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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (25 Aug 69)

FOR OT UT 692312

16 September 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

**ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General**

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5th Transportation Command

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 5TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
APO 96238

13 May 1969

SUBJECT: **Operational Report of Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command
for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RSCSFOR-65) (R-1)**

THRU: **Commanding General, US Army Support Command, QN
ATTN: AVCA QN-GO-H
APO 96238**

**Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-O
APO 96384**

**Commanding General, US Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375**

**Commanding General, US Army Pacific
ATTN: GOPP-DT
APO 96558**

TO: **Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310**

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. (U) Command Organization:

(1) Significant changes in the Command organization occurred during this reporting period. The 540th Transportation Detachment (BARC) was attached to Tuy Hoa Detachment (Prov), 593rd General Support Group effective 4 January 1969. Authority was General Order 434 dated 14 April 1969, HQ, USASUPCCM, QN. Operational control was delegated to the Commanding Officer, Vung Ro Outport.

(2) This Command assumed responsibility for two additional sections from Qui Nhon Support Command, ACofS Transportation. On 19 Jan 1969, the Rail Section was transferred to the S-3 for overall control followed by the Ro/Ro trailer program on 8 April 1969.

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(3) Per General Order 249, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, dated 4 April 1969, the 1st Shore Platoon, 264th Transportation Company (TS) was returned to the parent unit with one officer effective 5 April 1969. All other personnel and equipment was assigned to USASUPCOM, DNG for further assignment to 516th Personnel Services Co, Da Nang and assigned with the 403rd Terminal Transfer Company.

(4) A chart of present Command Organization is attached as incl 1.

b. (C) Command Group Activities:

(1) (U) On 11 Feb 69, LTC James H. Kendrick was reassigned from HHD, USASUPCOM, CN where he served as ACofS Transportation to the 5th Transportation Command as Deputy Commanding Officer.

(2) LTC William C. Freeman departed the Command on 11 Feb 69, to command the 27th Transportation Battalion, 8th Transportation Group.

(3) (U) On 16 Feb 69, LTC Pierre J. Dolan was reassigned from Commanding Officer of 394th Transportation Battalion to USAD, Qui Nhon. LTC Merrill R. Owen coming to the Command from 24th Corps replaced LTC Dolan as Battalion Commander.

(4) (U) The Command hosted several important guests during the reporting period. VIP's are listed in inclosure 2.

c. (U) Personnel, Discipline and Safety:

(1) During this reporting period the Command turnover of personnel was average. The Command was at 95% of authorized strength as of 30 April 1969. There are no anticipated personnel losses that would hamper mission accomplishment.

(2) Disciplinary action taken during the reporting period:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Article 15	17	19	26
Summary Court Martial	0	0	0
Special Court Martial	5	4	7

(3) Recordable Accidents:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Military	1	3	0
Vehicle	1	0	0

(4) During the reporting period a vigorous program was initiated in the Command to emphasize the importance of individual weapons safety and to provide effective ways of decreasing incidents occurring due to unsafe use and handling of weapons. Continued emphasis is being placed on overall safety throughout the Command.

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d. (C) Security/Provost Marshal:

(1) (C) Intelligence/Counterintelligence:

(a) Significant enemy activity within our defense area of responsibility occurred on 23 Feb 1969, at Gate 3, Qui Nhon Army Airfield. At approximately 230120, an estimated squad of sappers sabotaged/rocketed the check point and had temporary access to a portion of the Northwest corner of the airfield. Results were 9 US WIA, 1 US KIA, and 3 VC WIA.

(2) (C) Security:

(a) On 29 March 1969, a new policy concerning security responsibilities was established with the 394th Transportation Battalion. This policy change was caused by the initiation of the Qui Nhon Installation Compound, increasing the Battalion's defense requirements. The 394th Trans Bn is responsible for providing and training all internal security guards for the Qui Nhon Port complex, Han Jin Transportation Company convoy guards, train security, and ship security guards. These elements are under the operational control of the CO, 5th Transportation Command, through the S-3 and S-2. The Battalion also provides personnel for the port complex gate security, with the S-2, 5th Trans Cmd responsible for training and operational control.

(b) This headquarters published Defense Operations Order 1-69 (U) 18 April 1969. An estimated 90% of policies/procedures established by this OPOD have been implemented. Significant changes include: A decrease in number of units within our defense area. Defense operations are now oriented toward the Qui Nhon inner and outer harbor. Although our defense area of responsibility is considerably smaller than our defense area of interest and coordination, this document formalizes coordination requirements for the 13 headquarters that execute tactical operations within our area of interest. An important addition to the OPOD is a contingency plan for periods of security alertness. Optimum use is made of personnel available at the Port facility to observe possible avenues of enemy approach and for immediate reporting of suspicious activity to a central location. In addition, rules of engagement within Qui Nhon Installation have become more detailed and precise.

(c) This headquarters has been directed to establish and maintain a Joint Tactical Operation Center for coordinating matters relative to port security and harbor defense. The TOC will have necessary Army, Navy, and Vietnamese components to effectively coordinate harbor defense activities. A document proposing operational guidelines for the coordinating agency was published 28 March 1969. Two factors are presently preventing further progress in the establishment of TOC: Naval Forces, Qui Nhon are awaiting direction from their respective higher headquarters and a formal response from Headquarters, Binh Dinh Province is soon expected.

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e. (G) Operations

(1) (G) Cargo Operations: This headquarters and units within the Command engaged in logistical support operations during the entire 89 days of the reporting period. Tonnage and troop movement figures are:

(a) (U) Tonnage Handled (Includes Shifting Cargo)

	S/T	M/T
February	74,867	177,975
March	130,935	257,812
April	<u>88,112</u>	<u>228,006</u>
TOTAL HANDLED	293,914	663,793

(b) (U) Tonnage Discharged

	S/T	M/T
February	45,796	99,519
March	90,743	153,516
April	<u>49,724</u>	<u>132,650</u>
TOTAL DISCHARGED	186,268	390,685

(c) (U) Tonnage Outloaded

	S/T	M/T
February	28,347	76,793
March	38,471	95,728
April	<u>37,632</u>	<u>93,794</u>
TOTAL OUTLOADED	104,450	266,315

(d) (U) Class V Tonnage Discharged (Included in (b) above):

	S/T
February	8,850
March	30,175
April	<u>15,296</u>
TOTAL CLASS V DISCHARGED	54,321

(e) (U) Sealand Tonnage Handled (Included in (b) above):

	S/T	M/T
February	11,089	47,189
March	16,128	63,255
April	<u>12,741</u>	<u>56,951</u>
TOTAL SEALAND HANDLED	39,958	167,395

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(f) (U) Tonnage Handled by Service (S/T) (*):

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Army	53,052	93,112	60,889	207,053
Navy	83	112	562	737
Air Force	6,690	14,133	6,657	27,480
Commercial (**)	210	164	1,362	1,736
RVN/ROK	3,719	6,947	5,467	16,133
USAID	24	329	434	787

(*) Excludes Sealand

(**) (RMK, Vinnel Corp, Kongyung Const, PA&E)

(g) (U) Train Tonnage Handled:

	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
February	0	0
March	3,531	6,415
April	<u>2,146</u>	<u>4,555</u>
TOTAL TRAIN HANDLED	5,677	10,970

(h) (C) Troop ships called at Qui Nhon Port on four occasions during this reporting period. A total of 2479 ROKA Troops debarked and 3941 embarked.

(2) (U) Control of Operations:

(a) In February 1969, plans were made for the implementation of MILVAN. Similar to Sealand Trailers, MILVAN is a containerized cargo program utilizing military owned chasis and containers. MSTs controlled vessels containing MILVAN's will depart from CONUS every 15 days. This program will not result in additional tonnage into RVN, but rather a large amount of tonnage will be containerized. Once in country local haul will be handled by contractor vehicles while line haul will be the responsibility of 8th Transportation Group (MT). To implement this new concept a MILVAN Detachment of approximately 20 personnel will be established under the CO, 5th Trans Cmd (Tml). This detachment will maintain control of all MILVAN containers designated for consignees within a 30 mile radius of the MILVAN Marshalling Yard. The detachment will maintain location information on containers and establish a follow-up system to insure timely turn-around. New facilities for operations and maintenance of the marshalling area located on the New Causeway, Qui Nhon Port, have been requested to meet the project starting date of June 1969 and include a 72,000 Sq Ft maintenance building, 2,300 Sq Ft wash rack and steam cleaning area for retrograde MILVANS, a 1,600 Sq Ft operations building and a 12,000 Sq Ft marshalling yard area which will be capable of staging 200 trailers.

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(b) Operational organization of the Command is shown on the chart at inclosure 3.

(3) (U) Operational Activities:

(a) Sinking of BARC 59: Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo LX (BARC) #59 brouched on the beach at Tuy Hoa. during heavy surf on 8 January 1969. The BARC remained on the beach as all attempts made with equipment available to 5th Trans Cmd to remove it failed to succeed. Later a team from Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam (MMAV) succeeded in pulling the BARC from the beach toward open sea, While the BARC was in tow to Qui Nhon, the salvage pump failed to keep up with the incoming water and the BARC sank in 107 feet of water. Salvage attempts were made and abandoned after failures.

(b) On 24 February 1969, two days prior to the arrival of the USNS BLAND manifested with 6446 S/T of Air Force ammunition for discharge at Qui Nhon, this headquarters received a TWX requesting diversion of 3222 S/T of ammunition to RG4 (Vung Ro Bay) for Tuy Hoa Air Base. According to the CDI, every section of all the five hatches would be a partial discharge at both ports. To eliminate excessive shifting, blocking and bracing of cargo, the total ammo discharge at Qui Nhon was 4015 S/T, of which 1002 S/T was transhipped to Vung Ro Bay. By loading directly into BC Barges, LCM's, and LCU's, 845 of 1002 S/T discharged for shipment to Vung Ro Bay arrived ahead of the USNS BLAND. The total time the vessel remained in Qui Nhon was reduced by an estimated four days since cargo was neither shifted or backloaded. Blocking and bracing was only required in the lower holds of two hatches. The 845 S/T of ammo transhipped to Vung Ro Bay prior to the arrival of the USNS BLAND saved an estimated four days of the time the vessel would have been required to remain at Vung Ro Bay. The direct monetary savings that can be attributed to discharging the USNS BLAND in time saved and dunnage required if ammunition had not been transhipped to Vung Ro Bay exceeds \$35,000. In addition, indirect monetary savings were realized at Qui Nhon by the release of stevedore gangs for four extra days. These gangs were reassigned, thus enabling this Command to realize faster discharge of other vessels in port.

(c) Increased support of Duc Pho thru Sa Huynh commenced during March 1969. Over 500 S/T were moved each month primarily by LCM.

(d) Frequent disruption of rail service to Tuy Hoa/Phu Hiep by enemy activity resulted in heavy reliance on LCU's and BC Barges to supply those areas thru Vung Ro Outport.

f. (U) Comptroller: On 1 February 1969, Han Jin Transportation Company assumed operation and maintenance responsibilities of the 100-Ton Floating Crane stationed at Qui Nhon Port under authority of a contract modification.

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a. (U) Construction in the Port Area:

(1) Retrograde Storage Area: Work, primarily on a self-help basis, is continuing to level an existing sand pile to form the storage area. The completion date for the leveling of the area is estimated as 1 June 1969.

(2) Ammunition Barge Quay: The 536th Engineer Detachment (Port Construction) is continuing work on the ammunition facility. Lighting and a firefighting capability has been included into the construction plans. The anticipated completion date of the construction is 1 July 1969.

b. (U) Port Veterinarian:

(1) Inspection procedures were altered for the Port Veterinarian Section on subsistence discharged from vessels with the implementation of DD Form 1691-R (Arrival Condition Report Perishable Subsistence). More detailed inspection with independent temperature surveillance is required on fresh fruits and vegetables originating in CONUS. The DD Form 1691-R is submitted to the DPSC region from which the item originates and provides the procurement agencies with more rapid information concerning subsistence items and the projected quality and utilization of these items. Subsequent inspections by other units provide the agencies with a running record of the items from origin in CONUS to consuming personnel.

(2) Expanded operations at LST Beach involving refrigerated subsistence required increasing the work load of the Port Veterinarian Section to provide maximum surveillance of subsistence cargo. The operation consisted of transferring refrigerated cargo from vans to rail cars. Later, the tactical situation required loading the vans on LCUs for shipment to the consuming unit. Many problems arose during the early phases of this operation regarding faulty coordination and improperly functioning refrigerated units. These difficulties have been minimized through improved coordination. Inspection procedures in this situation involved, basically, visual inspection of the items, observing storage and loading procedures and temperature surveillance of refrigerated vans and cars.

i. (U) Maintenance: The maintenance posture of the Command remained at a high level throughout the last quarter. The availability of Wheeled Vehicles was 96%, Material Handling Equipment was 91%, and Marine Equipment was 81%. The apparent reason for this low deadline rate is attributed to a continuing Command emphasis in the area of maintenance.

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel: None.

b. (U) Operations:

(1) Throughput of Ammunition to Pleiku and An Khe:

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The 10 March 1969 Sapper attack on the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot severely limited the Depot's ability to ship and receive ammunition.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Since ONABD had limited ability for receipt of ammo, and five ammunition ships were discharging in port, it was necessary to find alternate means of clearing inland the ammunition consigned to ONABD. Through close cooperation with the ABD, information on ammunition stored on barges would be relayed to the Depot. They would then inform Qui Nhon Port of Pleiku and An Khe requirements. Utilizing 8th Trans Group line haul, ammunition would go directly from the port to its final destination. The port was able to clear approximately 250 S/T daily for the period 10-20 March 1969.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** When it is apparent that port discharge of ammunition will exceed ONABD's ability to receive it, the throughput concept be utilized.

(2) Gas Masks for Civilian Contractors:

(a) **OBSERVATION:** On 31 March 1969, a convoy of the 8th Trans Group which included contractor trucks was ambushed by an enemy element using CS Gas. US military personnel involved were equipped with protective masks. Though the contractor's drivers had been equipped with helmets, flak jackets, and weapons, they had no protective masks.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Following the gas attack, attempts were immediately made to procure protective masks for the contractor's drivers. It was found, however, that a request for authorization must be processed through channels to USARV level to obtain approval. During the time this request is being processed, the contractor's drivers must daily pass through enemy controlled territory without being equipped with masks which are considered to be an essential item for US military drivers. These drivers, as of this date, are still not equipped with protective masks due to the time involved in processing the request.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Recommend action be taken to provide for the immediate safety of contractor personnel performing missions in support of combat operations, and that the administrative procedure be accomplished after action has been taken to prevent delay in issue of required combat equipment.

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(3) Loss of LCM #63:

(a) OBSERVATION: On 15 April 1969, two (2) LCM-8's running to Sa Huynh encountered a sudden storm which tore the bow ramp off one boat. Despite the heroic efforts of its crew, the LCM 63 had to be abandoned and was eventually lost.

(b) EVALUATION: Accurate weather information is essential when operating small landing craft along the coast.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: (Already implemented) Make frequent evaluation of weather information available to the SS HIBUERAS, MSTS, and Harbor Defense with a final check just prior to dispatching boats.

(4) Prestaging of Cargo:

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Prestaging of cargo for Chu Lai and Da Nang has created problems at the LST Beach. There is insufficient space to pre-stage 5 or 6 LST loads. Additionally, pilferage has increased since prestaging took effect.

(b) EVALUATION: The prestaging of cargo is most important to bring about efficient, speedy loading and quick turn-around time for LST's. Since there is only limited space at the LST Beach there is only a limited amount of cargo that may be prestaged.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that only 1 LST load be pre-staged at LST Beach for Da Nang and Chu Lai at one time. This allows other cargo to be nominated for other destinations. When a LST is nominated, 50% of the cargo should be prestaged at the LST Beach upon arrival of the vessel. This will enable speedy loading of all LST's.

(5) Outer Harbor Anchorages:

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Vessels anchored in anchorages C-1 and D-1 in Qui Nhon outer harbor interfere with the safe approach to the Qui Nhon outer harbor entrance.

(b) EVALUATION: Vessels anchored in Qui Nhon outer anchorages are blocked from a safe and swift approach to the channel entrance. When vessels are occupying C-1 and D-1 anchorages, vessels underway to the inner harbor must spend an additional 15 - 30 minutes time underway to avoid these ships. A serious danger would occur if a vessel attempting to go between C-1 and D-1 anchorages happened to lose power. There are an additional thirty (30) anchorages available in the outer harbor.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: (Already Implemented) Due to sufficient anchorage space available the practice of using C-1 and D-1 anchorages has been discontinued.

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(6) Mooring of Deep Draft POL Vessels:

(a) OBSERVATION: It is virtually impossible to moor deep draft vessels to the Qui Nhon POL Jetty at mean ebb tide.

(b) EVALUATION: Several attempts to moor POL ships during a mean ebb tide has proven that tugs assigned to Qui Nhon Port have insufficient horsepower to facilitate the maneuvering of vessels into the tide. Mean tide builds to 2-2½ knots velocity, making it impossible to warp vessels into position.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The scheduling of arrivals of deep draft POL vessels alongside the Qui Nhon POL Jetty should coincide with slack water periods or the incoming tide.

(7) Fueling Problem with Refrigerated Vans:

(a) OBSERVATION: There have been numerous instances when refrigeration units on vehicles have run out of fuel. Subsequently, temperature within the vans elevate above the recommended levels of 45° chill items, 10° maximum high for freeze items.

(b) EVALUATION: There is an approximately eight hours fuel supply for the refrigeration unit. Once empty they are extremely hard to re-start. Reefer vans loaded at 1200 hours arrive at LST Beach at 1800 hours. They are loaded on LCU's for the trip to Vung Ro Outport which takes an additional 12 hours. There is no fuel aboard the vessels for the vans and crew members occasionally shut down the refrigeration units to conserve fuel. The mechanic accompanying the vans on board LCU's check the fuel level frequently, but often the vans remain on the beach for extensive periods of time prior to the arrival of the mechanic.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: (Already Implemented) To insure proper temperatures in refrigeration vans, adequate fuel must be available at LST Beach and aboard vessels transporting the vans. Refrigeration units should never shut down. Personnel trained in maintaining and fueling these units should be available while vans are on the beach for long periods of time and while enroute.

(8) Improper Loading of Milk Products in Freeze Vans:

(a) OBSERVATION: Filled milk products handled at LST Beach have been loaded into freeze vans and cars. Travel time is sufficient enough to cause freezing of these items.

(b) EVALUATION: Vegetable fat used in the manufacture of these products renders it unsuitable for freezing according to Headquarters,

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1st Logistical Command, and Headquarters, 44th Medical Brigade. Coordination with milk plant inspectors and depot inspectors has been undertaken to eliminate this practice.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Prior loading plans should be established which will insure that no chill items be placed in freeze vans.

(9) Cleanliness of Civilian Contractor Vehicles:

(a) OBSERVATION: Civilian contractor vehicles are used extensively in handling refrigerated subsistences. These vehicles are often presented for loading in an unsanitary condition.

(b) EVALUATION: Food items are very susceptible to contamination and should be handled in the most sanitary manner possible. In addition, dirt and debris is carried from these vehicles into refrigerated storage areas in the Depot and subsequently to Class I facilities and Mess Halls.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: (Already Implemented) Require civilian contractor to sweep trucks prior to loading. This could be accomplished by individual drivers or handled at a central area where vehicles are dispatched.

c. (J) Training: None.

d. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Vietnamese Gate Guards:

(a) OBSERVATION: Female civilian Vietnamese gate guards were intimidated and influenced by Local Nationals.

(b) EVALUATION: After experiencing the ineffectiveness of our gate guards for an extended period of time, bilingual special instructions covering their responsibilities were published and posted on 1 Feb 69. Coordination with Headquarters, National Police has been effected and two National Policewomen have been promised for such a mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That two National Policewomen or ARVN Womens Army Corp be assigned to this duty.

(2) Threat to Ammunition Anchorages:

(a) OBSERVATION: A sweep of CR088266 and surrounding area on 6 Feb 1969, disclosed 30 fortified bunkers, 8 of which were destroyed in the operation, the remaining fortification are a threat to the inner harbor ammunition anchorages.

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(b) EVALUATION: Every effort by the security section to initiate a tactical operation in the area has not succeeded. As a result the inner harbor anchorage, the construction of which cost approximately \$2,000,000 has not been available for use. The bunkered area is situated 1300 meters west of the anchorage, and it remains an unquestionable security risk.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the bunkered area in CR088266 be cleared and that tactical operations adjacent to the ammunition anchorage be maintained.

(3) Pass and Vehicle Control:

(a) OBSERVATION: As a result of traffic surveys taken at the Qui Nhon Port complex checkpoints a new permanent pass and vehicle control system was implemented on 10 March 1969, to reduce the number of non-official visitors in the port area.

(b) EVALUATION: Personnel entering the port on a regular basis for legitimate reasons are issued permanent passes, which are attached to the vehicle windshield. Passes are color coded and permit that vehicle and personnel to enter only that portion of the facilities required to conduct business or affect coordination. Tri-lingual visitors passes are issued to all others entering the port facilities. These passes require the signature of the party visited and the time group termination of the visit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The implementation of the new pass policy is felt to have decreased the amount of non-official traffic on the limited roadways and helped to reduce pilferage in the port complex.

(4) Train Security:

(a) OBSERVATION: It is extremely difficult to provide full security for the train for Phu Cat Air Base when it extends beyond the LST Beach checkpoint.

(b) EVALUATION: The train usually loaded with heavy ordnance (750 lb Bombs) extends beyond the LST Beach checkpoint perimeter into the Vietnamese civilian controlled pier and is extremely vulnerable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Two feed-in tracks be constructed on either side of the existing track within the beach and a chain link fence be constructed to prevent unauthorized entry from the Vietnamese Civilian Pier to give full security to the train.

e. (U) Logistics: Deleted TOE/MTQE Equipment:

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(a) OBSERVATION: Units have deleted TOE/MTOE equipment which decreases flexibility of the Command.

(b) EVALUATION: Preparation for a scheduled local operation pointed out that units have deleted certain TOE/MTOE equipment under the provision of USARV Reg 310-32. This reduction of such items as generators and beach lights has limited the flexibility within the Command.

(c) EVALUATION: Actions to delete TOE/MTOE items should be carefully reviewed by Operations to consider the possibility of subject items being needed for future requirements.

- f. (U) Organization: None.
- g. (U) Escape, Evasion, and Survival: None.
- h. (U) Other: None.

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AVCA QN-GO-H (13 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command
for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238 18 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O, APO
96384

1. (C) The Operational Report of the 5th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters and the following comments are submitted:

a. SECTION 2, paragraph b (1): Concur. Throughput of cargo should be practiced whenever possible.

b. SECTION 2, paragraph b (2): Concur. Protective masks for contractor's drivers have been obtained on 180 day loan and steps are being taken to obtain them permanently.

c. SECTION 2, paragraph b (4) (6) and (8): Concur. All of these recommendations are designed to improve port operations and are being implemented whenever possible.

d. SECTION 2, paragraph d (1): Concur. According to USARV Regulation 190-30, a female guard is required to search all women entering and exiting the compounds. Since local nationals are intimidating the female guards, women with a more formal background for this type work are required.

e. SECTION 2, paragraph d (2): Concur. As of 23 May a new artillery block was established by the FSCC and encompasses the area adjacent to the upper bay. The coordinates of this block are CR 075314, CR 092314, CR 091265, and CR 075265, which includes the area in question. The block is cleared daily and artillery fire can be obtained on immediate call. Sweeps and demolition operations continue to be conducted in the area.

f. SECTION 2, paragraph d (4): Concur. Barbed wire fencing for this area is programmed to be used in lieu of the hard-to-obtain chain link fencing. This would prevent any VN from having easy access to this area and would aid in its security. Construction of the proposed rail spur at the LST beach should eliminate the problem.

g. SECTION 2, paragraph e: Concur. It is incumbent, both on 5th Transportation Command Operations, and ACoFS, SP&O, this headquarters, to carefully review deleted TOE/MTOE items in consideration of the possibility of subject items being needed to fulfill future requirements. It is the policy of ACoFS, SP&O to carry out such reviews on all requests for turn-in of TOE and MTOE items not needed for operational requirements.

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for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-1) (U)

h. Escape evasion and survival information (DA Survey information)
was not required for this reporting period.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: QNL 2161

⚡
JOSEPH J. KRAYNAK
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

AVCA GO-MH (13 May 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

6 JUL 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. (U) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Improper Loading of Milk Products in Freeze Vars, page 10, paragraph b(8). Concur. Further, it is imperative that temperature be controlled throughout transit to preclude freezing due to improper operation of equipment.

b. Reference item concerning Vietnamese Gate Guards, page 11, paragraph d(1). Concur. Vietnamese National Policewomen, ARVN WAGs or ARVN military dependents residing locally with sponsors would be good prospects for female checkers.

c. Reference item concerning Train Security, page 12, paragraph d(4). Concur. A project to construct the required rail spur on the LST beach has been designed and funded. When the real estate is acquired and construction materials and personnel become available, the project will begin.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839



LANNY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM-QNE
5th Trans Comd

AVHGC-DST (13 May 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command
for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963751 4 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
5th Trans Comd
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (13 May 69) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Trans Comd for Period Ending
30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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