**UNCLASSIFIED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD514360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO: UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 17 OCT 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Army Adjutant General Office, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGO D/A ltr 30 Jun 1976  AGO D/A ltr 30 Jun 1976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG C. M. Hall, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
Acting The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Combat Surveillance School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
    US Army Engineer School
    US Army Field Artillery School
    US Army Infantry School
    US Army Institute for Military Assistance
    US Army Ordnance School

Copies furnished:
    Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
    Deputy Chiefs of Staff
    Chief of Research and Development
    Assistant Chiefs of Staff
    Chief of Engineers
    Chief of Military History
    Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Commanders in Chief
        Pacific
        US Army, Pacific
        US Strike Command
    Commanding Generals
        Deseret Test Center
        III Corps, ATTN: Director, Project MASSTER
    Chief of Staff, USAF
    Chief of Naval Operations
    Commandant of the Marine Corps
    Commandants
        Armed Forces Staff College
        Defense Intelligence School
        Industrial College of the Armed Forces
        The National War College
    The Air University Library
    Defense Documentation Center
    USAF Project RAND
    Commanding Officers
        US Army Limited War Laboratory
        US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
        US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
ATTACHED are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by Brigadier General C. M. Hall. The report covers the period 23 October 1969 - 17 October 1970, during which time BG Hall served as Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

2. Brigadier General Hall is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Mark W. Stevens Jr.
Captn., AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
AVFA-AT-D

17 October 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (RCS-CSFOR-74) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. (U) References:
   a. AR 1-26 dated 4 November 1966, subject: Senior Officer's Debriefing
      Program (U).
   b. USARV Regulation Number 1-3, dated 1 June 1968, subject: Senior Of-
      ficer's Debriefing Program (U).

2. (U) Attached as an inclosure is subject report covering my assignment as
   Commanding General, IFFORCEV Artillery from 23 October 1969 to 17 October 1970.

   C. M. HALL
   Brigadier General, USA
   Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
5 - CG, USAV
5 - CG, IFFORCEV
5 - CG, IFFORCEV Arty
1 - CO, 52d Arty Group
1 - CO, Provisional Arty Group
1 - CO, 4th Bn, 60th Arty
1 - CO, 6th Bn, 32d Arty

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DEBRIEFING REPORT (RCS-G3F08-74) (U)

Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debrief Report By: Brigadier General Charles M. Hall

Duty Assignment: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

Inclusive Dates: 23 October 1969 through 17 October 1970

Date of Report: 17 October 1970

INDEX

SUBJECT

Summary of Observations

Operations
1. Significant Operations
2. Ammunition Reduction
3. Redeployment Planning & Execution
4. Helicopter Usage
5. Vietnamese and Korean Forces Assistance
6. Training

Administration and Logistics
1. Personnel Problems
2. Morale and Leadership
3. Drug Environment
4. Sub Zone Coordination
5. Clubs and Messes
6. Turn-in of Excess Equipment

APPENDIX

Situation Summary
Organization of IFVF Arty
Tactical Area of Operations
Logistical Support - Depot and LSA

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

1. My tenure as Commander of IFFV Artillery was marked as a period of transition — transition from heavy US involvement in combat activities to a "Vietnamized" posture where US combat forces were in a secondary or supporting role. The most significant observation I offer is that fundamentals of technical knowledge, leadership and basic artillery tactics must be continually stressed because of the turnover of personnel and the relatively low experience level of junior officers and NCO's. Although this report may sound as though we made many mistakes and had many problems, I want to emphasize at the outset that we did most things well and our personnel were most capable. This report, however, will concentrate on those areas where we learned the hard way in the hope that others will be spared these same problems.

2. Battles for the Special Forces Camps at Bu Prang – Duc Lap in October 1969 and Dak Seang – Ben Het in April 1970 emphasized the need for prior planning and adherence to fundamental principles of local security and fire support coordination. In both of these actions, previously prepared contingency plans, though not followed in detail, provided the basic outline of the actions required. At Bu Prang, lack of aggressive patrolling by CIDG forces securing one firebase enabled enemy forces to mass for attack without adequate warning to defenders. At Dak Seang supporting artillery fires were delayed and less responsive tactical air fires were used initially because of a lack of effective fire support coordination. This resulted from an attempt to let the ARVN run the "whole show" from the beginning of the battle. When it became readily apparent that proper fire support was lacking a US artillery battalion commander took over this function and the effectiveness of supporting fires improved rapidly. Somewhat similar problems of fire support coordination were experienced in ARVN Operation Binh Tay 3 in Cambodia, when heavy artillery was unable to fire for extended periods of time because friendly aircraft were dispersed throughout the area. Careful adherence to fundamentals of fire support coordination is required if maximum benefit is to be obtained from artillery, TAC Air and helicopters.

3. After prolonged periods of combat such as experienced by this command, many things veer from the optimum as a result of the sequential decisions made to meet immediate problems. Periodically, it is necessary to take an overview of an entire subject and readjust to achieve optimum structure. This has been the case in several areas, most notable being the positioning of US artillery throughout Military Region 2. As a result of individual battery moves to meet requirements of the moment, deployments became scattered and less than optimum. Following the Bu Prang – Duc Lap Battle a thorough review and restationing of IFFV Artillery units was conducted which improved artillery coverage while at the same time simplifying command and control and logistic arrangements.

4. We have used three significant tools to provide continuing emphasis on fundamental tactics and techniques: The IFFV Artillery Forward Observer
CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Observation. (Cont'd)

and Fire Direction Officer School, our Firing Battery Evaluation Team and our command inspections. Each of these is geared to assuring the maintenance of high standards as personnel rotate throughout the command.

5. Conservation of artillery ammunition is a subject we have given careful attention. Our efforts have focused on shooting freely in those cases where we have good target information, but avoiding expenditures when target information is of questionable validity. We have been successful in reducing expenditures without reducing the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

6. Redeployment planning is a subject of increasing importance. This command has redeployed and inactivated one group headquarters and two artillery battalions during the past year, with one battalion being closed out on 17 days notice. Without prior development of redeployment contingency plans it is doubtful that this short- fuse inactivation could have been accomplished.

7. Paramount among my administrative requirements have been the control of drug and marijuana abuse, installation/sub zone coordination, and supervision of clubs and messes. The use of drugs in this command is probably no greater than in many US college campuses. However, the potential for disaster from drug use is always greater in the combat environment. All types of drugs are readily available at very low prices; we have had few positive results from efforts to cut off the supply. Although we are still a long way from solving the problem of drug abuse, emphasis on both punitive and rehabilitative processes has produced some tangible results.

8. A significant part of this headquarters' effort has been spent performing the duties of Sub Zone Coordinator. As an additional duty for which no staffing is provided, we are charged with coordinating administrative and defense matters for US units in a three-province area which stretches 200 miles along the coast. Included are the major US installations of Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Dong Ba Thin, Phan Rang AFB, and Phan Thiet. This task has been time consuming and has required us to become involved in many fields, such as real estate disposition and post exchange activities, which are foreign to an artillery tactical headquarters.

9. Through both the artillery command chain and the Sub Zone Coordination chain, we have become involved in the supervision of clubs and messes. The clubs are big business. For example, the NCO-EN Club here in Nha Trang does about $90,000 worth of business each month. I was forced to screen personnel assigned throughout the command to select an officer with business background to spend full time supervising the club operations for which I am responsible.

10. I have mentioned the Sub Zone Coordination and club managing requirement only to point out the increasing administrative burdens placed on a tactical headquarters without the benefit of increased personnel authorization to the Table of Organization. Many times I felt frustrated in the lack
Summary of Observations (Cont'd)

of ability to accomplish either the administrative or the tactical task to the best of our ability because of the concurrent requirements of both. The Army must face up to the fact that a base area support unit is necessary to administer to the day-to-day requirements while allowing the tactical headquarters to concentrate on the operational mission.

11. The final area I will mention is the turn-in of excess and unneeded equipment. During the 5 years many units have been in Vietnam they have accumulated many items of equipment that are excess or unneeded. These unneeded items put an added strain on our maintenance systems in addition to causing the procurement of major items beyond those actually required. Additionally, normal administrative procedures have caused units to requisition authorized items which they do not want and for which they have no requirement. Through concerted efforts at all levels of command, we have turned in over $500,000 worth of excess and unneeded equipment and have received permission to cancel outstanding requisitions for even more. This program has been particularly beneficial to those units ordered to inactivate or redeploy.

12. The attached annexes give further details of these and other areas in which I believe we have learned lessons which can benefit others. The appendices summarize the tactical and logistics situations in which the command operates.
Annex A Operations

17 October 1970

1. (C) Significant Operations During the Period,

a. Battle at Bu Prang and Due Lap.

(1) Discussion.

(a) In August 1969, intelligence indicated that the 66th and 28th NVA Regiments were moving into the border areas opposite CIDG camps at Due Lap and Bu Prang. IFFORCEV immediately began planning for the defense of likely enemy targets in the area. NVA intentions were clearly to launch an attack in Quang Duc Province. In response to this intelligence, II Corps and IFFORCEV Artillery commenced a buildup in the area during September 1969. On 29 October 1969, IFFORCEV Art had three firebases in the vicinity of Bu Prang, and four firebases in the vicinity of Due Lap. Some of these firebases were supporting reinforced reconnaissance operations in the area. The overall concept of the operation was to support a larger ARVN maneuver force against the NVA when the enemy location was fixed.

(b) US artillery units in support of the operation were all from IFFV Artillery's general support assets. A small amount of ARVN artillery was initially in the area. Command and logistical support for US artillery was provided by the 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery, with headquarters at Ban Me Thuot. A resupply point was established at the battalion headquarters and all supplies were flown by helicopter from there. In supervising his units, the commander visited each firebase almost daily. His task was enormous, as he had to control his organic battalion and an additional equivalent battalion of all calibers scattered at six different firebases at distances up to 95 air miles from his headquarters. At the height of the battle, IFFV Artillery committed 1 heavy, 10 medium and 7 light pieces in support of the area. The command and control problems grew to the point where consideration was being given to committing another battalion headquarters. At that time, however, the NVA withdrew into Cambodia.

(c) During our initial build-up in the Bu Prang area, IFFV Artillery's remote firebases were secured by Civilian Irregular Defense Group Forces. These were Montagnard troops whose normal mission is reconnaissance in the vicinity of their own base camp. One of these firebases, Kate, came under extremely heavy artillery and small arms fire on 31 October 1969. Enemy fire became so intense that it was impossible to man the howitzers. Helicopters which tried to resupply the base drew heavy fire and several were shot down. In the face of imminent loss of the security forces and the destruction of firebase howitzers it was decided to evacuate the base during the night of 1-2 November. Personnel from the firebase arrived safely by foot the next day at the Bu Prang camp. Howitzers and equipment left behind were destroyed by friendly airstrikes immediately after the evacuation.

(d) Two other remote firebases also defended by CIDG troops and which depended on Kate for mutual supporting fires were evacuated the following day without incident.
In addition to providing artillery support, IFFV Artillery established two combined fire support coordination centers, one to control fires in the vicinity of Dak Lap, the other to control fires of all artillery in the vicinity of the Su Prang Camp. Three officers were deployed from IFFV Artillery Headquarters to act as fire support coordinators at these combined centers.

(2) Lessons Learned.

(a) Two lessons were re-learned as a result of this particular campaign. One is that good prior planning facilitates an operation even if the plans cannot be followed in detail. Artillery units had been alerted well ahead of time and were in a high state of preparedness prior to the actual order to establish firebases. The major weakness was the extended span of control.

(b) The second lesson learned is that in the type of terrain one normally finds in Vietnam, aggressive patrolling by security forces minimizes the element of surprise by the enemy. The enemy force which surrounded Firebase Kate was not built-up overnight. More extensive patrolling by the security forces there would have provided sufficient indicators of enemy strength. Steps were taken after the episode of Firebase Kate to assure that all security forces were more highly motivated.

b. Battle at Dak Seang.

(1) Discussion.

(a) The Dak Seang battle was initiated on the night of 31 March – 1 April 1970, when enemy forces launched a strong rocket and mortar attack followed by ground probes against the Dak Seang Special Forces Camp. The ARVN resisted and continued to hold off strong enemy efforts to overrun the camp.

(b) IFFV Artillery's 52d Artillery Group had prepared complete plans for the defense of the DAK TO/BEN HET area. Movement of supporting US artillery into the key area of DAK TO II was initiated and completed without delay or incident. US artillery immediately began firing in support of the ARVN operations. The 52d Group plan worked well in all the aspects directly under Group control, and no major problems were encountered. Prior planning had earmarked and prepared both personnel and communications equipment for control centers at Tan Canh and Kontum. All artillery moves were accomplished with effective and immediate capability upon arrival. Realignment of other 52d Group assets was required, to include movement of major elements from the An Khe area to Pleiku and Plei Mrong. At the height of the battle, IFFV Artillery had committed 10 medium and 8 heavy artillery pieces. The resulting realignments freed ARVN artillery units for movement.
into the operations area. US artillery continued to provide essential coverage for the main supply routes which were kept open for all types of traffic throughout the period.

(c) IFFV Artillery provided some essential equipment and personnel to assist in fire support coordination. However, every effort was made to encourage ARVN artillery counterpart personnel to take an active and dominant part in planning and operations. To the maximum extent the ARVN artillery was encouraged to use those ARVN assets with which they might have to fight subsequent battles. However, no stinting of US artillery support was imposed. On the contrary, massive US support at critical junctures and for destruction of bunkers was the rule. US Forward Observer parties were inserted with all ARVN ground elements to include Mobile Strike Force (MSF) units, and liaison was established and maintained at all echelons of ARVN command. Throughout the battle, effective use was made of 8 inch howitzers firing Improved Conventional Munitions, particularly in support of MSF operations.

(d) There was a noticeable reluctance on the part of ARVN commanders to use heavy artillery in support of their operations, although it was available at all times. This constituted a recurring and ever-present problem of "selling" accuracy of delivery and destructive capability of the heavy artillery. It was only with great persuasiveness that the US FO's were able to call in effective close-in artillery support. Furthermore, ARVN commanders were reluctant to use their own artillery in close-in missions. The majority of ARVN artillery was fired at targets more than 1,000 meters from friendly positions. This enabled the enemy to "belly up" to the ARVN positions, sometimes within 30 meters, and largely negated the effectiveness of artillery. ARVN commanders would habitually call for, in order, gunships, tactical air support, and then artillery. With the time lag of up to 45 minutes to receive air support and the narrow valley restricting application of such fire, much needed artillery support was held in check and was made, as a consequence, less effective, timely and responsive.

(e) The joint US/ARVN plan called for the establishment of a Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) at Tan Canh, or a place to be designated by the CO, 24th STZ under control of the ARVN commander. Attempts were made by the 52d Artillery Group prior to the initiation of the battle to firm up plans for a joint TOC but to no avail. As a consequence, initial occupation of the joint TOC was accomplished in a piecemeal fashion with some resulting confusion and lack of cohesiveness of staff operations on the ARVN side. The ARVN commander did not designate an overall Fire Support Coordinator for all available fire support means and did not establish firm procedures for clearance of fires. Also, a US Air Liaison Officer (ALO) was not initially stationed at the TOC. As there were a large number of Forward Air Controllers (FAC) in the area and a large number of air strikes were being employed, this was an essential requirement.
Inability to coordinate airstrikes closely and the "on station" time of the high performance aircraft operating in the area resulted in long periods of time in which US and ARVN artillery could not fire. A further complicating factor was that check fires were given by many individuals without coordination. This often restricted or stopped essential artillery support at critical times. At the direction of the CG, IFFV Artillery the CO, 52d Artillery Group assumed overall control of the CFSCC. The CO, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery was designated as Fire Support Coordinator. He ensured full participation by ARVN counterparts in daily planning sessions to develop fire plans for each day's operations and coordination of fire support means. Procedures were established with specific areas around the Dak Seang Camp in which priority for fires were assigned to TAC Air, US artillery, ARVN artillery and gunships. This provided for greatly increased responsiveness and reduction in check fires.

(2) Lessons Learned.

(a) Two lessons were learned as a result of this particular campaign. First, greater emphasis must be placed on educating ARVN commanders at all levels in the effective use of available fire support means with emphasis on organic artillery and mortars. Continuing efforts must be made by advisory personnel as well as US tactical units to demonstrate conclusively to ARVN commanders the effectiveness and accuracy of artillery.

(b) The second lesson learned is that the average ARVN artillery battalion commander possesses neither the experience nor the personnel to establish and operate a Combined Fire Support Coordination Center. All contingency and operation plans must include the designation of the Fire Support Coordinator and assign him the authority to divert and control all fire support means. Emphasis should be placed on ARVN self-sufficiency using organic assets and reduced reliance on massive US assistance and fire support.

(c) Operation Metro Media.

(1) Discussion.

(a) In November 1969, IFFORCEV Artillery conducted a study of the suitability of assigned tactical missions and positioning of IFFORCEV Artillery tactical assets. The study resulted in a plan for extensive repositioning of IFFORCEV Artillery tactical assets. The objective of the repositioning plan was to provide for improved utilization of available assets, more responsive command and control, and better posturing of the 4 light, 4 heavy and 1 medium artillery battalions in IFFORCEV Artillery for future operations. The plan for redeployment was derived from consideration of the following factors.

1 Positioning of Light Artillery: Positioning of light artillery

CONFIDENTIAL
battalions of IFFORCEV Artillery had three of the four 105 battalions located in the northern part of Military Region 2 with the fourth battalion located in the extreme southern portion. There was an undesirable lack of US 105mm assets in the central portion of Military Region 2 which precluded rapid response in providing light artillery support and required dependence on aircraft for long distance movement. Positions placed only one heavy battalion headquarters with one firing battery in the Western Central Highlands. As demonstrated during the battle at Bu Prang/Lap, any enemy activity in this area required movement of light and medium supporting artillery from great distances, creating both logistical and command and control problems. The lessons learned in supporting the battle pointed toward the need for a light battalion headquarters as the control element in this area, with sufficient light artillery pieces immediately responsive to reduce dependence on assets which must be moved in from other areas.

2 Maximum Utilization of Heavy Artillery Capability: The limited heavy artillery assets available to IFFORCEV Artillery necessitated careful assessment of positioning policies to insure that maximum utilization of the extended range capability afforded by these weapons was exploited. In one instance, overlap of coverage occurred with resulting loss of maximum utilization.

3 Gaps in Artillery Coverage: An analysis of artillery coverage indicated that there were two areas in Military Region 2 where US coverage was non-existent and where such coverage could be provided by heavy artillery significantly contributing to mission accomplishment. The first of these was the area of Song Mao and the mountains north and east of Song Mao. Although outbreaks of hostilities of considerable magnitude periodically occurred in the Dak To/Ben Het and Bu Prang area, Binh Thuan Province was second only to Binh Dinh Province in consistent, sustained contact. The area north and northeast of Song Mao was not, nor had it ever been, covered adequately by artillery of any caliber. The second area was that consisting of the Dong Bo, Ba Cam Mountains, National Highway QL-1 between Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay, and the area west of Dong Ba Thin. This area had no US artillery capable of responding to a threat posed against the Cam Ranh Bay complex.

4 Artillery Flexibility: Prior to its inactivation, the 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery served as the "Strike" or swing battalion of IFFORCEV Artillery. As such, elements of this battalion made in excess of one hundred fifty moves in the 18 months it served in Military Region 2. IFFORCEV Artillery needed to reestablish this rapid deployment capability by establishing an element organized, equipped and missioned to operate in this fashion.

5 Split Battery Operations: IFFORCEV Artillery, by the very nature
of this conflict, had consistently been required to operate with battery elements split. Although necessary, this caused major problems in command and control, development of effective maintenance program, and in providing logistical support. Where mission permits, positioning plans must consider these problems, eliminate them where possible by maintaining unit integrity, and where this is impossible, to minimize their impact by reducing the time and distance involved in these split operations.

(b) Based on the above considerations, IFFORCEV Artillery formulated, and subsequently executed, operation Metro Media. The operation resulted in over 17 sequential and coordinated complete relocations of artillery battalion headquarters and subordinate elements between January and March 1970. In almost every case the moves were made in sequential fashion. A detailed time sequence table was used. The moves resulted in IFFORCEV Artillery assets being positioned in the best possible manner to accomplish the mission for the foreseeable future. All but one of the new positions could be resupplied by road, reducing dependence on air assets. Changes in communications, METRO, survey and logistical support requirements posed no significant problems. The moves lessened the span of control problems of the battalion commanders involved. A provisional unit was dissolved without loss in coverage. Better utilization of long range capability of heavy artillery was obtained. Critical areas previously denied US artillery support were provided this support at minimum cost in terms of uncovered areas. Light battalions of IFFORCEV Artillery were better distributed throughout Military Region 2. A quick reaction force in the central portion of Military Region 2 was created for rapid employment as needed.

2. (c) Ammunition Reduction Program.

a. Discussion.

(1) In mid-February 1970, Commanding General, IFFORCEV noted that large amounts of artillery ammunition were being expended during a period of decreased enemy activity. In late February, IFFORCEV Artillery was tasked to organize and head a study group composed of representatives from 4th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade and IFFORCEV Artillery to evaluate artillery ammunition expenditures during the period September 1969 through February 1970. The Study Group's primary objective was to submit recommendations on how best to reduce what appeared to be excessive expenditures. From these recommendations, methods and means would subsequently be adopted to insure that IFFORCEV/II Corps Artillery units...
expanded artillery ammunition more efficiently and effectively.

(2) An examination of data for the first six weeks of 1970 indicated an increased ammunition expenditure in Military Region 2 without any corresponding increase in enemy activity to account for this trend. Combined US and ROK 105mm and 155mm expenditures for the period August 1969 through February 1970 were in excess of 1,600,000 rounds. The total confirmed enemy killed in action for the same period totaled 4,800. It would be an optimistic evaluation to assume that one-third were killed by artillery.

(3) The month of March was selected for the study, with the initial meeting held at Force Artillery Headquarters on 4 March. Study group members representing all US artillery commands as well as representatives from RVN II Corps Artillery and Republic of Korea Field Command attended. Each member of the group was given specific tasks to accomplish within his organization, to include the gathering of statistical data to be used by the entire group at a later date. In addition, each member of the study group was assigned a target category with a final objective of determining expenditure guidelines applicable to each type target in that particular category. The goal of reduction for the sake of efficient utilization of ammunition, rather than purely for dollar saving, was outlined as the prevailing guidance for all considerations.

(b) The following assumptions were adopted by the study group:

(a) The future Available Supply Rate (ASR) will not necessitate a forced reduction of expenditures.

(b) The enemy will continue to utilize similar tactics in the future as he has in the past.

(c) Vietnamization will proceed at an accelerated rate with an expected increase in ARVN artillery expenditures. By assuming strictly a GS mission, US IFFORCEV Artillery units should be expected to achieve lesser expenditure rates than those in the September 1969 through February 1970 period.

b. Lessons Learned. On 25 May 1970, IFFORCEV Artillery published the findings of the study group. Three areas which require either renewed emphasis or new guidance were isolated during this study. The areas are as follows:

(1) Tactical Damage Assessment. Tactical damage assessment is an examination of the target area to appraise the effect of an attack and is the basis for the determination of artillery effectiveness. Para 11, FM 6-40 states that tactical damage assessment is the responsibility of the headquarters ordering the fires. This is accomplished by maneuver forces in the

A-10

CONFIDENTIAL
confirmed and preparation categories and, to a lesser extent, in counter-
battery fires. Artillery performs this function for the special purpose
category. To request that targeting or intelligence gathering agencies
perform tactical damage assessment of acquired targets is impractical and
imposes a requirement which can only be met by artillery air observers and
by maneuver force follow-up. Artillery must be selective in requesting
such follow-ups and, in effect, limit requests to those having a high prob-
ability of producing definite results.

(a) Findings: Effectiveness and efficiency of artillery ammunition
expenditures can be accurately measured only by the accomplishment of a tac-
tical damage assessment program.

(b) Recommendations:

1 That artillery provide to maneuver forces, on a continuing basis,
the description and time of engagement for acquired targets of minor tac-
tical importance and requests for ground follow-up on all regimental or
larger size enemy elements located by intelligence gathering agencies.

2 That US maneuver forces be tasked to respond to artillery ground tar-
get surveillance within their capability.

3 That artillery units place renewed emphasis on target surveillance
procedures for forward and aerial observers.

(2) Forward Observer and Fire Direction Procedures. A review of fire
direction center records collected from all US artillery units in IFFRCR
indicated a lack of clearly defined target descriptions by the observer.
The selection of the method of attack, caliber of ammunition and fuze com-
bination, as well as the number of rounds to be fired is derived solely
from the observer's target description. Where the description is incomplete,
the method of attack will no doubt also be incorrect. The employment of ar-
tillery in battery and platoon locations widely separated from the parent
unit, dictates that the Battery Fire Direction Officer, rather than the S-3,
make the decision on the method of attack to be employed. A combination
of inexperienced forward observers and fire direction officers compound this
situation.

(a) Findings: Failure of forward observers and fire direction per-
sonnel to follow the doctrine and techniques taught by the Field Artillery
School at Fort Sill has resulted in excessive ammunition expenditures.

(b) Recommendations:

1 That artillery units emphasize the importance of accurate target
descriptions by FO's and correct target analysis techniques by FDC person-
nel.
ANNEX A (Operations)

2 That all Field Artillery Commanders and S-3's be reminded that Fort Sill gunnery methods have not changed because of the RVN environment.

(3) Expenditure Guidelines. The seven target categories — Confirmed, Acquired, Counterbattery, Preparation, Interdiction, Special Purpose, and Others — were discussed and analyzed.

(a) Findings:

1 In all target categories, except Acquired, present procedures are adequate, but can be further refined.

2 Acquired targets consumed 60 percent of all IFFORCEV Artillery ammunition for the months of January and February 1970, therefore, this is the area requiring intensive supervision and control.

(b) Recommendations: That the expenditure guidelines outlined in the study be approved.

(4) On 10 July 1970, IFFORCEV published an ammunition expenditure letter which provided guidance on the type and amount of ammunition to be fired on various targets within each of the seven recognized target categories. That letter implemented the findings and recommendations of the ammunition study group. As a result of this program, there has been a substantial reduction in the amount of ammunition expended by US units in Military Region 2. For the six month period before the ammunition reduction program was initiated (Sep 69 - Feb 70), US units expended a total of 1,374,014 rounds, or an average of 6,436 rounds per day. This total dropped drastically to 497,272 rounds, or 2,648 rounds per day during the next six month period, for an average reduction of 59%. This favorable trend continues with no decrease in artillery support effectiveness noted.

3. (C) Redeployment Planning and Execution.

a. Discussion.

(1) During the period October 1969 to October 1970, First Field Force Vietnam Artillery units were involved with inactivations brought about by Keystone Cardinal operations in November of 1969, Keystone Bluejay operations in March of 1970, and Keystone Robin operations in October 1970. Throughout the period heavy emphasis was placed on the Vietnamization effort in the knowledge that withdrawals would take place in ever increasing increments and with greater frequency as time went on, and with the same factor in mind, all units kept redeployment plans in readiness for immediate execution.

(2) On 17 Sep 1969, 41st Arty Group received notification to inactivate
at Camp Fidel on 15 November 1969. Shortly following notification, 41st Artillery Group Headquarters formed a planning team to prepare for the realignment of assigned artillery units under a battalion group, to provide security for Camp Fidel during the transition period, to expedite the smooth transfer of personnel and equipment as directed, and to effect realignment of missions and tasks among subordinate units. The inactivation was accomplished as ordered with minimal difficulties. Those primary problems which did arise concerned the requirement to return to the US all personnel with less than 120 days remaining in-country, thereby sending many men home without credit for a full tour, and the late arrival of equipment disposition instructions only 18 days prior to inactivation.

(3) Following the loss of 41st Artillery Group, planning for a major realignment of artillery assets took place throughout Military Region 2. This planning was still in progress when Keystone Bluejay was initiated.

(4) On 3 January 1970, the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery was notified that it would undergo inactivation on 30 March 1970. Planning was implemented immediately with all batteries of the unit, except B Battery, standing down and processing personnel and equipment for transfer at Artillery Hill. B Battery stood down and accomplished processing at Phan Rang. Troop movements of personnel reassigned in-country were arranged AB hours prior to individual departures, while those displacing to CONUS were processed through the 22d Replacement Battalion at Cam Ranh Bay on 8 April 1970.

(5) Inactivation of the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery was accomplished as directed. The problem with personnel experienced earlier by the 41st Artillery Group was eliminated during this exercise by redeploying personnel who had 60 days or less remaining in their tours. However, a slight morale problem did develop as the result of some redeploying personnel not receiving their reassignment orders until just prior to departure from country. A problem unique to this unit was the location of one of its batteries at a great distance from the battalion headquarters. This problem was minimized through full scale assistance rendered by a sister battalion headquartered in the same area as the isolated battery.

(6) On twenty-six September the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery received orders to stand down immediately and inactivate NLT 12 October 1970. Despite the short notice upon which this move was directed, the stand down, turn-in, and inactivation were accomplished smoothly and on schedule. Since the batteries of the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery were deployed in a far-flung configuration, stand down, turn-in and processing were established on a schedule that permitted units farthest from the Logistical Support Command to complete transfer and turn-in first and then worked back toward the coast so that the unit nearest the Support Command was the last to complete the necessary actions. Experience gained in earlier inactivations proved invaluable in the swift execution of this redeployment and indicates that future inactivations or redeployments will be possible with minimal prior notification.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Annex A (Operations)

(7) The status of future redeployments within First Field Force Artillery is in a constant state of flux. The only certain thing at this point is that more units will be called upon to either redeploy or inactivate, and on a larger scale than experienced in the past. All units are aware that it may be their turn next and maintain plans for immediate execution in anticipation of that eventuality.

b. Lessons Learned.

(1) Coordination and liaison between the inactivating unit and the awards and decorations element of the S-1 section must be established early in order to assure proper recognition of personnel prior to DEROS or transfer.

(2) Assignment instructions for both in-country and out of country transfers should be issued as quickly as the situation permits.

(3) When a redeploying or inactivating subordinate element is widely separated from its parent unit, the nearest headquarters equivalent to the parent headquarters can render invaluable assistance in preparing that subordinate element for departure.

(4) Personnel with more than sixty (60) days remaining in their tours should be allowed to complete (10) months in-country before being returned to CONUS, or given credit for a full tour if an in-country transfer is not possible.

(5) Equipment disposition instructions, including those for lateral transfers, should be issued to all involved units as soon as possible after notification of redeployment or inactivation.

4. (c) Helicopter Usage.

a. Organic Aircraft.

(1) Discussion.

(a) In December 1969, IFFORCEV Artillery received the first of its 25 authorized OH-58A "Kiowa" helicopters. Within four months the entire fleet of aircraft was on hand and being utilized by organic units. The OH-58A helicopter is used primarily for command and control missions and affords the commander quick and easy access to his subordinate units. The Kiowa is not used as a scout aircraft in IFFORCEV Artillery. To date, over 12,000 hours flight time have been logged in the Kiowa and units are quite satisfied with the performance of the aircraft.

(b) Maintenance of these aircraft has been a continuing problem. This
maintenance problem can be attributed to several factors, including the newness of the aircraft in RVU, the dispersed location of IFFORCEV Artillery’s battalions and their aircraft, and lack of aircraft maintenance personnel on the MTOE of our units. To help solve these problems the following steps have been taken:

1. Worked closely with supporting field maintenance units and technical representatives from the Bell Helicopter Company and Allison Engine Company both to gain benefits from their knowledge of the aircraft and to assure feedback into maintenance management channels of the problems we have experienced.

2. Consolidated the repair parts prescribed load lists of our separate battalions when two or more battalions have their aircraft based at one location. Although technically a violation of AR 735-35, this consolidation of PLL’s has improved the availability of required repair parts.

3. At bases where more than one battalion has aircraft, one aviator has been assigned responsibility for supervising maintenance of all IFFORCEV Artillery aircraft at that base. This system was initiated by 52d Group for aircraft based at Pleiku and proved so successful that the concept was extended to aircraft from Provisional Artillery Group located at Phan Rang.

4. Attempts have been made to obtain additional aviation maintenance personnel. A warrant officer qualified in aviation maintenance was assigned to Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV Artillery. Although he has provided considerable assistance to the subordinate units, much of his time has been required as pilot of one of the two aircraft assigned to this headquarters. We have been trying to obtain four OH-58A qualified maintenance technical inspectors (MOS 67V30). However, due to an extreme shortage of these personnel (only two in USARV) we have been unable to obtain technical inspectors. Both a maintenance officer and technical inspectors are being added to our MTOE’s.

(2) Lessons Learned. Maintenance of aircraft at dispersed locations throughout the military region is difficult and requires continuing command attention. TOE’s and supply regulations must be modified as necessary to meet this peculiar situation.


(1) Discussion. COMUSMACV has directed a reduction of blade time for GS helicopters in non-tactical employment against a backdrop of increasing austerity. This reduction has a two-fold impact on operating costs; the first being savings on helicopter spare parts and the second is the savings of POL products. This headquarters has taken steps to reduce blade time.
required to support administrative and logistic functions. The first procedure was to consolidate requirements and usage of helicopters. Currently, one UH-1 is being allocated to a particular area even though elements of two or more battalions are involved. Requirements are being held and consolidated to insure full usage by several units in the same general area. This has saved dead time for the helicopter, thereby accomplishing the required movements with a reduction in dead time. The end result has been a minimal amount of delay in mission performance. Also, the headquarters has placed increased emphasis on the use of road convey in lieu of helicopters for resupply. Organic helicopters have been used frequently to transport small parts, mail and supplies during command and control flights. During operation Metro Media consideration was given to the relocation of fire bases that are accessible only by air. Reduced availability of CH-54 Flying Cranes and CH-47C Super Chinooks has reduced the ability to move the 155mm howitzer by air. However, this has not interfered with tactical plans as yet. The impact has been felt in the resupply of ammunition, fuel, and water.

(2) Lessons Learned. As redeployments continue, artillery units must rely more on road transportation and less on use of helicopters for routine administrative and logistical functions. This is becoming more feasible as the LOC Program progresses; however, road access is of increasing importance when selecting artillery positions.

c. Fixed Wing Aircraft.

(1) Discussion.

(a) During the period of 1 January 1970 through 3 June 1970, 52d Artillery Group was allocated four O-1 aircraft daily for three hours each, Provisional Artillery Group three O-1 aircraft daily for three hours each, 6th Battalion, 39th Artillery two O-1 aircraft daily for two hours each. In addition to the allocations, if one of the Force Artillery units were supporting either a 4th Infantry Division or 173d Airborne Brigade operation, these organizations would furnish the artillery unit with an aircraft for registration.

(b) On 4 June 1970, all O-1 aircraft allocations were reduced in some areas by more than 50%. At the present, each artillery group and separate battalion is allocated one aircraft for approximately 3 hours per day.

(c) Artillery units experienced some difficulty in allocating the one aircraft and establishing priorities of registration to the firing batteries. Poor coordination at first was a factor in not being able to register a battery because the aircraft would not have a qualified aerial observer or the pilot had the wrong grid or radio frequency. There was no set time when the aircraft would be available because of other commitments.
Better and closer coordination was established between the supporting RAC and the artillery units. Priorities for registration of the batteries were established by the artillery groups and battalions. In addition, maneuver units would still furnish the supporting unit with aircraft if they were supporting a specific operation of theirs.

(2) Lessons Learned. The artillery groups and separate battalions report that with the reduced aircraft allocation they have experienced very little difficulty except when adverse weather conditions exist and the aircraft cannot observe areas in which the units desire to register. However, with coordination the aircraft would proceed to the next firing battery to register and if weather permitting, would return to the previous battery to register it. The reduction in O-1 aircraft allocated to Force Artillery has not affected the mission. Proper coordination and planning have overcome this limitation.

5. (U) Vietnamese and Korean Forces Assistance.

a. Discussion.

(1) IFFORCEV Artillery has initiated three programs to assist Vietnamese artillery units.

(a) The Associate Battery Program.

(b) The CIDG Artillery Assistance Program.

(c) The Territorial Forces Assistance Program.

(2) The Associate Battery Program is designed to augment existing advisory programs, improve the effectiveness of ARVN artillery, and develop channels for coordination of fire support and mutual understanding. Under this program, ARVN artillery batteries and isolated platoons are sponsored by US artillery batteries in whose area of influence they are located. The sponsoring unit provides a responsive US headquarters from which the ARVN unit can request technical, maintenance and training assistance. These requests are answered in concert with existing advisory agencies. Additionally, contact teams periodically visit the sponsored unit in order to evaluate the proficiency of individual gun sections and fire direction centers. The evaluation includes observation of indirect firing and, when possible, air mobile operations.

(3) The CIDG Artillery Assistance Program is also designed to augment existing advisory efforts. Periodically, designated US artillery units provide contact teams to visit SF/CIDG camps. These teams provide assistance
with respect to maintenance of the howitzers, maintenance and storage of 
ammunition, and training of gun section and fire direction center person-
nel. Prior to the inception of this program, the SF/CIDG camp personnel 
expected and received only direct fire support from the 105mm howitzers 
located in their camps. As a result of the efforts of units responsible 
for implementing this program, significant progress has been made. The 
indirect fire capabilities of these platoons has progressed to the point 
where several are providing close support to maneuver forces and almost all 
are capable of attacking targets of opportunity. Additionally, nearly all 
camps have initiated plans for firing-in defensive targets as a portion of 
their camp defense plan.

(4) The Territorial Forces Assistance Program is intended to provide 
assistance to RF/PF, RD and PSDF units with emphasis at the district level. 
Liaison is established with district advisors on a periodic basis in order 
to apprise the advisor of the artillery support available. Efforts are 
made to assist each district chief in the establishment of an adequate fire 
support plan and effective fire request channels. The establishment of ade-
quate fire support plans for each district was promulgated as a combined ef-
fort involving ARVN, ROK and US artillery.

(5) These programs have assisted the improvement of ARVN artillery by 
making available expertise not otherwise available. However, in addition 
to those programs designed to provide assistance to Vietnamese forces on a 
continuous basis, assistance is provided to both Vietnamese and ROK forces 
upon request.

(a) Formal training programs were provided to the ROK AN/MPS-4 
radar sections located at Ninh Hoa, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang. On the job 
training was given to the ARVN AN/MPS-4 radar section at Ban Me Tho. In 
addition, this organization provided one instructor to the ARVN Radar School 
located at Duc My.

(b) The most significant assistance rendered was a detailed evaluation 
of inbore premature malfunctions with M101A1 howitzers by ROK forces. This 
evaluation isolated deficiencies and provided recommendations for correc-
tive action which assisted significantly in the reduction of accidents.

b. Lessons Learned.

(1) Contact teams sent by US artillery units to assist ARVN artillery 
units participating in the Associate Battery Program have noted an inability 
to communicate maintenance procedures to the ARVN unit. One of the best 
methods of communicating with respect to maintenance procedures is to con-
duct demonstrations in the US firing battery area for Vietnamese section 
chiefs and officers. During these demonstrations, correct procedures re-
lated to specific problem areas are highlighted.
(2) Monthly reports submitted by US artillery units relative to territorial forces must conform to an established format. Although additional remarks and observations are invited, a prescribed format causes the report to focus on problem areas and corrective actions. The number of units with/without forward observers are examples of specific reporting data which, when provided for all territorial forces, establishes an overview of a portion of the integrated fire support/maneuver team.

6. (U) Training.
   a. Discussion.
      (1) Command Inspections.
         (a) This headquarters administers comprehensive semi-annual Command Inspections to all attached groups and battalions. It closely follows the guidance of the USARV AGI and serves as an effective tool to evaluate a unit's progress in housekeeping, maintenance and logistical activities. The inspection is limited to one day, except for personnel and maintenance inspectors who arrive a day before the main body of inspectors. It takes the majority of all Force Artillery staff officers to support this inspection because of the thorough checks that are made.
         (b) Attempts are made to schedule the Command Inspection during the final phase of a commander's tenure of duty to afford him an opportunity to influence his unit's results.
      (2) Firing Battery Evaluation Team.
         (a) In an effort to maintain technical proficiency within Force Artillery, a firing battery evaluation team has been formed within the headquarters. The team's purpose is to assist the commander in evaluating the overall capability of his firing elements. The team is composed of one officer and two experienced NCO's. All facets of the firing battery are inspected, to include fire direction, service of the piece, communications, ammunition, and artillery maintenance. A copy of the inspection results is left with the battery commander and a report is written by the team to be evaluated at every level of command.
         (b) Without discussing individual deficiencies, some important observations have been noted. First, the team never inspected the "same" firing battery twice. By the time the team returns to a unit for a second inspection nearly all key personnel have changed through rotation or reassignment. Although a unit may improve from one inspection to the next it rarely can be attributed to the influence of one or two people. Secondly, small unit training must be continuous in fire direction, firing battery procedures,
and maintenance. The majority of deficiencies noted are not violations of procedures that are particular to the VN environment; rather, they are violations of basic gunnery procedures. Although personnel are properly and thoroughly trained in CONUS and have attended selected schools in Vietnam, unless properly supervised, they will shortcut or do the minimum essential to shoot a volley. This can easily be solved by a knowledgeable and aggressive battery commander who has the backing of an experienced S-3. The Firing Battery Evaluation Team provides impetus for upgrading the proficiency of all firing batteries in Force Artillery.

(3) The Forward Observer/Fire Direction Officer School.

(a) A constant problem, again because of the turnover in personnel, is assuring that high standards are maintained in the performance of our forward observer and fire direction personnel. In addition to firing battery evaluations, unit schools help in accomplishing this task. Both school operate under IFFORCEV Artillery Headquarters in Nha Trang and are open to personnel of all ranks who are nominated by their units. Courses are designed to review basics, and to introduce the local ground rules for operating in Military Region 2 as well as the MACV Rules of Engagement. Lessons learned from past experience are also incorporated into the curriculum.

(b) The student body is composed of other branches as well as artillerymen. Many personnel are from commands using artillery support. This includes airmen from bases throughout Military Region 2, logistic personnel from Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Support Commands, members of LRRP Teams and personnel assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment.

(c) In addition, special two week-long courses encompassing all aspects of fire direction, firing battery and observed fire procedures, are presented to Special Forces personnel representing all CIDG Camps in Military Region 2.

(d) Many of our unit commanders have adopted a policy of not allowing newly assigned officers to perform the duties of FDO until they have successfully completed the FDO course. All commanders prefer to get as many of their officers as possible through both courses.

(e) The school has qualified many enlisted personnel as forward observers. This in turn has permitted the use of NCO's for forward observer teams, expanding Force Artillery's ability to provide liaison and observer teams to supported units.

b. Lessons Learned. Command Inspections, Unit Schools, and Firing Battery Evaluations are viewed as excellent means to influence the maintaining of professional standards within the command and to assist artillery units with their training. Additionally, it should be emphasized that personnel turnover and the general lack of experience on the part of battery grade officers made it imperative to have a continuous program of training and inspections.
Annex B Administration and Logistics 17 October 1970

1. (U) Personnel Problems.

   a. Discussion. In the officer ranks, a crucial shortage of company grade officers of the Field Artillery Branch existed from May to October 1970. This shortage has caused firing batteries to operate at less than the strength authorized by MTOE. Fortunately, enemy action has been light since June 1970, so this shortage has not adversely affected the ability of units to furnish the required support to military operations. Assignment of liaison officers with supported ARVN and ROK forces has suffered due to this shortage, but liaison has been effected for designated operations by pulling an officer from other duties and having him perform liaison duties. Air Defense Artillery officers have been furnished in adequate numbers to maintain officer strength at near 100% of that authorized by MTOE and have been used in those Field Artillery positions where branch is not of paramount importance. Enlisted strengths have been maintained at approximately 90% of authorized strength. However, certain MOS's have been short and this has caused some degradation of the effectiveness of units. In each case individuals of less rank and experience than desired are occupying the vacancies. The following MOS's are those which fall into this category:

   - 12340 Chief of Firing Battery and Section Chief
   - 13250 Field Artillery Cannon Senior Sergeant
   - 16F20, 16F40 Light Air Defense Artillery Crewman
   - 76Y10 Supply Sergeant
   - 91B40 Mess Steward

   Recent gains in Field Artillery company grade officers show signs of relieving this officer shortage. The enlisted MOS shortages show few signs of improvement.

   b. Lessons Learned.

   (1) Field artillery battalions can effectively support operations with less than authorized officer strength when activity is at a relatively low level. When officer strength falls below 60% authorized, serious impairment to the unit's ability to properly perform its mission is experienced, even when no major combat activity occurs.

   (2) The Air Defense Artillery battalion requires authorized strength for effective operations, due to its missions and widely separated operations.

   (3) A shortage of senior NCO's in key positions causes a lack of proven experience which can not be overcome by replacing them with junior personnel.

2. (U) Morale and Leadership.
a. Discussion. With reduced enemy activity, there has been a corresponding reduction in friendly fires, and a marked reduction in ammunition expenditures. This inactivity has caused a greater challenge to commanders in insuring that the morale and esprit of their units remain high. Although meaningful work is always required to improve firebases and make living conditions better, these activities do not have the same effect on morale as actually performing the unit's primary mission, which is furnishing fire support for operations. Generally commanders have kept the personnel busy, and a noticeable decrease in morale is not detectable. A definite morale factor has been the availability of movies at all locations, both on firebases and in headquarters areas. Adequate and timely distribution of movies is made in this area; however, when projectors require repairs, a lack of repair parts keeps the projectors deadlined for lengthy periods of time. This is detrimental to troop morale and every effort is being made to alleviate this condition.

b. Lessons Learned.

(1) Reduced enemy activity requires increased efforts by the chain of command to maintain high morale in an organization.

(2) Movie projector and adequate distribution of commercial films are a great morale booster.


a. Discussion.

(1) A command-wide interest in the drug and marijuana usage of US personnel in Vietnam has been prevalent. The ready accessibility and low cost of marijuana and drugs in Vietnam are a constant problem which hinders all attempts to suppress drug usage. In addition, the lack of pressing tactical operations since the spring of 1970 has increased the free time of soldiers in the field, and has caused many to seek new adventures, including experimenting with marijuana and drugs. An exact measurement of the extent of usage is very difficult, and only a small percentage of drug users are apprehended and prosecuted. The laws for search and seizure are complicated and sometimes hard to follow correctly; this often frustrates the efforts of junior commanders and noncommissioned officers to control drug usage.

(2) In January 1970, an Amnesty Program was initiated whereby any person feeling that he had a drug problem could turn himself in for help. Persons who elected to participate in the Amnesty Program were not to be subjected to any disciplinary action; they were to be referred to a surgeon who would determine the type, duration, and location of medical care needed in the termination of the individual's drug usage. This program has received
wide publicity and has produced some participants with limited success in curing drug users. However, the ultimate success of this program must rest squarely with the motivation, or lack thereof, on the part of the individual and the leadership exhibited by the NCO's and officers at battery level.

(3) An estimate by commanders of the actual percentage of users of illegal drug usage within IFFORCEV Artillery was made at the request of the CG, IFFORCEV. Commanders were asked to estimate the percentage of users of marijuana, hard narcotics, and dangerous drugs. They were further asked to indicate habitual users and personnel who had experimented with or occasionally used drugs. Results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HABITUAL</th>
<th>NON-HABITUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Narcotics</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous Drugs</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is significant to note that commanders expressed the opinion that the known users were individuals of weak moral fiber, who might well be in trouble in the unit even if he did not use the drugs. Commanders also noted that many of the habitual users had acquired the habit prior to arrival in Vietnam.

(4) The problem of drug usage is one that is receiving highest priority, but the solution to discouraging and eliminating individual usage is difficult, with no infallible treatment available.

b. Lessons Learned.

(1) The drug and marijuana climate of Vietnam poses a real and constant problem for commanders. No proven method of suppression or elimination of drug usage is available.

(2) Apprehension, and prosecution of drug users is difficult due to complicated legalities of search and seizure procedures.

(3) The Amnesty Program has met limited success in attracting and treating drug abusers.

4. (C) Sub Zone Coordination.

a. Discussion.

(1) Sub zone coordination is a form of area coordination. It is a management system which enables commanders to establish, on an area basis,
procedures to eliminate duplication of functions and regulate command activities and use of shared facilities. Within the framework of the area coordination system, US military officers are designated as zone, sub zone, installation, and installation defense coordinators. This provides a means of coordination and solution of common problems at the lowest possible level. The system is not a substitute for command channels.

(2) Within Military Region 2, Sub Zone V includes; Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa, and Ninh Thuan Provinces plus Cam Ranh Special Sector. The Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery has been designated as the Sub Zone V Coordinator. Key and critical installations within Sub Zone V include Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Peninsula, Dong Ba Thin, Phan Rang and Phan Thiet.

(3) The sub zone coordinator is responsible for exercising coordinating authority over functions involving two or more services or two or more forces of the same service within the sub zone. Authority has been delegated to sub zone coordinators to require consultation between elements involved in area coordination matters. However, no authority exists to compel agreement. On an interim basis, pending resolution of specific issues, coordinators may require compliance on matters pertaining to installation defense. In all cases where essential agreement cannot be reached on any area coordination matter, the issue is referred to the next higher coordinator for resolution.

(4) In addition to installation defense and physical security, sub zone coordination responsibilities include numerous administrative functions. Principal among these are: maintenance of law and order, morale, welfare, recreation, safety, motor vehicle and traffic regulations, post exchange activities, allocation and disposal of real estate, messing, and billeting.

b. Lessons Learned.

(1) Installation coordinators are US military officers who are responsible for coordinating administrative matters in a designated installation. In order to adequately perform their functions it is necessary for them to have an organization responsive to their demands. If the installation coordinator is a large unit commander, that organization is normally sufficient to provide personnel to accomplish staff and supervisory functions. If, however, the installation coordinator is not a large unit commander, it has been found necessary to provide a TD organization, which is subordinate to him to accomplish installation coordination functions. A possible alternate solution, that of levying carrier units to provide necessary personnel to perform installation coordination functions was found to be unsatisfactory. Although personnel were made available, they frequently lacked the required MOS or skill. It was determined that a TD unit would provide the basis for requisition of personnel with the proper MOS and skill level.
(2) Installation defense coordinators are US military officers appointed by the sub zone coordinator, who are responsible for all aspects of installation defense. It has been noted through experience that the officer appointed as the installation defense coordinator should be the military counterpart of the ARVN officer or political leader charged by his government with the defense of the same installation. This arrangement reduces requirements for liaison and communications and will expedite Vietnamization during the reduction of US forces. As rollup operations continue and key installations are reduced or eliminated, MACV personnel are expected to be among the last to depart. Thus, they will be better able to terminate installation defense functions without endangering any elements of the command or requiring additional units to remain at the installation solely to perform that function.

5. (U) Clubs and Messes.

a. Discussion.

(1) With the publication of change 1 to USARV Regulation 230-60 in June 1970, the responsibility for operation of all Open Mess Systems was placed with the G-1/S-1 elements of all staffs. At that time only one system was operated within the IFFORCEV Artillery. This was a battalion Open Mess System with three small branches. However, as Sub Zone V Coordinator, the operation of the Nha Trang Officer Open Mess System and the Nha Trang NCO Open Mess System became the responsibility of the Commanding General, IFFORCEV Artillery. The Nha Trang Officer Open Mess System is composed of three branches located in the various military installations in Nha Trang. The NCO Open Mess System consists of seven different branches in the Nha Trang area. The combined assets of these three Open Mess Systems are valued at more than $415,000. The August 1970 gross income was $60,763.76, and the August 1970 net profit was $20,810.25. Military personnel are assigned full time duty with these three systems, and additional personnel, both Vietnamese Nationals and off-duty military personnel, are employed by the club systems to administer the clubs.

(2) Overseeing the operation of these clubs is a large undertaking. The responsibilities include monitoring the financial condition, inspecting the physical facilities, and ensuring that proper management is accomplished. It was necessary to immediately select one officer for the S-1 section in order to effect constant staff supervision of Open Mess activities. The officer selected was a First Lieutenant who had a degree in Business Administration. To accomplish his job, it is felt that he must be augmented with a minimum of one clerk who has an accounting background, and can also serve as an inspector of each club.

(3) The problem encountered is locating personnel with experience and

B-25

CONFIDENTIAL
training in club management and supervision, to fill the positions within the club systems, as well as the staff positions. Although the Army now trains some personnel in this field, there are few qualified and available personnel currently assigned to this organization.

b. Lessons Learned.

(1) Open Mess Operations are a big business, and are receiving a large amount of command emphasis.

(2) Trained personnel are essential for proper operation, management, and staff supervision of Open Mess Operations. These trained personnel are not normally available within tactical organizations.

6. (U) Turn-In of Excess Equipment.

a. Discussion. Starting in November 1969 command emphasis was placed on the identification and turn-in of excess equipment and supplies on firebases throughout TFORGEO Artillery. On 2 January 1970 further amplification of the turn-in of excess equipment was provided commanders. On 16 June 70 a program of turn-in of excess equipment was initiated. To provide for ease of turn-in of excess equipment, instructions were passed by USARV that a free turn-in of excess equipment where no turn-in credit was required would be accomplished with no questions asked. Certificates were required to be signed by the unit accomplishing the turn-in to the effect that no turn-in credit was required and that no ammunition, human remains or POL products were left in the vehicles or equipment. This program has been very successful. The free turn-in period will end on 31 October 1970. In conjunction with the foregoing program, USARV also established a program whereby unneeded TOE and MTOE equipment would be turned-in. This process was implemented under USARV Reg 310-32, subject: Turn-in of Unneeded TOE/MTOE Equipment and Personnel, dated 16 Jun 70. These two programs have assisted units to reduce their on hand equipment and to further reduce maintenance on this equipment.

b. Lessons Learned. In order to return equipment that was acquired by units over the years when equipment was made readily available to meet combat requirements a special program was required. This program has been successful in returning to stocks some $535,544.96 worth of equipment as of 31 Aug 70. During times of combat, restraints of property accountability are lessened, therefore accumulations of large amounts of excess are generated.
## Appendix 1 (Situation Summary) to DEBRIEFING REPORT (RCS-CSFOR-74)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>UNIT SUPPORTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, IFFORCE ARTY</td>
<td>NHA TRANG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 6/32 (175/8&quot;)</td>
<td>PHU HIEP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A BTRY</td>
<td>BAN ME THUOT EAST</td>
<td>REINF 2/17</td>
<td>23D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B BTRY</td>
<td>FSB WILSON (NINH HOA)</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>9TH ROK DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C BTRY</td>
<td>FSB FREEDOM (CAM RANH BAY)</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>9TH ROK DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52D ARTY GROUP</td>
<td>ARTY HILL (PLEIKU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 7/15 (175/8&quot;)</td>
<td>CAMP FIDEL (PHU CAT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A BTRY</td>
<td>LZ BLACKHAWK</td>
<td>GSR 1/92</td>
<td>22D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B BTRY</td>
<td>LZ TWO BITS</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>173D AIR BDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C BTRY</td>
<td>CAMP RADCILEFT (AN KHS)</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>4TH INF DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 6/14 (175/8&quot;)</td>
<td>ARTY HILL (PLEIKU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A BTRY</td>
<td>LZ OASIS</td>
<td>REINF 1/92</td>
<td>22D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B BTRY</td>
<td>FSB 12 (HEN HST)</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>22D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C BTRY</td>
<td>LZ ATHENA (KONTOM)</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>22D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 1/92 (155T)</td>
<td>ARTY HILL (PLEIKU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A BTRY</td>
<td>PLEI MENG (4)/WEIGHT DAVIS (2)</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>22D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B BTRY</td>
<td>FSB 6 (4)/FSB 12 (2)</td>
<td>REINF 6/14</td>
<td>22D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C BTRY</td>
<td>ARTY HILL</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>22D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROV ARTY GROUP</td>
<td>DALAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 5/22 (175/8&quot;)</td>
<td>PHAN RANG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A BTRY</td>
<td>FSB APOLLO (DUC TRONG)</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>23D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B BTRY</td>
<td>FSB GAISER (SNGN HAO)</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>23D ARVN DIV&amp;1/50 INF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C BTRY</td>
<td>FSB SANDY</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>23D ARVN DIV&amp;1/50 INF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 5/27 (105T)</td>
<td>PHAN RANG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A BTRY</td>
<td>FSB BRENDA</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>23D ARVN DIV&amp;1/50 INF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B BTRY</td>
<td>FSB SHERRY (5)/PSB SANDY (1)</td>
<td>GS/REINF 5/22</td>
<td>23D ARVN DIV&amp;1/50 INF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C BTRY</td>
<td>FSB MIKE NORTON</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>23D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 2/17 (105T)</td>
<td>BAN ME THUOT EAST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A BTRY</td>
<td>NHA TRANG</td>
<td>NHA TRANG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B BTRY</td>
<td>DALAT (5)/DUC TRONG (1)</td>
<td>DALAT DEFENSE/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C BTRY</td>
<td>BAN ME THUOT EAST</td>
<td>REINF 5/22</td>
<td>23D ARVN DIV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
Appendix 2 (Tactical Area of Operations) to DEBRIEFING REPORT (RCG-OSFOR-74) (?)
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix A (Logistical Support - Depot and LSA) to DEBRIEFING REPORT (RCS-CSF(R-74) (0))

UNITS SUPPORTED BY QUI NHON SUPPORT COMMAND:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 52nd Artv Op</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14th Artv</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/13th Artv</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/92nd Artv</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/60th Artv (AW)</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/26th Artv (TAB)</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/6/32nd Artv</td>
<td>Tuy Hoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNITS SUPPORTED BY CAM RANH SUPPORT COMMAND:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, Prov Artv Op</td>
<td>Dalat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17th Artv</td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27th Artv</td>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/22nd Artv</td>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/32nd Artv</td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Btry</td>
<td>Ninh Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Btry</td>
<td>Dong Bu Thin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Btry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNITS SUPPORTED BY PHAN THIET LSA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/22nd Artv</td>
<td>C Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27th Artv</td>
<td>A Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27th Artv</td>
<td>B Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27th Artv</td>
<td>C Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>A Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>B Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>C Btry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**DOCUMEN T CONTROL DATA - R & D**

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originating Activity (Corporate author)</th>
<th>Report Security Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, DA, OACS FOR, Washington, D. C. 20310</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG C. M. Hall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)**


**AUTHORS** (First name, middle initial, last name)

BG C. M. Hall

**REPORT DATE**

17 October 1970

**CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.**

N/A

**PROJECT NO.**

N/A

**TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**

37

**ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)**

718010

**OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned to this report)**

N/A

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

N/A

**SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

N/A

**SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

DA, OACS FOR, Washington, D. C. 20310

**ABSTRACT**

N/A