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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (21 Apr 70)

FOR OT UT 701172

28 April 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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as


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 5TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
APO 96238

AVCA QN-TTCO

15 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Headquarters,
5th Transportation Command for the Period Ending 31 January
1970 (RCSCSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVCA QN-GO-H
APO 96238

Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-O
APO 96384

Commanding General
US Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Commanding General
US Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Command Organization:

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Inclosure

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(1) On 7 November 1969 the 854th Transportation Company (TS) and the 540th Transportation Detachment (BARC) were reassigned from the 5th Transportation Command to the 593rd General Support Group.

(2) A chart of the present Command organization is attached as Inclosure 1.

b. (U) Command Group Activities:

(1) On 24 January 1970 COL Clifford C. Reynolds Jr. assumed command of the 5th Trans Comd from COL Charles H. Whitledge, who had been in command since 19 July 1969.

(2) The Command hosted several important guests during the reporting period. VIPs are listed as Inclosure 2.

c. (U) Personnel, Discipline and Safety:

(1) Personnel:

(a) As a result of the reassignment of the 854th Trans Co and the 540th Trans Det, authorized personnel strength for the Command was reduced from 107 officers and 1447 enlisted men to 97 officers and 1095 enlisted men.

(b) Enlisted personnel strength varied between 66% and 70% of authorized strength during most of the quarter, jumping to 75% during the last two weeks of January. Officer strength remained fairly constant, standing at the 73% of authorized strength on 31 January 1970.

(2) Civilian personnel: Local National Direct Hire authorized strength was reduced from 809 to 706. Local National assigned strength was reduced from 846 to 688.

(3) Disciplinary action taken during the reporting period:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Article 15	34	34	42
Summary Court Martial	0	1	0
Special Court Martial	0	0	0
General Court Martial	0	1	1

(4) During the reporting period, the following awards were

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presented to personnel for service in this command:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Bronze Star Medal w/"V" device	1	0	0
Bronze Star Medal (Meritorious)	7	11	8
Army Commendation Medal	30	14	10
(5) Recordable Accidents:			
Military Injury	0	4	0
Army Motor Vehicle	0	0	1
Other	0	0	3

(6) During the reporting period, continued command emphasis has been placed on vehicle and weapons safety. The safe operating condition of vehicles has been insured by improving maintenance and dispatching procedures. To promote weapons safety, increased controls were put on the possession of individual weapons. Enlisted personnel are now required to keep their weapons in the arms room when not on duty, except when the alert condition is Yellow, Option 3 or higher.

d. (C) Security/Provost Marshal: There has been no significant enemy activity directed towards the Qui Nhon Harbor Complex during the reporting period. Increased security measures have been implemented as follows:

(1) A two (2) man searchlight team has been attached to this Command for increased security during the hours of darkness. A twenty-three (23) inch zeon searchlight mounted on a 1-ton vehicle with the mission of patrolling the Qui Nhon Harbor Complex to act as a deterrent against possible enemy avenues of approach.

(2) The PBR's (Patrol Boat River) are now given a briefing by the S-2/PM section daily and advised as to the current Army and Navy intelligence reports so that patrols may be assigned as these reports dictate.

(3) Extremely close coordination has been entered into with the naval units (CSC, IUWG) within the Qui Nhon Harbor.

(4) Anchor collars have been constructed for the Vinnell power ships and any POL or ammunition ships moored in the inner harbor. These devices aid the ship guards in detecting any explosive

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devices which are used by enemy swimmer/sappers.

(5) The HHC Reaction Force has been sufficiently upgraded to a 33-man force which can now be very adequately supplemented by the Han Jin Escort Patrol's five gun jeeps and three gun trucks. Deployment of the Patrol's men and vehicles when they are not on convey provide an excellent deterrent against any hostile force attempting to attack the Harbor Complex.

(6) In anticipation of the Tet holiday period and increased enemy activity directed against the port area, plans have been submitted for a 5th Transportation Command Tactical Operations Center. Such a hardened Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is required in order to insure continuous operation of this Command during any tactical situation. The existing facilities available to this Command are not considered adequate, thus jeopardizing the defense and basic operation of the Qui Nhon Port Complex. Until such a facility can be approved and constructed, a bunker in the HHC compound is presently being reinforced with a 3½" concrete impact shell to accommodate the Command's TOC personnel during any adverse tactical situation.

(7) Realignment of the 5th Trans Comd's security responsibilities has been initiated. Responsibility for perimeter barriers and obstacles and any defense construction has been turned over to the 387th Trans Co, 394th Trans Bn. This will include the construction, repair, and maintenance of fences, bunkers, guard towers and any priority projects related to the perimeter defense of the Qui Nhon Harbor Complex. The effective direction and priority of work done by the 387th Trans Co will be coordinated through S-2, 5th Trans Comd and S-3, 394th Trans Bn. The internal guard responsibility for the Command was also realigned, leaving the 264th Trans Co with the sole responsibility of providing security. This revision will provide greater coordination and a much more efficient internal guard.

(8) Extensive fence construction has been completed and is still continuing at present. Approximately 36 long sleeves of concertina, 22,000 long pickets, 2,850 rolls of barbed wire, and six rolls of tie-down wire have been expended so far in upgrading existing fencing on the new and old causeways and LST Beach. Revetments, towers, and bunker construction has also been initiated by the 387th Trans Co work crews. Combined with the increased awareness of the Command's security procedures and the steady progress of the 387th Trans Co work crews, security deficiencies in the Qui Nhon Port have been greatly diminished.

(9) The new ammunition wharf on the new causeway (CR 093241) allowed 5th Trans Comd to relinquish operations and security at the old Can Decks. Two guard towers are now being constructed at the western end of the ammunition wharf and a total of twelve (12) internal

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and port security guards have been assigned to guard the wharf over a 24-hour period. Efforts by the S-2/PM office to obtain waterline illumination for the new causeway and the new ammunition wharf met with negative results in the form of disapproved work orders and 10-paragraph justification requests. Such waterline illumination would have acted as a deterrent to enemy swimmer/sappers as well as aiding guard surveillance along the new causeway.

e. (C) Operations:

(1) Cargo operations: This headquarters and units within the Command engaged in logistical support operations during the entire 92 days of the reporting period. Tonnage and troop movement figures are:

(a) Tonnage Handled:	S/T	M/T
November	98,335	212,014
December	93,648	188,860
January	117,330	223,641

(b) Tonnage Discharged:	S/T	M/T
November	64,546	130,788
December	68,263	126,718
January	78,542	137,636

(c) Tonnage Shifted:	S/T	M/T
November	3,634	7,049
December	1,156	2,490
January	2,320	3,351

(d) Tonnage Outloaded:	S/T	M/T
November	30,155	74,177
December	24,229	59,652
January	36,468	82,654

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(e) Class V Tonnage Discharged:

	S/T	M/T
November	27,652	27,287
December	19,772	24,335
January	28,602	27,441

(f) SeaLand Tonnage Handled:

November	16,538	45,911
December	14,370	36,140
January	15,394	38,602

(g) Tonnage Handled by Service:

	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOTAL
Army	67,747	63,607	77,319	208,673
Navy	96	45	12	153
Air Force	7,352	6,844	7,845	22,041
Commercial	1,024	407	10,194	11,625
RVN/ROK	5,391	4,593	6,536	16,519
USAID	187	3,782	30	3,999

(h) Train Tonnage Handled

	S/T	M/T
November	789	1,004
December	1,403	3,264
January	2,742	4,279

(1) A total of 3106 ROKA troops debarked and 3368 embarked during the reporting period.

(2) Control of Operations: With the reassignment of the 854th Trans Co and the 540th Trans Det, 5th Trans Comd relinquished control of Vung Ro Bay Outport and all cargo operations there.

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(3) Operational activities:

(a) During the period 10 November 1969 through 2 December 1969 the influx of ammo ships with priority ammo and high seas in the outer harbor combined to necessitate the discharge of ammunition over the DeLong Pier. During these 22 days a total of eight ships were worked with a total of 31,841 S/T discharged. By diverting port and ABD assets to this priority discharge and clearance the stevedores were able to discharge over 1100 S/T per 10-hour shift. Vessels which discharged ammo at the DeLong Pier are listed below:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
SS PRESIDENT ARTHUR	100710-131030 Nov	7,968	9,105
SS AMERICAN LEADER	121000-151330 Nov	650	322
SS RIDER VICTORY	140700-141820 Nov	1,886	1,819
SS THUNDERBIRD	140900-141845 Nov	3,874	3,644
SS QUEENS VICTORY	230935-240830 Nov	6,688	6,868
SS LOMA VICTORY	241020-250850 Nov	5,642	5,343
SS LAREDO VICTORY	291355-301805 Nov	4,989	5,312
USNS PETRARCA	020650-021730 Dec	144	140

(b) Effective 5 December 1969 two newly placed mooring buoys in the ammo anchorage gave the port the additional capability of working two ammunition ships in the inner harbor during periods of heavy seas in the outer harbor. Additional mooring buoys placed in the inner harbor have provided the port with three additional protected anchorages for general cargo/reofer ships.

(c) On 19 December 1969 the new ammo handling facility, including an ammo wharf with six discharge points and an ammo staging area of 20,000 square feet on the new causeway became operational. This facility eliminates the major bottleneck in the port's ammo handling facilities, the old Can Dock, and greatly facilitates clearance of ammunition from the port area to the ABD and using units.

(d) The arrival of the LST-Barge Highland Tender on 1 December 1969 and the deep draft vessel Anne Taylor on 29 December 1969 marked the initial use of Qui Nhon Port facilities to load nongovernment chartered commercial vessels with scrap bought by private contractors from U.S. Government PDO. The Highland Tender was worked by the private contractor's own personnel with the cargo being transported down by the government contractor, Han Jin Transportation Company. It took 27 days to load just 2,000 S/T of spent brass and shell casings on the Highland Tender. The Anne Taylor, worked exclusively by the government contractor, Han Jin, took two days to backload 1,720 S/T of scrap material.

(e) On 20 January 1970 the LT 1969, while assisting in the

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berthing of the SeaLand vessel S. S. Beauregard, was rammed by the Beauregard and subsequently sunk; there were no casualties involved. The location of the LT 1969 effectively blocked berth N-1 on the De-Long Pier, limiting the port to three berths until it is salvaged. As the LT 1969 was the only large Army tug in port the capability of the port to move ships has been severely limited to periods of nearly ideal conditions until another large tug is made operational to take the place of the LT 1969.

(f) During the period 18-20 January 1970 the port of Qui Nhon was involved in a project testing the feasibility of shipping ammunition by SeaLand vans. The first increment of 22 vans arrived aboard the PAC Barge 192-2, and were discharged using the military resources of the 285th Trans Co and the 8th Trans Gp in under 2½ hours. The barge was then backloaded by SeaLand with empty vans in five hours, for a total turnaround time of 7½ hours. The first increment of 22 vans hauled a total of 286.6 L/T of ammunition. The second increment of 22 vans arrived aboard the John U.D. Page on 20 January 1970. These vans were offloaded by military resources in one hour and 40 minutes with the SeaLand backloading operation taking two hours and 45 minutes for a total turnaround time of four hours and 25 minutes. 290 L/T of ammunition were carried by the second increment of vans.

(g) An ADP system has been initiated to expedite the flow of cargo manifests from CONUS loading ports. All cargo manifests destined for Qui Nhon are now transceived on IBM cards to the ADP section of Long My Depot. Documentation clerks at Long My feed these cards into a UNIVAC 1005 computer and run off cargo manifests and hatch tallies. This information is delivered to S-3, 5th Trans Comd, Documentation by courier where it is used to further assist in discharging vessel cargo. This system is considered to be in the testing phase until 31 March 1970. Until such time as it is approved as totally operational the present system of airmailing manifests and other vessel information will continue.

(4) Training activities: Vietnamization activities during this period included the signing of an agreement for joint ammunition discharge operations at the Can Dock, with subsequent indefinite loan of the Can Dock to ARVN once operations commenced at the new U.S. ammo wharf. ARVN personnel and equipment from the 201st Terminal Service Company and 203rd Medium Boat Group have participated in LOTS, stream and pier cargo discharge operations. Approximately 10 ARVN personnel have received on-the-job training in the supervisory and technical skills of terminal service and marine craft operations under Project Buddy.

f. (U) Comptroller: None.

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g. (U) Construction in the port area: The ammunition offloading facility at the port was completed by C Co, 84th Engineers in December 1969 and is currently being utilized for the discharge of ammo from barges. Work continued on preparation of reclaimed land for a final staging area in the port complex utilizing personnel and equipment from within the Command. In January, work was suspended and the remainder of the project is being placed under contract. Widening of the causeways and storage areas was hampered by almost continuous monsoon rain. As a result, the majority of earth moving equipment was involved in filling washout areas to save valuable storage space on the causeways. However, improving weather in the middle and latter part of January permitted the clearing and improving of approximately 30,000 square feet of causeway in the vicinity of the ammo wharf for storage of cargo. Work on hardening a personnel bunker in the Headquarters Company compound for future use as an alternate Harbor Tactical Operations Center is nearing completion. If the work order for a new, hardened Tactical Operations Center is approved, the present alternate Tactical Operations Center will be utilized by Port Security for their operations.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel:

(1) Observation: Many local national direct hire personnel are not performing in the job for which they were originally hired.

(2) Evaluation: The present TDA which authorizes local national employees is obsolete and does not reflect the requirements of this Command.

(3) Recommendation: That a manpower survey be conducted and a new TDA prepared reflecting current requirements for local national direct hire personnel.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Observation: Due to operational requirements placed on this Command for offloading ammunition, this reporting period experienced ammunition ships being brought in from the outer harbor to the inner harbor's northern anchorage to be discharged.

(2) Evaluation: Historically, there has been a high level of enemy activity in the "salt-flat" area approximately 1,000 meters west of the northern anchorage. The "salt-flat" area has been used as an enemy infiltration route into the city of Qui Nhon and has been identified as the point where enemy swimmers/sappers entered the water for their successful sabotage mission against the power ship Memphis

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on 11 June 1969. The terrain in the area consists of tall grass, underbrush, and numerous waterways, making detection extremely difficult. Since a vessel at the anchorage is vulnerable from all four sides, a minimum of two harbor defense watercraft are required at all times to patrol the area. This weakens the overall defense of other harbor vessels and facilities as the patrol boat commitment is centered on the ammunition ship, leaving an absence of manned patrol craft for the remaining areas within the inner harbor. The problem of possible stand-off indirect fire attack or swimmer/sapper attack is compounded by the fact that it takes at least one hour to maneuver an ammunition ship out of the anchorage during daylight hours, and an estimated two hours during the hours of darkness (although it has never been attempted at night). This makes any ship at that location extremely vulnerable to total destruction.

(3) Recommendation: That discharge of ammunition ships at the northern inner harbor anchorage be limited to those cases of extreme operational necessity. If ammunition ships are brought in, that all local land, water and air security elements be advised of the fact and required to increase readiness and vigilance for the period that the ship is in the inner harbor. Also, that two additional PBR boats with crews be made available for 24 hour operations for the period that an ammunition ship is in the inner harbor.

c. (U) Operations:

(1) Inoperational time of the 60 ton BD Crane:

(a) Observation: The US Army BD 6065 was deadlined on 10 November 1969 and, due to unavailability of repair parts, remained inoperational until 14 January 1970.

(b) Evaluation: As one of only two BD cranes in the port of Qui Nhon, the BD 6065 is an extremely valuable asset and, when operational, is in almost continuous use in the discharge and backload of deep draft vessels. The supporting marine maintenance activity experienced extreme difficulty in locating parts, many of which were obsolete to the supply system. Once parts were located, numerous shipping delays were experienced.

(c) Recommendation: That a better system of locating and procuring hard-to-get parts for vital pieces of equipment such as BD cranes be instituted.

(2) Operations with the commercial contractor in backloading scrap:

(a) Observation: The LST-Barge Highland Tender berthed on the barge quay 1 December 1969. The civilian contractor attempted to work the barge with his own personnel and equipment, utilizing

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the government contractor, Han Jin, only to transport the cargo, empty shell casings, to the barge quay. The equipment and the personnel used to load the barge proved to be inadequate, which resulted in a loading time of 27 days for just 2,000 S/T of cargo. As a comparison, the deep draft vessel, Anne Taylor, was worked entirely by the government contractor and loaded 1,720 S/T in two days.

(b) Evaluation: The 27 days taken to backload the Highland Tender resulted in an inordinate waste of Government and contractor assets. 10 contractor trucks and approximately 1/3 of the total available barge quay space were tied up for almost a month - hindering and limiting other cargo operations within the port.

(c) Recommendation: That any contractor buying scrap from PDO and desiring to use government port facilities to ship the scrap out of country be required to utilize the port's contractor in order to minimize the tieup of government assets.

(3) Prestaging of scrap cargo for commercial contractors:

(a) Observation: Vera, a commercial contractor who bought scrap tires from PDO, requested on 6 December 1969 to start moving the tires to port to prestage for a ship which they stated they had chartered and that was due within the week. To date Vera has yet to charter a ship and the tires are taking up storage area within the port.

(b) Evaluation: When it became apparent Vera had not chartered a ship the flow of tires to the port was stopped. At this time there are approximately 5,000 tires staged in the port taking up a total of 40,000 square feet of storage space which could better be used for government cargo. This limits the capability of the port to react to the changing situations and restricts the amount of government cargo which can be staged in the port.

(c) Recommendation: That before any commercial contractor cargo is moved to the port, proof of vessel charter and arrival date be required of the contractor.

(4) Shipment of ammunition by SeaLand containers:

(a) Observation: On 18 January 1970 22 loaded SeaLand vans were discharged from the PAC Barge 192-2 in two hours and 30 minutes; the total weight of cargo discharged was 290 L/T.

(b) Evaluation: By weight the ammunition discharge was much quicker than what can be achieved in discharge of a standard deep draft vessel. Combined with the obvious advantages of SeaLand containers in clearance, in direct shipment to the ABD and using units and in eliminating much handling of the cargo, this method of shipping

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ammunition is a definitely preferable capability which should be exploited to its limits.

(c) Recommendation: That the shipment of ammunition in SeaLand vans be continued on a regular basis.

(5) Cleaning of retrograde equipment:

(a) Observation: On 13 December 1969, the SS Andrew Jackson sailed from Qui Nhon for Newport with 528 S/T and 143 M/T of retrograde vehicles aboard, ultimately destined for Mobile, Alabama. Vehicles were required to be discharged at Newport for cleaning which had not been accomplished at Qui Nhon.

(b) Evaluation: Equipment in question had been cleaned at Qui Nhon in accordance with known procedures and to recognized standards. However, unbeknown to responsible personnel in the port, new regulations and significantly increased standards of cleanliness of retrograde cargo had been initiated prior to the loading of the SS Andrew Jackson. In effect cargo was to be in such condition that it required no further cleaning at port of discharge, which was not the case previously. The achievement of these standards requires revision of procedures and extensive construction of facilities, to include hardstand and high pressure water systems. Interim measures have been taken to the fullest extent possible, but have proven unequal to the task.

(c) Recommendation: That maximum effort be placed on construction of required cleaning facilities. Until such time as these facilities are complete, the preclearance standards, which are unattainable with existing equipment and facilities, should be suspended.

(6) Shipment of ARVN cargo:

(a) Observation: On 15 December 1969 a M41A1 tank belonging to ARVN was shipped to Saigon aboard the SS American Corsair to be rebuilt. The vehicle was discharged onto a barge where its main gun was accidentally fired by a guard, resulting in civilian casualties and property damage.

(b) Evaluation: The Transportation Control and Movement Document pertaining to this shipment contained certification in accordance with AR 740-20, but equipment did not contain DA Form 9-1 (Certification). However, ARVN is furnished with AR 740-20 for advisory purposes only and is not required to comply with its provisions. ARVN had not issued written instructions to require inspection and certification. Subsequent inspections by U.S. Forces of ARVN cargo has revealed repeated occurrences where ARVN ~~conex~~ containers or vehicles contained live ammunition or other dangerous items.

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(c) Recommendation: It is now the policy of this Command that all ARVN shipments of conexes or vehicles will be inspected by a U.S. Army commissioned officer for compliance with AR 740-20, regardless of previous certification.

(7) Ordering of contractor equipment:

(a) Observation: The established method of hiring contractor trucks for port clearance was to procure all equipment on a 24-hour basis.

(b) Evaluation: A greater amount of port clearance is accomplished during the day than is at night, primarily because of road restrictions at night. Thus, more trucks are needed between the hours of 0630 and 1730 than from 1830 to 0530. Better utilization of trucks could be achieved by hiring them on a 12-hour basis with fewer trucks on order at night than during the day.

(c) Recommendation: That ordering of trucks on a 12-hour basis, which has already been implemented, be continued.

(8) Throughput of ammunition:

(a) Observation: Throughput of ammunition was initiated in November 1969 in order to rapidly clear critical ammunition being discharged at the DeLong Pier.

(b) Evaluation: Shipping time from the port to units in the field was substantially reduced by loading ammo at the port onto line haul trailers and moving them directly to outlying ASPs. This procedure eliminated unnecessary handling of ammo at Qui Nhon ABD, reduced the number of contractor trucks on hire for port clearance, and enabled large amounts of ammo to be cleared from the port in minimum time.

(c) Recommendation: The throughput concept should be employed whenever possible in distribution of ammunition.

(9) Contract provisions:

(a) Observation: Under the Logistical Support Article of the FY 1970 contract, Han Jin was provided access to beer and soda sold in bulk by the Vietnam Regional Exchange. In November 1969, Han Jin requested that this provision be implemented.

(b) Evaluation: Interested agencies at MACV and USARV were unaware of this contract provision and raised questions as to its legality and the possibility of rate concessions in connection with its implementation. The contracting officer at this level did not have sufficient information or authority to resolve the issues.

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Personnel at Procurement Agency level who had negotiated the provision into the contract had since rotated. As a result, implementation was not achieved until late January 1970 and considerable effort was expended to justify a provision that had already been negotiated into the existing contract. The delay was detrimental to relations between the contractor and his employees and embarrassing to the U.S. Government.

c. Recommendation: Contract provisions which are likely to be legally questionable or which may affect other contract provisions if implemented should be coordinated with all pertinent U.S. Government agencies by procurement agencies before they are negotiated into the contract. Furthermore, the contract officer at unit level should be thoroughly briefed ahead of time on the correct procedure for implementation.

d. (U) Organization: None.

e. (U) Training: None.

f. (U) Logistics: Engineer Projects:

(a) Observation: Monsoon rains caused numerous washouts along the shoreline in sandy storage areas even though they were capped with eight to twelve inches of laterite clay.

(b) Evaluation: The causeway storage areas are essential to the marshalling of both incoming and backload cargo. A compacted laterite clay cap, graded to a gradual slope and sufficiently soaked with soil binder provides an adequate and economical surface upon which to store cargo during the rainy season. However, a drainage ditch running parallel to the shoreline with drainage pipes emptying into the bay should be dug approximately four to six feet from the edge of the causeway. This would prevent large volumes of water from causing washouts and would not materially decrease the area presently available for storage of cargo.

(c) Recommendation: During the dry season, sections of the causeway approximately 50 feet by 600 feet will be cleared of all cargo for approximately two weeks at a time to allow for capping and sloping of laterite, treatment with soil binder and preparation of an adequate drainage system along the shoreline edge.

g. (U) Communications: None.

h. (U) Material: None.

i. (U) Other: None.

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AVCA QN-TTCO

15 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

3. (U) Section 3. DA Survey Information: None.

C. C. Reynolds, Jr.

C. C. REYNOLDS JR.

COL, TC

Commanding

3 Incl

1. Command Organizational Chart

~~2. List of Distinguished Visitors~~

~~3. Command Operational Chart~~

Incl 2 and 3 wd HQ, DA

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AVCA 24-60-11 (15 Feb 70) 1st Incl

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Transportation Command for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCU CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APC 9623c

1. (C) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by headquarters, 5th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters and considered adequate with the following comments:

a. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 a: Concur. A proposed TDA is being prepared for submission to 1st Logistical Command expressing the current needs of each subordinate command. A letter was published by this headquarters on 13 February 1970 which will give the personnel office a tool with which to control local national direct hire (LNDDH) personnel and insure that they are occupying the TDA and line number for which they were hired.

b. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 b: Concur. Ammunition ships are brought into the inner harbor only when seas are too rough to unload in the outer harbor and ammunition on board is determined to be critical.

c. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (1): Concur. US Army Barge Derrick #0065 is powered by an Atlas Imperial Engine, Model 62M66B. This unit is approximately 24 years old and because of its age, problems were encountered in identifying and locating required parts. A program is now established to update all barge derricks with new standard engines beginning in September 1970.

d. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (2): Concur. In the future scrap contractors, utilizing the military port, will be required to use the military contractor.

e. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (3): Concur. Prior to the movement of material to the port for staging, a contractor will be required to offer proof of vessel charter and arrival date.

f. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (4): Concur. Concept is being reviewed at this time by USMAC. Present plans are to increase use of RC-RC and Sea-land containers until incoming ammunition is moved exclusively by these methods.

g. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (5): Nonconcur. Construction has been started on port cleaning facilities, but even though construction is not complete, equipment passing through the port for retrograde will still be required to pass USHS/DA inspections. A 5,000 gallon water tanker with high capacity pump can be towed to the causeway to re-clean vehicles not initially accepted by the public health agency.

h. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (6): Concur. Shipment of ARVB cargo.

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AVCA QN-GO-H (15 Feb 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Transportation Command for Period Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

i. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (7): Concur. Ordering of contractor equipment.

j. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (8): Concur. Ammunition through-put shipments will be coordinated with the 8th Transportation Group and through-put to ASP's and field units whenever possible.

k. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 c (9): Nonconcur. Contract provisions which are likely to be legally questionable would certainly be coordinated with pertinent US Government agencies if such provisions have been identified by USAPAV as questionable. However, to identify all provisions that could be questionable, each contract would have to be routed through all staff sections of USARV and MACV. Such a procedure is clearly not feasible. MACV J-4 (Procurement Policy Division) and J-1 have advised USAPAV to modify the questionable provision to limit Han Jin to 2 cans of beverage per day per employee. Furthermore, beverage must be opened and consumed in a Han Jin "Club Hall."

l. SECTION 2, paragraph 2 f: Concur. The 5th Transportation Command methods are adequate to control erosion in areas susceptible to washing.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: QN 2161

G. L. Lamborn
G. L. LAMBORN
CPT, AGC
ASST Adjutant General

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AVCA GO-MH (15 Feb 70) 2d Ind

17 MAR 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Transportation Command for period ending 31 January 1970 HCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow: Reference item concerning personnel, page 9, paragraph 2a. Concur with comments under sub-paragraphs 2a(1). Non-concur with comment 2a(2). The unit TOE/MTOE provides a mission statement, capabilities and authorization, and requisition base for personnel. Under Program 6 civilianization low skill military positions were identified for fill by Local National Direct Hire personnel (LNDH). Those positions being filled by LNDHs should be performing functions which otherwise would be performed by military personnel. Eighty five percent of the LNDH personnel vouchered to the 5th Trans Comd and subordinate units are authorized under Program 6 civilianization. Non-concur with that much of recommendation, subparagraph 2a(3), which states "that a manpower survey be conducted." LNDH positions authorized by TOE/MTOE do not require further appraisal. LNDH positions other than Program 6 should be justified by workload data and, along with Program 6 personnel identified by a nonstandard remark, documented by TDA action and forwarded for approval by DA. Concur with that much of paragraph 2a(3) which states: "and a new TDA prepared reflecting current requirements for LNDH personnel." Actions are under study to prepare and submit an augmentation TDA at Group and separate Battalion identifying LNDH positions.

3. (C) Reference item concerning discharge of ammunition, page 9, paragraph 2b. Concur in part. The current policy of bringing ammunition ships into the inner harbor only when heavy seas in the outer harbor preclude the offload of critical ammunition is valid. The vulnerability of a vessel located in the inner harbor ammo anchorage is not questioned, however, it appears that the primary threat area would be that to the west called the "salt-flat". If security guards are posted aboard the vessel and the provision of Log Regs 190-35 and 190-36 are followed, one watercraft should be sufficient to patrol the area around one deep draft vessel. Section 2, paragraph b(2) states that the utilization of two watercraft for ammo anchorage patrol weakens the overall defense of the rest of the harbor. Section 2, paragraph b(3) recommends that two additional PBRs be made available for patrol during that period in which an ammo ship is located in the inner harbor. The PBR Detachment at Qui Nhon currently has six PBRs and five Boston Whalers to provide waterborne security patrols. During the day three boats patrol the harbor and at night four boats patrol the inner harbor. One additional boat to provide a patrol close in around the ammo ship should be sufficient unless intelligence indicates an all out coordinated attack in which case the vessel should be moved to the outer harbor.

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4. (U) Reference item concerning cleaning of retrograde equipment, page 12, paragraph c(5). Concur with paragraph g, 1st Ind. Command emphasis has been placed upon this problem and construction has been accelerated to complete the final rinse facility as early as possible.
5. (U) Reference item concerning engineer projects, page 14, paragraph f. Concur. Methods adopted by the 5th Transportation Command are adequate to control erosion. Capping of storage area with laterite and preparation of drainage system as recommended is being carried out as a self-help project by the 5th Transportation Command.
6. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ME Clark

M. E. CLARK
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

TEL: LBN 4862

CF: USASUPCOM, QNH
5th Trans Comd

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AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 5th
Transportation Command for the Period Ending 31 January 1970
(RCSCSFOR-65) (R-1)(U)


Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 28 MAR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "Local National Direct hire", page 9, paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1a and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2: concur. Requirements are presently being reviewed and a proposed TDA finalized for submission to USARPAC. In addition, the 5th Transportation Command has been included in the proposed USARPAC FY 71 manpower survey schedule.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L. D. MURRAY
CPT. ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Log Comd
5th Trans Comd

GPOP-DT (15 Feb 70) 4th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Transportation Command for Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 APR 1970


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. I. SHORT
CPT, AGC
AMT AG



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