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AGAM-P (M) (24 Jan 69) FOR DS DC

31 January 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program Report of Lieutenant Colonel
William J. Beck

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, 4 November 1966, subject: Senior Officer Debriefing Program.
2. Transmitted herewith is the debriefing report of Lieutenant Colonel William J. Beck, former Commanding Officer of the Psychological Operations Group, USARV.
3. The contents of this report and the opinions expressed therein should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or view of the Department of the Army or any Army command, installation or agency.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

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Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debrief Report by: LTC William J. Beck / 058 829, Infantry

Duty Assignments: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Commander, 4th Psychological Operations Group

Inclusive Dates: 15 October 1967 - 7 October 1968 (U), (S)

Date of Report: 5 October 1968

(12) 28p.

1. (C) Causative factors of the insurgency in country or area:

a. Political and ideological: It is considered that one of the greatest handicaps to a psychological operations program in RVN is a lack of identity of the government with the people (and vice versa). Propaganda needs great impact in order to overcome the effects of such a gap. Additionally there appears to be no programmed effort on the part of GVN to provide the mass population with an ideology or government-identified framework of values to which the people would respond and which would provide readily-usable propaganda themes and a proper degree of audience impact. The psyoperator is thereby forced to "work around" this deficiency or establish artificial values for his purposes which, because of illusory and transient characteristics can be easily countered by the enemy. Finally, symbolism is of great aid in the typical PSYOP program and makes the gaining of allegiance a much easier job. Unfortunately, in RVN, national symbols (a "father-figure", significant national actions) have not been established (except for the annual "Tet"

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Campaign with different design and intent) which complicates the job of the propagandist.

b. Economic and social: Also complicating the PSYOP program is obvious lack of evidence of substantial economic and social progress (in the gaze of the mass audience). Land reform (a most telling and persuasive argument) has not materialized nor have resettlement programs, general agricultural improvement and education for the masses made substantial-enough headway to be effectively capitalized on by the propagandist. In the social sphere, the lack of national attention (including PSYOP treatment) to the highly substantial refugee problem (numbering upwards of 2+ million persons by conservative estimate) may bear bitter fruit at the cessation of hostilities regardless of the military and political outcome: i.e. we may have a new revolution in the making.

c. Personal motivation: It has been found that the unsophisticated Vietnamese is easily motivated. Problems for the psyoperator lie in those special audience groups (Saigonese and others) whose vested interests have "conditioned" or hardened them against the persuasive effects of propaganda. Unfortunately there are many such groups and our inability to forge their thinking along common lines may prove troublesome in the future.

2. (C) The insurgent:

a. Psychologically, recent changes in the ranks of the NVA/VC to include problems of cohesiveness, allegiances, disruptive factors

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in Communist Bloc relations and other world-wide events have created new opportunities for the propagandist. Intelligence is still very sketchy on these matters (at least from a PSYOP viewpoint) not permitting accurate assessment of values for use in propaganda. At lowest levels, postponement of announced VC "offensives", friendly success in capturing huge stores of NVA/VC war material are matters of keen interest for psychological exploitation. Some, not enough, of said exploitation has been undertaken.

b. Communist involvement: In the eyes of affected audiences in RVN it appears the "Communist enemy" theme may have lost value. Except in specific instances of violent terrorism, current popular attitudes in the countryside appear to range from neutralism or apathy (most prevalent) to varying degrees of acceptance of Communist control (as in the Delta). In other words Communist involvement per se, in the PSYOP sense, doesn't appear to be as attractive a target for psychological exploitation in the current framework of operations as was formerly the case.

c. The infrastructure: Formalized enemy military units are subject to PSYOP attack in more or less conventional PSYOP ways and, unlike all other aspects of the total counterinsurgency effort in RVN, techniques and themes used with some success in other more conventional wars can be used to some degree against these military forces. The infrastructure however is quite another matter. Psychologically this is truly the "hard core of insurgency" and is the main fabric of which military forces are only an operational part. Additionally it is the most difficult of PSYOP targets to attack. The involvement of political, military and diverse

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persons in a tightly-woven, disciplined organization (to include marginal supporters) presents what would appear to be an unattainable target. This (as we are beginning to discover) however is not the case. In spite of long-time political and organizational buildup of the infrastructure there are small tears in the fabric. Partially the result of fringe effects of the "other" social revolution in RVN, recent lack of large-scale enemy military success and some "outside" political impacts, there is evidence of changes in motivation. Such changes breed weaknesses which can be readily exploited psychologically. The present on-going programs for such action should bear fruit as months go on. It has long been realized (as learned in other insurgencies) that attack on the infrastructure consists mainly of two well-joined and compatible programs of psychological operations and intelligence. These assets must be molded together and centralized with each complementing the other. Only through this can success against the infrastructure be obtained. It must be remembered that regardless of the outcome of the "hard" military war the infrastructure must be destroyed if total success is to be achieved in a war of this type.

3. (C) Local government stability actions and the US role:

a. It is a widely-known fact that GVN-RVNAF philosophy and US philosophy on propaganda differs in terms of audiences. The Vietnamese (following the terms of old Chinese attitudes in the matter) are mainly aimed at insuring loyalties of the "in-house group" (e.g. beaurocracy and armed forces). The rural mass and most urban audiences, ethnic minorities and others are secondary considerations far down the priority scale of PSYOP objectives. The US attitude, of course, is that the hearts and minds of the masses must be won if total success in the sort of conflict can be achieved.

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This difference is presently reflected in a variety of ways to include organization and doctrine. These differences in the US - GVN/RVNAF systems complicates coordination and PSYOP relationships between the two entities.

b. Forces:

(1) Military forces: Presently RVNAF PSYOP resources consist of a General Political Warfare Department and five "POLWAR" battalions who carry out field PSYOP work in terms of the armed forces, military dependents and selected other audiences: They are not equipped for or trained in techniques of mass audience persuasion and cannot be considered a psychological instrument in the same sense as a US PSYOP battalion. A breakdown of functions, skills and resources of a typical US and POLWAR battalion is at Inclosure 1. It can be easily seen that the two capabilities are not comparable. It is my opinion, assuming an aggressive program to make ARVN capabilities comparable to US PSYOP assets were to begin now and assuming a change in PSYOP philosophy by the Vietnamese, that it would take at least a year before ARVN battalions could accomplish the same amount of work as a US unit.

(2) US-RVNAF PSYOP relations: In all cases throughout RVN, close relationships exist between headquarters and field PSYOP units of both entities. In two instances the same compounds are utilized. Local commanders tend to "lean on one another" in terms of exchanging personnel (e.g. ARVN translators in a US PSYOP battalion) and in other matters. ARVN Commanders however tend to be conservative and unwilling to expand programs or change methods of conducting "in-house" PSYOP. There are very few instances in the past year where an ARVN

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POLWAR unit commander was successfully prevailed upon (by the local US PSYOP unit Commander) to embark on significant PSYOP programs (or campaigns) on a unified basis. This is a fundamental weakness in the overall PSYOP effort in RVN.

(3) RVNAF PSYOP training: The POLWAR school provides training for selected personnel in "POLWAR techniques" (in line with the philosophy cited above). There are a few (if any) "skill schools". Talents which exist in POLWAR units are contained in those draftees who entered the service with civilian-taught capabilities. Assuming the PSYOP effort will continue to be most important in RVN in years to come, early consideration of a more sophisticated PSYOP training base for training RVNAF personnel in RVN is highly important.

(4) Paramilitary forces/police: These forces do not possess PSYOP capabilities and must borrow from ARVN POLWAR or US PSYOP units. Although it is unreasonable to expect that they will possess such assets in the near future, it is felt that PSYOP staff and liaison personnel should be appointed at all levels (to include platoon/company levels in the case of RP/PF) and given a comprehensive course of PSYOP orientation (probably under US direction). The PSYOP significance of the "person-to-person" aspects of paramilitary and police contacts with the populace cannot be underestimated and can enhance or severely jeopardize a local PSYOP program.

c. Intelligence & counterintelligence: In the US effort in RVN, intelligence is inadequate for PSYOP purposes. Not an uncommon problem world-wide where PSYOP requirements exist, detailed responses to matters

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of enemy vulnerabilities, psychological weaknesses in the infrastructure and data relating to the mass audience in Vietnam have been vague and inconclusive. It is apparent that other higher-priority requirements in the intelligence community forces a relegating of PSYOP needs to a secondary position. Unfortunately however, since propaganda impact is directly related to the current state of men's minds, attitudes, and motivations, there must be a constant flow of information on these matters into propaganda development systems. In an effort to alleviate this difficulty a more comprehensive intelligence processing system has been established in the 4th PSYOP Group than would normally be required in such a unit. This includes great use of specific intelligence requests and tapping of pools of intelligence information at low levels.

d. Civic action: By definition, civic action is PSYOP "of the deed" thus falling within the framework of PSYOP interest regardless of who performs the civic action. There are many, many such actions performed by military units, groups and agencies in RVN. Unfortunately few of these actions are deliberately made a part of a total PSYOP effort regionally or locally. Also in too few cases are other PSYOP media brought into play to complement the action and "pass a message" to the audience concerned. This is a deficiency which can be easily remedied and is important in the total effort.

e. Political action:

(1) Propaganda:

(a) Media:

(1) It is obvious that large masses of the population in SVN (to include many peoples in critical areas) are not re-

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ceiving information or propaganda from friendly sources due apparently to lack of sufficient communication media. On the other hand it was noted in many of these instances that enemy propaganda media are quite in evidence.

(2) If the total aims of the PSYOP program are to be achieved, a greater effort must be made to reach all audiences. By far the quickest and most practical means of reaching large audiences is by radio and it would appear that extensive expansion of radio propaganda broadcast operations should be made at all levels. Security of transmitter sites and equipment (overcoming a stated GVN political objection to use of radio on a broad scale) can, it would seem, be effectively done by the US military. There should be programs of daily broadcasting concentrating on those hours affording the greatest listening audience. It is believed that while the national broadcasting system would emphasize national themes, local transmitters would be especially important in broadcasting propaganda messages of immediate application to the locale.

(3) In order to assure validity of propaganda content (and incidentally train a personnel base for later GVN programs) staffs of radio facilities (although under US control) should be composed primarily of Vietnamese who should be recruited locally where possible. Assuming a period for training and orientation program selection should be mainly done by Vietnamese staffers with US managerial guidance. Local interests should be capitalized on where ever possible.

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(4) A possible second remedy to the problem of expanding mass communications media is extensive use of province or regional newspapers. Normally newsprint media offers a most practical, cheap, and flexible means of establishing and maintaining a strong bond of relationship with an audience. Generally in RVN there appears to be a dearth of such media outside the major urban centers. It is believed that simple provincial newspapers can be established within the context of the present program, under American supervision, with a minimum of cost. It is preferable that such newspapers be published on a regular schedule and as frequently as possible to maintain continuity and hasten the establishment of credibility. The 4th PSYOP Group is presently producing some newspapers and newsletters for distribution in selected areas.

(5) "Face-to-face" persuasion is a propaganda technique of considerable effectiveness possessing long-lasting values without need for repetition as in the case of many other media. Unfortunate aspects of the technique, however, are the expense in terms of numbers of people employed and intensive training required to make them effective as communicators. Thus use of this procedure in the present PSYOP program has been limited (it should be noted that informal contacts, for example, between US personnel and villagers however valuable, cannot be taken in this context).

(6) A likely means for expansion of the face-to-face effort is the present revolutionary development cadre program. In order to capitalize on this capability the following are suggested actions

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that can be taken:

(a) Expand the terms of the present curricula of the National Revolutionary Development Center (NTC) to include intensified instruction in face-to-face techniques.

(b) Augment the US advisory staff at the NTC with personnel familiar with this technique.

(c) Institute PSYOP input linkages to the cadre, after they are deployed, to insure propaganda validity and consistency with national and regional PSYOP objectives.

(d) Closely monitor cadre PSYOP to insure effectiveness and compatibility with other programs: this monitoring should be done at the regional (province) level.

(7) Finally it is believed that greater use can be made of other media possibilities than has been the case. A properly-handled poster campaign, for example, offers significant advantages in accomplishing a short-range, specific propaganda objective. Propaganda displays are of value in instances where special treatment of a subject is called for. There are other possibilities.

(8) It should be noted in connection with use of media, that a better attempt on the part of all PSYOP agencies should be made at "balancing" the program. Each media should be chosen with a view to obtaining the maximum desired effect. However, use of "combinations" of media is also important and, for example, a main appeal by radio, supplemented by newsprint coverage or possibly a poster campaign on the same theme, will often gain a quicker and more lasting

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reaction.

(b) **Media effectiveness:** That PSYOP has had a broad positive effect in all situations in RVN is without doubt. The number of Hoi Chanh in given instances appear to be a direct reflection (among other things) of propaganda effects in these areas. However this is what can be called a "surface" evaluation. Definitive effects of a given propaganda effort (i.e. Why did the Hoi Chanh change his attitude?) remain to be measured by the psyoperator. Currently the 4th PSYOP Group is developing techniques and procedures in the fields of audience survey and personnel interview which, computable in the MACV data computing system, will undoubtedly provide some answers in the very near future.

(c) **Propaganda origination:**

(1) Propaganda development (particularly in the complex counterinsurgency setting) is a highly-specialized skill. It can not be assumed that key personnel (commanders, staff officers et al) in other military and civilian systems are automatically adept (because of job qualification) in the arts of mass persuasion. On the contrary, it has been shown time and time again that such involvement in propaganda design and indiscriminate dissemination by people unskilled in the art results in adverse "audience conditioning" (requiring future messages to have greater and greater impact to have an effect). Unfortunately, it is felt that this type of situation has been too often the case in RVN and should be continually guarded against by all commanders.

(2) As a final note in this regard, this is not to deny the very important factor of proper command emphasis which very fortunately

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has been the case in RVN and evidence of such emphasis is obvious throughout the present program. Such attention by all military commanders and key members of the civilian-directed effort is essential to the progress of the effort. Command emphasis, however, must not be confused with personal involvement in the formulation of propaganda and reliance must be placed on established PSYOP development systems composed of persons with special skills.

(d) Gimmickry:

(1) It is apparent, from interviews of psyop-operators in Saigon and in the field, that many are frustrated by the lack of signs of tangible success in the psyop program. Obviously enthusiastic and willing, they find themselves in a quandry by an inability to find solid evidence of positive results. Perhaps in an attempt to overcome this deficit many appear to be impressed with the values of what can only be called propaganda "gimmicks" (i.e. the ace-of-spaces, sky-lighting effects, ghostly loudspeaker broadcasts). This aspect, unfortunately, has often reduced idea-formation, on the part of these operators and staffmen, to the level of "gimmickry" and more-or-less desperate attempts to find a quick solution or "dramatic breakthrough". This is not good PSYOPS.

(2) There have been instances in the history of propaganda where a special idea or gimmick had dramatic effect. But on close scrutiny it was discovered the "special effect" took place in an environment of such psychological sensitivity that the idea was all that was needed to provide the turning point. There is little evidence that

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positive, long-range mass persuasion can be achieved via the gimmick route. On the contrary it could probably be easily shown that gimmickry has a reverse effect of conditioning the audience against the emotional effects of well-thought-out propaganda.

(3) It is felt that in the case of RVN, against the strong psychological defenses of the VC and his supporting apparatus and conditioned defenses of the marginal populations, success in PSYOPS can only be achieved by virtue of a careful, systematic and aggressive implementation of well-thought-out, long-range programs. These programs must be well-coordinated and solidly-based on mutually-acceptable (US-GVN) objectives and containing systems of inter-locking themes, be designed to chip away at these defenses.

(4) In sum, there is a place for occasional gimmickry and dramatic effect in the PSYOP effort, but these are normally secondary aspects and should be reserved for those circumstances where the long-range program has created an acceptable situation. By far, in RVN, the greater reliance should be placed on the gradual effects of the long-range approach.

(e) PSYOP Concept: In spite of top level command emphasis on the importance of PSYOP too often a combat commander will not develop his operational concept in terms of its psychological implication; all-important in a counterinsurgency. It is felt that this must be done at the outset of planning for every operation.

4. (C) US military forces:

a. Organization: The 4th PSYOP Group is the main propaganda-

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producing resource available to the US military in-country. The Group (organized from the 6th PSYOP Bn on 1 Dec 67) has 4 battalions employed in the field: one in each CTZ. The Group headquarters provides backup support for the tactical battalions and is a focal point for propaganda development and production of mass media. The Group, with a strength of 946 plus 173 Vietnamese civilian personnel is considered by me to be adequate to perform the current mission in Vietnam. Changes in some skills to provide a greater number of loudspeaker and audio-visual teams in the field and more sophisticated production capability are reflected in a new MTOE recently submitted. The Group however, has increased its support of all programs, military and civilian, by more than fifty percent in the past year. Propaganda is becoming more sophisticated with increasing signs of requirements for more scientific application. If this trend continues a new look at Group resources with a view to enhancing its capability (by increases in personnel and equipment) may be necessary in late FY 1969.

b. Personnel:

(1) The state of training of new personnel assigned from CONUS to the 4th PSYOP Group has improved immeasurably in the past 12 months. The percentage of Bragg-trained officer personnel (in the 10 weeks PSYOP course) has increased from 40% in October 1967 to a current 85%.

(2) Several fundamental weaknesses exist with regard to PSYOP personnel in other-than-PSYOP units as follows:

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(a) Inadequate training of many staff and advisory personnel assigned to PSYOP positions.

(b) An imbalance of training backgrounds in cases of so-called "trained personnel." It appears that US personnel civilian and military receive training from four main sources.

(1) The two "regular" (10 week) "career" courses at the JPKSWS, Ft. Bragg.

(2) The "short" (5 $\frac{1}{2}$ week MATA) "orientation" course at Bragg.

(3) The course at FSI (Foreign Service Institute), designed principally for USIA representatives, which apparently has a minimum of instruction (about 2 hours) in propaganda techniques.

(4) Experience (of varied types) in previous PSYOPS assignments.

(3) It is noted in this connection that AF, Navy and Marine personnel do not have access to the same level of formal PSYOP training at their own service schools but often (not always) make arrangements with the Army for their attendance at Bragg.

(4) Many (not all) USIA and MACCORDS field representatives have access to the FSI course in Washington which (as has been noted) possesses virtually no instruction in propaganda techniques. Some ARVN personnel receive training at the RVNAF PSYWAR school which, it appears, offers little in the way of propaganda techniques and accents matters relating to political indoctrination and "in-house" personnel motivation.

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(5) In the area of technical skills (i.e. enlisted printers) increasingly better attempts are being made to assign personnel of the proper skills (often civil-acquired) to job vacancies in US PSYOP units. However there remain shortfalls in numbers of trained technicians available during critical periods; often the result of the rotation policy.

(6) In sum, the problem of inadequately-trained PSYOP personnel is a part of the larger US Armed Services PSYOP training problem (and a similar situation exists in RVNAF PSYOP units) to wit; inadequate PSYOP training programs to meet cold war requirements. However, in terms of the immediate future the following recommendations are made:

(a) No officer or civilian should be accepted for most categories of PSYOP assignments until he has completed one of the long courses at Ft. Bragg or its equivalent in scope of instruction. It is noted that attendance at the FSI course or the short "orientation" course at the SWS is not considered sufficient background training for these assignments.

(b) A special identification system should be established in-country to "tag" incoming PSYOP military personnel to insure their assignment to PSYOP positions for which they are qualified. Such personnel procedures should be closely monitored by Hq MACV. Some similar arrangement should also be in effect for PSYOP personnel in US civilian agencies in-country.

(c) An in-country orientation course should be established of short duration (1 week or 10 days) for all incoming PSYOP

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personnel (military officer and civilian). This course should be a joint (civil-military) endeavor containing detailed information on the nature of the PSYOP effort in RVN and US-GVN PSYOP programs. Special emphasis should be given matters of concert, coordination, and propaganda development. This course should also include GVN and RVNAF instructor participation. Selected VIS and RVNAF PSYOP personnel should attend all or portions of the course as students and be encouraged to actively participate in seminars and class discussions.

(d) An effort should be made to approach RVNAF to provide RVNAF PSYOP personnel with a curricula which contains fundamental propaganda techniques such as that offered in the Bragg courses. It is considered that the present accent on "political indoctrination" in the PSYOP training system does not adequately equip the RVNAF PSYOP officer to accomplish the same task calling for the similar degree of skill as his US counterpart. This provides an imbalance in present program effectiveness and inadequate training for the time when the Vietnamese will need to rely on their own resources for PSYOP.

c. Use of capabilities:

(1) US operations in RVN are conditioned by the principle of eventual takeover of all functions by the GVN with its agencies and forces when the conflict is ended. As applicable to the field of PSYOPS (for example) ARVN PSYOP units work closely with similar US PSYOPS units in the field in accomplishment of various PSYOP programs. Additionally VIS conducts PSYOPS to selected audiences within its resources. Unfortunately, however, this concept does not take into account the relative

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lack of skill, materiel capability and operational efficiency on the part of GVN-ARVN PSYOP personnel. US PSYOP advisors frequently complain of the inability of ARVN PSYOP units to satisfy even the simplest requirement (in one instance in Ham Tan it was reported that there was a delay of five months in a leaflet delivery). Furthermore, survey of the VN PSYOP training system reveals an overwhelming emphasis on "political indoctrination-type" training and relative lack of instruction in those techniques required for the conduct of propaganda programs. Finally, the PSYOP personnel selection system in VIS and ARVN seems abysmally unscientific and inefficient.

(2) Although a continually (and ever-increasing) greater effort should be made to assist the Vietnamese in enhancing their PSYOP capability, it would appear, in view of the above, because of the urgency of the current PSYOP requirement, there must be greater reliance, for the time being, on U.S. PSYOP resources than is presently the case. This "greater" emphasis should include US PSYOP material support of field advisory teams and support of PSYOP aspects of various "pacification" programs currently in the provinces of GVN or RVNAF.

(3) Additionally, in order to satisfy a greater degree of urgent PSYOP requirements, main operational functions should be based on US capability for the present. The underlying principle of all such activity, it is felt, should be one of "American top management with Vietnamese staffing." Examples of this would be the province newspaper which would be managed by an American with Vietnamese editor or a radio

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broadcast station under an American manager with Vietnamese program director. In this regard, the 4th PSYOP Group is presently authorized 119 Vietnamese civilians to include sociologists, psychologists, journalists and many other skills in its development systems. An additional 54 have been requested.

d. Research:

(1) As mentioned earlier, there is continually greater need for capabilities in PSYOPS organizations for "operational"-type (or current) research and research in depth. Accurate knowledge of the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the target audience so as to derive a theme of real emotional value is the basic building block on which all propaganda rests.

(2) "Depth-type" research, producing long-range studies and analyses, should be encouraged through such agencies as ARPA in support of the effort. Long-range betterment of the PSYOP effort will be expedited by such means. Current research (i.e. 4th PSYOP Group PSYOP Development System) however, is a function of organizations primarily concerned with propaganda as an operation and is an essential link in that chain of events leading to a meaningful propaganda message. (See an explanation of the Group PSYOP Development System at Inclosure 2.) It is important to note that PSYOP agencies of whatever nationality not possessing similar systems of message development can only turn out propaganda products of doubtful value and impact.

e. Logistics:

(1) Logistic support of the US PSYOP effort in Vietnam is inadequate. This condition is due to:

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(a) The specialised nature of PSYOP equipment and supplies

(b) High consumption rates in critical supplies

(c) Low priorities assigned to PSYOP requirements

(2) In brief, the 4th PSYOP Group is supported almost entirely through the QRP (quick reacting procurement) system rather than through routine processes which do not provide adequate response. Additionally, the Group is forced to stockpile many items far in advance of current needs in order to offset possible emergencies.

(3) Finally, the maintenance of equipment is a continuing problem due to the specialized nature of equipment and lack of military technicians.

(4) For the time being:

(a) Continuing reliance should be placed on use of the QRP system.

(b) Arrangements for maintenance of critical equipment (e.g. presses) should be contracted for through civilian agencies.

5. (C) Summary of main recommendations:

a. Immediate action should be undertaken to create an effective PSYOP effort in support of the refugee program (para 1b).

b. Special PSYOP attention should be paid to special audiences such as Saigonese (para 1c).

c. PSYOP against the VC infrastructure must be emphasized (para 2c).

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d. Action should be taken to change RVNAF philosophy toward PSYOP to concentrate their thinking on mass persuasion techniques. Unless this is done, no "turnover" of US PSYOP responsibilities to RVNAF is conceivable (para 3a & b).

e. No consideration should be given to turning over all or a portion of US PSYOP responsibilities to RVNAF until adequate propaganda development systems, training bases and logistical support systems have been established in RVNAF PSYOP units. If action were to begin now on this matter, it is estimated RVNAF PSYOP units will not have reached a state of desired proficiency for at least a year (para 3b and 4c).

f. RF/PF forces and national police units should at least have selected staff and liaison personnel trained in PSYOPS (para 3b, 4).

g. There must be a substantial "beefing up" of intelligence support of US PSYOP in RVN if the PSYOP effort is to be fully effective (para 3c).

h. Instructions should be disseminated and all Commanders directed that all civic actions, regardless of motive, should be made a deliberate part of the PSYOP effort and accompanied, wherever possible, by use of other PSYOP media (para 3d).

i. Not enough people in RVN are being reached by PSYOP media. There must be a much larger effort made by all PSYOP units and agencies to reach all audiences (para 3e).

j. Face-to-face persuasion efforts must be formalized and training programs established. The most likely vehicle for this is

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the Revolutionary Development Cadre (trained at Vung Tau) (para 3e).

k. A better attempt should be made at "balancing media output" by all units and agencies (para 3e (8)).

l. Propaganda development cannot be relegated to the "personalised approach" (e.g. individuals, whether American or Vietnamese, developing propaganda messages). Success in PSYOP in RVN can only be achieved if such development is done by "systems" which combine various skills (para 3e (1) (c) and 4c (3)).

m. All commanders should be urged to consider the PSYOP impact of all their operations, however minor. PSYOP implications should be brought out at the outset of concept formation for each operation. (para 3e (1) (e)).

n. If present trends in propaganda production and sophistication continue, 4th Group resources should be reviewed in late FY 69 for possible expansion (para 4a).

o. PSYOP military and civilian personnel for staff and advisory positions should receive better PSYOP training before assignment (para 4b).

p. Special measures should be taken to "tag" incoming personnel for PSYOP assignments (para 4b (6) (b)).

q. A special, comprehensive orientation program should be established in-country for newly arrived military and civilian psyoperators. This should include Vietnamese participation (para 4b (6) (c)).

r. Further attempts should be made to persuade RVNAF to adopt courses in mass persuasion in training curricula (para 4b (6) (d)).

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s. In view of inadequacies of RVNAF POLWAR capabilities, US elements should assume greater PSYOP support of critical "pacification" programs for which the Vietnamese are responsible, and for aid to US field advisory personnel. (para 4c (2)).

t. "Depth-type" research, using ARPA-sponsored civilian contract agencies, should be greatly encouraged with a view to enhancing the long-range impact of the PSYOP effort. (para 4d)

u. In view of the inadequacies of logistical support for the PSYOP effort in RVN, continued use of the QRP system should be made and maintenance of equipment should be contracted out to civilian agencies. (para 4e)



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
Comparison of US and ARVN Battalions

<u>US PSYOP Battalion</u>	<u>ARVN POLWAR Battalion</u>
175 personnel	200 personnel
6 printing presses	1 printing press
8 field teams (loudspeaker & audio-visual)	3 field teams
None	Cultural drama teams
Propaganda Development Center (Center)	None
Sociologists & psychologists	None
Lesser skills (e.g. journalists, script writers)	Usually none
PSYOP logistical system	None effective
PSYOP intelligence processing system	None apparently effective
Mobile advisory teams (to assist field psyoperators)	None
Skills training system (CONUS)	None
Access to higher & off-shore PSYOP resources	No such access

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PSYOPS DEVELOPMENT CENTER FUNCTIONS

1. Plans and Programs Section will:
 - a. Receive incoming requirements from S-3.
 - b. Review operational possibilities for propaganda.
 - c. Determine requirements based on operational needs to include priorities.
 - d. Pass requirements to Audience Analysis Section.

2. Audience Analysis Section will:
 - a. Receive requirements from Plans and Programs Section.
 - b. Receive and review data from all sources.
 - c. Conduct field surveys to gather data.
 - d. Catalog data.
 - e. Analyze data and develop audience characteristics.
 - f. Determine vulnerabilities.
 - g. Determine credibility patterns or credibility possibilities.
 - h. Pass audience information to Development Section.

3. Propaganda Development Section will:
 - a. Receive vulnerability objectives and credibility information from Audience Analysis Section.
 - b. Apply such data against programming information from Plans and Programs Section.
 - c. Determine objectives phasing pattern. Determine themes.
 - d. Determine message content ideas.
 - e. Determine propaganda media to be used and media intensity pattern.
 - f. Layout propaganda to include graphic representation.
 - g. Pass to and receive propaganda test recommendations from Test Section.
 - h. Make recommendations on propaganda to be used by S-3.

4. Testing Section will:

- a. Obtain propaganda recommendation from Development Section.
- b. Process and test propaganda using appropriate test panels.
- c. Report results of test to Development Section.

5. Coordination Section will:

- a. Obtain propaganda recommendations from Testing Section.
- b. Determine coordination required with other agencies.
- c. Coordinate propaganda.

6. Evaluation Section will:

- a. Develop plans for propaganda evaluation.
- b. Conduct field tests as required.
- c. Develop recommendations and reports as required.

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