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2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel Harold F. Bentz, subject as above.

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11 May 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel Harold F. Bentz, Jr.) RCS CSFOR-74-

TO: Commanding General, U. S. Army, Ryukyu Islands,
APO 96331
Commander in Chief, U. S. Army, Pacific, APO 9656

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN:
FOR OT UT, Department of the Army, Washington D.C.
20310

Debriefing Report by: Colonel Harold F. Bentz, Jr.

Duty Assignment: Commanding Officer, 7th Psychological Operations Group

Inclusive Dates: 30 November 1968 - 16 May 1972

DATE OF REPORT: 1 May 1972

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. This debriefing report is based on personal impressions and observations while serving as the Commanding Officer, 7th Psychological Operations Group, on Okinawa, during the period from 30 November 1968 to 16 May 1972. The experiences described in this report are confined primarily to psychological operations (PSYOP) activities within the Pacific Command (PACOM). The focus of the report is on major substantive issues that may warrant future study or may influence future doctrine, training, and materiel. The opinions expressed

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2. (U) OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

a. Nature of Operation. PSYOP is a unique operation in which the United States Army engages. PSYOP constitutes a specialized weapons system in the United States military arsenal that is employed for political communication purposes to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of foreign audiences in support of United States objectives. The nature of the operation extends beyond the sphere of normal military activities into the political field. Since the conduct of PSYOP interfaces with the political interests of the United States Government, it is imperative to exercise firm control over U. S. PSYOP activities. Such control is normally exercised at the country level by the Chief of the U. S. Mission.

b. Mission Responsibilities. As the theater PSYOP asset, the 7th PSYOP Group is responsible for all types of PSYOP support within PACOM as directed by CINCPAC. The general mission responsibilities of the 7th PSYOP Group are to conduct PSYOP in designated PACOM areas of operations, to provide PSYOP support to specified CINCPAC subordinate commands, to provide PSYOP advice and assistance to U. S. and foreign nations, as directed, and to be prepared to implement PSYOP actions in a contingency situation, as directed. It is reasonably safe to assume that these mission responsibilities will remain stable in the mid-range future, though responsibilities for the conduct of PSYOP are expected to taper off in light of the Nixon Doctrine.

c. Lack of PSYOP Appreciation. One major problem regarding PSYOP is the lack of understanding and appreciation for PSYOP by some senior military commanders. Although the situation has improved somewhat during the past decade, there are still some senior commanders who do not fully recognize the importance of the PSYOP weapons-system.
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4. 4.3. employed in a politically-military conflict situation. Currently, the attitude of senior commanders toward PSYOP can be broadly classified into two categories -- those who recognize the PSYOP role and those who do not. Factors that contribute to this situation are the senior commander's exposure to PSYOP in service schools or military operations and the understanding of the military role within the complex field of international affairs. A need exists to instill greater appreciation for PSYOP within the service schools.

3. (C) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. In view of the fact that the conduct of PSYOP is politically sensitive, U. S. military PSYOP activities are centrally controlled at the theater headquarters of CINCPAC. The 7th Group receives mission assignments, through CINCUSARPAC, from CINCPAC. The Group is under the operational control of CINCUSARPAC, and is assigned to CG, USARYIS. Prior to 1 July 1969, the Group was under the operational control of CG, USARYIS. Greater operational efficiency was realized by placing the 7th PSYOP Group under the operational control of CINCUSARPAC which served to shorten the line of communication and to improve the Group's responsiveness to PACOM PSYOP requirements. In view of subsequent increased requirements for PSYOP coordination during 1969-72, the decision to change the command relationship arrangement proved to be a wise one. The concept of having most of the theater PSYOP forces under the direct control of CINCUSARPAC makes it possible to react immediately with sufficient resources to PSYOP requirements from CINCPAC subordinate commands.

4. (C) EXPERIENCES IN COMMAND.

u. Personnel and Administration.

(1) Selection and Assignment of Qualified PSYOP Officers: Although the situation has improved somewhat recently, one perennial problem that confronted the 7th PSYOP Group was the fact that not all officers assigned to the Group had formal PSYOP training or experience. The Commanding Officer's flexibility in assigning officers within the Group
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In the case of an officer without PSYOP training or experience, such officers are usually assigned to positions where PSYOP knowledge is not critical such as administrative positions. PSYOP training or experience is mandatory for assignment to a PSYOP staff position or to a PSYOP unit since the planning and conduct of effective PSYOP is a complex operation. The need to assign qualified PSYOP officers has been brought to the attention of the Department of the Army.

(2) Lack of Printers: With reference to MOS qualified printers, it appears that the U. S. Army is deficient in the number of qualified printers if the frequent shortages of printers experienced by the 7th PSYOP Group is a microcosmic representation of the overall situation within the Army. The 7th PSYOP Group has suffered from the lack of qualified printers (MOS 83F), particularly at the E3-E5 grade levels. Such personnel shortages seriously reduce requisite flexibility necessary to support strategic operations and hamper the fulfillment of high priority operational missions in support of combat operations in Southeast Asia. This problem has been brought to the attention of higher headquarters up to the Department of the Army.

(3) Personnel Stability: Personnel stability is a prime requisite in a PSYOP organization because the nature of the operation is complex. PSYOP is complex since the body of knowledge associated with PSYOP has not been reduced to a science. One does not qualify as a PSYOP expert solely by mastering a discipline. PSYOP represents a blending of several disciplines and is generally recognized as an art of persuasive intercultural communications. A skilled propagandist is a person versed in social science, mass communications, cultural anthropology, psychology, and political science. In spite of the complexity of the operation, there are still some officers within the 7th PSYOP Group who are assigned to short tours of duty positions, specifically, in the Republic of Korea and Thailand. When the Group maintained a detachment in the Republic of Vietnam, that was also a short tour area. The tour of duty for the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer positions within the Group's...
Detachment in Korea has been extended to two years in contrast to the normal 13 months in recognition of the personnel stability problem. To defict the personnel rotation problem as well as to maintain continuity of effort and professional standards, the 7th PSYOP Group is staffed with civilian personnel at Group Headquarters and key detachments. Consideration should be given to extending the tour of duty for all officers assigned to key positions within the Group's detachments in Korea and Thailand because by the time they fully understand their job and are able to make a positive contribution, they are rotated. It would facilitate this personnel problem if these positions were designated MAOP primary positions with the normal tour extended to three years. Personnel accepting assignment in the MAOP could then expect an assignment of this nature for the normal three year tour. This would also facilitate early identification and programming of replacement personnel, thereby insuring continuity of operations.

b. Intelligence.

(1) PSYOP Intelligence Collection: One of the missions assigned to the 7th PSYOP Group is the PSYOP intelligence research and analysis mission, specifically the task of preparing necessary PSYOP estimates and studies to support current and contingency operational requirements. This mission requirement behooves the collection of all types of strategic intelligence -- military, political, economic, social, and cultural -- since PSYOP considers all areas of interest to human beings. Initially, the 7th PSYOP Group did not receive all categories of intelligence materials. The collection of military intelligence materials posed no problem, but the Group experienced extreme difficulty in collecting other types of intelligence materials because of bureaucratic obstacles. Particularly difficult to obtain were political, economic, and social reports produced by CAS and by the U.S. Embassy components which are considered invaluable by PSYOP intelligence researchers. After convincing the theater intelligence community that effective PSYOP depends upon adequate intelligence support, the 7th PSYOP Group has succeeded in closing
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the CCP in its intelligence collection effort. The continuous need for political, economic, social, and cultural intelligence for PSYOP cannot be overemphasized.

(2) PSYOP Intelligence Personnel: The skills required to develop PSYOP estimates and studies have not been properly recognized and appreciated in the assignment of military personnel to PSYOP intelligence positions. Military personnel who are assigned to PSYOP intelligence research and analysis positions generally are intelligence analysts (RCGS 985). They are trained in tactical military intelligence procedures, particularly in handling order of battle information, and perform capably in such tasks. In processing PSYOP intelligence, however, it has been noted that they are not well versed in identifying PSYOP vulnerabilities and opportunities and in perceiving attitudinal changes in target groups. PSYOP intelligence research and analysis functions require military personnel who possess skills in processing strategic intelligence information. Consequently, on-the-job training is provided within the 7th PSYOP Group to develop necessary skills to carry out the assigned missions. While such training is desirable from the long range viewpoint, PSYOP intelligence production is adversely affected during the training period. In the assignment of intelligence analysts to the 7th PSYOP Group, the Department of the Army should select strategic intelligence qualified military personnel.

(3) PSYOP Effectiveness: Undoubtedly the most difficult and challenging task in PSYOP is to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP. Considering that the overall objective of PSYOP is to change the attitude of a target group, the basic task is one of determining attitudinal changes. Unlike a rifle bullet, however, it is difficult to establish a one-to-one relationship between a PSYOP message and audience response and to measure attitudinal changes. Although it has happened, a single PSYOP message rarely stimulates a direct response on the part of a target member. It usually requires the cumulative effect of many PSYOP messages to modify an attitude. Notwithstanding the difficulty of the evaluation task, there are indicators, though few in numbers, that show PSYOP impact. The
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The problem is to maintain a vigilant watch for indications of PSYOP effectiveness and to record such evidences for operational and historical purposes.

d. Plans and Operations.

(1) Dependence upon External Printing Resources: One important mission assigned to the 7th PSYOP Group was the task to provide off-site printing support for PACOM PSYOP requirements, particularly in support of combat operations in Southeast Asia. The Group was responsible for printing approximately 80% of all PSYOP printing requirements for Vietnam. To meet PACOM PSYOP printing requirements, the 7th Group had to rely upon external printing resources because the demand far exceeded the internal printing capability. The Group had to utilize three printing plants -- the USIA Regional Service Center, Manila; the U. S. Army Printing and Publications Center, Japan (USAPP6CJ); and the 7th PSYOP Group Printing Plant -- to satisfy PACOM PSYOP printing needs. During the peak year of printing operations in 1966, the Group's printing plant printed less than 20% of the total requirement. The current arrangement to use the three printing facilities to meet PACOM PSYOP printing requirements is satisfactory so long as these facilities are available for use by the 7th PSYOP Group. Should a future decision be made to disestablish or to relocate to CONUS the USAPP6CJ printing plant, consideration should be given to provide the 7th PSYOP Group with a greater printing capability to make it less dependent upon outside resources.

(2) PSYOP Coordination: The conduct of U. S. PSYOP in a foreign country requires extensive coordination among interested U. S. military commands and governmental agencies and with the host government. Within PACOM, such coordination was conducted at the country team level. For example, PSYOP "Steering Committees" were organized in the Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Republic of Korea, and Thailand to assist the respective Chief of the U. S. Mission in directing U. S. PSYOP activities in country. Membership in the "Steering" Committee usually
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The steering committee consisted of representatives from USIS and the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy, occasionally a CAS representative, a representative of the concerned U.S. military command, and a representative from the implementing PSYOP unit. The PSYOP "Steering" Committee in the Republic of Korea, which was organized by the United Nations Command, consisted of both U.S. and ROK representatives from concerned military commands and civilian agencies. PSYOP "Steering" Committees, primarily editorial policy meetings for magazines, were also organized in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands to assist COMUSJAPAN and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, respectively, in controlling U.S. PSYOP activities. Organization of PSYOP "Steering" Committees is considered absolutely essential in the conduct of U.S. military PSYOP because such activities transcend U.S. military interests and encroach upon U.S. and foreign political interests as well.

(3) Policy: PSYOP is conducted under the principle of centralized control and decentralized execution. While policy guidance was provided to the 7th PSYOP Group from the national level as well as from the military commands, the Group's operational personnel felt that more policy guidance should be provided because they were faced with the task of making operational-level decisions in preparing media output. Media personnel are confronted with innumerable decisions to make such as selection of suitable topic, tone and nuances of treatment, and degree of emphasis. Detailed policy guidance is essential. Fortunately, the 7th PSYOP Group was able to obtain policy clearance for all printed media products, but that was not the case for radio media output. Printed media products were printed by the Group only after such products were approved by the requesting U.S. military command or governmental agencies. In the case of radio broadcasts, the fast reaction nature of the media precluded clearance of broadcast materials by the requesting command or agency. Therefore, the 7th PSYOP Group had to assume responsibility for approving broadcast materials based upon guidance it received from the national level and the concerned military commands. To maintain centralized policy control over the Voice of the United Nations Command broadcasts in Korea, the JCS forwarded daily policy
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Messages to the 7th PSYOP Group. In retrospect, this was an excellent concept to maintain policy control over U. S. PSYOP activities in the field, but the daily service has been discontinued. For on-going U. S. PSYOP activities, every effort should be made at the national level to keep concerned military commanders and the PSYOP unit commander in the field apprised of current policy guidance and such policy should be provided in detail as much as possible.

(4) Organization: As the PACOM PSYOP asset, the 7th PSYOP Group is located at a strategic central forward position in the Western Pacific on Okinawa. The bulk of its subordinate units are located on Okinawa, but the Group also maintains detachments in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand under its operational control which provide direct PSYOP support to CINCPAC subordinate unified commands. The present disposition of the Group’s PSYOP forces is excellent to support PACOM PSYOP requirements, and this should be maintained to continue PSYOP support as required and to provide PSYOP advice and assistance under the MAP. All PSYOP forces in a theater should be assigned to a parent theater PSYOP Group. Such an arrangement would provide-for economic and efficient utilization of PSYOP forces and would enhance the quality of PSYOP support provided to CINCPAC subordinate component and unified commands. In this respect, the 93d PSYOP Company in Thailand should be assigned to the 7th PSYOP Group, but could remain OPCON to COMUSMACVTHAI. The Group maintained a Detachment in Vietnam until March 1971 when it was redeployed to Okinawa as part of COMUSMACV’s package six redeployment. This action again tends to reflect the lack of appreciation for the PSYOP weapons system at a time when PSYOP should be playing a greater role in Vietnam. While the Group still provides major PSYOP support to COMUSMACV, it has no organic in-country representation to properly coordinate this support. Shortly after redeployment of the Group’s five-man detachment, the 4th PSYOP Group also was deactivated leaving no PSYOP unit representation in Vietnam to support the PACOM PSYOP Program there. This seems inconsistent in view of the fact that 7th PSYOP Group detachments are still considered essential in areas such as Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and
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(1) Logistics.

(a) PSYOP Equipment: The peculiarity of PSYOP equipment poses logistics problems. The peculiarity results from the fact that PSYOP equipment is nonstandard and has a low density in the U. S. Army inventory. Logistical problems arise in the maintenance and repair of this equipment. Normally, stockage of spare parts at the local depot level is nonexistent. When parts are not available, a high priority request for the required part is submitted through normal logistical channels. If the part cannot be obtained within the time frame required in this manner, a quick reaction procurement (QRP) is initiated. In many cases, QRP requisitions for these items cannot be filled by the U. S. Army CONUS stocks, and they have to be referred directly to the manufacturer of the end item. In most cases, the part required has to be manufactured, as it is normally not stocked by the manufacturer. Therefore, in the planning and conducting of PSYOP, the problems associated with PSYOP peculiar equipment must be taken into consideration. It is considered essential that the QRP system remain in effect for PSYOP use in the future.

(b) Procurement of PSYOP Supplies and Equipment: The procurement of PSYOP equipment and supplies normally requires long lead times. This, again, is attributed to the nonstandard nature of the equipment and supplies required for normal operations. For example, a requisition for a new printing press or a radio-transmitter would require months and, in some cases, possibly a year due to the equipment being a nonstandard item. The equipment would literally have to be manufactured from the ground up. Procurement of other nonstandard items such as "breakaway" cardboard boxes, float bags, and transistor radios from local sources further requires long lead times due to the quantity and peculiar nature of the items. The long lead time required to procure PSYOP equipment and supplies should be taken into consideration in future planning and conduct of PSYOP.
CONCLUSIONS.

It is imperative for the Chief of the U. S. Mission to continue to exercise firm control over in-country U. S. PSYOP activities in view of the increasing of U. S. military and political interests.

b. A greater appreciation for PSYOP by senior military officials should be programmed for in military service schools.

c. The current command relationship arrangement whereby the 7th PSYOP Group is placed under the operational control of CINCUSARPAC is the most effective arrangement to insure timely PSYOP support to requesting PACOM subordinate commands.

d. The Department of the Army should require the assignment of military officers who are PSYOP qualified through formal training or experience to PSYOP staff positions or PSYOP units.

e. In view of the limited number of qualified printers (MOS 33F) in the U. S. Army, the Department of the Army should program training to provide additional printers.

f. The tour of duty for 7th PSYOP Group officers assigned to key positions in short tour areas should be extended to provide maximum benefit to the U. S. Army.

g. Continued emphasis should be placed on the collection of PSYOP intelligence information to support on-going and contingency PSYOP requirements.

h. Consideration should be given to the training and assignment of military personnel who are qualified for strategic intelligence to PSYOP units.

i. Greater emphasis should be placed on the collection of evaluation feedback information and the systematic recording of all evidences of PSYOP effectiveness.
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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel Harold F.
Bentz, Jr.) RCS CSFO-74 (U)

1. In the event that the USAPPCJ printing facility no longer becomes
available for PACOM PSYOP printing, the printing capability of the
PSYOP Group should be increased to offset the loss.

2. Wherever U. S. military PSYOP activities are conducted in a for-
eign country, it is imperative to establish a PSYOP "Steering" Committee
to direct and coordinate U. S. PSYOP activities.

3. Theater PSYOP forces should be centralized under one command
to realize economic and efficient utilization of limited PSYOP forces in
PACOM and to improve PSYOP support qualitatively.

4. Centralized policy control is indispensable in conducting U. S.
PSYOP activities in a foreign environment and such guidance should be
in detail as much as possible.

5. The low density and nonstandard peculiarities of PSYOP equipment
and supplies should be taken into consideration in planning PSYOP.

HAROLD F. BENTZ, Jr.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
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