to the ABM defense problem has been found "in principle," but "the threat of a massive nuclear surprise attack by the enemy remains."

(22) A Soviet allegation that the U.S. is considering the use of bombardment satellites and studying ways of using the moon for military purposes.

(23) The omission of a passage in the first edition that placed emphasis on the importance of pre-attack evacuation of cities.

The second edition does not represent a radical departure from the first. The panel of authors remains the same, and the more conservative officers who criticized the first edition have had no more voice in the preparation of the second edition than the first. The new edition suggests that the continuing Soviet quest for qualitative and quantitative superiority still takes the direction of improving delivery systems, building greater skill in the employment of available weapons, and acquiring better active defense systems. The Soviet recognition that neither a first strike nor improved active defense can prevent all enemy weapons from getting through to their targets suggests that the Soviet leaders have little hope of avoiding unacceptable damage. They are concerned to impress on the West that this kind of vulnerability cuts both ways.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
SUMMARY	v
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS	5
III. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION OF "MILITARY STRATEGY"	13
IV. WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY	17
V. TYPES OF WAR	20
VI. THE DANGER OF GENERAL WAR	21
VII. U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITY	27
VIII. U.S. STRATEGY	30
IX. LIMITED WAR	37
X. THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEBATE	48
XI. SUPERIORITY	56
XII. GENERAL WAR STRATEGY	61
XIII. THEATER OPERATIONS	73
XIV. THE SIZE OF THE GROUND FORCES	77
XV. THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE	83
XVI. THE ROLE OF THE NAVAL FORCES	87
XVII. ANTIAIR AND ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE	91
XVIII. SPACE	95
XIX. CIVIL DEFENSE	97

I. INTRODUCTION

The publication in the spring of 1962 of a work titled Military Strategy, prepared and edited by a group of fifteen Soviet officers headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskii, was greeted with great interest both in the Soviet Union and in the West. The importance of the book was attributable to several factors: to the high rank of its leading author, to the fact that it represented the first comprehensive treatment of Soviet strategic doctrine since 1926, and to the further consideration that it reflected the views of a prominent segment of the professional Soviet military. The first edition of Military Strategy, however, did not provide a definitive Soviet view on war in the nuclear-missile age. Many important questions were left unanswered. At best the book may be said to represent a stage in an ongoing debate on strategic problems. This was also indicated by the invitation that its authors extended to Soviet readers for critical comments.

The publication in October 1963 of a revised edition of Military Strategy provides new insights into Soviet views on war and strategy. The new edition acquires special significance when viewed in the light of the critical comments to which the first edition was exposed both in the Soviet Union and in the West.

The second edition of Military Strategy still cannot be said to provide definitive Soviet views on a variety of strategic problems. It is not an official handbook on strategy of the Soviet Ministry for Defense. This point

is stressed by four of the book's authors in an article published in Red Star on November 2, 1963, devoted to a review of the American editions of the book and especially of the introduction to RAND's Prentice-Hall edition. It is noteworthy, however, that in addition to lengthy critical reviews of the first edition which appeared in the Soviet press and in professional journals, the authors state in a preface to the second edition (p. 4) that the book was discussed at meetings of "the Academy of the General Staff, at military-scientific societies of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces, at the M. V. Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army and in a number of other institutions." In the light of these high-level professional reviews, it seems reasonable to assume that the second edition of Military Strategy is a more circumspect and therefore even more authoritative document than the original edition.

Consequently it is important to note not only the changes and revisions made in the second edition, but also what has been retained despite Soviet criticism or Western comments.

The second edition follows the format and organization of the first. It is some fifty pages longer, however, and so many changes have been made in the original text that the book now contains some hundred pages, or 20 per cent, of new text. The second edition is given wider circulation than the first in that its printing numbers 40,000 copies as against 20,000 for the first edition.

The authors remain the same despite the criticism of some reviewers that the book represented too narrow a spectrum of Soviet military writers. (See, for example,

General of the Army P. Kurochkin's review in Red Star, September 22, 1962, and in Soviet Military Strategy, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, Appendix I, p. 525.) The new edition, however, does note the death of Lt. General N. P. Tsygichko, who acted as an adviser in the preparation of the first edition. Another innovation is the attribution of sole authorship of Chapter VII to Colonel General A. I. Gastilovich, one of the "radicals" and an expert on mobilization questions. In the first edition he was said only to have "contributed" to the preparation of that chapter.

There are several kinds of revisions in the second edition. Some are simple editorial changes. Others are attempts to update the text -- as in the case of Western military capabilities and strategic doctrine -- in the light of more recent events (the Partial Test-Ban Agreement, the Cuban crisis of October 1962, changes in Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and China, etc.) or important speeches and publications by Soviet and Western leaders. There are also revisions reflecting technological changes and changes in Soviet military capabilities that have occurred in the past fifteen months which have elapsed since the publication of the first edition. Of greater interest are the revisions made in response to Soviet criticism of the first edition. Finally there are changes resulting from a reappraisal of strategic problems and the nature of nuclear war. It must be noted, however, that it is difficult to determine the extent to which revisions were made in response to Western comments or for the purpose of influencing Western readers.

The discussion that follows is based on what is believed to be a careful line-by-line comparison of the two Russian editions. It is not the author's intention, however, to note all changes made in the new text, but rather to discuss the treatment of some select problems that appear to be of special interest. A more detailed analysis of the significance of the second edition and of its implications for the policy debate among the Soviet military and between the military and political leadership is presented in T. W. Wolfe's forthcoming Report mentioned in the Preface.

II. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

It seems significant that despite the criticisms to which the first edition was exposed, the new edition, though extensively revised, contains no radical changes in the basic views on war and strategy. In many instances the treatment of questions that are clearly controversial in the Soviet Union remains unaltered in the new edition. This suggests that the book has the approval of a very influential element of the Soviet military leadership. It is also significant that, despite the demands of some Soviet reviewers for a broadened spectrum of opinion, the book's authorship remains unchanged and that neither the more conservative elements of the Soviet ground forces nor any naval or air force officers have been given a greater voice in the preparation of the second edition.

It is not to be supposed, however, that the Soviet debate on strategy, force posture, and the organization of the armed forces has been resolved or that the second edition of Military Strategy provides final answers to these questions. The existence of an ongoing controversy is acknowledged by four of the book's authors in an article in Red Star, November 2, 1963,¹ as well as by explicit statement in the new edition itself (p. 367, second edition). In fact, as will be shown, the authors repeat and even expand their previous attacks on the conservative views held particularly by some prominent Soviet ground

¹Major General I. Zavialov, Major General V. Kolechitskii, Colonel V. Larionov, Major General M. Cherednichenko, "Against Slander and Falsification -- On the Occasion of the Publication of the Book Military Strategy in the United States," Red Star, November 2, 1963.

force officers. At the same time they themselves fail to resolve some of the obvious internal contradictions in the first edition and in a number of instances retain even those pointed out to them by their Soviet critics. This applies to such basic questions as how to win a nuclear war and survive, the size of the armed forces, the possibility of mobilization in wartime, the danger of escalation, the reliability of active defense means, the problem of quantitative and qualitative superiority, the duration of a war, the use of space for military purposes, and so on.

At the same time, as was also noted in the case of the first edition, there is considerable agreement in the views expressed on key issues. Thus, the second edition re-emphasizes the need to prepare the Soviet armed forces for a general nuclear war in which the strategic missile forces, now supplemented by missile-firing submarines, will play the decisive role. The objective of Soviet strategy continues to be the attainment of the war aims in the shortest possible time by means of the massive use of nuclear weapons in the initial phase of the war. The initial phase of the war is still viewed as decisive for determining the subsequent course and outcome of the war.

In accordance with what might be called the Soviet public line on this question, the authors persist in rejecting any concept of controlled employment of weapons in a general war. They describe and then deny the feasibility of the U.S.-enunciated counterforce strategy and continue to promote a Soviet strategy that includes simultaneous nuclear attacks on military as well as civilian targets. As a consequence of the danger of a surprise counterforce

attack there seems to be an increased emphasis on early warning, on a high state of readiness of the Soviet armed forces and on hardening as well as mobility of strategic weapons. It is also implied that a successful first strike counterforce strategy would require not only greatly improved reconnaissance systems but, above all, very large and constantly growing numbers of strategic weapons, especially missiles, since presumably military targets would greatly outnumber civilian targets. The authors suggest that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possesses such capabilities at the present time.

The second edition of Military Strategy continues to emphasize that since the war will be a final clash between opposing social systems, its aim will be the total defeat of the opponent. However, the authors show a greater degree of uncertainty than before on how a Soviet victory will be achieved. Thus, while still asserting that the final victory will require the occupation of the enemy's territory and the eradication of his social-political system, they no longer suggest that such occupation would be extended to the United States as they did in the first edition. Although they hope that the initial nuclear strikes will bring about a collapse of the enemy's will and capability to resist, they also state that the effects of such strikes are difficult to predict. Soviet uncertainty about the outcome of the first phase of the war is further reflected in the continuing consideration the authors give to the possibility of a protracted war and to the Soviets' need to prepare for it.

The new edition continues to emphasize that success in war is largely a function of qualitative and quantitative

superiority in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, and of superior skill in their employment. Although the authors make no new claim to quantitative superiority in weapons, their claim to qualitative superiority, as will be shown, appears in their reduced estimate for the number of weapons required by the Soviet Union for use against nonmilitary targets. The nature of the greater Soviet skill in the employment of weapons is not spelled out. However, the second edition still recognizes the danger of a surprise attack as well as the need for a Soviet pre-emptive attack.

The Soviet views on the character of a ground campaign in Europe in a general war remain essentially unchanged. The campaign is still based on the use of superior nuclear fire power and of mobile forces whose aim will be the final defeat of the surviving enemy forces, the destruction of all enemy nuclear weapons, and the consolidation of the victory by occupation of the enemy's territory. The new edition suggests that the ground advance would follow rather than coincide with the initial nuclear strikes and that greater use may be made in the theater of strategic missile forces, submarines, amphibious landings and large-scale airborne operations.

The second edition significantly continues to insist on a Soviet requirement for a multi-million armed force for general nuclear war. There is no suggestion that the size of the Soviet ground forces may be reduced. The size of the forces continues to be determined by the expectation of great losses during the ground campaign as well as by the need for large forces to ensure internal security and to carry out civil defense functions. At the same

time, the new text continues to emphasize that it is not possible in peace time to maintain sufficient ready ground forces to accomplish all the objectives of the campaign. The authors are still undecided about the feasibility of large-scale mobilization and redeployment of forces under nuclear war conditions. While favoring mobilization, they reject at the same time the arguments advanced by some Soviet critics (see Kurochkin) on the possibility of and need for shifting large forces during the war and continue to favor instead the execution of strategic maneuvers by shifting the fire of nuclear weapons. Despite the insistence on large ground forces, the second edition appears to indicate an increasing Soviet reliance on the use of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, in theater operations and on the use of airborne forces and amphibious landings that may draw on forces located far from the battle lines.

More attention is devoted in the second edition to limited wars. There is little evidence, however, of any significant change in previously expressed Soviet views on the danger and probability that such wars will escalate, especially those conflicts involving the confrontation of nuclear powers or affecting their vital interests. The authors repeat the Soviet commitment to support national-liberation and revolutionary uprisings. While they continue to warn that any limited war involving the nuclear powers must irresistibly escalate, they appear to be somewhat more cautious in the second edition in their discussion of the escalation of all other types of limited wars. In its expanded discussion of limited war, however, the second edition casts further doubt on the feasibility of

limiting objectives, the geographic scope of conflict, the number of belligerents, or the employment of weapons in limited conflicts in Europe. It also persists in asserting that the United States may resort to limited wars as a means for initiating a general war or that it may resort to nuclear weapons at critical moments in such wars in order to assure a successful outcome. The second edition, however, repeats the earlier statements concerning the need of the Soviet army to be capable of waging both general and limited wars.

At the same time there appears to be a somewhat greater Soviet recognition of the possibility of limited conflicts in third areas not involving a direct confrontation of the nuclear powers. In this connection the new Soviet interest in amphibious landing operations and the greater stress on the use of submarines may be significant, although the authors of Military Strategy did not refer to these weapons in conjunction with limited wars.

As for weapons development, the second edition continues to downgrade the role of the Soviet long-range strategic bomber, despite the introduction of air-to-surface missiles. At the same time it puts somewhat greater emphasis on the use of bomber, fighter bomber, and fighter tactical operations, especially for use against mobile nuclear weapons and for air defense missions. Mention is made of further developments of aircraft for these purposes, and the need for planes capable of using unimproved landing strips is reiterated. There is, however, greater emphasis on the role of long-range bombers in naval operations, especially for use against enemy carriers. The new edition also devotes more attention to the employment of Soviet

missile-carrying submarines, to hunter-killer submarines, and to the problem of defense against U.S. Polaris submarines. The increased references to Soviet missile-carrying submarines in conjunction with strategic attacks and theater operations appear to coincide with Soviet claims that such submarines are included in their inventory.

There is somewhat greater optimism expressed in the possibility of achieving an effective antimissile defense in line with Soviet public claims of having developed such weapons. However, it is not claimed that such defenses would prevent all enemy weapons from striking the Soviet Union. Soviet interest in the military use of space and in antisatellite defense is repeated, but no claims are made concerning any successful Soviet development of the latter.

The authors suggest that future development will seek improvements in nuclear weapons delivery systems, tactical nuclear weapons, antimissile, antisatellite and antisubmarine defenses, early warning systems, and possibly in better airborne and amphibious landing capabilities. Soviet space efforts may be further used at least as a means to demonstrate an alleged superiority in the quality of Soviet missiles. The Soviet Union clearly hopes to continue to derive advantages by claiming to possess a superior yield from its nuclear weapons.

One over-all impression of the changes in the second edition of Military Strategy is that they appear to reflect a greater Soviet sense of self-confidence. This is suggested by new references to increased Soviet strategic capabilities, to a possible decline in Soviet fears of a devastating enemy surprise attack, and to greater

readiness on the part of the West to acknowledge the existence of a significant Soviet deterrent capability. These changes may be the result of improvements in the Soviet military posture that have come about since the publication of the first edition fifteen months ago. They may also result from Soviet experiences in recent crisis situations and may explain, at least in part, the somewhat greater flexibility that seems evident in the authors' discussion of Soviet strategy and the character of possible future wars.

However, the description of U.S. capabilities and weapon programs and the recognition that neither a first strike nor an improved active defense can prevent some enemy weapons from reaching their targets in the Soviet Union suggest that the Soviet leaders have little hope of avoiding unacceptable damage. One of their concerns continues to be to impress on the West the certainty that the Soviet Union would also be able to inflict the same kind of damage on the West if the latter attempted to attack the Soviet bloc.

III. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION OF
"MILITARY STRATEGY"

In the Preface to the new edition the authors take issue with Western comments on the first edition of the book and recapitulate in brief the lengthy review article that appeared in Red Star on November 2, 1963. In particular they accuse Western commentators of seeking to ascribe aggressive intentions to the Soviet Union. The Red Star article went to great lengths to deny that the Soviet Union favored a pre-emptive strategy. The Preface, in turn, quotes Marshal Malinovskii's assertion that the best defense is not to attack but to warn the enemy of the Soviet Union's strength and its readiness to destroy any aggressor.² The Soviet authors continue:

This is why, rather than hide our views of the nature and means of waging a future war, we have revealed them in the book Military Strategy [p. 4].

Despite the disclaimer in the Preface that the Soviets are not interested in a pre-emptive strategy, the second edition repeats the earlier arguments in favor of such a strategy and even adds some new comments.

The second portion of the Preface deals with criticisms from Soviet sources concerning the scope of strategy and of the relative authority of the political and military leadership. The authors were criticized both for deferring too much to the political leadership and for trying to

² Malinovskii made this statement in an article in Kommunist, May 1962, and in a pamphlet, Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace, published in late 1962.

infringe on the functions of the latter. Two criticisms are of particular interest:

1. It is reported in the Preface that one group of critics argued that the authors' definition of strategy conflicted with its true scientific character, namely that strategy was not dependent on the "class interests" for which the war was waged, and was therefore independent of politics. This view the authors reject, asserting that the "dependence of strategy on politics" and the "party character of this science" (i.e., the predominance of the Communist Party in determining strategy) are incontrovertible. There thus appears to have been a conflict between a purely professional or narrow military definition of strategy and the more orthodox Soviet view which stresses the predominance of the political leadership in determining military policy as well as strategy. The authors of the first edition were criticized for paying insufficient attention to the role of the Party in the formulation of strategy and were obviously anxious to remedy this impression in the second edition. The requirement to stress the predominance of the Party was also reflected in a number of other Soviet articles which appeared after the publication of the first edition of Military Strategy, notably in Marshal Malinovskii's Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace, Colonel General Lomov's Soviet Military Doctrine, and others. The authors of Military Strategy, however, were not prepared to turn over all decisions on military problems to the political leaders.

2. The authors reject (p. 5) the opposite suggestion from some critics to "exclude" from the study of strategy the "question of leadership in preparing the country for

war." This suggestion, it is said, was based on the argument that strategy should "deal solely with the leadership of armed forces," while the preparation of the country for war was a "political matter." This criticism had been raised in a review article by Colonel V. Zemskov and Colonel A. Iakimovskii, which was published in Voennyi vestnik (Military Herald), No. 1, January 1963. The authors of the review (p. 124) complained that Military Strategy tended to identify "military science with military art" and to increase "the range of problems attributed to strategy at the expense of politics."

In our view, the problem of preparing the country economically, politically and morally is the concern of politics and not of strategy. This is the prerogative of the Communist Party and of the Soviet government and not of the military leadership.

The authors of Military Strategy, however, refused to make such a "mechanistic" distinction among the "interrelated aspects of the indivisible process of leadership." Pointing out that the defense capability of the country was primarily a matter of combat readiness, they asserted that Soviet military strategy must include "research into the question of the leadership for preparing the country to repel aggression" (p. 5, second edition). This passage suggests that Soviet military leaders are unwilling to leave the policy decisions governing prewar defense preparations entirely in the hands of the political leaders. It is also evident that in discussing this question the authors had to proceed with caution. Thus, speaking of strategy, which they said in the first edition was "to deal

with the mobilization of all the forces and instruments of a state in wartime," they have now added the word "military" before "forces" (p. 14, second edition; p. 10, first edition; p. 88, Prentice-Hall, hereafter cited as P.H.), thereby disclaiming predominance of strategy over all state policies in wartime.

The authors of Military Strategy had been criticized (Military Herald, No. 1, January 1963, p. 124) for having written in the first edition that, in wartime, "strategic considerations often determine policy. Cases even arise when the military factor not only predominates, but even acquires decisive significance" (p. 26, first edition; p. 104, P.H.). In support of this argument they had cited Engels' opinion that in wartime military operations were subject to their own laws, which could not be violated without endangering the war effort. In the second edition (p. 30), the authors apparently felt obliged to soften their previous statement, without, however, omitting the warning that the laws of war must not be countervened by the political leadership.

In pointing out a certain autonomy which strategy possesses, F. Engels did not mean to stress its independence from politics. He only warned that the violation or ignoring of the laws of military strategy by politics can lead to the defeat of the army and the destruction of the state. Contrariwise, in the course of the war, strategic considerations often influence politics. Cases even arise when the military factor acquires a decisive significance. During the Civil War in the USSR, V. I. Lenin pointed out that the outcome of the Revolution depended entirely upon who won the Civil War.

IV. WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

In the course of the recent Sino-Soviet debate some Russians have said that in the nuclear age war is no longer an instrument of policy. On this question Soviet military and political writers are not always in agreement. Military men continue to assert that war is an instrument of policy even though the decision to go to war may not always be rational because it might fail to achieve the political aims of the conflict. The political writers deny that general war is any longer an instrument of policy. The dispute appears to arise largely from a difference in interest and purpose. Thus the Soviet military, who continue to speak of the danger of war and who stress the need for further Soviet defense efforts, are unwilling to assume that the West is giving up war as a political instrument. The political writers, in their polemic with Peking and in the light of the current Soviet coexistence policy, obviously prefer to portray war as an irrational act.

Military Strategy continues to maintain the view that war is the continuation of politics (Clausewitz's formula) by violent means (Lenin's amendment). Thus the second edition retains the following statements of the first:

The acceptance of war as a tool of politics determines the relationship of military strategy to politics and makes the former completely dependent on the latter [p. 24, second edition; p. 20, first edition; p. 98 P.H.].

It is well known that the essential nature of war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing technology and armament [p. 25, second edition; p. 21, first edition; p. 99, P.H.].

Lenin is also quoted to the effect that "war is a part of a whole and that whole is politics" (p. 214, second edition; p. 195, first edition; p. 270, P.H.), and that "war is simply a continuation of politics by other (namely, violent) means." "This was always the very point of view held by Marx and Engels..." (p. 215, second edition; p. 196, first edition; p. 271, P.H.). In the same passage a reference to Clausewitz as the author of this formula and of Lenin's contribution to it is omitted. There is however a new quotation from Lenin:

For the correct understanding of the nature of war as the continuation of politics by violent means with the aid of military operations, the following Lenin thesis is of great importance: "War is the continuation by violent means of that policy which was pursued by the ruling classes of the warring countries long before the war. Peace is the continuation of that same policy, but embodying those changes brought about by military operations" [p. 216, second edition, italics in the original].

Furthermore, it is asserted in a new statement that:

In the correct understanding of the character of war the primary role is played by the Marxist-Leninist

proposition concerning the class nature of politics, whose continuation is war [p. 220, second edition].

The authors of Military Strategy continue to make it clear that the capitalist nations also view war as a continuation of politics and that they seek to attain some of their political objectives by means of war. Thus it is said again that "the imperialists and primarily the American imperialists" are trying to "ward off their inevitable destruction and, by means of war, to change the course of world events now so unfavorable to them" (p. 8, second edition; p. 4, first edition; p. 82, P.H.).

V. TYPES OF WARS

The second edition makes few changes in discussing types of wars. General war between the socialist and capitalist camps, the book continues to assert, will be unlimited in scope and violence because of the political objectives of the warring sides and the nature of modern weapons. Though the new edition repeats the earlier statements on national-liberation and revolutionary wars, it makes some changes in the treatment of wars between imperialist states. In the first edition, such wars were described under the rubric "Small Imperialist Wars, on a local limited scale..." (p. 209, first edition; p. 283, P.H.). In the second edition the word "small" is dropped as well as a statement that "small, local wars between the imperialist states, too, are not excluded" (p. 209, first edition). The statement that such wars are of a local, limited character is shifted to a discussion of national-liberation wars, where it is said that:

Like imperialist wars, national-liberation and civil wars are, in their scale small, local wars [p. 228, second edition].

VI. THE DANGER OF GENERAL WAR

The book continues to be ambiguous about the danger of war. Thus, while the Soviet Union claims parity or superiority in strategic capability, and asserts that the United States has acknowledged the existence of a state of "mutual deterrence," it also insists on believing that the United States still harbors aggressive intentions and seeks to unleash a nuclear war.

The second edition takes note of recent improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations and of the growth of "peace forces" in the world. While the first edition stated that the CPSU believed there were forces in the world capable of preserving peace, and that "...there are indications of a growing preponderance of the forces of socialism and peace over those of imperialism and war" (p. 3, first edition; p. 81, P.H.), the second edition omits this statement and instead claims that:

This [the possibility of preserving peace] is confirmed by the fact that increasing numbers of people believe in the policy of peaceful coexistence, and that with each passing day it wins new victories [p. 7, second edition].

The new text goes on to note that an "important success" in the peaceful solution of world problems was the agreement on partial test cessation. But however important this was for reducing international tension, "one must not at the same time lose one's sense of reality":

One must remember that the cessation of nuclear tests, which creates favorable opportunities for the search for further peace steps, does not at the same time mean disarmament and cannot halt the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Nor does it remove the danger of the imperialists unleashing a thermonuclear war [pp. 7-8, second edition].

The authors insist further that the Soviet Union must not rely on the "good will" of the imperialists, who, it is reasserted, "openly proclaim their insane plans to liquidate the Soviet Union and other socialist states by a new world war" (p. 4, first edition; p. 8, second edition; p. 82, P.H.).

The West and especially the United States has come to recognize that the Soviet Union has reached a state of relative strategic "parity" with the United States. There are some interesting differences in the treatment of this topic in the two editions of Military Strategy. Both editions state that in November 1961, President Kennedy acknowledged the "loss of alleged American superiority in strategic weapons" and that:

Thus, under the conditions of today, when there is a "balance" (approximate "equality") in strategic weapons and Soviet superiority in conventional armed forces, the American strategists are forced to re-evaluate their previous attitude toward general nuclear war [p. 74, first edition; p. 80, second edition; p. 156, P.H.].

In the first edition this was followed by a statement to the effect that the United States realized that a general nuclear war would lead to complete mutual annihilation:

They understand that when both sides possess very large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and various means of delivering them to targets, primarily strategic means, a general nuclear war holds great risks of complete mutual annihilation. Consequently, the greater the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, the greater becomes the conviction that it is impossible to use them. Thus the growth of nuclear-missile power is inversely proportional to the possibility of its use [p. 74, first edition; p. 156, P.H.].

This passage is omitted in the second edition. The Soviet authors apparently wanted to avoid mentioning "mutual annihilation" and the growing recognition of the impossibility of using nuclear weapons. Presumably this strained the credibility of their argument that the West still threatened war, and also made the outcome of the war appear to be symmetrical for both sides. The second edition, however, has retained the next two sentences:

A "nuclear stalemate," to use the Western expression, had arisen; on the one hand a tremendous increase in the number of missiles and nuclear weapons, and on the other hand the incredible danger of their use. Under these conditions, according to the evaluation of American and NATO political and military circles, both sides had attained the position of so-called "mutual deterrence" [p. 80, second edition; pp. 74-75, first edition; pp. 156-157, P.H.].

Even though the United States is alleged to recognize the existence of a state of "mutual deterrence," its strategies are still claimed to be designed for initiating a general war, for striking the first nuclear blow. The second edition continues to equate the American "massive retaliation" strategy with a first-strike strategy (p. 76, second edition; p. 70, first edition; p. 152, P.H.). While the first edition says that the "massive retaliation" strategy was based on the "assumption that the United States had overwhelming superiority over the Soviet Union" (p. 70, first edition; p. 153, P.H.), the second edition has it that the American strategy was based on the "assumption that the United States then allegedly had overwhelming superiority over the Soviet Union" (p. 76, second edition).

In the new edition the imperialists are accused of propagandizing "preventive war" against the Soviet Union (p. 232, second edition). In this respect there is a new reference to President Kennedy's statement that the United States may under some conditions take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons. This is said to

...clearly indicate that the United States is preparing for a surprise and unlimited use of nuclear weapons against the socialist countries, for a preventive war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries [p. 351, second edition].

In this connection, as will be discussed below, the second edition gives considerable attention to the American counterforce strategy, which it equates with a "preventive war" and a first-strike strategy. It notes, however, that the United States is coming to recognize more and more

that a counterforce strategy is very difficult to implement and cannot prevent the Soviet Union from carrying out devastating retaliatory strikes.

Concerning the alleged U.S. plans for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union, the second edition of Military Strategy contains an interesting change. Following a discussion of U.S. plans to use limited wars as a means for drawing the whole world into a new world war, the first edition asks whether this means that the United States has given up its plans for initiating general war by means of a surprise attack. The authors say no. Because, for one thing:

It must be realized that their preparation for such a blow has gone too far, that too great financial and material resources have been expended [to permit a reversal of policy] [pp. 326-327, first edition; p. 397, P.H.].

This passage has been omitted in the second edition. The new text, however, retains the second explanation provided in the first edition, namely, that "adventurism and recklessness have always been characteristic of imperialism. Blinded by this hatred of communism, the imperialists may commit any crimes" (p. 363, second edition; p. 327, first edition; p. 397, P.H.). Presumably, the omitted sentence was believed to be too strong since it tended to preclude any change in U.S. strategy and weakened the effectiveness of the alleged impact of Soviet military power on American intentions.

The second edition concludes, like the first one, that:

Our military strategy must accept the fact that there is still danger of the imperialists initiating new predatory wars and attacking the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, despite the growing influence of factors ensuring the preservation of peace [p. 230, second edition; p. 211, first edition; p. 285, P.H.].

The second edition also repeats the earlier statement that "at the present time (in the sixties) the danger of a world war breaking out has become particularly real" (p. 212, first edition; p. 286, P.H.), "...more real than before" (p. 232, second edition).

VII. U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITY

The second edition of Military Strategy makes an attempt to update the account of U.S. and allied military capabilities. Though incomplete and uneven, the new version of Western strength should appear to the Soviet reader to be even more formidable than the first in spite of a new reference to the growing instability of the NATO alliance (p. 35, second edition).

The U.S. strategic posture and planned development has been updated. Thus, it is noted in a new statement that by 1966 the U.S. plans to have 19 squadrons of Minutemen with 950 launchers as against the previous estimate of 16 squadrons with 800 launchers (p. 103, second edition; p. 88 first edition; p. 173, P.H.). The total number of missiles available by early 1963 has been raised from 32 (for 1962) to 200, including 20 Minutemen. The number of Atlas missiles in 1963 has been reduced from 132 to 126, and allowance has been made for 54 Titan-I's. By 1964 it is said that there will be an additional 54 Titan-II's and a total of 150 Minutemen. By 1966 the total number of missiles will be 1190 as against the previous estimate of 1040. The second edition also notes in a new statement that the warhead for Atlas-E is 3 megatons, for Titan, 1-4 megatons, and for Minuteman, 600 kilotons. No mention is made of combat-ready missiles, which, in the first edition, were said to number 63 in 1962, and 990 in 1966. Mention is still made of Thor and Jupiter missiles deployed in England, Italy and Turkey (p. 103, second edition; p. 88, first edition; p. 172, P.H.), but it is noted that the U.S. intends to withdraw them and will

"probably" replace them by Polaris submarines (p. 104, second edition).

The number of atomic submarines with Polaris missiles has been raised to 9 as against 6 such submarines in 1963, and the number of Polaris missiles has been increased to 144 as against 96 (p. 109, second edition; p. 94, first edition; p. 177, P.H.).

The number of strategic bombers has also changed. The U.S. is said to have 630 B-52's in 1963 (as against 600 in 1962), 800 B-47's (as against 1100) and 100 B-58's (as against 60). The number of B-47's stationed in the U.S. has been reduced from 900 to 700 (p. 105, second edition; p. 90, first edition; p. 175, P.H.).

Concerning ground forces, the combined strength of the imperialist blocs, including NATO, CENTO, SEATO, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, is said to be 5 million men or "about 180 regular divisions" as against 160 divisions in the first edition (p. 114, second edition; p. 99, first edition; p. 182, P.H.). NATO, as before, is said to have 90 divisions. CENTO is said to have 20 divisions (Iran 12 and Pakistan 8, showing an increase of one division for the latter). SEATO plus Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are said to have "about 70" divisions, as against the previous figure of 50 (p. 116, second edition; p. 101, first edition; p. 184, P.H.), thus accounting for the increase in the over-all number. The number of cruise-missile sites in Europe has been increased from 48 to 80 (p. 117, second edition; p. 102, first edition; p. 185, P.H.). The range of U.S. TAC aircraft has been extended from 1000 to 1500 km. (p. 117, second edition).

Concerning the U.S. space program, no change has been made in the second edition. It still shows such vehicles as Samos, Midas, Bambi, etc. (p. 108, second edition; p. 93, first edition; p. 173, P.H.).

While noting the American interest in the development of an antimissile defense capability, the second edition states that the Nike-Zeus tests have "so far" been disappointing and that it is planned to concentrate on the development of Nike-X (p. 112, second edition).

VIII. U.S. STRATEGY

The second edition greatly updates and expands the discussion of recently formulated U.S. strategic concepts. Considerable space (5 pages) is devoted particularly to the counterforce strategy, which was enunciated after the publication of the first edition.

According to the Russian authors, the counterforce strategy was developed as a result of a "prolonged study of the problem of the conduct of nuclear war" in the United States in order to determine what targets to destroy so as to "achieve a quick defeat of the enemy" (p. 84, second edition). More particularly, it was motivated by fear of "retaliatory nuclear strikes against defense-economic and military-political centers of the United States" (p. 83, second edition).

The delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy's strategic weapons is a more difficult task than striking large cities. These difficulties are due mainly, first, to [the fact that] such weapons exist in considerable quantity and, second, the majority of them, especially the missiles, which under present conditions are absolute weapons, are emplaced in underground bases that are difficult to destroy, on submarines, etc. And the trend toward increasing this invulnerability is constantly growing [p. 84, second edition. Italics added].

It should be noted that one of the authors of Military Strategy, Colonel V. Larionov, wrote an article (in collaboration with I. Glagolev) in Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' (International Affairs), No. 11, 1963, which sought to

prove that the United States could not carry out a successful counterforce operation by means of a first strike. In support of his argument Larionov said:

It is evident that even under the most favorable conditions the aggressor will not be able to destroy with his first strike all the means for a retaliatory blow. These means -- missiles, bombers, submarines, etc. -- are dispersed, hidden underground or under the water or are camouflaged. A considerable number of them are constantly on the move. Another, even greater number, such as the bombers on the airfields, are in a state of almost instant readiness for take-off. It is physically impossible not only to knock out all the retaliatory means simultaneously, but even to pin-point precisely the exact location of all of them at the moment the missiles of the first salvo reach their targets.³

The authors of Military Strategy point out that "the decision as to which targets to strike with nuclear weapons -- whether strategic forces or cities -- depends to a considerable extent on the available weapon systems and their numbers" (p. 84, second edition). The political objective of the counterforce strategy is said to be the preservation of capitalism.

However, the illusory aspect of such hopes is only too evident. If the militarists unleash a nuclear war, no strategy of whatever sort will save imperialism from destruction [p. 85, second edition].

³I. Glagolev and Colonel V. Larionov, "Peaceful Co-existence and the Defense Might of the USSR," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' (International Affairs), No. 11, 1963, p. 47.

One reason why such a strategy is not suitable, according to the Soviet authors, is that the "majority of the targets are located in large or small cities and inhabited centers" (p. 85, second edition). A similar statement by Marshal Sokolovskii appears in Red Star, on 19 July 1962 in response to Secretary McNamara's Ann Arbor speech.

The authors go on to say that, according to the U.S. "rules," the Americans should give some credibility to the counterforce strategy by removing all military installations from their large cities. But, they point out,

This problem is considered to be unrealistic, and it is emphasized in the press that if the United States and its allies were to start the removal of military installations from their cities, the USSR would draw the conclusion that the United States was preparing to attack [p. 85, second edition. Source for this statement is given as The New York Times, July 9, 1963].

The counterforce strategy is said to depend on a variety of requirements. These include:

1. The construction of a widespread shelter system whose "role and significance in a future war are quite problematic." It is noteworthy, however, that in the second edition there is still a strongly worded passage in favor of a Soviet civil defense program in Chapter VII, and among the tasks that Soviet strategy must accomplish the authors have added the determination of the "basic principles of civil defense" (p. 16, second edition).

2. "The availability of a sufficient number of reliable reconnaissance means."

3. "The availability of large numbers of missiles of

great accuracy, reliability and readiness, since there are considerably more military targets than cities."

4. "The availability of a reliable system of command and control, warning and communication."

5. "The careful planning of missile-nuclear strikes and of the operation of the armed forces of the imperialist coalition as a whole, on the basis of extensive use of computers."

6. "Surprise."

The United States, the Russian authors say, plans to solve the problem of reconnaissance by means of large numbers of satellites which can take photographs with a 2 m. resolution, and in 1965-1970 will be capable of photographing objects with 60 cm. resolution from a height of 500 km. (p. 86, second edition).

The authors cite H. Kissinger's article in Foreign Affairs of July 1962 describing U.S. plans and preparations for implementing the counterforce strategy. The article is said to indicate that this is a very difficult task. For example, Polaris missiles are said to be too inaccurate for use in such a mission. Furthermore, some U.S. military experts have pointed out that the increasing difficulty of locating Soviet missiles and their growing number complicate the planning and organization of a counterforce strategy and make its complete success problematic.

It is considered that the uncertainty in the solution of this task results in a decline in the political worth of the "counterforce" strategy, possibly even more quickly than its military worth, since it becomes increasingly difficult for the representatives of the commander of the armed forces to convince the

political leaders of the complete reliability of the calculations and plans, drawn up on the basis of fragmentary reconnaissance information about enemy targets [p. 87, second edition].

The authors conclude that:

The "counterforce" strategy is based first of all on the need for a preventive war. A strategy that expects to achieve victory through the destruction of [the enemy's] armed forces cannot be based on the idea of "retaliatory strike," but on preventive action, on the attainment of surprise [p. 88, second edition].

Subsequently, in the second edition, the counterforce strategy is summarily dismissed in a new statement that simply denies that the United States will limit its strikes to military targets.

The aggressive imperialist forces, first of all the U.S. militarists, do not intend to employ their nuclear weapons only against military targets, against the armed forces. They are planning to use these weapons above all against the targets in the deep rear, against cities, against the peaceful population, against the economy, and also naturally against the means of combat, the armed forces [p. 365, second edition].

A surprise attack is still said to be a part of the U.S. strategy. It would seek to "paralyze" the enemy and thus "determine his fate in the course of the first days of the war" (p. 88, second edition; p. 78, first edition; p. 160, P.H.). The second edition also repeats the statement that "surprise can and must be achieved in carrying

out a pre-emptive attack" (p. 90, second edition; p. 80, first edition; p. 162, P.H.). A new statement, however, suggests that the United States is becoming less confident of carrying out a surprise attack.

U.S. military experts believe that in the future the possibility of achieving strategic surprise will constantly decline. This is due to the fact that modern means of detection and warning allow the detection of the launching of ballistic missiles, especially strategic missiles, and the signaling of such launchings to the appropriate command centers.

The amount of [warning] time that such warning means can provide is not great, but even in that time it will be possible to bring to full combat readiness the antiaircraft and antimissile defenses, and the strategic weapon, to launch the main mass of the planes and even -- to launch retaliatory missile salvos in answer to the imperialist aggression [p. 91, second edition].

Here again, it should be noted that a similar argument is made by Larionov in his article in International Affairs. He writes:

Even such speedy weapons as missiles, which can be used at any time of day or night, in any weather, will be detected during the first stage of their flight by ever alert long-range radars or other instruments....

If the aggressor is to achieve at least a measure of relative surprise -- an advantage of a few minutes -- he would have to use for the first salvo only a small but the more rapid acting portion of his means of attack.

Larionov argues that a retaliatory strike can be launched within minutes, i.e., before the enemy's missiles strike their targets. However, Larionov stoutly denies any Soviet intention to pre-empt. Furthermore, he claims, because the enemy can use only missiles in the first strike, because bombers are too slow and would give warning, sufficient forces would survive to launch a devastating retaliatory attack.

Military Strategy credits the U.S. leadership, however with planning all types of wars, both general and limited, in accordance with the "flexible response" strategy of the present administration. Thus, the second edition repeats the statement that:

The U.S. military program outlined by President Kennedy in his messages and speeches provides for the organization and preparation of the armed forces for general nuclear war as well as for limited wars [p. 83, second edition; p. 77, first edition; p. 159, P.H.].

IX. LIMITED WAR

The second edition of Military Strategy, though it contains a more detailed and extensive treatment of limited war than the first edition, displays a considerable degree of inconsistency and fails to eliminate the ambiguities inherent in the first edition. It is evident that the authors were forced to treat the subject from different and often conflicting points of view. They had to take into account not only the purely technical and military aspects of the problem but also the political, i.e., the need to deter the United States, to keep in line with the Sino-Soviet dialogue and to reaffirm Soviet commitments for the support of national-liberation and revolutionary civil wars. The result is much uncertainty about the escalation of local wars.

As in the earlier version considerable stress is laid on the alleged functions of limited war in U.S. planning and strategy. The second edition reiterates the view that the U.S. limited-war doctrine serves to divert nuclear strikes from American territory, to suppress national-liberation movements, to preserve colonial rule, and to stimulate its economy so as to provide greater profits for the monopolists. To this is now added a new statement:

In addition, the imperialist military theoreticians consider that the theory of limited, local wars makes it possible to persuade the American people and the peoples in allied countries that the war "is not so terrible" even when nuclear weapons are employed, that the war can be allegedly "softened," "normalized."

In the opinion of American military theoreticians the value of the limited-war doctrine, or of wars with limited objectives, consists in presumably excluding the use of strategic nuclear weapons, while at the same time preserving the full possibility of carrying out aggressive plans in Europe, Asia, and Africa [p. 61, second edition].

The new edition also repeats the previous assertion that the imperialists place great value on limited wars as a means of launching a general war against the socialist countries. In this connection, the first edition of Military Strategy had been criticized by some Soviet reviewers for its treatment of the American "flexible strategy," which was said to envisage the waging of limited wars with conventional weapons. The Soviet critics made the point that

...it should have been made more clear that this strategic concept too is but a screen for the aggressive designs of the imperialists, behind which are hidden the real plans of the aggressors for the preparation and initiation of a nuclear world war [Military Herald, No. 1, 1962, p. 122].

The question of U.S. limited war doctrine is further discussed in a new five-page passage. It is noted there that:

As an alternative to general nuclear war the imperialist aggressors have advanced the concept of limited wars both with and without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Limited wars are defined as armed conflicts in which the belligerents deliberately limit the political aims of the war, the use of forces and weapons, the size of the area of military operation, the number of

belligerents in the war, etc. Limited wars include all types of wars in which conventional as well as tactical nuclear weapons are used, and also local wars [sic][p. 93, second edition].

What the distinction is between limited (ogranichennaiia) war and local (lokal'naia) war is not clear. It is possible that the term is used here to mean civil wars.

The U.S. doctrine is said to hold that strategic weapons are not used in limited wars to attack targets in the United States or the Soviet Union and that such wars are not pushed to the extreme, but that the participants seek to reach a compromise before the conflict goes too far (p. 93, second edition). A similar statement, repeating one in the first edition, is made on p. 373 of the second edition (p. 335, first edition; p. 405, P.H.).

A fairly objective discussion of the character of limited wars appears elsewhere in a new passage:

In such a war the military operation will first of all be waged in land and sea theaters [in contrast with general wars, which will be waged primarily with strategic weapons]. The objectives of the operations will be the [defeat of] armed forces, although the possibility of attempts to strike rear targets by means of planes is not excluded.

Offensive and defensive [operations] in the ground theaters will involve both ground forces and planes. Combat operations will be maneuverable, more mobile than in the past war because the ground forces as well as the air forces have fundamentally changed since then.

It may also happen that the belligerents, in the course of the local war [sic], will

make use of tactical nuclear weapons. This would radically change the ways of conducting military operations and would make them very dynamic and decisive. However, it is doubtful that the war would be waged for any length of time with the use of only tactical nuclear means. When nuclear weapons are used, the belligerents will be forced to employ their entire nuclear might. The local war will become a global nuclear war [pp. 374-375, second edition].

The second edition also repeats the earlier statement that:

Strategic offense and strategic defense as forms of strategic operations may retain their significance in certain types of local wars where military operations are conducted by conventional weapons. The probability of such wars cannot be completely excluded at the present time [p. 22, second edition; p. 18, first edition; p. 95, P.H.].

Although the above passages seem to imply that the Soviets recognize the possibility of fighting limited wars, at least with conventional weapons, the discussion elsewhere in the book tends to contradict this. Thus it is noted in a new statement that:

The representatives of bourgeois military science are forced to admit that the concept of limited war contains many contradictions [p. 94, second edition].

The authors attempt to prove this on the basis of a discussion of the limiting factors in such wars. Thus, in considering the question of political objectives in such wars, which must be sufficiently limited so as not to

provide a justification for an expansion of the conflict, they state:

In the opinion of [Western] military theoreticians, such "modest" objectives for the United States include: assuring its political and strategic rule in certain parts of the world or the weakening in some area of the position of the "communist countries"; the restoration of the capitalist system in some country or another that has taken the path to socialism; the suppression of democratic demonstrations in the capitalist states and of national-liberation movements in the colonial and dependent countries [p. 94, second edition].

"In limited wars," the authors continue, "the war aims of the United States and its allies will not be circumscribed by the borders or the political conditions that existed before the start of the war" (p. 94, second edition).

Thus, the views of the bourgeois ideologists on "modest" objectives are senseless, since they do not include the limitation of the political and military aims of imperialism [p. 94, second edition].

Similarly the authors take issue with the possibility of limiting the geographical area of the war. Such a limitation is said to be especially operative in the case of "...economically underdeveloped regions and countries located on islands or peninsulas" (p. 95, second edition). Although American proponents of this theory are said to believe that such limitations are easy to implement and observe, the Soviet authors claim that:

The partisans of limited war are forced to admit the fact that the existence at

the present time of military-political blocs of states, into which the American imperialist circles as is known have drawn the majority of the countries of the capitalist world, complicate to a considerable degree the possibility of limiting an armed conflict to a definite territory [p. 95, second edition].

This repeats in effect the old Soviet argument that the existence of alliances precludes the limitation of conflicts because there is likely to be a growing number of participants in such conflicts which will lead to its geographic expansion.

On limiting the use of weapons, both the conventional and the tactical nuclear kind, in accordance with "strictly defined military targets" and avoiding the destruction of large cities and strategic targets, it is said that "the illusory aspect of such a view does not require explanation" (p. 95, second edition). It is allegedly too difficult to distinguish between tactical and strategic targets, and it would be difficult for the belligerents to agree on such distinction (p. 95, second edition).

Finally, the authors reject the possibility of limiting nuclear weapons to tactical uses.

The American military theoreticians recognize, and in this they seem to be right, that the most acute problem of limiting war occurs when tactical nuclear weapons are put to use....

First of all the role and effects of tactical nuclear weapons have been insufficiently studied and are based primarily on assumptions. It is not possible to foresee the political, military and psychological consequences of the use of such weapons. The opposing

side, in response to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, may carry out nuclear strikes on the same or on a considerably greater scale. The possibility of miscalculation cannot be excluded, whose consequence will be the unleashing of a general nuclear war with catastrophic results [pp. 94-95, second edition].

Furthermore, the authors argue, it is unlikely that the belligerents will agree on the classification of nuclear weapons according to yield. It is also difficult to foresee what means of delivery may be used in limited wars and whether they could be located outside the zone of the limited conflict (p. 95, second edition).

From this the authors draw the usual Soviet conclusion that there is great danger of limited wars escalating into general war, "especially if tactical nuclear weapons are used in it" (p. 96, second edition. See also p. 374, second edition, for another similar statement).

Although the authors do not specifically rule out the possibility of a limited war in Europe, their discussion of the factors that may prevent the escalation of such a war suggests that in fact they do not believe in such a possibility. Presumably the war aims of the belligerents in a European limited war could not remain sufficiently "modest" since the conflict would have important political and military consequences for all participants. Furthermore, the alliance systems in Europe would preclude the geographic limitation of the conflict, while the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides would increase the probability of their use. The discussion avoids the question of the feasibility of fighting a purely conventional war.

The authors warn however that the United States would resort to nuclear weapons if it fails to achieve its aims by conventional means.

It is noteworthy that the Red Star article of 2 November 1963 disagreed with the American commentators on the question of escalation. The article asserted that the commentators had distorted the authors' views by claiming that the Soviets believed that all limited wars would automatically expand into general wars. In reality, it was said, the Soviet authors had only warned of the "possibility" of such an expansion. The article pointed out that the expansion of limited war was not "inevitable" and cited as proof the occurrence of some 70 limited conflicts since World War II. Thus the article said:

It is emphasized in the book [Military Strategy] that not any war expands into a nuclear war but only those into which the nuclear powers are drawn.

In this respect the second edition repeats the original statement that :

One must emphasize that the present international system and the present state of military technology will cause any armed conflict to develop, inevitably, into a general war if the nuclear powers are drawn into it [p. 242, second edition; p. 222, first edition; p. 299, P.H.].

This passage was also quoted in the Red Star article, but with the significant omission of the word "inevitably."

The new text also repeats the warning which followed this paragraph in the first edition that:

The logic of war is such that if American aggressive circles initiate a war, it will be transferred immediately to the territory of the United States of America. All weapons -- intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and other strategic weapons -- will be used in this military conflict.

Countries on whose territory NATO and American military bases are located and countries which build these bases for aggressive purposes would suffer crushing blows in such a war. A nuclear war would, in an instant, spread over the entire globe [p. 242, second edition; p. 222, first edition; p. 299, P.H.].

The second edition of Military Strategy also cites other reasons for the expansion of limited war. Thus it repeats the first edition to the effect that a general war may come about as a result of a "limited war against one of the nonsocialist countries, if this war affects the vital interests of the socialist states and creates a threat to world peace" (p. 232, second edition; p. 213, first edition; pp. 286-287, P.H.). It says again also that the United States will resort to nuclear weapons if it fails to achieve its objectives:

However, if the troops cannot achieve the assigned aims with conventional weapons, the use of nuclear weapons becomes possible [p. 82, second edition; p. 77, first edition; p. 158, P.H.].

The second edition also retains the statement that West Germany may attack East Germany, using at first only

conventional weapons, as a prelude to a general nuclear war (p. 362, second edition; p. 325, first edition; p. 396, P.H.). The same passage also repeats the warning that:

Under modern conditions, any local military conflict, if not nipped in the bud, can grow into a world war with unlimited use of nuclear weapons [p. 362, second edition; p. 325, first edition; p. 396, P.H.].

Furthermore, the United States is once more accused of planning to resort to nuclear weapons "in the course of expanding local conflicts, particularly at critical moments, in order to alter the situation sharply in its favor" (p. 362, second edition; pp. 325-326, first edition; p. 396, P.H.). Finally a new statement asserts that:

The imperialists by no means intend to wage war against the socialist states with ground forces. They are relying on nuclear weapons, principally on strategic ones [p. 368, second edition].

Despite the usual predictions that limited wars are likely to expand and the denunciation of alleged U.S. plans to use such wars as a prelude to a general war, there are suggestions that the Soviets themselves are interested in having a capability for fighting limited wars. In line with the current Soviet official policy, a new passage in the book promises Soviet support to national-liberation movements, which are still said to be unavoidable as long as imperialism survives in the world. Such assistance is said to be "not only ideological and political but also material" (p. 229, second edition).

The second edition repeats the statement that "the Soviet state, and all the socialist countries and their armed forces, must prepare above all for a world-wide war against a militarily and economically powerful imperial coalition" and that "...the armed forces of the socialist countries must be ready for small-scale local wars that the imperialists may ignite" since such wars are "waged with different instruments and by other methods than world wars" (p. 234, second edition; p. 214, first edition; p. 288, P.H.).

Socialist military strategy must study the methods of waging such wars too, in order to prevent their expansion into a world war, and in order to achieve a rapid victory over the enemy [p. 234, second edition; pp. 214-215, first edition; p. 288, P.H.].

A change in the second edition of Military Strategy suggests, however, that the authors may not be thinking in terms of a limited war initiated by the West against a communist state. Speaking of the imperialists' intention to resort to limited wars, it was said in the first edition that "such a war might be foisted upon the socialist countries" (p. 281, first edition; p. 356, P.H.). This statement is omitted in the second edition. Instead, the authors have substituted the claims that the imperialists "intend to wage local wars in various regions of the world" (p. 319, second edition). However, the second edition retains the original conclusions that "therefore Soviet military strategy should study methods of conducting both world and local wars" (p. 319, second edition; p. 281, first edition; p. 356, P.H.).

X. THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEBATE

The second edition of Military Strategy indicates that the Soviet debate on strategy has not been resolved. The article in Red Star of 2 November 1963 had taken the American editors of the first edition of Military Strategy to task for writing that there was an ongoing debate among "radicals" and "conservatives" in the Soviet military over strategy, force composition, weapons employment, budget allocations, and so on (see Soviet Military Strategy, Prentice-Hall, pp. 20-24, 27-41). While denying any controversy over fundamental issues, the article does make admissions:

Another matter are theoretical discussions, which are mentioned in the Introduction to our book. They existed in the past, they exist at present, and they will exist in the future. Without them it is impossible to develop any science, including also military science. But a discussion does not mean a struggle, an opposition, but a natural process of development of military theory.

The authors of Military Strategy indicate, however, that the issues of the discussion are far more fundamental than was suggested by the Red Star article. Both Soviet editions of the book point out the crucial importance of choosing a correct strategy:

In determining how to wage modern war, it is not enough to clarify the main objectives of armed combat. It is essential to establish what kind of military operations or what

form of strategic operations must be employed to attain the aims of the war, and what specific form these operations should take.

The types of strategic (or military) operations, the particular form they take in the course of the war, and the way in which they are combined and concerted, [determine] the methods by which the war is waged. It can be said without exaggeration that working out modern methods of effective warfare depends primarily upon the correct selection of the types of strategic operations [p. 367, second edition; p. 329, first edition; p. 400, P.H.].

But the authors concede in the second edition that these questions are still being debated:

These questions are subject to polemics. Essentially, the argument is over the basic methods of conducting a future war, whether this is to be a ground war employing nuclear weapons in support of the ground forces, or a fundamentally new kind of war in which the chief means of carrying out strategic tasks will be missile-nuclear weapons [p. 367, second edition].

The issue at stake is not whether nuclear weapons will be decisive in a future war -- which is conceded by all Soviet military writers -- but what the role of the ground forces will be and how nuclear weapons will be used in their support. One of the Soviet reviewers of the book, General of the Army P. Kurochkin, for example, had criticized the authors for stressing the importance of strategic missile forces while neglecting the role

of the ground forces:

...having justifiably concentrated their main attention on the strategic missile forces, [the authors] have not given sufficient weight to, and have not analyzed deeply enough, the role and methods of operations of other types of armed forces, particularly of ground forces [Red Star, 22 September 1962; cf. p. 527, P.H.].

As in the first edition, the authors take issue with the "traditionalistic" or "conservative" view. They again describe the conservative concept of strategic operations which they believe has changed little since World War II:

Has the situation now changed? Can we assume that modern warfare will also be reduced to two types of strategic operations, strategic offense and defense in military theaters?

Some authors believe that the [old] situation remains essentially unchanged and that strategic offense and defense, as before, should be considered the basic types of strategic operations.... The consequent practical recommendations [of this school of thought] are that the Strategic Missile Forces should deliver nuclear strikes deep within enemy territory in places where the Ground Forces are planning to operate, and should conduct so-called joint missile operations so as to pave the way for the front [army groups], as it were, with powerful nuclear strikes [p. 368, second edition; p. 330, first edition; p. 401, P.H.].

The second edition, however, omits the earlier attribution of these views to the authors of a book, On Military

Science, which was published in 1960 (p. 330, first edition; p. 401, P.H.).

The authors of Military Strategy clearly condemn these views. Not only does the second edition reassert that this concept

...of how to wage modern war is incorrect. It is the result of over-valuing the experience of the last war and mechanically applying it to modern conditions [p. 368, second edition; p. 330, first edition; p. 401, P.H.],

but continues in a new paragraph to elaborate on its reasons for disagreement:

The incorrectness of this point of view is that it plays down the role of the strategic missile-nuclear potential and relies on the ground forces as the traditional way of waging war [p. 368, second edition].

The West, the authors argue, has no intention of waging a war against the Socialist bloc with ground forces but plans chiefly on using strategic missiles. In support of this argument they quote from B. Brodie's Strategy in the Missile Age.

It is noteworthy that in a recent publication Marshal Malinowski also condemned the "conservatives" among the Soviet military:

The task of propagandizing the most advanced views and conclusions on Soviet military doctrine is very important because a certain portion of the military still has an old and obsolete view of

the character of modern combat....⁴

The second edition of Military Strategy continues to stress strategic missiles as the main weapons to be employed in a future war and those that will determine its course and outcome:

One of the important tenets in Soviet military doctrine is that a world war, if the imperialists initiate it, will inevitably assume the character of a nuclear war with missiles, i.e., a war in which the nuclear weapons will be the chief instrument of destruction, and missiles the basic vehicle for their delivery to target [p. 242, second edition; p. 222, first edition; p. 299, P.H.].

Consequently, the main targets of military operations will be deep within enemy territory and behind the front lines. The focal points of the war will be deep within the belligerent countries, although fierce, large-scale combat will also be waged in military theaters near the front lines and borders [p. 366, second edition; p. 324, first edition; p. 400, P.H.].

The primary role of strategic strikes is stressed even further in the new edition:

Thus, strategy, which in the past relied on the success of tactics and the

⁴ Marshal R. Malinovskii, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Task of the Military Press," Kommunist voernzhennykh sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No. 21, November 1963, p. 9.

operational art, now has the possibility of independently achieving the war aims irrespective of the outcome of battles and operations in the various spheres of armed combat [p. 1, second edition].

The authors therefore repeat their conclusion:

The Strategic Missile Forces need not plan their attacks in relation to the activity of the Ground Forces. The Missile Forces are not a means of support for the Ground Forces; the Ground Forces have their own nuclear weapons (operational and tactical missile forces, and front-line aircraft) to secure their rapid advance [p. 369, second edition; p. 331, first edition; p. 402, P.H.].

The second edition also repeats Colonel General Gastilovich's controversial argument that a country's war preparations are influenced by

...the availability of missiles and nuclear weapons of megaton yields, which reduce outlays on military preparations in peacetime since they permit the possibility of considerable cutbacks in production of all other types of armaments without lowering the firepower of the armed forces [pp. 408-409, second edition; p. 363, first edition; pp. 431-432, P.H.].

While stressing the supremacy of strategic missile-nuclear weapons and their employment independent of the requirements of other armed forces, the authors show some degree of flexibility in the second edition concerning the choices of strategic operations and the organization

and development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Thus, for example, they note the need to take into account the enemy's weapon developments:

An essential condition for properly solving the problem of organizing the armed forces is to take into account the potential enemy's combat capabilities, the trends in the development of his armed forces, and the character of the war he is preparing [p. 262, second edition].

The possibility of relying on any one single form of strategic operations is denied in the second edition:

War is always a rather complex and many-sided phenomenon. In working out the forms and methods of conducting a future war one must take into consideration a number of questions: how the war will be initiated; what its character will be; who the main enemy is; whether nuclear weapons will be used at the very beginning of the war or only in the course of the war; what types of nuclear weapons [will be used] -- strategic or only tactical; in what region or in what theater [of operations] the main events will develop; etc. By taking into account these factors it is possible to solve concretely the question of the forms and methods of waging war. One form of strategic operation may occur in a global nuclear war resulting from an enemy surprise attack; another form may occur in a global nuclear war arising as a result of the escalation of a local war; and a completely different form of operation will take place in a local war [p. 378, second edition].

Though recognizing the difference in the ways and means of waging global and local wars, the second edition does not make clear the distinction between a global war that begins with a surprise attack and one that escalates from a limited war.

XI. SUPERIORITY

The new edition, like the old, stresses the importance of military superiority. Not only are the key statements retained in the new text, but there are also some additional ones in the same general vein. The previous ambiguity in the matter of qualitative vs. quantitative superiority continues to be in evidence, although there appears to be a somewhat greater stress on quality and superiority in techniques of weapons employment.

The introduction contains a new statement consonant with the prevailing Soviet claim of superiority of peace forces over war forces:

Therefore in the struggle for the prevention of such a war [i.e., a thermonuclear war initiated by the imperialists] the Soviet Union cannot rely on the "goodwill" of the imperialists, but must reply first of all on the might of the socialist camp, on the constantly growing superiority of the forces of peace over the forces of reaction and war [p. 8, second edition].

Following this the book repeats the earlier claim that:

Having outstripped capitalism in a number of important branches of science and technology, socialism has put powerful material means for curbing imperialist aggression into the hands of peace-loving peoples [p. 8, second edition; p. 3, first edition; p. 81, P.H.].

The second edition also retains the statement that:

One of the most important problems in organizing and developing the armed forces today is to create and to maintain qualitative and quantitative superiority in missile troops over the enemy and to use them in a superior fashion [p. 303, second edition; p. 266, first edition; p. 340, P.H.].

To this statement there has been now added a new one in the same vein:

One of the basic questions is the problem of ensuring the qualitative and quantitative military technological superiority over the probable aggressor [p. 258, second edition].

The second edition retains a statement on the need to maintain across-the-board superiority and to counter enemy military developments:

In organizing and developing the armed forces, one must also take into account the directions in which the enemy is developing in order to find an appropriate countermeasure to each new enemy weapon. Here, the main thing is to maintain constant superiority over the enemy in the basic branches of the armed forces, weapons and ways of waging war. It is especially necessary to have constant superiority over the enemy in firepower, troop mobility, and maneuverability [p. 314, second edition; p. 277, first edition; p. 349, P.H.].

Concerning the actual state of the balance of power and the requirement for Soviet superiority, the text

contains some ambiguity. Thus the new edition repeats the claim that a state of relative parity exists between East and West and that the United States recognizes that there is "mutual deterrence" (p. 80, second edition; p. 74, first edition; p. 156, P.H.). However, the text restates the need for superiority, especially in nuclear weapons, and reasserts Soviet superiority in these weapons as well as in missiles. Thus it is again stressed:

The ability of the country's economy to mass produce military equipment, especially missiles, and to establish superiority over the enemy in modern weapons are the material prerequisites of victory [p. 261, second edition; p. 239, first edition; p. 314, P.H.].

The main task in organizing and developing armed forces, both in peace and war, is to be superior to the enemy in nuclear weapons and in the technique of their employment. It should be noted here that, at the present time, in gaining superiority in nuclear weapons, their quality and the technique for their employment are more important than their number [p. 297, second edition; p. 261, first edition; p. 335, P.H.].

Furthermore, the book repeats the claim that "...we consider our superiority in nuclear weapons over the Western bloc to be indisputable" (p. 239, second edition; p. 219, first edition; p. 297, P.H.).

To this is added a new claim of superiority in both nuclear weapons and missiles:

The Soviet Union has achieved superiority over the probable enemy in the decisive

means of armed combat: in missiles
and in the yield of nuclear warheads
[p. 317, second edition].

As for quantitative claims, the second edition has a few new statements. Thus it quotes Khrushchev's claim of December 1962 that the United States has about 40,000 nuclear weapons and that the Soviet Union also has "more than enough such weapons" (p. 244, second edition). There is also a new statement that because the West still plans aggression,

The socialist states are forced to maintain such armed forces that would be capable not only of repelling the aggressor in the event of such an attack, but also of completely defeating him [p. 274, second edition].

The second edition repeats the claim that the Soviet Union has the capability to destroy simultaneously both enemy military and civilian targets (p. 239, second edition; p. 219, first edition; p. 297, P.H.). In this respect, the second edition underscores the Soviet capability to carry out such attacks. In discussing the question whether the main strategic attack would be directed against both military and civilian targets or would be restricted to military targets the authors argued in the first edition that both kinds of targets could be attacked because

...there is a real possibility of achieving these aims simultaneously with the use of the military instruments at hand [p. 229, first edition; p. 305, P.H.].

In the second edition there has been added the words "for us," thus changing the sentence to read:

There is a real possibility for us of achieving these aims simultaneously with the use of the military instruments at hand [p. 250, second edition].

The most interesting and possibly significant change in the new edition is in the omission of an earlier statement dealing with the requirements for destroying the enemy's economic potential, which is labeled in both texts "a most important mission." The omitted statement read:

The key to the execution of this mission is the need for a large number of nuclear weapons to attain decisive results in destroying the enemy economy [p. 340, first edition; p. 409, P.H.].

It seems likely that this particular omission may be due to the increased Soviet stress on the effectiveness of very large-yield nuclear weapons, which are frequently mentioned in other Soviet publications. It suggests also the possibility that some of the more radical views on the number of weapons needed for dealing with U.S. civilian targets have prevailed.

XII. GENERAL WAR STRATEGY

No significant changes have been made in the second edition about the character of a general war, its aims, and the strategy it requires. This kind of war is still viewed as the decisive clash between two opposing social-political systems in which each side seeks the complete defeat of its opponent: the destruction of his military forces, the disruption of his economy, his administrative and military controls, and the occupation of his territory. Consequently, such a war continues to be pictured as unlimited in scope and violence and as one which will be waged primarily with nuclear-armed missiles.

Thus the second edition repeats the statement that

...massive employment of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the unlimited capabilities of missiles to deliver them to any target within minutes will make possible the most decisive military results at any distance, over an enormous area, and within an extremely brief period [p. 242, second edition; p. 222, first edition; p. 299, P.H.].

The belligerents are again expected to seek to annihilate their opponent or force him to surrender "in the shortest possible time" by means of the massive employment of nuclear weapons. Concerning the strategic objective of such attacks, the second edition asks and answers the questions as before:

The question arises: ...what is the main strategic goal of the war? Is it, as in the past, the defeat of the opponent's armed forces or is it the annihilation and devastation of targets deep within

a country in order to break up the organization of the country?

Soviet military strategy answers as follows: The attainment of both these goals must be simultaneous. The annihilation of the opponent's armed forces, the destruction of targets deep in his territory, and the disorganization of the country will be a single, continuous process of the war [pp. 249-250, second edition; p. 229, first edition; p. 305, P.H.].

The second edition repeats the earlier claim that the Soviet Union has sufficient missiles to attack the required number of targets:

The Soviet Union has strategic missiles in such quantity and of such quality that it can simultaneously destroy the required number of the aggressor's targets in the most distant regions of the globe and eliminate entire countries from the war by massive missile attacks [p. 241, second edition; p. 221, first edition; p. 298, P.H.].

The possibility of destroying or forcing the surrender of some countries by means of missile strikes alone is again largely made dependent on the size of such countries:

Any state, especially one with a small, densely populated area, can be eliminated from the war and even annihilated in a very short time without the invasion of its territory by ground troops [p. 366, second edition; pp. 328-329, first edition; p. 400, P.H.].

Although it makes no mention of the damage that the Soviet Union may expect in a general war, the second edition

continues to cite Western sources on probable damage and casualties in the United States and England (p. 243, second edition; p. 300, P.H.). Reference is also made to Khrushchev's assertion that "as a result of only the first strike 700-800 million persons may perish and all the large cities of many countries would be destroyed" (p. 244, second edition). As was noted above, however, the second edition no longer mentions the danger of "complete mutual annihilation" (p. 74, first edition; p. 156, P.H.).

Despite the stress on the decisive role of the Strategic Missile Forces, the second edition repeats the standing Soviet view that the attainment of victory can be achieved only by the combined use of all armies and forces:

Regardless of the future wartime role of such instruments of strategy as the Strategic Missile Forces, victory over the aggressor can be achieved only by the combined exertions of all the war-waging forces, namely: the Ground Forces, the National PVO, the Air Force, and the Navy, with the active participation of the people [p. 245, second edition; p. 225, first edition; p. 302, P.H.].

A surprise nuclear attack continues to be viewed as the most dangerous and likely form of initiating war.

Surprise attack, the second edition repeats,

...is the most probable way for the imperialist bloc to initiate such a war against the socialist states and is of the gravest danger [p. 234, second edition; p. 214, first edition; p. 288, P.H.].

The second edition adds to this a quotation from Marshal Malinovskii's pamphlet Vigilantly Stand Guard Over

the Peace: "War can now begin by surprise" "...without the traditional clearly evident period of threat [of war]" (p. 234, second edition).

Concerning the alleged Western plans for launching a surprise attack, the second edition refers to President Kennedy's statement of early 1962 in which, according to the Russians, he is said to have threatened to use nuclear weapons at the very start of a war (p. 240, second edition).

In view of the critical importance of a surprise attack and of the initial period of the war, the Soviet authors spoke in the first edition of a pre-emptive strategy, but without spelling it out in detail. In their article in Red Star of 2 November 1963, the authors denied that the Soviet Union had any sort of pre-emptive strategy:

The American "critics" are trying to prove that Military Strategy propagandizes preventive war and a pre-emptive blow. In particular, the assertion made by the editors of the Prentice-Hall edition, that Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskii's statement to the 22nd CPSU Congress on the preparedness of the Soviet armed forces to wreck a sudden attack by the imperialists was a call of a pre-emptive blow, can be called nothing but a crude lie. The text of this speech was published in full and the whole world read it.

The first edition had quoted Malinovskii, as saying that

...the initial period of the war and the methods of breaking up the opponent's aggressive plans by dealing him in good time a crushing blow will be of decisive

significance for the outcome of the entire war [Pravda, 25 October 1961, italics in text; pp. 238-239, first edition; pp. 313-314, P.H.].

This was followed by a sentence which said:

Hence, the main task of Soviet military strategy is working out means of reliably repelling a surprise nuclear attack by an aggressor [p. 239, first edition; p. 314, P.H.].

In the second edition the quotation from Malinovskii was changed slightly to read:

...the initial period of the war will be of decisive significance for the outcome of the entire war. Hence, the main problem is considered to be the working out of means for reliably repelling a nuclear surprise attack, and the methods of breaking up the aggressive plans of the enemy by dealing him a crushing blow in time [speech by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ia. Malinovskii at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU; p. 260, second edition].

Although a pre-emptive strategy is not specifically mentioned, a new statement in the second edition strongly suggests that it is still very much a part of Soviet doctrine:

One must assume that our retaliatory nuclear blow will considerably weaken the enemy's means of nuclear attack. But one cannot exclude the possibility that a certain number of enemy planes and missiles will nevertheless be launched to strike our targets [p. 394, second edition].

This statement appears to imply that the Soviet "retaliatory blow" will strike even before the enemy can launch his strategic weapons. In the article he wrote with Glagolev for International Affairs, Colonel Larionov also indicated that Soviet missiles and bombers would be launched before the enemy's weapons could impact on Soviet territory.

It should be noted, however, that in addition to denying the feasibility of a successful American surprise attack against the Soviet Union, the authors now appear to be less certain that the United States would resort to such an attack. In particular, they point out that American military experts believe that the possibility of achieving strategic surprise will increasingly decline in the future.

The second edition nevertheless continues to call for a high state of readiness, especially by the Soviet Missile and Air Defense Forces, in order to prevent a successful enemy surprise attack and to assure the launching of a powerful retaliatory attack.

Although the occupation of the enemy's territory remains an essential factor in assuring a complete victory, the new edition omits the earlier requirement that such occupation "...include also the regions where his [the enemy's] strategic weapons are reliably protected" (p. 263, first edition; p. 337, P.H.). Apparently the authors regard this implied demand for the occupation of the United States as unrealistic.

As for the duration of a general war, the second edition continues to reflect earlier ambiguous and conflicting views. While stressing that modern weapons, especially when used by surprise, can achieve the war aims in the

shortest time, the authors also recognize the possibility of a protracted war and insist that the Soviet armed forces and the defense industry be prepared to wage it. Thus it was said in the first edition that "it is necessary to make serious preparations for a protracted war" (p. 239, first edition; p. 314, P.H.). In the second edition this statement is amended to read:

However, a war may become protracted, which would require lengthy and prolonged efforts by the army and the people. This is why one must be ready also for a protracted war, and prepare for such an eventuality manpower and material resources [p. 261, second edition].

This statement reiterates essentially an argument advanced by Marshal Malinovskii in his pamphlet Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace, which was also republished in Red Star on 11 January 1963. It is less emphatic, however, than the statements made on this question in the 1962 edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, and in Colonel P. I. Trifonenkov's book On the Fundamental Laws on the Course and Outcome of War (Moscow 1962), which argued that a general war would most likely be protracted and that it would not end with the initial nuclear exchange.⁵

Nevertheless, the Soviet authors repeat their earlier conclusion that the "most important factor in determining the duration of the war...will be the effectiveness of the

⁵For a discussion of Soviet views on protracted war, see Leon Gouré, The Role of Civil Defense in Soviet Strategy, The RAND Corporation, RM-3703-PR, June 1963.

efforts made at its very beginning" (p. 500, second edition; pp. 453-454, first edition; p. 516, P.H.).

A new statement in the second edition points out that the strategic exchange may be of short duration but have unpredictable results:

At the same time the strategic operation will be rapid and of short duration. Its results are difficult even to imagine at the present time [p. 378, second edition].

Elsewhere the second edition notes for the first time that although military morale is the product of the sum of ideological and political "stimuli,"

...one must not however fail to take into consideration the possibility of a profound moral shock, which may be experienced by a person immediately after the first destructive and devastating nuclear strikes [p. 47, second edition].

At the same time it argues that industrial production in the course of the war will be meaningful even under nuclear war conditions:

There is no doubt that the advanced [pre-war] economic preparation of the country for a future war has become at the present time of exceptionally great importance. At the same time, even in the course of the war, be it even a short one, the role of the economy will not only remain but will increase [p. 276, second edition].

The new edition again speaks of the need for the economy to supply all the necessary weapons and equipment "if the war becomes drawn out over a protracted period. To this end it must be prepared in peacetime" (p. 277, second

edition; pp. 250-251, first edition; p. 326, P.H.). A new paragraph, however, in the second edition, dealing with the general aspects of Soviet strategy, notes that

...the general victory in a war is not the crowning, the sum of partial victories, but the result of the immediate application of all the might of the state, stock-piled before the war [p. 21, second edition].

It should be observed that the Soviet reviewers of Military Strategy approved the treatment of the question of the duration of the war by the authors of the book. The Military Herald of January 1963, for example, noted the necessity "to prepare for a prolonged and intense struggle" and declared that "consequently, our military cadres should never expect an easy victory."

Several reviewers, however, criticized the book for its treatment of the question of "strategic maneuver" in a general war. The first edition had pointed out that strategic maneuvers, carried out in past wars by shifting large military forces from one area of operations to another, would not be possible in a nuclear war because of the "great vulnerability of communications and insufficient time for such reconcentration."

Consequently, strategic maneuver in missile and nuclear warfare can be described as the shifting of the [main] effort from one strategic direction or target to another, mainly by the fire-maneuver of nuclear weapons. Maneuver in the former sense may be undertaken by the ground forces, air forces, and navy primarily on an operational scale, within theaters of military operations [p. 19, first edition; p. 96, P.H.].

The critics, who included General of the Army Kurochkin, author of a review in Red Star, and the reviewers in the Military Herald, all represent essentially a "conservative" viewpoint. Since they tend to assign great significance to ground operations, they were sensitive to the implication that it would be impossible in a nuclear war to transfer large forces from the interior of the country to the front or from one theater to another, and that consequently the theater forces might have to fight with the forces on hand at the outbreak of the war. Both reviews insisted that it would be necessary to regroup forces immediately before or after the initiation of war, that the strategic reserves and materiel would have to be moved to the front as well as large mobilized forces to replace losses in the theater forces.

The authors of Military Strategy have refused to be swayed by these criticisms. They have retained the above statement, except for omitting the words "...primarily on an operational scale..." (p. 23, second edition), possibly because their restricting the use of maneuvers to theaters of operation made the original statement redundant. Even though the "conservatives" in the Soviet military appear to have lost the argument in this particular instance, the second edition retains some earlier ambiguities and even inconsistencies in the treatment of this question. For example, while in the above passage the authors assert that railroads would be too vulnerable to be used in strategic maneuvers, the second edition has also retained another statement according to which:

The role of railways in supplying the Armed Forces will remain very great even with the increase in truck transport, since the delivery of freight from the interior of the country to the military theaters will primarily have to be carried out by rail [p. 434, second edition; p. 388, first edition; p. 455, P.H.].

Although this inconsistency was specifically pointed out by the review in Military Herald of January 1963, the authors were apparently unable to agree completely on this question. Colonel General Gastilovich, the author of the above statement, acknowledges that the railways would suffer heavy damage from nuclear strikes, but he presumably continues to believe that with advanced preparations it would be possible to restore the railways and keep them in operation.

Although the second edition continues to stress the class nature of a future war, which is described as a clash between opposing world systems fought in the interest of the ruling classes in these systems, it also has retained the previous non-Marxist statement about the possibility of non-socialist states joining the Communist bloc in the course of the war.

It is possible that a future war would find some non-socialist states siding with the socialist camp, especially after the war had begun. It is possible to create a coalition of states with different social-political structures, as shown by the history of World War II when the Soviet Union and a number of capitalist countries joined in an antifascist coalition [p. 233, second edition; p. 213, first edition; p. 287, P.H.].

Despite its somewhat dubious ideological orthodoxy, this statement escaped criticism, possibly because of its optimistic character.

XIII. THEATER OPERATIONS

Theater operations continue to be viewed as an essential feature of a global war. Their mission is to complete the destruction of the surviving enemy forces and weapons and to ensure final victory by the occupation of his territory. Nuclear weapons are still said to provide the main fire power of the ground forces, conventional weapons being used in a supplementary role or when the two forces are too close to permit the use of nuclear weapons (p. 246, second edition; p. 225, first edition; pp. 302-303, P.H.). It is also pointed out that the Soviet forces must have superior fire power to win.

The second edition of Military Strategy lays somewhat greater emphasis on the use of strategic nuclear weapons in the theater than did the original text. Thus there are more references to strategic missiles in the list of weapons that might be employed (see pp. 250, 340, 369, 372, 377, 378, second edition). These weapons would not be used, however, in direct support of the ground forces, but their strikes against targets deep in enemy territory is expected to create "favorable conditions" for their successful operations.

Another novel feature is the reference to the employment of missile-carrying submarines in theater operations (see p. 369, second edition, for example).

The second edition, for the first time, also mentions naval landings in conjunction with theater operations.

Naval organization must also face the task of assuring coordinated operations with the ground forces, and, first of all, assuring amphibious landings [p. 313, second edition].

This suggests that criticism of the book in Soviet naval publications has borne fruit.

At the same time there is a new warning of possible enemy landings on Soviet territory in the course of a war (p. 400, second edition).

Of special interest is a new treatment of how ground force operations are to be timed in a general war. The second edition indicates that such operations would probably not occur simultaneously with the initial nuclear strikes but would follow them. Furthermore it is said that nuclear strikes are most likely to be first followed by airborne operations rather than by a ground advance.

In the ground theater offensive operations will be carried out along fronts for achieving strategic tasks. These operations will follow the strategic nuclear strikes that will play the decisive role in the defeat of the enemy [p. 372, second edition].

Following retaliatory nuclear strikes airborne landings may be launched and, depending on the radiological conditions, the surviving formations of the ground forces will initiate a rapid advance, with the support of the airforce, to complete the destruction of the surviving enemy forces [p. 374, second edition].

Simultaneously with such blows [strategic strikes] or, what is more likely, following them, there will take place in the theater offensive operations by fronts, airborne operations, and in some areas also naval operations and [operations] by front line PVO troops, in order to complete the defeat of the surviving formations of the enemy's forces [p. 377, second edition].

In this connection, there appears also to be a somewhat greater emphasis in the second edition on the value and role of airborne operations in a future war. It is now said that the role of the airborne forces will be "considerably" increased (p. 307, second edition). The purpose of these forces, it is repeated, will be to seize enemy nuclear weapons, airfields and naval bases deep in the enemy's territory (p. 307, second edition; pp. 270-271, first edition; p. 344, P.H.). In discussing these operations the second edition adds the word "landings" to the earlier discussion of parachute "drops" (p. 307, second edition; pp. 270-271, first edition; p. 344, P.H.), thus suggesting that the Soviets have improved their airborne capability and have accordingly upgraded the scale of these operations.

The second edition still retains the following statement:

Airborne troops will be parachuted immediately after the nuclear strikes and tank formations will begin a swift offensive...[p. 385, second edition; p. 344, first edition; p. 412, P.H.].

There is also a new reference to "air armies," which, along with combined arms and armored armies, will participate in the offensive operations in the theater (p. 384, second edition).

Although nuclear weapons still provide the main fire power of the ground forces, some claims for these weapons are omitted in the second edition. The first edition said that tactical missiles would, "in a number of instances completely replace the rifled artillery and front line bomber aviation" (p. 268, first edition; p. 341, P.H.).

The new version omits this possibly because some reviewer (see Military Herald, January 1963) had pointed out that planes and artillery would still be needed to destroy small or mobile targets and to attack targets of opportunity.

One novel feature in the second edition is a reference to the importance of using captured enemy supplies during the advance:

The importance of using local resources during the advance into enemy territory must be especially emphasized, and the rear services must be prepared to this end [p. 422, second edition].

Concerning possible defensive operations, the second edition contains an interesting change. Whereas the first edition spoke of using nuclear weapons to interdict the enemy's advance by creating zones of destruction and radioactivity (p. 268, first edition; p. 341, P.H.), the second edition speaks instead of striking the enemy's forces with nuclear weapons (p. 304, second edition).

The second edition repeats the earlier claim that the Soviet Union has nuclear weapons with a yield of a "few tons" (p. 239, second edition; p. 219, first edition; p. 296, P.H.). In this connection, a recent article in Red Star mentions U.S. tests of nuclear weapons with a yield equivalent to less than 100 tons, but the article fails to claim lower yields for the Soviet Union, even though it stresses the great value of low-yield nuclear weapons for tactical employment.⁶

⁶Major General I. Anureev, "Physics and New Weapons," Red Star, 21 November 1963.

XIV. THE SIZE OF THE GROUND FORCES

The second edition continues to emphasize that nuclear war demands mass armies of millions of men. A new statement develops the arguments for such a force:

The necessity for a mass army is due to the fact that the great losses which will occur all at once as a result of nuclear strikes will require considerable reserves to provide replacements for the troops and to restore their combat capability. Furthermore, the spatial expansion of the war and the creation, as a result of nuclear strikes, of enormous zones of destruction and radioactive contamination will require large numbers of troops to guard and defend the borders, communications facilities and installations at the rear, and to overcome the effects of enemy nuclear strikes. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the future war will be waged with multi-million armed forces [p. 300, second edition].

The relative sizes of what may be called interior security forces, i.e., security, logistic and civil defense troops, and of the combat troops at the front are not spelled out. Presumably a very large proportion of the mass army will be devoted to security duty in the interior. A new paragraph notes that the number of personnel in combat units is declining:

A characteristic trait of the organization of ground forces at the present time in all the advanced countries is the attempt to increase the maneuverability and mobility of units and formations with a simultaneous increase in their striking and fire power. This is achieved by reducing the number of their personnel,

by fully motorizing and mechanizing them, and by incorporating in their armament tactical nuclear weapons with sufficient range and great mobility [p. 308, second edition].

However, after having stated the need for large ground forces, the second edition repeats the previous statements concerning the impossibility of any country maintaining sufficiently large forces in peacetime to satisfy wartime needs (see pp. 300, 410, second edition; pp. 264, 365, first edition; pp. 338, 433, P.H.), and then adds another statement in the same vein:

An integral and very important element of the organization of the armed forces is their preparation for mobilization deployment in the event of a war. No state, no matter how economically powerful, is capable of maintaining in peacetime such large armed forces as would be needed to achieve the war aims. They are always maintained in the smallest possible size sufficient to assure the security of the state at the start of a war and the preparation of trained reserves. At the present time, it is true, in view of the threat of surprise attack with nuclear weapons by the aggressive imperialist states, and the maintenance by them of multi-million regular armies, the Soviet Union along with the other socialist states is also forced to deploy large armed forces, a part of which is maintained in constant combat readiness. But, regardless of this these forces will be insufficient for conducting the war. Their expansion will occur as a result of new formations, which will be deployed in accordance with the mobilization plan [p. 291, second edition].

The questions of what size force to maintain in peacetime and of the feasibility, effectiveness and character of mobilizing the armed forces remain unresolved in the second edition. The new text repeats the statement that under nuclear war conditions "...one can hardly count on a more or less extended period, as in previous wars, to mobilize fully and to deploy one's armed forces" (p. 300, second edition; p. 264, first edition; p. 338, P.H.). And peacetime forces can be expected to achieve only some of the strategic objectives.

Obviously, the best solution to this problem would be the peacetime maintenance of such armed forces as would be able to secure at least certain proximate strategic war aims while the remaining echelons were being fully mobilized and put into action [pp. 300-301, second edition; pp. 264-265, first edition; pp. 338-339, P.H.].

Mobilization, the second edition again surmises, may begin prior to the war, at least when the outbreak of the war is preceded by growing international tension.

This [mobilization] apparently will take place partially during the threatening period while international tensions are mounting, and will continue on a full scale during the active military operations of the initial period of the missile and nuclear war [p. 301, second edition; p. 265, first edition; p. 339, P.H.].

It is again noted in the second edition, however, that:

It is very difficult to forecast in peacetime the exact dimensions of the forces that may be needed throughout a war,

because at the very beginning of a war the massive reciprocal use of nuclear weapons can fundamentally alter the situation [p. 411, second edition; p. 366, first edition; p. 434, P.H.].

Furthermore, in contradiction to the above statement on the possible timing of mobilization, another passage reasserts that prewar general mobilization is unlikely because it would risk triggering a pre-emptive attack by the enemy.

Under contemporary conditions, there is little likelihood of general mobilization starting prior to the opening of military operations, since it cannot go on without the enemy taking notice [p. 411, second edition; p. 366, first edition; p. 434, P.H.].

The second edition again mentions the possibility of partial or concealed mobilization, but notes that even these cannot remain undetected.

Furthermore, as was indicated earlier, the authors of Military Strategy are by no means clear how the mobilized forces could be deployed under nuclear war conditions. While stressing the insufficient size of peacetime forces for meeting the requirements of the entire war, they also indicate that the disruption of the transportation system will make the deployment of reserve forces to the front very difficult. For this reason the Soviet military are obviously reluctant to agree to a significant reduction in the size of the Soviet peacetime combat-ready forces. If such reductions were made, the Soviet military would probably call for an increase in the fire power of the

remaining forces so as to allow them to achieve the initial strategic aims of the war.

Concerning methods of mobilization, Chapter VII of the second edition repeats the statement that under nuclear war conditions "a system of territorial build-up of troops during mobilization is considered the most acceptable" (p. 412, second edition; p. 367, first edition; p. 435, P.H.). The peacetime army, however, is said to be organized on the "basis of regular formations," which, the second edition adds, "are recruited on an extraterritorial basis" (p. 412, second edition; p. 367, first edition; p. 435, P.H.). Chapter VII clearly continues to favor a territorial, flexible mobilization system, with the troops drawing their equipment from pre-dispersed stocks. The chapter repeats the earlier argument that:

Under conditions where missiles and nuclear weapons are used, both belligerents will be subjected to attacks in the very first hours of the war, and it can be assumed that both will find themselves in approximately the same circumstances as regards techniques of carrying out mobilization and moving troops to the theater of military operation. It follows, therefore, that the side which manages to penetrate more deeply into enemy territory in the very first days of the war will naturally acquire an opportunity to exploit the results of its nuclear attacks more effectively and to disrupt the enemy's mobilization. This is particularly important with regard to the European theaters of operation with their relatively shallow operational depth [p. 417, second edition; pp. 371-372, first edition; p. 439, P.H.].

The second edition again points out that the size of strategic materiel and other reserve stocks depends on the time necessary to mobilize industry and initiate war production (p. 419, second edition).

XV. THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE

The second edition's treatment of the role of the air force, and especially that of strategic bombers remains essentially unchanged. The most noticeable difference is the greater stress on the role of bombers in naval operations. Although a certain ambiguity about the role of manned bombers persists, the second edition tends even further to downgrade the worth of bombers. Thus, the inability of bombers to penetrate undetected to their targets is further emphasized. While the first edition mentioned such detection in conjunction with deep penetration into enemy territory (p. 273, first edition; p. 346, P.H.), the second edition says more sweepingly that it is "practically impossible to conceal" the flight of bombers from "modern means of detection" (p. 310, second edition).

The new version notes that bombers are now equipped with air-to-surface missiles of "400-600 km. and greater" range. This is said to "considerably increase the capabilities of the long-range bombers, which begin to become missile carriers capable of striking enemy targets without penetrating his antiaircraft defense zone" (pp. 310-311, second edition). Reference is also made to Hound Dog missiles with a range of 800 km. and Blue Streak with a range of 600-1000 km.

But even in this case the strategic bomber force cannot regain its lost significance. Its speed is too low by comparison with ballistic missiles [p. 311, second edition].

Therefore, it is noted, "the task of destroying and smashing targets deep in the enemy's territory will be

more reliably carried out by the Strategic Missile Forces" (p. 310, second edition). The unsuitability of bombers as a first-strike system is even more emphatically stressed in the Larionov-Glagolev article in International Affairs of 2 November 1963.

In discussing the naval role of the long-range bomber, the new text adds the following:

The long-range bomber force, armed with long-range missiles, can still make independent strikes against enemy targets, especially on the seas and oceans, as well as on the coast and in the depths of his territory [p. 312, second edition].

"In the immediate future," the air force will continue to serve such combat missions as those in support of ground and naval forces, reconnaissance, airborne operations, transportation of materiel, wounded, and sick personnel, and communications (p. 312, second edition; p. 275, first edition; p. 347, P.H.). The second edition also notes the use of airborne command posts by the United States (p. 86, second edition).

The tactical and fighter air force fares somewhat better in the second edition. Thus, while noting that the front line (tactical) bombers are increasingly losing their function to tactical missiles, the Soviet authors nevertheless add a new statement:

However, this air force has not as yet fully exhausted its combat capabilities. The arming of the bombers as well as fighter-bombers with various types of missiles allows them to operate successfully on the battle field and to fulfill with sufficient effectiveness their combat missions in support of the ground

forces, especially in weak antiaircraft defense zones. In addition there are many specific tasks, as, for example, the destruction of mobile targets, which can be more effectively carried out by bombers or fighter-bombers than by missiles. The future improvement of aircraft-missile technology may significantly increase the operational effectiveness of the bomber air force on the battlefield. But it would seem that the character of its tasks and the methods of their execution will change in a corresponding fashion [p. 311, second edition].

The primary mission of the front line air force remains the destruction of enemy nuclear weapons and, especially, mobile tactical missiles.

The second edition repeats the assertion that fighters will retain their important role "in the next years" in antiaircraft defense (p. 309, second edition; p. 272, first edition; p. 345, P.H.). It is also said again that the front line as well as fighter air force must have superiority in speed and altitude over the enemy (p. 311, second edition; p. 274, first edition; p. 347, P.H.). The fighter planes of the antiaircraft defense must be capable of long endurance, "...function as radar pickets and, if the enemy appears, shoot him down at any altitude" (p. 309, second edition; p. 272, first edition; p. 345, P.H.).

The new edition reasserts that aircraft development has not "completely exhausted its [aircraft] combat potential for modern warfare" (p. 312, second edition; p. 275, first edition; p. 347, P.H.). In this connection there is mentioned again the

...development of aircraft-associated missiles and of electronic equipment,

along with the introduction of types
of aircraft not requiring airfields
and improvements of flight control
techniques...[p. 312, second edition;
p. 275, first edition; p. 347, P.H.].

XVI. THE ROLE OF THE NAVAL FORCES

Unlike the air force, the navy receives somewhat greater attention in the second edition than in the first, and in some respects its role appears to have been upgraded. During the time between the publication of the two editions, there appears to have taken place a reassessment of the role and importance of missile-carrying submarines and of naval aviation, which possibly may be due to an expansion of these weapon systems.

The primary mission of the Soviet navy is still to defend the Soviet Union against enemy aircraft carrier- and submarine-launched nuclear attacks. To this has now been added a requirement for operations against enemy amphibious landings, and apparently a somewhat greater offensive role than previously.

One indication of the increased offensive role of the Soviet navy is that the new edition includes missile-carrying submarines among strategic weapon systems to be used against targets deep in enemy territory as well as in support of theater operations (see, for example, pp. 369, 371, 372, 406, second edition). Another indication, already mentioned, is the new reference to amphibious landings as one of the primary missions of the Soviet navy (p. 313, second edition). The authors of Military Strategy had originally been criticized in Soviet naval journals for overlooking this important function. In this connection it may be noted that Soviet naval publications have been devoting considerable attention to problems of amphibious operations under nuclear war conditions. For example, an

article in the Soviet navy magazine Morskoi sbornik (Naval Collection), of September 1963, states:

A thorough analysis of the existing and immediately anticipated development of weapons and technology as well as of means of transporting and landing troops allow one to assert that it is possible to carry out amphibious landing operations even under present conditions.⁷

The second edition also repeats the earlier statement concerning the need for large-scale attacks at the very beginning of the war against enemy maritime communications. It is said that strategic missiles, submarines and now, in addition, the Long-range Air Force will be used to strike naval bases, canals, narrow shipping lanes, shipyards, convoys, etc. (p. 400, second edition; p. 356, first edition; p. 423, P.H.).

The defense against U.S. Polaris submarines is treated somewhat more explicitly and is said to be "the most important task" of the Soviet navy (p. 398, second edition). (In the first edition this was said to be "an important task...", p. 355.) The assertion that such submarines are "vulnerable" despite foreign claims to the contrary is repeated (p. 381, second edition; p. 340, first edition; p. 409, P.H.). However, though the first edition said that "an effective means of combating atomic missile-carrying submarines are the homing missiles of submarines and surface ships" (p. 340, first edition; p. 409, P.H.), the second edition states that "an effective means of

⁷1st Rank Captain N. P. Viunenکو, "Modern Amphibious Landings," Morskoi sbornik (Naval Collection), No. 9, 1963, p. 21.

combating atomic missile-carrying submarines are anti-submarine submarines armed with homing missiles and torpedoes, as well as surface ships" (p. 381, second edition).

The second edition also mentions other methods for dealing with Polaris submarines.

Atomic submarines with "Polaris" missiles can be destroyed in their bases by strikes delivered by Strategic Missile Forces and Long-range Aviation, and [they can be destroyed] during transit and in their patrol areas by anti-submarine submarines, Long-range Aviation and other anti-submarine forces and means. The struggle against missile-carrying submarines is now carried out far from the shore, on the open seas and oceans. The earlier coastal system of anti-submarine defense [PLO] will now be ineffective against missile-carrying submarines [p. 399, second edition].

In discussing the importance of reconnaissance, the new edition includes in the priority list (airfields, missile sites), submarine bases and the location of submarines at sea (p. 382, second edition; p. 340, first edition; p. 409, P.H.).

The importance of destroying enemy aircraft carriers is reasserted, but the new text is somewhat more explicit about the vulnerability of the carriers to attacks by nuclear weapons. As in the earlier versions, it is said that carriers cannot be protected against submarine-fired missiles and strikes by the naval air force:

It is essential to try to destroy the attack carriers before they reach the launch position for their aircraft, to

strike their covering forces, supply units, and bases [p. 397, second edition; p. 354, first edition; p. 421, P.H.].

The best weapon system against carriers is still said to be submarines, which can destroy any surface ship with missiles or with a single nuclear torpedo (p. 398, second edition; p. 354, first edition; p. 421, P.H.). The carriers also may be attacked by units of the naval and Long-range Air Force. Thus, according to a new statement in the second edition:

Nuclear missile strikes by planes against attack carrier units or groups create the essential prerequisite for subsequent air operations whose aim will be the final destruction of the enemy. In view of the use of nuclear weapons, the solution of this task will not require the employment of large numbers of planes [p. 398, second edition].

XVII. ANTIAIR AND ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE

The second edition of Military Strategy continues to rely heavily on active defense against nuclear attack. The Soviet authors are perhaps a little less skeptical about the effectiveness of antimissile systems apparently as a result of Soviet public claims to possessing an ABM capability, but they still recognize that this defense will not prevent some enemy weapons from reaching their targets.

In a new statement, the Soviet authors say that:

Modern antiair defense is organized as
antiaircraft, antimissile and anti-cosmic
defense, all united into a single system
[p. 392, second edition].

As before they are aware that one of the "key problems for Soviet military strategy is the reliable defense of the rear from nuclear blows by means of antimissile and anti-aircraft defense" (p. 252, second edition; p. 231, first edition; p. 307, P.H.).

As for the effectiveness of antimissile defense, the second edition omits the statement that "ballistic missiles, employed en masse, are still practically invulnerable to existing means of air defense..." (p. 220, first edition; p. 298, P.H.).

When speaking of antimissile defense, concerning which it is repeated that "in principle, a technical solution to this problem has not been found," the second edition omits the next sentence: "In the future this form of defense must be perfected" (p. 309, second edition; p. 272, first edition; p. 345, P.H.). The new text, however, retains the statement that "...one must recognize that the present instrumentalities of nuclear attack are undoubtedly superior to the in-

strumentalities of defense against them. Consequently, the threat of a massive nuclear surprise attack by the enemy remains" (p. 252, second edition; p. 231, first edition; p. 307, P.H.). The text also repeats the assertion that the best way to protect the country against nuclear attack is "...mainly by destroying the enemy's nuclear weapons where they are based" (p. 391, second edition; p. 349, first edition; p. 417, P.H.). It is to be noted, however, that both statements acknowledge that some enemy forces and weapons would nevertheless reach their target, especially if the enemy attacks by surprise.

There are still other changes in the second edition that indicate a more realistic point of view. Thus, the first edition states that since the Soviet Union had "solved" the problem of destroying missiles in flight, "there is a realistic possibility of creating an insurmountable antimissile defense" (p. 351, first edition; p. 419, P.H.). This sentence is amended in the second edition to read "...thus the task of repelling the enemy's missile strikes becomes a realistic possibility" (p. 393, second edition).

However, the possibility of a completely effective antiaircraft and antimissile defense is mentioned in a new statement in the second edition:

The great effectiveness of modern PVO [antiaircraft defense] permits the successful solution of a difficult and important task -- the complete destruction of all attacking enemy planes and missiles, preventing them from reaching the targets marked for destruction. The crux of the matter lies in the skillful use of the modern means of antiaircraft and anti-missile defense [p. 395, second edition].

In discussing Western research on antimissile defense, the Soviet authors now mention not only the use of high-speed neutrons and electromagnetic flux (p. 393, second edition; p. 352, first edition; p. 419, P.H.), but also more advanced systems.

Various means for destroying missiles are now being studied; systems of radiation, antigravity and anti-matter, plasma (ball lightning), etc. Particular attention is being paid to lasers (death rays), and it is believed that in the future powerful lasers will be able to destroy any missile or satellite [p. 394, second edition; see also p. 405, second edition for a similar statement].

It may be of interest to note that a recent article in Red Star contrasts the ineffectiveness of American anti-aircraft and antimissile defenses with the allegedly great reliability of Soviet defenses.⁸ The article asserts that according to American experts the antiaircraft defenses would still let 25 to 30 per cent of the attacking planes pass through, and that there is little hope for an effective antimissile defense system. By contrast, the Soviet Union is said to have developed a powerful antiair defense system, which includes fighters equipped with "guided air-to-air missiles," and antiaircraft as well as antimissile missiles. The latter are said to be capable of "destroying any means of air attack." The article concludes that:

⁸ Major General I. Baryshev, "Nuclear Weapons and the PVO," Red Star, 13 November 1963. Some operational details of the new Soviet anti-missile missile are reported to have been published in the Hungarian Communist Party newspaper Nepszabadsag, Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1963.

In truth, the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and in particular the high effectiveness and reliability of our antiair defense cannot fail to give pause to the lovers of military adventures.

XVIII. SPACE

Concern for the possible military use of space and emphasis on the importance of developing antisatellite defenses continue to be reflected in the second edition of Military Strategy.

Contrary to occasional Soviet claims that the Soviet Union may be capable of destroying satellites in orbit, the second edition indicates that this problem is still unsolved.

The rapid development of space vehicles and in particular of artificial earth satellites, which may be launched for a variety of purposes, even as nuclear weapons carriers, poses a new problem -- the problem of antispace defense. What direction the solution of this problem will take is as yet too early to predict, but since a means of attack is being created, there will also be created a means of defense [against them] [p. 309, second edition].

The new text repeats the Soviet boast of superiority over the West in space (p. 64, second edition; p. 57, first edition; p. 139, P.H.). A new statement on the spatial character of modern war includes a reference to the possible use of outer space for military purposes (p. 254, second edition). Other than the reference to advanced defense systems (antigravity, antimatter, laser, etc.), the only new assertion about antisatellite defense is an accusation that the United States is considering the use of bombardment satellites and is studying ways of using the moon for military purposes.

Research is being conducted to determine the military potential of the moon. Studies are being made of the possibility of using the moon for communication, reconnaissance, and as a base for cosmic means of attack [p. 404, second edition].

The second edition repeats the previous statement that Soviet strategy "acknowledges the need to study the use of space and space vehicles to reinforce the defense of the socialist countries," and that "it would be a mistake to allow the imperialist camp to gain any superiority in this area" (p. 405, second edition; p. 361, first edition; p. 427, P.H.).

XIX. CIVIL DEFENSE

Despite its negative views on shelters mentioned earlier in conjunction with the U.S. counterforce strategy (p. 85, second edition), the second edition continues to value civil defense for reducing casualties and damage and ensuring the survivability of the state.

It was noted earlier that the functions of strategy now include the determination of the "basic principles of civil defense" (p. 16, second edition). The second edition repeats the statement that

...it should be remembered that no matter how effective an antiaircraft and antimissile defense system may be, it is essential to have prepared civil defense forces to eliminate rapidly the aftermath of nuclear attack... [pp. 395-396, second edition; pp. 352-353, first edition; p. 420, P.H.].

The new text again cites the need for special civil defense units, the use of mobilized military forces for civil defense tasks, and the desirability of training the entire population. Mention is also made once more of hardening and dispersal of industrial plants.

The only novel and possibly significant feature in the section dealing with civil defense is the omission of a paragraph discussing pre-attack evacuation of the population. The omitted paragraph reads:

Great importance is now attached to the prior and thoroughly planned evacuation of the population from large cities and border zones during the period when war

threatens or during the first days of war [p. 394, first edition; p. 460, P.H.].

It may be parenthetically noted that while the most recent civil defense publications still mention pre-attack evacuation, there is some evidence that this measure is being de-emphasized. The concept of a strategic alert continues to be mentioned in Soviet civil defense literature but appears to receive less attention in the current 19-hour public civil defense training program than in any of the previous programs.