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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**



AGDA-A (M) (22 Feb 71) FOR OT UT 703245

1 March 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 269th  
Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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**VERNE L. BOWERS**  
**Major General, USA**  
**Acting The Adjutant General**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 269TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)  
APO 96353  
"DISCIPLINED PROFESSIONALS"

AVBACA-F-SC

14 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 269th Aviation Battalion  
(Combat) Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) References: AR 525-15 and USAFV Suppl 1 to AR 525-15.
2. (U) Attached is the Operational Report - Lessons Learned 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Period Ending 31 July 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Billie G. Palmer*  
BILLIE G. PALMER  
CPT, Infantry  
Adjutant

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CO, 12th Avn Gp (C), ATTN: AVBACA-SC, APO 96266 (6 cys)  
CO, 11th Avn Bn (C), APO 96289  
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HEADQUARTERS, 269TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)  
APO 96353  
"DISCIPLINED PROFESSIONALS"

AVBACA-F-SC

14 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSF04-65 (h2) (U)

## SEE DISTRIBUTION

### 1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (U) Mission: During the reporting period there were no changes in the mission of the 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

b. (C) Organization: On 7 July 1970 the 116th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) became detached from the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) and attached to the 212th Avn Bn (Cbt) at Chu Lai, RVN. The attachment is planned for a period of 90 days. The organization of the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) at the end of the quarter is depicted in Inclosure 1.

### c. (C) Personalities:

(1) Commander: Lieutenant Colonel William H. Dillard, 226-30-2072, Infantry, who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Josh, 304-30-9881, Infantry, on 25 May 1970. (LTC Dillard became Acting Commander of the 145th Avn Bn (Cbt) on 14 July and remained through the end of the quarter).

### (2) Principal Staff:

(a) Executive Officer: Major Robert J. Poshard, 314-26-9412, Infantry (Acting Commander), who replaced Major William E. Oakes, 414-56-7471, Armor (Acting Commander from 14 July - 26 July) on 26 July 1970.

(b) S-1: Captain Billie G. Palmer, 461-66-3565, Infantry, no change.

(c) S-2: Captain James H. Kenton, 537-38-6512, Signal Corps, who replaced Captain Joseph E. Saunders, 558-62-4227, Air Defense Artillery, on 1 August 1970.

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(d) S-3: Captain Jack W. Revels, 249-50-5876, Corps of Engineers, who replaced Major Paul L. Joplin, 431-74-2166, Air Defense Artillery, on 25 July 1970.

(e) S-4: Captain Charles R. Dowling, 263-68-0703, Infantry, no change.

### (3) Subordinate Unit Commanders:

(a) Headquarters Company: Captain Glenn J. Bricker, 169-28-1389, Field Artillery, no change.

(b) 116th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter): Major Glenn E. Eberhardt, 258-52-8919, Field Artillery, who replaced Major Gerald R. Kundo, 394-34-6505, Infantry, on 12 June 1970.

(c) 187th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter): Major Joe D. Carothers, 458-58-1030, Infantry, who replaced Major John R. Gantt, 413-50-6015, Signal Corps, on 7 July 1970.

(d) 242nd Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter): Major Paul L. Joplin, 413-74-2166, Air Defense Artillery, who replaced Major Allan W. Hammerbeck, 473-36-1031, Field Artillery, on 26 July 1970.

### d. (C) Personnel and Administration:

(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength: The battalion strength as of 31 July 1970, is shown as inclosure 2. A summary of projected losses during the next 90 days is shown below.

Summary of losses for the next 90 day period:

	AUG	SEP	OCT
OFFICERS	7	2	3
WARRANT OFFICERS	10	4	4
ENLISTED	31	58	31

(2) Replacements have been requisitioned in accordance with current directives. The replacement program has functioned smoothly in regard to number of personnel authorized, but has not functioned properly in regard to MOS replacement. A lack of properly trained personnel has resulted in an extensive on the job training program, which not only denies us school trained personnel in key positions, but takes men away from work for which they are better qualified.

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(a) Assignments:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
37	20	154

(b) Rotation to CONUS:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
26	17	101

(c) Casualties Returned to Duty:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
0	6	4

(d) Casualties Evacuated:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
0	1	4

(e) Killed in Action:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
1	4	5

(f) Killed not as the result of hostile actions:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
2	1	2

(3) Reenlistment: During this quarter 4 personnel reenlisted in the battalion.

(4) Promotions: Promotions during this quarter were as follows:

<u>CPT</u>	<u>1LT</u>	<u>CW2</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E4</u>
7	0	24	0	1	0	83	74

(5) Reclassifications: 13 enlisted personnel were administratively reclassified during the quarter. The primary reason for this action was upgrading of MOS skills, adjustments in MOS to jobs performed, and enlisted promotions.

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(6) Retirements: There were no retirements this quarter.

(7) Civilian Personnel: There has been no change in the civilian personnel program administered by the battalion. Permanent hire personnel levels continue to be allocated by 12th Aviation Group (Combat) IAW USARV Reg 690-7.

(8) Awards and Ceremonies: Ten (10) awards ceremonies were held during the quarter. A change of command was held on 25 May 1970 in which LTC William H. Dillard assumed command of the 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat); on 7 July 1970, when MAJ Joe D. Carothers assumed command of the 187th Assault Helicopter Company located at Tay Ninh; and on 27 July 1970, when MAJ Paul L. Joplin assumed command of the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company.

(9) Morale and Personnel Services:

(a) The R&R program is continually stressed throughout the battalion. During the quarter the Battalion received 171 allocations of which 109 were filled.

(b) Leaves granted during the quarter were as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Emergency	0	2	10
Compassionate	0	2	2
Special	2	5	26
Ordinary	9	14	35

(c) Postal Services: Postal Service has continued to be excellent thereby greatly assisting the morale of the battalion personnel.

(10) Discipline, Law and Order: During the past quarter the following disciplinary actions have been conducted:

- (a) Special Court Martial - 1
- (b) Summary Court Martial - 0
- (c) General Court Martial - 0
- (d) Article 15 Impositions - 43
- (e) Article 32 Investigations - 0

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(11) Marriage to Foreign Nationals: None

(12) Exchange Facilities, Clubs and Messes: No change this quarter.

(13) Information Activities: During the period May 1970 to July 1970, this battalion submitted 297 home town news releases. Each month has shown an increase in the number submitted. This battalion realizes the significance of home town news releases in maintaining a high level of morale. Another device is the articles submitted to Army and civilian news media. In particular, one article was published in "Stars and Stripes" in May and another in "The Army Times". Another method of recognizing achievements of personnel in the battalion is through the battalion newspaper, "The Black Baron Release". This newspaper is a bi-monthly publication which stimulates interest in the battalion functions.

### e. (U) Intelligence and Security:

(1) The S-2 Section continued its mission of advising the commander on intelligence information. Also the S-2 gathers, analyzes and disseminates intelligence and classified materials to subordinate units and the Battalion Staff to assist them in accomplishing their mission.

(2) Recent inspections reveal that company intelligence sections are in most cases maintaining classified containers and materials in accordance with appropriate regulations. However, greater care must be exercised to insure that all documents are correctly marked, security checks are made regularly and rosters are kept current.

(3) Monthly staff assistance visits were conducted by the S-2 Section to assist intelligence sections in each company by locating and correcting deficiencies.

### f. (C) Operations:

#### (1) Significant Operations:

(a) Throughout the reporting period, the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) continued its support of primarily the 25th Inf Div with additional support given to various other II FFV and III Corps ARVN units. The most significant operations of the quarter concerned the Cambodian Operations. For the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) the Cambodian Operations were divided into two phases.

(b) Phase I, Operation Rockcrusher, began on the 29th of April, when the 334th Aerial Weapons Company and A Troop, 3/17th Air Cavalry Squadron came under operational control of the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt). The mission of the battalion during Phase I was to provide close air support to III Corps ARVN in the Parrot's Denk (XT2005) and Angel's Wing (XT2505) areas of Cambodia while continuing to provide airmobile and medium

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airlift support to the 25th Inf Div and other II FFV units in RVN as directed by II FFV. Phase I was executed as follows:

1. On 29 Apr 70 the first support mission was conducted over Cambodia.
2. The operation lasted from 29 Apr until 4 May. During that time the 334th AWC flew 75 missions with a total flight time of 230 hours.
3. During the operations one aircraft was forced down by enemy ground fire. The aircraft was recovered as planned by using the Pathfinder Detachment from the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) to rig the aircraft, while A Troop, 3/17th Cav secured the area. A CH47 from the 242nd ASHC evacuated the helicopter.

(c) The results of Phase I are as follows:

### Enemy Losses:

- 1591 KIA (585 credited to 334th AWC)
- 225 PW
- 189 HC
- 313 Detainees
- 745 Individual Weapons
- 120 Crew Served Weapons
- 102 tons of rice
- 26.2 tons of small arms ammo
- 1 one hundred bed hospital captured

### Friendly Losses:

- KIA - US 4, ARVN 145
- WIA - US 7, ARVN 714

(d) During Phase I a forward Ck was operated by the 12th Avn Co (Cbt) in Go Dau Ha. The secure radio system between the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) Operations Center and the forward Ck presented some problems. In the Go Dau Ha Ck, many radios were operated in a confined, uncooled area. Overheating of radios and secure units caused many outages. The problem was rectified by using ice, fans, and by shutting down the equipment for periods of time.

(e) Phase II of the Cambodian operations was conducted from 060830 May 70 until 301200 June 70. The 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) provided air-mobile and medium airlift support to the 25th Inf Div and other II FFV elements as they attacked base areas in Cambodia, north and west of War Zone C.

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(f) Phase II began on 6 May 70, with the 116th and 187th AHC's lifting two Infantry Battalions, the 2/14 Inf and the 3/22 Inf into Base Area 354. This was the first operation the 25th Inf Div conducted in Cambodia. On 6 May 70, two "Command Vaults" were used to prepare landing zones in dense jungle with good results. One and two ship LZ's were opened with pinpoint accuracy. On 9 May another battalion size operation was conducted into Base Area 707. This time elements of the 4/9 and 1/27 were the supported units. On 11 May, an airmobile assault was conducted into the suspected location of COSVN Headquarters, vicinity XU1012. This was the largest operation conducted by the 25th Inf Div during the Cambodian Operation. On 14 May, the 4/9 was extracted from Base Area 353. These were the most significant operations in which the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) participated.

(g) During Phase II nearly daily company size airmobile operations were conducted in Cambodia in support of the 25th Inf Div. In addition to the assault helicopter support, the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company provided support to the 25th Inf Div effort in Cambodia. During the months of May and June, the 242nd ASHC flew approximately 2900 hours. 1800 hours were flown in support of the 25th Inf Div while 1100 were flown in support of other units, the majority involved in the Cambodian Operations.

(h) The results of Phase II are as follows:

### Enemy Losses:

- 1075 KIA (35 credited to 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) )
- 54 PW
- 22 HC
- 712 Individual Weapons
- 131 Crew Served Weapons
- 1537 tons of rice
- 42 tons of ammo
- 55 Vehicles
- 5760 pounds of commo equipment
- 13,690 pounds of medical supplies
- 1524 pounds of documents
- 127 Bicycles
- 22 Motor Scooters
- 90 Sampans
- 50 Generators

### Friendly Losses:

- 119 KIA
- 906 WIA (6 belonging to 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) )

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Vehicles damaged - 12 light  
19 moderate  
34 heavy

Helicopters damaged - 30 light (12 belonging to 269th CAB)  
13 moderate (4 belonging to 269th CAB)  
8 heavy (2 belonging to 269th CAB)

(i) With the exception of the use of "Commando Vaults" and occasional intense .51 caliber antiaircraft fire, battalion operations in Cambodia were routine in nature. It was not necessary to vary our tactics nor were any new enemy tactics observed. Weather became a problem in that flights were frequently required to fly below restrictive ceilings thus becoming extremely vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. On 14 May 70, a flight of six aircraft flying below a 1000 foot ceiling was fired on by a .51 caliber weapon. Two aircraft were hit, one of which crashed killing all on board.

(j) After the Cambodian Operations, the remainder of the quarter remained routine with the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) providing support to the 25th Inf Div and other II FFV units. The operational statistics may be found in Inclosure 3.

(2) Basis of Issue (BOI) for AH-1G in the 187th AHC.

(a) During the reporting period, the 187th Assault Helicopter Company underwent a test to evaluate the BOI of six AH-1G's versus the BOI of eight AH-1G's. The evaluation of the TO&E of six AH-1G's versus a TO&E of eight AH-1G's is based on comparison of the month of March, the last month the 187th AHC had six AH-1G's and the month of May, the designated test period.

(b) The items of interest which were considered and the results were as follows:

<u>Items of Interest</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>May</u>
1. Total hrs flown daily	17.8 (542)	17.4 (539)
2. Daily Availability	56%	60%
3. Monthly hrs flown on each aircraft	90.3	69.6
4. Number of total PE's	5	5
5. Number of days with 4 or more AH-1G's flyable	5	25
6. Number of flight hrs lost due to unscheduled maint.	30	0

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<u>Items of Interest</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>May</u>
7. Number of aircraft receiving battle damage & number of non productive days due to battle damage	0	0
8. Total hrs flown by company	3151	3064
9. Number of AH-1G hrs on hand during the month		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Oper Ready</u>
March	4464	2508
May	5952	3564
	<u>Not Operational</u>	<u>Ready</u>
	<u>Supply</u>	<u>DS/GS</u>
March	1200	276
May	1608	36
		<u>Or: Maint</u>
		480
		744

(c) The figures compiled for the two months concerned show that the AH-1G hours flown daily and for the month changed very little; however, the availability rate increased with eight ships on hand. There were indications that the availability would have continued to increase over a period of time with eight AH-1G's on hand; however, during the months of June and July the availability dropped because of a serious shortage of parts. This headquarters believes eight AH-1G's will decrease the number of hours flown per aircraft per month considerably. This is very important for long range planning because at the rate of 90.3 hours per ship per month (6 ships) each ship will reach the 11th PE and major TBO within 12 months; while at 69.5 hours per ship per month (8 ships) it will take each ship 16 months to reach the 11th PE and major TBO. This extended period of time from 12 to 16 months, will give the maintenance officer more latitude in scheduling the aircraft to avoid a concentration of major TBO's. This will result in higher availability over an extended period of time. It should be noted that the increase of 2 aircraft did not increase the scheduled maintenance load, 5 PE's each month.

(d) In the area of personnel, a significant shortage of a 67N Maintenance Supervisor existed. A shortage of this nature is extremely critical as the actions of this individual directly influence the work output and therefore the availability.

## (3) Physical Security:

(a) The 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) is responsible for E Sector of the Cu Chi Base Camp Perimeter. During the reporting period, 7 new bunkers were built on E Sector, and plans for new lateral fighting positions and secondary positions are presently in the making. After the move of the 116th AHC, the 116th bunker was taken by the 3/22 Inf.

(b) Security measures for the defense of the battalion were updated, and plans were made to construct new personnel bunkers. A request to the Cu Chi Installation Coordinator to procure protective



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lighting in the battalion area was denied due to the lack of funds. A request for material to erect a protective fence around the battalion area was submitted to the Installation Coordinator on 20 July 1970.

### g. (b) Training:

(1) During the last quarter of FY 1970, the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) continued to utilize the in-country training facilities of the 25th Inf Div. There were 156 people sent to this training prior to being sent to their assigned companies within the battalion. The subjects, which are geared for newly assigned personnel, include enemy weapons, mines and bobby traps, patrolling, land navigation, ambush and counter ambush techniques, plus other related subjects. In addition, this battalion continues to use refresher training in the above subjects to enable personnel to better cope with the local situation and for better defense of the base camp. This two (2) hour block of instruction administered by the 25th Inf Div also emphasizes interior guard and perimeter defense.

(2) This period being the last quarter of FY 1970, special emphasis was placed on mandatory training and make-up mandatory training. The end of the quarter saw every individual current in all mandatory subjects. Plans were formulated for the training of personnel in FY 1971. Training has been scheduled and lesson plans prepared. Training visits by battalion personnel were made to insure the success of the training objectives.

(3) The following Army Aviation Training School quotas were received and filled by this battalion.

	<u>HHC</u>	<u>116th</u>	<u>187th</u>	<u>212nd</u>
Tech Supply			1	
Tech Inspector		2		
AAPC		2		2
PLL Clerk	1	3	2	3
CH47 Hel Repair				2

A study was made to determine weak areas for which the need for refresher training is anticipated. The results of this study were used to schedule training and request in-country school quotas.

(4) A special class by the Escape and Evasion Mobile Team from Clark AFB was presented to all personnel of this battalion during the month of May 1970. During the quarter, special classes were held on the use and control of drugs. The film "People versus Pot" was used throughout the battalion during the training.

### h. (C) Logistics:

(1) During the period of this report the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) conducted the normal logistical support necessary to provide the attached

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units with assistance and coordination for mission accomplishment.

(2) During this period, this office was involved in the supply of elements of two units, the 334th AWC and a Troop 3/17 Cav, which were placed under operational control of this Battalion for the first cross border operations into Cambodia. Personnel of these units were billeted, fed and supplied through coordinated efforts of the S-4.

(3) The 187th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) was given a Command Maintenance Management Inspection during the month of May. The results of this inspection were unsatisfactory. There was a reinspection during the month of July from which the results have not yet been received.

(4) A significant operation during July was the movement of the 116th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) from Cu Chi to Chu Lai. This move involved coordinated efforts by Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel and was conducted smoothly and with minimum problem areas. During the month of July all units of this command actively prepared for the annual AGI which will be conducted during August. Assistance and guidance has been provided to all units in preparation for this inspection.

(5) The proposal for the 187th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) to remain at Tay Ninh as the base camp is turned over to the Vietnamese will provide this office with a challenge in adequate logistical support.

### (i) (C) Aircraft Maintenance:

(1) Both the 116th Avn Co and the 187th Avn Co started this period under strength in UH-1D & H models but both were filled by the middle of the period. The 116th Avn Co started with 6 UH-1C's and were up to 7 by the time they moved.

(2) The 116th Avn Co moved to Chu Lai on the 9th of July and all responsibility for maintenance was transferred to the 212th Avn Bn.

(3) During the month of June, the 242nd Avn Co received one OH-50A and the HHC of the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) picked up 2 more OH-50A's to bring them up to the Brigade fill on OH-50A's. The requirement was placed on Headquarters of the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) to turn-in one of their two UH-1D's.

(4) The 187th Avn Co experienced a great deal of difficulty in maintaining their aircraft due to a shortage of aircraft parts. They requested and received assistance from 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) in the initial use of the Expedite System for parts at AMMC. This system helped somewhat, however, further assistance was requested from 1st Avn Bde in the form of an assistance visit from Sgt. Clark of the 1st Avn Bde. By the end of the quarter, the parts situation greatly improved.

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(5) The 242nd Avn Co ended this period 2 ships under strength. The backlog for future fill to their authorized level of 16 aircraft is very bleak. Aircraft status at the end of the quarter is included in Enclosure 4.

### j. (U) Surgeons:

(1) The medical section provided support to the 116th Avn Co during their move from Cu Chi by providing a Flight Surgeon and two medics for interim medical care. They established liaison and coordinated with local medical facilities, conducted area sanitation inspections, and monitored flying hours. After local observation and after discussions with the 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) Flight Surgeon and the 1st Avn Bde Flight Surgeon, it was decided not to move the 431st Medical Detachment from Cu Chi at this time.

(2) It is tentatively planned that the 431st Detachment Commander will assume the duties of the Battalion Surgeon upon the latter's DEPOS in early October.

### k. (U) Aviation Safety:

(1) During the period 1 May 70 to 31 July 70, the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) flew 18,000 hours and experienced 5 accidents with 5 fatalities, giving an accident rate for that period of 27.8 hours.

(2) During the quarter there was a serious incident involving a midair rotor strike between two ships which meshed rotor blades while in formation flight. There were no injuries and both ships were landed safely. Two accidents were caused by engine failures and subsequent unsuccessful autorotations.

(3) Two accidents were caused by suspected pilot error involving movements and low level flight, although investigations were unable to positively identify the cause factors. One accident had weather as a suspected cause factor with hydraulic failure resulting in a hardover and subsequent inversion of the airlift as a possible cause factor. To preclude further accidents of this nature, the following actions have been taken:

(a) Autorotation and emergency procedures have been emphasized and aviators have been evaluated as to their proficiency in this area.

(b) Low level flight and marginal weather flight hazards have been brought to the attention of all aviators and these flight conditions are to be avoided unless there is a definite tactical necessity involved.

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(c) Correct procedures for flight in and out of revetments were emphasized, and action was taken to insure that these procedures were understood and complied with by all air crews.

(4) Further evaluation of accident cause factors and the prevention of their reoccurrence is currently being undertaken in order to save lives and prevent the destruction of aircraft and the subsequent loss of operational readiness.

### 1. (b) Chaplains:

(1) Religious services for the three major faiths are available to all personnel within the command. Denominational services are also available for various protestant denominations. Services for Roman Catholic personnel are provided by chaplains from the 25th Inf Div. Roman Catholics stationed at Cu Chi base camp have a mass in the Battalion Air High Chapel each Sunday. Roman Catholic personnel in the 187th Avn Co attend mass in the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div Memorial Chapel at Tay Ninh. Jewish personnel in the units located at Cu Chi base camp attend services in the 25th Inf Div Memorial Chapel; special arrangements are made for those at Tay Ninh. All Jewish personnel are provided arrangements to attend special days of obligation, such as Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and Passover. The battalion chaplain conducts Protestant worship services for the units as follows:

(a) HHC, 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) - Sunday, 1100 hours, Battalion Air High Chapel

(b) 187th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) - Sunday, 1930 hours, Crusader Mess Hall

(c) 242nd Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel) - Sunday, 1330 hours, Haleskinner Day Room

(2) During the absence of an assigned chaplain for two months of this reporting period, unit coverage was provided by 25th Inf Div and 12th Avn Gp chaplains.

(3) Memorial services are held for all personnel who lose their lives while in this command. These services are normally conducted by the Battalion Chaplain. In cases of Roman Catholic personnel, a priest is also present to say the Requiem Mass. These services are held in the Division or Brigade Memorial Chapels, or in the area of the unit concerned.

(4) The Battalion Chaplain has continued a program of education and consultation. An initial briefing is given to all new arrivals. The chaplain conducts daily visits to subordinate units to better avail himself to all personnel who may need his assistance, in addition to holding

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regular office hours for private consultation. A "Chaplain's Corner" is maintained in each unit's orderly room, making Bibles, crosses, rosaries, religious medals, and religious tracts and pamphlets are always available to everyone. Regular and systematic coverage is given to battalion personnel in the various hospitals and medical holding companies.

(5) Character guidance classes are held each month on a topic prescribed by higher headquarters. The chaplain conducts these classes for subordinate units whenever such instruction is requested through the Battalion S-3. In addition, a supplemental orientation sheet is prepared by the chaplain, and distributed in sufficient numbers to the unit training officers for use by all officers and enlisted men unable to attend these classes.

### m. (C) The Move of the 116th Avn Co (Aslt Hel):

(1) During the reporting period, one of the most significant activities of the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) was the move of the 116th AHC from Cu Chi to Chu Lai. Planning began with a directive calling for the 116th to be attached to the 212th Avn Bn (Cbt) at Chu Lai for a tentative period of 90 days. This directive was received on 5 July 70. The move was supported by the 25th Inf Div Transportation Officer, the US Air Force, and the US Navy.

(2) On the sixth of July, the 269th S-3, and the Commanding Officer, Operations Officer, and Maintenance Officer of the 116th flew to Chu Lai to coordinate with LTC Eaton, ADAO Americal Division. The coordinating party also contacted the XO of the 16th CAG. The results of these two meetings were reported to the Commanding Officer of the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt).

(3) The advance party consisting of 13 personnel and 3 aircraft traveled to Chu Lai on the seventh of July. On the ninth, the main party departed Cu Chi. The party consisted of 21 aircraft and 104 personnel. Two PB teams with tools and the Flight Surgeon accompanied this move.

(4) In support of the move, the USAF provided air transport for 66 personnel, 32 vehicles and trailers, 45 Conex containers and assorted cargo. The US Navy provided sea transport of 14 personnel and 14 vehicles and trailers.

(5) The 116th was operational on 12 July 1970; the move was completed on the twenty-sixth of July. A rear detachment of 1 officer and 9 enlisted men remained behind to provide 24 hour guard for the company area at Cu Chi.

(6) Problem areas discovered in the move may be found in the Extract of the After Action Report found as Inclosure 5.

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### 2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

#### a. (U) Personnel:

##### (1) Use of non-rated supply and motor maintenance technicians.

(a) OBSERVATION: A non-rated supply technician (WO) and a motor maintenance technician (WO) should be placed in the TOE of all aviation units.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the importance of Aviation Supply and Motor Maintenance especially in a combat environment, the practice of assigning an aviator to those positions is detrimental to mission accomplishment. This practice usually places an individual whose training has been only aircraft oriented into a job that requires immediate knowledge of his work and an expertise that is not possessed until after many months of learning. It also takes an aviator away from his primary mission and places him in a duty to which he must devote full time in order to perform adequately.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE changes be made to incorporate a non rated Supply Technician and a non-rated Motor Maintenance Technician into aviation units.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A TO&E change is being requested.

#### b. (U) Intelligence:

##### (1) Improper classification of classified material.

(a) OBSERVATION: It was noted in recent inspections that classified material originating at higher headquarters was not marked in accordance with AR 380-5.

(b) EVALUATION: Recently classified material has been received by the Battalion which was not marked with the classification at the beginning of each paragraph, chapter, or section. Additionally, the classification marking which should be at the top and bottom of each page was deleted from some pages and in one case from the entire section.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Staff sections should be instructed as to the proper method of marking classified material.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Staff sections and subordinate unit commanders have been instructed in proper classification.

#### c. (C) Operations:

##### (1) CH-47 ground incident.

(a) OBSERVATION: During a ground guiding operation of CH-47 helicopter, the blades overlapped with a parked CH-47 resulting in two severely damaged helicopters.

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(b) EVALUATION: These CH-47's were damaged due to the failure of crew members to properly guide and direct the movement of aircraft taxiing from one revetment to another.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: There should be a greater emphasis and an additional training session, or period of instruction, on the proper aircraft ground guiding procedures.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Included in the monthly training schedule will be a period of instruction on ground handling, to include guiding, directing and signaling of aircraft. The SOP is being revised to locate the guide in the position of wing walker rather than centered on helicopter. If there are obstructions on both sides of the aircraft two wing walkers will be used.

### (2) Low Ceilings and Airmobile Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Weather causes a serious problem when flights are required to operate below a restrictive ceiling.

(b) EVALUATION: During the Cambodian Operations, weather became a problem in that flights were frequently required to fly below low ceilings, thus becoming extremely vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. Airmobile operations below marginal ceilings are also complicated by the fact that gunships cannot adequately cover the flight due to restricted maneuver room. Restrictive ceilings cause undue risk to these aircraft both from enemy fire and shrapnel effect from their own ordnance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Ground commanders should be advised of the significant increase in risk when conducting airmobile operations under conditions of low ceilings (below 1000 feet) due to increased vulnerability to ground fire and decreased effectiveness of supporting gunships.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Air Mission Commanders are constantly reminded of the necessity of keeping mission commanders advised of all hazards and making recommendations whenever applicable.

### (3) Unsecure areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: Recently one of our aircraft was picking up an external load when it took a hit from an RPG. There were 20 passengers on board at the time. Two crewmembers and three passengers were killed in the resulting crash and fire.

(b) EVALUATION: The area designated as the pick-up zone was a virtually unsecure area. The 20 passengers were on board as a result of attempting to combine an administrative sortie with a tactical sortie.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All flight crews be briefed on the extreme importance of insuring that the pick-up zone is secure and that tactical sorties are not to be combined with administrative sorties.

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(d) COMMAND ACTION: Crews have been advised.

d. (U) Organization: None

e. (U) Training: None

f. (U) Logistics:

(1) Utilization of Maintenance Stands.

(a) OBSERVATION: During a recent periodic inspection on a CH-47, an engine transmission was dropped from the top of an aircraft damaging the fuel pod.

(b) EVALUATION: The reason for the transmission being dropped was that the wheels for the maintenance stand were not chocked, allowing the stand to roll away from the aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All maintenance supervisors and team leaders insure that wheels on maintenance stands are chocked before doing any work on the aircraft.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The importance of chocking wheels of maintenance stands has been emphasized to all appropriate personnel.

(2) Parts shortage at the 187th Aviation Company.

(a) OBSERVATION: The shortage of parts at the 187th resulted from improper record keeping procedures.

(b) EVALUATION: The shortage of qualified Tech Supply NCO's and Specialists has resulted in a lack of experienced people in the Tech Supplies at unit level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that unit maintenance officers and commanders carefully evaluate the personnel placed as NCOIC of the Tech Supply. Further recommend that unit CO's and Maintenance Officers initiate a complete OJT program and make full use of the AARTS refresher courses.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The unit Maintenance Officer has initiated an OJT program and the Tech Supply Officer is closely supervising the listing of demand data. The unit commander has made the management of the Tech Supply a matter of command interest.

g. (C) Communications:

(1) Weather Damage of Avionics Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Unnecessary damage to radios and commo equipment on UH-1H helicopters due to monsoon weather conditions.

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(b) EVALUATION: An unusual increase in radio problems seems to start as the monsoon season gets underway the problems most frequently come from aircraft without cargo, jump, and pilot doors. Upon inspections of one lower console as much as three inches of standing water was found to be the cause of a persistent bad set of radios.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That all doors and windows be placed on aircraft where missions permit and those aircraft not immediately scheduled to fly. That canvas or ponchos be provided those aircraft which, for maintenance reasons cannot be equipped with doors and or windows for a temporary period of time.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: To inform platoons, pilots, and crews of this problem and assure corrective action is taken.

### (2) Monthly SOI changes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Unnecessary confusion at the beginning of each month due to careless frequency assignments issued via monthly SOI changes.

(b) EVALUATION: For the past four months this unit has been assigned the following primary or alternative frequencies to be used on tactical combat operations. 1. Cu Chi ground UHP 2. Bear Cat TWR UHF 3. Quan Loi GCA UHF and Vung Tau Arty FM. These are only the more obvious careless assignments of frequencies. There are also those primary or alternates assigned to units working an adjacent AO's. Additionally, interference from our Allies and numerous SOI changes add to the problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That possibly the reception range of similar radio transmissions be reevaluated. That the range between similar frequencies be increased where aviation units are concerned. That a greater than .05 frequency spread be given to different stations within a 100 mile radius.

(d) COMMAND ACTIONS: That appropriate signal officer personnel monitor frequency assignments more closely.

### h. (U) Material:

#### (1) Windshield breakage.

(a) OBSERVATION: There have been several incidents of breaking the right windshield of the M151A1  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicle when lifting the passengers seat enroute to the rear seat.

(b) EVALUATION: There is no stop to restrict the passengers seat from striking the windshield when the above situation occurs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Installation of a chain between the seat frame and floorboard to restrict full forward travel.

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(e) COMMAND ACTION: Claims are being investigated.


(2) Crown Cowling:

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has been experiencing problems with the crown cowling getting cracked and sometimes getting broken.

(b) EVALUATION: The crown cowling is a very light weight thin item and will break very easily when any excessive weight is placed upon it.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That aircraft crew members and flight deck crews be cautioned not to step on, or lay any heavy object on, the crown cowling.

(1) COMMAND ACTION: Personnel have been advised.

  
ROBERT J. POSHARD  
MAJ, IN  
Commanding

5 Incl  
as

**DISTRIBUTION:**

CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558 (2 cys)  
USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558 (2 cys)  
CG, USAFV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375 (3 cys)  
CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBAGC-O, APO 96304 (2 cys)  
CG, 25th Inf Div, ATTN: ACof S G3, APO 96225  
CG, 12th Avn Gp (C), ATTN: AVBAGC-SC, APO 96266 (6 cys)  
CG, 11th Avn Bn (C), APO 96289  
CG, 145th Avn Bn (C), APO 96227  
CG, 210th Avn Bn (C), APO 96307  
CG, 214th Avn Bn (C), APO 96370  
CG, 222nd Avn Bn (C), APO 96291  
CG, 3rd Sqdn, 17 Cav, APO 96289  
CG, 25th Avn Bn, APO 96353  
CG, 116th Avn Co (Aslt Hel), APO 96374  
CG, 187th Avn Co (Aslt Hel), APO 96216  
CG, 242nd Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel), APO 96353

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AVRACA-SC (13 Aug 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 269th Aviation Battalion  
(Combat) for the Period Ending 31 July 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 2 September 1970

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-(DST), APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

2. (C) The following additional comments are provided:

a. Paragraph 1c subject line should be changed to read Personnel.

b. Reference: page 15, para 2a(1). Use of non-rated supply and motor maintenance technicians. TOE and LTOE changes will be submitted by the battalion and its companies IAW AR 310-4.9 during the present reporting period. This request will be carefully evaluated at that time.

c. Reference: page 13, para 2b. Improper classification of material. 12th Aviation Group (Combat) S-2 has taken action to correct improperly marked documents in the 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) and is currently reviewing all Group documents.

d. Reference: page 16, para 2c(3), Unsecure Areas. 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) aircraft frequently provide passenger transportation from point to point when flying to and from mission reporting points. This headquarters has directed that no administrative passenger transportation will be furnished if the aircraft is scheduled for or anticipates any tactical mission requirements. Further, emphasis has been placed on insuring PZ's and LZ's are secure and that airlift is in fact the only means of accomplishing the mission.

e. Reference: page 17, para 2f(2), Parts Shortage. 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) S-4 has given instructions to 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) in PLL and supply procedures and assisted in correcting existing requisitions.

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
**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVBACA-SC (13 Aug 70) 1st Ind

2 September 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 269th Aviation Battalion  
(Combat) for the Period Ending 31 July 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. Reference: page 18, para 2h(1), Windshield Breakage. 12th  
Avn Gp (Cbt) Motor Maintenance Officer is reviewing the recommendation and  
will submit an EIR if appropriate.

  
JOHN C. HUGHES LTC  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

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AVFBC-RE (14 Aug 70) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 269th Aviation Battalion  
(Combat) for the Period Ending 31 July 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 17 SEP 1970

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96375

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from the 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and concurs with the comments of the indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Monthly SOI Changes", page 18, paragraph 2g(2). Concur with the intent of the recommendation. Carelessness is not, however, a factor in failure to assign frequency resources .05 mhz (or .1 or .15 mhz) apart within 100 mile radius, as might be desirable. Frequency resources are limited. And although aviation units may be based 100 miles apart, they do not always maintain this distance while conducting operations. Frequencies for aviation battalions are assigned by aviation group headquarters, which are not always cognizant of all units sharing these frequencies. A large number of emitters per available frequency per square mile, and the extended range of airborne radios, render impossible the provision of frequency-separated, geographically-separated assignments. Frequency interference problems are solved on an individual basis, and care is taken to provide maximum service.

b. Reference item concerning "Windshield Breakage", page 18, paragraph 2h(1). Nonconcur with installation of chain between the seat frame and floorboard of the M151  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicle to restrict forward travel of the front seat. The chain would hinder access to the battery box in addition to requiring a substantial amount of material and man hours to modify vehicles currently in this command. Personnel should be instructed to exercise proper caution when raising the seat to avoid hitting the windshield.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
W. C. BARTEL, JR.  
CPT, AGC  
ASST, AG

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AVBAGC-0 (12 Aug 70) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 269th Aviation Battalion  
(Combat) for the Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 19 SEP 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
R. L. STROHECKER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

AVHDO-DO (14 Aug 70) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 269th Aviation Battalion  
(Combat) Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 11

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Charles W. Stevens  
ALC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
1st Avn Bde  
269th Avn Bn


GPOP-DT (14 Aug 70) 5th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 269th Aviation  
Battalion (Combat), for period ending 31 July 1970,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 NOV 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department  
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



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Inclusion 1 (C) 269TH Aviation Battalion (Combat)

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## UNIT STRENGTH HEADQUARTERS, 269TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)

MILITARY Subordinate Unit	OFFICERS		WARRANT OFFICERS		ENLISTED		TOTAL		LOCATION
	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG	
187th	17	19	47	47	210	209	262	275	TAY NIEL
541st Med	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	TAY NIEL
Total	18	20	47	47	225	216	290	283	
242nd	<u>14</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>227</u>	<u>215</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>242</u>	CU CHI
Total	14	10	23	17	227	215	264	242	
HHC	19	18	3	9	55	94	107	121	CU CHI
431st Med	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	CU CHI
Total	20	19	3	9	92	100	115	128	
Total 269th Personnel	52	49	73	73	544	531	669	653	

CIVILIAN Subordinate Unit	DAC		VN		3rd Natl Civil		TECH REPS	
	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H
187th	0	0	11	11	0	0	0	0
541st Med	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	0	0	11	11	0	0	0	0
242nd	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	0	0	7	5	0	0	1	1
HHC	0	0	9	8	0	0	0	0
431st Med	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	0	0	9	8	0	0	0	0
Total Civilian Personnel	0	0	27	24	0	0	1	1

Enclosure 2 (C) Unit Strength as of 31 July 1970

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## OPERATIONAL STATISTICS HEADQUARTERS, 269TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT) QUARTER ENDING 31 JULY 1970

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAXS</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>STRUC</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>FLY</u>
				<u>KI.</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>LOSS</u>	<u>DEN</u>	<u>HGS</u>
116th Avn Co	21,400	34,174	11	32	43	3	4	94
187th Avn Co	23,697	45,105	223	6	5	1	6	7000
242nd Avn Co	11,606	27,337	21,569	-	-	2	-	3040
Total	<u>56,763</u>	<u>106,616</u>	<u>21,803</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>17,628</u>

Inclosure 3 (C) Operational Statistics

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AIRCRAFT STATUS  
HEADQUARTERS, 269TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)  
As Of 31 July 1970

Unit	UH-1 B/C AUTH ASG	UH-1 D/H AUTH ASG	CH-53A AUTH ASG	CH-47 AUTH ASG	AH-1G AUTH ASG
HQ 269th Avn Bn (Cbt)	0 0	0 2	3 3	0 0	0 0
187th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	0 0	22 22	0 0	0 0	6 6
242nd Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)	0 0	0 0	2 1	16 14	0 0

(2 on loan for  
a total of 8  
on hand)

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Inc 4 (C) (Aircraft Status)

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### After Action Report Move of the 116th AHC

#### EXTRACT

#### 1. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. The issue of two different messages, one from USMkV and one from II FFV, caused some confusion in the initial planning stages of the move.

b. The 16th CAG was directed to provide billets, mess, direct support, refuel, and security for the 116th. As a result of the short notice given concerning the move, the 16th CAG had some difficulty locating the required facilities. In spite of this, they accomplished their mission in an outstanding manner.

c. The initial coordination meeting between the 16th CAG and the 116th AHC brought to light several areas that had not been considered and should be on future moves. They are indicated as follows:

(1) S-1 - The control of personnel records, finance records, awards and decorations, the depth of attachments, R&K, personnel losses, and mail.

(2) S-2 - The availability of secure areas to store classified material. The availability of maps for the operational area.

(3) S-3 - Submission of reports such as OPR V, downed aircraft, hit reports, ordnance reports, etc. The conduct of training, both individual and flight.

(4) S-4 - What equipment would be required. What supply facilities would be available. Laundry facilities, reports required.

(5) The amount of medical support required.

(6) Maintenance - Units available to perform DS and GS maintenance and the coordination required. The location of support units in relation to the company location. What portion of the PLL would be required.

(7) Signal - Arrangements for SOI's, K&C Codes, Key Lists. What reports will be required.

#### 2. (C) Commander's Analysis:

(1) Much of the equipment was moved on a "as needed" basis; this was due to the uncertainty which developed from the initial messages alerting the unit to move. The initial airlift was given high priority; however, subsequent airlifts which became necessary after the depth of support at the new location was ascertained were given a lower priority. This lower priority resulted in a longer than necessary completion date.

~~Inclosure 5~~

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4. (C) Recommendations:

- (1) Unit movement plans be complete to allow maximum movement of equipment on the initial airlift request.
- (2) Do not send Conex containers on the sea move due to the stringent requirements to list each item in the Conex on the request form.
- (3) Establish a control system to prevent barracks from being ransacked as the unit departs.
- (4) A thorough police and cleaning of all buildings to prevent loss of discarded government property.

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~~Inclosure 5~~ (C) After Action Report

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL
		2b. GROUP
		4
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 269th Aviation Battalion		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, 269th Aviation Battalion		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
14 August 1970	35	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO.	703245	
c. N/A	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		