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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

AGDA (M) (4 Nov 70)

FOR OT UT 702192

10 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 214th
Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 214TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96357

AVGC-EC

13 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOB-DT,	APC 96588	(2 copies)
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Commanding General, 164th Avn Gp (Cbt),	APC 96215	(5 copies)

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Mission: There were no changes or additions to the Unit Mission during this reporting period.

b. (C) Organization:

(1) There were no changes to the TOE of the organic units during this reporting period.

(2) There were no changes in the organizational structure of the battalion during this period.

c. (C) Personnel Changes:

(1) Commanding Officer: LTC Larry J. Baughman, IN, 512-24-8141.

(2) Executive Officer: MAJ James E. Richards, SC, 313-30-5366.

(3) S-1: CPT Thomas N. Estes, SC, 458-74-7963, replaced 1LT Beecher N. Washburn Jr., IN, 026-32-3942, on 10 March 1970.

(4) S-2: CPT Thomas N. Estes, SC, 458-74-7963, replaced CPT Raymond Medlin, IN, 037-28-2619, on 9 February 1970.

CPT John R. Powers, IN, 564-48-5864, replaced CPT Thomas N. Estes, SC, 458-74-7963, on 10 March 1970.

(5) S-3: MAJ Gary O. Lozier, AR, 541-44-2389, replaced MAJ Leo A. Kramer Jr., IN, 230-44-2701, on 6 March 1970.

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(6) S-4: CPT Terry M. McClain, IN, 429-85-0373.

d. Unit strength as of 30 April 1970:

(1) The authorized strength of the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) is 127 commissioned officers, 209 warrant officers and 1054 enlisted men for a total authorized strength of 1390. A critical shortage exists in the area of commissioned officers, Battalion supply warrant officers, helicopter technical inspectors and helicopter maintenance personnel. It is not considered more acute than it was three months ago.

(2) The Battalion is authorized:

(a) Military:

	<u>OFF</u>		<u>WO</u>		<u>EM</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>
HHC	19	22	3	7	93	98	115	127
114th	19	11	51	47	218	194	288	252
*135th	19	22	51	41	218	194	288	257
175th	19	13	51	46	218	183	288	242
199th	32	19	2	9	89	88	123	116
335th	19	12	51	49	218	188	288	249
**758th Med Det	2	1	0	0	8	8	10	9
**11th Wx Det	1	1	0	0	8	8	9	9

* Includes 35 Australian EM and 11 Officers

** Attached Units

(b) Civilian: The 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) is under the freeze imposed by USARV on the hiring of direct hire and program 6 personnel.

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	<u>DAC</u>		<u>VN</u>		<u>3 NAT'L</u>		<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>
NMC	0	0	9	3	0	0	0	0
114th	0	0	6	4	0	0	0	0
135th	0	0	11	16	0	0	0	0
175th	0	0	6	5	0	0	0	0
199th	0	0	4	3	0	0	0	0
335th	0	0	8	3	0	0	0	0
758th	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

e. (C) Administration:

(1) Casualties:

<u>HOSTILE</u>	<u>NON-HOSTILE</u>
Lightly Wounded 28	Lightly Injured 9
VSI 3	VSI 0
KIA 3	KIA 6
MIA 2	MIA 0

(2) During this period the battalion had nineteen emergency leaves and no compassionate leaves.

(3) 237 EM were promoted: 86 to E-4, 140 to E-5, 6 to E-6, and 5 to E-7.

f. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Security: A total of 1198 classified documents were processed by the S-2 section during the reporting period, of which 1186 were Confidential and 12 were Secret.

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(2) Intelligence: In response to an observation and evaluation in the last ORLL, an intelligence facility was established in the 214th Battalion Operations Center to provide a twenty-four hour spot reporting capability directly from the aircraft to Battalion Headquarters. Reports are received on the Battalion alternate UHF frequency, recorded, posted on a SPOTREP map and forwarded immediately to higher headquarters if considered appropriate.

g. (C) Operations and Training:

(1) The 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) operating as Task Force Cougar continues to support the 7th and 9th ARVN Divisions to include the Provincial forces within each Division's tactical area of responsibility.

(a) Essentially, the 7th ARVN Division, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa and Go Cong Provinces receive a standard tactical element of eight UH-1D/H troop transport helicopters, three UH-1B/C armed helicopters, and one UH-1D/H Command and Control helicopter from each of the 135th and 335th Aviation Companies (Assault Helicopter), plus an aerial observation and reconnaissance capability from one platoon of the 199th Aviation Company (Utility Airplane). Frequently, the standard tactical element is reduced from eight to five UH-1D/H troop transport helicopters tailored to the unit integrity of the ground element and the remaining three UH-1D/H helicopters are utilized for resupply or command and liaison missions. In addition, the 7th ARVN Division is now making an almost nightly request for the Night Hawk system from the 335th Aviation Company consisting of a UH-1H Command and Control helicopter with a door-mounted 7.62mm mini-gun and a second UH-1H with xenon light, a night observation device and a door-mounted mini-gun.

(b) The 9th ARVN Division, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, Sa Doc and An Giang Provinces are supported by the 175th Aviation Company also with the standard 8-3-1 tactical element, and a second platoon from the 199th Aviation Company. For night target acquisition and interdiction, in a role similar to that of the Night Hawk system, the 9th ARVN Division has occasionally employed the Night Hunter-Killer team (one UH-1D/H Command and Control helicopter, one UH-1D/H flare helicopter and two UH-1C armed helicopters) from the 175th Aviation Company.

(c) Task Force Cougar is augmented daily by assuming operational control of two Air Cavalry Troops (one per ARVN Division) from the 7/1st Air Cavalry Squadron, one or two Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) Squadrons with UH-1H helicopters and one or two U.S. Assault Helicopter Companies from the IV Corps general support assets. The VNAF troop transports are normally supported by three AH-1G armed helicopters from IV Corps GS. Units OPCON to the Task Force are rotated on a frag-order

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basis by higher headquarters, with the airmobile assets normally supporting the 9th ARVN Division which frequently operates outside its DTA (Division Tactical Area).

(d) Task Force Cougar continued to provide administrative aviation support to the Province Senior Advisors of Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Go Cong, Vinh Long, Sa Dec and An Giang Provinces on a monthly scheduled basis as requested by DEPCORDS (Civic Operations and Rural Development Support).

(2) Under the Task Force concept, the 114th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) continued to provide airmobile assets, with emphasis on night operations, to the 44th Special Tactical Zone (STZ) under the operational control of Task Force Blackhawk (7/1st Air Cavalry Squadron). The normal daily commitment was one UH-1D/H Command and Control helicopter, five UH-1D/H troop transport helicopters, two AH-1G armed helicopters, three Province DCS helicopters, a Night Hunter-Killer team (NHK) and a flareship for a second NHK. The 3rd Platoon of the 199th Aviation Company, also OPCON to Task Force Blackhawk provides aerial reconnaissance for the 44th STZ.

(3) HHC, and the 199th Aviation Company (Utility Airplane) were operational for the 89 days of the reporting period. The remaining companies of the Battalion were operational as follows:

(a) 114th Avn Co (AH) - 88 days; one maintenance stand-down day.

(b) 135th Avn Co (AH) - 85 days; four maintenance stand-down days.

(c) 175th Avn Co (AH) - 88 days; one maintenance stand-down day.

(d) 335th Avn Co (AH) - 86 days; three maintenance stand-down days.

(4) Task Force Cougar conducted a combined and joint operation 27 March 1970, vicinity of XS 4604 to search for a missing O-1G aircraft. Forces utilized: D Troop, 7/1st ACS, 3 Vinh Binh Regional Force (RF) Companies, DMAC Advisory Team 72, 191st Avn Co (AH), U.S. Navy River Patrol Boat Team, 214th Avn Bn (Cbt) command elements, Pathfinder Detachment, 105 Field Artillery Btry (-), USARV EOD Team, and 271st Avn Co (ASH). Seven U.S. were WIA as a result of booby traps, one U.S. gunner was WIA as a result of ground fire. Three VC suspects were detained. Nothing was found of the missing O-1G or crew.

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(5) Training: Training as required by USARV Regulation 350-1 and local directives is being conducted as the tactical situation allows. Special classes were presented by visiting instructors on Safety and Handling of the 2.75 inch FFAR, Capability of Enemy Anti-Aircraft Weapons, and Services Provided by Paddy Control Radar Facility. Orientation training was presented by the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) to five U.S.A.F. advisors to VNAF on airmobile tactics, and to forty-five U.S. advisors and ARVN officers in the continuing Airmobile Task Force Commanders Orientation Course.

h. (C) Logistics:

(1) During the quarter, the transient refueling mini-port facilities dispensed a total of 1,673,800 gallons of JP-4.

(2) On 1 March 1970, responsibility for POL and ammunition supply at six of the Delta stagefields was transferred to the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

(3) During April the consolidation of unit motor pools of the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat), located at Vinh Long was initiated with a view to enhancing the maintenance posture of the organization and toward better utilization and conservation of resources.

(4) Orientation programs in basic procedures were again conducted for supply and motor maintenance personnel by the S-4 Section.

1. (C) Aircraft Maintenance:

(1) Aircraft assigned as of 30 April 1970 were as follows:

	<u>UH-1B</u>		<u>UH-1C</u>		<u>UH-1D</u>		<u>UH-1H</u>		<u>AH-1G</u>		<u>O-1</u>		<u>UGA</u>	
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>
HHC	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
114th	0	0	0	0	0	9	22	13	6	5	0	0	0	0
135th	0	0	8	7	0	0	22	21	0	0	0	0	0	0
175th	0	0	8	6	0	12	22	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
199th	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	23	1	1
335th	0	5	8	0	0	0	22	22	0	0	0	0	0	0

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(2) Overall availability of assigned aircraft for the reporting period is as follows:

	<u>UH-1B</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>UH-1D</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>AH-1G</u>	<u>O-1</u>	<u>U-6A</u>
Feb	76	76	68	81	72	89	96
Mar	60	69	68	63	57	89	58
Apr	62	48	65	72	63	89	83

j. (U) Safety:

(1) During the reporting period, the Battalion flew 37,320 hours as compared to 38,953 for the previous reporting period. Seven accidents were experienced as compared to six for the previous period. The accident rate for the period was 18.8, a rise of 3.4 from the previous period of 15.4.

(2) Operation: Pilot error was the primary cause for six accidents, while material failure caused the remaining accident. Two of the accidents occurred on training missions, two were the result of low level flight over water, one was the result of a loss of RFM on landing and one was an O-1G that ground looped on roll out. The material failure was caused from the 90 degree gear box separating from the aircraft. An increase in operation cause factors was experienced over this last reporting period. This is due primarily to the large number of newly assigned aviators and their lack of experience; also failure on the part of the Aircraft Commander to conform to existing directives. In order to preclude accidents of this type, command emphasis has been placed on a more extensive training program, increased criteria for selection of all Instructor Pilots and disciplinary action where flagrant violation of regulations and established procedures were involved.

	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>RATE</u>	<u>ACCIDENTS</u>
Feb	12,354	8.1	1
Mar	12,895	7.7	1
Apr	12,071	41.4	5

COMULATIVE RATE FOR FISCAL YEAR 70 - 19.3

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2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

a. (C) Personnel: Shortage of UH-1 Helicopter Maintenance Personnel.

(1) OBSERVATION: The battalion aircraft availability has suffered from a lack of UH-1 helicopter maintenance personnel.

(2) EVALUATION: The battalion is critically short of trained maintenance personnel such as: 67250 Maintenance Supervisor, 67N30 Technical Inspectors and 67N20 Aircraft Mechanics. Some maintenance personnel have been malassigned into other MOS fields such as doorgunner.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all MOS malassignments be reviewed and corrected.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: All units were directed to review all malassignments and reassign all personnel, with more than 60 days retainability in their proper MOS.

b. (C) Intelligence: Effective Times for Visual Reconnaissance.

(1) OBSERVATION: Recent intelligence gathered from captured VC and NVA revealed that there is another excellent time for most effective visual reconnaissance.

(2) EVALUATION: In addition to first light and last light visual reconnaissance missions, indices are good that excellent enemy intelligence can be gained from missions during the noon hour. Enemy POW's have indicated that their units, for a large part, have continuously made their movements of troops and supplies, set up in position for night operations, and generally operated during this period, because not only do most air assets land for lunch and refueling, but ground operations also cease for rest and food. Reactions to these reports have been very successful and productive in the number of enemy sightings.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all aviation units, particularly intelligence gathering aircraft, establish a regular program whereby an occasional mission is scheduled during the noon hour in an effort to disrupt enemy movements and operations during that period.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Sector pilots of the 199th Aviation Company now schedule random visual reconnaissance flights during the noon period three or four times weekly in each sector or province.

c. (U) Operations: Flight Following for Single Ship Missions.

(1) OBSERVATION: Single-ship mission type aircraft require a more responsive system of flight following.

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(2) EVALUATION: All reconnaissance/surveillance type aircraft normally fly single-ship missions. With hazardous flight in this manner of flying, it is imperative that a timely and accurate flight following system be employed. It has been found that flight following with most sector Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) is inadequate and unreliable.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all reconnaissance/surveillance type aircraft be required to not only file flight plans with their operations, but to flight follow, even on tactical operations, with one of the approved flight following agencies, (i.e., Delta Center, Paddy Control, Capital Center, Reed Control, etc). In addition, sector pilots should begin an immediate education program for their TOC's, emphasizing the importance of reliable flight following, to include updated, accurate friendly artillery warning.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Aviators flying single-ship missions in direct support of a province or sector TOC (eg., O-1G reconnaissance, UH-1D/H province DCS) have been directed to establish contact with approved agencies for primary flight following.

d. (U) Organization: None.

e. (C) Training: Shortage of Experienced Instructor Pilots.

(1) OBSERVATION: Two similar training accidents occurred in one unit of the battalion while relatively inexperienced instructor pilots were giving standardization rides.

(2) EVALUATION: The units of this battalion have been supplied with a critically low number of experienced instructor pilots. Many instructor pilots are first tour aviators having attended the instructor pilot course immediately upon graduation from flight school. This lack of flying experience in a combat aviation unit causes a lessening of confidence in the IP by the aviator receiving a standardization ride and can lead to indecisiveness or contested control in an emergency situation.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Inexperienced instructor pilots not be allowed to perform as a Unit IP until he obtains 600 flying hours; second tour and senior first tour aviators be used as much as possible as unit instructor pilots.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Instructor pilots that were assigned directly to the IP course from flight school are not utilized in that capacity until they have an experience factor of at least 600 hours and have become Aircraft Commanders. Every allocation possible is obtained to qualify the more experienced aviators as Instructor Pilots.

f. (C) Logistics:

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(1) Shortage of Supplies.

(a) OBSERVATION: Again during the reporting period, the timely delivery of requested Class II and VII supplies fell short of desired levels.

(b) EVALUATION: Transportation for delivery of bulk quantities of supply is inadequate, creating difficulty in maintaining an adequate stock level at direct support units in the Delta.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: More effective and frequent utilization of water transportation assets, and more frequent scheduling of over the road convoys to local distribution points.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Frequent liaison visits to DSU commanders by S-4 has produced a slight improvement in supply posture.

(2) Stagefield Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Stagefield operations are hindered by a lack of equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: Lack of material handling, fuel pumping, and fuel filtering equipment for both primary and back-up systems is causing inordinate wear on equipment presently in use, and undue delay in refueling and rearming aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Assignment of additional 100 and 350 GPM pumps, 350 GPM filter separators, and 4000 - 6000 pound rough terrain fork-lifts on temporary loan to provide efficient primary and back-up systems, and facilitate handling of bulk ammo and packaged POL.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Letter requests for pumping equipment and MHE were submitted through command channels.

(3) Consolidation of Unit Motor Pools.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sixty percent of the enlisted personnel working in the 214th AB(C) unit motor pools at Vinh Long AAF were relatively untrained and assigned in an OJT status. Each motor pool was dispatching personnel to their direct support unit (approximately 80 miles round trip) on resupply runs as many as three times a week.

(b) EVALUATION: Enlisted personnel undergoing OJT required technical supervision which was not available due to a shortage of school trained supervisors, MOS 63040. Repair parts resupply runs required four vehicles and minimum of eight personnel three times a week resulting in nearly 200 nonproductive manhours and approximately 960 road miles per week.

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(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That units consolidate motor pools to obtain maximum use of school trained personnel and that qualified school trained personnel be used to train and supervise OJT personnel. DA Form 1687 (Receipt for Supplies) should be prepared to allow one PLL clerk to receive supplies for units effected by the consolidation.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) staff personnel coordinated with unit commanders located at Vinh Long AAF to effect a consolidated motor pool operation under the guidance of the Battalion Motor Officer. This action caused a significant increase in the number of man-hours available and improved personnel management.

g. (C) **Communications:**

(1) **Use of Yagi Folded Dipole Antenna with VRC-12 Series (FM) Radio.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The Yagi antenna normally used with AN/GRC-10 VHF radio may be used to extend the range of FM communications.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The distance to one of this units forward CP's, resulted in marginal FM communications using RC-292 antennas. Operational necessity dictated reliable FM service. Yagi antennas were installed on an experimental basis at the base camp and at the forward CP. Antennas were at elevations of 90 feet at the base camp and 40 feet at the CP. Initial alignment was made by map orientation, with final adjustment by minute adjustment for best signal. The higher gain and directional characteristics of this antenna improved FM communications from marginal to satisfactory. Distance involved was in excess of 40 miles.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Communication personnel seeking means to extend the range of tactical FM equipment may find this field expedient useful.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** This technique will be disseminated to subordinate unit communications personnel and will be used in future operations.

(2) **Command Communications.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Separation of 80 miles between battalion headquarters at Vinh Long and two subordinate units at Bearcat continues to plague communications as reported in ORLL's of October 1969, and January 1970. Proposed reduction of Class "A" common user telephone service will cause a critical communications problem to become even worse.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Two areas have been tested in attempting to alleviate the problem. First, two sole user circuits were placed in service early in September 1969. Reliability was less than 50%. These circuits were cut over to the Integrated Communications Systems (ICS) in November 1969;

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however, reliability and quality showed little gain. Second, a high frequency radio-teletype system was installed, using organic equipment, between battalion and the 135th Avn Co. Lack of sufficient back up equipment and frequent use of battalion equipment resources in forward locations has resulted in less than satisfactory service. A request was made through channels for a dedicated speech plus half duplex teletype circuit between locations. This request was denied because of "over the counter" message center service being available at both locations. However, experience has shown that there is a delay of 48 - 72 hours between initiation and receipt of messages using the highest realistic priority. Communications pertinent to air operations is of a highly perishable nature, and such delay is not tolerable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Priority should be given to aviation units in retaining Class "A" telephone service at the expense of units with less critical requirements. A sole user teletype circuit should be approved between battalion headquarters and at least one of the two units at Bearcat.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Communication personnel at both locations are maintaining close contact with post signal to reduce the impact of lost Class "A" telephone service. Trial messages will be sent through local message centers in both directions and data maintained on time required for delivery. This information will be used in justification for resubmission of request for dedicated teletype service. Every attempt will be made to utilize the high frequency radio-teletype resources between Vinh Long and Bearcat, when not demanded by more urgent operations.

h. (U) Materiel: Inadvertent Operation of UH-1 Main Fuel Switch.

(1) OBSERVATION: Two major training accidents occurred in which the probable cause appears to be that the Instructor Pilot turned off the main fuel switch rather than the hydraulics switch.

(2) EVALUATION: Hazardous conditions exist in that the main fuel switch and the hydraulics switch are similar in appearance and operate in the same fashion.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: A guard similar to the main generator switch cover would become an additional safety to prevent inadvertently turning off the main fuel.

(4) COMMAND ACTION:

(a) An Equipment Improvement Recommendation was submitted to Commanding General, USAAVN, Material Command, P.O. Box 209, Main Office, St. Louis, Mo. 63166, on 20 April 1970, for an additional safeguard to be installed on the main fuel switch.

(b) Command emphasis has been taken to insure that all pilots positively identify a switch before turning it off.

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(c) 1st Aviation Brigade Unclassified Message #6356, Subject: "Training Accidents", was disseminated on 20 April 1970, to all helicopter units outlining the procedure to be used for conducting hydraulics off training in the UH-1 series aircraft.


1. (C) Safety: Inexperienced Instructor Pilots.

(1) OBSERVATION: Aviators graduated from an IP school immediately following their initial rating, lack experience, sound judgement and technique.

(2) EVALUATION: "Turn-around" instructor pilots qualified under a controlled training environment may be assigned to the responsible and demanding job of Unit IP due to a lack of more qualified instructor personnel. Their ability to cope with the varied and relatively uncontrolled conditions and situations in a combat environment may be found inadequate until an experience base is developed.

(3) RECOMMENDATION AND COMMAND ACTION: Reference paragraphs 2.e. and 2.h., above.

- 2 Incl
- 1. Organization
- 2. Operational Statistics


LARRY J. BAUGHMAN
LTC, IN
Commanding

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AVBAGE (24 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOA-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, 164TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96215, 24 May 1970

TO: Department of the Army, ATTN: AGSFOR
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC-O

1. (U) The attached 214th CAB ORIL for the period ending 30 April 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. The following comments are made on the report.

a. Para 2 a page 8. Concur with comments on personnel shortages. By closely monitoring the strength of each unit this headquarters has been able to effect an equitable distribution to subordinate units, however an overall shortage of personnel in the maintenance field exists. Higher headquarters has been kept advised of personnel shortages by number, grade and MOS. Assisting in this strength monitoring is the recent separation of door gunners and crew chiefs by MOS.

b. Para 2 b page 8. Concur with comments. This information will be passed to units within this command.

c. Para 2 c page 8 and 9. Concur with comments. All units within this command have been directed to flight follow with approved agencies at all times.

d. Para 2 e page 9. Concur with comments.

e. Para 2 f (1). Concur with comments. On 20 April 70 the consolidated service battalion supporting IV Corps Tactical Zone was replaced by a logistical support activity directly under the U.S. Army Support Command, Saigon. This change is expected to improve logistical support in all classes of supply.

f. Para 2 f (2). Concur with comments. Inadequate provisions exist for airmobile staging within the IV Corps Tactical Zone. This subject is in command channels at present.

g. Para 2 f (3). Concur. Similar action was taken by the 13th CAB in Dec 69.

h. Para 2 g (1). Concur

i. Para 2 g (2). Concur with comments. This headquarters will render assistance to the 214th CAB maintaining justified class 'A' telephone

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AVBACE (24 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (L)

service.

j. Para 2 h. Concur.

k. Para 2 i. Concur.


WILLIAM J. MADDOX JR.
Colonel, ARMOR
Commanding

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AVBAGC-O (13 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 24 JUN 1970

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 30 April 1970 and concurs with the report. The following comments are considered pertinent.

a. Paragraph 2g(2), page 11; discusses command communications. Concur. The 1st Aviation Brigade is aware of the reduction of class A to class C phones to a 20/80% ratio. MACV has been advised of the expected impact this reduction will have on the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

) MACV has tasked USARV to investigate the situation and recommend the actual ratio of class A to C phones required to support the units mission.

(2) 1st Aviation Brigade has contacted the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and advised the unit to resubmit the request for the teletype circuit. USARV states that a circuit request with proper justification, is required by USARV. CEOI, sent through proper channels, will be reconsidered for activation.

(3) 1st Aviation Brigade has coordinated the use of the brigade teletype circuits by the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

(4) If the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) has traffic for its units located at Bear Cat the following routing address will apply: To: Bear Cat unit thru 164th Aviation Group (Combat), 1st Aviation Brigade, 12th Aviation Group (Combat), 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat). The 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat) has been instructed to provide communication center support to the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) units located at Bear Cat. The reverse of the above message routing procedures would apply to messages from Bear Cat to the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

AVMAGC-0 (13 May 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

b. Paragraph 2a, page 8: USARV is aware of the shortage of maintenance personnel. Assignment of available maintenance personnel is equitable throughout the Brigade.

c. Paragraph 2f(1), page 10: USARV, SGASPTCMD, and 1st Log Command have requested that water assets and truck companies turned over to ARVN be made available for delivery of bulk POL supplies. The request was sent to MACV.

d. Paragraph 2f(2), page 10; discusses stagefield operations. The request for loan of forklifts was disapproved by USARV because of non-availability of depot stocks. The 164th Aviation Group (Combat) has been advised to consider redistribution of available forklifts to fulfill this requirement. The request for POL equipment has been approved. Two requests are only 50% filled due to lack of depot stock.

e. Paragraph 2h(1), page 12; discusses the inadvertent operation of UH-1 main fuel switch. The 1st Aviation Brigade Standardization Section has submitted an EIR with a recommendation to place a cover over the fuel switch.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


WARREN A. PETERSON
CPT, AGC
ASST AG

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AVHGC-DST (13 May 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) Period Ending 30 April 1970 RCS CSFVR-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 14 JUN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Experienced Instructor Pilots," page 9, paragraph 2e, and paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement: concur. USARV Supplement to AR 95-1 requires 400 hours in category, 200 hours in model, and 25 hours in series, exclusive of student pilot time. This assures a minimum of 600 hours total flying time. Concerning second tour aviators, this Headquarters has stated to DCSPER, DA that a minimum manning level of second tour aviators in an assault helicopter company should include four instructor pilots.

b. Reference item concerning "Inadvertent Operation of UH-1 Main Fuel Switch," page 12, paragraph 2h; paragraph 2j, 1st Indorsement; and paragraph e, 2d Indorsement: concur. This Headquarters has dispatched a standardization letter to all units stating precise procedures for the practice of a hydraulic system failure. In addition, a message was dispatched to all units citing the requirement for continuous crew coordination in the operation of the aircraft systems. The main fuel on/off switch cover, for which an EIR has been submitted, causes system deactivation to require three movements: first, operator must open the switch cover; second, the switch must be pulled up, and third, back to the off position. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
1st Avn Bde
214th Avn Bn

Cliff W. Stevens Jr.
Cliff W. Stevens Jr.

Assistant Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT (13 May 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat), for Period Ending 30 April 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

Inclosure 1 (C) Organizational Chart and troop list to 214th AB(C) Operational Report - Lessons Learned
for quarterly period ending 30 April 1970



* Attached Units

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Operational Statistics to 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
 Operational Report - Lessons Learned for quarterly period
 ending 30 April 1970.

	<u>HEC</u>	<u>114</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>335</u>	<u>199</u>
1. Number of hrs flown	565	7013	7850	7223	8612	7194
2. Number of M/R clicks daily	8%	6%	60%	68%	73%	NA
3. Number of M/R guns daily	NA	61%	61%	66%	66%	NA
4. Aircraft hit by hostile fire	0	29	36	42	27	12
5. Estimated number of rounds	0	89	78	60	82	15
6. KIA - Hostile fire	0	0	2	0	1	0
7. KIA - Non-hostile fire	0	2	3	0	1	0
8. MIA - Hostile fire	1	0	0	0	0	1
9. Enemy killed by Air - confirmed	0	149	130	147	110	20
10. VC structures destroyed	0	76	200	415	312	12
11. VC sampans destroyed	0	63	36	793	163	34
12. Sorties flown	1278	11961	21442	13957	29316	4954
13. Cargo handled (tons)	2	296	130	101	384	NA
14. Troops carried	743	18799	57512	51339	60876	NA
15. A/C dest - Hostile fire	0	3	3	0	1	1
16. A/C dest - Non-hostile	0	3	3	0	1	1
17. Ammunition Expended - 7.62mm	200	211000	500000	1029020	558800	NA
40mm	NA	10555	100	5360	340	NA
2.75"FFAR	NA	5965	2222	6251	6165	1363

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