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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

11 May 71

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP (M) (30 Sep 71) DAJD-OTT

149

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Support Commands - Saigon, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay ~~Sanh Bay~~ (U).**

**SEE DISTRIBUTION**

Operational Rpt. for  
four support commands - Qui Nhon, etc.

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1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAJD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.
4. As section 1 of the report is not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, it has been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Verne L. Bowers*

VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS OSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

30 MAY 1971

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel (1) Shortage of Transportation Corps Officers

(a) OBSERVATION: Up to 1% of command-wide Transportation Corps officer authorization was substituted by officers of Infantry, Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery branches due to a shortage of TC officers.

(b) EVALUATION: Substitution of officers by grade and branch due to shortages of TC officers has been successful in duty positions not requiring specific TC skills.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: While DA and USARV are requested to make every effort to assign sufficient TC officers to fill authorized positions in order to assure capability for mission accomplishment, substitution of officers from other branches should continue as appropriate.

(2) Human Relations

(a) OBSERVATION: Emphasis on human relations increased markedly during the reporting period. A command circular requiring Human Relations Councils at company level was published, and the councils and their minutes are closely monitored by a full-time Human Relations Officer. This office has responsibility for making presentations to the councils on request, sending out recommendations, and aiding unit commanders in the area of race relations, service irritants, improved communications and better American-Vietnamese understanding.

(b) EVALUATION: Human Relations Councils are only effective if they receive command support and reflect the view of lower-ranking EM and minority groups. A free and open atmosphere must be encouraged for the exchange of ideas. At the same time members of councils must be ready to offer constructive solutions for problems brought to the council's attention. Racial tensions should be the council's prime concern. Surveys have indicated a lack of knowledge by many EM of the council's functions.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Lower-ranking EM and minority group members should be appointed to Human Relations Councils at battalion and company levels. Minutes of the councils should be posted on company bulletin boards; and recommendations or lessons learned from different councils

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should be circulated to all councils of the command.

(3) Drugs

(a) OBSERVATION: The drug problem is demanding more and more attention. The scope and size of the problem remain difficult to measure because of the secretive, distrustful attitude shown by drug users. The resulting distortion makes statistics highly suspect. Even anonymous surveys cannot consistently produce accurate data, but they can offer a better understanding of the problem for commanders. Education and rehabilitative treatment are probably the most effective approaches for drug users who have a desire to stop their use. A firm disciplinary policy is essential to deal with drug users who cannot or will not give up the use of drugs. The most effective solution, and clearly the most difficult, lies in convincing each individual to stay off drugs before he gets started.

(b) EVALUATION: Implementation of pertinent DA and USARV directives will result in the formal structure necessary for any effective drug program to include drug councils, the Amnesty/Rehabilitation Program, unit drug training and individual counselling and orientation. Unless command emphasis is placed on all of these aspects, the program will be ineffective. Drug Councils of higher headquarters have been found to be more effective when they include field grade representatives of the command's subordinate councils who make monthly progress reports. Insufficient drug orientation for personnel while being processed through replacement battalions continues as a problem. Stress has been placed on drug training of personnel after initial assignment to a unit. Monthly Amnesty/Rehabilitation reports should be carefully maintained at battalion and company level. Halfway houses play an important role in rehabilitation. Their success depends on close coordination with the commanders of men who receive treatment and organized unit follow-up on individuals who have gone through the programs. Well-constructed surveys on drug abuse can produce data on drug use patterns and user profiles which can be valuable to commanders in planning corrective actions.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Representatives of subordinate unit drug councils should be members of higher command's councils and be required to report monthly; commanders should coordinate with local halfway houses and attempt to use rehabilitated personnel of their units as informal liaison between the units and the rehabilitation houses; articulate trained former drug addicts should be used in training sessions on drug abuse with other young EM without the presence of NCO's or officers; and a 30 minute illustrated slide show on drug dangers, presented by a

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team consisting of a former addict, physician and/or JAG officer, should be included in orientations at each replacement battalion in Vietnam.

(4) Personnel Grievances

(a) OBSERVATION: The Inspector General should avoid interviewing large groups of soldiers submitting a mass complaint.

(b) EVALUATION: Thirteen (13) soldiers were interviewed as a group on a mass complaint. The group alleged that discrimination was the basis for action to transfer certain black EM from one Saigon Support Command unit to another. Control over the group was maintained, but not without difficulty. Since that time, each individual who participates in a group complaint has been interviewed separately. It is believed that more positive control at company level could have resulted in a programming of these men to see the Inspector General in accordance with existing mission requirements, thereby keeping the group from becoming formed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1 That each participant in a group complaint be interviewed separately, or the group elect a spokesman to be interviewed.

2 That when a large number of soldiers desire to see the Inspector General as a group from the same unit, the unit should program the personnel, one or two at a time, until each person has had a chance to see the Inspector General.

b. Intelligence None.

c. Operations MEDTC Assets

(1) OBSERVATION: Requisitioning procedures for excess ARVN assets to be used for MEDTC differ from the procedure for Switchback items.

(2) EVALUATION: Requisitioning procedures for MEDTC Switchback and ARVN excess items are processed through separate channels. Switchback requests come through supply channels and ICCV, whereas ARVN excess requests come through operations channels.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That MEDTC be made a depot customer and that all requests be handled through supply channels.

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- d. Organization None.
- e. Training None.
- f. Logistics (1) Closed Loop Support Program

(a) OBSERVATION: Unit inactivations caused an increase in the retrograde of Closed Loop Support end items.

(b) EVALUATION: The removal of Closed Loop Support (CLS) end items from operations in the field has reduced the quantity of secondary CLS assets, such as engines and transmissions, available for retrograde. The main impact of dwindling CLS secondary assets is the difficulty of meeting retrograde goals for assets established for the fiscal year.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Closed Loop Support Program (CLSP) retrograde goals be phased proportionately with decreases in equipment density. It is recommended that adjustment of retrograde goals be made after each increment of unit inactivation.

(2) Deport Supply of Tactical Operations Out of Zone

(a) OBSERVATION: 1 During the period, US Army Depot Long Binh (USALB) was required to provide expedited supply support to combat elements supporting tactical operations outside its primary zone of responsibility. These were Dewey Canyon II and Lam Son 719 in MR I. The support rendered included supply Classes I, II, IV, VII and IX to elements in MR I and to units being redeployed from MR III and IV to MR I. The sequence of processing requirements were:

- a Identification of requirement by the support unit.
- b Recognition of the requirement, determination of availability and location of assets, and preparation of the supply directive by ICCV.
- c Establishment of transportation priority by USARV DCSLOC Operations.
- d Preparation for shipment, request for expedited transportation (CEs and SMARs) and delivery to surface or air staging areas by USALB.
- e Transportation of supplies or the arrangement for same transportation elements of Saigon Support Command.

2 The overall supply performance was approximately 91% of the total requirement. Some of the assets came from Keystone turn-ins and required varied maintenance prior to shipment. Maintenance activities responded

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rapidly and efficiently.

3 With few exceptions the supplies were delivered in such a manner to meet the required delivery date. There were instances that led to unnecessary confusion and effort, and as a result, delayed shipment of supplies and equipment. Summarized these were:

a Often delays were encountered when the priority of shipment was not known at the time the supply directive was prepared.

b Difficulties surfaced when the mode of transportation changed, after the shipment was released from the Depot and items were staged at the water port or airhead.

c Confusion and possibility of frustrated shipments occurred when the priority of shipments changed from routine air to SPAR or CE and vice versa.

d Time losses were experienced when specific quantities on a particular shipment were reduced and then reinstated, necessitating additional releases by ICCV and additional transportation assets.

e Requirements for equipment that required repair were placed into maintenance channels prior to receipt of a supply directive, causing some problems. Example being: Directions were given to place keystone assets that had not been given disposition instructions into maintenance. Then subsequent attempts to ship the same item were directed when the asset had not been transferred to AAA stocks from the keystone account.

(b) EVALUATION: Unity of control or direction was jeopardized when supply directives were issued by one activity and the announcement of transportation mode and priority of the shipment being issued by another agency. The principal difficulty encountered in accomplishing the mission was the situation that arose when supplies had been released for shipment before priority and mode instructions had been received. This taxed highway transport assets, required new documentation, additional man-hours to reprocess equipment, and often delayed shipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In support of future project type operations in another zone it is recommended that unity of control be established and maintained. This can be accomplished by determining the requirement and shipping priority before a supply directive is issued. This would improve efficiency, enhance the rapid delivery of supplies and permit better control.

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(3) Use of 3,000 Gallon Collapsible Bags

(a) OBSERVATION: In November 1970, US Army Support Command, Saigon, installed four 5,000 gallon tankers on four LCMs to satisfy expeditiously FCL resupply requirements around Ca Mau, South Vietnam. Due to the inaccessibility of the Delta and the short operational time frame this was the only method of resupply feasible. The use of 5,000 gallon tankers presented the following operational and safety problems:

1 Because of the high silhouette of the tankers, there was an inordinate tendency to draw enemy fire. The tankers were a potential easy prey for VC gunners using all weapons from AK 47's to B-40 rockets.

2 Line haul capability was decreased because the tankers were used as a static storage facility.

3 Craft navigation was impaired because of the outsize of the 5,000 gallon tankers. The river pilots were forced to use lookouts to assist in navigation adding unnecessary dangers to the already treacherous Delta waters.

(b) EVALUATION: Although the tanker-mounted LCMs received extensive small arms fire, none of the 5,000 gallon tankers were seriously damaged. However, immediate action was taken by Saigon Support Command to alleviate the obvious hazards. Accordingly, three LCMs were cribbed with wood and lined with steel walls, to accept three 3,000 gallon collapsible fuel bags each. This action was expeditiously completed producing the following results:

1 It provided an additional 7,000 gallon storage capacity while concurrently releasing one LCM for employment elsewhere.

2 It released the four 5,000 gallon tankers, thus increasing the area line haul capacity.

3 It provided a resupply capability that was much less vulnerable to enemy attack and safer for its crew.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When operational requirements necessitate the use of water borne bulk FCL resupply procedures using LCMs, every effort should be made to equip these craft with appropriate size collapsible fuel bags.

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(4) Overcoat Issue

(a) OBSERVATION: 1 USARV Message DTG 050658Z Jan 71 established a winter protective clothing issue policy to personnel going on leave to CONUS. Saigon Support Command implemented the program by establishing an overcoat issue facility at the Tan Son Nhut Civilian Air Terminal. Five thousand (5,000) overcoats were requisitioned by ICCV and issued to the Central Issue Facility for hand-receipt to personnel departing on leave.

2 Since the issue of Protective Clothing started 4 January 1971, Saigon Support Command has issued 183 overcoats, 96 scarfs, and 160 pairs of gloves to 11,400 personnel departing the country on leave. The largest number of overcoats issued in any two-week period was 61, issued from 16 January to 30 January 1971. During this period 3,000 personnel departed on leave.

3 A total of 83 Statement of Charges have been prepared for unreturned overcoats.

(b) EVALUATIONS: 1 During the four month period which the clothing issue was operated, 183 (4%) of the 5,000 overcoats available were issued.

2 Of the 11,000 personnel departing country during the period, only 183 (1.8%) personnel were issued overcoats.

3 Of the 183 issued, 83 (45%) were not returned and required the preparation of Statement of Charges.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Based on past issue experience, recommend that the winter protective clothing issue to Army Personnel going on leave to CONUS be discontinued and that the 5,000 overcoats, scarfs, and gloves be returned to the supply system.

(5) Distribution of Subsistence Supplies

(a) OBSERVATION: Continued withdrawal of U.S. Forces in MR III, including Class I Supply Points, has caused increased difficulty in supporting MACV Advisory Teams and isolated Fire Support Bases.

(b) EVALUATION: 1 Redeployment of the 25th Infantry Division, two Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division (AMEL), and the standdown of the 758th Supply and Service Company and the 223rd Supply and Service

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Company, Saigon Support Command, reduced the number of Class I supply points from seven to three in MR III. During this same period, the Command was tasked to support the southern portion of MR II. Ration break points were operated at Tay Ninh, Dong Tam, Phan Thiet, and Bao Loc.

2 A test is presently being conducted to determine the feasibility of providing aerial tailgate deliveries via fixed wing aircraft to isolated locations in MR III. Aircraft utilized are common user Special Mission Air Request. Assets are provided by 7th Air Force. Prior to implementing this test it was felt that aircraft used on these type ~~missions~~ should be provided on a dedicated basis. MACV TMA did not concur with the request for dedication of CTA assets. As a consequence, many problems have arisen in the area of cargo show time and flight scheduling which have caused losses of perishable rations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That aircraft utilized to support subsistence aerial tailgate deliveries be obtained on a dedicated basis regardless of whether fixed wing or CH-47 assets are available. When all factors are considered, the latter type aircraft appears to possess more desirable characteristics and capabilities.

(6) Baler Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: The operation of the heavy metal baler at the Long Binh FDC facility indicated both operational and maintenance shortcomings in the system.

(b) EVALUATION: The operation and maintenance of such a large and complex piece of equipment in an overseas theater is beyond the capability of the military organizational and support maintenance. The cost of the baler itself is \$200,000.00 with maintenance cost being \$10,000.00 per year. Thus the initial investment for the first five years would amount to \$50,000.00 a year. In Vietnam, the expected price of the scrap is \$4.00 - \$5.00 per ton. During a twelve month period the baler will produce close to 12,500 tons. This figure multiplied by the projected price per ton points to the economic necessity of the projected five year production cycle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Installation of such a piece of equipment for economic reasons should only be considered when adequate scrap generations for full production will exist for at least five years.

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(7) Cleaning of POL Tanks

(a) OBSERVATION: Neither the Quartermaster units nor the Engineer units in Vietnam have the equipment or trained personnel to safely remove sludge from POL storage tanks.

(b) EVALUATION: After several years of service with little or no maintenance, POL storage tanks are rapidly becoming contaminated. In light of the present troop withdrawals, an R&U contract appears to be the best way to obtain a continuing capability to maintain POL tanks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the commands concerned arrange for the necessary modifications to the R&U contracts in Vietnam.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A request to so augment the present R&U contract has been sent to USARV.

(8) Liberal Offering Procedure for Retrograde Cargo

(a) OBSERVATION: Transportation managers depend on cargo offerings to determine how much shipping to bring into a port. Customary procedure provides for cargo to be ready for shipment before being offered. An alternative to this procedure is for the command to offer cargo before it is ready for shipment, while it is in an early stage of processing for retrograde movement. This procedure gives a critical advance notification and brings the shipping into port on a more timely basis, thus allowing more cargo to be moved faster.

(b) EVALUATION: This liberal offering procedure has an inherent risk. It is possible that shipping can be brought into port before the cargo is fully processed and ready. In that case, ships must leave port partially loaded, costing the government extra money for unused space. The command has recognized the risk, but has chosen the liberal offering method. The success of this decision is demonstrated by the fact that in February, March and April the command exceeded its retrograde goals, while in December and January it failed to meet the target under the conservative offering procedure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The liberal offering procedure should be considered by transportation managers in cases where there are large quantities of cargo to be moved in a timely manner, when the cargo processing capability is a limiting factor and when assets are insufficient to

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support a conservative offering procedure.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** The command has monitored closely the liberal offering procedure and has accepted the risk of shortfall. Acknowledgement of the potential danger of not filling ships has generated cautious and skillful transportation management as well as a more successful retrograde program.

(9) Use of RO/RO in the Delta

(a) **OBSERVATION:** RO/RO advantages in the Delta are similar to the advantages at any other location; decreased materials handling, faster turn-around time for watercraft, better utilization of water and highway assets and throughput delivery of cargo.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Before RO/RO was established between Vung Tau - Newport and Delta ports, there was a constant five day backlog of cargo awaiting shipment. Turn-around time was cut from eight days to four days. The backlog was cleared out.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Continue use of RO/RO to Delta locations.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** RO/RO use will continue as long as assets are kept available.

(10) Cargo Movement by Rail

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Rail cargo movement was inaugurated on 12 January 1971 in Military Region III. The command was confronted with several operational problems at the outset, but has gained improved efficiency with experience. By creating an enforced reduction of highway transportation support to organizations served by rail system, the command has effectively increased the quantity of rail tonnage since January. The system still has several drawbacks with lack of adequate loading and offloading facilities at important locations preventing further development and utilization of existing rail assets.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The rail system has greatly enhanced the extent of Newport cargo clearance and has made more highway assets available to missions in support of retrograde and resupply of distant locations accessible by highway. Lack of steady improvement of supporting facilities such as platforms, spurs, docks, and other structures constricts the uses of the existing system.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continued development of these facilities is mandatory for more complete usage of the rail network.

(c) COMMAND ACTION: Loading facilities have already been approved for USADLB and the POL site at Long Binh, although construction has not yet begun. Further means of improvement of the system are being studied and receive support when justified.

(11) Effects of Turnover of Logistical Activities to ARVN

(a) OBSERVATION: The command has turned over several barge and shallow draft discharge sites to ARVN control. Some problems remain when the command continues to move cargo through these sites.

(b) EVALUATION: ARVN authorities on site do not always give priority to U.S. operations, thus frustrating centralized planning and control. In addition, there is a language and communications barrier on location. Expedient local coordination is the principal method of dealing with these difficulties as they arise.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Planning of availability of ARVN-operated discharge sites must be flexible and be prepared for these difficulties.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Command personnel are aware of potential coordination gaps and the delays and disruptions that they bring.

g. Communications None.

h. Material Steel Pipe for Buried POL lines

(1) OBSERVATION: Six inch, schedule 40, steel pipe was not in stock in the depots in Vietnam, but large quantities of steel well casings were available.

(2) EVALUATION: After cutting off the threaded ends, well casing became an acceptable substitute for schedule 40 pipe.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: None.

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Saigon, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSF(R-65 (R3) (U)

1. Other None.

Tel: LB 2604

*Howard C. Miller*  
HOWARD C. MILLER  
Colonel, OrdC  
Acting Commander

2 Incl

~~1 Distinguished Visitors list~~

~~2 Organizational Chart~~

Enclosures withdrawn

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AVHDO-DO (30 May 71) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Support Command,  
Saigon, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 2 3 3.

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Transportation Corps Officers," page 15, paragraph 2a(1): concur with the recommendation to continue substituting officers of other branches for TC officers where appropriate. The projected requisitioning authority (PRA) has been established for USARV by DA to be used in lieu of authorizations as the basis for requisitioning and assignment of officers. Due to availability of Transportation Corps officers under the PRA being less than authorizations, branch substitution is essential in meeting personnel requirements in selected positions normally filled by Transportation Corps officers. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Closed Loop Support Program," page 18, paragraph 2f(1): Concur. All retrograde programs will be reviewed as indicated in the recommendation. In addition, SUPCOM's have the opportunity to present their views on retrograde programs during GLS conferences held at this Headquarters. This Headquarters will monitor retrograde programs and advise ICCV regarding appropriate quota reductions. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "Overcoat Issue," page 21, paragraph 2f(4): Concur. While the overcoat usage experienced during the past winter wear season was not as high as anticipated, it can be said that this low usage was due to a lack of knowledge on the part of the individuals departing as well as the fact that the program was not initiated until the latter part of the winter season. Action has been initiated to return 4,500 ea overcoats, scarves, and pairs of gloves. However, the 500 remaining will be utilized for this project during the FY 72 winter wear season. In addition to being held for Operation Reunion, these items are slated for other contingency purposes. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

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Saigon, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

d. Reference item concerning "Baler Operations," page 22, paragraph 2f(6): Nonconcur. There are considerations of much higher importance than economic feasibility including American foreign policy determination and military exigencies which have required in the past, and would require again in the future, the installation of such a piece of equipment without regard to economic production utilization on a five year basis. There are U.S. companies in Vietnam which are capable of maintaining this baler. Since February 1970, Dynallectron Company has maintained this equipment under contract. Contract maintenance will continue to be used because organic military maintenance capability is being deleted from the TDA. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "Cleaning of POL Tanks," page 23, paragraph 2f(7): Concur. This Headquarters has requested Engineers modify PA&E and Philco Ford contract to include tank cleaning. SUPCOMs have been requested to provide a list of tanks needing cleaning in their MR and list a priority for cleaning. This listing will be forwarded to Engineers on receipt by this Headquarters. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



CPT. INF.  
Acting Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-FD (30 May 71) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, USA Spt Comd, Saigon,  
period ending 30 Apr 71, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
E.H. OZAK  
OPT. AGC  
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: OML, HQ, USA SUPCOM, Qui Nhon, for the period ending 30 April 1971

SECTION II  
LESSONS LEARNED

1. (U) Personnel: None
2. (U) Intelligence: None
3. (U) Operations

a. In country household goods and personal baggage shipments

(1) Observations: A dual system of household goods and personal baggage services exists in RVN. Out of country shipments are performed adequately under civilian contract household goods tenders of service. However, for in country PCS movements, service consists of a contract requiring PA&E to "construct wooden containers for personal effects of troops departing for points other than CONUS." It does not provide for packing services.

(2) Evaluation: The failure to provide professional moving services for in country movement of personal baggage has resulted in marginal service at best. PA&E boxes are not always available as needed and the bulk of frustrated personal baggage shipments in RVN result from in country shipments.

(3) Recommendations: That household goods and personal effects of departing military personnel be provided the best service obtainable regardless of destination. To this end, the present Rate Service Tenders for household goods carriers should be renegotiated to provide packing and crating service for all military personnel regardless of destination.

b. Traffic Management Functions

(1) Observations: A fragmentation of traffic management functions has occurred within RVN between MACV-TMA and USARV Support Command MCC's.

(2) Evaluation: Dual traffic/transportation management systems inhibit optimum utilization. A single focal point agency is required for submission of movements requirements from all military services for all transport modes. The duplication of transportation management functions inherent in the dual TMA/MCC system is wasteful in both effort and resources. Under the Support Command concept of logistics, the commander requires a viable means for exercising complete control of movements throughout his area of operations as well as the means to interface transport activities with those of supply, maintenance and personnel.

(3) Recommendation: A single transportation concept for movements management should be developed and controlled at the level of overall logistical support responsibility in order to ensure optimum use of available

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resources and to provide needed flexibility to respond to dynamic operational changes quickly and efficiently. The concept should provide the required movement control and highway regulations within the overseas theater and have an appropriate relationship with joint movements management.

c. Conex Disposition

(1) Observation: A sizeable number of CONEX containers are being used for purposes other than intended, such as bunkers and storage when other facilities are available. Units are not making full use of CONEX for retrograde. ARVN and FMA forces are not cooperative in the utilization and turn in of CONEX. Disposition of excess CONEX is a lengthy and often unproductive process.

(2) Evaluation: Greater emphasis must be placed on proper CONEX utilization, including selection of the CONEX mode for retrograde shipments. CONEX are not being returned to the transportation system in a timely manner nor in the quantities desired. CONEX are being inefficiently utilized throughout the system.

(3) Recommendation: Theater command level (MACV/USARV) CONEX survey teams should be established and empowered to conduct inventories by serial number, direct on-the-spot turn-ins or other disposition as appropriate, and follow through to insure corrective actions are taken.

d. Diversion of Common Service Highway Assets

(1) Observation: In February common service highway assets of this command were diverted north for Dony Canyon II reducing the tonnage capability without there being a corresponding reduction in requirements.

(2) The immediate result was an increase in highway cargo backlog and in cargo past required delivery date. In response, a ten percent increase in the Han Jin commercial trucking contract was authorized from USAKV and steps were taken to expedite action on requisition to fill vehicle shortages. Intensified management by Support Command and TMA resulted in better utilization of assets to satisfy customers priorities and reduced turn-around time. It is felt that one factor in this problem is that military line haul performance has not equaled calculated capabilities. Transportation doctrine developed for military highway capability/performance criteria and formulas cannot be applied in RVN without some modifications. Truck performance is affected by the hostile environment, topography, road conditions, security requirements (to include restrictions on night operations), operator capabilities, shortage of drivers, and age and condition of equipment. Adverse operating conditions are the greatest single factor degrading mission performance. The RVN environment is unique where determination of highway transport capability is concerned.

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(3) Recommendations: The intensified management should be continued to keep utilization at a high level and maintain an economic and efficient operation. Planning criteria/formulas should be developed within the theater for application to line haul truck units as a measure of capability/performance vice the usual "school solution" measures. MOS school-trained heavy and medium truck operators should be assigned where possible, as opposed to assigning light vehicle drivers for OJT. Vehicle shortages should be replaced in the shortest possible time. Drivers should be provided special incentive pay as an additional motivational factor to increase truck turn-around.

4. (U) Organization: None

5. (U) Training

a. Inadequately trained personnel of the 808 Tiger Division on the AN/MPQ-4 radar set.

(1) Observation: Due to trained personnel rotating and lack of technical knowledge, the Korean operators were not able to correctly operate or maintain the very intricate and sensitive controls of this equipment.

(2) Evaluation: As a result of the classes presented by 808M personnel with Korean interpreter, the Koreans are capable of operating the radar sets. However, they continue to make many errors causing a magnification of maintenance problems.

(3) Recommendations: Recommend the 808 Tiger Division be encouraged to assign school trained personnel from Korea or personnel who have attended a school in CONUS to operate the AN/MPQ-4 radar sets.

6. (U) Logistics

a. Availability of repair parts for the AN/FPS-5 radar.

(1) Observation: The MOR rate for the AN/FPS-5 radar has been exceedingly high for the 3rd quarter due to the non-availability of repair parts.

(2) Evaluation: Eight each AN/FPS-5's were deadlined at one time for a remote cable. This particular item is on the repair and return list. Because of the excessive turn-around time for repair and return items, it placed the Qui Nhon Support Command in a critical position. After a search of several weeks, cables were located at Long Binh Depot and hand receipted to Qui Nhon Support Command to bring the radars off deadline.

(3) Recommendations: Recommend that the turn-around time for M&R items be improved or increase and/or establish the float stockage at the DSU's of M&R items.

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b. Close-out of the USAD, QNH

The principal lesson to be learned from the close-out of the USAD, QNH is that a consolidated plan should be quickly completed when the decision is made to close such an operation. A balance must be struck between rate of movement and inventory management time. The amount of stock to be moved must be estimated reasonably and the rate of disposition consistent with an approved schedule. When deciding upon a closeout or phasedown schedule, an optimization study should be made to weigh the savings accrued against only partially known future requirements. If manpower savings must be later spent to again redistribute stocks which were moved incorrectly, the net savings will decrease. The essential elements of an efficient close-out are:

- (a) Accurate Inventory
- (b) Stock manager flexibility
- (c) Continual communications with ICC
- (d) Continuous shipping backlog of at least 1000 tons
- (e) Responsive ADF special program support
- (f) Continuous flow of disposition

A must in efficient clearance is accuracy of ABF and master locator files. As inaccuracy rises, the ABF must be abandoned in favor of an extraordinary procedure of inventory and release. Disposition instructions must be received at a rate which will allow nearly continuous shipping. It is inefficient for the ICC not to process an entire batch of notifications for 10 days and then provide disposition of several thousand lines in two or three days. Hundreds per day is better than thousands in concentrated batches.

The rate of disposition must be consistent with personnel assets. Once a depot is marked for closure the flow of replacements is cut off. If stocks can be rapidly cleared early in the game there will be enough people to finish off the end work of cleaning up the final stocks. The depot should also make a conscious manpower plan to reduce strengths to those actually needed. The work plan and manpower phasedown plan should be keyed to the on-hand tonnage rather than to calendar time.

The pacing element of the entire phaseout was the management time needed to decide the disposition of the depot stocks. Through the entire operation physical movement was periodically slowed because of a lack of enough MHC's to keep the available material handling equipment and transportation resources busy. Despite the physical capability to move over 1000 tons per day, there were many days when tonnage shipped was less than 300 tons.

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The lack of firm shipping instructions left the depot with a chance between rapid clearance and defensive inventory management. The depot stock managers knew that some of the items were needed within country. The depot assumed the responsibility of filling the obvious gap in ICCV management to reduce the disposition time lag. The ICCV managers were only vaguely informed as to the nature of the operation even well after the decision had been made to clear the depot and could not easily visualize why nonconformities were made in the manner they were. A total of 8000 short tons were shipped without ICCV direction. This was necessary to meet stringent deadline dates set on the command.

A part of the phaseout program involved setting up a remote storage location (RSL). The RSL concept, while compatible with 3S, did not prove worthwhile. The dwindling stocks and the added processing times to first check one depot then another raised denial rates to customers. The impact of the higher denial rates meant a longer order ship time by the length it takes to reverse a release (up to 7 days). The 3S system is inadequate in its ability to keep up with a high rate of reversals and inventory adjustments. In retrospect a decision should have been made to completely transfer all activities to C&B and move stocks as rapidly as possible. The combination of C&B being a supporting depot, and having a remote storage sight at a closeout location does not lend itself to efficient closeout operations.

#### c. Station Returns

When the depot at Qui Nhon was phased out, the organization set up to take over its functions was a 32 man detachment (Qui Nhon Holding Detachment). For the purposes of processing paperwork for accountability this type organization is suitable, but when it gets into the materials business it will not work efficiently. When a depot phases out the station return mission should revert to the DSU's for the physical handling of equipment. The DSU's are fully capable of requesting disposition instructions, storing, and performing minor packing operations to ship to the supporting depot for final disposition if the material is to be placed into depot stocks. The DSU's can also ship Fringe K items to offshore destinations.

#### d. Class I Operations.

The following recommendations are offered for improvements in the overall management of class I operations:

(1) Place more emphasis on status of individual commodities rather than days of rations on hand. If you base all calculations on days of rations on hand no excesses or critical shortages of individual items will be apparent.

(2) Establish a set policy for days of supply, safety levels, and stockage objectives and remain with that policy for not less than 1 year.

(3) Closer monitoring of intra-depot transfers is needed to reduce the shipments of the same item back and forth between depots.

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(4) USARV must requisition against item quantities computed on depot worksheets or at least coordinate changes.

(5) Program factors must be distributed to class I depots not later than the 7th of the month.

e. Increased Awareness of Logistics Planning

Experiences have shown that commanders of tactical units must balance good tactical planning with sound logistics preparedness. Information regarding operational requirements should flow freely between the tactical units and the SUPCOM. Intelligence information should be exchanged. An example of this problem area is highlighted by events in Jan 71 where QNH resources for delivering POL were stretched to a minimum to support the Laos operation. In February NVA troops started massing in the area north of Pleiku. If this information had been known by the SUPCOM, immediate actions could have been taken to replenish Qui Nhon assets and plan for support in the Pleiku area. When the action in the Pleiku area broke, there were insufficient assets in the Qui Nhon area to give full support. It is highly recommended that logistics planning be given increased emphasis in all Service Schools from the Career Course level and upwards.

f. Keystone Operations with regard to Post Compound Station Property

During the Keystone operation involving the 4th Infantry Division the problem of disposal of post, camp, and station property caused many problems to this SUPCOM. The economics of retrograding office furniture, bunks, wall lockers, etc., is completely unfeasible. The shipping costs far exceed the value of the items. To assist the 4th Infantry Division in clearing PCS from property books this SUPCOM established a turn-in point at the Division area in An Khe. The purpose of establishing the turn-in point was further justified by the fact that line haul transportation was too scarce to utilize it to haul PCS and leaving the PCS in the base area precluded damage in shipment by hasty loading practices. Based on the economics of shipping costs most of the PCS was classified for PDO disposition. A plan was developed to have the PDO sell the PCS in place and steps were initiated to start the sale. During the course of the sale, ARVN requirements were made known and a good deal of the PCS was issued to ARVN forces. A change in the tactical situation at An Khe resulted in new U.S. forces coming into the area and further PCS items were issued to the U.S. forces. The end result was so much PCS had been issued that the sale became impractical. As more and more U.S. forces leave, the disposition of PCS furniture will become an acute problem. The value of the vast majority of the property has declined by fair wear and tear past the point where it has any value to the supply system. Recommend that consideration be given to leaving the majority of PCS in place, and when ARVN forces

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take over a compound, have them sign for the PCS as part of the real property transfer.

5. Keystone/AVN Equipment Transfers

As was noted in paragraph 1 of this report, the substantial influx of AVN candidates created a backlog in the 86th Maint Bn that hampered support of U.S. Forces and seriously delayed transfer of this equipment to AVN. To avoid such delays it is recommended that a single dedicated maintenance facility be established in AVN, whose sole mission would be to repair and transfer all AVN candidates. Centralized management would standardize acceptance criteria and allow U.S. Maintenance Bns to continue uninterrupted support to U.S. forces. Supply Management could be directed to give this facility a specific portion of critical repair parts so that a steady or predicted turnover to the AVNAF could take place. To require SUPCOM DS/GS units to keep up with U.S. support missions plus prepare AVN transfers is too large a task for current TO&E's. A dedicated AVN maintenance facility would benefit both AVN and US needs.

- 7. (U) Communications: None
- 8. (U) Materiel: None
- 9. (U) Other: None
- 10. (U) COMMAND ACTION: None

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AVHDO-DO (Undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 22 JUL 1971

TO: ✓Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon and concurs except as indicated below:

a. Reference item concerning "Keystone Operations with Regard to Post Compound Station Property," Section II, page 6, paragraph 6f: Nonconcur. At present, RVNAF authorization documents do not authorize US type Post, Camp, and Station (PC&S) Property. As such, it is not legal to transfer this property to RVNAF. Serviceable items are returned to Depot for subsequent issue to US Forces. The majority of PC&S items are critical to US requirements. Unserviceable, uneconomically repairable items are processed through property disposal channels for final disposition in accordance with existing regulations. On 1 July 1971, MACV J-4 informed this Headquarters that these items may be transferred to RVNAF under the following conditions:

- (1) The items must be unserviceable or uneconomically repairable.
- (2) Transportation cost would be too great to warrant shipment of equipment to repair agencies.
- (3) The items are not required by USARV.

b. Reference item concerning "Keystone/ARVN Equipment Transfers," Section II, page 7, paragraph 6g: Nonconcur. The maintenance of Keystone assets designated for ARVN should be performed in the support command where the asset is generated. All items designated for ARVN must be job-ordered to Maintenance, repaired to ARVN acceptance standards, and transferred. To transship a SCRAM 1-7 item from one support command to another would add additional transportation costs, result in additional damage due to handling, and substantially increase the Keystone documentation requirements. The current system of maintaining and transferring Keystone assets to ARVN at each support command is functioning satisfactorily and should continue to function for the foreseeable future. No further action is required by this Headquarters, or higher headquarters. Unit has been so advised.

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AVHDO-DO (Undated) 1st Ind  
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 Support Command, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1971,  
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2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "In country household goods and personal baggage shipments," Section II, page 1, paragraph 3a. The observation made in paragraph 3a is correct in that there is a dual system of household goods and personal baggage services in RVN. Packing boxes constructed by PAE have generally been provided on a timely basis except at certain times when construction material was in short supply. To determine if the government will achieve improved services by elimination of the dual system, further study by this Headquarters will be required. This study will compare the cost of providing the same desired level of services by both the household goods carrier and the facilities engineering contractors. Since the recommendation is in effect to provide additional packing services that are presently being accomplished by troop labor, it is apparent that considerable additional OMA funds will be required. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Availability of repair parts for the AN/PPS-5 radar," Section II, page 3, paragraph 6a. Support furnished by CONUS depots for the Repair and Return Program has been excellent, however there are occasions when problems develop creating unacceptable OR rates. Sufficient AN/PPS-5 radars to establish authorized maintenance float have not been available in the past. An increase in assets have be obtained and maintenance float issues initiated. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Station Returns," Section II, page 5, paragraph 6c: Concur. The procedure of handling station returns through a DSU rather than a holding detachment has been implemented in the phase-down of CRB Depot. DSUs are reporting excesses and requesting disposition instructions from their supporting depot at Long Binh rather than a holding detachment at Cam Ranh Bay. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Geddes F. MacLaren*  
 GEDES F. MACLAREN  
 CPT. INF.  
 Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
 USASUPCOM-QM

GPOP-FD (undtd) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ US Army  
Support Command, Qui Nhon, Period Ending  
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 AUG 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
L. M. GIBBS  
CPT, ASD  
Asst AS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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**AVCA GO-H**

**30 April 1971**

**SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)**

**2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.**

**a. (C) Personnel**

**(1) (C) Flagging Actions**

**(a) OBSERVATION: The 518th AG PSC Records Section was responsible for control of flagging actions on approximately 175-200 records each month.**

**(b) EVALUATION: The average time interval between initial flagging and final action was two months. Units were initiating the DA Form 268 (Report for Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions) and in some cases submitting them with incomplete information and/or submitting them late.**

**(c) RECOMMENDATION: A team of three clerks at the PSC handle all flagging actions from beginning to end. Units simply submit requests to initiate or finalize an action and the PSC Team does all the documentation including maintaining a suspense card system.**

**(d) COMMAND ACTION: The above stated recommendation was adopted and is working very successfully. The USARV CPNI Team approved this procedure at the time the PSC passed their CPNI on 27 April 1971 with an error percentage of 1.2 and an overall rating of highly satisfactory.**

**(2) (U) Local National Personnel Management**

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
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**AVCA GO-N**

30 April 1971

**SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Assigned Local National Direct Hire strengths have been reduced from 2325 in Nov 70 to 1652 in Apr 71 for a decrease of 673 or 29% of the LN workforce during this period. This has been accomplished through a USARV imposed hiring freeze, a RIF in Nov 70 and through normal attrition. Expected authorizations in the future will undoubtedly be lowered due to drawdown activities.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Reductions have been made in soft skill and non essential areas, and in the former, greater use has been made of AIK Daily Hire personnel to offset these cutbacks. Although the mission of this command has not shown a decrease, greater emphasis is placed on improving utilization of available LN resources. Also at a time where there is increased difficulty in obtaining qualified military personnel in certain skill areas, greater emphasis has to be placed upon the LN workforce to be more effectively utilized and release military for more critical duties.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Further identification must be made to identify positions held by Local Nationals which are not being effectively utilized or can be vacated to fill other more urgently required positions. Further reductions of the LN workforce are expected; however, efforts must be continued in making reductions where the mission will not be affected adversely.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** Through means of Annual General Inspections, staff visits and close coordination with the Area Civilian Personnel Officer, many problems that face the command have been surfaced. Classes have been conducted to improve management procedures for LN supervisors and AIK Daily Hire personnel have been used to a greater extent to free personnel for essential mission oriented duties. Although command efforts to improve Local National utilization may not make up for personnel shortages, we expect that any real effects will be minimized.

**(3) (U) Civil Military Operations**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The relationship between the US Military personnel and Vietnamese citizens is marginal.

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AVCA GO-V.

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Can Rach Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCB CBFOR-65 (RS)

(b) EVALUATION: Recent traffic accidents along C/L 1 involving US and Vietnamese personnel, resulting in serious injuries/fatalities have given rise to a deterioration of community relations. In one case a vehicle was detained until a payment of \$20,000 VN was paid. In another case the vehicle and three individuals were detained. Several reasons exist for the marginal relations:

1. Claims have been very difficult and slow in coming to victims or next of kin.

2. Presently few if any soldiers, except AWOLs, have had an opportunity to intermingle with the Vietnamese citizens, causing distrust and suspicions among the citizens and military personnel.

3. The drawdown of US military personnel has given rise to Vietnamese citizens questioning the US motives in Vietnam.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the command show renewed emphasis in US-VN relations by encouraging an interchange of communications.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The command has established a procedure for sponsoring students to tour the Army facilities weekly as well as tours for US military personnel to Vietnamese villages in the Can Rach Bay area. Along with having US military units provide materials for civic action projects, greater emphasis is being placed on having US soldiers go to the Vietnamese villages to make presentations and assist the Vietnamese with their projects. Additionally, a US Vietnamese Friendship Council has been established and is expected to greatly improve relations between US and Vietnamese personnel.

(4) (U) Drug Abuse

(a) OBSERVATION: Drug abuse is a major problem at this command. Reliable statistics on the number of drug users within the command are extremely difficult to obtain. Medical personnel indicate that there is a steady and appalling increase in drug usage, with hard drug usage being the most serious problem.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters US  
Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending  
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

CID reports reflect that 148 new drug cases were opened during the six month period of November 1970 - April 1971. 105 of these cases involved heroin.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Surveys conducted at units and reports from medical and CID personnel point to a serious drug problem within the command. Although much effort has been made to counteract this problem, reports of ever increasing use of drugs prevail.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** A massive Vietnamese Government effort to cut off the source of illegal drugs appears to be the most effective solution to the drug problem. This command has requested the co-operation of the Mayor of Cam Ranh City in preventing entry of illegal drugs onto the Cam Ranh Bay Peninsula, however the problem is widespread and should be attacked at the national level.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** The command has established programs for educating personnel on the dangers of drug abuse. A Drug Amnesty and Drug Rehabilitation Program has been established and a Rehabilitation Center is scheduled for opening during the month of May. These actions will assist greatly in reducing drug abuse, but under no circumstances are they a solution to this dreadful problem.

b. Intelligence: None

c. (U) Operations

(1) Improvement and Modernization

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The greatest problem encountered in the Improvement and Modernization (I&M) Program has been the lack of a USARV or a MACV planning and coordinating office which would monitor the overall I&M program and give pertinent guidance to subordinate commands. There has been no firm establishment as to what equipment and facilities should be offered to ARVN and within what definite time frame a transfer should be accomplished.

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AVCA GO-N

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Can Binh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCE CSFOR-65 (R3)

(b) **EVALUATION:** The Support Command has continued to pursue an active Vietnamization program, but this program has been limited for three reasons: the lack of a responsive planning and coordinating committee; the lack of sufficient ARVN and US translators within the Buddy and Switch Projects; and the reluctance of ARVN to accept facilities and equipment on a rigid schedule and in a realistic condition rather than an ideal one.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That a USAFV or a MACV central coordinating office assume the responsibility for monitoring the Improvement and Modernization Program. This would enable Support Command project officers the opportunity to go to a central office for specific guidelines and instruction.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** All Vietnamization projects will continue to be implemented in the most expeditious and thorough manner.

(2) **Centralized Military Justice System**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The Support Command is not experiencing any difficulty in the operation of a centralized military justice system.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The centralized military justice system has greatly improved the administration of military justice in the Support Command. This system allows courts-martial to be tried in a more efficient and expeditious manner.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the centralized system be continued at Support Command.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** No action needs to be taken to continue the system.

(3) **Combined Police Patrols**

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US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending  
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Close cooperation and liaison between military, allied and civilian police agencies is essential in maintaining effective law enforcement activities in an area occupied by forces of several different nations.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The initiation of Combined Police patrols greatly enhanced the effectiveness of law enforcement activities off Cam Ranh Peninsula. These patrols extend from Myca Checkpoint north to Tan Thanh and south 10 Kilometers south of Ba Ngoi along QL 1.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That continued emphasis be placed on the operation of Combined Police Patrols and liaison with Local National and Allied Police agencies.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** The Command has coordinated, established and is supporting a Combined Police Station in Ba Ngoi City.

(4) **Convoy Security Force.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** During the last six months the line haul tonnage has averaged 13,300 S/T per month. The capability for the same period has averaged 14,800 S/T per month. While the requirements have increased, the driver posture has become extremely critical. One factor that has been limiting capability is the use of drivers for security and control. Approximately 20 individuals are utilized as security guards per convoy and as a result approximately 20 vehicles are available per day without drivers.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The non availability of approximately 20 vehicles and 20 drivers decreases the line haul capability approximately 4,000 S/T per month.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Present medium truck TO&E's are designed to be implemented in secure areas and do not provide for security forces. It is felt that significant improvements could be made to future line haul operations if a detachment TO&E were established to provide security for tactical convoys.

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30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters  
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30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (23)

Such an organization would consist of qualified light weapons personnel, control vehicles, and medium weight high speed, armored vehicles that would be conducive to convoy travel.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The Army Concept Team has made several complete studies of convoy operations in RVN. The concept of a separate security force was recommended to the Army Concept Team and is currently under evaluation.

d. (U) Organization: Reorganization of Transportation Responsibilities

(1) OBSERVATION: Prior to 5 January 1971, line haul responsibility was divided between the 124th Trans Command and the 54th General Support Group. The responsibility for port operations and port clearance was divided between Hq, 124th Trans Command, the 10th Trans Battalion, and the 24th Trans Battalion. Significant problems were realized with coordination, command and control, and maintenance.

(2) EVALUATION: The concept of the reorganization was to consolidate transportation missions under the appropriate command.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: N/A

(4) COMMAND ACTION: On 5 January 1971 the 24th Trans Battalion assumed responsibility for line haul operations. The 360th Trans Company was transferred from the 54th General Support Group to the 24th Trans Bn. The two port and beach clearance units, the 24th and 502nd companies were transferred to the 10th Trans Bn, which also assumed responsibility for the operation of all shallow draft facilities. It has been projected that the 10th Trans Bn will also assume operational control from Hq's 124th Trans Command for the deep draft facility. The reorganization placed line haul operations under the 24th Trans Bn and placed the complete operation of port facilities, to include security, under the 10th Trans Bn.

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Since this reorganization an increased efficiency in over all highway and port operations and a more effective command control within designated areas of responsibility has been realized.

e. Training: None

f. (U) Logistics

(1) Highway Capability Computation

(a) **OBSERVATION:** In computing highway tonnage capability, many organizations are satisfied with the standard capability formula, which uses various standard items without regard to mission, environment, or availability of personnel and/or equipment. In many instances a standard formula is used for high level transportation planning, which usually creates an unrealistic projection of logistical transport ability.

(b) **EVALUATION:**

1. The following is a comparison between the rated, adjusted (realistic), and performance of the 24th and 10th Trans Battalions highway capabilities for a seven month period:

a. 24th Trans Battalion (Line Haul)

|          | <u>RATED CAPABILITY (S/T)</u> | <u>ADJUSTED CAPABILITY</u> | <u>PERFORMANCE</u> |
|----------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| October  | 18,900                        | 13,200                     | 10,300             |
| November | 18,900                        | 13,900                     | 13,800             |
| December | 17,200                        | 12,700                     | 11,700             |
| January  | 21,500                        | 14,000                     | 14,000             |
| February | 24,600                        | 14,500                     | 16,200             |
| March    | 24,400                        | 14,100                     | 14,700             |
| April    | 22,500                        | 13,400                     | 15,600             |
| Total    | 148,000                       | 96,800                     | 82,300             |
| Average  | 21,143                        | 13,400                     | 13,186             |

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b. 10th Trans Battalion (Port and Beach Clearance)

|          | <u>RATED CAPABILITY</u> | <u>(S/T)</u> | <u>ADJUSTED CAPABILITY</u> | <u>PERFORMANCE</u> |
|----------|-------------------------|--------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| January  | 95,400                  |              | 61,500                     | 52,300             |
| February | 93,800                  |              | 63,500                     | 45,200             |
| March    | 90,100                  |              | 54,700                     | 42,500             |
| April    | 89,800                  |              | 57,100                     | 55,900             |
| Total    | 369,100                 |              | 236,800                    | 206,900            |
| Average  | 92,275                  |              | 59,200                     | 51,475             |

2. Capability Computation

a. Line Haul capability

The following is an example computation and explanation of line haul capability (long and short haul):

|            | <u>OH</u> | <u>Avail</u> | <u>Short</u> | <u>B/T-Ref</u> | <u>Trips</u> | <u>S/T</u> | <u>CAPABILITY</u> |
|------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|------------|-------------------|
| Long 184 x |           | .75          | - 37         | - 17           | x 15         | x 10       | = 12,600          |
| Short 37   |           |              | -            | - 4            | x 30         | x 10       | = 9,900           |
|            |           |              |              |                |              |            | <u>22,500</u>     |

- OH - On hand number of prime movers (M52, 6-ton tractors)
- Avail - Availability (deadline, non-mission, etc)
- Short - Short line haul convoys, one day turnaround
- B/T-Ref- Bobtails, refuel tanker, tire trucks
- Trips - The number of expected convoys per month (long hauls average a two-day turnaround)
- S/T - Short tons per vehicle utilizing M127, 12-ton S&P

Adjusted Capability:

|          | <u>OH</u> | <u>DL</u> | <u>NA Dvr</u> | <u>NA Othr</u> | <u>B/T</u> | <u>Short</u> | <u>Trips</u> | <u>S/T</u> | <u>ADJ CAP</u> |
|----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|----------------|------------|--------------|--------------|------------|----------------|
| Long 184 | 65        | -         | - 21          | - 21           | - 17       | - 37         | x 15         | x 10       | = 3,450        |
| Short 37 |           |           |               |                | - 4        |              | x 30         | x 10       | = 9,900        |
|          |           |           |               |                |            |              |              |            | <u>13,350</u>  |

- DL - Deadline
- NA Dvr - Nonavailable, lack of drivers
- NA Othr- Nonavailable, admin and nonmission duty

b. Port and Beach Capability:

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**Rated Capability:**

|      | OH   | Avail | S/T  | T/A | Days | Capability    |
|------|------|-------|------|-----|------|---------------|
| M 52 | 41 x | .75 x | 3 x  | 5 x | 30   | 35,800        |
| M 54 | 41 x | .75 x | 4 x  | 6 x | 30   | 22,320        |
| KW   | 30 x | .50 x | 17 x | 4 x | 30   | 30,600        |
|      |      |       |      |     |      | <u>88,720</u> |

T/A - Number of turnarounds per day

KW - Kenworth tractors

**Adjusted Capability**

|      | OH   | DL   | NA Dvr | NA Othr | T/A  | S/T | Days | Adj Cap       |
|------|------|------|--------|---------|------|-----|------|---------------|
| M 52 | 41 - | 7 -  | 8 -    | 11      | x 5  | x 6 | x 30 | 21,600        |
| M 54 | 41 - | 10 - | 8 -    | 2       | x 4  | x 6 | x 30 | 15,120        |
| KW   | 30 - | 15 - | 6 -    | 1       | x 17 | x 5 | x 30 | 20,400        |
|      |      |      |        |         |      |     |      | <u>57,120</u> |

c. By computing an adjusted capability, the ability of the Command is more objectively realized. An adjusted capability will consider such items as driver shortage, availability due to deadline, non-mission requirements, (e.g. pre-convoy loading, administrative transport requirements, maintenance support) and type and frequency of convoys. A rated or standard capability will tend to show an inflated or "look good" type posture and will not present the true picture. An adjusted capability will also indicate areas that may require improvement, i.e. high deadline, excessive administrative requirements, or critical driver shortages.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Due to varying situations and environments in which transportation units operate, it is recommended that a less standard formula be established, similar to the formula shown herein, to reflect capabilities which represent an objective ability of a certain unit based upon the area in which it is operating.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** This command has been computing capability based on local factors and has experienced relatively favorable results. A recommendation will be drafted to modify capability formulas. The recommendation will include samples and explanations and will be sent to:

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Commanding Officer  
US Army Combat Developments Command  
Transportation Agency  
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

(2) Retrograde

(a) OBSERVATION: There have been instances where ammunition, ammunition components, explosives or other hazardous materials have been found in vehicles which are candidates for the Retrograde Program.

(b) EVALUATION: Hazardous material in retrograde equipment can endanger the lives of personnel working in and around this equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all Commanders continuously review their turn-in procedures to insure that all vehicles qualifying for turn-in as retrograde are in fact free from hazardous material.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The Command has published a new retrograde regulation that establishes explicit procedures and responsibilities. A Quality Assurance program was instituted in USAD-CRB, the primary shippers, to insure that no hazardous material is contained in vehicles offered for retrograde. A final inspection is made by Port Authorities prior to offshore shipments and certifications are perpetuated throughout the transportation system.

(3) Sea Land Ammunition Movement (SLAM)

(a) OBSERVATION: SLAM shipments to Qui Nhon during this reporting period have been very limited. The popularity of this system whereby ammunition was through put on trailers via LST to Qui Nhon for rapid discharge with less handling has diminished due to inherent faults within the system. Trailer maintenance and lack of timely response to turn around requirements have been major contributing factors to the problems of this system. In addition, the number of LSTs dedicated to the SLAM System have been limited and erratic.

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(b) **EVALUATION:** After ammunition stocks were destroyed at Qui Nhon in the April 1971 explosion, CEB was tasked with rebuilding Qui Nhon Class V stockage. Break bulk shipments have proven the most reliable and practical for this tank.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That resupply to Qui Nhon continue via break bulk.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** Break bulk shipments will continue.

(4) Ammunition Surveillance Activities

(a) **OBSERVATION:** A vigorous ammunition surveillance program has commenced over the past four months by the 191st Ordnance Battalion. This program emphasizes inspection, maintenance, and rewarehousing of Class V items.

(b) **EVALUATION:** This program, although in the embryonic stage, has proven its validity whereby unserviceable and suspended ammunition has been substantially reduced.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That this program continue in full scale thus implementing not only a mission of receipt and issue but also of care and preservation of Class V stocks.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** Continued monitorship of the practicality of this program.

(5) Report of Survey Review

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Unit procedures for reporting lost or damaged property often fail to meet the requirements of appropriate regulations, especially those dealing with reports of survey.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Individuals therefore are not made to feel the personal responsibility which must accompany possession and use of government equipment. The combat environment intensifies the problem. Abuse and cannibalization of equipment are common consequences.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: N/A

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This Headquarters has begun each week to inspect the report of survey procedure of one battalion and to inspect that battalion's motor pools for damaged vehicles which require survey. These motor pool visits have been especially productive in getting surveys promptly initiated. Furthermore, awareness of proper property accountability and responsibility has greatly increased.

(6) Reimbursable Support Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: Goods and services which the Support Command provides non-Army customers under Interagency and Interservice Support Agreements (IASA's and ISSA's) are required to be fully reported in order that proper billing or cost transfer action can be taken.

(b) EVALUATION: The basis of the system is the identifying, documenting, and reporting by the individual issue or service activity of this non-Army support and is the source of the system's weakness because of the turbulent nature of the Vietnam conflict. This command has nevertheless greatly improved all phases of its accounting for support provided non-Army customers; the following measures have been especially helpful:

1. The number of billings contested by customers issued goods from the US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay was significantly reduced by requiring a signed DD Form 1348-1 or DA Form 2756-1 on hand prior to submission of the MRO card for billing. This insures that an actual issue to the customer was made, not just an inventory drop.

2. All reimbursable and cost transfer documentation for POL issued at Cam Ranh and its LSA's has been consolidated at the 1st S&S Bn, which screens documents for completeness and correctness, forwards one copy for billing, and retains one copy in the event of a questioned billing. This procedure has sharply increased POL reimbursements.

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3. To insure that all reimbursable issues are reported, this Headquarters has intensified inspections of all issue activities. During these inspections activity files are reviewed for documents not forwarded, personnel are briefed, and SOP's, regulations, and ISSA files are updated. These inspections are especially necessary because of personnel turbulence and have improved the reimbursable program.

4. Port documentation personnel are reviewing incoming manifests to insure that terminal services provided non-Army customers are identified and reported IAW the recently published USARV Reg 37-14.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That other Support Commands adopt any of these measures which may be beneficial to their own reimbursable support programs.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** None

(7) **Contract Laundry**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** During the reporting period the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) encountered difficulty in checking the contractor's consolidated invoice against the laundry tickets of the supported units.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Checking the unit tickets against the contractor's receipts is the only means the COR has for verifying the contract claims. Until March the COR did not receive all forms requiring checks.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** None

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** The COR for the contract installed a locked box at the laundry plant. He now receives all unit laundry tickets, and an accurate check of the contractor's claim is now possible.

(8) **Graves Registration**

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(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period two search and recovery missions were necessary. On both occasions after the team had reached the crash site, a need for additional personnel and equipment arose.

(b) EVALUATION: Had a prior survey been made by an Engineer recovery specialist and a Graves Registration NCO, these delays would not have occurred.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The G-3 of 1st Field Force Vietnam, who has responsibility for planning, organizing, and implementing all search and recovery operations, should in future missions insure that a qualified Graves Registration NCO and Army Engineer are inserted into the crash site before the operation starts to determine the type of equipment and the number of personnel needed to effect recovery.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The G-3 of 1st Field Force will take necessary action on future missions.

(2) Property Disposal

(a) OBSERVATION: Higher proceeds are available in the Philippines rather than Okinawa from the sale of property disposal assets.

(b) EVALUATION: Two test sales were conducted in Okinawa for a total of \$3,256,315 worth of material. The higher proceeds available in Okinawa were offset by the higher cost of extra transportation and handling resulting in a net loss of \$46,952 for the first sale and \$13,213 for the second sale. It was learned that the items were shipped to the Philippines after purchase. A shipment was then made to the Philippines from Da Nang and the sale yielded a return of 32% profit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That future sales be conducted in the Philippines provided the market remains stable.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The property disposal activity is in process of preparing a shipment to the Philippines,

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**g. (U) Communications: Antenna Location on LCU Watercraft**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** It was determined that there was a problem in radio communications on the LCU watercraft. The LCU's could not maintain contact with the base station when out of the harbor.

(2) **EVALUATION:** Investigation revealed that super-structure configuration had been altered on the craft. Most vessels had pilot cabins added. These cabins were constructed either of metal or wood. The antenna was masked by the added cabins, and only a portion of the antenna mast was above the cabin. There was an additional problem, particularly with the metal cabins, in that the antennas were located near the vertical sides of the cabin, and a capacitive effect was created when the radio transmitter was keyed. Reflective wave measurements indicated that some radios were broadcasting at less than 10% of their rated output.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** The antennas should be relocated to the top of the mast assembly.

(4) **COMMAND ACTION:** All antennas were relocated. The result was a marked improvement in range and output of the radios.

**h. (U) Material: 20 Ton Crane Serviceability**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** The Cam Ranh Bay Support Command serviceability rating for 20 ton cranes from November 1970 thru March 1971 had continually been below the UCARV goal of 80%. For December 1970 our average operational rate dropped to its overall low of 53%.

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(2) EVALUATION: a. Because CRB supports such a low density of 20 ton cranes, a total of 24, consisting of both truck mounted and rough terrain, most of the needed repair parts are not stocked in theater and must be shipped from CONUS.

b. There is a multiplicity of models of truck mounted cranes within CRB.

c. It has been determined by technically qualified personnel that the primary causes for the high failure rates has been operator abuse and ineffective organizational maintenance.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: a. Determine those repair parts that are continually needed and insure that they are stocked within the supply system.

b. Eliminate the multiplicity of models within the command and retain one model (single manufacturer) to insure that repair parts are more easily expedited.

c. Initiate quarterly training for both operators and organizational maintenance personnel within the command.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Due to adherence with the recommendations stated in paragraph (c) above, the CRB Support Command has increased the average operational rate to 84% for the month of April. With continuing emphasis this command should continue to be able to report that the 20 ton crane serviceability is above the USAFV goal.

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ing 30 April 1971, NCS CSFOR-02 (23)

20 Ton Cranes

% Operationally Ready

|        |    |
|--------|----|
| Nov 70 | 76 |
| Dec 70 | 53 |
| Jan 71 | 67 |
| Feb 71 | 67 |
| Mar 71 | 69 |
| Apr 71 | 34 |

1. (U) Weather

(1) Problem: Each year from November thru February MR 2 South enters into the so-called wet season. Thus a lesson learned during these months centers around the problems associated with the timely transport of supplies to different LSA locations.

(2) Evaluation: During the monsoon season or the wet months transportation operations are greatly hampered by the inordinate amount of rain and high winds which characterize this period. Of particular note are the shallow draft resupply and retrograde operations conducted to Phan Rang and Nha Trang. The flat-bottomed LCUs are not suitable for operations during extreme sea conditions, and therefore, appropriate adjustments must be made to alter schedules and gain optimum use of good weather. Another problem area has been convoy movement into the Southern region to include Dalat, Dillard and Duc Trong. Unimproved roads are numerous and extremely hazardous in and around the the Goodview Pass region. Convoy operations to Ban Me Thuot, Nha Trang and Phan Rang are rarely effected by the road conditions, but they are subject to the normal restrictions of inclement weather.

(3) Recommendations: Although many different aspects of inclement weather may adversely affect shallow draft and convoy operations, the anticipatory and preventive measures that this Support Command takes will provide a good basis for initial considerations under like circumstances.

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
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters  
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ing 30 April 1971, RCC CSFOR-65 (R3)

(4) Command Actions:

(a) Project "Overload": Prior to the onslaught of the wet season, the Support Command institutes overload missions which normally start in early October. The function of these operations is to over supply or "overload" those areas which are difficult to resupply during inclement weather. Shallow draft and convoy operations are stepped up to those areas mentioned previously to provide alternate support for the monsoon season.

(b) Augmentation of normal supply modes: Alternate modes for resupply to potential monsoon stricken areas are selected. For the Dillard, Dalat, Duc Trong area resupply is by air and therefore, prior coordination is conducted between the Army and the Air Force. Likewise, Phan Rang and Nha Trang resupply can be satisfied by convoy or air operations.

(c) Advent of the wet season: Once the wet season has arrived priority is given to those areas which are having resupply difficulties. This last step requires continual monitoring of all resupply operations and weather forecasting to assure that every area will be adequately resupplied.

  
H. A. KISSINGER  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

3 Incl

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Inclosures withdrawn

CF: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOB-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Washington, D.C. 20310

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AVHPO-DO (30 Apr 71) 1st Ind  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support  
 Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971, PCS CGROP-6  
 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-ED  
 APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
 Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
 for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, US Army Support  
 Command, Cam Ranh Bay and concurs.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Civil Military Operations," page 31,  
 paragraph 2a(3). Concur with Command Action. This Headquarters has  
 forwarded correspondence to all zone coordinators requiring the estab-  
 lishment or restructuring of Community Relations Committees. One of  
 the primary functions of the committee will be to review local incidents  
 occurring during the preceding calendar month to insure completeness of  
 claims investigation and necessary follow-up action.

b. Reference item concerning "Improvement and Modernization,"  
 page 33, paragraph 2c(1): Concur. The office of the Assistant Chief of  
 Staff for Military Assistance (MACMA) is the MACV centralized planning  
 and coordinating office to monitor and issue pertinent guidance for the  
 I&M Program. In addition, each MACV staff agency having an interest in  
 the I&M Program has their own respective point of contact for detailed  
 planning and coordination. Personnel desiring information can contact  
 MACMA at 923-2126. If their office cannot provide the information, they  
 will direct the request through the appropriate MACV agency. USARV  
 receives guidance and directives from MACV to carry out the I&M Program.  
 The USARV, DCSOPS, Plans Division, is the central point of contact for  
 coordinating the USARV portion of the I&M Program (telephone: 926-4842/  
 4246). Each USARV staff agency associated with the I&M Program has an  
 appointed action officer to carry out specific parts of the Program.

c. Reference item concerning "Retrograde," page 38, paragraph 2c(2):  
 Concur. USARV Reg 755-1 "Retrograde of Army Materiel," dtd 31 May 1971  
 establishes explicit procedures and responsibilities with respect to  
 hazardous materiel in retrograde cargo. In addition, an aggressive  
 inspection program has been initiated at the USARV staff level which will  
 help to reduce the possibility of shipping cargo containing hazardous  
 materiel.

AVHDO-DO (30 Apr 71) 1st Ind

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Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65  
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d. Reference item concerning "Sea Land Ammunition Movement (SLAM)," page 39, paragraph 2f(3): Concur. The last SLAM shipment from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon was made in January 1971. Since that time, break bulk shipments have been used. Break bulk shipments are considered the preferred method by this Headquarters and are expected to continue as the means of ammunition supply to Qui Nhon. Qui Nhon is now under the command of USASUPCOM Cam Ranh Bay and, consequently, will be resupplied by the method determined best by USASUPCOM Cam Ranh Bay. Unit has been so advised.

e. Reference item concerning "Ammunition Surveillance Activities," page 39, paragraph 2f(4): Concur. The surveillance program of inspection to include the periodic plan was instituted by msg AVHDL-AM-I 290340Z Jan 71 which involves scheduling of ammunition by lot for inspection. The inspection cycle was established as semi-annual for wooden boxed munitions and annually on separate loading projectiles. This Headquarters has further required the Support Command to furnish a semi-annual schedule with an update on a monthly basis. This report includes semi-annual projected workload and identifies periodic inspections accomplished for the previous month. The report is titled, Ammunition Surveillance Progress Report, RCS-PSU-199. This program is considered essential and will be closely monitored by this Headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
J. HONSOWETZ  
AGC.  
Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
USASUPCOM-CRB

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GPOP-FD (30 Apr 71) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ US Army  
Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending  
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGO  
Asst AG

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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13. ABSTRACT

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