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

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(10) Frank H. Gleason, Jr.

(11) 15 Aug 69

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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AGDA (M) (4 Sep 69) FOR OT-UT-69B032 19 September 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL Frank A. Gleason, Jr., [illegible] Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, Period 2 December 1968 to 2 August 1969 (U)

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 3 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of COL Frank A. Gleason, Jr., subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHGC-DST

AUG 18 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by COL Frank A. Gleason, Jr., Commanding Officer, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, for the period 2 December 1968 through 2 August 1969.

2. COL Gleason is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, CAM RANH BAY
APO San Francisco 96312

AVCA CRB-CO 28 July 1969

(the)

DEBRIEFING REPORT

PREFACE

(U) This report covers the highlights of the eight-month period of ~~my command of~~ the activities of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, from 3 December 1968 to 2 August 1969.

(U) Included herein are comments, observations and suggestions for future improvements in the logistical support system within the Republic of Vietnam.

Frank A. Gleason Jr.
FRANK A. GLEASON, JR
Colonel, CE
Commanding

9 Incl:
1. Area of Operations, CRB SUP COM
2. Breakdown of Type Units Supported
3. HQ Staff Prior to December 1968
4. Present Organization
5. Organization of 124th Term Cmd
6. Organization of 500th Gp
7. Organization of 54th Gp
8. Organization of USA Depot, CRB
9. Organization of MACV

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1. REFERENCES:

a. Army Regulation 1-26, dated 4 November 1966.

b. USARV Regulation 1-3, dated 1 June 1968.

2. SCOPE: This report covers the operation of a corps-type logistical command in support of United States Forces, Korean Forces, Australian Forces, and Vietnamese in the counterinsurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam from the period 3 December 1968 to 2 August 1969.

3. MISSION AND FUNCTIONS: The US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, is one of the four major subordinate commands of the 1st Logistical Command. The mission is to provide supply, maintenance, service support, including transportation to United States and other free world forces located in the lower half of the II Corps tactical zone. The area of responsibility covers about 15,500 square miles (Incl 1). Logistical support is provided to approximately 77,000 troops and civilians. The general breakdown of type units supported is shown in Incl 2. The US Army troops represented less than half of all those who receive support from this commitment. This support command provides backup support to the three support commands. The ammunition safety level of the Qui Nhon and Da Nang Support Command is stocked in the Ammunition Depot at Cam Ranh Bay. The organization is charged with receipt, storage, assembly, proofing, and shipment of the various electronic intrusion devices utilized by the combat units. The requirements placed on this unit originate from MACV.

4. HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, CAM RANH BAY: The Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay was reorganized under "The Administrative Support Theater Army (TASTA-70) (Modified)" concept during December 1968. The then existing organization consisted of a mixed general and director staff and an extensive special staff. The director staff was aligned along both functional and commodity lines as is shown on Incl 3 to this section. Formerly the general staff was limited to a Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel; security, plans and operations; and comptroller activities. The organization implemented in December 1968, as shown on Incl 4, created a functionally oriented general staff. The principal deviation from the TASTA-70 concept was creating the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Ammunition rather than consolidating this function with other supply-type functions and also creating the Assistant Chief of Staff Transportation. The rationale for this deviation was that the scope, magnitude and complexity of ammunition and transportation operations at Cam Ranh Bay justified the retention of these two more definitive staff elements.

5. MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS:

a. The 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) operates Cam Ranh Port, outports at Phan Rang and Nha Trang and conducts over the beach operations at Phan Thiet. In addition this command provides pilot service to ships entering or departing Cam Ranh Bay and operates a unique vessel, the barge discharge lighter, John U.D. Page. The principal elements of the 124th Transportation Command, as shown by Incl 5, are the 10th and 24th Transportation Battalions (terminal service). The former is organized for port operations and includee two terminal service companies, a heavy boat company and a terminal service detachment. The latter is organized for port clearance and includes a medium truck company, a light truck company, and three separate light truck platoons.

b. The 500th Transportation Group (motor transport) was activated on 1 January 1969. Although organized as a motor transport group, the mission and staffing of the 500th is far more diversified. This is evidenced by its over all organization as shown by Incl 6, which includes the 36th TC Battalion (motor transport), the 191st Ordnance Battalion (ammunition), the 262d Quartermaeter Battalion (POL), and a provisional augmentation which accomplishes poet, camp, etation, and administrative support functions on the Cam Ranh Peninsula. Operational functions performed by this group include line haul of bulk cargo and POL; port and beach clearance on request; bulk and package POL receipt, storage and issue; ammunition receipt, storage, issue, and surveillance; and explosive ordnance disposal.

c. The 54th General Support Group located at Nha Trang, Vietnam is principally engaged in direct support logistics throughout the mission area assigned to US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. Its major organizational assete (see Incl 7) include the 69th Maintenance Battalion, the 21st and 148th Supply and Service Companies, the 59th Field Service Company, and a provisional augmentation which accomplishes post, camp and station functions in the Nha Trang area. Operationally, the major part of the 54th GS Group's resources are organized into five provisional logistic support activities (LSA's). Each LSA draws teams from the maintenance battalion, the QM POL battalion, one of the two supply and service companies, or the field service company. A typical LSA provides POL storage and issue, laundry and bath, direct support maintenance, gravee registration, ration breakdown, Class II and IV supply support and ammunition supply to customers within its assigned area. In addition remaining elements of the supply and service companies, and particularly the field service company, provide direct support of all types to 1st Logistical Command and other units located in or near Nha Trang and on or near the Cam Ranh Peninsula.

d. The US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay was constituted as a TDA organization on 1 August 1968 with an authorized strength of 105 officers, 11 warrant officers, 2871 enlieted men, 11 Department of the Army civilians and 182 local national civilians for an aggregate strength of 3180. In addition, the Depot has a quartermaster aerial delivery company, a quartermaster air drop and service detachment, two engineer gas generating detachments, and a heavy material storage detachment. The depot ie organized as ehown at Incl 8. Thie

depot has the responsibility to receive, store and issue all classes of supply except medical, cryptographic material, aviation, avionics, POL and ammunition.

e. The US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam is a TDA activity with an authorized strength of nine officers, 11 warrant officers, 476 enlisted men, and 12 local national civilians for an aggregate strength of 508. The unit has fielded four provisional marine maintenance detachments with three being assigned to US Army Support Command, Saigon, and the fourth to US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. The remainder of the unit (slightly over 200 personnel) including the headquarters accomplished general support marine maintenance at Cam Ranh Bay. The employment of this unit is somewhat unorthodox in that the detachments are assigned rather than attached to the aforementioned support commands. Organization is as shown at Incl 9.

6. OPERATIONS:

a. Port Operations: The scale of the 124th Transportation Command's operation is extensive in both scope and variety. At the port of Cam Ranh Bay alone, facilities valued in excess of $80 million and three thousand men are engaged in the movement of all types of cargo - general, ammunition, reefer, vehicles, containers - at an average rate of 200,000 S/T a month. The outports of Nha Trang, Phan Rang, and Phan Thiet move an additional 45,000 S/T per month.

(1) Cam Ranh Bay has five deep draft piers capable of working ten vessels simultaneously. The capabilities of these piers vary considerably. Although Piers 1, 4 and 5 are efficient, Pier 2 is too short (300 feet in length) and Piet 3 is too narrow (39 feet in width). Shallow draft operations are conducted at six LST ramps, one barge pier and one sunken LST hull which is capable of working either a barge or an LST.

(2) At Cam Ranh Bay, the 124th Transportation Command has the responsibility for managing the entire port complex, for assigning berths for vessels, for providing tugs and pilots to assist vessels in berthing, and for providing security for the port's terminal facilities. Additionally, the command's responsibilities include coordinating and supervising the operations of two civilian stevedore contractors and monitoring the operations of one MSTS contractor in shallow draft operations.

(3) Vinnell Corporation, Lam Brothers Corporation, and the 10th Transportation Battalion (terminal) perform stevedoring operations for all deep draft vessels. Vinnell is an American corporation with American supervisors and Korean laborers. They furnish twelve hatch gangs per ten hour shift and work two shifts per day. In addition, they operate the US Army BD6655, a 100-ton floating crane. Lam Brothers is Vietnamese-owned and employs only local national civilians. They furnish ten hatch gangs per ten hour shift and work two shifts per day.

(4) The 124th Transportation Command complements these civilian operations by the use of its military stevedores from the 10th Battalion, concentrating on military efforts in the discharging and outloading of reefer and ammunition cargo. The 10th Battalion is composed of the 870th Transportation Company (TS), the 155th Transportation Company (TS), and the 97th Transportation Company (heavy boat). The 10th Battalion also operates a stevedore training school for local nationals.

(5) The Alaska Barge and Transport Company (AB&T) performs shallow draft stevedoring. AB&T is American-owned and employs American, local, and third-country nationals. They also perform all shallow draft stevedoring at the outports of Nha Trang and Phan Rang.

(6) Outport operations are generally shallow draft. At Nha Trang, for example, the bulk of its monthly load of 26,000 S/T of cargo is moved over two LST ramps and three barge piers. Deep draft operations are conducted, however, by the use of lighterage. In addition, all ROK deployment (an average of two troop ships per month) is handled through this outport. At Phan Rang, on the other hand, there are no deep draft operations; 11,000 short tons per month are moved over two LST ramps and one sunken barge pier. Finally, Phan Thiet is entirely shallow draft, landing craft utility, the USAV John U.D. Page, and LSTS can work the open beach, tide permitting. Recently, the Army Corps of Engineers constructed a ramp at Phan Thiet; LSTS and the Page can use this ramp.

(7) Tonnage Handled: Average monthly figures based on January through June 1969 follow:

CAM RANH BAY		
Deep Draft	134,835 S/T	
Shallow Draft	65,290 S/T	
TOTAL:		200,125 S/T
NHA TRANG		26,584 S/T
PHAN RANG		11,789 S/T
PHAN THIET		5,646 S/T
TOTAL:		44,019 S/T
TOTAL COMPLEX		244,144 S/T

b. US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay Operations: Prior to August 1968, the 504th Field Depot had the mission of receiving, storing, and issuing all of the old classes of supply, i.e., Classes I, II & IV, III and V. In addition, the depot provided field maintenance support through the 69th Maintenance Battalion. The

depot consisted of five battalions and a headquarters company with an overal strength of 5984 military personnel. In August 1968 the 504th Field Depot was ordered to inactive and organized under TDA P5W04DAA00, establishing the Cam Ranh Army Depot (CRAD). In September 1968 the 96th S&S Battalion and the 278 S&S Battalion were inactivated and personnel assigned were used to fill the spaces provided in the TDA. The three battalions responsible for ammunition (191st Ord Bn), POL (262d QM Bn), and DS/GS Maintenance (69th Mnt Br) left depot control in November 1968. A revised manning level was imposed by an MTDA in October 1968 and is the structure under which CRAD is operating at this time.

(1) The depot manages an inventory of approximately $500,000,000, composed of approximately 115,000 line items stored in six areas on the Cam Ranh Peninsula, i.e., the main depot complex, engineer yard, engineer annex, asphalt storage area, the unserviceable property yard, and the property disposal yard. Altogether, the depot covers about 255 acres of land, 35 general warehouses, eight subsistence warehouses (four of which are cold storage), and 39 sheds.

(2) The depot has three contracts with the Vinnell Corporation employing 617 US, third country, and local national civilians, to operate the Engineer Construction Materiel Yard, the Care and Preservation Activity, and the vehicle park for major end items.

(3) The depot also has four attached units with 377 military personnel. These are the 109th Quartermaster Company (aerial delivery), the 67th and the 68th Engineer Gas Generating Detachments, and the 194th Quartermaster Detachment which inspects and classifies aerial delivery equipment.

(4) The depot utilizes an IBM 7010 and a 1460 computer system in managing its supply operations and processes about 50,000 requisitions a month with about 86% demand/accommodations and 76% demand/satisfaction over the past six months. The warehouse denial rate is running 2-3% per month. On an average the depot ships about 65,000 tons a month and receives about 40,000 tons per month. The total on hand tonnage is approximately 216,000 tons valued at slightly over one-half billion dollars.

(5) To improve operations at the depot, the standard supply system Vietnam (SSSV) has been implemented, wall-to-wall inventories are performed to provide an accurate data base, storage areas have been improved with some rewarehousing of stocks made to preclude deterioration of stocks, procedures have been initiated to increase capacity for handling more tonnage with less delivery time to customers, and an aggressive retrograde program is underway to move excess stocks out of Vietnam. In summary, the depot command has devoted many man-hours for the purpose of achieving an accurate inventory, valid demand data, and appropriate management so as to utilize this accuracy and validity to meet combat requirements effectively and economically whenever and wherever required.

c. Direct Supply Support Activities:

(1) Direct supply support is provided to the supported units of the Southern II Corps tactical zone by five logistical support activities (LSA's) in the outlying areas: Dalat, Phan Rang, Phan Thiet, Bao Loc, Ban Me Thuot; and by two Class II, IV and VII direct supply support units: the 148th S&S Company at Nha Trang and the 21st S&S Company at Cam Ranh. The LSAs provide direct Class I, III and IV supplies to the supported units on demand. In addition there are 15 fast moving expendable items that are stocked at the LSAs to meet customer requirements. These include paper products and barrier material. Class II and VII items are requisitioned from the supporting DSU's. A service stock consisting of fast moving Class IX items of supplies are also maintained at the LSA and Class IX items are requisitioned from the supporting DSU through the LSA maintenance detachments.

(2) Two of the LSAs, Phan Rang and Phan Thiet, are located at coastal ports and can be resupplied by ship, aircraft and convoy. The other three LSAs are located inland and are resupplied by aircraft and convoy. Resupply to the LSAs from Cam Ranh Bay, using all modes of transportation available, allows this command to maintain stocks at the required management levels and to reduce to a minimum the possibility of the supported units running out of their required supplies. Direct supply support is furnished through this system to all free world military assistance forces and the Air Force and Navy units in the Southern II Corps area (approximately 60,000 customers). During this period, reorganization of supply support occured in this command. The number of supported units requisitioning on the US Army Depot-Cam Ranh was decreased by approximately 90 to a "wholesale" customer group of approximately 50. This resulted in the increased capability of the USAD-CR to provide supply support to the DSUs, which in turn have been able to build a more effective stockage and thus reduce the order ship time for the "retail" customer requirements. The total amount of material furnished to the supported units has actually experienced an increase under this operational concept. Additionally, each Class II & IV DSU operates a self-service supply center (SSSC) which furnishes selected expendable material to supported customers upon demand. The continuous emphasis placed upon more effective supply support can be seen in the increased effectiveness of the support provided by the SSSC to its customers (increased customer satisfaction). Organizational clothing and equipment is provided by the central issue facility located at Cam Ranh for all incoming personnel. Each DSU operates a direct exchange facility for these items which enables the support to the individual to be more effective.

(3) Class I refrigerated and dry rations are distributed through this same basic system. Aircraft are used exclusively to provide refrigerated rations and ice to the LSAs from the Class I supply points at Cam Ranh and Nha Trang. The dry rations are delivered by either convoy or ship dependent upon location of the LSA. Milk and ice cream are produced at the Meadow Gold Dairy at Cam Ranh and flown with the "R" rations to the LSAs for distribution to the

customers in the field. The command stockage objective of balanced rations is maintained at 31 days for USAD-CR, ten days at the Class I supply points and seven days at the LSAs. The effective utilization of all modes of transportation to provide the necessary subsistence support to the field units has made the supported units the best fed field troops in Vietnam. Additionally, this command has initiated the program of Class I cash bulk sales. Unit Funds and other authorized organizations can now make bulk cash purchases of food on a non-recurring basis from the commissaries at Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang, and Nha Trang. The authorization for such purchases will definitely contribute to morale of the troops in the lower II Corps tactical zone.

(4) This command provides common items in Class III (POL) through the same distribution channels as the other classes of supply. The primary storage sites are Cam Ranh and Nha Trang. Bulk fuels entering the command from out-of-country arrive at the terminal of Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay aboard MSTS and commercial vessels. The Phan Rang facility is supplied with JP-4 and AVGAS by a T-1 class tanker (ship), with MOGAS and diesel being supplied by truck from the CRB storage facility. Phan Thiet is supplied by a variety of modes including "Y" class tankers, a roll-on roll-off system using 5,000 gallon tank trucks aboard the barge lighter Lt Col John U.D. Page, and air shipments. Inland supply points are supplied via convoy (tank trucks) and air using bladder birds (C-130 and C-123 aircraft having collapsible bladders installed) and 500 gallon collapsible drums. Gia Nghia, an inland supply point for POL only, must be supplied entirely by air. Drummed fuels in 55 gallon drums are received from commercial contractors in Nha Trang, while the other packaged products (oils and lubricants) are received from CONUS sources and commercial contractors in Nha Be. These products are distributed from Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay to the LSAs primarily by the surface modes.

(5) The T-5 jetty at CRB which was placed in operation on 17 Jan 69, is a most unique feature of the Marine Terminal Facility. Extending 1600 feet into the harbor, it can accept tankers up to and including super class with 55 feet of draft. When the installation of breasting dolphins in completed, the jetty will be capable of simultaneously off-loading a T-5 super class tanker while backloading a T-2 or T-1 class tanker for transshipment to other RVN ports. The supervision of supply operations and planning for supply operations in this command is vested in one staff element. The ACofS, supply has this responsibility, which includes conducting continuous liaison with the supported units to insure effective supply responsiveness. With one staff element responsible for the supervision and coordination of supply operations, less ammunition, from the depot to the customer, an extremely efficient and knowledgeable staff operation has been achieved. Problems relating to the distribution of supplies can be coordinated and resolved more expeditiously and with a minimum of effort and coordination. To insure the most expeditious receipt of supplies by the supported units, a technique of "push" has been developed and refined in this command. By the use of supply directives the ACofS, Supply is able to respond to the tactical requirements of the field units and is able to insure continuous maintenance of stockage levels at the LSA with a minimum of lapsed time.

Stockage levels and unit operations are monitored critically by the supply personnel and when requirements are indicated supply directives are prepared to "push" the material forward to the user. The user will present his requisition to the LSA personnel for his material rather than having to pass it through the system for action. This avoids placing a large quantity of material in the forward areas, yet provides the supported units with their requirements in a most rapid manner.

(6) This command has also developed the technique of "asset visibility"; items in critical short supply that effect the combat operations and combat support operations of units in the command are identified and intensive supply management is applied. This has resulted in the identification in the past six months of over 300 critical items which have been acted upon under "asset visitility". Approximately 3500 items are maintained in authorized stockage by the Class I, II, III, IV and VII direct support units (less the LSAs). These items have been determined to be the ones most common to the total requirements of the user. One of the problems that has hendered the total accomplishment of the maximization of supply support has been the lack of aircraft dedicated upon a daily basis, or on call, to provide the expedited shipments required by the supported units. It has been determined that a dedicated aircraft, either C7A or heavy lift helicopter, is essential to insure that maximum of supply support by this command. Additionally, a helicopter is needed to transport supply and maintenance customer assistance teams.

d. Maintenance Operations: Direct and general support maintenance is provided on all types of equipment and materiel except crypto devices, medical mat materiel, aircraft and avionics equipment. Maintenance on ground materiel is performed by the 69th Maintenance Battalion (general support) with a headquarters and five hetrogeneous companies.

(1) 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS)

(a) 128th Signal Company (depot), Cam Ranh Bay

(b) 129th Main Support Company (DS), Nha Trang

(c) 136th Light Maintenance Company (DS), Cam Ranh Bay

(d) 377th Light Maintenance Company (DS), Cam Ranh Bay

(e) 557th Light Maintenance Company (DS), Cam Ranh Bay and LSAs: Phan Rang, Phan Thiet, Bao Loc, Dalat and Ban Me Thuot.

(2) Winnell Corporation in CRB has a contract to perform backup direct support maintenance for the 69th Maintenance Battalion, GS overhaul on ¼ and 3/4 ton trucks and ½ ton mules, component rebuild and direct support maintenance on commercial designed equipment.

(3) At the beginning of the period, the maintenance organization differed greatly from the present organization. The 136th Light Maintenance Company arrived in March 1969 to replace the 135th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (GS) which was located in CRB. The loss of the 135th HEM Company left Vinnell Corporation as the only general support activity for maintenance in the support command area with the exception of signal items.

(4) Vinnell's FY69 contract called for much more end item general support work. In addition to backup direct support they were preforming GS overhaul on MHE and engineer construction material.

(5) In December 1968 the operation of the maintenance detachments in four of the LSAs was placed in the 557th LM Company with Ban Me Thuot coming under the 129th until early June when the 557th assumed complete maintenance responsibility for all of the LSAs. This was done to centralize control of the LSAs and to provide a single source of Class IX supply for the outlying areas. As a light maintenance company is not authorized all the MOSs needed to support the various types of equipment found in the outlying areas, the 557th was augmented by personnel from other units within the 69th Maintenance Battalion.

(6) As stated previously, with deactivation of the 135th HEM in February 1959, Vinnell Corporation assumed the entire general support mission for wheeled vehicles, MHE and engineer construction equipment; however, the biggest problem caused by the loss of the 135th was the loss of MHE and heavy engineer repairmen and most of our artillery repairmen.

(7) In February, the "Return and Recuperation" (R&R) program for self propelled artillery was started. Vehicles and crew are brought into the shops with the artillery piece and it is gone over completely. As of now, eighteen vehicles have been completed and a nineteenth is in process. This has been extremely effective in upgrading the artillery weapons. The crews have an opportunity of working directly with high-level, trained mechanics on their own weapons. Motivation is high and results show it.

(8) In March, a prepunched PLL program was also started. Every unit which has submitted a PLL to its supporting tech supply now can order PLL parts on a prepunched DA Form 2765. These forms save time and trouble for the using unit because the only information to be written on the card is document number, priority and quantity. They reduce processing time in the DSU because less editing and less manual keypunching must be done. The opportunity for incorrectly writing in the nine diget stock number is greatly decreased.

(9) Increased emphasis on an organizational maintenance program has reduced the vehicle deadline rate drastically. The most dramatic drop has been in the 5-ton rate which went from around thirty percent to less than ten percent. Several methods are used to increase the effectiveness of organizational maintenance: 1. Supply and maintenance conferences are held monthly. 2. Assistance teams are sent out from both the support command headquarters and the 69th

maintenance Battalion. 3. Classes are given by field maintenance technicians on various types of equipment; and 4. Monthly newsletters are published by Support Command and the 69th Maintenance Battalion.

(10) As the effectiveness of organizational maintenance has increased, the workload in direct and general support activities has decreased in most areas. However, a problem remains with respect to special purpose equipment for which trained operators and maintenance personnel are not available in the numbers needed. Material handling equipment has required special emphasis on driver training and organizational maintenance. Technical supply operations have shown steady improvements. The microfild reader with its various tapes of the Army Master Item Data File have proved invaluable. These machines are in all direct support units, Vinnell Corporation and Pacific Architect and Engineers (R&U Contractor). Additional requirements exist for a key punch machine at PA&E and the engineer construction battalions. Verifiers are needed in all DSUs to ensure key punch operators are accurate.

7. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE PERIOD FROM 2 DECEMBER 1968 TO 2 AUGUST 1969:

a. The lack of organic aircraft in the command has caused delays in getting repairmen and parts to some of the outlying areas.

b. The overall condition of the MHE Fleet, the lack of trained operators and organizational mechanics, the necessity for almost continuous operation, and the nonavailability of repair parts are all factors in the high MHE deadline rate experienced by this command.

c. The loss of a requisitioning base for certain MOS's which occurred when the 135th HEM was deactivated has forced maintenance units within the command to repair equipment using relatively untrained personnel. Hardest hit areas are MHE, engineer construction equipment, small arms and tracked vehicle repair.

8. MARINE MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS: The maintenance of all floating plants such as barge tugs, floating cranes, reefer barges, and outboard and inboard motor boats in performed by the Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam (MMAV). This organization has its headquarters and main operating base at Cam Ranh Bay with operating detachments in the Saigon and Qui Nhon Support Commands. Approximately $104 million dollars worth of floating plants are on hand from small propeller driven craft up to the unique vessel LTC John U.D. Page - beach discharge lighter, and one hundred ton cranes. USAMMAV provides Marine support maintenance for all US Army watercraft a d amphibians in Vietnam. The total density of standard US Army watercraft and amphibians in 519 vessels with a total dollar value of $99,780,449.00. The total density of non-standard watercraft, i.e., patrol river boat, hurricane aircat boat, and Boston whalers is 586 for a total dollar value of $4,594,785.00. Since 1 January 1969 a total of 25 US Army watercraft were overhauled at the Vinnell Shipyards,

Cam Ranh Bay for a total cost, to include government furnished repair parts, of $1,321,899.00. During the same period a total of 34 vessels were shipped out-of-country for overhaul for a total average cost of $1,495,000.00. Presently, 58 vessels still remain out-of-country and have not been completed; however, some of this number were shipped more than one year ago. Approximately 48% of marine repair is performed in-country and 52% by out of country contract repair at Okinawa, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Singapore. The out-of-country repair has been costly in loss of assets over long periods due to travel, time and contractual processing coupled with a shortage of repair parts for many pieces of old and obsolete equipment. At this time some 58 vessels are not of country for repair. In-country facilities would have saved valuable time just for travel alone, not counting long periods required to negotiate contracts to have repairs done. There is an obvious need for modernization of the fleet to ensure efficient and responsive harbor operations and cost of hauling in any future commitments.

9. SERVICES: Services consist of graves registration, laundry, bath, engineering, internal supply, food services, and property disposal activities. Graves registration collecting points are established at Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Phan Rang, Phan Thiet, Bao Loc and Ban Me Thuot. The deceased and his personal effects are rapidly moved to the Saigon Mortuary for processing and movement to to CONUS. This important function operates well.

a. Laundry Operations: Field laundry has averaged in excess of 800,000 pounds per month and contract laundry has been averaging over $135,000 per month. If many soldiers did not use the local mama-san type laundry ladies, the facilities would be severely taxed.

b. Engineering: There are no organic engineer troops in this command for repairs and utilities or construction. As a result we have experienced extreme difficulty in effecting necessary upkeep of present plant and effecting essential improvements. Installation - R&U is provided by Pacific Architects and Engineers under the contract supervision of US Army Construction Agency Vietnam. New construction is provided by engineer troop labor or by contract with RMK-BRJ. Over a $20,000,000 MCA construction program has been developed to improve the facilities in this logistical complex.

c. Property Disposal: Property disposal at Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang is operated by a small staff of 22 and 200 personnel, respectively. This function operates with few problems, except getting buyers to rapidly move the property purchased away from out facilities.

d. Food Service: Food Service advisors provide assistance to some 78 food facilities. Close attention is provided to ensure top flight food preparations and service.

10. CONTRACTS: In this military action more than any of its size and magnitude, we have relied on contractors to help us accomplish out mission. Contractors are being used in stevedoring, depot supply operations, care and preservation and maintenance. Seven contractors with approximately 4,300 personnel--made up of United States, third country and local national personnel. In the main, this arrangement has been highly satisfactory. The only apparent weakness has been possible work stoppages due to labor problems which have threatened on two occasions. Contract performance is closely monitored to ensure that the contract personnel meet desired standards. The contractor's efforts are thoroughly coordinated, supervised and completely integrated with the efforts of organic elements. The principal areas in which contractors are employed are maintenance, depot operations and stevedoring. The Command is also responsible for supervising sizable contracts for dairy products and laundry services. More than 4300 personnel are engaged in the contracted effort and total cost exceeds $34,000,000. The contract maintenance includes both a field maintenance shop and a dry dock operation. The field maintenance represents backup for direct support and a 100% of the Command"s capability for general support, while the marine maintenance represents most of the Command's general support and all of the Command's depot maintenance in the marine area. The dairy contract provides all milk, cot5age cheese and ice cream used in II Corps South Zone. It also provides some milk and cottage cheese to elements external to II Corps South. The daily production under this contract is approximately 18,000 gallons of milk, 24,000 gallons of ice cream and 2,500 lbs of cottage cheese. Contracted stevedoring is indispensable in the Support Command's port operations. Currently, nearly 90% of the Command's stevedoring capability is in contracted effort. Contractual laundry service provides the principal laundry capability for the Command's populace.

11. (C) LOCAL DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. In September 1968 a MACV special investigating team surveyed existing physical security and ground defense programs on Cam Ranh Peninsula. This team found that a lack of inter-service coordination and security weaknesses made the peninsula susceptible to pilferage and enemy sapper attacks. As a direct result of this investigation, the Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay was appointed installation coordinator for the Cam Ranh Peninsula and the waters of the bay vice the Commanding General, 18th Engineer Brigade, in December 1968.

b. In December 1968 the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command began implementation of a tri-service defense program. By 29 January, a coordinated peninsula ground defense plan was issued. On 1 February, a Peninsula Joint Defense Operations Center was inaugurated. By mid-February, subordinate elements of the Command and major peninsula service command had implemented supporting plans. From February to June 1969, continual modification and improvemen was made to the defense system, inter-service coordination and physical barrier systems. To keep pace with a rapidly improving defense coordinating system and to take advantage of lessons learned during the formative phases of the defensive system, a revised ground defense plan was published in June 1969.

c. Between 1 January 1969 and 15 July 1969, a total of six subsequent inspections of Cam Ranh Peninsula physical security/ground defense systems were conducted by MACV, USARV, IFFV, IFFV Artillery and 1st Logistical Command. All inspecing teams noted significant improvement in the peninsula defense posture and the elimination of weaknesses noted by the September 1968 MACV inquiry.

d. The following comments are offered concerning development of an installation defense coordination system at Cam Ranh Bay.

(1) Upon appointment as an installation/installation defense coordinator, a combat support or combat service support commander must be given adequate personnel and equipment support to accomplish this additional mission. The diversion of personnel from normally assigned duties adversely affects mission accomplishment and the lack of sufficient equipment, particularly controlled items such as communications equipment, delays the rapid implementation of the defense plan.

(2) A major problem encountered in attempts to improve defenses near critical Army facilities was the inability to rapidly obtain material and construction support. The lack of available engineer support and funding for projects delayed corrective action on major defiencies cited by investigating teams.

(3) The assignment of a senior combat arms officer as a special assistant to the Support Command Commander for combat security matters proved invaluable in the discharging of defense coordination and tactical security responsibilities. The expertise provided by this officer assisted greatly in the formative phases of defensive planning, the physical implementation of the defense plan, and periodic checks upon the effectiveness of defensive systems.

12. (C) SECURITY FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES:

a. The US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay was responsible for the physical security and ground defense programs for logistical support activities (LSA's) at Ban Me Thuot, Dalat, Phan Rang, Phan Thiet and Bao Loc. Support Command Headquarters was responsible for ensuring that adequate internal security arrangements for the protection of the LSA's. Close supervision of internal security arrangements was maintained through staff visits and command inspections.

b. The following comments are offered concerning LSA security:

(1) The installation coordination system is entirely dependent upon the cooperation of all commands involved inasmuch as the area defense coordinator does not have command authority over tenant units. As such, the success of th the system evolves to a great degree around the personalities of the individual commander and the approach taken by the coordinator. An aggressive program, if

not handled with extreme tact and a cooperative attitude, often leads to an alienation of tenant units and a degredation of the effort.

(2) A significant problem area concerned providing adequate port, harbor and outport security. In major port areas such as Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang, the existence of US Naval harbor defense elements contributed greatly to effective, responsive security. In minor ports, such as Phan Rang and Phan Thiet, however, only limited support could be provided by US Navy surveillance craft. Harbor security responsibilities for these areas were assigned to Cam Ranh Support Command, which did not have adequate organic assets to perform this mission. Repeated attempts to obtain assistance in the form of US Naval swift boats and military police craft were negated by a higher priority demand upon these assets.

(3) Improvement is required in the responsiveness of the supply system to requests for equipment in support of defensive responsibilities. Because of the very nature of logistical support activities, personnel and equipment requirements for these elements were established at an absolute minimum. Consequently, LSA's lacked the necessary equipment and manpower needed to respond to a defensive mission assigned by the local defense coordinator and a requisitioning base for internal defensive improvements.

13. (C) COMMAND RELATIONSHIP:

a. Cam Ranh Bay Support Command had direct relationship with non-1st Logistical Command units in its role as Cam Ranh Peninsula Installation Defense Coordinator and as the senior headquarters for logistical support activities.

b. Relationships with tenant US Air Force, Navy and Army units on Cam Ranh Peninsula were characterized by a recognition of the common effort and an extremely cooperative attitude. The effective rapport established at the working level during the development of the joint defense effort was supplemented by vigorous tri-service command emphasis. Joint service reaction to incidents was both rapid and effective, with each service contributing assets to a common goal.

c. Relationships with area installation defense coordinators were for the most part effective in solving LSA security problems. In some cases, however, delays in the initiation of effective corrective actions were experienced due to the lack of clear definition of coordinator responsibilities.

14. (U) RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES: We provide supply support to the Republic of Korea Forces. These include the 9th ROK Division, the ROK Field Force Headquarters, and the 100th Logistical Command. We also provide supply support to a squadron of Australians at Phan Rang. The 30th ROK Regiment of the 9th ROK Division provides security at the upper end of the peninsula at Cam Ranh Bay and on the Can Tho Peninsula, the western part of the harbor area. Close cooperation and coordination is effected by personal contact. I am unaware of any difficulty.

15. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT: We work closely with the Mayor of Special Cam Ranh Sector, the local police and the national police. Meetings are held at least monthly to discuss mutual problems of security, discipline, law, order and civil affairs. During January 1969, the civil affairs program within the command was extremely active. A community relations council and a friendship council were established to provide for the overall guidance for the program and to secure local acceptance and support and the number of projects initiated in this area included: construction or repair of four schools, distribution of over 200 books to local schools, and training of local population in skills essential to the national effort. To aid in the economic development of this area, the Command has support two swine associations as part of the GVN animal husbandry program which has enabled Cam Ranh City to become self-sufficient in pork production. A sewing center for war widows and a craft orphanage for children left parentless by the conflict have been started. In addition, a fishing and boat dock pier for commerce has been built, village roads are being improved, a recreation park has been planned, and a security lighting system has been approved for the shoreline. Refugee camps have received intensified help and assistance in their search for a better life. Operation between US and GVN is at an all time high. For the first time, the GVN has submitted a list on their proposed projects to the US for comment and support. Combined MEDCAP's are reaching the 84,000 Vietnamese in Cam Ranh City area on a monthly basis. A combination medical teaching facility and OB/GYN Clinic has been built for the GVN in an attempt to raise the level of expertise of the local health officials. In all, a total of 6,737 man days and $200,000 in supplies have been expended in this untiring effort and have materially assisted in the realization of the aspirations of the local population.

16. RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. COMMANDS: The Support Command of Cam Ranh Bay is under the direct command of the 1st Logistical Command. We operate in accordance with policies and directions of that headquarters, primarily. Nevertheless, within the southern half of the II Corps tactical zone we are the logistical operators who provide combat support to all elements in the area. We are responsive to the desires of the Commander of IFFV on matters of defense, discipline, law and order and such other matters not in conflict with 1st Logistical Command directives. We work in close cooperation with 18th Engineer Brigade, 1st Signal Brigade, the 44th Medical Brigade, MP Brigade, Air Force, Navy and MACV elements. Our job is to support and as such we are anxious to ensure that our customers are well served. By close cooperation and personal contact most problems are eliminated. It is clearly evident that combat, combat support and other unit commanders are extremely cooperative in improving supply and maintenance operations. The only weak point is aviation support. A command of this size should not be required to depend on uncertain aircraft allocation to accomplish its job. Firm aircraft commitments cannot be made until 1800 hours the previous night. Commanders and staff officers must get out, supplies must be delivered, repairables must be retrograded. Convoys must be monitored; all these requirements should be recognized to justify responsive air travel. Many efforts have been made to IFFV for dedicated aircraft without success. This problem should be resolved.

17. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Effect of Enemy Action on our Operations: The enemy activity in our area of responsibility has had little effect on our operations. We have sustained losses of POL at Phan Rang by repeated demolition of the pipeline which extends for some 12 miles from the beach to the tank farm inside the perimeter of the AF Base. We have received three rocket/mortar attacks on the peninsula during February and March 1969, and in June we have sustained intermittent attacks at the end stations and a sporadic "pot shot" type action against convoys. We have had one swimmer attack in the harbor which was unsuccessful. In the most part all attacks have been more harrassement than dealing a serious blow to our logistical facilities or operations. Nevertheless, the activity experienced in other areas by 1st Logistical Command troops and others have energized us to improve our defenses and coordinate closely with all concerned. The important object lessons to be learned are that defenses against enemy attack--either stand off type or ground assault--must be thoroughly developed and implemented throughout. Frequent inspections and CPX's are required to eliminate weak aspects of defense plans as well as the ground defensive unit themselves. All personnel must be constantly motivated to prevent complacency during quiet periods. Close cooperation between combat forces and logistical units is essential. It must be recognized that logistical units have little capability for defensive security. Adequate provisions should be made to augment logistical installations with combat security elements.

b. Logistical Personnel: Overall is an ever increasing need to upgrade the caliber of the officer and enlisted men in the logistical system. More thorough selection in supply, maintenance and transportation is essential. Soldiers assigned to jobs in an active theater must be able to function immediately upon arrival. Learning period on the job must be minimal.

c. Logistical Organization and Procedures: Organization and procedures must be standardized throughout the Army. Personnel who function in Germany or CONUS must be able to pick up in Vietnam without learning a new system or techniques. The project initiated by the Commanding General of the 1st Logistical Command, under project SAME, would satisfy the requirement in Vietnam; but this has application Army wide if we are to be responsive to future requirements or future conflicts.

d. Supply: Numerous suggestions have been submitted in our periodic operations lessons learned reports which deserve study and analysis; however, there are a few major points which stand out to me as the Commander;

(1) The requirement of having to go through an inventory control center should be carefully examined. Overcentralization does not necessarily mean efficiency or economy. I feel that each support command at depot level can function as its own inventory control center with authority to requisition from CONUS within limitations of theater Army policies. Crossleveling can be effected by monitoring other depots and a system of inter-servicing each other.

(2) Inventory in Motion - the concept of counting inventory which is in transit as part of stockage objective desires careful study. If this can develop more clearly and definitively, the requirements for stock in forward areas can be markedly reduced.

(3) Interchangeability and substitute items: More work is required to fully develop adequate information for customers and supply managers.

(4) Identification: Item nomenclature on shipping containers must be expanded to make them meaningful to supply managers and particularly for storage personnel. Example: FSN 2815-911-3645 Engine for 5-ton multi-fuel is more meaningful than just engine. Needless to say, too brief nomenclature causes great confusion.

(5) Maintenance: The most vivid lesson to be learned in my opinion is that more attention is required for modular replacement across the board. The level of mechanical skill to cope with increased equipment component sophistication point in this direction. Coupled with this is the need to standardize on components such as hydraulic pumps, electrical and electrical guages, fittings and the like to provide maximum interchangeability and a decrease in the total number of line items. Within this concept, care of maintenance should be again emphasized to ensure that the maintenance is effected rapidly and simple. The personnel for maintenance should be functionally trained and not by type equipment, i.e., engineer equipment repairman and wheeled vehicle mechanic. We should have mechanics who are system trained in internal combustion engines--diesel and gas, hydraulic specialists, and electrical systems.

e. Transportation:

(1) Port Operations - There is no substitute for efficient materials handling equipment to effect rapid off loading and back loading of ships.

(2) Container type ships are a logistician's dream. The Sealand type van in use in Vietnam has proved successful beyond our expectations. To be able to load and back load 12,000 S/T of cargo in 30 to 36 hours is remarkable. The doctrine for employment of this type container in future overseas operations needs full development. The concept of inventory in motion is fully realized with a container. We can see where a container can be loaded in CONUS and transported directly to a forward area without intermediate handling. The use of these containers can be likened to moving depots.

(3) Advanced manifests - an important need exists for knowing cargo by line item and quantity on each vessel well in advance of arrival in port. This will jubilate off loading, transportation and receipt planning.

UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND - CAM RANH BAY



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US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY

SUPPORTED STRENGTH JUNE 1969

US ARMY	31,814
US AIR FORCE	18,346
US NAVY	2,265
US COAST GUARD	8
REPUBLIC OF KOREA FORCES	14,721
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE	285
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM NAVY	125
CONTRACTOR & OTHER SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES	4,289
	76,853

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY SUPPORT [illegible] CAM RANH BAY
ORGANIZATION CHART

APPROVED BY

KENNETH F. LANGLAND
COLONEL, TC
COMMANDING



——————GENERAL STAFF SUPERVISION

* COMMANDING OFFICER 92ND FINANCE DET.
** COMMANDING OFFICER 43RD MED GP.
*** COMMANDING OFFICER 178TH MP DETACHMENT.

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US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY



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
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

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
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557 LT MAINT CO
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22 FIN DET
59 FS CO
293 QM DET
50 APU
148 S/S CO
AUG 54 GS GP (PROV)
Vinall Corps G/S

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CAM RANH ARMY DEPOT, CAM RANH BAY, VIETNAM

ORGANIZATION CHART

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US ARMY MARINE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY VIETNAM



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