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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (9 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 70B013 11 June 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG A. E. Milloy, CG, 1st Infantry Division, Period 10 August 1969 to 21 March 1970 (U)

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG A. E. Milloy, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHGC-DST

2 MAY 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG A. E. Milloy

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG A. E. Milloy. The report covers the period 10 August 1969 through 21 March 1970, during which time MG Milloy served as Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

2. MG Milloy is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges when his tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam has terminated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as (trip)
2 cy wd HQ, DA

I. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-T-MHD

18 MAR 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

(U) Reference letter from USARV AG (undated) to CG, 1st Infantry Division, the required Senior Officer Debriefing Report is forwarded in five copies as Inclosure 1 IAW AR 1-26 and USARV Reg 1-3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

J.F. CALI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SENIOR OFFICER DEBRIEFING REPORT (RCS-CSFOR-74) (U)

Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debrief Report by: Major General Albert Milloy

Duty Assignment: Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, APO SF 96345

Inclusive Dates: 10 August 1969 - March 1970

Date of Report: March 1970

1. (C) Causative Factors of the Insurgency.

a. Political: No comment.

b. Military: Since the late 19th Century, the absence of any Vietnamese national government has divided military loyalties and undermined military professionalism. Years of warfare against the French and Japanese have trained local leaders in guerrilla warfare and widened the traditional split between urban and non-urban populations. Ending this gap by bringing Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces out of the urban areas and into the countryside has been one of our major goals. Achievement of this goal will fill a governmental void and eliminate the insurgent's local base of power. However, as long as the Communists receive substantial outside aid through the Cambodian border, it is doubtful that the insurgency can be entirely eliminated.

c. Economic, Social and Ideological: Economic and social needs of South Vietnam are as great as any underdeveloped country in transition. In those areas where GVN was not meeting the needs of the people through lack of will or strength, local Communist leaders promised to institute reforms. When coupled with an anti-foreign nationalism, Communist ideals and promises gave the Viet Cong a wide base of popular support, especially in rural areas where government presence was absent.

2. (C) The Insurgent.

a. Organization: The parallel military/political organization of enemy units within the Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI), basically similar to all Communist systems, extends from the North Vietnamese regime, through the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), to the Military Regions and Sub-Regions. From Military Region (MR) and Sub-Region (SR) level, the organizational structure extends through provinces, districts, special zones, villages and hamlets. Although VC Provinces, Districts and Special Zones have often differed from GVN political and geographic sub-divisions, there have been recent indications that the Communists are beginning to shift organizational boundaries to coincide with GVN boundaries, possibly to facilitate the hoped-for transition to a coalition government, as outlined in COSVN Resolution #9. Portions of three Sub-Regions are included in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI: SR-1, SR-4 and SR-5. These Sub-Regions, along with the other Sub-Regions surrounding Saigon, were established in late 1967, prior to the 1968

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Inclosure (7)

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TET Communist Offensive. SRs 1 and 5 are theoretically subordinated to MR-4 (or T-4) (in practice, they are directly subordinate to COSVN), and SR-4 is subordinate to MR-7 (or T-7). T-4 and T-7 serve as intermediate command and control links between the SRs and COSVN, with T-7 considerably more active than T-4.

b. Main Force Elements in Area of Operations:

(1) Dong Nai Regiment: During August 1968, the Dong Nai Regiment (DNR) was held near Highway 301 with a total strength of 800-1000. Extensive 3d Brigade operations in that area forced some DNR elements as far north as Chon Thanh (vic XT765620) and reduced total strength to about 500. Critical food shortages and increasing isolation from the local populace, brought about by expanding GVN control and extensive Allied interdiction of routes of movement, compromised the Regiment's ability to fight as a unit. A letter written in December 1969 by the regimental political officer, after he had inspected subordinate units expressed shock at the personnel and supply shortages and the low state of morale, and concluded that elements of the DNR were capable of operating as local force units only.

(2) 101st Regiment: The 101st Regiment was located in the Trapezoid/Michelin areas until October 1969. At that time Allied operations so adversely affected food supply and movement that elements of the Regiment were forced to displace to the east and north of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Numerous PW, ralliers and captured documents indicated that the Regiment was on the verge of widespread starvation and unable to move tactically because of Allied operations. The 1st and 3d Brigades pursued the northward movement of the Regiment, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting rear area operations between Minh Thanh (vic XT628661) and the Michelin. As a result, during December 1969 and January 1970, major elements of the 101st Regiment moved further north across the Saigon River into War Zone "C."

c. Command and Control: Traditionally, enemy offensive operations within the TAOI have been meticulously planned and rehearsed prior to execution. However, the lack of offensive activity on the part of the enemy since September appears to have been the product of a deliberate decision to disperse into small groups, with emphasis on survival, pending a change in his situation. The resulting decentralization of command and control, along with the pressure of Allied operations has forced enemy commanders to give greater leeway to subordinates in choosing courses of action, particularly in the selection of times and places in which to conduct minor harassing activity. The movement of major units seems to be controlled directly by COSVN. Although some planning flexibility appears to be available to enemy field commanders at regimental level, operations continue to remain inflexible once underway. Variance from agreed-upon attack plans generally results in confusion and disorder.

d. Strategy and Tactics: Enemy strategy within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI appears to consist of conducting a holding action for the purpose of maintaining his political and military presence. Enemy tactics include stand-off attacks (with mortars and/or rockets), anti-aircraft fire and mine warfare;

selected terrorism, propaganda and proselytizing activities; infrequent attempts to interdict lines of communication (LOC) through ambushes, and ground probes against Allied installations. The enemy's capability to conduct sustained combat operations is non-existent.

e. Armament: The enemy has no unusual weapons or munitions and carefully conserves his meager supply. He has full range of conventional small arms, grenades and mortars. A varied selection of manufactured and improvised mines and boobytraps, to include command-detonated mines and devices captured from Allied forces, have been used. The 107mm and 122mm rocket has been used extensively in standoff attacks by main force artillery units. Special anti-aircraft weapons have not been employed by enemy forces in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI, although on occasion small arms fire is directed against aircraft throughout the area. One of his most versatile weapons is the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher, commonly designated as the RPG-2 or RPG-7, firing either the B40 (RPG-2) or B41 (RPG-7) rocket grenade. RPGs are used as anti-personnel and anti-vehicular weapons, as well as against hard installations.

f. Logistics: Innovative interdiction of enemy supply lines has seriously affected enemy resupply, and in many cases, rendered resupply completely ineffective. Enemy units have been cut off from local supply sources and have been forced to relocate in order to obtain badly needed rations. Virtually all enemy units have been forced to devote major efforts each day to food resupply. Intensive rice denial operations, conducted by Allied military and police forces in the TAOI during the rice harvest season (from mid-November 1969 to early February 1970), successfully denied the enemy the opportunity to refill his empty rice caches. This was attested to by numerous prisoners of war, Hoi Chanhs and captured documents. A shortage of munitions has limited the enemy's ability to conduct harassing standoff attacks by rockets and mortars within the TAOI. The most successful blow dealt to the enemy logistics system was the intensive interdiction of his supply lines along and across the Saigon River Corridor into traditional enemy controlled areas in the Michelin, Trapezoid and Iron Triangle. This cooperative effort was conducted by US and Vietnamese ground and Riverine forces, supported by 1st Infantry Division Night Hawk aircraft. The only significant logistic trend within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI has been the enemy's need to employ combat personnel in resupply and transport tasks, due to the inability of COSVN Rear Service Groups to provide adequate support. These resupply parties, in turn, have been subjected to intensive around-the-clock harassment and interdiction. A vast drop in both the morale and effectiveness of enemy combat units has been the end result.

g. Transportation: The enemy moves his supplies by the most expedient means available: foot, bicycles, sampans, oxcarts or wheeled vehicle. With increased Allied interdiction of traditional enemy supply routes and improved Allied control of major LOC's, the enemy has been forced to move supplies by foot on secondary trails and cross-country. Resupply parties tend to be small, 10 men or less, moving at dusk or at night.

h. Communications: Communications continues to be a major enemy weakness forcing him to decentralize command and control. He relies heavily on couriers under the supervision of commo-liaison sections. Enemy elements within the TAOI identified as using radios are the Sub-Region headquarters, regimental

headquarters and scattered specialized units. Wire is rarely used. Except for major headquarters, a courier system composed of runners is the primary means of communication. Allied interdiction of known and suspected commo-liaison routes and stations has resulted in decreased effectiveness of this means of communications, as evidenced by captured documents from commo-liaison channels. Enemy communications intelligence, on the other hand, is excellent. In December 1969, 1st Infantry Division elements captured an SR-1 radio intercept section intact, which had been successfully intercepting US and Allied radio messages. The personnel of this unit were well trained in interception techniques, fluent in English and adept at breaking simple Allied tactical codes.

i. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Organization - Activity and Capability (to include methods of operation): The military intelligence arm of SR-1, SR-4 and SR-5 extends down to village and hamlet level. The chain of control consists of a flow of directives from the top down and a flow of information reports from the bottom up. The intelligence organization includes reconnaissance, radio intercept and document translation elements, in addition to a series of wide ranging intelligence collection nets employing agents. The Security Section of the Sub-Region political staff is responsible for counterintelligence. The identification and neutralization of "counter-revolutionaries" and pro-GVN informants comprise the enemy counterintelligence mission.

j. Psychological Aspects: No Comment.

3. (CNF) Local Government Stability Actions.

a. International Relationships: No comment.

b. Government Organization: No comment.

c. Forces:

(1) Military Forces: The TAOI of the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Division are roughly contiguous. Traditionally, the 5th ARVN Division has been based in populated southern Binh Duong Province. However, during the past nine months, the increasing stability of the South Vietnamese government has lessened the need for the division to maintain a defensive posture along the traditional infiltration routes into Saigon. This, coupled with the greatly improved security status of Southern Binh Duong Province, has encouraged ARVN to devote more time to offensive operations in remote areas of highest enemy density. To ease this transition, the 5th ARVN and 1st Infantry Divisions have participated together in II Field Force Vietnam's DONG TIEN Program since July 1969. The program's three major goals are (1) to increase the quantity and quality of combined and coordinated joint operations, (2) to materially advance the division's three major missions (support of pacification, improve the effectiveness of US, GVN and ARVN units, and intensify combat operations), and (3) to significantly increase the efficiency of critical combat and combat support elements, particularly Army Aviation assets. The 1st Infantry Division has implemented this program by having ARVN and US infantry battalions and artillery batteries operate from combined fire support bases. Through cooperation and understanding, US and

ARVN commanders have conducted offensive operations against a common enemy in a common area of operations. Over a period of eight months, the operational efficiency of the entire 5th ARVN Division has been sharpened by this program. Recently, 5th ARVN Division Headquarters moved north to Lai Khe Base Camp and now operates in the 1st Infantry Division's former central Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).

(a) Tactics:

1. ARVN tactics are essentially no different from our own. The DONG TIEN program has remedied many of their weaknesses by encouraging small unit operations in remote enemy areas. As a result, the ability of ARVN small unit leaders and staffs has improved considerably. The present movement of division and regimental readquarters away from the populated areas should increase ARVN flexibility and cause commanders and staffs to focus their attention on enemy main force units. This will also allow Regional and Popular Force (RF/PF) units to assume more responsibility for the defense of populated areas through small unit operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), local force units and local guerrillas. This trend must be continued and encouraged by making more combat support and combat service support (especially helicopters) available to ARVN. For maximum benefit, training in the use of these assets must also be continued and increased.

2. One new small unit technique, used by both ARVN and US, is the mechanical ambush (Incl 1). The mechanical ambush is a claymore mine or series of mines rigged to be detonated by a tripwire. Most important, it is employed as an offensive weapon. Standard uses include securing the flanks or rear of manned ambush positions, and covering areas of likely enemy movement which are not being ambushed by ground troops. Since October 1969, 1st Infantry Division troops have eliminated a total of 262 enemy by mechanical ambushes.

b. Intelligence: ARVN relies on Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), which are employed like US Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, to collect tactical intelligence. The ARVN intelligence production cycle, however, is relatively slow, and at times the intelligence product lacks immediacy and also timeliness. ARVN relies heavily on other GVN intelligence agencies or sources for tactical intelligence, such as National Police Special Branch, Military Security Service and Allied intelligence agencies. ARVN uses agents for the collection of tactical intelligence; but, inflated source information, poor evaluation criteria and weak operational security in working the agent nets detract from the reliability of ARVN reports.

c. Identity and Adequacy of Counterintelligence Training: ARVN troops are given security briefings similar to US SAEDA briefings. Most ARVN counterintelligence functions are handled by GVN Military Security Service.

(2) Para-military Forces/Police.

(a) Tactics: In the Division's TAOI, RF/PF forces have steadily increased in number and strength. PF platoons and National Police Field Force Units continue to operate mobile resource control teams and provide local hamlet and

village security. RF units and national police provide the best search forces for village seals; PF platoons are not recommended because of their close ties with the local population. The ability of these local forces to gather intelligence and provide on-the-spot analyses of local situations should not be underestimated. Under the DOAG TIEN program, many US/RF combined operations have taken a heavy toll of local Communist units and VCI. At the same time these forces have gained experience and developed aggressiveness through field operations with US units. However, the performance of the 30 odd RF companies in the Division TAOI is mixed. Continued assistance and encouragement is necessary if their ability to provide local security is to be further improved.

(b) Intelligence: The GVN National Police Special Branch operates agent nets whose value has increased steadily. The differences in EEI (essential elements of information) levied on para-military and police intelligence sources from those levied on tactical military units have resulted in a useful exchange of intelligence information between the 1st Infantry Division intelligence agencies and national police advisors in the TAOI.

(c) Identity and Adequacy of Counterintelligence Training: The Military Security Service (MSS) is often an effective counterintelligence organization. The MSS personnel encountered by 1st Infantry Division counterintelligence personnel were, on the whole, professional and well trained in counter-subversion, counterespionage and countersabotage techniques. An excellent personnel security program uses the dossier system to maintain records of local civilians. Much useful black and grey list information was obtained by coordinating with GVN police and MSS agencies in the TAOI.

d. Intelligence and Counterintelligence:

(1) Organization, Activity and Capability (to Include Methods of Operation) No comment.

(2) Penetration of Insurgency Forces: Penetration of Communist/NVA forces has been made by GVN intelligence agencies; however, information provided had only limited tactical value.

(3) Employment of Civil Populace: The GVN Provincial Reconnaissance Units and National Police Special Branch have made excellent use of casual and paid informants.

(4) Adequacy to Supply Internal Defense Requirements: Both ARVN and GVN civilian intelligence agencies are heavily dependent on US counterparts for financial and logistical support. Good advisor-counterpart relations continue to be the cornerstone of success in bilateral intelligence efforts.

(5) Ability and Willingness of Local Government to Protect US Classified Information: Penetration of GVN and ARVN by Communist/NVA intelligence makes the release of anything other than immediately exploitable tactical intelligence undesirable. Apparently, a lack of communication among GVN and ARVN intelligence agencies prevents the full exploitation of black lists by the GVN.

4. (CNF) US Role in Support of Local Government.

a. US Country Team: No comment.

b. US Military Forces:

(1) Involvement: The 1st Infantry Division has conducted intensive tactical operations within Binh Duong Province.

(2) Command and Relationship with Government Forces:

(a) Under the DONG TIEN program, US and ARVN units were not placed OPCON to one another. Instead, equal units (companies, battalions, batteries, brigades/regiments) were "associated" with one another in combined areas of operation and endeavor. In the absence of command relationships, mutual cooperation and coordination was emphasized. This system permitted ARVN leaders to develop at their own pace.

(b) Essentially the same type of relationship was maintained with province and district RF/PF forces, with emphasis on pacification operations. The advantages of including RF/PF in pacification operations (search and seals and resource control) were three-fold: first, these forces are better adapted to certain missions than non-Vietnamese speaking infantry units; second, their employment freed line troops for other missions; and third, the experience they received increased their own prestige and ability.

(3) Location of US Forces: During the DONG TIEN program, US and ARVN forces shared the same area of operations and often shared fire support bases. In addition, infantry battalions coordinated with local RF/PF units while the division cavalry squadron was tasked to support a number of these units in southern Binh Duong Province (Incl 2).

(4) Functions Performed at Various Levels: Functions performed in support of GVN were civic action, PSYOP, hamlet/village security, security for resource control programs, and combined operations with RF/PF units and National Police. Under the DONG TIEN program there were combined operations with ARVN infantry battalions and artillery batteries, continuous coordination/liaison between regimental and division commanders and staffs, and formal training conducted for ARVN on technical subjects:

(a) Civic Action: The 1st Infantry Division Civic Action program stressed economic and sociological projects which contributed to the general health, education and welfare of the local Vietnamese population. Civic action projects were supported by the military skills, equipment and resources of the division in cooperation with civilian authorities. In all cases, the principles of self-help were followed and found to be sound.

(b) PSYOP: Aerial PSYOP proved most effective when employed in the quick reaction role, in support of troops in contact, or for immediate exploitation of ralliers. One successful technique was the "early word broadcast," which consisted of a rallier on the ground talking into a radio for retransmission

over an aerial loudspeaker system. Another new technique was the use of "rally rags." Chieu Hoi messages on pieces of white cloth were disseminated in areas of known enemy activity, with instructions to use the white cloth as a rally flag. Ground PSYOP broadcasts were conducted in populated areas using GVN support and themes, such as the Volunteer Informant Program and "Support Pacification." One new concept was a series of rallies centered around TET Holiday and Redeployment themes. The Province Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) planned and directed the rallies, while the division contributed gifts and a MEDCAP Team. The redeployment of the division was portrayed as a major step in the defeat of the Viet Cong and the growth of ARVN capabilities.

(c) Training: The 1st Infantry Division's mobile training team continued to present formal instruction at the 5th ARVN Division NCO Academy. Periodically, ARVN commanders and NCO school graduates joined 1st Infantry Division units for one-week OJT periods. More extensive OJT programs included radar operation/maintenance instruction, classes on artillery procedures and techniques, helicopter loading instruction, trouble-shooting repair classes for signal and vehicular equipment, and medical instruction. In addition, all division staff sections supported the DONG TIEN program through visits with counterpart staffs of the 5th ARVN Division to discuss mutual problems and provide assistance where necessary.

(d) Combined Operations: From July 1969 to March 1970, each infantry battalion of the 7th and 8th ARVN Regiments, and two artillery batteries of the 51st ARVN artillery, participated in DONG TIEN combined operations for periods of two to four months. US and ARVN infantry battalions and artillery batteries shared areas of operation, fire support bases and tactical operations centers. Combined operations included ground reconnaissance and night ambush operations in areas of high enemy density, aerial assaults and resupply, use of air and artillery support, and pacification security. To encourage decentralization of operations, US units made air and fire support available to ARVN commanders; for the same pu pose, dual US/ARVN company operations were encouraged. As a result of combined operations, ARVN small unit leaders and staffs became more proficient in tactical operations and the use of support assets.

(5) Effectiveness of US Military Support: Measured by operational activity and results, the 5th ARVN Division benefited significantly from the DONG TIEN program. Best results were achieved when US and ARVN infantry battalions were co-located at fire support bases for more than two months.

(6) Areas of Inadequacy: Though much improved, ARVN units still lack a depth of leadership at all levels. Continued emphasis on delegating authority and obtaining experience through "doing" is needed. Limited combat support assets force ARVN to depend on US support for operations against remote base areas and infiltration routes.

(7) Logistical Support: While ARVN use of logistical assets is often inefficient, they are improving through experience. There is a need for helicopters to support ARVN resupply operations.

(8) Intelligence: A daily liaison program between the division G2 Section and all GVN agencies in the TAOI was mutually productive. The G2 counter-intelligence section provided a permanent liaison officer to Binh Duong Province, who rendered daily VCI neutralization reports to the G2 Section. He also passed intelligence information from division sources to GVN agencies. The 1st Infantry Division conducted an effective agent intelligence collection effort. Paid agents from three independent unilateral nets operated by the counterintelligence section provided approximately 200 intelligence information reports each month. This effort resulted in an occasional combat response by maneuver elements of the division and, through the liaison program with GVN, the identification and eventual neutralization of several district level VCI cadre.

(9) US Operations: Since August 1969, several new combat techniques were developed and older ones refined. One such technique, the "mechanical ambush," has already been cited.

(a) Target Destruction Section (TDS) (Incl 3): Located in the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC), the TDS was a new organization drawn from resources of the Division Artillery S2, the Division Fire Support Element (FSE), the Military Intelligence Detachment and the Sensor Platoon. The Section received all intelligence reports coming into the DTOC, and maintained communications with division radar teams and all sensor monitoring stations servicing the division TAOI. In addition, the TDS communicated with all artillery units in and adjacent to the TAOI through the facilities of the FSE. In operation, the TDS received and analyzed intelligence, determined possible targets, and assisted the G3 Operations Officer in recommending appropriate responses. This permitted quicker response to fleeting targets and a more efficient use of division assets.

(b) Night Hawk: One of the most effective division night assets and the one recommended most frequently by the TDS was Night Hawk. The Night Hawk force consisted of three Night Hawk helicopters (UH1H, each equiped with TVS-4 Starlight scopes, two Sheridan searchlights, and two mini-guns), two AH-1G/UH1C gunships and one UH1H slick. Night Hawk teams consisted of one Night Hawk aircraft and one gunship or slick used as a chase ship.

(c) Shotgun Technique of Area Saturation (Incl 4): The "Shotgun" small unit ambush technique was developed to trap elusive groups of enemy by saturating a given area with small ambush patrols (AP). Shotgun operations were implemented by splitting an infantry company into six-man ambush teams, successively air assaulting them into separate locations, and organizing them into a network of day and night AP's. This allowed the company to cover more area and increased its chances of making contact. These techniques proved especially successful in interdicting small groups of enemy attempting to obtain food and supplies from local hamlets by night.

(d) Aerial Assault Ambush Flights (Incl 5): Nicknamed the "Triple A" Flight, this was another tactic for trapping elusive enemy elements. Essentially, small ambushes are air assaulted around a suspected base camp area and positioned on likely avenues of approach and exit. Air strikes and artillery

TOT are then directed at the target's center and followed by the insertion of a company (-) "stirring force." The stirring force rapidly sweeps the immediate area, reconning by fire. The perimeter ambushes engage any enemy attempting to leave the area, and remain in position overnight to trap enemy observers returning to investigate the activity in the center (a variation is to put a mechanized force in the area to act as a "stirring force.").

(10) Resource Control Operations: One significant combined operation was the rice denial program implemented in Tri Tam District November 1969 through February 1970. Security for operation RICECAP consisted of eight ARVN and two US infantry companies (at the time the parent battalions were co-located at FSB KIEN, vic XT519418, under the DONG TIEN program), with other forces being available if needed. Extensive ground reconnaissance and ambush operations were executed in the vicinity of the rice fields. Aircraft with night surveillance devices were employed during the hours of darkness to prevent enemy forces from harvesting rice at night. The concept of the operation and subsequent instructions from province and district officials permitted the harvesting of rice from 0800 to 1700 hours daily. All rice cut during the day had to be removed from the fields or destroyed. The rice was taken to a rice Control Collection and Storage Point (CCSP) to be dried, measured and bagged. Each family was permitted to keep enough rice at the CCSP for one week with no more than 5 kg of rice allowed in the house at one time. Rice in excess of the weekly ration was trucked to the district warehouse in Dau Tieng to be kept for the family's use or sold. This method of operation insured that no rice was available for the enemy to buy, steal or otherwise obtain. It is estimated that approximately 654 tons of rice were harvested with only 1.1 tons being lost to enemy forces. The district is still not self-supporting, and has to import rice from other areas each year; however, it is anticipated that the need for rice will be less than in past years due to the success of the rice denial operations and the close controls exercised over the possession and storage of rice.

5. (U) Third country support of local government: N/A.

6. (C) Lessons Learned.

a. Areas needing continued emphasis are:

(1) Combat and combat service support of ARVN.

(2) Combined DONG TIEN-type operations with weak ARVN and RF/PF units.

(3) Expanded GVN civic action and security programs, especially in the northern Saigon River villages in Tri Tam District.

(4) Intensive small unit operations to prevent the enemy rebuilding his logistical system.

b. Recommendations:

(1) That systematic resource control, especially rice denial, operations

be implemented with GVN and ARVN assistance to increase commerce and deny the enemy needed foodstuffs. Rice denial programs must be well thought out, well organized, and thoroughly coordinated at least two months prior to the harvest.

(2) That the combat techniques noted in Inclosures 1-5 be employed against elusive enemy forces seeking to avoid major engagements.

W.E. WILLOY
Major General, USA
Commanding

5 Inclosures
1. Mech Ambush
2. Cav/RF Ops
3. TDS
4. Shotgun Technique
5. Air Assault Ambush

AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Automatic Mechanical Ambush ORLL

1. GENERAL CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT: In the 1st Infantry Division, mechanical ambushes are positioned on trails and/or in areas of suspected enemy activity that cannot be covered entirely by conventional ambushes. In this way, the mechanical ambush compliments a conventional ambush by increasing the coverage of a selected area. The mechanical ambush is also used to secure the flank or rear of a conventional ambush position.

2. DEVICES USED: The devices used are all in the supply system or can be easily fabricated.

a. The components of the ambush are:

(1) one or more claymore mines.

(2) power source.

(3) triggering device.

(4) demolition cord.

b. Three types of triggering devices are used in the 1st Inf Div.

(1) clothes pin.

(2) rat trap.

(3) sliding wire.

Advantages, disadvantages set up procedures and sketches of these devices are at Inclosures 1 thru 4.

3. TECHNIQUES FOR EMPLOYMENT: a. Mechanical ambushes are usually employed along enemy trails. The claymores can be placed in trees or in daisy chains along a trail. When two daisy chains are employed, a gap of 10-15 meters should be left between the two trip wires.



VC moving in either direction will then be in one of the two kill zones when the point man activates the daisy chain.

b. Mechanical ambushes are usually positioned in the afternoon or evening by a patrol that will be ambushing within one kilometer of the mechanical ambush. Another method is to insert a patrol from the Aerorifle platoon to position one or more mechanical ambushes and then be extracted. The same patrol returns the next morning to check the kill zone and retrieve the ambushes if necessary.

4. SAFETY: The mechanical ambush power source (PRC-25 batteries or BA-200) should be controlled by the positioning patrol leader. The patrol leader should place the power source on a flank of the claymore(s) with a distance between power source and claymore(s) that exceeds the maximum range of the claymore. The patrol leader should not wire the claymore wire to the wire terminals until he has made sure that all of his men are beyond the maximum range of the claymore(s). The patrol leader who retrieves the mechanical ambush should be the same patrol leader who positioned it. (See Inclosures 2, 3 and 4).

5. METHODS OF OBSERVATION AND MONITORING: Generally the mechanical ambushes are monitored by sound. When a position detonates in daylight a patrol checks the results as soon as practical. If the position detonates at night a patrol checks the results at first light. If available, a helicopter is used to check the area prior to arrival of the patrol. Trip flares have been made an integral part of the mechanical ambush and serve to give visual notification of activation.

6. COMBAT EXAMPLES: a. If a mechanical ambush position is not covered by indirect fire the enemy will normally remove their dead from the kill zone. Kill zones which do not have indirect fire placed on them following the detonation of claymore(s), frequently will yield blood trails only. On occasion, hand grenades and M-79s have been used to keep the enemy from recovering their dead from the kill zone. The kill zone search should be far reaching. In several instances wounded enemy have been found several hundred meters from the kill zone.

b. The results of 1st Inf Div mechanical ambushes are:

	Total Killed in Div TAOR	Killed by Mech AP's	% Killed by Mech AP's
Oct 69	375	12	3
Nov 69	363	33	9
Dec 69	376	62	16.5
1-27 Jan	282	43	15

The number of enemy dead found in the kill zone has usually been one or two.

7. COUNTER MEASURES: The enemy normally disassembles a mechanical ambush if they discover one. They may, however, booby trap it or establish their own ambush in the near vicinity, to inflict casualties on the recovery patrol.

AVDB-T-T
SUBJECT: Automatic Mechanical Ambush ORLL

The patrol recovering mechanical ambushes should assume that the mechanical ambushes have been discovered. The move to the area of the ambushes should be secure and cautious. Further, the recovery team should search carefully for trip wires or any other booby trap indicators as they approach the source of power, disconnect the claymore wires and recover the claymores. Additionally, mechanical ambushes may be booby trapped to prevent the enemy from tampering with them.

8. All elements of the mechanical ambushes must be camouflaged for maximum effectiveness. White Detcord is difficult to camouflage and requires extra effort; the camouflage sleeve issued with fragma cord works well.

5 Incl
1. Mech Ambush Using Rat Trap Ambush
2. Mech Ambush Using Sliding Wire Device
3. Mech Ambush Using Clothes Pin Firing Device
4. M-16 Cartridge Clip Firing Device
5. Power Sources

AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting Up and Recoving the Mechanical Ambush Using the Rat Trap Device

1. SETTING UP:

Step #1: Position the rat trap taking advantage of natural camouflage and making sure the trip wire will work properly.

Step #2: Install trip wire. One man will arm the trap and hold the action while another adjusts the wire across the trail.

Step #3: Run the battery end of the claymore wire back to the position the battery will be located. Leave the ends of the wire twisted together. DO NOT CONNECT THE BATTERY AT THIS TIME.

Step #4: Position the claymore insuring that it is sighted and camouflaged.

Step #5: Before fusing the claymore inspect the camouflage in the area of the trap, the claymore wire to the claymore and the claymore itself. If all is satisfactory THEN fuse the claymore.

Step #6: Move back to the battery end of the claymore wire. If the power source is a BA-200 battery wire directly to the terminals. If a PRC-25 battery is used expose the wires and hook directly to them.

Step #7: Place battery in plastic bag and camouflage the position.

2. RECOVERING:

Step #1: After carefully inspecting the area around the battery the wires should be removed from the battery and twisted together. ALWAYS UNHOOK THE BATTERY AS THE FIRST STEP.

Step #2: Move forward and carefully inspect the area around the claymore and then defuse it. Put the claymore in its carrier. Leave the blasting cap in place.

Step #3: Release the tension on the trap.

Step #4: Take the trip wire down.

Step #5: Retrieve the trap.

Step #6: Pick up the claymore wire.

3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: a. When connecting the claymore wire to the battery the individual should have an obstacle between himself and the claymore. If this is not possible then the prone position should be assumed prior to making the connection.

b. The power source ends of the claymore wire should be twisted together to short the wire until such time as the connection with the power source is made. This will prevent static electricity from setting the claymore off prematurely.

c. Proper camouflage techniques must be followed in order to prevent detection by the enemy. This applies to all parts of the device.

d. An extremely accurate map location and sketch must be made as well as noting any landmarks in the area which will help locate the area.

e. The direction the claymore is pointing must be determined. (Use a compass).

f. A route out of the area and back into the area should be predetermined.

g. The team which installs the machanical ambush should take it down.

4. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROPER SEQUENCE AND PROCEUDRE ARE ALWAYS USED.

Tab A to Incl 1 Firing Device Type A (Rat Trap Device)



AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting up and Recovering the Mechanical Ambush Using the Sliding Wire Firing Device

1. SETTING UP:

Step #1: Select spot and put in anchor stake making sure the wire is facing the right way and there is as much natural camouflage as possible for the device.

Step #2: Set a small stick in trip wire end of sliding wire device. Make sure the wire loops have about two inches of overlap.

Step #3: Anchor the trip wire across trail.

Step #4: Run the battery end of the claymore wire back to the point where the battery will be located. Leave the wires twisted together. DO NOT CONNECT THE BATTERY AT THIS TIME.

Step #5: Position the claymore insuring that it is sighted and camouflaged.

Step #6. Before fusing the claymore inspect the camouflage on the stake, claymore wire to the claymore, and the claymore itself. If all is satisfactory THEN fuse the claymore.

Step #7: Move back to the battery end of the claymore wire. If the power source is a BA-200 battery wire directly to the terminals. If a PRC-25 battery is used expose the wires and hook directly to the terminals. If a PRC-25 battery is used, expose the wires and hook directly to them.

Step #8: Place battery in plastic bag and camouflage the position.

2. RECOVERING:

Step #1: After carefully inspecting the area around the battery the wires should be removed from the battery and twisted together. ALWAYS UNHOOK THE BATTERY AS THE FIRST STEP.

Step #2: Move forward and carefully inspect the area around the claymore and then defuse it. Put the claymore in its carrier. Leave the blasting cap in place.

Step #3: Take the trip wire down.

Step #4: Retrieve the sliding wire device.

Step #5: Pick up the claymore wire.

AVDB-T-T
SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting Up and Recovering the Mechanical Ambush Using the Sliding Wire Firing Device

3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

a. When connecting the claymore wire to the battery the individual should have an obstacle between himself and the claymore. If this is not possible then the prone position should be assumed prior to making the connection.

b. The power source ends of the claymore wire should be twisted together to short the wire until such time as the connection with the power source is made. This will prevent static electricity from setting the claymore off prematurely.

c. Proper camouflage techniques must be followed in order to prevent detection by the enemy. This applies to all parts of the device.

d. An extremely accurate map location and sketch must be made as well as noting any landmarks in the area which will help locate the device.

e. The direction the claymore is pointing must be determined. (Use a compass).

f. A route out of the area and back into the area should be pre-determined.

g. The team which installs the mechanical ambush should take it down.

4. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROPER SEQUENCE AND PROCEDURE ARE ALWAYS USED.

Tab A to Incl 2 Firing Device Type B (Sliding Wire Device)



AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting Up and Recovering the Mechanical Ambush Using the Clothes Pin Firing Device

1. SETTING UP:

Step #1: Select spot and put in anchor stake making sure the clothes pin is facing the right way and there is as much natural camouflage as possible for the stake.

Step #2: Install trip wire. This consists of installing spacer and anchoring the trip wire across trail.

Step #3: Run the battery end of the claymore wire back to the point where the battery will be located. Leave the wires twisted together. DO NOT CONNECT THE BATTERY AT THIS TIME.

Step #4: Position the claymore insuring that it is sighted and camouflaged.

Step #5: Before fusing the claymore inspect the camouflage on the stake, claymore wire to the claymore, and the claymore itself. If all is satisfactory THEN fuse the claymore.

Step #6: Move back to the battery end of the claymore wire. If the power source is a BA-200 battery wire directly to the terminals. If a PRC-25 battery is used expose the wires and hook directly to them.

Step #7: Place battery in plastic bag and camouflage the position.

2. RECOVERING:

Step #1: After carefully inspecting the area around the battery the wires should be removed from the battery and twisted together. ALWAYS UNHOOK THE BATTERY AS THE FIRST STEP.

Step #2: Move forward and carefully inspect the area around the claymore and then defuse it. Put the claymore in its carrier. Leave the blasting cap in place.

Step #3: Take the trip wire down.

Step #4: Retrieve the stake.

Step #5: Pick up the claymore wire.

3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: a. When connecting the claymore wire to the battery the individual should have an obstacle between himself and the claymore. If this is not possible then the prone position should be assumed prior to making the connection.

b. When installing the spacer between the contacts of the clothes pin care should be taken to put the spacer in far enough to prevent the wind from dislodging it, but not so far that the trip wire would make the connection between the contacts. It would be best to cover the trip wire at the spacer with tape.

c. The power source ends of the claymore wire should be twisted together to short the wire until such time as the connection with the power source is made. This will prevent static electricity from setting the claymore off prematurely.

d. Proper camouflage techniques must be followed in order to prevent detection by the enemy. This applies to all parts of the device.

e. An extremely accurate map location and sketch must be made as well as noting any landmarks in the area which will help locate the device.

f. The direction the claymore is pointing must be determined (use a compass).

g. A route out of the area and back into the area should be predetermined.

h. The team which installs the mechanical ambush should take it down.

4. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROPER SEQUENCE AND PROCEDURE IS ALWAYS USED.

Tab A to Incl 3 Firing Device Type C (Clothes Pin)







AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Firing Device Fabricated from M-16 Cartridge Clips

1. Advantages: All materials available in field except rubber bands. Light weight, easy to fabricate, simple.

2. Disadvantages: The space between contacts is small. A spark could bridge the gap in wet weather. Has not been used during rainy season.

3. Materials used in M-16 Cartridge Clip Device:

a. 2 M-16 cartridge clips.

b. 1 small stick.

c. 1 tripwire.

d. 1 non-conductive spacer.

e. 1 battery.

f. 1 claymore wire.

g. 1 M-18A1 claymore.

Tab A to Incl 4



AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Power Sources

1. It is recommended that a BA-200 battery be used instead of a PRC-25 battery because positive contact is guaranteed. Wires plugged into a PRC-25 battery may not make contact. If the trip wire is then pulled and not detected the recovery team may set off the device while disarming it. This is done by extracting the wires and making contact as they are extracted.

2. The BA-200 has wire terminals exposed and positive connection can be guaranteed.

3. Either power source can be weather proofed by putting it in a plastic bag or ammo box.

4. if a PRC-25 battery is used it should be broken open to expose the wires and then the connection made.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-T-MHD 4 November 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Interview Report: Combined US Armor/RF Infantry Operations Against Local VC Forces (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Enclosed is After Action Interview Report: Combined US Armor/RF Infantry Operations Against Local VC Forces (U).

2. (U) This report covers the operations of the 1-4 Cav and the 749th RF Company against the VC C65 Local Force Company. The careful planning and detailed coordination needed to insure the success of the effort are covered in depth. Commanders initiating similar operations will find useful guidelines outlined in Inclosure 5 to basic report.

3. (U) Distribution will be made throughout II FFV. The importance of such operations is increasing and the valuable experiences gained by the 1st Infantry Division will hopefully assist others planning similar endeavors.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

C.T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

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Incl 2

27

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
17th Military History Detachment
1st Infantry Division

AVDB-T-MHD APO 96345 26 October 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report: Combined US Armor/RF Infantry Operations Against Local VC Forces (U)

Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1. (C) Background: a. Prior to September 1969, the Division Armored Cavalry Squadron, the 1-4 Cav, had been under the operational control of one or more of the Division's three Infantry Brigades. However, on 21 Sep 69, the 1-4 Cav was placed under the direct control of the Division Headquarters. The Squadron's D Troop, an air cavalry troop comprised of an Aero Rifle Platoon and helicopter gunships would continue to operate as a separate divisional unit from Phu Loi, base camp of the 1st Aviation Battalion. However, the 1-4 Cav HQ and the three cavalry troops would now operate as a unit from field CP locations. Their rear facilities would remain at Lai Khe base camp.

b. The presence of mechanized infantry companies operating northeast and northwest of Lai Khe, allowed the 1-4 Cav to direct its attention south. Utilizing the road network south of Lai Khe, it would act as a quick reaction force able to reinforce US or ARVN infantry contacts, or initiate rapidly executed operations against elusive VC units through its own mobility and firepower. Gradually it would expand its area of operations and increase its efforts to neutralize all VC elements in the Division's southern AO. Coordination with the 2d US Bde, the 8th ARVN Regt, the 5th ARVN Div, and Binh Duong Province would be continuous.

2. (C) Situation: a. The basic mission of the Squadron was to conduct ground reconnaissance, night patrols and convoy security operations from the Ben Cat area (XT7433) to the Song Be Bridge (XT920430). However, its area of interest encompassed Lai Khe Base Camp to the north and extended 23 km south to Phu Cuong, the capital of Binh Duong Province. Despite the monsoon rains, most of the roads which interlace the area are passable to the Squadron's tanks and ACAVs (Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles or Armored Personnel Carriers); the lighter ACAVs can negotiate most of the local terrain even in the monsoon season.

b. Within this area are elements of the Dong Nai Regiment and the C62, C63, and C65 Local Force Companies. During the past two months, the 749th Regional Force (RF) Company, the crack reaction and reconnaissance company of Binh Duong Province, had conducted successful ambush operations in the

AVDB-T-MHD 26 October 1969
SUBJECT: After Action Interview Report: Combined US Armor/RF Infantry Operations Against Local VC Forces (U)

area north of Dinh Hoa Village (XT8120). The RF company commander, LT Tran Van An, had identified the ambushed enemy as members of the C65 Local Force Company apparently out on local resupply missions. LT An also estimated that a C65 base camp was located two km northeast of the village in a densely overgrown Rome Plow cut area. The area was known to be heavily boobytrapped with dud 105 and 155 shells and similar devices.

3. (C) Planning: a. On 30 Sep 69, the commander of the 1-4 Cav, LTC John T. Murchison Jr., and elements of his staff visited Binh Duong Province officials at Phu Cuong and coordinated with LT An, the Province Senior Advisor, LTC Fleigh, and his deputy, Mr. Gardiner Brown. Once US assistance was offered, the Province Chief was eager to launch an operation against the suspected base camp with LT An's RF Company in support. On 3 Oct 69, a final coordination meeting was held at Phu Cuong, and the 1-4 Cav commander presented his plan of action. The plan was approved and the final details were completed. The operation would take place the following day.

b. The Squadron Commander had conducted several aerial reconnaissance flights over the concerned area. The flights were spaced over a three-day period so that the enemy would not be warned by increased air activity. In addition, these VRs consisted of high altitude sweeps, 12-15 km long, to avoid the tell-tale orbit over an area of an impending operation. One quick low-level reconnaissance one kilometer from the base camp was necessary to ascertain exactly what areas were passable to the 50-ton tanks and to measure the height of the surrounding scrub vegetation. If the scrub growth was above the height of the ACAVs, the danger from boobytraps would be substantially increased. Fortunately, the reconnaissance indicated that the ground would hold tanks, and that the growth was just equal to the height of the ACAVs.

4. (C) Concept of Operation: a. On the morning of 4 Sep 69, HQ elements of the 1-4 Cav and Troops A and C would move out from AP sites north of Chanh Luu (XT8232), and travel 14 km south along highway TL2A. Troop C would pick up the 794th RF Company at Bung Dia (XT809218). All elements would then simultaneously swing southeast off the highway and assault the suspected enemy base camp. A stream and gully line, relatively free of brush, paralleled the highway behind the base camp area. The enemy would be squeezed against this terrain feature. A hunter-killer team would act as the initial blocking force east of the base camp. The 3d platoon of B Troop, positioned 4 km to the south on the Phu Cuong By-Pass (XT8216) would be ready to move up the highways on either side of the target area. In addition, a forward supply point was established at an ARVN outpost located south of Hoa Loi 2 at XT815224 (see map, Incl 3).

5. (C) Narrative: a. At approximately 0845, the Task Force moved off

AVDB-T[illegible]ED 26 October 1969
SUBJECT: After Actior Interview Report: Combined US Armor/RF Infantry Operations Against Local VC Forces (U)

the road on two axis, C Troop, carrying the 794th RF Co., on the south and A Troop on the north. The suspected base camp location was approximately two km from the road. At the final coordination line, about one km from the road, the Task Force was deployed on line. The tanks from each troop were placed in the center, the ACAVs on the flanks, and the 794th RF Company mounted on ACAVs behind the tanks. The armored vehicles were approximately 10-15 meters apart. As the line advanced through the thick, 7-8 foot high bamboo, brush, and grass to the suspected base camp location, the tanks began a steady volume of 90mm cannister fire to clear the area of boobytraps. Grenadiers fired a steady stream of M79 rounds further in advance, to detonate boobytraps, and fix the enemy in place.

b. At 0855, A Troop's left flank began to detonate boobytraps and take small arms fire, indicating the enemy base camp (vic XT829213) had been found (see Sketch Map #1, Incl 4). Immediately the northern ACAVs and the tanks directed heavy cannister, M-79, and machine gun fire on the enemy positions while the RF troops moved behind the contact elements. As the units assaulted, the enemy attempted to escape to the north. This development was noted immediately by the squadron commdner, who was located in the center of the assault line. On his instructions, C Troop moved quickly behind the engaged A Troop, positioned itself northeast of the contact area and effectively blocked the enemy escape route (see sketch map #2), Incl 4). The task force, now positioned around the bulk of the enemy forces in a semicircle, closed in, swept forward and destroyed the enemy base camp.

c. From 1030 to 1130, the armored vehicles pursued the fleeing enemy soldiers aided by hunter-killer teams, and the 3d Platoon of B Troop, which had been moved up from the south. While C Troop and the RF Company pursued north, A Troop moved through the base camp and continued south. The hunter-killer team and the B Troop platoon blocked all possible withdrawal routes (see Sketch Map #3, Incl 4). In the afternoon, the battle area was swept and reswept, uncovering more holes, tunnels, boobytraps and miscellaneous supplies.

d. Initially only the Squadron S3, MAJ William R. Wilson, was providing aerial support in a light observation helicopter (LOH). However, as soon as the contact began, the LOH was reinforced by the Division's "Lighthorse" helicopter group. At the request of the Squadron Commander, the Lighthorse commander directed hunter-killer teams to block withdrawal routes and supervise "Dustoff" helicopters to evacuate the wounded. He also provided the 1-4 Cav with a PSYOPS helicopter and aerial transport for an IPW Team. As a result, the PW were immediately exploited for tactical intelligence and the captured C65 Assistant Platoon Leader was quickly placed on the PSYOPS ship to broadcast personal Chieu Hoi messages to his comrades in arms.

e. This successful operation took a heavy toll of the C65 Local Force

AVDB-T-MHD 26 October 1969
SUBJECT: After Action Interview Report: Combined US Armor/RF Infantry Operations Against Local VC Forces (U)

Company. The final results were six enemy dead, nine enemy PWs, and five AK-47s, one 60mm mortar, 15x82mm rounds, four RPG-2s, and four RPG-2 rounds captured. There were three US wounded slightly by RPG and boobytrap fragments. No casualties were suffered by the RF troops and no vehicles were damaged in the action.

6. (C) Conclusion: a. The 1st Inf Div G2, OB Section held the strength of the C65 Local Force Company at approximately 32 men. The estimated company engaged by the 1-4 Cav Task Force was completely decimated with 15 members of the C65 accounted for. Equally significant, three PW were identified as NVA cadre, some of the first to be found in "Local Force" units within this specific area. Confirmation and further evaluation is now being undertaken.

b. Based on hard intelligence, the well-planned, quickly executed operation was a complete success. The action against the C65 is only the beginning of a series of 1-4 Cav operations planned in conjunction with RF/PF Forces and designed to clear the southern portion of the Division's AO of all enemy elements.

7. (C) Recommendation: The successful operation underlined some proven techniques and pointed out new ones; a complete summary of recommendations is given in Incl 5.

JEFFREY J. CLARKE
Captain Infantry
Commanding

5 Incls
1-Task Force Organization (U)
2-Sequence of Events (U)
3-Area Map (U)
4-Tactical Sketch Maps (U)
5-Recommendations (U)

Inclosure 1

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

1. General:

a. HQ, 1-4 Cav

b. A Troop, 1-4 Cav

c. C Troop, 1-4 Cav

d. 794 RF Co (note: the 794 RF Co was not "attached" but operated in close coordination with HQ, 1-4 Cav)

2. Squadron Control:

a. 3/B/1-4 Cav

b. HAC Platoon (HQ ACAVs/Flame Platoon [-])

c. Lighthorse elements:

(1) C and C ship

(2) Hunter-Killer Team

(3) PSYWAR helicopter

(4) Two troop carrier helicopters

d. Forward Supply Point (Flame Thrower Unit, ammunition resupply for 90mm cannister, 50 caliber, 7.62 and M-79)

e. Darkhorse elements (D Troop, 1-4 Cav): one Hunter-Killer Team

Inclosure 2

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

0706 Sqdn departed NDP for pick-up of 794 RF Company

0735 Picked up 794 RF Company

0800 Units crossed LD with 794 mounted on C Troop vehicles

0815 Deployed at phase line into assault sweep formation

0845 A Troop made contact with AP boobytraps and VC; 794 RF Co dismounts

0850 Lighthorse elements arrived on station; screened along gulley

0905 C Troop moved from the southern to the northern flank to block

0915 Dustoff of A Troop WIA completed

0915 Initial contact broken

1015 A total of 4 VC were KIA; 6 VC, 1 RPG, 1x60mm morter, and several AK-47 rifles were captured

1040 Dustoff for one US WIA (slightly wounded by booby traps)

1050 A Troop kills another VC and captures the assistant platoon leader

1110 Assistant platoon leader used in PSYOPS helicopter to deliver direct plea to his comrades

1207 C Troop captured 2 VC (one wounded by fire), and one AK-47 rifle

1215-1515 Swept and reswept battle area

1410 Lighthorse obtained 1 VC KBA (BC) on southern flank

1700 Terminated operation; displaced forward MAFs; and requested night ambushes in the area

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INCLOSURE 3 AREA MAP: 1: 100,000



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

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

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

Inclosure 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. When operating in populated areas, commanders must be able to obtain, evaluate and use all intelligence from local GVN/ARVN sources. Good intelligence was the key to this operation.

2. Joint operations with ARVN or RF/PF troops should always be considered. These operations increase the force density available and give RVN military units valuable training. In addition careful joint coordination and planning will assist the commanders in gathering intelligence without making their intentions known to the enemy.

3. The mobility of armored units is often limited by terrain and weather. In the rainy season, a careful reconnaissance must be made to determi nod exactly what ground can be used; weighing these limitations, commanders should augment such units with enough ground troops to insure the accomplishment of the mission.

4. Whenever possible, blocking forces should be positioned near terrain features, such as streams or open fields, which naturally hinder hidden or rapid enemy withdrawals. The initial blocking element should consist of a Hunter-Killer Team. The team should be backed up by an equally mobile, strong force such as the 1st Division's Lighthorse Team or the 1-4 Cav Aero Rifle Platoon.

5. Massed cavalry troops assisted by aerial gunships can produce a tremendous shock effect. Such an effect is desirable, but can only be achieved if the operation is based on hard intelligence, is carefully planned, and is rapidly executed. In this operation, the psychological shock of the assault accounts for the unusual percentage f enemy who surrendered.

6. The use of 90mm cannister assault fires to clear boobytrapped areas is highly successful. Boobytrap wires were found blown away and smaller boobytraps were crushed under the tracks without any damage. Cannister also clears tunnel and bunker entrances, brush, bamboo, and keeps enemy heads down.

7. The immediate availability of IPW teams and special PSYOPS helicopters make it possible to gain and exploit tactical intelligence from enemy prisoners. Such information furnishes direction for further sweeps while prisoners broadcast Chieu Hoi messages over the immediate area.

8. Mobile armored units make the best use of mobile support units. In this operation, the 1-4 Cav effectively used Division air assets for reconnaissance, as blocking forces, and for control. The supporting forces responded quickly to the rapidly developing situation and prevented the enemy's escape. The Lighthorse Team with one command and control helicopter, one PSYOPS ship, and two lift ships, was an invaluable part of this operation.

9. In joint operations, a colocated US/RVN CP is usually necessary for smooth control. The need is also apparent in armored operations where quick reactions are necessary to exploit any given situation. In this operation the Squadron Commander was able to communicate directly with the RF company commander who was mounted on the Squadron Commander's track.

THE TARGET DESTRUCTION SECTION
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

GENERAL

The 1st Infantry Division operates in a general area 36 miles east to west and 24 miles north to south above the city of Saigon (see map, Annex C). There are no established front lines and the enemy is deployed throughout the division's entire Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI). The key to locating the enemy is accurate and timely intelligence. But intelligence itself is not a target - it is only information. A target is the final product of the skillful collection, analysis and evaluation of available data. These time-honored precepts have again proved themselves in Vietnam. Due to the increased number of intelligence and response assets now available, key organizational changes have been made in the Big Red One to insure that these precepts are being efficiently applied.

BACKGROUND

In August 1969, Major General A.E. Milloy assumed command of the 1st Infantry Division and recognized that more efficient methods were needed to bring together the division's intelligence and response assets. He noted that small unit contacts, sensor activations, and SLAR, SPAR, Red Haze and Bloodhound reports were not being followed up systematically. Often probable targets were passed to brigade for clearance, and then to artillery for automatic engagement. There was no further analysis and insufficient attention was paid to the time lapse between reception of the data and engagement.

MG Milloy directed that an intelligence and response center be formed that would have instant access to all current combat assets. Within such an organization it would be possible to centralize the analysis of all incoming data and, at the same time, have the widest choice of possible responses. Thus the Target Destruction Section was born.

MISSION

The mission of the Big Red One Target Destruction Section (TDS) is to monitor and analyse all current intelligence. Based on this intelligence, the TDS insures that the division's most effective combat assets are quickly focused on immediate or fleeting targets. The TDS receives target information, analyzes it and recommends a response to G3 Operations. The main emphasis is on speed - the speed with which an effective, measured response can be placed on enemy targets.

TDS ORGANIZATION

The TDS is a consolidation of existing TOE positions and assets from the Division Artillery S2, the Division Fire Support Element (FSE), the Military Intelligence Detachment and the Sensor Platoon. The TDS is located in the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC) and is supervised by the division Assistant Fire Support Coordinator. Operations are handled by two, 12-hour shift teams. Each team is headed by an Officer-in-Charge (OIC) assisted by two Target Analysts and a Recorder. In addition, an enlisted sensor specialist monitors the division sensor stations which operate daily from 1800 to 0500.

TDS INTELLIGENCE INPUTS

The TDS receives inputs from many sources. Most important are the spot reports from the G3 and G2 Operations sections. Through these sections, the intelligence from all the maneuver units in the division is available to the TDS as soon as it is received at the division TOC. Often this is a matter of seconds. Agent reports from the division Counter Intelligence Section flow into the TDS. Additional information is received from G2 Air through visual air reconnaissance, SLAR, Red Haze and Bloodhound reports. The 5th ARVN Infantry Division and Binh Duong Province, both of whose boundaries are generally within the 1st Infantry Divi... 's TAOI, also provide valuable inputs.

The TDS receives radar and sensor readings. The section has direct radio communications with all TPS-25 radars in the AO and indirect communications with all PPS-5 radars through divisional artillery battalions. All TPS-25 radar sightings are transmitted directly to the TDS as they occur. In addition, the sensor specialist records the readings and classified them according to intensity of activation.

TARGET ANALYSIS

Rapidly recording, organizing and analyzing the vast amount of intelligence data is a demanding task which requires experienced personnel. The Target Development Officer, assisted by the Recorder and two Target Analysts, is charged with this job. Intelligence inputs, whatever their source, are quickly recorded, analyzed and correlated with other intelligence data. During this process, possible targets are designated. When a target is identified, a decision is made in conjunction with the G3 Operations Officer as to how the target will be treated. In some cases the resulting action may only involve posting the data and continuing to monitor the target area. More often, there will be a recommendation to employ gunships, artillery or troops against the target. The inclusion of a PSYOP mission is always considered. In fact, the recommended response could be a combination of any of the capabilities noted here.

RESPONSE

The rapid ability to collect and analyze data must be matched with an equal ability to respond to that data. This is another reason why the TDS is located in the Division TOC. Using the radios of the Fire Support Element and G3 Operations, the TDS can communicate with all maneuver units and all artillery battalions in the AO. Fire clearances and fire missions can be obtained quickly. In addition, there are land lines to the 5th ARVN Division TOC, and the FSE of II Field Force, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 25th Infantry Division.

THE TDS IN ACTION

From 24 August 1969, when the TDS commenced operations, to 10 December, the Section has assisted in 170 confirmed kills. The most notable successes have been along the Saigon River and the Razorback mountain area north of the Michelin Rubber Plantation (see Map, Annex C).

On the night of 21 September, the TPS-25 Radar at Fire Support Base Tennessee (XT583333) detected movement along the Saigon River just south of Ben Chua (vic XT5636). At 0015, 22 September, river patrol craft of the 571st Riverine Division moved north to investigate and found 25-30 enemy attempting to cross the river vic XT559350. The patrol boats engaged the enemy before they had a chance to respond. A search of the water turned up 25 enemy KIA, 14 backpacks and one AK47 rifle (see Battle Map, Annex D, point "A").

On the night of 16-17 October, strong readouts were noted from a sensor field placed on the central Razorback (vic XT5055). The information was relayed from the monitoring station on Nui Ba Den (the Black Virgin Mountain, XT2858) to the 1st Infantry Division TDS. The sensor readings developed a pattern of movement, and artillery and Night Hawk aircraft were quickly directed into the target area. The results were 21 enemy KIA over a three-hour period (vic XT571575, 535575, 490607 and 480575; see Annex D, point "B").

On 19 October, D Battery, 1-5th Artillery, fired on a radar sighting in the Trapezoid vic XT6233. Eight days later a mechanized infantry company (B/2-2), operating in the general vicinity of the sighting, discovered seven enemy soliders killed by artillery fire (Annex D, point "C").

Another significant action began with a series of sensor activations and radar sightings along the Saigon River on 23 October. The readings were quickly followed up by river patrol craft and Night Hawk gunships. This combination of all four assets resulted in a total of 10 enemy KIA in two different locations (vic XT634320 and XT590351, see Annex D, point "D").

The success of the TDS is due to its ability to collect, analyze and direct a response with professional speed. It makes a more efficient use

of both intellignece and division combat resources. During its period of operation, the TDS has established and perfected a number of operational techniques which have paid off handsomely. These are listed at Annex E. Despite the enemy's attempts to escape the pressure of the Big Red One by operating in smaller units, the division's ability to engage the enemy has not fallen. Assisted by the Target Destruction Section, the 1st Infantry Division has been able to accomplish its missions more effectively. With continued perfection and refinement, the TDS will play a significant part in the Big Red One's future.

6 Annexes
A. TDS Diagram
B. Glossary
C. 1st Inf Div Map
D. Battle Map
E. Lessons Learned
F. Photographs

Annex A

TARGET DESTRUCTION SECTION

CONCEPT



Annex B: GLOSSARY

1. Bloodhound ("People Sniffer"): Helicopter equipped with chemical personnel detection devices.

2. FSE (Fire Support Element): The Division Artillery Commander's coordinating element for all fire support (supervised by the Fire Support Coordinator) and a special advisor to the Commanding General.

3. Hunter Killer Team (HKT): Team of one light observation helicopter and one AH1G "Cobra" gunship.

4. I&I: Intelligence and Interdiction (referring to artillery fire).

5. Light Fire Team (LFT): Team of two helicopter gunships.

6. Lighthorse: Air Cav element consisting of one Command and Control helicopter, 2-3 utility helicopters, and Hunter Killer Teams.

7. Night Hawk: Helicopter with two miniguns, two starlight scopes and two searchlights.

8. PBR: Riverine Patrol Boats, operated by the Navy.

9. Red Haze: The use of infrared imagery technique to detect targets.

10. Sensors: Sensor activations are classified as light, less than a squad; medium, a squad; and heavy, more than a squad. The various types of sensors are:

a. MINISID - Seismic, hand implanted, activated by ground vibrations.

b. PIRID - Infrared, activated by temperature changes.

c. ADSID - Seismic, air deployable, activated by ground vibrations.

d. IID - Infrared Intrusion Device, activated by the interrruption of infrared beam.

e. ACOUBOUY - Acoustic, activated by ground vibrations.

f. HELSOID - Seismic, helicopter implanted, activated by ground activations.

g. MAGID - Magnetic, activated by moving metal.

11. Shadow: USAF C-119 with four miniguns, night observation device, searchlight and flares.

12. Sky Spot: Nighttime, high altitude airstrikes guided by radar.

13. SLAR: Side-looking Airborne Radar.

14. TDS: Target Destruction Section.

15. (D)TOC: (Division) Tactical Operations Center, the centralized location of combat staff sections and division communications.

16. VR: Visual (Aerial) Reconnaissance.

17. Yellow Jacket: Code name for a possible enemy headquarters element location based on current intelligence.

Annex C 1st Infantry Division Map

Reference: See III Corps Tactical Zone Special Map, 1:250,000



Annex D

BATTLE MAP

Reference: Map 1:100,000, VN Series L607, Sheet 6231



Annex E: LESSONS LEARNED

1. Sensors should be employed in groups for maximum effectiveness. Well placed sensor "fields" will also indicate direction and speed of movement, making it possible to allow for the time difference between activation and response.

2. From Chieu Hoi and PW interrogations it has been determined that the enemy moves at a rate of 250-300 meters per five minutes. Thus, even if no direction of movement can be established from sensor activations, likely avenues of movement can often be determined. Taking the response time into consideration, a target can be effectively engaged.

3. If no definite movement patterns can be ascertained, artillery should fire two C Zone and sweeps by battery (i.e., sheaths 200 m left, right, above and below the sensor grid).

4. The TDS uses Night Hawk on most lucrative targets. When radar sightings are involved, this radar can be used to bring the Night Hawk on the target quickly and accurately. By virtue of its night observation devices, the Night Hawk can give a quick assessment of the results.

5. Continued studies of sensor and radar reports should be made and correlated with other intelligence data. Once enemy movement patterns are established, recommendations should be made on the placement of night ambush sites.

6. Artillery should not automatically engage SLAR and Red Haze readouts. Instead, the TDS should review and analyze this intelligence and submit recommended target areas based on the intelligence situation and enemy movement patterns.

7. The TDS should review radar fields each night. From these studies, radar operators should be given specific areas or grids to scan.

8. Both Radar and WP rounds can be used to orient night aircraft and direct them on targets or target areas.

9. Sensor activations should be verified by radar whenever possible.

10. The entire area of operations must be systematically studied. In the 1st Infantry Division, the TDS has broken the Division AO into 100 square kilometer blocks; each TDS shift makes a complete analysis of at least two of these blocks daily. In this way, an entire intelligence re-evaluation of the division AO is made every week.

Annex F: PHOTOGRAPHS

1. TDS Sensor Monitor points out a new activation.

2. Radar sighting is followed up in the TDS.

3. Navy Patrol Boats search the Saigon River, ready to respond to any intelligence targets.

4. Day and night, 1st Infantry Division gunships stand by for target information.



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

"Lessons Learned: The "Shotgun" Technique of Area Saturation (U)"

1. (U) Purpose: This training note introduces a new technique of small unit employment developed by LTC Thomas R. Finley, Commanding Officer, 1-18 Infantry.

2. (C) Background: The "Shotgun" technique developed by LTC Finley is tailored to a situation where it is possible for friendly infantry to operate at squad level due to greatly reduced enemy activity. This type of operation is especially useful in relatively pacified areas where groups of four to six enemy soldiers are attempting resupply or liaison operations. When this is the case, the infantry company can "dominate" a larger area more effectively by operating in squad-size elements.

3. (C) Concept of Operation: a. The company is broken down into 12 ambush teams (four per platoon) of about six men each. The company CP group and any supporting elements constitute the 13th team. The company commander retains direct control over all of his subordinate elements.

b. A known area of enemy movement is chosen for the company AO. This may be a trail network in the vicinity of a village or hamlet, or any other area through which the enemy is known to pass. The area should be within the fan of supporting artillery.

c. Aerial photos and trail overlays are prepared. After taking into consideration all available intelligence data, 13 ambush locations and 13 LZ are selected. Whenever possible, each LZ should be 50-100 meters from its matching ambush location. The ambush locations should be approximately 1000 meters apart; close enough so that one unit can reinforce another, but far enough away so that one ambush does not interfere or block the fires of another. Possible directions of enemy movement, routes of reinforcement and the possibility of artillery support should also be considered. Inclosure 1 contains a schematic diagram of the ambush system utilized by A Company, 1-18 Infantry.

d. The concept was first implemented by A/1-18 in early November 1969. After the above procedures were carried out, the company commander assigned ambush sites to each of his platoon leaders. Each ambush team was given an overlay and an aerial photo of their ambush and LZ sites. With these items and the use of a sand table, the team members were familiarized with their future area of operations. In addition, the teams were briefed extensively on procedural matters and the importance of camouflage and concealment.

4. (C) Team Organization: Each platoon formed four teams. Two teams had one machine gun each; one carried a 90mm RR with AP rounds; and the fourth contained the platoon CP. The 13th team was made up on an eight-man company HQ group and two six-man 81mm mortar teams, for a total of 20 personnel. Each team carried a radio, and one man in each group was given supplementary medical training and extra medical supplies. Since the company intended to operate in the field for three consecutive days without resupply, each man carried a three-day supply of C-rations and each team carried one five-gallon water can. In addition, each man carried two claymores, LAW, extra hand grenades and ammunition. The mortar teams carried two 81mm tubes, 50 illumination and 20 HE rounds.

c. Additional water supplies were obtained by collecting rain water in ponchos. In the coming dry months, an additional five gallons per team will have to be carried.

d. Helicopter pilots are not familiar with this method of operation and a thorough briefing must be coordinated as early as possible.

d. In addition to denying access to the enemy, the operation places great responsibility upon the small unit leader and has resulted in identifying the strong as well as the weak leaders within the companies. It also increases self-confidence and helps train the individual soldier in patrol, ambush and search techniques through practical experiences. Morale has risen as the small unit self-confidence builds.

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Incl 1: AO Antelope V



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

NUMBER 525-19

15 December 1969

(Expires 1 December 1970)
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Air Assault Ambush Flights

1. PURPOSE: This circular explains the techniques of conducting the air assault ambush flight.

2. APPLICABILITY: The techniques and tactics described below apply to all areas within the 1st Infantry Division TAOR. However, the circumstances which lead to a decision to conduct air assault ambush flight operations are more likely to prevail in those areas where the enemy can easily conceal units.

3. GENERAL: a. Air assault ambush flights are conducted by one or more rifle companies. Operations may be conducted using either one-half of an assault helicopter company or the entire company. They are designed to place a loose cordon around an area of known or suspected enemy occupation while concurrently inducing him to attempt to evacuate the area.

b. Air assault ambush flights are conducted in three phases:

(1) Phase I: Insertion of squad/section size ambushes along avenues of egress from selected area of enemy occupation.

(2) Phase II: Insertion of a platoon or company size stirring force into or near the center of the area in an effort to force the enemy to fight or evacuate the area along the avenues of egress. Phase II proceeds as if it were a major assault. Normal artillery and Tac air preparatory fires are used.

(3) Phase III: Extraction of the stirring force from the center of the area and inserting it near one of the cordon ambushes along an avenue of egress. Phase III takes place only if no contact is made during Phase I or II. In this event, the cordon ambushes remain in place overnight, and the stirring force becomes the reaction force for these elements.

4. TECHNIQUES: a. Air assault ambush flight operations begin with selection of an area, not to exceed three km in diameter, which intelligence indicates contains an enemy element (see Appendix A). The area should have multiple avenues of egress along each of which there must be at least one LZ which can accommodate one lift ship.

b. A maximum of six squad or section size ambushes is inserted along these avenues to form a loose cordon around the area. Deceptive false insertions may be made in each case, and artillery/Tac air/helicopter gunship preparatory fires may or may not be used.

c. If contact develops at any of the cordon insertion points, the original mission may be altered and forces added to exploit the contact.

d. Upon insertion, the cordon ambush elements move from the LZ to their ambush positions. Mechanical ambushes will be placed around each cordon ambush position. These units will remain in position awaiting movement of the enemy, which will be stimulated by the insertion of the stirring forces.

e. The stirring force will insert with the primary mission of creating the impression of a unit which is inserted to conduct major ground reconnaissance operations in the area. In reality, all it will do is insert, following heavy preparatory fire, and conduct clover leaf patrols around its LZ.

f. Should the enemy in the area elect to remain and not immediately evacuate along the avenues of escape, the cordon ambushes will remain in position overnight. There is always a possibility that the enemy within the area will make his move under the cover of darkness, particularly when encouraged by well placed supporting fires. For this purpose, the stirring force will be moved to a position outside, but adjacent to, the cordon, from which it can most readily react to a contact at one of the cordon ambush sites.

5. PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE: a. Timely response to fresh intelligence is the key to successful air assault ambush flight operations.

b. The success of the operation depends heavily upon the amount of pre-mission planning accomplished. In addition to subtle but thorough aerial reconnaissance, extensive rehearsals should be conducted for all phases of the operation. Artillery defensive concentrations for each ambush position should be registered and confirmed during a 48 hour period prior to the actual insertion. Tying these registrations to the intelligence and interdiction program by firing random deception rounds will maintain secrecy. Among the more important facets of preparation is the final pre-mission inspection of the cordon ambush elements. If a cordon ambush fails because of incomplete preparation, the expenditures of aerial resources, combat power

and time have been wasted.

(AVDB-T-D)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

C.T. SELBY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

A.G. HUME
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

1 Appendix
A - Air Assault Ambush Diagram

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20-CO, 17th MH Det



LEGEND:

REINFORCED SQUAD AMBUSH

LANDING ZONE

Appendix A

UNCLASSIFIED
Security Classification

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