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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

AGDA (M) (29 Jun 70) FCR OT UT 70X009

10 June 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Randolph Glen, 101st
Airborne Division, 7 December 1969 to 31 March 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO 96383

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN,
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), PACJ3-32 (R2) (U)

1. (U) Name of Operation: RANDOLPH GLEN.
2. (U) Date of operation: 7 December 1969 - 31 March 1970.
3. (U) Location: Thua Thien Province, RVN. Map Vietnam: Series L70M.
Scale: 1:50,000. Sheets 6341 I, 6343 I, II; 6442 I, II, III, IV;
6441 I, II, III, IV; 6541 I, II, III, IV; 6542 III.
4. (U) Control Headquarters: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).
5. (U) Reporting Commander: Major General John H. Wright, Jr.
6. (U) Task Organization: See Inclosure 1, Task Organization.
7. (C) Support Forces:
 - a. United States Forces.
 - (1) 7th United States Air Force and 1st Marine Air Wing provided air support in I Corps Tactical Zone.
 - (2) 7th United States Fleet provided naval gunfire support and amphibious forces on station off IZTL.
 - (3) 1st Logistical Command (USA Support Command, Da Nang) and III Marine Amphibious Force (Fleet Logistical Command) provided logistical and administrative support to IZTL.
 - (4) XXIV Corps Artillery provided artillery in support of the division in the area of operation.
 - b. Republic of Vietnam Forces. See Inclosure 1, Task Organization.
 - (1) 1st Inf Div (ARVN), in operational coordination with the 101st Abn Div (AbnI), conducted operations to provide protection and security for the populated lowlands; located and destroyed enemy forces and base

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camp; and supported the pacification and development plans and programs in the division area of operation.

(2) Territorial forces of Thua Thien Province provided territorial security for the populated lowlands and directly supported the province pacification and development programs in coordination with other GVN forces and agencies. The territorial forces were assisted by the province advisory team, the joint MACV mobile advisory teams (MAT) the USMC 3d Combined Action Group (CAG) with its organic 3d Combined Action Platoon (CAP), and by mobile training teams (MTT) from the 101st Air Div (Amd). In addition, the dedicated infantry battalions in Phong Dien and Phu Loc districts actively assisted the Regional and Popular Force units in planning and executing combined operations and assisted with the training of these elements. Inclosure 4 depicts the number, type, training status, and present disposition of the territorial forces in Thua Thien Province.

c. (1) Intelligence: See Inclosure 3, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: 101st Air Div (Amd) conducted offensive operations to locate and destroy NVA/VC main forces and interdicted enemy movement into the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province; conducted operations to defeat VC/LF/VC in the populated lowlands; conducted limited objective airmobile operations west of the piedmont in reaction to hard intelligence; conducted periodic interdiction of the A Gian Valley, and placed fires on acquired targets on a continuous basis; conducted reconnaissance and surveillance in AR; provided one airmobile infantry battalion as Corps reserve; supported GVN pacification and development plans and programs; provided civic action assistance; and assisted in upgrading GVN forces for eventual assumption of full responsibility for combat, pacification, and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province.

10. (C) Concept of the Operation:

a. General. Operation RANDOLPH GLB was developed, planned, and executed in close cooperation and coordination with Vietnamese civilian and military agencies at all levels. The resources of the division were committed to the accomplishment of two basic, interrelated tasks:

(1) To provide, in coordination with the 1st Inf Div (MkV), a protective shield on the periphery of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province.

(2) To support, to the maximum extent possible, the accomplishment of the goals of the 1970 Province Pacification and Development Plan.

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All operations conducted by the division during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were planned to maximize security of the population and to support accelerated attainment of the eight objectives of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. These eight objectives are:

- (a) Territorial Security: Security is the prerequisite to insuring that social, economic, and political development in Phu Thien Province progresses and yields the desired results. The efforts of US, ARVN, Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF), and the National Police/National Police Field Forces (NPF/FPF) must be coordinated and combined in order to insure effective security for all the people.
- (b) Protection of the people against terrorism: The neutralization of the VCI through combined efforts at increasing the effectiveness of the Phuong Hoang (Phoenix) organization at every level, to include the effective administration of intelligence material by District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) and Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCC).
- (c) People's Self Defense: Better organize, train, and equip PSDF to increase their capabilities of protecting the villages and hamlets and to discharge their responsibility of helping to identify the VCI.
- (d) Local Administration: Development of a local administration with the capability of self-management in administrative, economic, and financial affairs. Complete election of all village, hamlet, municipal, and provincial councils.
- (e) Greater National Unity: Continue implementation of the Hoi Chanh program with greater emphasis on rallying high and middle ranking enemy cadre to the government ranks.
- (f) Brighter Life for War Victims: Increase efforts at improving life for war victims, assisting resettles in returning to secure areas and encourage their participation in local economic development.
- (g) People's Information: Establishment of an effective information system based on close coordination between government agencies and between the various people's organizations, with emphasis on information aimed at educating the people and motivating them to participate in local development in every field.
- (h) Prosperity for All: Continue to build on the achievements of

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preceding years, advancing steadily from previous economic and political successes to economic independence.

b. The two basic tasks, territorial security and pacification and development support, were conceived and organized in the following manner:

(1) Territorial security was developed through combined operations with ARVN and territorial forces, and through an extensive training program that provided some specialized instruction for ARVN units, but concentrated primarily on training RF, PF, and PSDF units to accomplish their assigned tasks with the equipment and personnel authorized and on hand.

(a) ARVN Operations and Training.

1. Operations. The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) had joint responsibility with the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) for the assigned area of operation. By close coordination, common boundaries were established for areas of operation shared by US brigades and regiments of 1st Inf Div (ARVN). These unit boundaries were established along district political boundaries when possible to facilitate coordination with territorial forces and GVN authorities. Within these areas, extending from the South China Sea through the populated lowlands, the piedmont, and the heavily forested mountains to the Laotian border, combined operations were conducted by the division with ARVN, RF and PF units. In the division reconnaissance zone, along the Laotian border, including all of the western portion of Quang Tri Province, extensive reconnaissance was conducted to monitor enemy activity as supplies and combat units moved across the border into the dense jungles of South Vietnam. The principal intelligence collection agency was the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. This unit conducted extensive armed aerial reconnaissance, augmented by the ground reconnaissance capability of Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf. There was only limited participation in reconnaissance operations by ARVN forces. The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) employed ranger teams to conduct deep reconnaissance, but relied on US aviation assets for the insertion, resupply and extraction of these teams. Reconnaissance in the brigade/regimental patrol and surveillance zones was conducted by rifle and reconnaissance platoons organic to the infantry battalions. Based on the intelligence obtained, combined airmobile, quick-reaction operations were conducted to eliminate the enemy or force him to abandon his base areas. During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, eleven of these multi-battalion operations were conducted, employing US and ARVN battalions in close coordination to conduct detailed reconnaissance in force within specified target areas. In the

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brigade/regimental operations zone on the periphery of the populated lowlands, US and ARVN battalions were deployed to conduct platoon and company patrol and surveillance operations on a continuous basis to prevent enemy forces from using this area to launch attacks by fire, or stage for ground attacks against the populated lowlands. Extensive airmobile operations were conducted in this zone by both ARVN and US forces using the airmobile assets of the division to position maneuver units and supporting artillery in areas of enemy activity.

2 Training. Training assistance to ARVN units was provided by supplementing the advisory effort in certain technical fields, such as airmobile operations, aerial movement of supplies and equipment, pathfinder training, ground surveillance, and counter-mortar radar training, and in base management. In addition, the division continued an informal junior officer exchange program in which US and ARVN units exchanged platoon leaders and junior staff officers for periods of one week.

(b) Territorial Forces. See Inclosure 4.

1 Combined operations with territorial forces were designed to upgrade the ability of each unit to perform its assigned mission. Operations were conducted with the RF to improve small unit tactics. These combined operations stressed techniques applicable to the assigned mission and the weapons and equipment available to the RF soldier. However, these operations also included airmobile insertions and rappel training to improve the self-confidence and aggressiveness of the individual. Combined mobile security operations with RF units were conducted progressively farther from the traditional area of operations of the unit to familiarize the RF soldiers with terrain on the edge of the populated areas, to develop confidence and esprit, and to prepare the unit to assume full responsibility for territorial security operations in the lowlands when required. Operations with PF platoons were more restricted, concentrating on patrols, ambushes, and cordon operations in the vicinity of the village to which the PF unit was assigned. Operations with PSDF were limited to occasional night ambushes; most contact with PSDF was in the form of basic military training, designed to prepare the local PSDF unit for the defense of its own hamlet and the members' homes.

2 Training for territorial forces was provided through two programs: dedicated battalions and mobile training teams (MTT).

a Two infantry battalions were dedicated to the dual task of upgrading the effectiveness of territorial forces and supporting pacification

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and development in two districts with a record of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) incidents. These two battalions, one in Phu Loc District and one in Phong Dien District, integrated all operations with those of the district forces. Training presented to RF, PF, and PSDF units was tailored to the specific requirements of the unit being trained, as determined in coordination with the district chiefs and district senior advisors. On-the-job training during combined operations was conducted on a unit-to-unit and man-to-man basis. Training was provided primarily on equipment on hand and available to the unit being trained, although additional training was also presented on equipment authorized and scheduled for issue, e.g. FRC-25 radios. In coordination with MACV mobile advisory teams (MAT) and sector officials, RF units from other districts were rotated to Phong Dien and Phu Loc districts to receive training with the dedicated battalions.

b. Threemobile training teams (MTT) were organized by each brigade to conduct programmed training for PF and PSDF in districts where elements of the 101st Abn Div (Amb) did not habitually operate. This training was developed and scheduled in coordination with the district chiefs and sub-sector advisors. Instruction was tailored to correct the specific weaknesses of PF and PSDF units or elements being trained and was presented at a level commensurate with the skills required to perform their specific missions. A fixed, rigid program of instruction was avoided; however, training was organized and scheduled on a regular basis once the content had been determined.

(2) Pacification and Development. The goals of Thua Thien Province during RANDOLPH GLEN were and are to provide adequate security for the entire population, eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure, initiate and complete needed public projects, improve existing economic programs, and implement economic reforms where required.

(a) Psychological Operations.

1 Psychological operations were divided into three broad categories.

a. Category I: Support provided to operations conducted in the populated areas designed to destroy VC/VCI.

b. Category II: Support provided to operations designed to locate and destroy NVA/VC units on the periphery of the populated areas.

c. Category III: Support provided to operations designed to locate and destroy NVA forces in the jungle covered mountain regions.

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2 Employment. Close coordination was effected with district chiefs, and ARVN and territorial force units to insure the effective employment of PSYOP assets. Primary emphasis was placed on raising the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) rating for security to A or B for all hamlets, encouraging the use of the Village Hamlet Radio System (VHRS) to insure timely reaction to enemy harassment and terrorism, and conducting leaflet drops in support of the campaign to raise the rating of all hamlets. Emphasis was also placed on the Chieu Hoi program to encourage potential ralliers. The denial program was supported by developing a "High Price of Rice" campaign that emphasized the futility of the enemy's effort.

(b) Civic Action.

1 In order to support the Thua Thien Province Pacification and Development Plan through civic action, direct coordination was effected with district chiefs and district senior advisors. A priority list of civic action projects was initiated in each hamlet. These lists were consolidated and approved at village, district, and province level, and served as a guide for unit civic action assistance. Priority was given to the completion of projects already in progress, with emphasis on those hamlets with HES ratings of D and those with a low security C rating. All new projects were selected from the civic action priority list.

2 Civic action support was provided to improve the life of war victims, assist resettles in returning to secure areas, and encourage participation in local economic development. One significantly successful economic development project has been the timber industry. Lumber production in Thua Thien Province reached an all time high during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN.

(3) Concerted effort was directed at denying the enemy the ability to mix with the populace and gain recruits, sustenance, and supplies essential to maintaining his combat effectiveness. Operations in coordination with GVN forces were conducted to:

- (a) Interdict enemy supply routes into the populated areas.
- (b) Prevent enemy access to rice producing areas through saturation patrols and ambushes.
- (c) Monitor and check movement on all secondary roads and waterways through combined operations with RF, PF, and MPFF.
- (d) Assist in the enforcement of curfews.

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c. Disposition of Forces. 101st Abn Div (Amol) conducted Operation RANDOLPH GLEN with the 1st Bde coordinating with the 5th Regt (ARVN) in an area of operations in southeast Thua Thien Province, the 2d Bde coordinating with the 3d Regt (ARVN) in central Thua Thien Province, and the 3d Bde coordinating with the 1st Regt (ARVN) in northwestern Thua Thien and southern Quang Tri provinces. All brigades were deployed to conduct combined security operations in the lowlands and offensive operations in the piedmont region to locate, interdict, and destroy enemy forces and provide maximum security for the population. In the division reconnaissance zone in western Thua Thien Province, quick reaction, limited objective operations, to include artillery raids, were conducted in response to hard intelligence. Support for pacification and development programs, training of territorial forces, elimination of VCLF/VCI, and assistance with resettlement programs characterized operations in the populated lowlands.

11. (C) Execution.

a. Methods of operation. The focal point for coordination of all efforts in Thua Thien Province was the informal Area Coordination Committee composed of the CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl); CG, 1st Inf Div (ARVN); the Province Chief; and MACV senior advisors. This committee coordinated broad policies for the employment of military forces to accomplish the established objectives and determined priorities for pacification and civic action. Detailed coordination to implement these policies was effected through continuous liaison at division level with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and with province/sector officials. Brigades provided liaison teams with dedicated communications to counter-part regiments and each district in the area of operation. Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was characterized by operations designed to provide maximum security for the populated areas, accentuated by accelerated pacification assistance efforts and training for RF/PF/PSDF units. Movement of troops and supplies was accomplished by utility and cargo helicopters, wheeled vehicles, boats of the 12th and 13th Coastal Groups, and US Navy patrol craft. Airmobile field artillery, reinforced by aerial rocket artillery, provided close, continuous, flexible fire support and added depth to the battlefield.

b. Operations Narrative.

(1) - 24 December 1969.

(a) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN commenced with extensive reconnaissance-in-force, search, and ambush operations to find, fix and destroy NVA/VC forces, caches, and base camps within the division area of operation,

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and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. Active participation in support of the accelerated pacification program in Thua Thien Province continued, with operations conducted in close coordination with territorial forces to deny the enemy recruits, intelligence, supplies, and the advantage of anonymity gained by mixing freely with the people. A comprehensive training program for RF, IF, and PSDF units was continued to increase the combat effectiveness of these forces. The command posts of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf and 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf remained collocated with the Phu Loc and Phong Dien District Headquarters, respectively.

(b) Significant Activities. Moderate contact in the AO characterized this period. At 091930 December, the 3d Bde's provisional air cavalry platoon, located 25 kilometers northeast of FSB Sward (YD46330), received seventeen 60mm mortar rounds. Artillery fires were employed on the suspected enemy positions (YD452334). A first light check revealed negative results.

On 11 December, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf and 2d Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) air assaulted from Camp Evans into multiple LZs in the vicinity of FSB O'Reilly to conduct reconnaissance-in-force and detailed search operations for enemy units, base camps, and cache sites. At 112102 hours, while in ambush positions vicinity YD481030, the 3d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf engaged one enemy moving in a northwesterly direction with Claymores and small arms fire. After the enemy fled without returning fire, the element conducted a sweep, during which it received 15 to 20 AK47 rounds. Returning to an ambush posture, the platoon engaged and killed three enemy at 2210 hours. Three AK47 rifles were captured.

At 141445 December, in the vicinity of YD302228, 3d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire. The enemy returned small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire and fled to the northeast. A sweep of the area revealed two enemy killed, one AK47, one RPG launcher, and a bunker which was subsequently destroyed by the platoon. Friendly casualties were two US KIA and seven US WIA.

Co A and C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf conducted a cordon of MY TUYEN village at 171337 December in coordination with the 156th and 185th Co (RF) and the Phong Dien National Police unit. Seven of the 501 individuals processed were detained as Viet Cong suspects (VCS) and sent to the Phong Dien National Police station for questioning.

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On 19 December Co C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf engaged two enemy in the vicinity of ZD083004 with organic weapons. The enemy returned RPO fire and fled. While sweeping the area, the element received approximately 60 rounds of small arms fire. As the sweep continued, the company retrieved four VC KIA and four individual weapons.

At 210004 December, Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf engaged 30 enemy with small arms fire at YD555310. Aerial rocket artillery (ARA) and USAF C-119 gunships were employed. A sweep revealed three NVA KIA, two AK47 rifles captured, and three POW.

At 240755 December, 3d Plt, Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf located six kilometers southeast of FSB Tomahawk, received small arms fire and one explosive (satchel) charge. The platoon returned small arms fire, and artillery was employed. A sweep was conducted with negative results. Friendly losses were one US killed and seven wounded.

Throughout the day, the division prepared to observe the Christmas cease fire scheduled to begin at 1800 hours.

(2) 25 December 1969 - 10 January 1970.

(a) During this period, the division continued Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, conducting operations in coordination with territorial forces of Thua Thien Province to intercept enemy movement into the populated lowlands and to deny them access to sources of supply. Divisional elements conducted a number of combined village/hamlet cordons in conjunction with RF, PF and National Police units. Throughout the period, teams from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf and the USMC III Marine Amphibious Force Reconnaissance Company augmented air cavalry reconnaissance operations in the A Shau Valley.

(b) Significant Activities. On Christmas Day, at 1400 hours, near YD514251, the 3d brigade provisional air cavalry platoon's command and control aircraft received small arms fire from three enemy. The OH6A aircraft returned 7.62mm ("mini-gun") fire, and ARA was employed. Upon insertion, the platoon conducted a sweep of the area and discovered six enemy KIA, one PW who was evacuated to Co C, 326th Mad Bn at Camp Evans, and four AK47 rifles. In the 1st Bde area of operation (ZC176964), the 1st Plt, Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf uncovered graves containing 18 Viet Cong recently killed by small arms fire.

At 270837 December, Co C and D, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf conducted a combined cordon of PHONG AN Hamlet (YD613295) with the 222d, 185th, and 156th RF companies. Of 591 persons processed, eight were detained and taken to Phong Dien National Police station at Phong Dien District headquarters.

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At 311657 Decomber, Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf engaged three NVA at 50 meters with small arms fire. The enemy dispersed without returning fire. Pursuit, followed by a search of the area, disclosed one NVA KIA, two AK47 rifles, miscellaneous documents, two recently buried bodies killed by small arms fire, three huts, and three bunkers.

At 1800 hours, defensive positions and defensive ambushes were established throughout the division in preparation for the New Year's cease fire. Reconnaissance operations continued in an effort to detect enemy movement. Enemy forces violated the cease fire on nine occasions before its termination at 1800 hours 1 Jan 70.

At 031244 Jan 70, in the vicinity of XD933251, one OH6A and two AH1G aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav received heavy automatic weapons fire. The gunships engaged the area, and an airstrike was requested. One AH1G aircraft returned to Quang Tri after sustaining a hit in the generator. Helicopter fire accounted for 17 NVA dead, and an additional two enemy were killed by the airstrike.

On 3 and 4 January, the 1st Bde conducted an artillery raid to FSB Thor. Preplanned intelligence targets and targets of opportunity located by artillery and air cavalry observation aircraft were engaged by one battery of 105mm howitzers. Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf deployed from FSB Rifle to provide security for the artillery.

On 8, 9, and 10 January, a series of combined cordon operations were conducted by units of the division's two dedicated battalions in coordination with local RF companies and PF platoons in Phu Loc and Phong Dien districts.

(3) 11 - 27 January 1970.

(a) RANDOLPH GLEN continued over this period with combined operations designed to locate and interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. Extensive employment of radar raids aided in locating the enemy. Training continued to upgrade regional force capabilities to provide security for the population. Extensive resources, to include the employment of flame drops for defoliation, were used to clear a mined and booby trapped area in Phong Dien District scheduled for resettlement. The period included a multi-battalion assault staged in the area of FSB Bastogne in coordination with ARVN forces.

(b) Significant activities. At 140945 January 1970, while supporting Marine reconnaissance operations, a UH1H of F Trp (Prov), 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was hit by small arms fire near YC453953. The aircraft crashed,

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with four US (one USMC) killed, and five (four USMC) wounded.

On 16 January, the 3d Bde conducted an artillery raid from FSB Shepherd. Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf air assaulted from Camp Evans to FSB Shepherd to provide security for six 105mm and two 155mm howitzers employed on the raid. The artillery delivered fire on pre-determined targets selected from intelligence data and from division artillery and air cavalry aerial observers.

On 17 January Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from FSB Shepherd to Camp Evans. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved by air to FSB Birmingham, passed under the operational control of the 2d Bde and prepared for an assault into the area west of FSB Bastogne. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, also under OPCON of 2d Bde, staged at FSB Rifle for deployment into the 2d Bde AO.

The 2d Bde conducted a four battalion combined air assault on 18 January into the area west of FSB Bastogne to conduct a detailed search for enemy forces, base areas, and cache sites. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf air assaulted from FSB Birmingham to YD583067 and moved to FSB Veghel to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations to the northeast. Operations on the high ground west of FSB Bastogne were conducted by 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf following insertion along the Song Bo River. Extracting from FSB Rifle to FSB Birmingham, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf air assaulted into the vicinity of YD5310 and YD5210 to sweep to the northeast. The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) arrived at FSB Bastogne by convoy from FSB Geronimo and combat assaulted to the west in coordination with the 2d Bde. The reconnaissance-in-force continued until 25 January.

Little contact occurred in the reconnaissance zone throughout this phase of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN.

At 251400 Jan 70, an OH6A aircraft from Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav discovered and directed fire against a suspected enemy warehouse complex (YD338006). ARA and air strikes were employed, resulting in 16 NVA KIA.

Repositioning of forces commenced on 27 January in preparation for possible enemy action during the Tet season. Positions were assumed from which quick-reaction operations could be conducted against enemy attempts to harass the population of the lowlands. This repositioning culminated a division-wide program designed to increase security in the AO and prevent enemy acts of terrorism and sabotage and attacks on key GVN facilities and populated areas.

At 271840 Jan 70, an element of Co A, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf, assisting in the security of the resettlement area in Phong Dien District, observed

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three enemy while on an Eagle flight. The element inserted at YD545393 to engage the enemy, while a command and control aircraft (UH1H) illuminated the area with its landing lights. The aircraft was hit by enemy fire. The battalion artillery liaison officer was killed, and the S3 seriously wounded. A sweep of the area revealed two NVA KIA, one PW, one crew-served and three individual weapons captured.

(4) 28 January - 13 February 1970.

(a) The division's close-in security mission for the 1970 Tet period was completed during this period. Combined operations continued to improve the capabilities and increase the effectiveness of territorial forces. Reconnaissance-in-force operations were conducted to eliminate enemy presence in the Thua Thien lowlands and to restrict hostile infiltration and resupply.

(b) Significant Activities. AHG aircraft of Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, engaged five NVA at 011000 February (XD851647) while conducting reconnaissance in the 3d Bde AO and division recon zone, killing four NVA. At 1130 hours, gunships of Trp A located three more NVA at the same location and killed two by rocket fire.

The division-wide program of "Get Set for Tet" reached its peak when the division assumed a readiness posture to observe the Tet cease fire scheduled to begin at 1800 hours on 5 February. Division elements augmented territorial forces security efforts at key points along lines of communications and at critical target areas in Thua Thien Province.

At 070557 Feb 70, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf received small arms fire and eight RFG rounds from an enemy force of unknown size in the vicinity of YD652082. ARA was employed in support of the company. At 0710 hours, the company received rocket and mortar fire, followed an hour later by sniper fire as it was moving toward the suspected enemy location. Two NVA were killed, and nine US wounded during the contact.

At 100030, a squad from Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, while on an ambush, engaged nine NVA moving along a path at a distance of 25 meters (ZD182021). A sweep revealed three NVA killed and three AK47 rifles captured.

At 110100 Feb 70, the collocated battalion headquarters of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) at FSB Rifle received fifty to sixty 60mm mortar rounds from suspected enemy locations vicinity YC860967 and YC846975. Coordinated with the mortar attack was RFG fire from the southwest, followed by a sapper attack from the north. Satchel charges were detonated in bunkers along the US sector of the perimeter. The artillery battery and other key positions at the firebase were not reached by the enemy. Artillery and ARA were employed on the suspected

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mortar positions and on enemy routes of withdrawal. Eight US and one ARVN soldier were killed, and 12 US and three ARVN were wounded during the action. A first light check revealed 12 NVA bodies, five AK47 rifles, one .45 caliber pistol, and two RPG-2 launchers.

(5) 14 February - 2 March 1970.

(a) The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) continued Operation RANDOLPH GLEN with patrols and night ambushes in coordination with RF and PF units. Radar raids were conducted in the lowlands to detect enemy movement and provide targets to be engaged by artillery. River patrols around key bridges and populated areas restricted enemy use of inland waterways. US forces augmented GVN bridge security and continued to assist in the training of local forces to upgrade their effectiveness.

(b) Significant Activities. On 14 February, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, operating in the vicinity of YD440234, received RPG fire from an estimated NVA squad at 1445 hours. The element returned small arms fire at the suspected enemy location. A subsequent sweep revealed five NVA KIA and three abandoned AK47 rifles. At 1720 hours, gunships from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed and killed six NVA at XD863511.

The 2d Brigade opened two firebases on 16 February to provide additional artillery coverage for its AO. Co A, B, and D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from FSB Birmingham to conduct patrol and surveillance operations around FSB Spear. The firebase was opened at 1232 hours, with Co D tasked to provide security. Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf reopened FSB Normandy at 0936 hours and provided security for the battalion CP.

Twenty-six AH1G Cobras participated in an ARA raid flown against a target area southwest of FSB Leatherneck on 20 February. Areas adjacent to Route 616 were saturated with flechette and HE rockets.

At 221812 February 70, a Ranger team from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf, operating in the vicinity of XD863557, received small arms fire from 14 enemy at 40 meters. Return fire from the team resulted in six enemy KIA. Aircraft from the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav extracted the team at 1845 hours.

Continuing combined operations with GVN forces, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf provided one company and the battalion reconnaissance platoon to conduct an air assault in the vicinity of FB O'Reilly (XD345290) in coordination with the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN).

101st Aviation Group (Cmbt) (Ambl) supported the assault of the 3d Bn, 2d Regt and the HOC BAC (Recon) Co, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) into northern Quang

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Tri Province on 25 February.

At 261115 Feb 70, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav delivered fire on seven VC observed in a cave entrance. Gunships killed six of the VC and destroyed one AK47 rifle.

At 021500 March an OH6A aircraft of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was hit by enemy fire in the vicinity of coordinates YD370070 while flying a reconnaissance mission for the 3d Bde. Hostile fire wounded both the pilot and the enlisted observer. The pilot died, and the observer took control of the aircraft to fly it to Camp Sally. He crashed the aircraft attempting to land, resulting in injuries to the crew chief.

(6) 3 - 31 March 1970.

(a) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN continued to conclusion during this period, with the division conducting extensive patrolling, surveillance and ambush operations with a marked increase in activity. Close operational coordination with ARVN forces, training of territorial forces by divisional units, and radar and artillery raids were continued. Division engineers constructed a new firebase at YD439189 (FSB Granite) in the jungle area southwest of Camp Evans.

(b) Significant Activities. At 041500 Mar 70, the 2d Plt, Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf uncovered five bodies in a grave while conducting patrol activities at YD497231. A further search of the area revealed an additional six bodies.

At 080845 Mar 70, the 3d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf and a platoon of the 176th Co (RF) encountered five VC at 2D205047. Three VC rallied to the patrol and assisted in capturing the other two. All five were evacuated to Phu Loc national police headquarters for interrogation. The VC were unarmed and had been contacted earlier by covert GVN agents.

At 100555 March, the 3d plt, Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received small arms and RPG fire from an enemy force estimated to be a company. Artillery was employed, and a sweep was conducted with negative results. US casualties were six killed and 14 wounded. At 1410 hours, a Ranger team conducting a reconnaissance mission engaged a squad-size enemy unit at a distance of 15 meters. Results were four NVA KIA and one US KIA. The team was extracted at 1549 hours.

Gunships of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav killed 11 NVA on 42 March; Trp A killed seven at 1220 hours (XD935305), and C Trp killed four at 1635 hours (YD424076).

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FSB Pistol was opened on 14 March to provide fire support for operations in the Ruong Huong and Huu Trach Valleys. A combined assault by the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and the 2d Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) into the Ruong Huong Valley was followed by reconnaissance-in-force operations. At 1945 hours, the 2d Plt, Co C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf engaged eight enemy with organic weapons at coordinates YD410248. Satchel charges wounded two US during the contact. An early morning sweep revealed one enemy RPG launcher and two AK47 rifles.

At 200213 March, the company commander of Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf was checking the security of FSB Granite when he observed and shot a sniper on the northern part of the perimeter. At that time, a force of undetermined size attacked the firebase from the south. The attack was supported by mortar, RPG, small arms, and automatic weapons fire. Co C returned fire, supported by artillery direct and indirect fires. A first light check conducted after the withdrawal of the enemy revealed 16 NVA killed, four RPG launchers, and five AK47 rifles. 10 US were KIA and 31 WIA.

At 241035 Mar 70, A Trp, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav killed four NVA with gunship fire at YD410154.

At 271445 Mar and again at 1450 hours, an OH6A aircraft from Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav received a large volume of hostile fire at YC493858 but sustained no hits. ARA, artillery, and airstrikes were employed on the suspected enemy location, resulting in 21 NVA KIA and the destruction of one 12.7mm machine gun.

On 28 March, AMTG aircraft from the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed 10 enemy in a bunker complex at YD245360. The complex was engaged at 1410 hours, resulting in 16 NVA KIA.

FSB Granite was closed at 1535 hours 29 March by Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. FSB Gladiator (YD416211) was opened on the same day by the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf.

Division Operation RANDOLPH GLEN officially terminated at 312400 March, with infantry and artillery units repositioned to begin Operation TEXAS STAR.

12. (C) Results:

a. During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, the division prevented incursions by main force or NVA units into the populated areas, assisted in the attainment of major goals in the province pacification and development plan, increased the effectiveness of the RF, PF, and PSDF, and helped the

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people of Thua Thien Province move closer to a better way of life. The division not only accomplished its assigned mission, but also laid the foundation for an effective Vietnamese security system that will continue after the departure of the division. By conducting offensive combat operations on the periphery of the populated lowlands and limited objective and interdiction operations west of the piedmont, a protective shield was formed to permit the accelerated attainment of the goals of the pacification and development plan. Through combined operations and training, the forces of the Government of Vietnam progressed towards the goal of assuming full responsibility for combat, security, pacification, and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province.

b. Enemy losses:

(1) KIA (BC): 668 (547 NVA, 121 VC)

(2) PW: 19 (9 NVA, 10 VC)

(3) Hoi Chanh: 6

(4) Weapons Captured:

(a) Individual: 323

(b) Crew-served: 35

c. Friendly losses:

(1) US KIA: 123

(2) US WIA (evac): 163

(3) US WIA (minor): 84

(4) US MIA: 4*

d. Body to weapon ratio (enemy): 1:0.54

e. Enemy to friendly killed ratio: 5.4:1

13. (U) Administration: See Inclosure 5.

14. (U) Logistics: See Inclosure 6.

15. (U) Chemical: See Inclosure 7.

*Result of aircraft crash on 5 Feb 70; aircraft remains unlocated.

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16. (U) Civil Affairs: See Inclosure 8.
17. (U) Psychological Operations: See Inclosure 9.
18. (U) Communications: See Inclosure 10.
19. (U) Engineer: See Inclosure 11.
20. (U) Artillery: See Inclosure 12.
21. (U) Army Aviation: See Inclosure 13.
22. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Ground Defoliation. Enemy interdiction of the Hue-Da Nang Railroad continued to be an area of concern. In order to reduce this interdiction, a large scale defoliation project was undertaken. Diesel fuel sprayed from containers mounted on railroad flat cars was used to saturate the area along the tracks and was then burned to clear the brush. The enemy's ability to place booby traps along the track was effectively restricted.

b. Cave Seeding. To restrict the use of cave complexes, a cave seeding technique was used. Detonating cord was placed under bags of CS-1 and CS-2, which had been positioned throughout the complex, and detonated to spread the powder. The persistency of the riot control agent will vary from approximately three months to one year.

c. Radar Registrations. The AN/MPQ-4 radar has been used to conduct registrations for artillery units. In cases where artillery observers are not available, this type registration permits the unit to maintain current data for immediate fire for effect missions.

d. False Extraction. The division continued to use false extraction techniques to deceive the enemy. An aircraft with two personnel lying flat on the floor of the troop compartment entered a landing zone. All normal communications and procedures were followed for an extraction. As the aircraft departed, the two personnel sat up with one or both door gunners in the troop compartment. Deceived enemy forces were unprepared for stay-behind ambushes.

e. Deception During Resupply Missions. In order to deceive the enemy as to the location of friendly units, false kick-out resupply was effected. During normal resupply operations, weighted discarded C-ration cartons were dropped at false locations.

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f. Firefly. Use was made of an CH6A aircraft equipped with a locally developed, hand-held spot light, consisting of three CH6A landing lights mounted on a M16 rifle to permit the operator to point the light at the area being searched. This "Firefly" aircraft made periodic checks of the firebase perimeters during the hours of darkness and was employed after the execution of an ambush to search for dead or wounded enemy.

g. Dog Teams. Dog teams were used extensively to assist ground troops in detecting enemy personnel, booby traps, and to aid in search of tunnels and bunkers. They were employed effectively on ambush operations to give early warning of approaching enemy.

h. Hush Flare. Continued use was made of the Hush flare to provide extended periods of illumination around fire support base perimeters and on avenues of infiltration into base camps.

23. (C) Commander's Analysis:

a. General. Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was a radical departure from what has become the conventional approach to the US effort in Vietnam at division level. It was the first time the energy, resources, and good offices of an entire division were devoted to assisting in the pacification and development of a province. Preparation for this operation began as the division redeployed its forces from the A Shau Valley in September 1969. The division was assigned the mission at that time to establish, in coordination with 1st Inf Div (ARVN), a belt of security on the periphery of the populated area of Thua Thien Province and, on order, to assume responsibility for an expanded area of operation, including western Quang Tri Province. Further, the division was tasked to screen the standdown and redeployment of the 3d Marine Division from Quang Tri Province. These tasks were accomplished during Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE (29 September - 6 December 1969), as previously reported. During REPUBLIC SQUARE it became clear that the division had achieved a concert in method and effort with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) in accomplishing its initial mission to engage and defeat the enemy and protect the population. It became equally clear, however, that it was urgently necessary to achieve a similar concert in method and effort with Thua Thien Province if the goal of accelerated attainment of the pacification and development objectives for 1970 was to be realized.

b. Planning. The operations order for Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (OPORD 13-69) was written as the Combined Objectives Campaign Plan for Thua Thien Province. The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province both published operations orders and other instructions outlining the same concept and issued coordinated directives to subordinate units effective the same day

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as the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) OPORD for RANDOLPH GLEN. To achieve this degree of integration required careful planning and deliberately timed briefings for the key personnel involved. After briefing and receiving approval of the concept from the Commanding General, XIIIV Corps, the concept was presented to Major General Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General, 1st Inf Div (ARVN). Once his concurrence with the concept had been obtained, the two division staffs prepared the detailed, coordinated plans for integrating the efforts of both divisions. The concept was then presented to the Thua Thien Province Chief, Colonel Le Van Than and the Province Senior Advisor, Colonel John W. Chism. Both Colonel Than and Colonel Chism enthusiastically supported the concept, and the province/sector staff, CORDS personnel, and members of the division staff prepared the detailed implementing plans. To assist in maintaining continuity during the execution of the plan, an informal Area Coordination Committee was established, as outlined in paragraph 11a, above.

c. Execution.

(1) Operations in coordination with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) continued as during Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE, with some minor adjustment of boundaries and troop dispositions. The most significant technique for coordinating the efforts of the two divisions during the execution phase was the alignment of brigade and regimental boundaries, which were further aligned with political (district) boundaries. The brigade/regimental areas of operations were then divided into lettered battalion areas of operation. Forces were assigned to these lettered areas based on their availability as opposed to their nationality.

(2) Activities in the lowlands were monitored by establishing liaison with each district headquarters, employing a full time liaison team with dedicated communications. In both Phu Loc and Phong Dien districts, areas where VCI activity had been greatest, a dedicated battalion was employed. The intent was to assign an infantry battalion to a specified district on a long term (dedicated) basis. The battalion headquarters were each collocated with the respective district headquarters. This system has proven to be an extremely effective technique for upgrading the command, control, staff and coordination capability of the district headquarters. Notable improvement has been made in this regard, particularly in Phong Dien. At division level, staff coordination with province and CORDS officials was continuous, resulting in the establishment of a relationship that permitted the frank exchange of ideas and the employment of division resources within a framework of priorities established by the Vietnamese.

(3) Beyond the brigade and regimental operations zone and in the brigade area of operations was the brigade/regimental patrol and surveillance zone (area between lines GREEN and BLUE, Inclosure 2, Area of Operations). In this area, the brigades and counterpart ARVN regiments conducted extensive reconnaissance patrols, established detailed aerial reconnaissance plans, monitored sensor activity in the area, and conducted short duration,

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airmobile operations to disrupt and destroy enemy forces and to preempt the enemy's ability to interfere with pacification and development operations in the lowlands. To the south and west of the brigade/regimental patrol and surveillance zone, was the division reconnaissance zone, an area assigned to the division air cavalry squadron. Each brigade was responsible for monitoring the activity in a specific portion of the reconnaissance zone, and for preparing for implementation on order, contingency plans for the conduct of short duration, airmobile operations against hard intelligence targets developed. Reaction to intelligence in this area was often hampered by weather and was frequently limited to the employment of firepower. The artillery raid proved to be a valuable technique for bringing fire on the enemy in areas thought by him to be out of artillery range.

d. Problem Areas. The only significant problem encountered, and one which requires more work and effort to resolve, is that of measurement of progress. It is recognized that this problem has been addressed at every level since the beginning of our effort in Vietnam. It is one that continues. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) report is an excellent management tool, particularly the systems-oriented 1970 HES program. Even this system, however, cannot quantify the new hope evidenced in the return to normalcy of a significant portion of the population of Thua Thien Province. Nor can the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) for Regional and Popular Forces reflect the increase in spirit and determination evidenced by a RF Company upon returning from a combined operation in the piedmont or the fringes of the jungle canopy with a US unit. Measurement against absolutes are not meaningful. The division therefore used as a starting point the goals established in the Thua Thien Province 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. Each of these goals, except in the Chieu Hoi program, is being met or exceeded. Schools have been built, land fallow for years is now under cultivation, roads have been built or improved, wells dug, and refugees resettled. Assistance has been provided to the province in relocating and significantly upgrading the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistics Center. This has had a marked influence on the effectiveness of the Regional and Popular Forces, on the efficiency of the district headquarters, and the effectiveness of the Village-Hamlet Radio System supported by this center. These tangible accomplishments can be tabulated and reported. It is more difficult to measure and report accurately the discernible fact that the net result of this coordinated effort is greater than the sum of the separately identified components.

e. Lessons Learned.

(1) Coordination. The most significant lesson learned during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN is that of the complexity of the US effort in support of the Republic of Vietnam. The interrelationship of the three basic tasks of

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internal defense or counterinsurgency operations, territorial security, populace and resources control, and environmental improvement, have been brought into sharp focus during this operation. The airmobile division is designed, organized, trained, and equipped to best handle tasks associated with territorial security, locating and defeating the enemy. The division has had that task since arrival in Vietnam. It has been in the orchestration of this task with the efforts of ARVN, territorial forces, police, intelligence agencies, and civil administrators that a new dimension has been added to the division's grasp of the total requirement. Each operation planned and conducted by the division has been subjected to the question "How does this operation support the attainment of the pacification and development plan?" It is recognized that pacification and development cannot proceed when the populace is threatened with terrorism, NVA incursions, or major attacks. The effort required to assist in coordinating the activities behind the established shield of security is equally important, as is the effort required to train the territorial forces to provide their own security.

(2) Roads. The importance to an agrarian economy of farm to market roads has been long recognized. This lesson has again been relearned by the division during Operation RANDOLPH GLEW. No other civic action project or activity captures the imagination and interest of the people and the local administrators as does a road building or upgrading project. The most consistent and urgent requests for civic action assistance have been for road construction. This interest extends from the individual villager, who often turns out voluntarily to assist US and Vietnamese engineers, to the province chief. It is strongly recommended that the importance of these rural lines of communication, often requiring the passage of 3/4 ton or Lambretta-type traffic only, be acknowledged at the level where engineer assets are allocated. Engineer support for these projects is now limited to that which can be gleaned as civic action assistance from combat support or approved construction projects. The construction of these important links between the government and the people is at least as important to the accomplishment of our broader mission as combat support projects. Resources allocated and priorities assigned should be based on a recognition of this fact.

(3) Detailed analysis of each area is required. Thua Thien Province has a fairly homogeneous population of approximately 600,000 persons living in the ten rural districts and in the city of Hue. The division has learned that, while in the broader sense there is a certain commonality of strengths and weaknesses in the districts, each hamlet, village, and district is different. Each has its own peculiar set of problem areas and vulnerabilities. This requires a detailed analysis of each area and a recognition that there are no panaceas. One area may need assistance from US forces for security,

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while another needs assistance in training territorial forces already available or in building a school or market. Without a detailed analysis to determine what is needed, assistance provided may prove to be counterproductive.

13 Incl

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2. Area of Operation
3. Intelligence
4. Territorial Forces
5. Personnel and Administration
6. Logistics
7. Chemical
8. Civil Affairs
9. Psychological Operations
10. Communications
11. Engineer
12. Artillery
13. Army Aviation

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Inclosure 1 (Task Organization) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLASS, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) MACJ3-32 (R2)
(U)

1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Abl)

HHC, 1st Bde
1-327th Inf (15 Dec - 17 Jan)
(26 Jan - 17 Mar)
2-327th Inf
2-502d Inf (7 Dec - 17 Jan)
(26 Jan - 31 Mar)
1-501st Inf (18 Dec - 21 Dec)
2-320th Arty (-) (DS)
A/326th Engr (DS)
1st FSSE (DS)
A/326th Med Bn
B/801st Maint Bn
Fed Spt Plt/A/426th S&S Bn
1/265th HRC
1/101st MP Co
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (DS)
TACP 20 TASS
42d Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
Team 101st MI Co

3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Abl)

HHC, 3d Bde
1-327th Inf (18 Mar - 31 Mar)
1-501st Inf (2 Jan - 10 Jan)
(12 Jan - 27 Jan)
2-506th Inf (10 Dec - 31 Mar)
1-187th Inf
1-506th Inf
2-319th Arty (DS)
B/326th Engr (DS)
3d FSSE (DS)
C/326th Med Bn
D/801st Maint Bn
Fed Spt Plt/A/426th S&S Bn
3/265th HRC
3/101st MP Co
58th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
Team 101st MI Co
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (DS)
TACP 20 TASS
34th FI Det (Field Service)
Cbt Weather Team
5th Weather Det

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Abl)

HHC, 2d Bde
1-327th Inf (7 Dec - 14 Dec)
(18 Jan - 25 Jan)
2-502d Inf (18 Jan - 25 Jan)
1-501st Inf (7 Dec - 17 Dec)
(22 Dec - 2 Jan)
(11 Jan)
(28 Jan - 31 Mar)
2-501st Inf
1-502d Inf
2-506th Inf (7 Dec - 9 Dec)
1-321st Arty (DS)
C/326th Engr (DS)
2d FSSE (DS)
B/326th Med Bn
C/801st Maint Bn
Fed Spt Plt/A/426th S&S Bn
2/265th HRC
2/101st MP Co
47th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
Team 101st MI Co
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (DS)
TACP 20 TASS
25th FI Det (Field Service)
Cbt Weather Team
5th Weather Det

101st Abn Div Arty (Abl)

HHC, 101st Abn Div Arty
2-11th Arty
4-77th Arty (ARA)
268th Trans Det (Aoft Maint)
331st Trans Det (Aoft Maint)
388th Trans Det (Aoft Maint)
A Btry (Avn) 377th Arty
650th Trans Det (Aoft Maint)
266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)

Task Force 3-506th Inf
(OPCON 173d Abn Bde, LZ English)

D/2-320th Arty (DS)
Plt/Hq/326th Engr Bn

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(S)

101st Aviation Group

HHC, 101st Avn Gp
101st AHB (-)
 499th Trans Det
 510th Trans Det
 516th Trans Det
 527th Trans Det
158th AHB
 159th Trans Det
 168th Trans Det
 273d Trans Det
 169th Trans Det
159th AHB
 625th Trans Det
 327th Trans Det
 649th Trans Det
 478th Avn Co (-)
163d Avn Co
 530th Trans Det
359th Avn Spt Det

Division Troops

HHC, 101st Avn Div (Ambl)
2-17th Cav
 Trp F (Provisional), 2-17th Cav (Note 1)
 Co L (Ranger) 75th Inf
 332d Trans Det
 33d Trans Det
 507th Trans Det
 326th Engr Bn (-)
 501st Sig Bn (-)
 101st MP Co (-)
 557th Inf Plt (Cbt Tracker)
 265th ERC (-)
 10th Cml Plt
 20th Cml Det
 22d Mil Hist Det
 101st MI Co (-)
Operating Location 6
 5th Weather Det (-) (USAF)
 20th TASS (USAF)

Division Support Command

HHC and Band
5th Trans Bn (Aircraft Maint & Supply)
326th Med Bn (-)
426th S&S Bn (-)
901st Maint Bn (-)
SCOP (-) 501st Sig Bn (DS)
101st Admin Co

Note 1: Troop F was organized from assets of Company A, 101st Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) (Ambl) on 16 December 1969 by division general order. The troop was inactivated on 12 March 1970 and reverted back to an assault helicopter company.


Note 2: The division worked in close cooperation and coordination with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and with the Regional and Popular Force units of Thua Thien Province. The 1st Brigade and the 54th Infantry Regiment (ARVN), the 2d Brigade and the 3d Infantry Regiment (ARVN), and the 3d Brigade and the 1st and 2d Infantry Regiments (ARVN) were normally conducting combined operations with forces integrated at battalion level and below. Division Support Command and Division Artillery worked closely with their counterpart units.

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Inclosure 2 (Area of Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation RUMOLDI GALT, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).
IACFJ-32 (R) (U)

7. Sketch : Division Area of Operation (7 December 1969-18 February 1970) taken from map, Vietnam, 1:250,000.



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Malware (Type of Operation) to Conduct Operations Action
Action Report, Operation REVENGE (C) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Division (Malware) (C) [REDACTED] (C) [REDACTED]

2. Sketch: Division Area of Operation (10 February - 31 March 1970) taken from Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000.



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Inclosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV 3-32 (R2) (U)

Salient (YD0027) into western Thua Thien Province. National Highway 9 (YD0757), paralleling the DMZ, is an all-weather paved road from Dong Ha to FB Vandergrift, and a fair weather dirt road from FB Vandergrift to the Laotian border, suitable for tracked and wheeled vehicles its entire length. National Highway 1 is the main LOC in the area, leading from Dong Ha through Quang Tri to Hue. The Dong Ha airfield at YD243597 and Quang Tri airfield at YD3352 are all-weather airstrips capable of handling C130 aircraft. A seasonal airfield is located at YD094515. Vandergrift Combat Base (YD0049) (now inactive) is astride Highway 9 at the northern reaches of the Ba Long Valley. Dong Da Mountain (YD0159) (FSB Fuller) overlooks Highway 9 north of the Cam Lo River. The Cam Lo River is another major LOC which flows into the Qua Viet River in the lowlands. Hill 691, FB Gates (YD926443) overlooks the Da Krong Valley, Highway 9, and the Khe Sanh Plain, all of which are along major enemy infiltration routes from Laos. Dong Ha and Quang Tri cities are major population centers. Bridges along QL1 and QL9 are particularly important terrain features. The destruction of selected bridges would effectively interdict these major LOC.

1. (U) WEATHER.

a. December 1969: December was an unusually dry month for the northeast monsoon season. Rainfall totals were below normal and ranged from $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches in the northern sector of the AO to $7\frac{1}{2}$ inches in the southern sector of the AO. Rainfall fell on 19 days during the month, which is higher than average. December experienced normal amounts of cloudiness and visibility restrictions. Ceilings below 1500 feet and/or visibilities of less than 3 miles occurred on 18 days. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities of less than $\frac{1}{2}$ mile occurred on five days. The average high temperature in December, 72°F , was lower than the mean. The average low temperature was 65°F , which is the climatological mean for December.

b. January 1970: January was a typical month. Rainfall totals were just below the monthly mean. Precipitation fell on 19 days, which is slightly more than average, with a total accumulation of 6 inches. A trace of precipitation fell on another three days. Cloudiness and visibility restrictions were as predicted by climatological studies. Ceilings below 1500 feet and/or visibilities of less than 3 miles occurred on 20 days. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities of less than $\frac{1}{2}$ mile occurred on four days. The temperatures during January were exactly at the climatological mean. The average high temperature was 73°F and the average low 64°F .

c. February 1970: The weather during February 1970 was typical of the last full month of the northeast monsoon. Rainfall occurred on more days than average. The total rainfall for the month, however, was below the mean. Precipitation was measured on 12 days during February, and a trace was observed on two additional days. The total rainfall for the month was approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches. The ceilings and visibilities were typical for February. Ceilings and/or visibilities below 1500 feet and three miles occurred on 18 days. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities of less than $\frac{1}{2}$ mile were

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Inclosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH CREEK, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32 (R2) (U)

reported on 8 days. Fog formed almost every day this month. Temperatures were very close to the monthly February mean. The average high temperature was 76°F and the average low 64°F.

d. March 1970: During March, the total rainfall was far below the average. However, precipitation fell on more days than the mean. The total rainfall measured 1½ inches and occurred on 11 days with a trace recorded on another five days. Only one thunderstorm was reported. Cloudiness and visibility restrictions occurred on more days than normal. Ceilings below 1500 feet and/or visibilities of less than 3 miles were observed on 24 days this month. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities less than ½ mile occurred on 4 days. Fog was reported on 14 days. Temperatures were very close to the March mean. The average high temperature was 79°F, and the average low temperature was 69°F.

3. (C) ENEMY SITUATION:

a. General

(1) Throughout Thua Thien (P), the enemy increased logistical infiltration and established forward staging areas in the central canyon region. Intelligence indicated enemy activity concentrated along the Laotian border vicinity Base Area 611, the A Shau Valley, and the Vietnamese-Laotian salient areas. The 5th and 6th NVA regiments relocated to areas suitable for supporting operations in the lowlands. Following their eastward deployment, the NVA initiated attacks by fire and limited ground attacks on Allied fire support bases and other sensitive installations. Agent reports and captured documents located sizeable elements of the 29th NVA Regiment east of the A Shau Valley. There was substantial evidence that elements of the 803d NVA Regiment also moved eastward into the A Shau Valley to establish lines of communication and anti-aircraft sites. Phong Dien, Huong Tra, and Phu Loc districts were the principal areas of enemy interest in the lowlands. Interruption of National Highway 1 and the Hue-De Nang Railroad remained of primary importance to enemy forces operating in these areas. Activity in central Thua Thien (P) was characterized by small "cell" groups of 3 to 5 individuals attempting to collect rice in the Huong Thuy, Huong Tra, and Phong Dien district areas of the piedmont region.

(2) In Quang Tri (P), enemy elements along the DMZ made sizeable incursions to the south, while conducting harassing attacks against Allied installations. The enemy was deployed generally throughout the DMZ with reconnaissance and artillery forces. Forward elements of the 304th NVA Division, B-5 Front, infiltrated into western Quang Tri (P), using QL9 as a resupply route. Naval sapper units repeatedly mined the Con Viet River in an attempt to interdict Allied shipping. In southern Quang Tri (P), the 7th Front was located west of former Base Area 101. Ranger patrols operating in that area encountered intense small arm fire and had to be extracted. Photo and visual

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Inclosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV-32 (R2) (U)

reconnaissance missions consistently detected signs of vehicular activity in the Vietnamese Salient and northern A Shau Valley. The enemy employed engineers and bulldozers to repair roads and bridges interdicted by Allied air strikes.

b. Enemy locations at the beginning of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
MAIN	Vic Base Area 611
675th Arty Regt	Vic Base Area 611
Hq, 324th Division	Vic Base Area 611
290th Inf Regt	Vic Base Area 611
609th Inf Regt	Vic Base Area 611
612th Inf Regt	Unlocated
Hq, 7th NVA Front	YD2526
608th Inf Bn	YD2531
614th Inf Bn	YD2536
K10 Sapper Bn	YD1921
K11 Sapper Bn	YD2545
K24 Arty Bn	YD2547
6th Inf Regt	YD2509
600th Inf Bn	YD1812
601st Inf Bn	YD2509
602nd Inf Bn	YD2545
712 Sapper Bn	YD2510
K35 Arty Bn	YD6713
5th Inf Regt	Vic Base Area 607 (YD2512)
604th Inf Bn	YD2524

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Inclosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV 3-32 (R2) (U)

UNIT

LOCATION

810th Inf Bn	YD4503
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn	Vic Base Area 607 (YC5075)
Chi Thua II Sapper Bn	Vic Base Area 607 (YC5075)
K32 Arty Bn	Vic YC7391
4th Inf Regt	Z00893
K4B Inf Bn	ZD1695
K4C Inf Bn	Vic Z00692
9th Inf Regt (Independent)	Unlocated
C113 LF Co	YD4033
C114 LF Co	YD5124
C115 LF Co	YD6925
C116 LF Co	YD8222
Phu Yang Special Action Unit (PVSAU)	YD9419
Hq Hme City Recon Bn	YD6318
Phu Lo Armed Bn (PLAB)	ZC1495
B5 Front	XD9276
308 (325) NVA Division	Unlocated
304 NVA Division	Unlocated
246th Inf Regt	XD9391
27th Inf Regt	Vic YD0765
270th Inf Regt	YD1506
248 Inf Regt	XD6767
31st Inf Regt	Vic YD1172

3.2

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Inclosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32 (R2) (U)

UNIT

LOCATION

126th Naval Sapper Regt

YD2259

84th Arty Regt

Along DMZ

4. (C) NVA/MAIN FORCE ACTIVITY: The 101st Abn Div (Abnl) was deployed to provide maximum protection for the populated lowlands and react to hard intelligence in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Significant activity from 7 December 1969 through 31 March 1970 was as follows:

a. In December 1969, the 24B Regiment, 304th NVA Division, was reported to have moved into the northwest quadrant of Quang Tri (P). Although this unit was not contacted, there was evidence that a large base camp or staging area was being constructed.

b. On 4 and 6 January 1970, ARVN forces engaged an estimated company-sized enemy force at YD050632 and YD055653, resulting in a total of 47 enemy KIA and one PW, who identified his unit as the 2d Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment.

c. On 21 January 1970, vicinity YD5209, 2d Co, 2d Bn, 3d ARVN Regt captured 100 60mm mortar rounds and documents confirming the presence of the 810th Battalion, 5th NVA Regiment.

d. On 29 January 1970, vicinity YD5407, Recon Plt, 2d Bn (Abnl), 501st Inf contacted elements of the 7th Bn, 29th NVA Regt, confirming the forward deployment of this regiment from Base Area 611.

e. On 31 January 1970, FB Birmingham received three 122mm rockets.

f. On 31 January and 1 February 1970, vicinity YD053636 and YD063633, ARVN forces engaged an unknown-sized enemy force, resulting in 93 enemy KIA, identified as elements of the 1st Bn, 27th NVA Regt.

g. On 6 February 1970, FB Bastogne received 25 to 30 RPG rockets, with no damage. Documents captured later in the month identified the attacking force as the 439th Bn, 5th NVA Regt.

h. On 9 February 1970, FB Birmingham received four 122mm rockets, with no damage.

i. On 11 February 1970, FB Rifle received 50 to 60 60mm mortar rounds, followed by a sapper attack, which succeeded in penetrating the perimeter, resulting in eight US and one ARVN KIA, and 12 NVA sappers KIA. Documents captured after the attack identified the attacking force as the Chi Thua I Sapper Battalion, 5th NVA Front.

j. On 22 February 1970, northeast of FB Barbara, 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st ARVN Regt engaged an unknown-sized enemy force, resulting in 22 NVA KIA and

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Enclosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLIDE, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32 (R2) (U)

the capture of two complete 60mm mortars, 120 60mm mortar rounds, 142 RPG rockets, 50 stick grenades, 12 Chinese Claymore mines, 100 cases of AK ammunition, and other miscellaneous items. Captured documents identified this unit as a forward tactical command post of the 7th NVA Front.

k. On 24 February 1970, four kilometers north of FB Veghel, 3d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Infantry received 10 60mm mortar rounds, with negative results.

l. On 25 February 1970, LZ Anne received six 122mm rockets, with negative results.

m. On 26 February 1970, vicinity XD9061, a PW was captured, who stated that he was from the 3d Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment. A second PW captured in the same area stated that the 3d Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment was to create a diversion and provide support, while the 1st and 2d Battalions conducted attacks in the FB Fuller and Camp Carroll areas. He also stated that attacks were to occur against the Khe Gio Bridge and QL9. On 26 February 1970, ARVN forces located at the Khe Gio Bridge received from 1 to 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

n. On 27 February 1970, vicinity XD9061, ARVN forces received 110 82mm mortar rounds in conjunction with a ground attack.

o. During early March 1970, in an area southwest to FB Rakkasan and northwest of FB Veghel, there were numerous enemy-initiated ground contacts and attack by fire, probably attributable to elements of the 6th and 29th NVA Regiments.

p. Beginning on 12 March 1970, in an area west of FB Ripcord, there was an increasing number of ground contacts and attacks by fire against friendly forces.

q. On 14 March 1970, Camp Eagle received 12 122mm rockets with light casualties and damage.

r. On 20 March 1970, FB Granite (XD430189) was attacked by a company-sized enemy force using RPGs, mortars, satchel charges, and small arms fire. The enemy damaged three mortar tubes and one bulldozer, along with 10 US KIA and 31 WIA. Enemy casualties were 16 NVA KIA.

5. (C) VC/VCI ACTIVITY: VC/VCI activity consisted primarily of rice collection, distribution of propaganda leaflets, and attempts to strengthen the weakened political infrastructure. Captured documents and PW indicate that guerrilla forces have been involved in training, while waiting for the spring rice harvest. In Quang Tri (P), Viet Cong have been reported receiving sapper training from NVA personnel of the 7th Front. Intelligence indicates that the NVA are reinforcing local force units and VCI cadre in the lowlands. The primary objective of the enemy continues to be to disrupt the Allied pacification effort and discredit GVN ability to secure the populated areas.

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Inlosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV-32 (B2) (U)

6. (C) SUMMARY:

a. Enemy results during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were as follows:

	<u>US</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
KIA	668	418	74
PW	19	17	12
HC	6	4	12
TWC	323	234	146
CSWC	35	18	8

b. The most significant accomplishment of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was the increased security provided the populace and resulting denial of enemy rice collection efforts in the coastal lowlands. Captured enemy documents and agent reports revealed that the NVA were no longer able to obtain rice from the local Viet Cong, but rather were forced to transport supplies from North Vietnam. Local force units, such as the Phu Vang Special Action Unit (PVSAG), were rendered combat ineffective as a result of Allied cordon operations and saturation ambushes in the lowlands.

c. Enemy locations at the close of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
UNIT	Vic Base Area 611
675th Arty Regt	Vic Base Area 611
HQ, 324th Division	Vic Base Area 611
29th Inf Regt	Base Area 611
803d Inf Regt	Base Area 611
812th Inf Regt	ID0023
HQ, 7th NVA Front	ID1931
808th Inf Bn	ID2251
814th Inf Bn	ID3737
K10 Sapper Bn	ID3133
K11 Sapper Bn	ID2842
K34 Arty Bn	ID2636

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Enclosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
RANDELMAN GLASS, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV-32 (R2) (U)

UNIT

LOCATION

K12 Trans Bn	ID1327
6th Inf Regt	ID216
800th Inf Bn	ID3022
802d Inf Bn	ID2010
806th Inf Bn	ID3320
K12 Sapper Bn	ID3423
K35 Arty Regt	ID3620
5th Inf Regt	YC5282
804th Inf Bn	YC8195
810th Inf Bn	ID5715
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn	YC6282
Chi Thua II Sapper Bn	YC6383
K32 Arty Bn	YC7299
4th Inf Regt	YC9781
K4B Inf Bn	ZC1896
K4C Inf Bn	ZC0193
71st Sapper Co	ID9704
C113 LF Co	ID4134
C114 LF Co	ID4724
C115 LF Co	ID6614
C116 LF Co	ID8304

Pim Vang Special Action Unit(PVSAU) Unlocated

B2 Hue City Recon Bn ID6514

Pim Loc Armed Bn (PLAB) ZC1095

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Enclosure 3 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
RANDOLPH CLEW, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ-32 (R2) (U)

UNIT

LOCATION

B5 Front	ID9276
304 NVA Division	ID8438
246th Inf Bgt	ID9371
27th Inf Bgt	ID0668
270th Inf Bgt	ID1986
31st Inf Bgt	ID1185
126th Naval Sapper Bgt	ID2369
84th Arty Bgt	ID9374
52d Bgt	ID6765
36th Bgt	ID0687

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Inclosure 4 (Territorial Forces) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV-32
(R2) (U)

1. (U) During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, combined operations with and training of territorial forces were emphasized in order to upgrade the ability of these forces to provide security for the population of Thua Thien Province. The dedicated battalions and MTs of the 101st Abn Div (Amb) participated in 86 company size, 368 platoon size, and 1413 squad size combined operations. These combined operations consisted primarily of patrols, night ambushes, and cordon operations in the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province. In addition, several RF companies conducted combined operations in close coordination with US units into the jungle canopy, remaining there for several days at a time.

2. (U) The intensive training program initiated during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN provided training in basic military skills to a large number of territorial forces. The dedicated battalions located in Phu Loc and Phong Dien districts conducted training for 27 RF companies and 10 PF platoons. The brigade MT, operating throughout the populated lowlands, conducted training for 2 RF companies, 42 PF platoons, and 1971 members of the PSDP.

3. (U) MACV mobile advisory teams (MAT) trained 24 RF companies, approximately 45 PF platoons, and approximately 1500 PSDP during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. USMC Combined Action Platoons (CAP) trained 42 PF platoons during the same period. There was some duplication of these programs with the training activities of the 101st Abn Div (Amb). However, it was minimal and beneficial to the combat effectiveness of the units trained.

4. (U) Definite improvement was noted in the combat effectiveness of territorial forces which operated with and received training from elements of the division. This training effort was a valuable supplement to the territorial forces training programs conducted by Vietnamese units and agencies.

5. (U) At Appendix I is depicted the number of territorial forces deployed in each district of Thua Thien Province at the beginning and end of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. The goal for disposition of territorial forces has been the assignment of local home and hamlet defense to PSDP, where possible, to free PF platoons for static security missions on major lines of communication, district headquarters, and other key installations. This, in turn, frees RF companies for extended patrol and surveillance operations on the periphery of the populated areas.

Appendix I - Territorial Forces Distribution

Incl 4

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APPENDIX I, TERRITORIAL FORCES DISTRIBUTION, THUA THIEN PROVINCE TO ENCLOSURE 4
TO AFTER ACTION REPORT (OPERATION RANDOLPH GLEN)
101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE), MACJ 3-32 (R2)(U)

DISTRICT	MP CO GP		MP CO		PF PLY		CRS			P8DF (INDIVIDUALS)			ARMED		WPPF		APTS	HOTEL ROOMS	PRU
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)			
PHU LAC	2	2	0	0	10	20	0200	0001	2220	2220	2220	2220	2220	2220	24	48	10	2	12
PHU LAC	0	0	0	0	16	17	3046	3338	2027	2027	2027	2027	2027	2027	20	0	0	1	0
PHU THU	1	1	7	7	11	12	3160	3210	341	341	341	341	341	341	0	48	10	1	12
PHU THU	1	1	0	0	23	28	0000	0000	0130	0130	0130	0130	0130	0130	20	48	7	1	0
PHU THU	0	1	0	0	24	26	0477	10101	0077	0077	0077	0077	0077	0077	21	48	0	1	0
PHU VANG	0	0	1	1	10	23	07301	07301	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0	44	7	1	0
PHU VANG	0	0	1	1	0	0	070	070	070	070	070	070	070	070	12	48	0	1	0
PHU VANG	0	0	2	2	21	24	2022	11000	2200	2477	2477	2477	2477	2477	0	48	0	1	10
PHU VANG	2	1	10	6	10	10	2000	4154	1020	1020	1020	1020	1020	1020	32	48	11	1	14
PHU VANG	0	0	1	1	10	10	2103	1504	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400	0	0	0	1	4
PHU	0	0	1	1	0	0	10040	10009	0000	0222	0557	0557	0557	0557	04	04	04	1 PLY	20
THE CENTER			1	1	3	3													
TOTAL	0	0	42	43	100	100	03000	07207	37204	37204	37204	37204	37204	37204	414	422	101	1 PLY 11 ROOMS	102

(1) AS OF 7 DEC 60
(2) AS OF 2 MAR 70

M - ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS
M - PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT
FIGURES SHOWN ARE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL

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Inclosure 5 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACVJ-32
(12) (U).

1. (C) Unit Strengths.

a. Strengths as of 7 December 1969:

UNIT	OFFICERS			WARRANT OFFICERS			ENLISTED MEN		
	AUTH	ASG	PYD	AUTH	ASG	PYD	AUTH	ASG	PYD
HHC, 1 Bde	26	38	38	18	17	14	186	239	231
1/327	43	38	37	2	2	2	875	798	755
2/327	43	40	39	2	1	1	875	806	766
2/302	43	42	42	2	2	1	875	784	742
HHC, 2 Bde	26	29	29	18	11	10	186	205	197
1/501	43	40	40	2	2	2	875	806	778
2/501	43	47	47	2	2	2	875	819	790
1/502	43	42	41	2	2	2	875	810	769
HHC, 3 Bde	26	28	21	18	15	14	186	198	154
1/506	43	42	41	2	2	2	875	811	758
2/506	43	40	39	2	2	2	875	824	781
3/187	43	47	45	2	1	1	875	833	757
HHB DIVARTY	24	28	28	3	4	4	135	137	120
2/11	37	23	28	6	3	3	555	503	474
4/77	56	55	53	55	56	53	505	488	460
2/319	43	43	41	2	1	1	391	355	342
2/320	52	51	50	2	1	1	479	412	389
1/321	43	42	42	2	1	1	391	338	326
HBIC 101 Gp	37	38	37	2	7	7	184	207	201
101 Avn	63	70	66	124	114	111	653	671	642
158 Avn	63	77	73	124	123	116	681	648	644
159 Avn	44	45	41	83	62	57	679	677	627
HHC, DISCOM	27	25	23	2	2	2	134	162	154
5 TC	27	26	26	21	19	14	531	521	499
326 Med	54	43	42	15	13	12	311	341	329
426 S&S	26	19	17	7	6	6	448	430	454
801 Maint	22	17	17	4	4	4	311	345	321

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Inclosure 5 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH CREEK, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ3-32
(R2) (J)

Div Trp	62	88	77	1	2	2	132	178	166
HHC Div	81	90	84	99	100	94	859	912	856
2/17	9	7	7	2	2	2	178	199	190
101 MP	36	35	32	2	2	2	583	672	632
326 Engr	15	11	11	4	4	4	380	371	353
501 Sig									

b. Strengths as of 31 March 1970:

UNIT	OFFICERS			WARRANT OFFICERS			ENLISTED MEN		
	AUTH	ASG	PFD	AUTH	ASG	PFD	AUTH	ASG	PFD
HHC, 1Bde	26	34	32	18	13	11	186	226	221
1/317	43	44	41	2	2	2	875	863	815
2/327	43	45	43	2	2	2	875	846	792
2/502	43	47	47	2	2	2	875	876	818
HHC, 2 Bde	26	34	33	18	12	11	186	202	185
1/501	43	47	46	2	2	2	875	866	796
2/501	43	43	43	2	2	2	875	887	823
1/502	43	46	42	2	2	2	875	880	830
HHC, 3 Bde	26	39	37	18	15	15	186	216	203
1/506	43	43	39	2	2	2	875	836	771
2/506	43	38	35	2	2	2	875	879	779
3/187	43	43	39	2	2	2	875	871	829
H&B DIVARTY	24	26	25	3	4	4	135	145	140
2/11	37	33	30	6	3	3	555	553	526
4/77	56	49	49	55	50	47	505	441	406
2/319	42	46	44	2	1	1	391	407	388
2/320	50	52	51	2	2	2	479	478	461
1/321	42	43	42	2	-	-	391	433	408
HHC, 101 Gp	37	38	36	2	7	7	184	226	216
101 Avn	63	60	60	124	88	84	653	591	553
158 Avn	63	68	63	124	89	85	653	615	590
159 Avn	44	49	48	83	61	59	677	678	651
HHC, DISCOM	27	26	24	2	2	2	134	181	174
5 TC	27	24	23	21	15	15	534	504	466
326 Med	54	48	48	15	11	11	311	313	297
426 S&S	26	24	23	7	6	5	448	447	422
801 Maint	22	19	19	3	5	5	325	354	331

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Inclosure 5 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ3-32
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Div Trip									
HHC Div	62	82	76	1	2	2	132	223	218
2/17 Cav	81	59	59	99	92	87	859	871	821
101 MP	9	6	6	2	2	1	178	206	197
326 Engr	36	34	32	2	2	1	583	587	556
501 Sig	15	12	12	4	3	3	380	366	357

2. (U) Other aspects.

a. AG. There were no significant problems encountered by the adjutant general during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. Replacement and rotation processing continued in the normal manner, except during the pre-TET period, when a significant number of replacements were averted by air from the Eagle Personnel Center to SMPTB. During the period 20 January 1970 to 16 February 1970, the division rest center, Eagle Beach, was closed as part of the "Get Set for TET" program. Extensive maintenance and rehabilitative work was performed during this period.

b. PMD

(1) During the period of this report, the 101 Military Police Company provided security escorts for division units performing cordon operations. Three escort missions were provided for 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, and one for 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf. The escort mission was from Camp Eagle to dismount points and the provision of security for the return of the empty vehicles. This mission was accomplished by the use of military police $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with mounted machineguns.

(2) All off-post patrols on QL-1 were by $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with machineguns mounted. Beginning 6 Feb 1970, V-100 armored cars were used to patrol Route 547.

(3) Daily convoys moving replacements from the division personnel center in Phu Bai to the division replacement training school were escorted by military police security vehicles.

(4) Two to six convoys daily were escorted from Pohl Bridge traffic control point, which was manned by a military policeman, to FSB Birmingham and FSB Beatoys, and on the return trip to Pohl Bridge. These operations supported the M Bde security precautions imposed on Route 547 during the TET period.

(5) At each base camp within the division, the 101st MP Company maintained stand-by $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with machineguns mounted and crews to react to emergency requirements. In addition, a V-100 armored car with crew was on stand-by at Camp Eagle.

c. Finance. No significant problems were encountered. Members of

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Inclosure 5 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLAY, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ3-32
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the division continued to receive personal attention to solve individual problems.

d. Chaplain. During Operation RANDOLPH GLAY, the 24 chaplains assigned to the division pursued every opportunity to take religious services and related activities to the troops. As the result of a critical analysis of chaplain performance in the period October through December 1969, a modification in the utilization of chaplains was initiated in January 1970, which almost doubled the Catholic religious coverage as well as improving the overall division chaplain program. During the reporting period, 70 chaplains in the division area, including those assigned to non-divisional supporting units, conducted a total of 3,866 religious services with an attendance of 89,939. During the same period, division chaplains held 11,635 personal counseling sessions and made 436 hospital visits with a total of 3,911 patients. A special Easter Sunday Service was conducted on 29 March 70 with an attendance of more than 8,600 personnel.

e. Surgeon. Medical support was provided by organic medical units of the division. All classes of patients were treated in divisional facilities, if medically practical, prior to evacuation to a supporting hospital. Serious cases were flown directly to supporting hospitals.

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Inclosure 6 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV-32 (R2) (U)

1. (C) Concept of Support.

a. External Support:

(1) Supply: The 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) was supported by:

(a) Class I, II, III, and IV: 26th General Support Group units located at Phu Bai.

(b) Class V: 1st Logistical Command ASPs at Phu Bai, Camp Evans, and Quang Tri.

(2) Ground Maintenance: 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) was supported by 26th General Support units at Camp Eagle, Camp Evans, and Phu Bai.

(3) Aircraft Maintenance: 101st Airborne Division (Amb1) aviation and aviation maintenance units received support from 34th General Support Group.

(4) Transportation: The following type of transportation support was provided by the units indicated:

(a) Airlift: 834th Air Division (USAF)

(b) Sealift: MSTS

(c) Surface Transportations: 26th General Support Group, Phu Bai and Camp Eagle.

(5) Medical:

(a) 85th Evacuation Hospital, Phu Bai.

(b) 18th Surgical Hospital, Quang Tri.

(c) USN Hospital Ship, SAFETY.

(d) USN Hospital Ship, REPOSE.

(e) 56th Dental Detachment, Phu Bai.

(f) 172nd Preventive Medicine Unit, Phu Bai.

(g) 571st Medical Detachment (Hel Amb), Phu Bai.

b. Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was supported primarily from Camp Eagle. Direct support for the three brigades of all classes of supplies except

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Inclosure 6 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH CLASH, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ-32 (R2) (U)

Class V was provided by the battalion elements attached to the DISCOM forward supply and service elements (FUSE). Back-up support for these classes of supplies was furnished by the division supply office at Camp Eagle. All Class V support was rendered by the 1st Log AMP to division firebases after being coordinated by the division ammunition office and the DISCOM movement control center. Supply point distribution was used for Class I. Unit distribution was used for Classes II-IV. In addition to the normal support of all classes of supplies rendered to the division during this operation, the 426th LAM Bn operated two forward aircraft refueling points at FM Roy and FM Birmingham, and a forward aircraft repair point at Quang Tri.

2. (C) Material and Services.

a. Supply and services:

(1) Supplies issued in support of Operation RANDOLPH CLASH during the period 7 Dec 69 - 31 Mar 70 were as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Class I	10,754 tons
Class II & IV	762 tons
Class III	
J44	764,000 gal
MX243	409,000 gal
Diesel Fuel	1,677,000 gal
Class V	14,764 gal
Water	704,000 gal

(2) Services provided to the division during Operation RANDOLPH CLASH:

(a) Aircraft repair point at Quang Tri issued the following ammunition:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
2.75" rockets (10 lb warhead)	15,159
2.75" rockets (17 lb warhead)	4,518
2.75" rockets (flashed)	1,736
40mm rounds (linked)	14,000
7.62mm MG ammunition (linked)	768,000

(b) Rigger missions accomplished in support of division and non-divisional units during this operation were:

Standard sling missions	5,270
Non-standard sling missions	41
Green tag missions	120
Rigging classes	38

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Inclosure 6 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLIDE, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACV-32 (R2) (U)

b. Maintenance:

(1) Aircraft.

(a) Aircraft availability during the period 7 Dec 69 - 31 Mar 70 averaged 84.5%, operationally ready. Combat damage during this period was 1.7%, which equals 819 aircraft days lost due to combat damage.

(b) Supply operations continued to be a matter of extreme interest at all levels of command throughout this period. Control and return to the supply system of all recoverable/repairable components was the most significant achievement. During the period concerned, a total of 114,171 transactions were conducted, resulting in a demand accumulation of 77% and a demand satisfaction of 60%.

(c) Six hundred and forty-two aircraft were released from direct support maintenance during this period. The maintenance performed was in support of all divisional aviation units.

(d) The Division retrograded on four F4UHU, 14 OV10A, 12 AH1G, six OH17, and one OH1C, a total of 34 aircraft, during the reporting period.

(2) Ground.

(a) Maintenance Support Activities.

(1) During the reporting period, the 81st Maintenance Battalion continued to maintain deadline rates for GORNA, ammunition, and automotive equipment well below the USARV goal.

(2) Deadline percentages in major commodity areas were as follows:

Commodity	Deadline	Ratio
Ammunition	5.51	5.11
Signal	5.70	5.60
Automotive	6.70	5.60

(b) Technical Supply Activity.

(1) The 81st Maintenance Battalion's technical supply activities experienced a continued high request rate from support units. Supply requests numbered 20,276 for December, 24,401 for January, 11,712 for February, and 10,779 for March.

(2) Receipt of major commodities improved during Operation RANDOLPH GLIDE, resulting in our all-time low deadline rates in each major commodity area.

(3) The self-service supply center ("country store"), established

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Inclosure 6 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLIDE, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ3-32 (22) (U)

earlier in the year, has increased its stockage to 93 lines and has been very successful in supplying high usage, low cost items to its customers with minimum essential administrative processing.

(4) The division continued to issue the 30 day reconciliation report for both normal and Red Ball requisitions. This procedure has resulted in a reduction of customer dues out in both categories. In addition, it provides the customer with an accurate status of requisitions outstanding.

(c) Technical Assistance Visits.

(1) Technical assistance visits continued during this period, with emphasis on infantry battalions during scheduled training periods.

(2) Technical inspection teams completed inspection of all mortars in the infantry battalions of the 1st and 2d Brigades. On-site howitzer maintenance and bore-scooping teams provided timely technical assistance and immediate repair to artillery batteries throughout the division area of operation.

c. Transportation.

(1) Vehicle Transportation: During the reporting period 7 Dec 69 - 31 Mar 70, Movement Control Center (MCC), DISCOM coordinated and monitored the utilization of 3,096 wheeled vehicles, transporting a total of 19,612 short tons of cargo.

(2) Air Transportations:

(a) At the Hue/Phu Bai airfield approximately 866.2 short tons of air delivered cargo were received. Outgoing cargo totalled 723.5 short tons. Division incoming passengers totalled 21,297, for a daily average of 253; there were 22,836 outgoing passengers, for a daily average of 272.

(b) During the reporting period, the number of division reserved seats on five Air Force common service aircraft was reduced from 110 to 100 daily. Mission 643 was re-routed to fly directly from Hue/Phu Bai airfield to Tan Son Nhut with no stopover at Da Nang. The division presently has the following seats reserved on the flights indicated:

<u>MISSION NUMBER</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>SEATS RESERVED</u>
841	Cam Ranh Bay	30
849	Cam Ranh Bay	30
846	Da Nang	20
740	Da Nang	5
643	Tan Son Nhut	15

(c) A total of 3,766 logistical CH47 helicopter sorties were flown,

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Enclosure 6 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RAINBOW GUN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACV 3-32 (R2) (U)

averaging 45 sorties per day. Cargo hauled by the logistical support helicopter totalled 10,983 short tons for a daily average of 130 short tons.

(3) Sea Transportations: The division received approximately 9,652.2 short tons of cargo through the facilities at Tan My Bamp. Approximately 60% of the incoming cargo was Class VI, 20% Class III, and 17% Class V. Outgoing cargo totalled 198 short tons.

3. (C) Medical Services:

a. The 326th Medical Battalion allocated one lettered medical company to each DISCOM Forward Service Support Element (FSSSE) in direct support of the division's three brigades. The battalion's headquarters and support company provided coverage of the division base. The aero-medical evacuation platoon provided aerial evacuation for the division on an area basis. Supporting and augmenting the capability of the 326th Medical Battalion were the 18th Surgical and the 85th Evacuation Hospitals.

b. Medical Statistical Recapitulation:

(1)	Patients seen - - - - -	13,144
(2)	Dental patients - - - - -	3,323
(3)	Admissions - - - - -	970
(4)	Transferred - - - - -	876
(5)	Recapitulation	
(a)	IRMA - - - - -	244
(b)	HSC - - - - -	1,201
(6)	Medical diseases	
(a)	Malaria - - - - -	14
(b)	FUOs - - - - -	450
(c)	Diarrhea - - - - -	344
(d)	Skin diseases - - - - -	1,661
(e)	H/P - - - - -	1,047
(f)	Gastroenteritis - - - - -	329
(g)	Foot problems - - - - -	685
(h)	Heat injuries - - - - -	30
(i)	VD - - - - -	398
(7)	Medical evacuations	
(a)	Evac missions - - - - -	1,458
(b)	Hoist missions - - - - -	138
(c)	Total missions - - - - -	2,274
(d)	US patients - - - - -	2,517
(e)	Others - - - - -	745

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Inclosure 7 (Chemical) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLAX, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ-32 (R2) (U)

1. (C) Missions: The division chemical section, with operational control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CH2C) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (D3), performed a variety of chemical operations in support of Operation RANDOLPH GLAX for the period 7 Dec 69 to 31 Mar 70. A discussion of each type mission follows.

a. Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Operations.

(1) The Airborne Personnel Detector was employed to provide information on areas of interest, to assist in locating enemy base areas and cache sites, and to detect enemy movement. The brigades conducted APD missions in their respective AO, while the 3d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry conducted missions in the reconnaissance zone and special missions requested by the brigades. The division chemical section provided technical assistance in the planning and conduct of the missions. An officer was also provided, when requested, to serve as CIC for the conduct of the missions and for interpretation of results for immediate exploitation of targets.

(2) A total of 177 missions were conducted during the reporting period.

(3) Several techniques were used to exploit targets located. In areas where significant readings were recorded, targets were engaged immediately by the gunship from the APD team, by artillery, or by air strikes. All significant readings were recorded and passed to the requesting unit for action. In some cases, reconnaissance teams were dispatched by the units to search those areas where positive readings were registered.

b. Aerial Flame Operations.

(1) Extensive aerial flame operations were conducted during the reporting period. Operations included clearing fields of fire around fire support bases, clearing landing zones for immediate and projected combat assaults, and clearing mines and booby traps from trails and abandoned villages. Flame drops were also employed on known and suspected enemy locations.

(2) The two primary techniques of drops used during the operation were the bulk drop by CH-47 and the smaller drop by UH1H aircraft.

(a) The UH1H drop consists of two drums of 4% thickened fuel carried externally in a sling load and dropped from an altitude of 200 to 250 feet at a speed of 80 knots. The drop gives an area of coverage of approximately 10 x 25 meters and is used on small targets or when extreme accuracy is required.

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Inclosure 7 (Chemical) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACV 30 (32) (U)

(b) The CH47 bulk flame drop consists of 8 to 20 drums of thickened fuel dropped at 80 knots from a minimum altitude of 300 feet above the terrain. The drums are placed in a large cargo net, two corners of which are attached to the aircraft cargo hook and the other two corners attached to the aircraft crossbar. This rigging procedure allows the net to be retained for reuse. The optimum drop load of 10 drums gives an area coverage of approximately 20 x 30 meters. Two internally loaded sorties were conducted to test the feasibility of this method. The test proved successful, and future missions are planned.

(3) Sixty UH1H sorties and 358 CH47 bulk drop external sorties were flown. In addition, two CH47 internally loaded sorties were conducted.

(a) There were 108 sorties of thickened fuel dropped to clear booby traps from a resettlement area in Phong Dien District. The supported unit reported 27 booby traps of various types detonated or neutralized, with many others exposed to visual detection as a direct result of the flame drops.

(b) A flame project was conducted in Phu Thu District to clear booby traps along trails and dikes adjacent to friendly rice fields. A total of 3 CH47 sorties and 29 UH1H sorties were flown to clear the booby trapped areas. Two secondary explosions were attributed directly to this use of flame.

(c) Two villages planned for resettlement and one small mine field in Huong Thuy District were cleared using flame. A total of 87 CH47 sorties and nine UH1H sorties were used to clear this area.

(d) Seventeen flame drops, for a total of 38 sorties, were made on landing zones to clear suspected booby traps from LZs prior to insertions. Eleven secondary explosions were reported.

(e) A total of 84 bulk flame sorties and 22 UH1H sorties were conducted on fire support base perimeters to clear fields of fire. Principal fire bases targeted were P-3, Tomahawk, Rifle, and Mooney.

(f) Thirty-nine sorties of flame were employed on five separate suspected enemy locations. As a result of the drops, numerous bunkers were destroyed. Enemy personnel were observed fleeing the area following one drop.

c. CS Operations. Seven bulk CS missions and four tactical CS missions were conducted during the reporting period. The missions were flown against suspected base camps and enemy infiltration routes to restrict the use of the areas and cause the enemy to move to other locations, thus diverting his efforts and exposing him to visual observation.

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Inclosure 7 (Chemical) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH 723, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACV 3-32 (R2) (U)

(1) Four of the bulk missions were conducted utilizing 260 55-gallon drums of CS dropped from CH47 helicopters equipped with a roller assembly. The drums armed with the M925 impact fuse and burster assembly, were dropped from 2500-3000 feet above the terrain. Visual reconnaissance following two of the missions revealed several enemy personnel fleeing the area. On one occasion, an aircraft supporting the mission reported receiving automatic weapons fire. Since the employment of the CS, no indications of enemy activity have been noted in the areas.

(2) Three bulk CS missions, for a total of 11 sorties, using powdered CS-1 were conducted on two major road networks extending into the division AO. Eighty-two MK77 500 lbs bombs, each containing 80 pounds of CS-1, were dropped from Marine A-4 high performance aircraft.

(3) One tactical CS mission was conducted using the CBU-30/A dropped by two F-100 high performance aircraft at low levels. Eight dispensers were dropped in conjunction with an aerial rocket artillery raid on a suspected enemy location in the upper A Shau Valley. Each CBU-30/A weighs 385 pounds and delivers 1280 skittering projectiles from 40 canisters ejected from the dispensers. The projectiles emit a CS cloud providing an area coverage of approximately 75 x 300 meters. The area coverage varies, depending upon the amount of dispersion of the canisters and the skittering effect of the projectiles. The mission was conducted during the early morning hours to take advantage of the inversion conditions for retention of the CS on target. The accuracy of the drop and the area coverage was excellent.

(4) Two of the tactical CS missions were conducted using B158R2 CS canisters in support of a XXIV Corps artillery raid and an airborne personnel detector mission. Fifteen canisters were employed on the targets from a UH1H helicopter, giving an area coverage of approximately 100 x 800 meters. The areas were engaged with A1H6 gunships and 175mm artillery fire. The visual reconnaissance following the artillery mission revealed numerous bunkers destroyed. Enemy personnel were observed fleeing the area.

(5) A tactical CS drop using M7A3 grenades was conducted on a suspected enemy base camp five kilometers east of FSB Airborne. The grenades were delivered by a UH1H helicopter using a grenade tube system constructed from four 2.75 inch rocket canisters taped together to make a more efficient, manageable system. There were 410 grenades delivered from 20 tube assemblies by angling the tubes out the door of the aircraft. Two passes were made over the target area to obtain better coverage, providing a line source of CS approximately 700 meters in length on each pass.

d. Aerial Defoliation Operations.

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Inclosure 7 (Chemical) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLAN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACV 3-32 (R2) (U)

(1) Eleven trail dust defoliation missions were flown in the division AO during the reporting period. A total of 103 missions were scheduled. However, inclement weather required that most of the scheduled missions be cancelled. No missions were scheduled during the month of January 1970.

(2) Twelve herbicide spray missions were conducted using agents Orange and Blue sprayed from a helicopter mounted Agavenco sprayer. Targets included areas around FSB Bastogne to improve observation and Route 547 between FSB Henry and Veghel to assist in removing the heavy foliage along the road.

(3) Extensive diesel defoliation operations were conducted around fire support bases in the piedmont area where herbicides could not be used due to proximity of friendly crops. A total of 16,475 gallons of diesel was sprayed using the UH1H helicopter mounted Agavenco sprayer with moderate success.

e. Ground Defoliation. A project was initiated by the 1st Brigade to clear foliage from each side of the Huu-Da Nang Railroad track extending from FSB Los Banos to Lung Co Bridge. The enemy consistently hampered the movement of the train through the area by mining the railroad. A method was developed using large containers carried on railroad flat cars to spray diesel along each side of the track. The area of spray extended approximately 50 feet on each side of the track. The spray area was then burned to clear the railroad right of way of brush. A hose extension was assembled to provide a wider coverage. Approximately 295,000 gallons of diesel was sprayed using this method.

f. Cave Seeding. Cave seeding operations were conducted to restrict the use of large caves discovered on sweep operations. One cave had several rooms and numerous vents and entrances and was large enough to contain an estimated company size element. Detonating cord was placed under bags of CS-1 and CS-2 located throughout the cave complex to spread the powder and restrict the enemy's use of the cave.

g. Crop Destruction. A crop destruction program was initiated during Operation RANDOLPH GLAN to destroy the increasing number of small garden plots scattered throughout the AO. A total of 420 gallons of agent Blue was dispensed on garden plots using both the Agavenco sprayer and five gallon collapsible plastic containers. The plastic containers were dropped from UH1H aircraft at a speed of 80 knots and an altitude of 100 feet above the terrain. A total of 31 enemy garden plots were destroyed.

2. (C) Statistics: The following statistics pertain to chemical operations during the period 7 Dec 69 to 31 Mar 70 of Operation RANDOLPH GLAN.

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
APC	177	177	-
Bulk flame (CH-47)	91	360	3,375 drums thickened fuel
Mini-flame (UH1H)	7	60	170 drums thickened fuel
Tactical CS	2	2	15 E15022 CS grenades
	1	1	410 M7A3 CS grenades
	1	1	8 CSU-30/A
Bulk CS	3	11	82 MX77 CS-1 bombs
	4	10	260 CS-2 55 gallon drums
Herbicide defol	12	64	40 gallons Blue, 6,730 gallons Orange
Diesel defol (aerial)	25	171	16,476 gallons diesel
Diesel defol (ground)	N/A	N/A	296,000 gallons diesel
Cave seeding	2	N/A	360 pounds of C-2
Crop destruction	4	4	420 gallons of Blue

3. (C) New Methods.

a. A need for defoliation around fire support bases in the piedmont area was determined where the use of herbicides was not approved. A mixture of diesel and 50-weight oil at a ratio of 3 to 1 was sprayed around these fire bases using a modified Agavenco sprayer. Heavy concentration of the diesel/oil mixture retards the growth of the foliage and allows easier burning around the perimeter. Additional sprayings are necessary to prevent the growth of new foliage. Two Agavenco sprayers were modified by removing the windmill pump assemblies and replacing them with M13 APC bilge pumps. The pumps operate from the aircraft electrical system, making the spray concentration independent of aircraft speed. This modification enables the mission to be flown at slower speeds, providing a heavier concentration of spray in the area. At a speed of 80 knots, the modified Agavenco sprayer will dispense 110 gallons of liquid defoliant over a distance of seven kilometers. The width of spray is approximately 60 feet, providing a concentration of three gallons per acre.

c. The Hush flare was developed to provide extended periods of illumination around fire support base perimeters and on avenues of infiltration into base camps. Extensive tests were conducted to achieve a standard design that would provide optimum illumination with a long burning time. The present design provides bright flame 3 to 5 feet high for 5 to 7½ hours. The flare consists of a 55 gallon drum with the top removed and three 8-inch artillery powder canisters with one 3/16" hole drilled in the top of each. The drum is emplaced in the ground to the second ring, and three canisters filled with 6% thickened fuel are inverted in the drum. The lids are firmly positioned in the canister, and three screws are placed through the canister to secure the lid. Fuel is placed in the drum around the canister. Ignition is achieved with a trip flare with an electrical blasting cap placed under the handle. Pressure is generated inside the canisters from the flame in the drum, forcing the gaseous vapors through the small holes and

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RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ-32 (22) (U)

producing the bright flame. A 48" half culvert two or three sections high is placed behind the flare to reflect the light forward and prevent illumination of the perimeter. A plastic cover is placed over the drum to protect the fuel from decomposition due to weather. Total time involved in replacing the flare is approximately two hours. Reservicing the flare requires approximately 1/2 hour. All components may be reused except for replacing the canister cap screw, which is melted from the heat, and the trip flare for ignition. A thickened fuel prepared with M1 thickener, prolongs the serviceability of the flare. Best results were achieved when using the above design and a good quality thickened fuel.

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Enclosure 8 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACVJ-32
(R2) (U)

1. (U) General: During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province were sustained at an aggressive rate. Territorial security, achieved through combined VC and GVN (ARVN, RF, PF, and PSD) tactical operations and local security measures, provided a safe environment in which long range, high-impact projects were generated in all ten rural districts of Thua Thien Province, as well as the three urban districts of Hue City. All pacification and development efforts during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were directed toward the achievement of the national objectives as outlined in the Thua Thien Province Pacification and Development Plan, 1970. As a part of the overall effort, the division continued to improve its civic action program. The number of projects in progress at the beginning of RANDOLPH GLEN was 170. The figure at the end of RANDOLPH GLEN was 142. During this operation, 118 projects were completed, with the Civic Action Priority List serving as the guideline for selection.

a. Refugee Movement. Under the national objective of "Brighter Life for War Victims," the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan lists the goals of resettling 11,848 war victims and identifying war victims who have not previously been identified. The term "War Victim" classifies two types of individuals; refugees and war victims requiring resettlement. Refugees are those individuals who have not received the full measure of relief benefits as authorized by the Ministry of Social Welfare. War victims requiring resettlement are those individuals who have received temporary relief payments, resettlement payments, homeliving allowance, and enjoy the development projects at temporary camps. Individuals in this category are no longer carried as refugees even though they require resettlement at some future date. Using these definitions, no new refugees were generated in Thua Thien Province during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, and the refugee population was reduced from 17,679 to 9,068. These refugees are located in the following hamlets:

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>	<u>NO REFUGEES</u>
Nam Hoa	Cu Khanh	115
Huong Thuy	Phu Nam	2,281
Phu Lo	Trung Kien	2,471
Phu Thu	Hoa Da Tay	761
Phu Vang	Thai Duong Ha	2,740
	TOTAL	9,068

In addition to the reduction in the refugee population, 9,068 persons were resettled during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. Of the total number resettled, 5,148 were resettled during the first quarter of GI 70, and represent 43% of the year end goal. Advanced planning at province and district level for the continuing resettlement in Phuoc Dien, initiation of resettlement in Huong Kien and Quang Dien, and planned future resettlement in other districts indicates that the year end goal will be exceeded.

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(R2) (U)

b. Food Extractions. Negative.

c. MEDCAP Operations. Significant progress was made in the MEDCAP program during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. Division Circular 40-3, published 1 January 1970 by the Division Surgeon, is a key document and serves to promote a well-organized and highly effective MEDCAP program. A total of 794 MEDCAPs were held; 36,474 medical and dental patients were treated, 1,157 immunizations were administered, 32 Vietnamese were evacuated to hospitals for medical care, and 744 health students received training during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. Although medical treatment increased during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, the real significance is that more and more of the actual treatment was administered by the Vietnamese, thus freeing US medical personnel to become deeply involved with the training of Vietnamese medical personnel and health workers.

d. Animal Evacuations. Negative.

e. Civic Action Projects. The broad objective of the civic action program during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was to contribute to the national objective (GVN) of "Prosperity for All," and to support the related goals as outlined in the Thua Thien Pacification and Development Plan, 1970. Specific objectives directly related to military civic action were twofold: (1) Improving the image of the Government of Vietnam in the eyes of the local populace; and (2) improving the living conditions of the people, thereby alleviating the underlying causes of insurgency. Major projects completed during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN include 45 schools, nine dispensaries, seven village/hamlet headquarters, 41 wells, three markets, three police stations, and 10 other category projects. Projects under construction/repair at the conclusion of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN include 21 schools, 12 dispensaries, three village/hamlet headquarters, 81 wells, six markets, 11 police stations, and eight other category projects. One of the ongoing projects in the "other" category is the upgrading of the capabilities of the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistics Center to enable that organization to provide better maintenance and logistical support to RF, PF, PSDF, and RD cadre elements in Thua Thien Province. During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, DISCOM, assisted by the ABB, developed detailed plans for the relocation of the SMDSLC to a more suitable location. These plans also involved the upgrading of operational activities, with assistance being provided by appropriate elements of DISCOM.

f. Distribution of Supplies and Commodities. The major civic action effort during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was repair and construction. Therefore, items used in large quantities were lumber, tin, and cement. The majority of these commodities were salvaged items. Sources of materials included the sanitary fill for scrap lumber, firebases for ammunition

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boxes, and construction units for salvaged building materials and hydrated cement. The CA/PSYWAR fund was used to purchase needed items on the local economy. While the majority of the commodities was delivered by vehicle, helicopters were used for deliveries to areas inaccessible by other means.

g. Miscellaneous Activities.

(1) Local Government. The territorial security provided by US and GVN forces during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN enabled the local administration to strengthen, to grow, and to expand the influence of the government of Vietnam throughout Thua Thien Province. All 85 villages in Thua Thien Province have elected officials, with none in exile. Of the 400 hamlets recognized by the central government in Saigon, only 12 had appointed rather than elected officials, with none in exile. Although no elections were held during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, the 1970 elections for village and hamlet officials were planned and final arrangements were made under the protective cover of US and GVN forces. Eight of the 12 hamlets with appointed officials are included in the scheduled elections for May 1970.

(2) Road Building and Pacification. Improvements and repairs to roads and bridges throughout the province during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN materially assisted the resettlement process and the resumption of trade and commerce. While the roads and bridges were built for tactical purposes, the effort enriched the pacification effort immeasurably. Of particular significance was the completion of 21 kilometers of road in the southern area of Phu Thu and 12 kilometers of road in northern Phong Dien and Quang Dien districts. The Phu Thu road permitted formerly waterbound inhabitants to use the completed road as a farm to market route, further strengthening the economy. The resettlement of the northern areas of Phong Dien and Quang Dien districts is directly attributed to the roadwork in those areas.

(3) Dedication Ceremonies. Three significant dedication ceremonies were held by local officials during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN. BG Smith, ADC(S) attended the presentation ceremony in Hue on 7 December 1969, when 232 Kubota tiller tractors were presented to 110 hamlet chiefs. The tractors were purchased for the hamlets of the province as a means to increase rice and vegetable production. Each village has two trained tractor operators. A central repair and parts exchange shop has been established in Hue, and the province has organized and trained three mobile maintenance teams to assist the districts with tractor maintenance and service. The division provided eight men to assist in the assembly of the tractors. On 29 December, BG Smith, ADC(S) and Colonel Moore, DIVARTY CO, attended the dedication of Gia Le Cham Health Station. DIVARTY sponsored the construction project. A MEDCAP was held immediately following

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the ceremony. On 24 January 1970, MG Wright attended the dedication ceremony of Phu Vang High School. The division furnished materials to construct the five-classroom building.

(4) Humanitarian Christmas Projects. Christmas support was provided by the division to orphanages throughout Thua Thien Province. Candy and toys were delivered by units to orphanages as follows:

101st Aviation Group - Bao Son Orphanage, Hue
801st Maintenance Battalion - Kim Long Orphanage, Hue
2d Brigade - Tu Mau Orphanage, Phu Bai
3d Brigade - Tan Nguyen Orphanage, Huong Dien
101st Admin Co - Phu Cam Orphanage, Hue
501st Signal Battalion - Tay Loc Orphanage, Hue
DIVARTY - Namzetun Orphanage, Hue

(5) TET. As the Vietnamese New Year approached, the division's theme for activity was "Get Set for TET." Divisional units provided toys, food, candy, and various forms of entertainment as some troops joined the children in the Tet parties. Candy and toys were purchased with the CA/PSYWAR fund and distributed to dependents of soldiers in DIVARTY, 3d, 1st, and 5th ARVN Regiments. All Popular Self-Defense Forces of the districts were supported with surplus food and commodities. Because of security and the festive and religious nature of Tet, all civic action activities temporarily halted during 6-8 February.

2. (U) Statistics: Summarized below are the amounts of major commodities delivered by the division during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN:

Food	51,761 pounds
Clothing	2,035 pounds
Soap	3,700 pounds
Construction Lumber	34,995 board feet
Scrap Lumber	15,086 board feet
Cement	6,438 bags
Ammunition Boxes	3,996 boxes
Tin	2,346 sheets
Paint	98 gallons
Rebar	16,219 feet
School Desks	330 desks
School Benches	330 benches
School Kits	3,220 kits

3. (U) Analysis: Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, the first US division size operation oriented squarely on GVN national objectives for pacification

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and development, produced highly favorable results. Territorial security, the first of the eight national objectives, permitted the aggressive pursuit of the remaining objectives. In addition to territorial security, other significant contributions to the Pacification and Development Program during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were in the form of civic action, MEDCAPs, road and bridge construction, and upgrading of the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistics Center. Throughout the conduct of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, all civic action was oriented on improving the image of the GVN, with the division remaining in the background.

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Inclosure 9 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLAD, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACG 3-38 (AF) (U)

1. (C) General: The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) PSYOP elements in cooperation with ARVN/CTM forces conducted intense combined psychological operations to further the objectives of the pacification and development plan of Tien Tien Province.

2. (C) Program: The 101st Air Div (Jatl) and supporting units developed and employed a wide variety of PSYOP means during RANDOLPH GLAD. Aerial and ground loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops, movies, cultural drama performances, and armed propaganda teams were used by PSYOP as an integral part of the operation.

a. The first program, the TBT Campaign - 1970, began with detailed target planning in coordination with the G2 Order of Battle Section. Based on current intelligence reports of known and suspected enemy locations, fifty four PSYOP targets were selected. Each brigade was tasked to cover the targets in its respective AO, and the division PSYOP section covered the targets in the division reconnaissance zone. The brigades were assigned three to five targets daily in accordance with a detailed target list which was compiled by the division PSYOP section. In addition to these aerial broadcast targets covered by the brigades and division with organic aircraft, the 7th SFG provided backup and supplemental support to the division on a daily basis. Employment of both organic and general support aircraft on broadcast missions insured a more complete and comprehensive coverage of all target areas within the division AO. Leaflet missions in support of the TBT campaign began on 15 January 1970, using standard leaflets on hand at that time. On 22 January 1970, the division began using special TBT leaflets which were procured from the 7th PSYOP Battalion. Both organic and general support aircraft were employed on leaflet missions.

b. During Operation RANDOLPH GLAD, the PSYOP mobile teams were used extensively in support of ground operations. The PSYOP mobile team included one or more RB and RE teams, a cultural drama team, one or more armed propaganda teams, and a MRCAP. The skillful blend of this team, plus leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts around the contested area, assisted in alleviating the alienation which is normally produced when a ground operation interrupts the daily routine of the people.

c. A "white flag" campaign was initiated during this period. This campaign involved the distribution of leaflet packets in the field along trails and in suspected enemy operational areas. These packets contained safe conduct passes, an explanation of the Chieu Hoi Program, a card containing a Chieu Hoi symbol, basic rally instructions, a map of the area, and two cigarettes.

d. The division PSYOP section worked in close coordination with the ADA/PSYOP and Chieu Hoi Center in Hue on a campaign which was designated "Operation Homecoming." This campaign was centered around a list of 1,100 families which had VC affiliations in Tien Tien Province. The campaign

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Inclosure 9 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HANOULHIE GLAD, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACV 5-92 (R) (U)

was designed to reach out VC/VL not only during Tet, but until the list was exhausted. During the period 2-5 February, the Chieu Hoi Center distributed gifts to these families. Pictures and statements were taken from the families and were developed into leaflets which were air-dropped as well as hand-distributed. The statements contained personal appeals to the VC/VL to return home for Tet by rallying to the GVN. The program was supplemented by the Vietnamese Information Service concentrating on a strong face-to-face campaign aimed at these 100 families, and by the national police and Florens Committee maintaining a close surveillance of the designated target areas. Special wanted posters and leaflets were developed and distributed.

e. Leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts were conducted during HANOULHIE GLAD directing a TV theme at the NVA soldiers. This theme generally outlined the NVA's living conditions, lack of food and medicine, and told him that a TV received good food and good treatment from the allied forces.

f. The advertisement of the Voluntary Informant program by all MACV agencies in the province proved most effective. Aerial loudspeaker support, leaflet drops, distribution of ground posters, ground loudspeaker missions, and word of mouth dissemination of information supporting the program were combined into a massive effort to publicize its benefits. Considerable emphasis was given to passing the information to children. An increasing amount of weapons and munitions was turned in to friendly forces.

5. (c) Executions

a. 101st Air Div (AABD) F-105F was directed at four main target audiences:

(1) NVA - Propaganda was directed at both North Vietnamese regulars and service support soldiers in an effort to convince them that the information that they had been given concerning the people and the war in the south was wrong. Particularly stressed were the facts that the people in South Vietnam do not welcome and support the NVA; that ARVN units were not fighting with the NVA against the American "aggression," but were constantly seeking out and destroying the NVA; that the NVA was winning no great victory and was constantly increased and forced into hiding by superior Allied fire power and ground operations; and that NVA soldiers were indefinitely separated from their homes and families with no end of the war in sight.

(2) VC - Propaganda was directed at all levels of VC and VL cadres in an effort to induce them to reevaluate their goals and transfer their loyalty to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi program. Emphasized were the facts that they were misled by the Communists; that they were not winning victories, but instead were continually being caught and killed by Allied fire power and ground operations; that they were short of personnel, food, weapons, ammunition and medicine; that they could neither be with their families nor live as free and happy men; and that they were killing their brothers and sisters and bringing much pain, grief, and sadness to their families.

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Inclosure 9 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ3-32 (R2) (U)

(3) VCI/VCS - Propaganda in this category was directed at South Vietnamese civilians who supported the VC as food suppliers, ammunition bearers, recruiters and political proselytizers. An effort was made to convince the civilians that they were being taken advantage of and would never be able to live as happy, free men unless they transferred their loyalty to and came under the protection of the GVN.

(4) Local population - This propaganda was directed at the South Vietnamese civilians in an effort to obtain or retain their loyalty to the GVN, prevent their indoctrination with Communist ideals, and bring the entire population of Thua Thien Province under GVN control.

b. Totals for the operation (7 Dec 69 - 31 Mar 70)

(1) Leaflets disseminated:

(a) Aerial - 209,273,000

(b) Ground - 100,335

(2) Loudspeaker hours:

(a) Aerial - 676,111

(b) Ground - 1,560,000

(3) Movies - 294,500 hours

(4) Posters - 55,750

(5) Leaf Clank - 36

(6) Weekly Chien Hoi TV hours - 19,000

c. Themes:

(1) Leaflets:

(a) Anti VC/NVA

(b) Pro GVN

(c) VIT/peace

(d) Survival of life

(e) Health and sanitation

(f) Allied firepower

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Inclosure 9 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32 (R2) (U)

- (g) PW treatment
- (2) Broadcasts:
 - (a) Anti-VC/NVA
 - (b) Pro GVN
 - (c) Chieu Hoi
 - (d) VIP rewards
 - (e) Surrender or die
 - (f) Population control (Cordon operations)
 - (g) Cultural drama performances and MEDCAPs.
 - (h) Artillery and airstrike exploitation
- (i) Current news
- (j) PW treatment
- (3) Movies:
 - (a) Pro GVN
 - (b) Health, sanitation, and agriculture.
 - (c) Anti-VC/NVA
 - (d) Current news
 - (e) Entertainment
 - (f) Drama and comedy (cartoons)
 - (g) Human interest studies
- (4) Posters:
 - (a) Rewards
 - (b) Anti-VC/NVA

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Inclosure 9 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH CLASH, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
MACV-32 (R2) (J)

4. (C) Analysis: Results achieved during the period were:

a. Impact on NVA. Recent PW interrogation reports from this area corroborated reports from other highly classified sources that US/GVN PSYOP activities resulted in a very damaging impact on elements of the NVA. Although wholesale evidence of the impact cannot be provided, sufficient evidence was secured during the period which indicated an effective PSYOP effort in progress against the NVA.

b. Impact on VC/VCI/VCS. It was significant that an increased percentage of ralliers attributed their decision to rally on messages received from both broadcasts and leaflets.

c. Impact on Local Population.

(1) Dissemination of the Voluntary Informant Program by all PSYOP agencies proved most effective. An increasing amount of weapons and munitions was turned in to friendly forces.

(2) The PSYOP audio-visual and ground loudspeaker teams expanded the effectiveness of the VIS program. By showing movies and slides of GVN-completed self-help projects and other successful civic action programs, respect and support for the GVN was strengthened. The VIS chiefs and cadre learned communication techniques and how to operate and maintain the audio-visual equipment in the process. A fringe benefit, which further indicates the effectiveness of the teams, was the frequent, unsolicited information about local VC activities, provided by the local inhabitants.

Appendix 1 - Kit Carson Scouts

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Appendix 1 (Kit Carson Scouts) to Inclosure 9 (Psychological Operations) to
Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st
Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACJ-32 (R2) (U)

1. During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN Kit Carson Scout strength increased from 205 to 261. A total of 12 scouts were wounded in action. One KCS was killed in action by a booby trap. Scouts proved themselves particularly valuable in detecting booby traps and mines, gathering intelligence and assisting in psychological operations. Mobile Training Teams are finding English-speaking scouts a valuable aid in training Popular Forces, especially when sufficient ARVN interpreters are not available.
2. As part of the "Get Set for Tet" campaign, Division Training Scout Tuong Vinh gave snapper defense classes and inspected all 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) active fire bases and base camps. He advised commanders on likely enemy avenues of approach and suggested means of strengthening the defenses.
3. On 28 January, a meeting for all scouts and their buddies was held at Camp Evans. General Wright addressed the scouts, congratulating them on their past performances, encouraging them to continue improving their skills, and wishing them a happy Tet. Awards for valor were presented to three scouts.
4. All scouts were required to be present for duty during Tet; however, about 20% were AWOL during at least part of this time.

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Inclosure 10 (Communications to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 1966, Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32
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1. (U) General. Communications employed throughout the division included Very High Frequency (VHF) radio, FM radio, Single Side Band (SSB) radio, and air to ground communications. The following is a summary of each type system employed.

a. VHF (area system). In line with the concept being employed in the ICT2, VHF communications from division to brigade were provided by non-divisional units through the area communications system. This consisted of AN/MRC-69 and AN/MRC-54 equipment employed by the I Corps Signal Support Group in configuration requested by the division signal officer. This system provided 12 channel communications from division headquarters to brigade base camps, brigade forward fire bases, and to selected combat support and combat service support base areas.

b. VHF (organic). Due to support provided by the area communications system, VHF equipment organic to the division signal battalion was utilized primarily to link brigades with their attached battalions. This is one step lower in the communications scheme than is normally provided by the signal battalion in its support of the division. As battalions were committed to various phases of the operation, 4-channel VHF would be air-lifted into the battalion firebase, and the system established back to brigade. The 4-channel equipment used included the AN/MRC-68 and AN/GRC-163. The reliability of both systems fluctuated due to the strict line-of-sight characteristics of the MRC-68 and the unreliability of the component parts of the GRC-163. These features, combined with the various weather patterns encountered, created some minor problems. In the overall perspective, the 4-channel VHF systems provide a valuable communications tool and provide an effective alternate route for brigade command and control.

c. FM radio. The division communications SOP calls for a division command operations net (secure and non-secure) and a division operations/intelligence net (secure). Brigades operate in these nets and in addition operate a brigade command net and a brigade operations net. A great deal of reliance was placed on FM secure voice capability by operations personnel at division level. The convenience of passing up to SECRET information over the radio without having to use a crypto code greatly facilitated operations. Consequently, this net received a great deal of use, and a great deal of effort was expended to keep it operational. An FM test shot to FSB Carroll from the DIOC was put in, using the AS-2169 and the AS-2236 antennas. The AS-2169 is a log periodic antenna and is organic to the VHF radio equipment used by the 501st Signal Battalion. The AS-2236 is a log periodic antenna best known as the "Marine antenna". The test was on FM (secure) radio, using first the AS-2169. Communications were established, although the quality was not too good. In addition, on frequencies above 55 MHz, communications were not acceptable. Utilizing

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the AS-2236, satisfactory communications on all frequencies were established.

d. SSB Radio. The division communications concept calls for employment of SSB radio at division level for a command net, at DISCOM in support of several admin/log nets, and at brigade for a command net. The primary use of SSB during this operation was at the various FSSS base areas for logistical communications with DISCOM. The radio equipment was primarily AN/VSC-2, with AN/GRC-1142 used to a limited degree. The RFT capability was also used by the brigades for teletype communications with a SSB radio located near the division command center. This provided an alternate route to the VHF administrative teletype circuit employed from division to the brigades. An AN/GRC-1142 was deployed to LZ English in support of the 3/506 Inf Bn. This provided the division with a SSB RWI and teletype capability to the battalion. The same type radio was used to test the AM/SSB capability between Camp Eagle and FSB Carroll. This test successfully passed voice and teletype traffic. Near the end of the operational period, division admin/log net was expanded to include brigades and battalions. This provided them the capability to pass message traffic directly to GH and DISCOM elements.

e. Air to Ground. Air to ground communications were provided primarily through the use of AN/ARC-54 radios in the aircraft and AN/VRC-46 and AN/PRC-75/77 on the ground.

2. (C) Problems.

a. General. Problems were experienced in securing circuits on the area communications system and with FM frequency interference problems.

b. Area Communications System. Near the end of the operational period, there was some difficulty encountered in obtaining tactical circuits over the area system. This resulted from a 1st Signal Brigade policy to eliminate as many tactical circuits from the area system as possible. This policy was particularly significant to the division since the area system carried many of the tactical circuits that would normally be placed on organic VHF systems, if these systems were available. Direct coordination with the XXIV Corps signal section usually resulted in the requested circuit being approved for the area system, but only after detailed justification. This is a potentially serious problem that requires additional coordination between division, Corps, and USARV.

c. FM Frequency Interference. This division experiences a great number of frequency interference problems due primarily to the limited number of frequencies available for use and the large number of divisional aircraft. Available frequencies are assigned after normal frequency

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Inclosure 10 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
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engineering so that interference will be minimized. Since sufficient frequencies are not available for each net to have a unique frequency, approximately 17 frequencies are co-assigned within the division. Due to the airmobile environment, units constantly shift locations. This creates frequency problems that are difficult to preclude. Units have been instructed to operate on low power whenever possible and to work through the interference if it is not too heavy. To date, this problem has not significantly hindered operations.

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Inclosure 11 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32 (R2) (U)

1.(C)General. During the period 7 December 1969 to 31 March 1970, the 327th Engineer Battalion (Airmobile) continued to provide general and direct support to maneuver elements of the division. During the reporting period, 13 existing fire bases were reopened, and three new fire bases were constructed. New bunkers and fighting positions were constructed; repair of bunkers and TOC was accomplished at permanent fire bases. Extensive mine sweep and land clearing operations were conducted in support of combat operations and the resettlement program. Twenty-eight kilometers of secondary LOC was upgraded in support of tactical and civic requirements. A combined TOC was constructed at Phu Loc District headquarters in support of joint US/GVN operations. Project Lifesaver, an LZ construction program, continued during the period, with 106 landing zones cleared or improved. Additional landing zones were cut in support of maneuver elements. The battalion continued to provide boats and operators to support river patrol and ambush operations.

2.(C)Operations Narrative.

a. 1st Brigade AO: Company A continued in direct support of 1st Brigade during the reporting period. Visual and mechanical mine sweeps were conducted along QL-1 and the Phu Thu Estuary Road. Mine sweep and demolition teams supported the 1st Bn (Aml), 327th Inf and the 2d Bn (Aml), 327th Inf. At FSB Los Banos, a mine field was cleared, and the hilltop was leveled to accommodate an artillery battery and an infantry company CP. A combined TOC was constructed at Phu Loc District headquarters in support of joint US-GVN operations. On 1 March, Company A passed the Phu Thu road construction project to Company C after completion of culvert emplacement and one 22-foot bridge at ZDC06120. A water point was established at the O'Brien Bridge site (ZU197011) which provided potable water at a rate of 2350 gallons per day to brigade elements. Combat support was provided at FSB Roy, Los Banos, and Tomhawk. FSB Brick and Rifle were reopened. Company A provided an engineer team for Operation Lifesaver throughout the reporting period.

b. 2d Brigade AO: Company C continued in direct support of the 2d Brigade during the reporting period. Support included construction of 17 landing zones for the 1st Bn (Aml), 501st Inf, and the 1st Bn (Aml), 502d Inf. Support was provided to reopen FSB Veghel, Bullet, and Spear by clearing fields of fire and constructing bunkers and fighting positions. A radar tower was built at FSB Bastogne. At FSB Arsenal, the CH47 helipads and road network were reconstrued. On 1 March, Company C assumed responsibility for the Phu Thu road construction project. Mine sweeps and demolition work were conducted in support of brigade maneuver elements. At FSB Bastogne fields of fire were cleared, the TOC was expanded, and additional defensive wire was installed.

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c. 3d Brigade AO: Company B continued in direct support of the 3d Brigade during the reporting period. In December, Company B reopened FSB Radkasan and supported the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf until 3 January by improving defensive positions and general maintenance of the fire base. During the period 11 December to 20 December, FSBs O'Reilly and Ripcord were cleared of mines and booby traps, and two landing zones were constructed in the vicinity. During the month of January, Company B was committed to clearing mines and booby traps in Phong Dien District. A daily sweep was conducted between FSB Jack and Camp Evans. On 26 January, construction was begun on the FSB Jeanne/Knight Road and was continuing at the end of the period. On 25 February, support was provided to the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf in opening FSB Mooney. On 14 March, combat support was provided to construct FSB Granite and to reopen FSB Radkasan. Both fire bases were cleared of mines and booby traps, and defensive positions and artillery gun pads were constructed. FSB Gladiator was constructed in support of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. Company B provided one team for Project Lifesaver throughout the entire reporting period.

3. (c) Problems:

a. Inadequate airmobile engineer training in army training centers.

(1) Discussion. For enlisted personnel, there is currently no training conducted in US Army training centers or COMUS schools on airmobile engineer techniques or airmobile engineer equipment. For officers, airmobile training is primarily a general orientation on airmobile operations, with no specific instruction devoted to airmobile techniques. As a result, every assignee regardless of grade or position, must be given on-the-job training upon his assignment to the airmobile engineer battalion. This training places significant administrative burdens upon a unit that is already handicapped by the lack of a general support capability in its TCE. The unique employment of airmobile engineer equipment necessitates a full-fledged training program in operations and maintenance, equipment disassembly and re-assembly, and in rigging for helicopter lift.

(2) Recommendations. It is recommended that:

(a) The Department of the Army/Office of the Chief of Engineers jointly review COMUS engineer training programs to incorporate specific airmobile engineer training in AET centers and in COMARC schools, as applicable. This training should be provided to engineer enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers, officers, equipment operators, and maintenance personnel who are designated for assignment to airmobile engineer units.

(b) An MOS suffix/prefix be established to identify qualified/trained airmobile engineer personnel.

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b. Inadequate repair parts, supply and development of airmobile engineer equipment.

(1) Discussion:

(a) Inadequate repair parts. The airmobile engineer battalion equipment authorization was established in 1964 - 1965. All equipment was classified as nonstandard or limited standard. Repair parts were acquired on the basis of limited operational experience and in one-time bulk procurement packages. Repair parts were sent to the airmobile unit in a "push package" category, rather than by routine supply procedure. In 1969, the airmobile engineer equipment was reclassified to standard and limited standard categories. It is anticipated that the repair parts supply system will eventually carry airmobile engineer repair parts. However, difficulties and shortages are expected to continue due to lack of established demand data, and to the relatively low density of these items in the Army. The standard stockage criteria are not believed applicable to the airmobile engineer equipment repair parts due to these factors. Special consideration should be given to the establishment of separate stockage criteria for airmobile engineer equipment repair parts.

(b) Airmobile engineer equipment and item supply. The 101st Abn Div (Arb1) has never been issued its full TGE authorization of airmobile engineer equipment. Several items are known to be in equipment pools and in non-airmobile divisions. The explanation for non-issuance to this division is that there is not adequate equipment available for issuing to all units requiring these items. The need for airmobile engineer equipment by other than airmobile divisions is recognized. Procurement of airmobile engineer equipment should be in sufficient quantity to fully equip organic airmobile engineer units and to provide necessary "floats" to replace combat and maintenance losses.

(c) Airmobile engineer equipment development. The current airmobile engineer equipment was procured/developed in 1963 - 1965 based on the lift capability of the available aircraft. There has been no apparent review of these items or evolutionary development to keep pace with the known/projected increased lift capability of the division's organic/attached helicopters. Specific examples of equipment that should be reviewed/developed are:

1. 2 1/2 ton/5 ton dump trucks vice 3/4 ton dump trucks.
2. D6/L7 sectionalized bulldozers vice D5 bulldozers.
3. Tracked backhoe/loader vice TD 3114 wheeled vehicle.
4. 2 1/2 ton/5 ton wrecker vice 3/4 ton wrecker.

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Inclosure 11 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32 (S2) (U)

(2) Recommendations:

(a) That airmobile engineer equipment repair parts be procured and inserted into the current Army repair parts supply system.

(b) That airmobile engineer equipment and items be procured in sufficient quantity to fully equip airmobile engineer battalions and other users as appropriate, to include "floats" for combat/maintenance losses.

(c) That appropriate Army agencies be tasked to review and expedite airmobile engineer equipment development in consonance with lift aircraft development and increased capabilities.

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Inclosure 12 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32
(R2) (U)

1. (C) Mission. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) provided close and continuous fire support to maneuver elements during the conduct of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (7 December 1969 - 31 March 1970). In addition, Division Artillery coordinated all artillery firing in support of the division, supported civic action projects, and assisted in Vietnamization by providing artillery fire support training and logistical assistance to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Artillery.

2. (C) Concept of operation: Task Organization

a. Division Artillery

- (1) 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty (105) - DS, 3d Brigade
- (2) 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty (105) - DS, 1st Brigade
- (3) 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty (105) - DS, 2d Brigade
- (4) 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty (155) - GS, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
- (5) 4th Bn (Aerial Artillery), 77th Arty (Ambl) - GS, 101st Abn Div Arty (Ambl)
- (6) Btry A (Aviation), 377th Arty (Ambl) - GS, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

b. Artillery with the division

- (1) 1st Bn, 39th Arty (155SP/8"/175) GSR, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
- (2) 2d Bn, 94th Arty (8"/175) GSR, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
- (3) 1st Bn, 83d Arty (8"/175) GSR, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
- (4) 1st Bn, 44th Arty (AW) GS, XXIV Corps
- (5) Btry G, 65th Arty (AW-QUAD 50) GS, XXIV Corps
- (6) Btry G, 29th Arty (SLT) GS, XXIV Corps

3. (C) Execution:

a. Artillery coverage was provided to all maneuver elements within the division area of operation. Division artillery light howitzer batteries were continuously employed in the direct support role. Medium howitzer batteries from division and corps artillery provided general support.

Incl 12

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Inclosure 12 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACVJ-32
(R2) (U)

Division artillery executed 86 individual battery displacements, primarily by helicopter, to maintain continuous close fire support. After XXIV Corps Artillery reequipped its sole medium artillery unit (1st Battalion, 39th Artillery (155SP) with 8" howitzers and 175mm guns, it became necessary to split organic medium howitzer batteries. Heavy artillery support was adequate throughout the operation.

b. Fire Support Bases: The following fire support bases were occupied at the beginning of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN:

<u>Fire Support Base</u>	<u>Grid</u>	<u>Arty Unit(s)</u>
Camp Fagla	YD827137	A/2-11
Camp Sally	YD638274	C/1-83
FSB Roy	ZD658031	A/2-320
FSB Rifle	YD863798	B/2-320
FSB Tomhawk	ZD116613	C/2-320, B/1-39
FSB Rakkasen	YD490197	A/2-329, A/2-11
Camp Evans	YD535312	B, C/2-319
FSB Bastogne	YD662095	B/1-321, B/2-11
FSB Arsenal	YD812082	C/2-11
FSB Normandy	YD880017	A/1-321
FSB Birmingham	YD704101	C/1-321, B/1-83

c. The following fire support bases were subsequently occupied during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN:

<u>FSB</u>	<u>Grid</u>	<u>FSB</u>	<u>Grid</u>
Camp Sally	YD63274	FSB Los Banos	AT832990
FSB Blaze	YD535020	FSB Shepherd	YD734110
FSB Strike	YD577171	FSB O'Reilly	YD324252
FSB Rakkasen	YD490198	FSB Davis	YD253290

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Inclosure 12 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HAKULUWH OLEA, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV-32
(R2) (U)

<u>FBI</u>	<u>GRID</u>	<u>FBI</u>	<u>GRID</u>
FBI Jack	YD072000	FBI Knight	YD070101
FBI Omega	YD050101	FBI Jensen	YD052102
FBI Thor	YD060101	FBI Henry	YD030101
FBI Ray	ZD050102	Platoon Sergeant Name	YD070101
FBI Ealyard	YD070101	FBI Anne	YD070101
FBI Sharon	YD060101	FBI Rifle	YD060101
FBI Arsonal	YD010101	FBI Tomahawk	ZD010101
FBI Vogel	YD050101	FBI Spout	YD060101
FBI Newmanby	YD060101	FBI Thistle	YD010101
FBI Black	YD010101	FBI Honey	YD060101
FBI Pistol	YD060101	FBI Gladiolus	YD060101

d. The number of battery-issued discrepancies made by the artillery units were:

(1) Division Artillery units:	
(a) 2d Bn (Asst), 317th Arty (105)	17
(b) 2d Bn (Asst), 320th Arty (105)	5
(c) 1st Bn (Asst), 321st Arty (105)	13
(d) 2d Bn (Asst), 11th Arty (155)	14
(2) Non-divisional artillery supporting the division:	
(a) 1st Bn, 83d Arty (8"/175)	10
(b) 1st Bn, 39th Arty (155SP/8"/175)	16
(c) 2d Bn, 94th Arty (8"/175)	11

TOTAL 86

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Incident 12 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HANHUAH (GDP), 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACV-32
(R2) (U)

c. Summary of missions/rounds fired:

	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Rounds</u>
Confirmed	1,151	79,712
Acquired	29,810	179,789
Counter-battery	22,714	121,214
Preparations	2,911	111,280
H & A	7,660	30,547
Special Purpose	11,420	82,862
Other	391	7,741
TOTAL	76,157	613,645

Support of ARVN elements during the operation is included under other missions.

d. (G) Conclusion.

a. The major operations conducted during Operation HANHUAH (GDP) were combined ARVN-AB operations. During these operations, ARVN and AB artillery were jointly employed while firing preparations and close support missions. Detailed coordination was accomplished between the ARVN and AB artillery by exchanging liaison personnel and, in some cases, by exchanging artillery forward observers. As a result, effective and responsive fire support has been available to the combined maneuver forces from either AB or ARVN artillery units.

b. The division artillery aerial reconnaissance program was supported by the 28th Reconnaissance Airplane Company which flew 625 hours while conducting 376 registrations and making 45 target sightings, and by Battery A, (Aviation), 117th Artillery (Airmobile) which flew 713 hours in OH-6A aircraft while making 713 sightings.

c. The division artillery made extensive use of the artillery raid to extend the combat power of the division into remote areas and to place fire on enemy units, base areas, and cache sites. These raids were from eight to 72 hours in duration and capitalized on the division's airmobility.

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Inclosure 12 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32
(R2) (U)

normally one rifle company or less was required for security. The 2d
Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry supported the raids by providing
an increased target acquisition and damage assessment capability.

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Inclosure 13 (Army Aviation) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACV-32 (R2) (U)

1. (U) Missions: To provide aviation support for combat and pacification operations of the 101st Abn Div (Amb1) during operation RANDOLPH GLEN.
2. (U) Concept of Operations. The 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Amb1) provided each brigade with a direct support (DS) aviation company; the remainder of the group was in general support (GS) of the division.

a. 101st Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1): Provided one company in direct support of 1st Brigade operations and alternated with the 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1) to provide direct support to the 2d Brigade. The remainder of the battalion was placed in general support of the division.

During operation RANDOLPH GLEN, Co A, 101st Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1) was placed under operational control of the 2d Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav and by a Division General Order was redesignated F Troop, a provisional air cavalry troop, to provide increased surveillance to the division. It was authorized the following allocation of aircraft; 8 UH1H lift helicopters, 9 UH1C helicopter gunships and 8 light observation helicopters. F Troop was placed on stand down from operational missions on 12 March 1970 for reconversion to Co A, 101st Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1). Reconversion was completed on 27 March 1970 with A Company having 18 UH1H aircraft assigned. By 1 April 1970 A Company had 12 of the 20 authorized UH1H aircraft.

b. 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1): Alternated 2d Brigade direct support aviation companies with the 101st Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1) and provided one direct support company to the 3d Brigade. The battalion further provided both direct and general support to the 1st and 2d ARVN Regt and direct support to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech). The remainder of the battalion was placed in general support of the division.

c. 159th Avn Bn (ASB) (Amb1): Placed in general support of the division to provide air movement of artillery units and infantry troops; diversified logistical support to all elements of the 101st Abn Div (Amb1), 1st Inf Div (ARVN), III MAF, and heavy lift helicopter support throughout the ICTZ.

d. The 163d Avn Co (GS) (Amb1): Provided command and control aircraft in general support of the division.

3. (C) Execution.

a. The daily direct support requirements of the brigades were met with 10 lift aircraft of the DS company in the execution of both logistical resupply and combat assault requirements. Additional aircraft were provided from GS assets when mission requirements dictated. Normal daily operations included one ship ambush insertions, radar raids, nightly flareship standby, firefly and Nighthawk missions.

b. Disposition of Forces: The 101st Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1) units are located

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Indicature 13 (Army Aviation) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACV-32 (R2) (U)

at Camp Eagle and Hue/Phu Bai airfield. The 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl) units are located at Camp Evans. The 159th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl) units are located at Camp Eagle, Hue/Phu Bai airfield and Red Beach, Da Nang. The 163d Avn Co (OH) (Ambl) is located at Camp Eagle.

c. All aircraft were habitually based with their units. Staging of aircraft at other locations for extensive periods of time was not required, with the exception of aircraft committed to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).

d. Additional aviation assets were directed to division psychological operations. Assorted means of communication with the local populace were used; e.g. voice persuasion employing loud speaker systems mounted on helicopters and leaflet drops. These methods, coupled with a display of gunship firepower, were used extensively in Thua Thien Province.

4. (C) Analysis.

a. General. It is felt that the desired objectives of operation RANDOLPH GLEN were met during this reporting period. Through the judicious use of the group's aviation assets the overall operation has been highly successful. The increased mobility and maneuverability, even during the adverse weather conditions, allowed each of the infantry brigades to rapidly reposition their combat troops anywhere in the AO.

b. Personnel. There were significant losses of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men during the time period of the operation, however, this did not affect the overall operation or mission requirements. An increased number of replacement enlisted personnel began arriving in the latter stages of the operation. Officer strengths which dropped below 80% in some units slowly began increasing very late in the operation.

c. Chemical Operations. Chemical missions such as flame drops, CS agents and defoliants were scheduled frequently and successfully in the operation. These were conducted under the direct supervision of the division chemical officer. Flame drops were accomplished several ways. One method was to release a drum of napalm slung below a UH1 helicopter. Another method was to use a barrel release device released from a CH-47, the barrel being detonated by a fuse. Armed helicopters escorted the flame drops normally in unsecure areas. CS drops were accomplished in a similar manner from UH1 and CH-47 aircraft. Defoliants were dispersed using the tank and spray bar adapted for the UH1 series. All chemical missions are employed on a mission basis after prior clearance is obtained from the ground commander. Post strike assessments were noted as successful and conducted by group aircraft or air cavalry assets.

d. Nighthawk Operations. The Nighthawk System became operational in this division on 6 February 1970. The method of operation is to fly a

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Inclosure 13 (Army Aviation) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GREEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) MACVJ-32 (12) (5)

given geographical area between 400 to 500 feet above ground level at a speed of 40 to 60 knots. The operator continues to scan the area looking for targets of opportunity; i.e. enemy movement and/or probable enemy positions. Once a target is identified the operator ceases utilization of the night observation device and illuminates the target area with the Xenon searchlight. At this time the gunner engages the target with the minigun. Nighthawk is most effective in coastal plain and piedmont areas. The system is generally used for, but not limited to night visual reconnaissance of roads, rivers, and areas of probable enemy infiltration in the flatlands. The Nighthawk System has proved to be an effective instrument in denying the enemy his habitual freedom of movement during the hours of darkness.

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AVII-GCT (22 April 1970) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Randolph Glen

DA, HQ XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, ATTN: MACJ
3-05, APO San Francisco 96222

1. (U) Subject Combat Operation After Action Report has been reviewed by this headquarters and is forwarded in accordance with MACV Directive 335-8.

2. (C) This headquarters concurs in the subject report except as noted in the comments below:

a. Inclosure 3, Intelligence, Paragraph 6c: See Inclosure 1, Order of Battle.

b. Inclosure 5, Personnel and Administration, Paragraph 2b: External Military Police support for the 101st Airborne Division was provided through the XXIV Corps Provost Marshal. The Division MP's were relieved of route security for QL-1 (MSR), Route 551 and base security for Phu Bai and Tan My Logistical Support Centers by the 504th MP Battalion which also assisted in the detention, evacuation, and processing of prisoners of war and detainees from division collecting points. Additionally, the 504th MP Battalion assisted in coordinating and integrating GVN National and Military Police support for civilian security cordon operations, and resources/straggler control points established at Hue, Phu Bai, Tan My, and along QL-1. Major portions of two (2) MP companies, including 4 armored car teams and MSR motor patrols were employed by the 504th to accomplish the tasks above.

c. Inclosure 10, Communications:

(1) Paragraph 1c: The successful utilization of secure FM radio communications during this operation is an encouraging sign. Command emphasis on its use is resulting in more widespread benefits of this capability. The high quality of reception using the AS-2236 is a well known fact; however, no additional AS-2236 log periodic antennas are programmed for Army units in the near future. As a result, Corps Signal has initiated action to procure essential components and to evaluate field fabrication techniques for purposes of developing equivalent antennas for use by units located within ICTZ.

(2) Paragraph 2b: Detailed justification is required on all circuit requests, and this is not an isolated case. The large number of tactical circuits being requested within ICTZ necessitates this requirement due to limited channel capacity of the area communications systems. Delays are caused when the requesting units fail to submit circuit requests IAW XXIV Corps SSI.

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report-Operation Randolph Glen

(3) Paragraph 2c: The current frequency authorization within ICTZ consists of 427 FM frequencies for use by US Forces. Due to the geographical features of ICTZ, the Hat Van Pass acts as a dividing line so that the same frequencies can be used in both NICTZ and SICTZ with minimal interference. The use of these frequencies in helicopters in effect eliminates this divider. This problem represents approximately 10 percent of frequency interference problems. The primary frequency interference problem is generated by units operating on unauthorized frequencies. The limited number of frequencies available for use by US Forces precludes the issue of all frequencies on a sole user basis. Frequency interference can be reduced only through mutual cooperation and coordination among using units.

d. Inclosure 11, Engineer, Paragraph 3a(1): This problem is recognized, and its impact on operations of the airmobile engineer battalion is correctly stated. It is questionable, however, whether the solution proposed in para 3a(2) is completely feasible and practical. While a general but brief orientation on airmobile equipment and operations may be appropriate during engineer AIT, a "full fledged" training program such as that described might not be warranted by the numbers of personnel who will be assigned to airmobile engineer units and have been so identified before completing AIT and specialty schools. Further, the variety of techniques employed by different airmobile units, and the new techniques developed through continued experience and personnel turnover, make an OJT program necessary in each engineer unit. An MOS suffix prefix for airmobile engineer personnel may also be unwarranted by the degree of specialized training required for this qualification. It is recommended that appropriate DA and CONARC agencies evaluate this problem and proposed solutions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Order of Battle

/s/
R. D. PECCO
MAJ, AGC
ASST AG

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AVII-GCT (22 Apr 70)

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report-Operation Randolph Glen

ORDER OF BATTLE

(c) XXIV Corps Order of Battle held enemy units at the end of subject operations at the following locations:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
MRITH	YC 2199
675th Arty Regt	vic BA 611 (same)
HQ, 324B Div	YD 2295
29th Inf Regt	YD 2503
803d Inf Regt	YD 3106
812 Inf Regt	YD 0525
HQ, 7th NVA Front	YD 1931 (same)
808th Inf Bn	YD 2333
814th Inf Bn	YD 3135
K10 Sapper Bn	YD 0416
K11 Sapper Bn	YD 1634
K34 Arty Bn	YD 2638
K12 Trans Bn	YD 1327 (same)
6th Inf Regt	YD 3216 (same)
800th Inf Bn	YD 4723
802d Inf Bn	YD 2010
806th Inf Bn	YD 2611
K12 Sapper Bn	YD 3918
K35 Arty Bn	YD 3807

Inclosure 1

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UNIT

LOCATION

5th Inf Regt	YC 6879
804th Inf Bn	YD 9301
810th Inf Bn	YD 5313
439th Inf Bn	YD 7797
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn	YC 6090
Chi Thua II Sapper Bn	YC 7190
K32 Arty Bn	YC 6285
4th Inf Regt	ZC 0090
K4B Inf Bn	ZC 1695
K4C Inf Bn	ZC 0395
71st Sapper Co	YD 9704
C113 LF Co	YD 3830
C114 LF Co	YD 4724
C115 LF Co	YD 6217
C116 LF Co	No change
Phu Vang Special Action Unit	YD 8806
Hue City Recon Bn	YD 6214
Phu Loc Armed Bn	ZC 0988
B5 Prov	YD 0184
204th NVA Div	Unlocated
246th Inf Regt	No change
27th Inf Regt	N of CDMZ
270th Inf Regt	No change

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UNIT

LOCATION

31st Inf Regt	No change
126th Naval Sapper Regt	YD 2189
84th Arty Regt	XD 9874
52d Regt	Unloc in NVN
36th Regt	No change

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