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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA-A (M) (5 Apr 71) FOR OT UT 704218

13 April 1971

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st  
Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl  
as

*Verne L. Bowers*  
VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96384

AVBAGO

15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 1st Aviation  
Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. Command:

(1) The 1st Aviation Brigade mission of providing effective and responsive Army aviation support to US, RVN and FVMAF ground elements remained unchanged.

(2) Changes in Key Staff Personnel: The following changes were made in key staff personnel during the quarter:

(a) Brigade Commander:

COL Samuel G. Cockerham, TC, 425-34-0427	1 Aug 70 - 11 Aug 70
BG Jack W. Hemingway, USA, 462-12-6043	12 Aug 70 - Present

(b) Deputy Brigade Commander:

COL Samuel G. Cockerham, TC, 425-34-0427	12 Aug 70 - 3 Oct 70
COL John C. Hughes, IN, 332-12-5425	4 Oct 70 - Present

(c) Deputy Brigade Commander/Admin:

COL William D. Proctor, IN, 258-18-6325	1 Aug 70 - 4 Oct 70
COL F. N. MC Gullar, IN, 463-03-3556	5 Oct 70 - Present

(d) Chief of Staff:

LTC Gerald E. Royals, TC, 054-22-1860	1 Aug 70 - 12 Aug 70
COL Thorvold R. Torgersen, IN, 231-34-6442	13 Aug 70 - 15 Sep 70
LTC Gerald E. Royals, TC, 054-22-1860	16 Sep 70 - 19 Oct 70
COL Charles R. Smith, IN, 261-36-4599	19 Oct 70 - Present

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(e) Secretary of the General Staff:

MAJ Willis R. Bunting, FA, 221-24-0004	1 Aug 70 - 14 Oct 70
LTC David L. Mosher, FA, 507-28-6448	15 Oct 70 - Present

(f) G1:

LTC Anthony J. Idessa, IN, 156-24-8969	1 Aug 70 - 25 Aug 70
LTC Sydney L. Strickland, IN, 260-34-1633	26 Aug 70 - Present

(g) G2:

MAJ Miles C. Hedrick, IN, 243-50-7241	1 Aug 70 - 18 Sep 70
LTC William R. Fonshell, IN, 218-26-4059	19 Sep 70 - Present

(h) G3:

LTC Larry J. Baughman, IN, 512-24-8141	1 Aug 70 - 3 Sep 70
LTC George N. Ivey, IN, 254-52-1140	4 Sep 70 - Present

(i) G4:

MAJ Henry M. Hagwood, Jr., FA, 549-48-2410	1 Aug 70 - 12 Aug 70
LTC Gerald E. Royals, TC, 054-22-1860	13 Aug 70 - 15 Sep 70
MAJ Henry M. Hagwood, Jr., FA, 549-48-2410	16 Sep 70 - 19 Oct 70
LTC Gerald E. Royals, TC, 054-22-1860	20 Oct 70 - Present

(j) Staff Judge Advocate:

CPT Ronald G. Vantine, JL, 501-44-6139	1 Aug 70 - 15 Sep 70
CPT Davis C. Mitchell, JL, 539-40-7286	16 Sep 70 - Present

(k) Safety Officers:

MAJ Dulus E. Evans, FA, 429-58-4651	1 Aug 70 - 12 Oct 70
MAJ Wayne B. Davis, EN, 408-54-4447	13 Oct 70 - Present

(l) Flight Section:

CPT Salvatore A. Salupo, IN, 273-42-8520	1 Aug 70 - 8 Sep 70
CPT Merrill R. Menlove, FA, 528-36-4318	9 Sep 70 - Present

(m) Aircraft Maintenance Officer:

MAJ John R. Hopkins, TC, 408-48-3950	1 Aug 70 - 1 Sep 70
CPT Lou Litchfield, TC, 357-36-3974	2 Sep 70 - 15 Sep 70
CW4 Robert J. Sable, AV, 287-24-6518	16 Sep 70 - 1 Oct 70
LTC Earnest W. Ryan, IN, 446-28-2961	2 Oct 70 - Present

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(3) The organization of 1st Aviation Brigade units is shown in the Organization Chart at Inclosure 1 and the Station List at Inclosure 2.

b. GI/AG:

(1) Breakdown of *Aviators*

(a) Commissioned Officers	-	1851
(b) Warrant Officers	-	2261
(c) Total	-	4112

(2) Breakdown of Officers by Branch.

IN	-	307
AMEDS	-	47
LR	-	247
JA	-	3
AD	-	96
AG	-	13
FL	-	380
CH	-	19
SO	-	84
TC	-	125
MP	-	11
NI	-	10
CE	-	7
OD	-	6
CI	-	3
EN	-	160
GI	-	3
WO	-	2368

TOTAL 4389

(3) Brigade Strength. The strength of the 1st Aviation Brigade as of 31 Oct 70 was as follows:

UNIT	OFF	WO	ERL	TOTAL
HHC, 1st Avn Bde	67	20	230	317
12th CAG	542	635	4264	5441
17th CAG	619	871	5948	7438
164th CAG	484	599	4429	5512
165th CAG	132	63	1380	1575
212th CAB	177	180	1275	1582
TOTAL	2021	2368	17526	21915

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(4) Recommendations for Awards. The following is a report of actions taken on all awards recommendations received by this headquarters during the period 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970.

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>PROCESSED</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>
MH	1	1	0
DSC	3	3	1
DEM	0	0	0
SS	68	68	45
LOM	25	25	14
DFC	639	639	536
EM	61	61	61
BSM"V"	70	70	70
BSM	2164	2164	2164
AM"V"	415	415	415
AM	28591	28591	28591
ARCOM"V"	175	175	175
ARCOM	7684	7684	7684
PH	125	125	125

(5) Orders Published. General Orders published by Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, with totals by month, are as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>GENERAL ORDERS</u>
August	1013
September	1167
October	1018
TOTAL	3198

(6) R & R Data. During the period 1 August 1970 through 31 October 1970, a total of 4105 R&R allocations were received by this headquarters. Of this 3687 were utilized. The following is a breakdown by month:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SPACES ALLOCATED</u>	<u>SPACES USED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
Aug	1408	1248	88.7%
Sep	1385	1233	89.2%
Oct	1312	1206	91.9%
Totals	4105	3687	89.9%

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(7) Applications Received. The following reflects officer application/appointments received by month for the reporting period:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>OCS</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>DIA APP</u>	<u>RC</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Aug	0	1	4	1	6
Sep	0	1	7	8	16
Oct	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>28</u>
TOTALS	2	2	33	13	50

c. G2:

The following personnel Security Investigation actions were completed during the period 1 August 1970 through 31 October 1970:

- (1) Requests for Background Investigations: 17
- (2) Requests for verification of Background Investigations: 176
- (3) Requests for National Agency Checks: 19
- (4) Requests for verification of National Agency Checks: 110
- (5) Requests for verification of Entrance Nat'l Agency Checks: 75
- (6) Total PSI Actions: 397
- (7) Of these 397 PSI actions, 108 are pending and 289 were completed.

d. G3:

(1) The 1st Aviation Brigade has completed a compilation of all unit summary authorization documents into detailed MTOEs. The documents have been forwarded to USARV for review. The objective of this action was to give the units one detailed authorization document for their use and to establish a correct data base at USARPAC. This major task was accomplished well before the deadline established by USARV.

(2) Following the 30 day evaluation of FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) in August 1970 in MR 4, an additional 60 day evaluation commenced in MR 1 in early September 1970. Night surveillance and reconnaissance by fire missions flown by FLIR received an enthusiastic response from tactical units in MR 4. Estimated completion date of the 60 day evaluation in MR 1 is 5 Dec 70.

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(3) Evaluation of the YO-3A which began in May 1970 is still in progress. Three aircraft operating from Phu Bai support MR 1, four aircraft operating from Long Thanh support MR 3, and two aircraft operating from Binh Thuy support MR 4. Maintenance deficiencies in both the aircraft and mission equipment have caused considerable delay in the evaluation. Due to these delays the YO-3A evaluation has been extended 60 days. The YO-3A aircraft and evaluation personnel are assigned to 1st Avn Bde units, however, test and evaluation are under the proponent of ACTIV, and will be reported through ACTIV channels.

(4) Continued emphasis has been placed on civic action programs during the past quarter. An increase was realized in educational efforts provided for the Vietnamese. Other activities included construction and repair of schools and medical facilities and contributions of food, clothing, health items and money. Medical and dental assistance continued to be provided by widely employed MEDCAP and DENTCAP Teams.

(5) During the past quarter the 1st Aviation Brigade continued to use all available sources of in-country training to maintain a high state of operational readiness at all levels of command. In-country training is essential to augment training conducted in CONUS. The following data provides a recapitulation of the training quotas allocated to subordinate units during the reporting period:

(a) Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS). The school at Phu Loi continues to provide the 1st Avn Bde with its largest number of formally conducted courses. The AARTS, conducted by the 3rd General Support Group, provided regular training in the following courses (2d quarter quotas are also shown):

<u>COURSES</u>	<u>QUOTAS</u>
UH-1 Repair	43
CH-47 Repair	8
T53-L13 Engine	27
T55-L11 Engine	4
Armament #1 Crs (OFF)	9
Armament #1 Crs (EM)	24
Armament #2 Crs (AH-1G OFF)	8
Armament #2 Crs (AH-1G EM)	27
Tech Supply (PLL)	83
Tech Inspector	<u>25</u>
SUB-TOTAL 258	

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(b) USARV conducted aviator transition and maintenance courses:

<u>COURSES</u>	<u>QUOTAS</u>
AH-1G	23
CH-6	16
CH-58	24
(c) IP/SIF Courses	
AH-1G (USARV School)	7
CH-6	6
UH-1 (1st Avn Bde School)	32
(d) PACAF Life Support School	
Aviator	8
Enlisted Technician	15
TOTALS	113

(6) The INFANT System School, implemented to train aviators and enlisted men in the INFANT electronics system, was terminated on 3 Oct 70. Sufficient personnel were trained to operate and maintain the INFANT systems presently in country. Local unit transitioning and OJT is expected to satisfy further INFANT personnel requirements. Personnel and equipment from the INFANT school will be assigned to a Combat Aviation Group and integrated into one of the Assault Helicopter Companies.

(7) Significant progress continues toward accomplishing the objectives of the VNAF/AFGP/USARV Improvement and Modernization Helicopter Augmentation Plan 70-51, which has been reported in 1st Aviation Brigade OP-LL's dated 15 May 70 and 15 Aug 70. Highlights of the program during the past three months are:

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(a) VNAF pilot training conducted by 1st Aviation Brigade Units:

UNIT	LOCATION	TRAINING PERIOD	VNAF PILOTS		REMARKS
			START	COMPLETED	
336th AHC	Soc Trang	15 Jul - 15 Oct	20	18	1 WIA 1 Mod Rostr
189th AHC	Holloway	15 Aug - 15 Nov	20	N/A	
282d AHC	Da Nang	15 Sep - 15 Dec	20	N/A	
68th AHC	Bien Hoa	15 Aug - 15 Nov	19	N/A	1 KIA
170th AHC	Kontum	15 Oct - 15 Jan	20	N/A	
191st AHC	Can Tho	15 Oct - 15 Jan	10	N/A	*
61st AHC	An Son	15 Oct - 15 Jan	5	N/A	*
214th CMB	Vinh Long	15 Sep - 15 Dec	20	N/A	*

\* Training only; these units do not convert to VNAF Squadrons.

(b) VNAF UH-1 Maintenance training conducted by 1st Aviation Brigade units:

UNIT	LOCATION	TRAINING PERIOD	VNAF PILOTS		REMARKS
			START	COMPLETED	
121st AHC	Soc Trang	1 - 30 Aug	14	14	
336th AHC	Soc Trang	1 - 30 Sep	13	13	
189th AHC	Holloway	1 - 30 Oct	14	14	

(c) The 190th AHC converted to the 223d VNAF Helicopter Squadron on 2 Sep 70 at Bien Hoa. Aviation and support assets were transferred to the VNAF in a ceremony. An operations cadre and a maintenance augmentation team totaling 27 former 190th AHC personnel will remain for 90 days to assist the newly activated squadron in becoming operationally ready.

(d) The 121st AHC hold a conversion ceremony on 2 Oct 70 at Soc Trang, to mark the turn-over of aviation and support assets to the newly activated 225th VNAF Helicopter Squadron. An operations cadre and a maintenance augmentation team will also remain with the 225th for 90 days. Compositions of the Cadre/Team are:

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### OPERATIONS CADRE

1 Operations Officer  
2 Instructor Pilots  
11 Aircraft Commanders

### MAINTENANCE TEAM

1 Maintenance Officer  
1 Maintenance Supervisor  
11 Crew Chiefs

#### (e) VNAF CH-47 Training:

1. Aircraft transfers of CH-47 aircraft were accomplished as described by 1st Aviation Brigade OR-LL dated 15 Aug 70.

2. On 30 Sep 70 a ceremony was held at Phu Loi to mark the conversion of the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company into the 237th VNAF Medium Lift Helicopter Squadron. All personnel of the former 205th ASHC will remain in place until 1 Mar 71 to assist the 237th MLHS. The 205th ASHC is still assigned to the 11th CAB for administration and logistics, but has been placed under OPCON of Air Force Advisory Team 3 at Bien Hoa.

#### e. Q4:

(1) A "Mobile Maintenance Training Team" has been organized and is now in operation. The MMTT was established to give formal instruction and guidance in such areas as proper care and preventive maintenance procedures for the turbine engine, aircraft technical supply, maintenance management, quality control and aircraft topping which includes inflight testing. This team will visit aviation companies throughout the 1st Aviation Brigade and is comprised of:

- (a) MMTT Team Chief (64823)
- (b) MMTT Assistant Team Chief (64823/6710)
- (c) Rotary Wing Technical Inspector (67W40)
- (d) Turbine Engine Repairman (Supervisor) (66B40)
- (e) Aircraft Repair Parts Specialist (76T40)

(2) USAFVSCOM Safety of Flight Message dated 16 Sep 70 immediately grounded all CH-47C aircraft with the T55-L-11 engine due to in-flight engine failures. Special conversion teams arrived in the 1st Aviation Brigade on 14 Oct 70 and as of 31 Oct 70 have completed the conversion of 28 assigned aircraft.

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(3) The third unit within the 1st Aviation Brigade has successfully turned over its aircraft to the supporting DSU for further transfer to VNAF. This makes a total of 62 UH-1H's and 16 CH-47A's that have been transferred.

(4) The Brigade CMMI Team conducted 53 inspections during the quarter. This number includes 32 regular inspections, 9 re-inspections, and 12 courtesy inspections.

(5) The report of survey actions for the period were:

Total processed . . . . . 356

Personnel held. . . . . 78

Personnel relieved. . . . . 278

Dollar value of all surveys . . . \$2,936,312.74

\*Report of survey actions for the report period ending 31 Jul 70 did not include the data for Jul 70. The data for Jul 70 is: total processed - 103; personnel held - 18; personnel relieved - 85; dollar value - \$96,822.83.

(6) The following were approved or negotiated during the period:

Gratuitous issues . . . . . 35 approved

Temporary loans . . . . . 172 negotiated

Vietnam assets reconciliation program (VARP). . . . . 11 negotiated

Requests to operate at less than tabular authority . . . 83 approved

(7) The Brigade POL and ammunition term has taught 18 formal classes during the quarter, at various unit locations throughout Vietnam. Sixty (60) refueling and rearming points manned by Brigade personnel were either inspected or re-inspected and considerable improvement was noted in safety and quality control. Four classes remain to be taught and twenty-four (24) follow-up inspections are scheduled for the next quarter.

(8) An operational support mission was requested and approved to construct overhead shelters across all YO-3A revetments to protect the aircraft from the environment encountered in RVN. The initial design for the shelters consisted of a canvas cover support by cables and poles. Construction difficulties proved that design to be impractical. The Engineering Directorate, USAECV(P), is currently designing a wooden truss suitable to support a metal roof across the sixty-six (66) ft span required for the YO-3A.



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(9) Engineering Directorate, USAECV(P) has designed and tested precast, reinforced and relocatable concrete revetments to the size specifications required for Army aircraft. Such revetments are currently programmed as replacements for the U-21 aircraft revetments at Long Thanh North, Army Airfield.

(10) During the reporting period, the USARV Facilities Review Board approved the following projects which were requested by units of this command:

PROJECT NUMBER	JOB DESCRIPTION
993 . . . . .	Construct a 42,000 sq yd asphalt rotary wing aircraft parking ramp at Can Tho A.F.
1045 . . . . .	Upgrade the airfield at Duc Pho by designing and placing pavement on the 3600 ft x 60 ft runway and two 150 sq ft turn-arounds
1048 . . . . .	Upgrade the airfield at Quang Tri by designing and placing asphaltic pavement on the 3500 ft x 60 ft runway.
1051 . . . . .	Upgrade the airfield at Song Be by designing and placing asphaltic pavement on the 3500 ft x 60 ft runway and two 150 sq ft turn-arounds.
JOR 0140-71 . . . . .	Construct four O-1 minihangers over existing revetments to provide maintenance space for the 221st Aviation Company (Reconnaissance Airplane) at Vinh Long.
JOR 0035-71 . . . . .	Construct an air-conditioned, 20 sq ft extension on the dispensary at Vinh Long.

(11) EMK has completed work on USARV projects 1070 and 1072. The construction provided additional officer and enlisted billeting space, a mess hall and associated facilities such as latrines and showers for the aviation elements at Vinh Long.

(12) (C) An overall reduction in the budget by Department of the Army made it necessary to reduce the USARV FY 71 OMA budget for facilities engineering support by 26 million dollars. The reduction was absorbed by reducing the services provided by the facilities engineering contractors, i.e., Pacific Architects and Engineers, and Philco Ford. Consequently, aviation units and all other troop

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units have had to rely heavily on self-help to fulfill their facilities engineering requirements. In addition, expenditures for minor new construction and alterations have been curtailed except for support of the most urgent requirements.

(13) (C) During the reporting period, the following facilities were transferred to RVN L&M MLCV Directive 735-3:

(a) With the conversion of the 190th AHC, their billets and associated facilities and aircraft and motor maintenance facilities were transferred to VNAF. The transfer was accomplished through direct coordination with Air Force Advisory Team 3, VNAF and Facilities Engineering Directorate, USAECV(P).

(b) The installation of Soc Trang was transferred to VNAF, in conjunction with the VNAF, L&M program. In an associated move, the 13th CAG and the 221st RAC were relocated into facilities at Can Tho and Vinh Long, respectively.

(14) RMK completed the required testing of the high speed refueling system at Sanford Army Airfield and thereby officially fulfilled their contractual obligation. The system as designed, pumps fuel at a rate of from 100 to 150 gpm which is too high of a rate for Army aircraft. Consequently, the system requires a modification to reduce the pumping rate. The facilities Engineering Directorate, USAECV(P) has directed P&E to modify the system as required to make it a usable facility.

(15) (C) The following unit relocations occurred during the period:

(a) The 192d AHC moved from Phan Thiet into partially completed existing facilities at Phan Rang. Initially, many of the buildings occupied by the unit at Phan Rang did not have permanent roofs. Sufficient corrugated metal was obtained for the unit to install metal roofs employing self-help.

(b) The 135th and the 335th AHC's relocated from Bear Cat to Dong Tam, an RVN installation. The appropriate Land Use Agreement was obtained to station the units on the installation. The existing facilities such as billets, maintenance hangers, and mess halls required extensive rehabilitation. It was necessary to construct new support facilities such as showers, latrines, and water towers. Because of construction and materials difficulties, the required engineer effort has not been completed, however work is in progress.

(c) The 17th CAG and some of its subordinate elements have relocated to Tuy Hoa, which is being turned over to the US Army by the US Air Force. USAECV(P) has been tasked with the responsibility of providing adequate facilities engineering support for the installation. USARV approved a waiver which authorized the parking of Army aircraft in the Air Force type revetments with the stipulation that the aircraft would be ground handled in and out.

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### f. IO:

(1) Hometown News Releases. During the reporting period the Brigade submitted 6,185 Hometown News Releases to Hometown News Center at Kansas City for publication in CONUS newspapers. This is a slight increase over the previous reporting period and the increase was made during a period of decreasing Brigade strength.

(2) Press Releases. During the past quarter the Brigade Information Office has processed and released 161 external press releases to the civilian media. It also handled the press arrangement for four major I&M ceremonies to include the coordination of transportation, communications, and releases for the civilian press corps.

(3) "The World I See." The 1st Aviation Brigade's multi-screen audio-visual presentation, "The World I See" was presented at the Army Aviation Association of America's annual convention in Washington D.C., on 14 October 1970 at the invitation of BG William J. Maddox, Jr., the Director of Army Aviation.

### g. Surgeon:

(1) Personnel. During the reporting period the Brigade had no sustained critical shortages of medical personnel. All flight surgeon positions were filled during most of the accounting period. Administrative officers were assigned to the Groups and the Brigade Surgeon's Office during the entire reporting period. During the months of August and September, nine of the thirteen Medical Service Corps positions were filled at the Battalion level. This is a precedent as never before have MSC Officers been made available for assignment at the battalion level. These officers have been a valuable asset to the physicians by relieving them of many administrative burdens thus helping them to better accomplish their medical mission.

#### (2) Operations.

(a) The scaling down of American troop population and activity coupled with the Vietnamization program has affected medical support within the Brigade. There have been several relocations and consolidations of medical detachments during the reporting period. The 41st Med Det (O.) has moved from Soc Trang to Dong Tam. The 17th C&G Surgeon has moved along with Group Headquarters from Nha Trang to Tuy Hoa. All 13th C&G medical assets have moved from Soc Trang to Can Tho along with the Battalion Headquarters.

(b) During the reporting period the US&RV Amnesty Policy was implemented at all levels of command in the 1st Aviation Brigade. Through the efforts of flight surgeons, chaplains, and lawyers each commander was informed as to the

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 15 November 1970

policies of the program, and they in turn disseminated this information to all the troops at the lowest levels. Presently there are no statistics available concerning the effects of the amnesty program. However, by the end of the next reporting period, there should be some figures to show the number of persons applying for amnesty and those who qualified, as this is part of the weekly telegraphic morbidity report obtained by the Surgeon.

**h. Aviation Safety:**

(1) The 1st Aviation Brigade flew 381,485 hours during the reporting period and experienced 62 aircraft accidents. The aircraft accident rate for the quarter, based on 100,000 flying hours, was 16.3.

(2) 48 per cent of the total accidents during this quarter resulted from human cause factors. Engine failures were the greatest material cause factor and accounted for 37 per cent of the total accidents.

(3) Fixed wing accidents accounted for 5 of the 62 accidents representing an upward trend of fixed wing accidents. The fixed wing accident rate for this quarter was 8.0, compared to the 17.9 rate for rotary wing aircraft per 100,000 flying hours.

(4) During the last quarter the Aviation Safety Section visited a total of 34 battalion and company sized units. These visits proved beneficial in assisting the aviation accident prevention program at the lowest unit level.

**(5) Aircraft Accident Statistics:**

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>TOTAL FLYING HOURS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>RATE*</u>
August	135,247	27	19.9
September	129,952	19	14.6
October	116,286	16	13.8

\*per 100,000 flying hours

**i. Chaplain:**

(1) Group Religious Services

(a) Sunday/Weekly

1. Number Conducted: 1348

2. Number Attending: 23,814

14

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(b) Memorial Services

1. Number Conducted: 34
2. Number attending: 3018
- (2) Number of Pastoral Visits: 10,412
- (3) Number of Counselings and Interviews: 10,446
- (4) Character Guidance
- (a) Number of Classes: 118
- (b) Number Attending: 11,585

j. Headquarters and Headquarters, Company Commander: No input

k. Historians

(1) Combat Art Team. Despite the presence of only one combat artist during the last six weeks of the quarter, the Brigade Combat Art Team accomplished the following:

- a. The creation of all illustrations for the three monthly editions of Hawk Squawks.
- b. The creation of 29 oil and acrylic paintings.
- c. The creation of illustrations for the HAWK magazine.
- d. The shipment of six paintings to the USARPAC Annual Armed Forces Art Show.

(2) Combat After Action Interview Reports. Eleven Combat After Action Interview Reports were completed and submitted to the Office of the Chief of Military History.

(3) Historical Collection. The historical section commenced shipment of the captured enemy weapons and equipment in the 1st Aviation Brigade Historical Collection to the United States Army Aviation School Museum, Fort Rucker, Alabama. In addition six paintings were transferred to the USJMW Nature of War Museum.

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(4) Lineage and Honors. During the reporting period the historical section initiated the collection of unit patches from each of the Brigade's subordinate units for eventual display at the U. S. Army Aviation School Museum. The historical section researched 20 congratulatory Unit Dry Letters to the Brigades subordinate units. The historical section also initiated the compilation of all awards (U.S. and Foreign) received by the Brigade's subordinate units.

(5) End of Tour Interviews. Ten End of Tour Interviews of significant unit commanders were conducted and transcribed during the reporting period. In addition, the historical section compiled a list of 33 initial topics for selection and incorporation into the Commanding General's Senior Officers Debriefing Report.

### 2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, Recommendation and Action.

a. Personnel: No Input

b. Operations: No Input

c. Training:

(1) Simulated Right, Left Fixed Pedal Antitorque Failure.

(a) OBSERVATION: The training time spent on these maneuvers is longer than any other maneuver taught at the UH-1 IP School. There has been one major accident and one known incident that occurred while practicing these maneuvers.

(b) EVALUATION: Brigade Aviation Safety researched the records for the past twelve months and did not find an accident or incident that was attributable to right or left fixed pedal antitorque failure.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That simulated right and left fixed pedal antitorque failures be abolished as a training maneuver in USARV.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: 1st Aviation Brigade has requested authority from USARV to eliminate this maneuver from the USARV IP School FCI and no longer requires it be taught or practiced at unit level.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Effects of Helicopter Air Strikes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Although armed helicopters have been operating in RVN for a considerable time no current information on their effects upon enemy tactics training and anti-helicopter defense had been made.

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(b) **EVALUATION:** No recent intelligence study had been made on the effects of armed helicopter upon the enemy.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That G2 conduct such a study.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** G2 was directed to prepare the subject study. Study is attached as Incl 3.

(2) **OV-1 Collection Program Improvement.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** A quantity of information collected by OV-1 Mohawk Aircraft was not being fully exploited for intelligence production.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Data on the time and location of sensor omissions and radar sightings, although fully evaluated on Immediate Imagery Interpretation Reports (IIIR) was not retained on a permanent basis by any agency in the intelligence community in RVN for the purpose of area pattern analysis. This occurred because a convenient means of information storage and retrieval has not been sought and made available.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That a computer be programmed to store and present our command information collected in a usable form.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** Coordination was made with an agency equipped with such a computer so that such information could be stored and made available to users on request.

**e. Logistics:**

(1) **Unauthorized modifications of the M-60 Machine Gun.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Some M-60 machine guns recently turned into direct support units of the 34th General Support Group by units of the 1st Aviation Brigade contained unauthorized modifications.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Inspections by this headquarters and reports which have been forwarded from the 34th General Support Group indicate that some units are utilizing M-60 machine guns which have had unauthorized modifications performed on them. Examples of such modifications include the adding of springs in the cover assembly and to the operating rod, and the cutting of holes or grooves in the buffer assembly. It should be noted that these modifications could cause loss of life or injury to personnel.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That unit commanders and maintenance officers insure that no unauthorized modifications exist on any assigned weapons systems.

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(d) **CORRECTED ACTION:** A Brigade message, dated 10 Oct 70, was sent to all major commands directing that all Commanders take action to insure that unauthorized modifications do not exist on assigned weapon systems. This headquarters will continue to insure that weapon systems assigned to the 1st Aviation Brigade have no unauthorized modifications.

### (2) Aircraft Turn-In for VNAF.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Using the established criteria, the Brigade Aircraft Maintenance Officer selected the tail numbers of aircraft to be turned-in by the Brigade units for VNAF.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Overall maintenance condition of the aircraft was not considered in the selection nor was aircraft configuration, e.g., VIP aircraft. This method caused frequent delays and was not satisfactory.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That unit commanders and maintenance officers select the aircraft to be turned-in for VNAF utilizing established criteria.

(d) **CORRECTED ACTION:** Unit commanders have been directed to select the aircraft for turn-in to VNAF.

### (3) Firefighting/Crash-Rescue Capability.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The reduction in facilities engineering support throughout RVN resulted in airfields at Pleiku, Soc Trang, Can Tho, Tay Ninh, Lai Khe and Quang Loi being left without adequate firefighting/crash-rescue protection.

(b) **EVALUATION:** In 1967, facilities engineering assumed responsibility for firefighting and crash-rescue at Army airfields in RVN. When this occurred, most aviation units no longer had a need for personnel or equipment to perform this TOE mission and personnel and equipment were withdrawn. With the current reduction of facilities engineering support the fire fighting mission, which had been accomplished by facilities engineering, was vastly reduced in scope and the aviation units on site were ill-prepared to assume the mission.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the facilities engineering elements and aviation units coordinate closely on all matters concerning facilities reduction in regards to fire-fighting and crash-rescue. That aviation unit's TOE mission of fire-fighting and crash-rescue remain at full strength to allow the commanders to retain the capability to accomplish the mission where-ever the unit is located.



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(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** This headquarters will closely monitor all facilities engineering reduction to preclude incidents of this nature.

f. **Organization:** None

g. **Information:** None

h. **Signal:**

(1) **Premature Obsolescence of Federal Stock Numbers**

(c) **OBSERVATION:** Some federal stock numbered items have been removed from the supply systems while they were still needed by field units.

(b) **EVALUATION:** This unit recently experienced the following situation: MWO 55-1560-221-30/13 (AN/APX-72 provision) is being applied to all AH-1G aircraft. The modification calls for a new impedance matching network (FSN 1560-133-9320) to be installed. This MWO has not yet been applied to AH-1G aircraft in USARV. Unmodified aircraft require impedance matching network FSN 1560-937-2603. This latter FSN was declared obsolete on the Army Master Data List. Since requisitions for the latter item were automatically cancelled by computer processing, the premature obsolescence contributed to the current critical shortage of the item.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That a system of checks be implemented by DA, which would prevent an FSN from being declared obsolete until it becomes absolutely certain that the item is no longer needed.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** This unit has submitted a request through channels to retain a supply of these items.

i. **Surgeon:** No Input

j. **Safety:**

(1) **Engine Failures:**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Engine failures continue to be the largest single accident cause factor within the Brigade.

(b) **EVALUATION:** A suspected design deficiency in the T53-L-13A and T55-L11 engines has produced a substantial number of engine failures that have resulted in excessive accidents, incidents, precautionary and forced landings.

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(c) **RECOMMENDATIONS:** That the 6 point engine analysis program be continued and that the Aviation Safety and Aviation Maintenance sections monitor the results to identify any unit which experiences an abnormal number of engine failures in any given period. The system should also provide a current accounting of failure causes and the resulting type of mishap. (i.e., accident, incident, precautionary or forced landing).

(d) **ACTION:** The 6 point engine analysis program has been continued and information gathered from initial phases has been utilized to improve the TBC and DER checks on the engine. In addition, a mobile maintenance training team has been established to assist unit commanders in analyzing the maintenance program and taking any necessary corrective action. Additionally, significant trends in engine component failures are identified and presented to appropriate agencies for analysis and action.

(2) **Standing Accident Investigation Boards:**

(a) **OBSERVATIONS:** The quality of accident investigations performed and reported to this headquarters is less than desirable.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The inexperience of most aviators in performing the duties of accident investigation officer, the sometimes limited flying experience of the investigator, and the unfamiliarity of the officer with basic investigation regulations and procedures have resulted in accident investigation reports which are not thorough and which present invalid findings and recommendations.

(c) **RECOMMENDATIONS:** That each battalion-sized unit establish a Standing Accident Investigation Board which would include aviators in sufficient numbers to offer flexibility in assigning members for particular accidents. At least one member should be assigned for each type aircraft within the unit. The board should then be trained by the most qualified USC graduate in investigation techniques and given a thorough briefing in the proper procedures for completing the investigation and submitting the final report.

(d) **ACTION:** A letter has been sent to all group safety officers recommending that a Standing Accident Investigation be established at each battalion-sized unit. Specific recommendations were made concerning the training and assigning of the investigating officers.

k. Judge Advocate: No Input.

3 Incl  
as

*for*  
JACK W. HEMINGWAY  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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AVHDO-DO (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 1st  
Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65  
(R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 18 JAN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade and concurs.


2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Simulated Right, Left Fixed Pedal Antitorque Failure," page 16, paragraph 2c(1). Simulated antitorque failure training with the fixed left and right pedal setting was discontinued on 17 November 1970 as a required maneuver for all UH-1 helicopters. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Unauthorized modifications of the M-60 Machine Gun," page 17, paragraph 2e(1). The 1st Aviation Brigade should continue command and maintenance emphasis to ensure that only authorized modifications are performed on organic M-60 machine guns and other weapons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Premature Obsolescence of Federal Stock Numbers," page 19, paragraph 2h(1). FSN 1560-937-2603, Impedence Matching Network, has been reinstated as a valid FSN. Fourteen impedence matching networks were shipped to AMMC and future requisitions will be filled. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.  
Captain AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
1st Avn Bde


GPOP-DT (15 Nov 70) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Aviation Brigade,  
for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 FEB 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department  
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
L.M. OZARI  
CPT, AGO  
Asst AG

1st Avn Bde

As of 1 Nov 70



NOTE: 1. 164 CAG, 14th CAG, 71st, 174th & 176th ASHC attached to 23d Americal Division for all purposes (not shown above).  
 2. 478 Hvy Hel Co attached to 101st Airborne Division (Aml) for all purposes (not shown above).  
 3. 196th ASHC and C/16 ACS attached to the 22nd CAG.  
 4. \* 151 AHC, 199 C, 205 AHC, and 336 AHC are in units reduced cadre strength.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APO</u>
54th Util Apl Co	Long Thanh	96530
74th Recon Apl Co	Phu Loi	96289
<u>222d COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Bear Cat	96530
Hq & Hq Co	Bear Cat	96530
117th Aslt Hel Co	Long Binh (Plantation)	96266
195th Aslt Hel Co	Long Binh (Plantation)	96266
93d Med Det (OA)	Long Binh (Plantation)	96266
240th Aslt Hel Co	Bear Cat	96530
772d Med Det (OA)	Bear Cat	96530
273d Hvy Hel Co	Long Binh (MAAF)	96384
<u>269th COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Ou Chi	96353
Hq & Hq Co	Ou Chi	96353
187th Aslt Hel Co	Tay Ninh	96216
541st Med Det (OA)	Tay Ninh	96216
242d Aslt Spt Hel Co	Ou Chi	96353
3d SQUADRON 17th AIR CAVALRY	Di An	96289
HQ & HQ Troop	Di An	96289
A Troop	Di An	96289
B Troop	Di An	96289
C Troop	Quang Tri (Atch 212 CAB)	96477
D Troop	Di An	96289
<u>16th COMBAT AVN GP</u>	Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
HQ & HQ CO	Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
<u>14th COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
Hq & Hq Co	Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
14th Secty Plat	Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
534th Med Det (OA)	Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
71st Aslt Hel Co	Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
132d Aslt Spt Hel Co	Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
174th Aslt Hel Co	Duc Pho (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
756th Med Det (OA)	Duc Pho (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
176th Aslt Hel Co	24 Chu Lai (Atch 23d Amer Div)	96325

~~Incl 2~~

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APO</u>
178th Aslt Spt Hel Co	Chu Lai (atch 23d Amer Div)	96325
<u>212th COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Marble Mountain	96349
Hq & Hq Co	Marble Mountain	96349
59th SC Det (HL)	Hue Phu Bai	96308
21st Recon APL Co	Chu Lai	96374
62d Corps Avn Co	Marble Mountain	96349
116th Aslt Hel Co	Chu Lai	96374
431st Med Det (On)	Chu Lai	96374
131st Surv APL Co	Hue Phu Bai	96308
220th Recon APL Co	Hue Phu Bai	96308
134th Med Det (On)	Hue Phu Bai	96308
282d Aslt Hel Co	Marble Mountain	96349
519th Med Det (On)	Marble Mountain	96349
<u>17th COMBAT AVN GP</u>	Tuy Hoa	96316
Hq & Hq Co	Tuy Hoa	96316
25th Med Det (On)	Tuy Hoa	96316
201st Corps Avn Co	Nha Trang	96240
58th Avn Det	Nha Trang	96240
<u>10th COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Dong Ba Thin	96377
Hq & Hq Co	Dong Ba Thin	96377
130th Med Det (On)	Dong Ba Thin	96377
48th Aslt Hel Co	Ninh Hoa	96240
286th Med Det (On)	Ninh Hoa	96240
92d Aslt Hel Co	Dong Ba Thin	96377
155th Aslt Hel Co	Ban Me Thout	96297
8th Med Det (On)	Ban Me Thout	96297
185th Recon APL Co	Dong Ba Thin	96377
192d Aslt Hel Co	Phang Rang	96321
198th Med Det (On)	Phang Rang	96321
243d Aslt Spt Hel Co	Dong Ba Thin	96377
281st Aslt Hel Co	25 Nha Trang	96240

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APC</u>
<u>52d COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
HQ & HQ Co	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
52d Secty Plat	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
68th Inf Det (R&D&R)	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
94th Med Det (Cn)	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
57th Aslt Hel Co	An Khe (Camp Radcliff)	96294
193d Med Det (Cn)	An Khe (Camp Radcliff)	96294
119th Aslt Hel Co	An Khe (Camp Radcliff)	96294
170th Aslt Hel Co	Kontum	96499
154th Med Det (Cn)	Kontum	96499
179th Aslt Spt Hel Co	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
755th Med Det (Cn)	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
189th Aslt Hel Co	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
219th Recon AFL Co	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
361st Aerial Wpns Co	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
665th TC Det (AD)	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
621st SC Det (RL)	Pleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
<u>223d COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Qui Nhon	96238
HQ & HQ Co	Qui Nhon	96238
163d Med Det (Cn)	Qui Nhon	96238
18th Util Apl Co	Qui Nhon	96238
61st Aslt Hel Co	An Son (Lane AHP)	96226
129th Aslt Hel Co	An Son	96238
196th Aslt Spt Hel Co	An Son (Lane AHP)	96226
546th Med Det (Cn)	An Son (Lane AHP)	96226
225th Surv Apl Co	Tuy Hoa	96316
<u>268th COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Tuy Hoa	96316
HQ & HQ Co	Tuy Hoa	96316
433d Med Det (Cn)	Tuy Hoa	96316
134th Aslt Hel Co	Tuy Hoa	96316
180th Aslt Spt Hel Co	Tuy Hoa	96316
238th Aerial wpns Co	Tuy Hoa	96316

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APO</u>
355th Hvy Hel Co	Tuy Hoa	96316
7th SQDN 17 AIR CAVALRY	Fleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
Hq & Hq Troop	Fleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
A Troop	Fleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
B Troop	Fleiku (Camp Holloway)	96494
C Troop	An Khe (Camp Radcliff)	96490
D Troop	An Khe (Camp Radcliff)	96490
K Troop	Phan Thiet	96317
<u>164th COMBAT AVN GP</u>	Can Tho	96215
Hq & Hq Co	Can Tho	96215
52d QM Det (PLTRL)	Can Tho	96215
Btry H (Search Lt) 29th Arty	Can Tho	96215
62d QM Det (PLTRL)	Can Tho	96215
5th QM Det (PLTRL)	Can Tho	96215
53d QM Det (PLTRL)	Can Tho	96215
267th FA Det	Can Tho	96215
13th Scty Flat	Phu Minh	96215
78th FA Det (RADAR)	Can Tho	96215
268th FA Det	Can Tho	96215
261st FA Det (RADAR)	Vinh Gia	96215
269th FA Det	Vinh Long	96357
AM-1G MBTT (atch 12th CnG)	Nui Hon Soc	96215
OH-6A MBTT (atch 12th CnG)	Vung Tau	96291
69th Inf Det (RADAR)	Vung Tau	96291
262d FA Det (RADAR)	Soc Trang	96296
	Soc Trang	96296
<u>13th COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Can Tho	96215
Hq & Hq Co	Can Tho	96215
41st Med Det	Can Tho	96215
*121st Aslt Hel Co	Soc Trang	96296
162d Aslt Hel Co	Can Tho	96215
191st Aslt Hel Co	Can Tho	96215
221st Recon Apl Co	Can Tho	96215
*336th Aslt Hel Co	Soc Trang	96296
C Troop 16th Cav	27 Can Tho	96296

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APPO</u>
<u>214th COMBAT AVI BN</u>	Vinh Long	96357
Hq & Hq Co	Vinh Long	96357
758th Med Det (On)	Vinh Long	96357
114th Aslt Hel Co	Vinh Long	96357
135th Aslt Hel Co	Dong Tam	96357
175th Aslt Hel Co	Vinh Long	96357
335th Aslt Hel Co	Dong Tam	96357
<u>307th COMBAT AVI BN</u>	Can Tho	96215
Hq & Hq Co	Can Tho	96215
774th Med Det (On)	Can Tho	96215
73d Surv Apl Co	Long Thanh	96350
147th Aslt Spz Hel Co	Can Tho	96215
85th Med Det (CA)	Can Tho	96215
235th Aerial Wpn Co	Can Tho	96215
271st Aslt Spz Hel Co	Can Tho	96215
<u>7th SQDN 1st Air Cav</u>	Vinh Long	96357
Hq & Hq Troop	Vinh Long	96357
83d Med Det (CA)	Vinh Long	96357
A Troop	Vinh Long	96357
B Troop	Vinh Long	96357
C Troop	Vinh Long	96357
D Troop	Vinh Long	96357
D Troop, 23d Sqdn, 5th Air Cav	Vinh Long (attached)	96357

\*Denotes units reduced to cadre strength.

NOTE: All Aviation Detachments (D) on this listing are assigned to the 165th Aviation Group (Combat) and further attached to Brigade units or other Commands as indicated.

Request each CAG and 212th CAB verify the information and notify G-3, 1st Avn Bde, 926-2173/2703 of any corrections.

OFFICIAL:

IVEY  
LTC, IN  
G3

HEMINGWAY  
EG, USA  
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96384

AVBAGB

12 September 1970

SUBJECT: Effects of Helicopter Air Strikes

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1. (C) The following information is a compilation of 59 interrogation reports of former WA and VC personnel that were either captured or rallied to the GVN, all of whom had been subjected to air strikes, and covers a period from October 1967 to June 1970. Subject areas in which interrogators asked questions is attached. (Incl 1)

2. (C) Only six reports were used which included high performance aircraft and/or artillery support. Helicopters were used in each strike.

3. (C) Background information:

a. 20 personnel interrogated were members of the NVA.

b. Sources ranged from 15 to 39 years of age, and had from 0 to 7 years of formal education.

c. Military or VC experience ranged from one month to 22 years. Most of the VC had received little or no formal training. NVA personnel received from one to three months basic and some had attended officer and NCO schools.

d. Sources accounted for 396 KBA, 213 WBA, 110 deserters, 20 who rallied, 64 weapons destroyed, 22 sampans destroyed, 81 houses destroyed, 54 houses damaged and various supplies and equipment destroyed, as a result of the air strikes.

e. Sources knew of 14 aircraft being shot down, but had no information on hits.

4. (C) Tactics:

a. Small VC units or guerrilla teams seldom receive instructions on defensive action against helicopters and rely solely on avoiding detection and using the protection offered by covered trenches. In isolated cases

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the VC were instructed to shoot at aircraft only under the following circumstances:

- (1) It was certain that the unit's location had been positively identified.
- (2) Only when the aircraft was flying "low and slow", as at the bomb release point.
- (3) Only if the firer was certain he could shoot down the aircraft.
- (4) When ground troops were being inserted.

COMMENT: Since the first two stipulations presupposed an air strike in progress, the sources indicate that seldom would anyone expose themselves enough to fire at the aircraft, especially with only small caliber rifles.

b. Battalion size units normally have a small AA capability, but rely heavily on not being detected. Firing at aircraft is avoided, whenever possible, to preclude drawing an airstrike. An exception to this is that troops caught in the open use diversionary tactics. A predesignated cell of 3 men, or a squad dependent on the size of the unit and number of aircraft, is used to fire on the aircraft and draw attention away from the main body, enabling it to seek cover.

c. When engaging helicopters from dug-in positions, the conditions for engagement were that the aircraft must be within a lateral range of not more than 300 meters and a vertical range of not more than 150 meters. These conditions were imposed in order to bring effective fire on the target from all weapons within the unit. Although the light and heavy machineguns could bring effective fire on the aircraft at a distance in excess of 300 meters, the AK-47, the primary individual weapon, could be most effectively employed within 300 meters.

d. LZ Interdictory Tactics: Generally there are two methods employed in an effort to deny Allied helicopters the use of LZ's near a unit's base camp area.

- (1) Mines are laid approximately 10 to 15 meters apart. These mines consist of 3 kilograms of TNT and metal pellets, and a pressure fuse. They have an effective killing radius of up to 25 meters. (The mines are picked up when the unit leaves the area.)

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(2) A platoon is deployed around the LZ in order to ambush Allied troops arriving there. These ambushes are laid upon receipt of information that a helicopter operation was coming into their AO. (Sources stated that they often received warnings as much as two days in advance of an operation.) The purpose of the ambushes are twofold. First, to inflict casualties and damage or destroy aircraft, and second, to lead any pursuing force away from the main body of the unit. The latter is accomplished through the withdrawal of the ambushing unit in a direction away from the base camp area.

### 5. (U) Fortification and Deceys:

a. Fortified positions normally are "L" or "C" shaped, covered with timbers and 30 to 50 centimeters (12 to 20 inches) of dirt, and camouflaged with leaves and natural foliage to avoid detection.

b. When decoy positions are used, they are constructed 25 to 30 meters away from the primary positions, poorly camouflaged and normally manned by dummies. When aircraft attack the decoy positions they are engaged by a team of 3 cols. If the cols draw fire, they retreat into the shelters, withdraw as soon as possible and return to the base camp.

c. Trenches or simple fortified positions are normally prepared under the floor of houses in the area used as rest areas. The houses are located near well concealed trails leading to the fortified positions to allow most of the personnel in the area to retreat to the fortified positions without detection.

d. Positions are located approximately 50 meters from the banks of canals, sometimes in the trees, but normally on the outside edge of the tree line and always near the paddies.

### 6. (C) Morale:

a. The morale of personnel of units to which the sources were assigned ranged from high in units that had not been subjected to an air strike, to low and very low in units that had received air strikes and casualties.

b. Most units experienced desertions and malingering after air strikes due to the fear of death or injury and the added hardships of living in the jungle, moving at night, shortage of food, supplies, equipment and staying alert in the event of another air strike.

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c. Some sources indicated that several personnel deserted as late as seven months after receiving an air strike, some of which had heard of other air strikes.

### 7. (C) Effects:

a. Not all sources considered air strikes effective since many were conducted against decoy positions or in clearings away from the main body and their fortified positions.

b. Many felt that improper or insufficient ordnance was used against their positions and that strikes were concentrated in too small an area.

c. All sources indicated a fear for rockets and general purpose bombs, for their fragments and concussion. However, most felt relatively safe from rockets if they were in fortified positions. (Due partially from not being detected and the low probability of direct hit.) All feared rockets and guns if caught in an open area, due to their accuracy and high rate of fire.

d. Many felt that there often was too much delay in gunships arriving on station after the observation planes started circling the area and in some cases marking with smoke.

e. All sources felt that fire should be placed in a wider area in the case of troops caught in the open. Fire also should be directed along tree lines and the edge of paddies near rest areas, since most of the time troops have a little time to disperse or gain the security of fortified positions.

f. It can be concluded that air strikes have a definite psychological effect, often causing the commander to lose complete control of the unit.

8. (C) Handling of Downed Pilots: Only one unit had received positive instructions relative to handling downed pilots. Any pilot (Vietnamese, US, or FWMAF) captured would be brought to the Battalion Commander. (The order also allegedly threatened a death penalty for any VC who might kill rather than capture a downed pilot.) Others assumed that the pilots were to be captured whenever possible. (Other intelligence reports indicate that explicit instructions are given NVA units to capture downed pilots.)

### 9. (C) Conclusions:

a. Air strikes are considered effective in the area of employment,

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inflicting heavy casualties and damage to supplies and equipment.

b. Rocket and gunships are feared greater in open areas due to their accuracy and high rate of fire.

c. The main body or other units are often missed by concentrating air strikes in small areas or against decoys.

d. Air strikes are conducted against unoccupied base camps while the unit is located within 200 meters of the site.

e. Air strikes have a tremendous psychological effect on the personnel in the unit, often rendering it 100% ineffective for short periods of time and partially for extended periods causing desertions and malingering.

f. Spotter aircraft circling over the area for extended periods of time and a delay of gunships arriving on station often allows elements of the unit to withdraw prior to the air strike.

g. Insertion of ground personnel will cause the enemy to disclose his location.

h. Ground sweeps are not always conducted to check for undetected personnel, abandoned equipment and supplies.

### 10. (C) Recommendations:

a. Reconnaissance by fire should be conducted in the area adjacent to known or suspected enemy locations in an effort to locate other elements of the unit and their fortified positions.

b. Observation/spotter aircraft should not circle the immediate area where enemy personnel are located but should enlarge their search area, thus giving the enemy a false sense of security and possibly preventing him from dispersing or gaining the security of fortified positions prior to the arrival of gunships.

c. Whenever possible ground troops should be inserted to sweep the area causing the enemy to disclose his position and take prisoners.

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
11. (U) Comments:

a. Much of this information has been alluded to in other publications. However, this does give units a composite view of helicopter effectiveness from the enemy viewpoint.

b. Additional information will be furnished when received.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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MICHAEL J. DAVIS  
CPT, AGC  
ASST AG

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### Subject Areas in which Interrogators Normally Ask Questions:

1. Circumstances Surrounding the Air Strike
2. Reason for Air Strike (Detection of Personnel or Buildings, etc)
3. Conduct of Air Strikes
4. Results of Air Strikes
5. Defensive Tactics
6. Communications (Organic Capability)
7. Storage Areas (Knowledge of Cache Areas)
8. Unexploded Ordnance (Duds and Their Disposition)
9. Morale
10. Effectiveness (Methods of Improvement)
11. Unit's Mission (Rest Area, Enroute, etc)
12. Aircraft Downed or Destroyed
13. Handling of Downed Pilots (Instructions)

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~~Incl 1 to Incl 3~~

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