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FOR OT UT 69B039

9 October 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Ellis W. Williamson, CG, 25th Infantry Division, Period 3 August 1968 to 15 September 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG Ellis W. Williamson, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. The two systems (projects) discussed on page 19 in paragraph 5 of the section titled Research and Development are hazardous and are not authorized for use in the field.

5. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG Ellis W. Williamson, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division for the period 3 August 1968 to 15 September 1969.

2. MG Williamson is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate joint colleges and service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. P. Vision
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCAG
13 September 1969

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report (RCS-CSF04-74) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVDCAG-DST
APO San Francisco 96375

This report is classified only because of the classified portion at TAB K. It is regraded unclassified when separated from the classified portion.

FOR THE COMMANDER

E. L. SHIRLEY
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCG

10 September 1969

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report (RCS-CSPOR-74) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO San Francisco 96375

1. Attached hereto is a group of comments on some of the principal policies of the 25th Infantry Division during my command period. This cover letter is intended only to emphasize those command attitudes which I feel are particularly important.

2. A commander's principal concern must be the motivation of his subordinates and consequent improvement of their capabilities, since they are his most valuable asset. A major portion of his time should be devoted to the psychological well-being of the individuals within his command.

3. A commander should order his subordinate leaders to be optimistic and to be decisive. He must direct them to exude an air of confidence and accomplishment, and insure that they do not lapse into despondency or become pessimistic, for nothing could be more destructive to a unit. In charging them with decisiveness, however, he must make a covenant with these subordinates which allows them to make mistakes. He must convince them that they can be wrong and still survive so long as they are active, aggressive and getting something done.

4. A commander must encourage creativity in his subordinates and must himself improvise and develop new approaches toward a better accomplishment of the mission. The "half-life" of a new idea on the battlefield is all too short. To remain mentally keen and to retain the initiative over the enemy, a military force must be constantly seeking constructive changes in its methods.

5. The higher headquarters must "force feed" to make all types of support available to the subordinate units. It is just as important to have the impetus come from the rear with respect to firepower and administrative support as it is with the proven concept of "higher to lower" logistical support. Attention and effort must be focused downward so that ultimately the entire power of the organization bears upon the enemy.
6. A commander must constantly strive to improve not only the availability but also the usage of his assets. For example, an operationally available rate for Army aircraft of 85% or better is not necessarily worthy unless those aircraft are efficiently employed.

7. Finally and most vital; people are important! What people think is important. Motivation spells the difference between mediocrity and excellence. A unit in combat should be taught to fight with bullets, not bodies (fire-power instead of manpower). In so doing, the men will learn that their commanders respect them and value their protection. In turn, these men will perform to the best of their abilities.

ELLIS W. WILLIAMSON
Major General, USA
Commanding
Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debrief Report by: Major General Ellis W. Williamson

Duty Assignment: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division

Inclusive Dates: 3 August 1968 - 15 September 1969

Date of Report: 10 September 1969

U.S. Role In Support Of Local Government

U.S. Military Forces (25th Infantry Division) (U)

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Degree of Involvement

1. The 25th Infantry Division participates at all levels in the prosecution of the counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Our main effort, due to circumstances, has been toward the defeat of the enemy main force units as they attempted to launch offensive operations against Saigon and Tay Ninh City. In this, we have succeeded to the point where we can place greater emphasis on the elimination of the local forces and the VC Infrastructure. In August and September of 1968, the Division broke the enemy's "Third Offensive", aimed at Tay Ninh City. From February through April of 1969, the Division fought a series of intense battles along the Saigon River and along the Cambodian Border as the enemy attempted to move on the capitol city of Saigon. Over four thousand enemy were killed during this period, and the main force units were dealt a blow from which they have not yet recovered. In June of 1969, the enemy again chose Tay Ninh City as his objective, but the combined 25th Infantry Division and ARVN forces in that area frustrated their every move.

2. Concurrent with these major engagements, the Division pursued aggressive psychological operations and civic action programs, and severely damaged the strong VC Infrastructure in Hau Nghia Province through the use of special counter VCI teams.
Disposition of Division Forces

The 25th Infantry Division's Tactical Area of Interest encompasses Tay Minh, Hau Nghia, and Long An Provinces, and is generally contiguous to the TAOI of the 25th AIVN Division. The brigade areas of operation generally coincide with provincial boundaries, 1st Brigade - Tay Ninh Province, 2d and 3d Brigades - Hau Nghia Province, and 3d Brigade, 9th Division - Long An Province. Battalion AO's follow district boundaries wherever practicable. This is done to facilitate coordination of military operations and civil affairs.
Relationship with Government Forces

1. The 25th Infantry Division maintains formal liaison with all governmental/military echelons from Corps down to District level. ARVN III Corps has a permanent liaison party with the Division. The Division provides liaison parties to the ARVN 25th Division at Duc Hoa, and to the ARVN Airborne Brigade at Tay Ninh. The Division's brigades are charged with maintaining liaison to the Province Headquarters: 1st Brigade – Tay Ninh Province, 3rd Brigade – Hau Nghia Province, and 3rd Brigade, 9th Division – Long An Province. Battalions effect liaison with the districts through their Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoons, which are battalion organizations located at District Headquarters, operating under the direction of the DIOCC.

2. The quality of our relationships with the GVN elements has been generally good. Problems have occurred but the proper balance of respect, patience and judicious pressure has resulted in a gradual increase in their pride, self-confidence and efficiency.
Operations

1. During the latter part of 1968 and the early part of 1969, the 25th Infantry Division maneuver elements engaged the enemy main forces in a series of large and intense battles, as they attempted to move first against the city of Saigon, and later against Tay Ninh City. These engagements were highly destructive to the NVA and VC main force units. Realizing the futility of open combat against our superior forces, they have modified their tactics and are placing increasing emphasis on attacks by fire, terrorism, and sapper tactics—all designed to produce the maximum damage and propaganda value, while holding their losses to a minimum.

2. These changing battlefield conditions have allowed the Division to reorient its objectives. Contact with and elimination of the main force units are still sought, however, the Division can now apply a greater share of its resources and energy to the elimination of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, to strengthening the local government through advice and judicious assistance, and to preparing the ARVN military forces for the full assumption of their responsibility in combating the insurgency. We have set ourselves a balanced, three-fold mission: 1) elimination of enemy main force units, 2) pacification, and 3) upgrading GVN military forces.
Tactics

Our principle in this Division has always been that our personnel would be used to find the enemy and then apply their superior weaponry to the destruction of the enemy. There is no virtue in fighting the enemy on his terms. Our men have the skill and determination to pursue this enemy constantly, under any conditions, and when they have him fixed, they have the ability to rapidly direct destructive firepower against him. The men of this Division have driven the equivalent of three enemy divisions from our area at the least possible cost in friendly casualties. Our most notable example of this principle occurred on the nights of 5 and 6 June 1969 when the enemy attacked Fire Support Base Crook northwest of Tay Ninh with three battalions and massive fire support. Crook was defended by only one rifle company and one artillery battery, but the Division used Crook as the focus of a counter-attack by fire which resulted in over 400 NVA soldiers killed, and only one U.S. soldier wounded seriously enough for evacuation.
Combined US/ARVN Operations

1. Combined operations are being conducted from platoon to battalion level within the 25th Infantry Division TAOI. Our purpose, as stated earlier, is to improve the combat efficiency of the ARVN, RF, and PF units so that ultimately they will be self-sufficient.

2. These combined operations are of all types: airmobile, ground and mounted reconnaissance, waterborne, ambush, and long range patrol. The Vietnamese have displayed an eagerness towards this program largely because it does much for their pride. One of the key principles in these combined operations is that the Vietnamese will be given as much credit for the tactical successes as possible. This is done by crediting them officially with a proportionate share of the body count and weapons captured and by awards for valor. Our basic premise here is that if we can instill in the Vietnamese an image of their own courage and professionalism, they will attempt to live up to that image.
"Forced Feed" Fire Support

1. The successful implementation of the "bullets not bodies" principle just discussed, required a reeducation of commanders at all levels. Traditionally, we have taught our people economy of force, using only that combat power required to achieve the objective. This principle is valid in a conflict in which the majority of maneuver units are in contact with the enemy at the same time. But this is not the prevailing condition in Vietnam. Quite often there is only one significant contact in a Division area at a particular time. If a rifle company makes contact with the enemy, there are generally combat assets at all echelons which can be diverted to support that contact without degrading other operations in progress. The commander at the scene, however, often failed to realize that this great amount of support could and would be placed immediately at his disposal.

2. This situation was changed through continued command emphasis and through "force feeding". In any significant contact, the Division Tactical Operations Center will dispatch a Forward Air Controller, a helicopter fire team, a load of tactical CS gas, and a "flame bath" helicopter with an immediate napalm capability. The ground commander is expected to employ these assets along with his organic weapons and all available artillery support in a coordinated, continuous attack on the enemy position so that the enemy force is eliminated in the shortest possible time. This reduces our casualties, increases the enemy's, and precludes our becoming involved in a drawn-out, inconclusive fight.

3. Our commanders have had to become masters of fire support coordination, but they have been ably assisted. The artillery LNO coordinates all artillery support and the Forward Air Controller controls the patterns of all aircraft in the area, and provides the initial briefing and ground orientation for the air support elements moving in. This clears the command net of extraneous traffic, and allows the commander to deal with fewer elements.
Fire Support Base Evolution

1. Fire support bases within the 25th Infantry Division have undergone an evolution in both their physical configuration and in the concept of their defense. The basic purpose of the fire support base has always been offensive, i.e., a point from which offensive operations are launched and supported, positioned in such a manner to achieve the maximum interdiction of enemy activity. When the enemy attempted to eliminate these positions, however, our attention and efforts were so strongly focused upon defending them that we often failed to take full advantage of the fact that the enemy had massed and was engaged in a form of combat in which we were inherently superior.

2. During the late summer and fall of 1968, many engagements were fought at Division fire support bases in the Tay Ninh area. These battles were Division successes, but a critical appraisal of the bases and their defense indicated many aspects which could be improved.

3. Most of the bases at this time were elliptical. This configuration does not allow for an equal distribution of firepower in all directions. The bases were also quite large, requiring two to three rifle companies for their defense and consequently having a high density of bunkers on the perimeter. The large area covered by these bases also provided an adequate target for enemy indirect fire weapons. Fire control between artillery and air fires was maintained by the use of a "safety line," artillery impacting on one side of the line, and air support striking on the other side. This control measure was successful and has been retained, but the amount and distribution of supporting fires were not developed to their full potential.

4. The elliptical configuration was rejected in favor of the circular, which provided equal firepower in all directions and allowed for a much faster emplacement; all elements of the base could be constructed on given azimuths at stated distances from a center point. This reduction in construction time became essential as the enemy began to deviate from his normal two- to three-day reconnaissance of a new position and began to attack bases on the first or second night after construction was begun.

5. The bases were also reduced in size, eventually to the point where they could be defended by one rifle company. This made many more companies available for night ambushes and mobile patrol bases, extending the volume and range of the Division's offensive operations. The smaller area also resulted in far fewer enemy indirect fire projectiles impacting within the perimeter with a consequent reduction in friendly casualties. At this point, the concept of an engagement at one of these bases was two phased - initially defensive, then shifting to the offensive. As the enemy fire slackened and the pressure on the base reduced, the supporting fires were shifted to block the enemy routes of withdrawal and to attack the enemy weapons positions. The zone of contact was made deeper and the battle became offensive.
6. These initial modifications proved highly successful in a series of engagements fought along the Cambodian Border from February through April of 1969. Small, circular patrol bases manned by one rifle company and one howitzer platoon, and constructed within a single day were emplaced along the Cambodian Border as a lure for the enemy main forces which were only several kilometers away. The apparent vulnerability of these small positions so close to the enemy sanctuary was too tempting and the enemy seized at the bait.

7. In each of these engagements, the enemy used a heavy volume of supporting fire with negligible results. The target was small and very well fortified, holding our casualties to a minimum. The enemy assault forces ran into a storm of carefully preplanned firepower which not only broke the assaults but was shifted to attack their withdrawing elements and their supporting weapons. The results of these engagements testified to the efficiency of our new techniques.

8. The final phase of this evolution came from an appreciation of what we had accomplished. We could rapidly emplace a small, heavily fortified base in a manner calculated to cause an enemy reaction. These small positions could be adequately defended by a small force and well planned and coordinated supporting fires. These fires could be shifted to an offensive role once the immediate threat to the base was removed.

9. Our next step was simply to view the entire situation as a Division offensive. The base was the anvil and the Division was the hammer. Fire support, or more properly, "offensive fires", were planned for the entire battle area. Enemy assault troops, attack positions, supporting weapons positions, and command centers would all be struck simultaneously; when activity declined in these areas, the routes of withdrawal and likely assembly areas would be attacked.

10. This system of deep, simultaneous and continuous fires was employed at Fire Support Base Croo on the nights of 5 and 6 June and represents the culmination of both the fire support base evolution and our "forced feed" fire support concept.
Aviation Asset Control

1. Organic aviation assets of the 25th Infantry Division were primarily employed to provide the required command and control, resupply, liaison, reconnaissance and similar missions in support of the ground commander. Even though seven subordinate headquarters were assigned resources, the Division Army Aviation element was required to continually assess available assets against required missions and proportionately task subheadquarters to support Divisional missions. This continual monitoring of Army Aviation enabled the Division to fly in excess of 9,000 hours per month, yet maintain approximately 85% availability.

2. The changing configuration and tactics of enemy units necessitated maximum surveillance of the battlefield which was accomplished by a reallocation of OH-6 aircraft, which, when combined with AH-1G gunships, provided the Division with a total of six Light Scout Teams.

3. The "Force Feed" concept required constant management of UH-1 assets to insure rapid response to the ground commander in contact. Initially, an uncommitted aircraft would be provided with Flamebath/CS. If this wasn't possible due to prior commitments, then, based on priority, aircraft performing other missions would be diverted to support the contact.
1. During the first week of April 1969, the 25th Infantry Division initiated a program to computerize the large volume of data which results from operations in the Division area. The ultimate objective of this program is to achieve the highest operational efficiency. The more immediate goals are to draw accurate conclusions on the efficiency of tactical operations, to identify trends of enemy activity, to provide accurate data for operational reports, and to formulate a sound basis upon which the Division can plan its operations.

2. The nature of the Vietnam conflict poses unique problems for those who must interpret what is happening and for those who must plan to do something about it. The fluctuating contact with a variety of enemy forces over differing terrain produces a great volume of unassimilated information. Friendly operations also generate a great deal of valuable information, but due to the pressures of combat, it is often not recognized. Present methods of analyzing and interpreting this mass of information consume much time and effort, and often fail to exploit its full value.

3. In order to reduce the time and effort involved in analyzing and interpreting this information, and to exploit its full potential, the Division developed a system employing the UNIVAC 1005 computer. The raw data for each program is obtained from a careful screening of the daily Intelligence Summary, the Operational Situation Report, and the G2 and G3 Journals, by the G3 Doctrine and Training Division. There are no additional report requirements imposed on the field commanders. The raw data is extracted from these source documents and recorded manually on work cards on a daily basis. These work cards are then delivered to the AG Machine Records Branch, where they are converted to punch cards and processed through the computer which produces the desired programmed data in a tabular form. The data is then analyzed by the G3 Doctrine and Training Division and applied to graphs, charts and map overlays for ease of interpretation by G2 and G3 personnel.

4. The first efforts of this program were directed toward countering the high incidence of road mining in the TACI. The computer program pinpointed four areas as the critical mine areas. The Division concentrated its efforts in these areas through the use of seismic sensors with artillery response, ambush patrols, and night aviation surveillance and significantly curtailed mining activity in those areas.

5. This system is not designed to supplant normal staff procedures or sound judgement. It does, however, reduce a great amount of data to manageable proportions and presents it in a manner in which it can be...
more rapidly and efficiently analyzed, interpreted, and put to use in planning operations. The initial results of the program have been highly encouraging. Several operational problem areas have been brought under control and the utility of the system is becoming more apparent as the program expands.
Research and Development

1. The Research and Development program has been a major area of interest. The Division sponsored the testing and evaluation of numerous projects provided by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), the Limited War Laboratory (LWL) and the ENSURE program. Not satisfied with its passive role as a live-fire laboratory, the Tropic Lightning Division launched an aggressive program designed to promote improvements in weapons, tactics and equipment.

2. Utilizing equipment provided by ACTIV and LWL, the Division evaluated numerous special purpose weapons. In an effort to perfect sniper and Long Range Patrol operations, silent rifles of commercial manufacture as well as modified M16 and M14 rifles are continually being tested. Priority is being placed on a program to obtain adequate telescope sights for use in connection with these weapons. A new version of the M72 LAW, the M72A1S1, with an improved warhead and a modified tube was tested and found to be highly effective and convenient.

3. In order to complement tunnel exploration tactics, an evaluation was conducted on a tunnel exploration kit, and more recently on a non-metallic mine detector. Low sound level pistols are likewise undergoing evaluation. One type now in use fires a cluster of lead pellets.

4. Efforts to outfit mobile platforms with automatic 40mm weapons have met with success, and testing is still in progress for adaptations for ground vehicles. An automatic grenade launcher and a minigun have been mounted successfully on APC's. A new recoil-operated, high velocity grenade launcher, which may prove to be feasible for mounting on any type of vehicle, has been requested through Army channels from the manufacturer. The XM203 shotgun-type adapter for the M16, enabling it to fire conventional 40mm ammo, was tested and found to be highly reliable.

5. In the field of helicopter armament, two major projects were implemented within the Division—flame bath and MADS. The flame bath concept involves suspending three 55-gallon drums containing diesel fuel and JP4 from a UH-1 helicopter. The drums are fitted with incendiary bursters and ignite on impact, burning an area of 400 to 600 square feet. The mortar aerial delivery system (MADS) consists of a wooden bomb rack, installed on the deck of a UH-1 and loaded with 4.2-inch mortar rounds. The standard fuze is replaced by an M157 bomb fuze. The system is designed to deliver a large amount of high explosives on a pinpoint target in a minimum amount of time, supplementing available means of fire support.

6. Another project, now ready for the initial testing, will provide Command and Control helicopters (OH-1) with two 7-rocket pods, designed to give these aircraft the ability of marking targets and of engaging targets of opportunity when air support is not yet on station.
7. A highly reliable night surveillance system, Dark Lightning, was installed in the UH-1 helicopter for Night Hawk operations. The system consists of a large searchlight with white/infrared capabilities, a Night Observation Device (NOD) AN/TVS4, and a minigun. During periods of darkness, the Night Hawk orbits over suspected enemy routes or holding areas, scanning covertly with the infrared searchlight and NOD. The white light capability is utilized to pinpoint targets for the minigun as well as for surveillance.

8. The improvement of vehicles and the testing of new vehicles was a major field exploited during this period. The V-100 armored patrol vehicle was tested and is actually performing convoy escort and security missions with the 25th Division Military Police units. The FJ71 Articulated Carrier is undergoing a succession of tests with armored, mechanized infantry, and infantry units. A similar vehicle, the Commercially Available Terrain Vehicle (CAT) will arrive in Vietnam this month for testing by the Division.

9. In an effort to reduce casualties and combat damage in incidents where APC's encounter mines, the Division tested a belly armor kit for the APC. The system was found acceptable and is being installed in all APC's in the Division. Two recent encounters, in which only light casualties were sustained, have proven the worth of these armored plates. Also undergoing evaluation are four Assault Bridge Launchers, which already have been proven capable of permitting a mechanized company to surmount a terrain obstacle in 20 minutes.

10. In an effort to detect mines, rather than detonating them, the Division tested various devices of dubious value. Presently undergoing evaluation is the performance of mine and tunnel detector dog teams.

11. The AN/PPS-9 radar, a lightweight radar set is scheduled for delivery this month. A Foliage Penetration Radar, capable of detecting targets at 350 meters through dense foliage or wooden buildings is presently being demonstrated to operators prior to deployment in the Division AO. As a complement to existing surveillance systems, a series of 190-foot towers are being installed at strategic points in the area.

12. The Division has recently received for testing an infrared illuminator designed for use during periods when insufficient light is available to the starlight scope.

13. In the field of personal gear, the Division designed and requested a utility vest, capable of holding 20 M16 magazines and two (2) canteens with a minimum of discomfort to the wearer. Special footwear, designed for protection of the feet in inundated areas, is being deployed in units of the 3rd Brigade.
1. The effectiveness of the 25th Infantry Division intelligence effort is attributable to command emphasis on intelligence and to a philosophy of intelligence operations. Command emphasis is placed on the concept that it is better to react to intelligence and have the operation result in a "dry hole" than to ignore the intelligence indicators in operational planning or to react only to a sure thing. In the long run the most successful maneuver unit is the one that reacts quickly to all timely information that is possibly true. The allocation of intelligence resources and the emphasis among the various intelligence assets and techniques has varied with changes in the enemy situation. The organization of the G2 Section and the 25th Military Intelligence Detachment is flexible and changes to maximize individual talents as key personnel come and go. However, the philosophy of intelligence operations remains constant. This philosophy insists that the intelligence effort be both target oriented and user oriented and that intelligence personnel actively participate in the field exploitation of the information they develop.

2. That the intelligence effort is target oriented means that the primary purpose of the entire intelligence effort is to produce targets for combat response. A data bank is no good if it cannot contribute to producing tangible operational results. At division level collection assets should not be employed merely or primarily to collect information for pattern analysis. If the goal is target acquisition, and if reaction is made to all information that indicates a possibility of damaging the enemy, a sufficient volume of data for longer term analysis will be automatically generated as a by-product. This philosophy frequently generates a conflict of interest in the utilization of collection assets controlled by higher headquarters. A target orientation also requires the rapid integration of all information. There is not a single or several sources of information that are more important than others. Everyone producing information must continuously coordinate with each other; photo interpreters must talk to interrogators who must talk to order-of-battle specialists, who must talk to aerial observers, and so on.

3. Two specific means were developed by the division to improve the integration of target information. A Target Information Center (TIC) was established in the Tactical Operations Center to integrate and display all-source data. The TIC maintains a seven-day plot of all sensor activity (radar sightings, "Duffel Bag" sensor activations, SLAR and infrared returns, airborne personnel detector readings), visual sightings, contacts, intelligence reports, and other selected information. A semi-permanent record of trail activity and a permanent record of hard installations from imagery interpretation and visual reconnaissance also is posted. The purpose of the TIC is rapid (preferably immediate) conversion of incoming information, particularly sensor data, to targets and the dissemination of these targets to the brigades, the artillery, and the G3 Air.
4. To integrate information produced primarily by the MI Detachment, a
system of Target Folders was initiated: interrogation reports or agent re-
ports identifying a specific military or Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)
target is supplemented with aerial photographs. Extensive use is made of
hand held photography taken from the 0-1 Bird Dog aircraft or from a heli-
copter. The specific target house, hedgerow, or patch of woods is identi-
fied and marked on the photographs. The entire package of reports, anno-
tated photographs, and necessary maps is provided to the exploiting
battalion. The intelligence personnel who develop the target participate in
the planning and execution of the operation. When possible, the source
(rallier, informant or agent) also participates.

5. Being user oriented is implicit in being target oriented. However,
being user oriented also means that at least as much emphasis is given to
support of the subordinate units as to providing the division staff and
higher headquarters with the information they need. Publications must be
designed for use by brigades and battalions. For example, the daily intel-
ligence summary (INTSUM) must include all document readouts, to include the
fact that a document contained no tactical information, so that the captur-
ing unit learns the result of their efforts. Interrogation and agent reports
must include a G2 evaluation and comments, since there is little analytic
capability below division level. The weekly intelligence estimate, published
in the INTSUM, and the monthly Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) must
tie together the "big picture" for the brigade and battalion S2s. The daily
morning intelligence briefing presented to the Commanding General is elec-
trically disseminated to the brigades. A major project of the Order of Bat-
tle Section is the production and current updating of handbooks for use in
the rapid field identification of documents, and detainees: pocket sized
handbooks of unit designator codes, names and numbers, infiltration group
numbers, and letter box numbers. The key to target orientation and user
orientation is timeliness. Intelligence produced at division level usually
was exploited by companies - three levels removed in the chain of com-
mand. The integration of the various sections of the division "intelligence com-
pany" has proven relatively simple. But the need for timeliness, for a
sense of urgency, is more difficult to maintain. Constant and repeated em-
phasis on the need for speed is a major management problem of the G2.

6. Finally, to insure the best possible user oriented-target producing pro-
duct, 25th Division policy requires that intelligence personnel actively
participate in the field exploitation of their intelligence. Counterintelli-
gence personnel accompany informants on operations. Interrogators handle
ralliers in the field. The MI Detachment includes a VCI Exploitation Team
of counterintelligence officers and area-oriented Kit Carson Scouts, who work
with tactical units. Even aerial observers and imagery interpreters accompany
operations that are based on information they have developed. This policy
insures that intelligence personnel learn what the ground troops need and what
they do with the information they get. The intelligence personnel become mo-
tivated to turn out the best possible product and demonstrate their readiness
to stand behind their information. They also are then readily available to
assist in the immediate exploitation of further leads arising during the op-
eration.
7. The 25th Division philosophy of intelligence operations has minimized the all-too-frequent tendency of intelligence personnel to conduct their individual intelligence specialties in isolation, at a deliberate pace, and for their own sake.
Maintenance of Personnel Strength

1. One continuing problem is the provision of minimum essential personnel for installation-type functions and other requirements encountered by divisions in Vietnam with the least possible deterioration of combat-effective strengths in TOE units.

2. Each base camp complex maintained requires that numerous activities be staffed and supported which are not authorized by TOE, but are nonetheless essential to the base camp and must normally be provided with military manning from within division strengths. These activities and functions include Base Camp Defense elements, installation coordinating agencies, open mess and sundry fund management systems, military police functions, post exchanges, labor control offices, educational facilities, troop orientation and training activities, and other "fixed" support agencies.

3. In the 25th Infantry Division we applied a number of techniques to resolve this problem. We used twice-wounded, surplus, or profile personnel for these functions to the maximum extent. We identified specific manning levels and positions for each activity and kept those activities within their recognized strength requirements by frequent survey. Gradual expansion must be resisted. Where ever possible and appropriate, we identified and "drew down" combat service support spaces to provide for the recognized but unauthorized requirements. We employed civilians where practicable, to release military personnel. Command-level approval was required for all increases in requirements.
Morale and Welfare

1. Infantrymen must be afforded respite from combat other than R&R and leave.

2. Combat troops need recurring opportunities to rest and relax in a secure environment offering recreational facilities and pleasant surroundings. Certain administrative and maintenance tasks can be accomplished concurrently.

3. Our approach was to provide each base camp with an attractive, comfortable, well-equipped stand-down facility. We required that at least one company stand-down per day, to include maintenance and refitting stand-downs in unit rear areas. Rest, relaxation, sports, food, beverages, and entertainment were emphasized. Contact teams were used in record checks, DX issue of clothing, dental care, and maintenance, but periods of stand-down time devoted to these activities were minimized.
Discipline, Law and Order

1. Control of the consumption of liquor and beer.

2. Uncontrolled availability of liquor and beer has no place in the combat zone. Combat missions and the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives make the consumption of liquor and beer highly dangerous. Elimination of accidents and incidents require stringent controls over the availability of intoxicating beverages, especially in the field.

3. Control can be achieved through a plentiful supply and ready availability of soft drinks and ice, and prohibition of the presence of liquor or beer at fire support and patrol bases. At base camps, permit no bulk sales of beer (cases) and liquor (bottles) to individuals. Impose firm age limits upon Club and Mess sales of intoxicants, and allow such sales only by the drink or can, never in bulk. Do not display liquor or beer in Post Exchanges. Establish accounts and maintain controls over sales to Clubs, other Sundry Funds and Unit Funds.
Maintenance Support of U.S. Units

1. Mission critical equipment which required command monitoring.

   a. Particular emphasis was placed on maximizing the availability of radar and organic aircraft assets. The availability rate of these two categories was monitored daily to insure that surveillance, detection, command and control, and aerial offensive capabilities were not degraded for lack of maintenance interest. This approach proved very successful in that as flying hours maximized, aircraft availability remained virtually stable between 80% and 85%. Radar availability improved significantly with the inclusion of AN/PPS-4 and AN/PPS-5 radars in the maintenance float.

   b. As the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry converted from the M48A3 tank to the M551 "Sheridan" vehicles, particular command emphasis was required during the initial stages of deployment to assure that combat effectiveness was maintained. Initially M551 deadline rates rose as high as 37% but have stabilized to an acceptable average of 10%. Emphasis was placed upon immediate isolation and definition of the problems as they arose followed by an accelerated maintenance program to eliminate the problem area. Examples of some of the problems experienced include leaking recoil seals, faulty brass rings within the recoil mechanism, turret power supply failures, lack of oil filters, and deficient fan belt and pulley systems. In each case an adequate solution was obtained which permitted the squadron to continue operations.

2. Problematic equipment which required command monitoring.

   a. Wheeled vehicles of the 2 ½ ton and 5 ton variety were command managed because of their continual high commitment rate and the dependence of the transportation system upon these assets.

   b. All tracked vehicles were command managed because of the environment of the area of operations and the complete dependence of the mechanized battalions upon this mode of transport.

   c. Bridge trucks and dump trucks received command attention as required, because of their periodic high deadline rates. Continued division level management was not enforced because all of these assets were within the organic engineer battalion.
Supply Support of U.S. Units

Generally no unit operation was impaired as a direct result of a logistical failure. There were, however, many instances in which commanders were required to manipulate on hand assets, accept substitute items, and modify techniques to accomplish assigned missions. Some examples were:

a. In August of 1969, 155mm illumination rounds became unavailable and mortar and flareship illumination had to be employed more extensively.

b. The scarcity of 2.75 inch aerial rockets in July and August of 1969 required us to restrict their use to contact situations, and to perform aerial reconnaissance-by-fire with machine guns and to rely on artillery and aerial machine guns for LZ preparation.

c. When the density of flame track service units in the mechanized battalions dropped from 2 to 1, the commitment of these units had to be directed by battalion rather than accompanying the flame units allocated to the companies.

d. The simultaneous reduction in available bunker timber, the advent of the rainy season, and the commitment of a brigade to the southern portion of the Division TAOR materially affected the capability of units to rapidly erect fire support and patrol bases.
Aircraft Maintenance and Supply

1. Aircraft direct support maintenance is provided to the 25th Infantry Division by Company E, 725th Maintenance Battalion, with back up direct support from the 20th Transportation Company, 520th Transportation Battalion, 34th General Support Group.

2. The aviation maintenance system was structured to support the command policy of maximum availability of aircraft. The supply system is mechanised, employing an NCR 500 computer. A second NCR 500 is presently being installed and will be operational in mid-September. The supply facility also deals directly with the aviation depot in Saigon, thus expediting the movement of critical aviation commodities from depot to mechanic. Parts are picked up twice daily from the depot, using organic aircraft to speed delivery of hand manageable EDP parts. Maintenance schedules are adjusted and monitored so that peak periods do not develop for a particular type aircraft. Work schedules are adjusted as required to concentrate effort during periods of increased unscheduled maintenance.

3. The most persistent aviation maintenance problem occurred with the introduction of the OH-6A observation helicopter, and chronic problems with their tail rotor assemblies. With the receipt of redesigned tail rotor assemblies this problem area appears to be solved.
Construction and Utilities Support

1. The adequacy of vertical effort in support of the division.

In general the division requirements for vertical construction far exceeded the non-divisional and contractual effort committed to support this area of operations. The shower and sump priorities at the Tay Ninh and Cu Chi base camps were continually revised by the surgeon in an effort to provide relief on a worst case first basis. The cantonment construction program approved for FY 69 (cancelled on 6 April 1969) was a complete failure because of lack of funds, lack of materials, and the requirement to give priority to maintenance of the lines of communication (QL 22) and upgrade of airfields. Invariably the vertical projects approved in support of troop billeting, materials storage, and maintenance facilities degenerated into O&MA funded self help projects.

2. The adequacy of civilian contractual repairs and utility support at base camps.

The contractor (PA&E) has had extreme difficulty in guaranteeing adequate mission performance. The demand for service far exceeds contractor capabilities at both Tay Ninh and Cu Chi. Equipment on hand is inadequate and generally old enough to pose a major maintenance problem. Examples of this are organic availabilities of bull dozers, graders, scrapers, garbage and dump trucks, generators, for loaders, and clam shells. To keep up with the horizontal work load PA&E has become dependent upon the loan of equipment from TOE sources and participation of engineer troops on a project by project basis. To complicate matters the contractor sustained a 20% personnel and funding reduction during contractual negotiations in July.
Civil Organization, Authority and Responsibility

At the village, district and province level there are many areas which may be significantly improved through the employment of division assets in support of the aims of pacification and the effective organization of government and development of authority and responsibility in the conduct of government.

a. As the provision of military security becomes less demanding due to a lower intensity of contact and the dissolution of the enemy internal organization, the opportunity arises to create a more stable social and political environment through psychological preparation and physical training of the populace for future roles in a stable government.

b. Aid offered in the training of the common population in mechanical, medical, agricultural, veterinary and military skills on as low and close a level as practicable produces effective results in having most basic skills and many special ones represented among the local population.

c. The emphasis upon increased participation of very low level hamlet and village officials in US civic action programs to better educate them to assume the authority and responsibility of their positions and increase their stature and acceptability of their function in local civil organization is most important at this stage of hamlet and village government development.
Civic Action and Its Effectiveness

1. In the past year, this Division has experienced a reorientation of its civic action efforts.

2. The conditions which produced large refugee resettlements and distributions for civilian relief, generally no longer exist. Coupled with this decline in mass civilian needs, there has been a realization, at all levels, that the indiscriminate distribution of supplies and construction of civic structures does little to instill loyalty and self-reliance in the people. The impetus for civic action projects must come from the populace. If they will identify their needs, and actively plan and work toward accomplishing these goals, then our technical and material assistance will directly contribute to their nation building.

3. This realization is the basis for the current Village Self Development Program. The emphasis is on assisting those who display a desire for self-improvement, through encouragement, advice, and technical assistance. The ultimate objective is not a given number of wells, churches, schools, etc., but the self-reliance and political identity of the people.
PSYOP Effectiveness

1. Psychological operations have effectively contributed to the reduction of the enemy's combat power. The Chieu Hoi program has caused a loss of enemy manpower and other programs have served to deny the enemy the support of the people. There are, however, several problem areas which detract from this overall effectiveness.

   a. Equipment. Both the quantity and quality of PSYOPS equipment adversely affect the program. Most of the PSYOPS equipment presently in use is old and in a poor state of repair. PSYOPS equipment at a low level, i.e., the company level, is lacking. There is not a speaker set available that is effective for use from a helicopter. The U-10 is a good speaker aircraft but there are not enough of them to meet operational needs.

   b. Leaflet Planning. Leaflet planning is often too hurried and the end product is often not the result of the best thinking. A check and complete analysis of the target of the PSYOP message should be the basis for writing the PSYOP message. This is especially true of message directed at the enemy.

   c. Program Planning. PSYOPS must be planned to get the maximum desired result from the target audience. Sheer numbers of leaflets can not guarantee an effective program. The approach must be to find the most effective message and deliver it to the audience by the best media available. But this all must be based on an accurate and systematic analysis of the audience.

2. These are problems which can be solved through a proper understanding of PSYOP objectives and the proper orientation of our PSYOP personnel.
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Ellis W. Williamson

Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 3 August 1968 to 15 September 1969.

MG Ellis W. Williamson

10 September 1969

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