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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHGC-DST

16 JUN 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted by MG G. S. Eckhardt. The report covers the period 15 January 1968 to 1 June 1969 during which time MG Eckhardt served as CG, Delta Military Assistance Command and Senior Advisor, IV Corps.
2. MG Eckhardt is recommended for oral debriefing by the Department of the Army staff and as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate joint colleges and service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

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2 cy wd Hq, DA

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HEADQUARTERS  
DELTA MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
USAAG, IV CTZ, APO 96215



MACCZ-IV-CS

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program

Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DH  
APO 96375

1. References:

- a. United States Army Regulation 1-26.
- b. United States Army Vietnam Regulation 1-3.

2. In accordance with the above regulations attached as Inclosure 1 is my debriefing report.

3. I will confine my observations to the period 15 January 1968, to 1 June 1969, during which I was Commanding General, Delta Military Assistance Command and Senior Advisor, IV Corps. I will address each of the major problem areas that I perceive together with recommendations for their solution.

4. Training of ARVN Divisions:

a. Although the effectiveness of these units has improved, it has been only as a result of the receipt of better weapons and improved support. True, the units now operate more frequently and for longer periods of time. Basically however, the training of the individual soldier and the small unit leadership and operations have not improved during the reporting period. Fire teams, squads, and platoons do not exist tactically. Independent company level operations are rarely undertaken in the day and night operations are unknown even though they are recognized by the ARVN commanders as desirable at this stage of the war.

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MACCZ-IV-CS

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program

b. I have recommended to the Commanding General, IV Corps, a combination of intensive garrison type training and refresher training at the training centers. Although he agrees, the tempo of operations and the load at the training centers are such as to preclude any meaningful improvements to date.

## 5. Territorial Security:

a. The 1969 pacification campaign is progressing too slowly; primarily because of a shortage of territorial forces. The additional RF companies authorized for 1969 are now beginning to come out of training and should permit more progress in the second half of 1969. In viewing long range progress however, the continued improvement will be directly proportionate to the continued increase in effectiveness and numbers of territorial forces. Peoples Self Defense Forces are being developed and armed as rapidly as weapons can be made available. They cannot, however, take the place of RF and PF as long as the enemy still has a sizeable number of local squads and companies that are better armed and better trained.

b. My recommendation made in message 1455, 2 April 69, that 34,000 additional RF and PF be authorized is still valid. Recruiting should begin not later than 1 July 1969.

## 6. Internal Security:

a. It is common knowledge that the Vietnamese military structure is seriously penetrated by enemy sympathizers and agents. This makes it very difficult to attain the necessary element of surprise in operations. It is also conducive to last minute, poorly coordinated operational planning. The only solution I can suggest is the compulsory death penalty for treason together with a much more intensive counter-intelligence and security training efforts. These programs must be initiated at the national level.

7. Border Interdiction: Our pacification efforts are doomed to failure unless we can do a better job of shutting off the flow of supplies and personnel from Cambodia. We are making a concentrated effort with the limited resources that are available to IV Corps: Air Cavalry Squadron, Camp and Mobile Strike Forces, and United States and Vietnamese naval elements. Before this vital program can succeed completely, however, we need the US Brigade and additional air mobility which were originally approved for Speedy Express and the US composite artillery battalion that has since been requested. In addition, I

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recommend the CIDG units currently performing border surveillance be converted to Regional Forces. This will constitute a significant step toward achieving the unity of command which is essential to effective and efficient surveillance and interdiction operations.



GEORGE S. ECKHARDT  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS  
DELTA MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
USAAG, IV CTZ, APO 96215

COUNTRY : REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

DEBRIEF REPORT BY: MG G. S. ECKHARDT 019766

DUTY ASSIGNMENTS : COMMANDING GENERAL  
DELTA MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
AND  
SENIOR ADVISOR, IV CTZ

INCLUSIVE DATES : 15 JANUARY 1968 - 1 JUNE 1969

DATE OF REPORT : 22 MAY 1969

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## 1. THE ENEMY, IV CTZ

### A. Organization

Taking direction from the North Vietnamese Government, The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) controls military and political operations in IV CTZ. Within the zone, the enemy has divided his military structure into two commands: Headquarters, Military Region 2 controls the upper part of the Delta; and Headquarters, Military Region 3 controls the lower part. Each military region (MR) has regimental headquarters which control main force battalions. In addition, the military regions have direct control over separate main force battalions, companies and platoons. The Viet Cong divide IV CTZ into 12 provinces. Each province possesses at least one provincial mobile force (PMF) battalion and many have two or three. Generally, but not invariably, the PMF battalions operate solely within the confines of the VC province to which assigned. The Viet Cong further subdivide IV CTZ into 66 districts, subordinate to the provinces in which located. Each of the VC districts has either a district company or platoon under its control. In addition, there are guerrilla forces which operate on specific missions in the villages and hamlets throughout the corps area. The political infrastructure controls the military at all echelons. The infrastructure is organized into Political Affairs Committees at the region, province, district, village and hamlet levels. In addition to playing major role in directing military operations, the infrastructure is responsible for recruitment, collection of taxes, proselytizing and political expansion. Total enemy ground strength as of 15 May 1969 was estimated as follows:

Main Force Bns (18)	2,980
Local Force Bns (19)	3,205
Separate Companies & Platoons (95)	7,276
Admin Services	8,230
Guerrillas	23,916
VCI	<u>26,000</u>
TOTAL	71,607

### B. Command and Control

Command and control of main force units is exercised through the regimental headquarters. The province committees control PMF units. Districts, villages and hamlets control their own units, although subordination of these lower level units to PMF or MF units for specific operations is not unusual. Overall command and control is good as evidenced by the coordinated, MR-wide, indirect fire/ground attacks which raise the incident rate from 3-6 per night to the 50 or more per night which ordinarily signals initiation of a VC offensive phase. However, a significant high level shortcoming is the apparent ignorance on

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the part of COSVN of the lack of real success by the VC battalion size units. Because of the lack of a good tactical communication system, command and control does break down in multi-unit ground attacks. Examples of this occurred during the Tet 1968 action when scattered VC units roamed city streets without secondary missions or knowledge of routes of withdrawal, and again prior to the planned Tet 1969 attack on My Tho, when attacking units failed to get into position at the prescribed time. Ofttimes, the platoon or squad leader does not know his mission until his force is committed. The VC must rely heavily on prescribed plans of attack and predesignated assembly and withdrawal areas because, once units are committed, they cannot modify schemes of maneuver due to the lack of adequate battle-field communications.

### C. Strategy and Tactics

In late 1967 and early 1968, the enemy decided it was essential for military and political reasons to move quickly into the third phase of revolutionary warfare--the strategic counter-offensive--by a maximum effort on the military, political, and proselyting fronts simultaneously in order to gain victory in a short period of time. The enemy designated his forthcoming effort the 1967 - 1968 Winter-Spring Campaign.

Military operations in the Winter-Spring Campaign began in late October 1967 and were accompanied by logistics preparations on an unparalleled scale. Material was infiltrated across the Cambodian border, transshipped to VC base areas, and then stockpiled throughout the Delta. Staging from these base areas during the Tet 68 offensive, the enemy first made local attacks and later assaulted populated areas, expecting a popular uprising. It was assumed that such an uprising would topple the GVN, cause the collapse of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, isolate the American forces from the war, and permit the expansion of enemy control in the rural areas. In actuality, the enemy's only major success was in the propaganda field outside South Vietnam. Only limited success was realized in controlling the rural areas.

As a result of the losses sustained--about one sixth of his forces--the enemy reassessed his strategy after Tet. He decided to stagger his main blows in the second offensive, both in time and place. As a result of spoiling operations by US and ARVN forces and the shortage of units, the enemy's second offensive, originally scheduled for mid-April, was delayed until early May. This second offensive was also a military failure, and the enemy again lost large numbers of personnel.

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The enemy then paused to regroup and refit. His next major action, the so-called "Third Offensive", 17-18 August through 22 September, was pre-empted by FVMAF operations. Without gaining a single significant objective, the enemy displayed both quantitative and qualitative symptoms of force degradation. Moreover, reports of poor morale caused by physical hardship, lack of success, fear of air and artillery strikes, and general disillusionment with communist objectives mounted.

In contrast to the reliance on ground assaults which characterized earlier campaigns, the enemy's Winter-Spring Campaign of 1968-1969 consisted almost exclusively of indirect fire attacks. There was a sprinkling of small ground attacks on isolated outposts and a temporary increase in sapper/terrorist activity. Again, the enemy achieved none of his stated objectives and the creditability of his propaganda further declined.

At present it is probable that the enemy will continue to employ economy of force tactics, such as indirect fire attacks, harassments, and sapper/terrorist activities in order to conserve manpower while still displaying a significant military capability. Ground attacks, for the most part, will be directed against remote, lightly defended positions where the enemy enjoys the greatest chance of success. Recently pacified areas will be especially vulnerable to such attacks. The VC forces in IV CTZ remain a potent though reduced threat. If he is willing to sustain heavy casualties, the enemy can launch multi-battalion ground attacks against selected objectives.

#### D. Armament

During the last two years, the VC have standardized their weapons systems within the combat maneuver elements (MF/PMF). However, many guerrilla units still use a wide variety of weapons manufactured in both communist and non-communist countries. The basic infantry weapon is the AK47 rifle with a basic load of approximately 50 rounds. Other individual weapons include the B-40 and B-41 ATGL and the RPD light machinegun. Officers may carry the K54 ChiCom pistol. The primary crew served weapons are the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles. Indirect fire weapons include 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars. Anti-aircraft weapons consist of the 12.7mm and 14.5mm YHMG. Recently introduced into the Delta are 107mm and 122mm rockets, which can be used for direct or indirect fire missions. The bulk of the VC armament and ammunition is manufactured in Communist China and is of good quality. The VC continue to use captured and dud allied munitions to construct booby traps, mines and launch bombs, although the reliability of these reworked munitions is

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extremely low. Individual training on the weapons systems lasts one to two weeks, consisting primarily of verbal instruction and dry fire exercises. Standardization of the weapons system is of the most significant gains made by the VC in the Delta.

## E. Logistics

Prior to December 1968 there was evidence that military and non-military supplies were being infiltrated into IV CTZ from Cambodia at a high rate. Reports indicated that from 180 to 200 tons of supplies per month were being infiltrated into the Corps from Cambodia. In December 1968, due to the dry season, which restricted sampan movement of supplies to major waterways only, resupply activity throughout the Delta was limited. Twenty-four hour friendly air and ground reaction also adversely affected enemy infiltration of supplies.

Since 1 January 1969 there have been numerous Hoi Chanh and PW reports and captured enemy documents emphasizing the lack of supplies in IV CTZ. These shortages range from a lack of medical supplies in VC combat units and medical facilities to a critical shortage of munitions in My Tho Province. These reports have been, for the most part, scattered throughout the Corps Tactical Zone and do not depict perpetual supply shortages, with the possible exception of medical supplies, in specific areas or units. There have been an increasing number of reports indicating that the VC are experiencing personnel shortages in logistical units and are encountering difficulties in moving equipment along commo-liaison routes due to continuous friendly operations and surveillance. These problems are best exemplified by information provided by an assistant rear service chief of MR 2 captured in mid-February 1969 and a document captured in VC Rach Gia Province, MR 3. This information indicates that MR 2 and MR 3 are attempting to reorganize their rear service units because of difficulties in meeting logistical requirements. Although the VC are experiencing difficulties in providing adequate logistical support to units in MR 2 and MR 3, infiltration of supplies is expected to increase beginning in May 1969 when the rainy season begins.

## F. Transportation

The enemy uses the Delta's extensive canal and waterway system as their primary transportation routes. All sizes and types of watercraft are employed to move men and supplies throughout the zone. Movements to contact, routine resupply, rapid dispersal and the massive logistical flow all are carried out in this manner. The road systems, using purchased, commandeered, or

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hired vehicles of all descriptions supplement the waterways, particularly in rapid movement of supplies from Cambodian ports to border staging areas. During the rainy season, the inundation of large areas increases the ease of waterborne movement across the Cambodian-RVN border and also within the Delta. Wet season infiltration tonnage is reportedly twice that of the dry season. Hindrance of friendly ground movement during this period also augments this capability. In addition, sampans can be modified to provide mobile firing positions for both small arms and indirect fire attacks.

### G. Communications

The main means of communications for the VC in the Delta, especially during combat operations, is the runner. This has often caused the VC problems because runners have a tendency to become lost or the units in contact become dispersed. Orders and requisitions are passed through the commo-liaison system by using drop boxes and postal runners between stations. The VC have more radio/receivers than transreceivers. Transreceivers are not normally found below regimental level. When the units are in the base areas, land lines are frequently laid between company CPs. The VC do use some captured PRC6s and PRC25s.

### I. Outside Support

Since January 1968, reports have indicated that small groups of NVA have infiltrated through Cambodia and into IV CTZ to perform cadre duties, support functions, and to replace a limited number of VC combat losses. An NVA PW captured in Dinh Tuong Province on 24 December 1968 indicated that he was a member of 309 Infiltration Group which arrived in Dinh Tuong Province about mid-December. There were 300 men in this group and they were to be used as fillers in unidentified VC units in the area. An NVA lieutenant captured in Dinh Tuong Province on 29 March 1969 said he was a member of the 231 Infiltration Group. His group, consisting of 120 personnel, departed Hanoi in February 1968 and arrived in the Ba Thu Base Area in September 1968. The exact disposition of this infiltration group is unknown, but it is believed that only a small portion of the group was assigned to IV CTZ. On 11-12 May 1969, six NVA PWs were captured in Chau Doc Province near the Cambodian border. Preliminary interrogation indicates that the prisoners belonged to the 3rd Regiment of the 9th VC Division. The 9th VC Division normally operates in the vicinity of the Ba Thu base area along the Cambodian border in western Hau Nghia Province. The PWs said that, due to high casualties, their unit had received a large number of NVA replacements. The percentage of NVA in the unit was estimated at approximately 50 per cent. Prior to the report of the 3rd VC Regiment operating in IV CTZ,

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the number of NVA in IV Corps was estimated to be between 800 and 1000.

### I. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Organization, Activities (To Include Methods of Operation)

VC military units have only a limited organic military intelligence capability, relying on reconnaissance parties for their immediate tactical needs and their infrastructure for detailed information on targets and warning of friendly operations. This political-economic infrastructure seeks to penetrate all activities within their particular area of responsibility. The formation of various occupational and age-oriented associations under the control of the local committee provides control and access to a flood of low level information. Formal intelligence collection operations through penetration of RVNAF, US-employed local nationals and the RVN political structure must be credited. The pervasive nature of their system also functions as a counterintelligence force since RVNAF and FWMAF sources and informants can be detected through a high level penetration of the controlling agency or a low level disclosure of unexplainable activities or remuneration. Monitoring of friendly radio transmissions with captured or compatible equipment is a well-documented tactic of VC units. During these radio intercept operations, the enemy has been able to copy and understand a substantial percentage of RVNAF radio traffic and evidence points to an ever increasing capability to intercept and understand other FWMAF transmissions. Radio interception personnel are assigned at regimental level and use civilian type portable receivers with several shortwave bands. Although the effort is still relatively unsophisticated, the VC are resourceful in the use of equipment and knowledge they possess. In areas where the intercept capability is hindered due to a language barrier, jamming is employed. There have been occasional reports of enemy entry into ground tactical nets in an attempt to deceive and confuse friendly operations.

### J. Psychological Aspects

The setback suffered by the VC in their "strategic counter-offensive" has been reflected in a very high Chieu Hoi and defection rate over the past year. The degradation of training levels and the accelerated demands for replacements have lowered the morale and esprit of enemy units as a whole. Continued allied offensive operations, firepower advantages and interdiction of resupply activity have adversely affected living conditions, eliminated sanctuaries and former base areas, and forced the VC into a troubled, erratic existence. Medical supply shortages and the resultant fear of death, should they be wounded, have weakened their will to fight. Still, the NVA cadre and fillers, dedicated long-time soldiers, and principally a well-implanted infrastructure have maintained a viable enemy fighting force, albeit reduced both qualitatively and quantitatively from late 67 levels.

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### II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT, IV CTZ

#### A. Government Organization

##### 1. Corps Level

In 1956 the position of Government Delegate was established in the Republic of Viet Nam. The position was created to represent the central government in each Corps area, review the activities of provinces, for the President, and under certain emergency conditions to direct provincial activities. In 1963, concurrently with the overthrow of the Diem regime, the position was assumed by the Corps Tactical Zones' Commanding Generals. In early 1964 a civilian Administrative Assistant (sometimes called Deputy Government Delegate for Administration) was added to the Government Delegate's staff, to assist in administrative matters relating to Corps, Province and other subordinate levels of civilian government. With the exceptions of the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) and Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD), the central government ministries are not represented on the corps level.

##### a. Military Authority and Responsibility

Since January 1968, there have been four Commanding Generals in IV CTZ. In addition to holding the position of Government Delegate, the Corps Commanders, as senior ARVN officers, exert a great deal of influence upon the IV CTZ's province chiefs, all of whom are regular ARVN officers.

This authority began to wane shortly after the 1968 VC Tet Offensive when the President on 15 April 1968 signed a decree abolishing the position of Government Delegate. The Government was to then immediately create a civilian Inter-provincial Inspectorate. This was not done promptly as expected, and in the unfilled vacuum, influence and power gravitated back to the CTZ Commanding General. In December of 1968, the National Legislature passed the laws creating the Inter-provincial Inspectorates. Two were assigned to IV Corps, one for the eight provinces north of the Bassac River and one for the eight provinces south of the Bassac River. This legislation was subsequently signed by the President in early January of 1969.

##### b. Civil Authority and Responsibility

In early May, the Prime Minister named IV CTZ's two Inter-provincial Inspectors, however, they are not yet operational. In the past, civil authority and responsibility was assigned to the Government Delegate, and this authority exercised

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through the Deputy Government Delegate for Administration. The IV CTZ incumbent was appointed Chief of Cabinet for the Prime Minister in June of 1968, and the vacancy created was never filled. This inaction was probably due to the expectation of the timely creation of the Inter-provincial Inspectorate. This lapse, for whatever reason, left an unfilled vacuum and civil authority on the Corps level has been largely non-existent. The Chief of Cabinet for the former Deputy Government Delegate for Administration tried, intermittently, to fill the gap but was simply incapable of doing so.

### c. Coordination

Coordination between the Corps military and civilian authorities, and particularly the subordinate levels of government has been effective. This was evidenced by the rapidity with which Operation Recovery, initiated following the Tet Offensive of 1968, met its goals and subsequently with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). This Campaign, undertaken in the months of November and December 1968 and January of 1969, aimed at establishing viable and creditable GVN government presence in previously contested or VC hamlets. During the APC, 404 hamlets were "retaken".

### d. Effectiveness

The effectiveness of government organization at Corps level may be gauged only within its own narrow framework. The Corps level government organization is only a small, monitoring-post-auditing arm of the central government. The effectiveness is wholly dependent upon the personality, prestige and energy of its personnel.

## 2. Subordinate Levels

### a. Organization, Authority and Responsibilities

#### (1) Province

On 9 April 1968, the then Prime Minister by Decree No. 37-SL/NV, abolished the position of Deputy Province Chief for Security. This reduced the officers holding those positions to RF commanders or Deputy Sector commanders only. This did however, serve to enhance the position of Deputy Province Chief for Administration, and served further to civilianize provincial government. The Province Chief, or his Deputy controls the various internal administrative operations of the province headquarters and, by statute, has the power to direct, coordinate and control the provincial technical services representing the central government ministries

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and directorates. These include Public Works, Revolutionary Development, Public Health, Agriculture, Social Welfare and Refugees, Education, etc. Many times however, this power is difficult to exercise as the technical service personnel are employees of their respective Ministries in Saigon and operate with funds, personnel and material allocated directly from the Ministries.

### (2) District

The district is, in terms of civilian government, an administrative arm of the province government and funded from the province budget. Functions include checking for form and preaudit expenditures of the villages. In fact, however, the District Chiefs wield great influence over the villages in their districts. In theory, the authority and responsibility of the district was reduced by certain decrees promulgated in September and October of 1968. The Popular Forces and the Revolutionary Development teams were placed under the control of the village chiefs and the village chiefs authorized to consult directly with the representatives of the provincial offices of the Saigon Ministries. Direct coordination with the ministry representatives at province appears to be working, however the District Chiefs continue to exercise operational control over the Popular Forces and the Province RD Control Group over the Revolutionary Development Teams.

### (3) Villages/Hamlets

The hamlet is a decentralized arm of village government, funded from the village budget and performing village clerical, registration, information and security functions. It is commonly referred to as Village/Hamlet government. The structure of Village/Hamlet government was established in Decree #1968-SL/DUHC of 24 December 1966. Village authority and responsibility was enhanced by these decrees and by the creation of the Popular Self Defense Forces (PSDF) under the direction of the village. Further restructuring and expansion of the authority of the village was accomplished by the promulgation of Decree #045-SL/NV dated 1 April 1969. The Decree raised the amount a village could spend on Self Development projects without prior approval of the Province Chief, from 50,000\$VN to 100,000\$VN. Decree #045 also retained with the Province Chief, the authority to approve all village budgets regardless of amount, rather than requiring those in excess of 1,000,000\$VN be approved by the Ministry of the Interior in Saigon. The prestige of the village has been greatly enhanced by the 1969 Village Self Development Program, established 24 February 1969. This program allots 1,000,000\$VN to

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villages with elected councils and 40,000\$VN to appointed village governments for Self Development projects. It effects no permanent change in the continuing authority and responsibility of the village government. It could have long range effect on the people's attitudes, particularly if the projects are wisely selected and swiftly implemented.

### b. Status of Elected Government

(1) Decree No. 68/NV of 9 April 1965, provided for elected Province Councils with power to decide, "within the frame work of policy and course of action of the Government", certain stipulated matters. The primary purpose of the council is to advise the province chief on the desires and needs of the people. Fifteen of the sixteen provinces in IV Corps have elected councils. Sa Dec Province was created subsequent to the province council elections on 30 May 1965, and consequently has no council. In actual practice these bodies, where operative, are consultative only. In some provinces, notably, An Giang the council meets regularly and is effective as an advisory body. In some other cases, the province council has not met in recent months.

### (2) Village/Hamlet Elections

#### (a) Village

	TOTAL	ELECTED	APPOINTED	NO GOVERNMENT
Jan. 1968	776	394	309	73
May 1969	770	579	146	44

#### (b) Hamlets

Jan. 1968	5274	1970	1324	1980
May 1969	4752	2832	612	1308

#### (c) Comments

The increase in elected governments is largely due to the GVN elections held in March 1969, and the US advisory effort constantly recommending that elections be held wherever possible. Villages/Hamlets with operating, viable governments serve to deny VC recruitment and resupply.

The reduction in the total number of villages and hamlets is the result, largely the product of US effort and advice, of consolidations jointly planned. In the "No Government" category areas, there are few people. Over 80% of the population of the Corps lives in areas with operating governments.

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### c. Effectiveness

#### (1) Provinces and Districts

An analysis of progress in IV Corps indicates the province governmental functions are more effective today than they were in January of 1968. This is due to a number of factors:

(a) The quality of province chiefs appointed has improved.

(b) Sustained advisory effort has resulted in increased effectiveness of the province chiefs. For instance, in the area of strengthening local government, the province chiefs are now thinking in terms of holding elections wherever possible; they are, with a few exception, expediting the implementation of the Village Self Development Program.

(c) Some technical service reorganization at the province level has served to streamline provincial organization and reduce the province chief span of control. This has increased the efficiency of the organization. For instance, each of the Directorates; Agricultural Service, Fisheries, Animal Husbandry etc., of the Ministry of Agriculture had separate, independent offices at province with a common point of command only at the Saigon level. Now, these separate offices have been brought together with a single provincial chief of agriculture with the representatives of the separate directorates responsible to that office. More of this type of reorganization could be accomplished within the fields of Public Works and Education.

(d) The administration, at the province level, of the Basic Administrative Management course to provincial and technical service supervisory personnel has had a lasting effect.

(e) On the negative side, it must be pointed out that national mobilization has left many key offices at the provincial level shorthanded and understaffed.

(f) One very big plus at the district level has taken the appointment of young, trained, inspired graduates of the National Institute for Administration as Deputy District Chiefs for Administration. After graduation from the NIA, these men were drafted, given short basic officer's training; then assigned to the districts with the military rank of Aspirant as the Deputy Chiefs for Administration.

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## (2) Villages and Hamlets

(a) The administration of the in-province Village/Hamlet Administration training courses was badly delayed by the 1968 Tet Offensive. Yet, after having lost almost half a year, the province training directors accomplished approximately 85% of their 1968 training goals by the end of the year. In 1969, much of the same sort of delay was caused by the need for training in election procedures for the March elections and training for the Village Self Development Program. This training is particularly important for the new village staff members created by Decree #045. The cumulative effect of the training has increased the effectiveness of Village/Hamlet government.

(b) During late 1968, as it became apparent that the need for training additional RD teams would be diminished, the GVN decided to use the facilities of the National Training Center at Vung Tau for the training of Village/Hamlet officials during 1969. The first cycle of training began on 24 March 1969 and covered a four week training period. The second cycle began on 12 May and was for the same period. In the Corps, a program was established for interviewing a representative sample of the returnees from each province. Although there were minor gripes about the length of the daily sessions and the food, nonetheless the returnees have come back inspired and with a national viewpoint. It must be pointed out that for many of these officials, it was the first time in their lives that they had traveled outside their native provinces. The effect of meeting with and talking to their counterparts from the villages of the entire nation was enormous. By the end of 1969, village officials and all hamlet chiefs from the IV Corps village and hamlets having governments will have had an opportunity to go to Vung Tau. A total of 6344 Village/Hamlet officials from the Corps are scheduled for Vung Tau training during 1969.

(c) The importance of training Village/Hamlet officials to operate efficiently and responsively cannot be overemphasized. Viable GVN presence in the villages and hamlets serves to deny these areas to the insurgents--to deny them moral, financial, logistical and manpower support.

## (d) Major Problem Areas

### (1) Taxation

The majority of the governments in the Corps simply do not have sufficient revenues to meet the needs of the people. The causes for this lack are many, not the least of which is training. The primary cause however, is the simple fact that the nation has been at war for 24 years. Tax records range from

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bad to non-existent. Secondly, under French domination few key civil service positions were held by the Vietnamese. When the French departed in 1954, they took with them over half of the trained Vietnamese civil service cadre.

## (2) Governmental Structure

(a) Provincial governments will never operate with complete efficiency until the province has a stronger hold over the technical services. A stronger hold in this case related to controlling, hiring, firing and the granting or the withholding of rewards, monetary and prestige, by the province chief or council.

(b) The structure of village government in all of Viet Nam is defined in Decree #198 as amended by Decree #045. A primary shortcoming is this same basic structure applies to all villages, regardless of population. Some villages reportedly have less than 200 people while others, province capitals, have up to 100,000 people. All have the same structure. The smaller villages have fewer councilmen and two less commissioners, but the organizational structure is the same. Another facet of this problem is that in many of the major urban areas, again generally province capitals, two or more villages have grown together so as to be indistinguishable from one another; constituting a single economic, social, industrial, cultural and transportation entity. The salaries of local officials, village chiefs for instance, are established uniformly in Saigon and regardless of the population of the village, the magnitude of the job, or the cost of living in the area, all village chiefs receive the same salary.

## (3) Philosophy and Culture

The philosophy and cultural mores of the Vietnamese people work against increasing the effectiveness of local government. After French training and centuries of outside domination, they are "form" or "procedure" oriented rather than "result" oriented. Coupled with this is the pervasive ancestor worship. Also a problem is the lack of cross-training. When the person performing one process in a sequence is absent, the flow of work ceases. Finally is the Asian fear of "Loss of Face". The total impact of this results in the following: every "T" must be crossed, every "I" dotted, every step in the work flow taken, regardless of the urgency of the problem; innovating or shortcircuiting of the bureaucratic processes may result in a mistake and a consequent loss of face, a greater consideration than that of the results that can be achieved and the value of immediacy of solution.

It is for these reasons that training and education are so important.

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## B. Political Development

1. The period January 1968 to May 1969 has seen GVN control in the Delta slowly but steadily increasing. Much of the support for the government is lukewarm at best, being only the reverse side of resentment against the VC. The by-now traditional problems of favoritism, corruption, factionalism, inability to provide security, incompetence, and indifference to the needs of the people have by no means disappeared, and they mitigate popular support for the Saigon government considerably. Nevertheless, gains have been made, and it will be the purpose of this paper to point these out, as well as to identify the areas where progress has been lacking. The following is an analysis of political activity in IV Corps, January 1968 to May 1969.

### a. The Minority Groups in the Delta

#### The Cambodians

Politically speaking, the 500,000 plus Cambodians in IV Corps are divided into two groups. The first include all those who look to Son Thai Nguyen in Saigon as their leader. It is closely connected with the Khmer Serei, has good contacts with the GVN, and draws most of its support from Vinh Binh Province. The second group is headed by the Dai Duc Danh Rao, a Rach Gia bonze chosen recently to lead the newly-formed Cambodian Leadership Council. The Council is completely dominated by monks, who claim--rather unconvincingly--no interest in politics.

Notwithstanding this split, the principal trend among the Cambodians during the last year and a half has been toward political consolidation. Given their past willingness to support the GVN against the VC, the prospect of Cambodians wielding national influence is not an unwelcome one. The possibility that this could turn into a separatist movement is not great, but should be watched nonetheless.

The man most likely to make the Cambodians into an effective political force seems to be Danh Bao. Convinced after Tet 1968 that the VC would lose, he switched his support to the GVN, began thereafter to participate in a series of conference from which, eventually, he emerged as top man. The first of these meetings was held September 25-27, 1968. Called the "Conference for the Unity of Vietnamese Buddhists of Cambodian Origin in Vietnam," it was attended by 70-80 official representatives from nine provinces, plus lower house representatives from five of the six provinces having substantial Cambodian minorities. The Vinh Binh deputy Kiem Sot did not attend, nor did the Cambodian leadership in Saigon. The meeting's purpose,

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according to LTC Kim Khanh, IV Corps officer in charge of Cambodian affairs, was, first, to establish for the first time a centralized religious leadership for Cambodian Buddhists, and, secondly, to express Delta Cambodian dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Saigon headquarters. The upshot of the conference was the appointment of a Temporary Priests' Leadership Council, and a Temporary Lay Leadership Council, with the provision that after three months the conference would reconvene to elect a permanent council.

The next meeting was, in fact, held on March 19-20, in Can Tho, with representatives from ten IV Corps provinces and Vung Tau in attendance. Again absent were representatives of Son Thai Nguyen in Saigon, as well as his supporters in Vinh Binh. The election of the Permanent Leadership Council contained one surprise: it was completely dominated by bonzes. The lay leaders resented being presented with what they termed a fait accompli on the part of the monks, but their disaffection did not seem serious. Danh Bao was elected head of the 21 man council (two members from each participating province, plus one from Vung Tau).

Since the nature of Danh Bao's position (i.e. head of a newly-created body) is not such as to confer the automatic authority and prestige that adhere to leadership positions in older, more tradition-laden organizations, Danh Bao will to some extent have to create and solidify his own following, and in this he is off to a good start. Relatively young, intelligent, aggressive, diplomatic, he enjoyed wide respect while at Rach Gia. In April he moved to Can Tho, and now spends most of his time travelling through the provinces maintaining contact with local Cambodian groups. Thus, although the Son Thai Nguyen-Khmer Serei Cambodians still form a significant and influential minority, at this point the future seems to lie with Danh Bao's group.

One subject which has heretofore not been mentioned, but which is of great import to almost all Cambodians in Vietnam, is the proposed creation of an Office of Cambodian Affairs at the national level. The Cambodians have been asking for this for several years, and in the past several months serious discussions have been in progress between Cambodian representatives and the GVN. The Cambodians would like to see a full-fledged ministry established, "like the Montagnards have". They feel that in the past the GVN has taken them, and their loyalty, for granted; they point, for example, to the difficulty Cambodians have in getting ahead in the civil and military services, to alleged discrimination in Vietnamese schools, to the unnecessary and considerable damage they say the GVN has inflicted on their pagodas trying to destroy the VC. The Cambodians feel their grievances deserve much more GVN attention than they get, and that they need a more effective line

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to Saigon than they have at present. (Right now IV Corps has a Cambodian Affairs representative, but the GVN gives him little support and he is, therefore, almost powerless.) Possibly, after several years of petitioning, the Cambodians may be about to get the type of arrangement they want. If so, and if Danh Bao's leadership council increases its influence, the Cambodians in the Delta will be in a better position than ever before to make themselves heard, and they will have to be reckoned with as a political force.

### (2) The Hoa Hao

The Hoa Hao, like the Cambodians, are presently divided into two major factions, and this split has meant a general decline in Hoa Hao influence on the national level during the past year and a half. The Hoa Hao continue, however, to be cohesive and effective locally.

The Hoa Hao were relatively unified and at the height of their influence following the Constitutional Assembly elections in 1966. Two years later, however, there began a rupture which has yet to be mended, and which has cost the Hoa Hao in terms of power and prestige on the national and provincial levels. On December 10, 1967, a meeting was held at Hoa Hao Village, Chau Doc, in which Luong Trong Tuong was re-elected chairman of the Hoa Hao Central Committee. His opponent had been LTC Tran Van Tuoi, who withdrew from the struggle after his defeat, but whose supporters refused to accept the validity of the election. On May 28, 1968, these people convened, again in Hoa Hao Village, and chose a second, completely different Central Committee. The chairman was Huynh Van Nhiem, like Tuong an elderly man, prominent in Hoa Hao affairs for many years. Ideologically there was little to differentiate the two factions. The only issue seemed to be who would control Hoa Hao affairs.

After an initial attempt at reconciliation, relations between the two groups grew worse instead of better. On the evening of July 20 a group of representatives of the Nhiem faction arrived at Hoa Hao headquarters in Saigon, held by the Tuong faction. Someone on the inside threw a grenade over the wall, killing two and wounding 25. The effect seems to have been the defection of many Tuong followers.

On October 6 another election was held in Hoa Hao Village, and the results indicated that Hoa Hao fortunes were brightening. The delegates were numerous enough to represent a clear quorum, and they elected a completely new Central Committee, composed of unknowns. They left vacant the post of chairman, reserving it for the founder, Huynh Phu So, who they believe will return. Most encouraging for the participants was the decorum that prevailed at

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the proceedings, a welcome contrast to the bitter quarrelling that had marked previous attempts to get together.

It is still too early to say whether the Hoa Hao are out of the woods. Some think that the problem of uniting the two factions (Tuong did not come to the election, and still occupies the headquarters in Saigon) was not really confronted: not only is the new Committee made up of non-entities, but the top position was left vacant. Nevertheless, the October Committee is thought to represent a majority of the Hoa Hao, and the orderliness of its birth gives hope that a new phase has begun in Hoa Hao conduct of their own affairs.

The shaky leadership situation has reflected itself in a diminution of Hoa Hao influence on the provincial, and therefore national levels; by June, 1968, there was only one Hoa Hao province chief in the Delta; not much over a year before there had been four. In March, 1968, when the Hoa Hao province chief of An Giang was replaced with a non-Hoa Hao, the hue and cry that could have been expected a year or two earlier was not forthcoming: some An Giang Hoa Hao, having tired of bickering within the sect, said they welcomed the appointment.

All this does not mean that the Hoa Hao are disintegrating locally. Their record during the 1968 Tet Offensive, for example, was generally good: not only did security in An Giang province undergo negligible change, but Hoa Hao districts in Phong Dinh, Chau Doc, and Vinh Long, among others, were similarly untouched by VC attacks. More recently, when the VC attacked the Hoa Hao village, March 15-16, 1969, members of both factions banded together to drive out the attackers. Earlier, on February 22-23, after the VC attacked Hoa Hao areas in Tan Chau and Chau Phu districts of Chau Doc Province, and GVN air retaliation unfortunately compounded the damage, Hoa Hao leaders mounted a quick, effective campaign to feed and shelter the victims. All this indicates that their ability to put aside feuding and work together in times of crisis is still considerable.

### C. Political Parties in the Delta

Saigon-based parties have traditionally had little success in the delta. People in IV Corps tend to distrust politicians, to expect little from them, to believe that government governs best when it impinges least upon their lives. Little has happened during the past year and a half to change this attitude. People complain frequently, for example, that many Lower House representatives spend their time in Saigon and devote little attention to representing their electorates, all the while receiving a salary that many consider excessive. This is by no means universally the case, but most voice this opinion.

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As far as political parties are concerned, to add to the generally low regard for formal political organizations, another consideration has influenced the situation: many of those who would ordinarily belong to a political party have been reluctant to associate themselves with any of the numerous political organizations until the political future is clearer, security is assured, and the threat of VC retaliation against those joining has diminished.

Over the past six weeks this picture has started to change in at least one respect: the political future is becoming clearer. President Thieu's call for the formation of a front to support the government, and for a loyal opposition, has made it necessary for parties to begin to declare themselves, and has spurred them into the field in a search for new adherents. Indications are that the parties are responding to the new situation quite seriously. If their efforts continue at present intensity, the Delta may be entering a phase of more widespread political participation.

Several parties are likely to figure prominently in the Delta's political future. One of these is the Progressive Nationalist Movement (NM). Comprising the Movement are the Tan Dai Viet party, as the major element, the Vietnam People's Force, the Movement for the Renaissance of the South, the An Quang Buddhists, some VNQDD factions, and a collection of other generally sudiste politicians. Although the PNM is mostly southern, it includes members from all regions and religions. Its leaders are Nguyen Van Bong, Director of the National Institute for Administration and political editor of the new daily Cap Tien; and Tan Dai Viet leader Nguyen Ngoc Huy, presently serving on South Vietnam's delegation to the Paris peace talks. With these prestigious professors furnishing the main leadership, the Movement has some hope of rallying South Vietnamese intellectuals to a party which is anti-Communist and yet can serve as the vehicle for expression of dissatisfaction with the GVN (it will stand in opposition to President Thieu's proposed front). At the same time, the PNM include many experienced politicians. PNM leaders stress privately that they are trying to gather together "clean" (i.e. non-corrupt) elements, and seem to be doing so.

The Progressive Nationalist Movement is a recent formation, a predominantly Southern collection who feel it is time to band together and make themselves heard. They presented their Movement to the public in Saigon on April 20, at a ceremony with 2000 attending. On May 11 the PNM convoked its first official assemblage in the Delta: at Long Xuyen Professor Huy spoke to the Movement's An Giang provincial cadre. Similar meetings are planned in IV Corps in the very future. The PNM, then, has made an effective beginning, and chances

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seem good that the Movement's appeals for an honorable but speedy end to the war, and its insistence that the government prosecute a genuine social revolution, will continue to attract support.

Another political grouping that has begun to build up support in the South is the Nhan Xa party, which appeared publicly in April 1968. Composed largely of Central Vietnamese Catholics who were associated with the Can Lao party during the Diem era, the party is strongest in I Corps and Coastal II Corps. In the Delta, Nhan Xa's IV Corps representative claims 20,000 cadres, probably an inflated figure. Most people would say that the Nhan Xa in the Delta is small, but strong for its size, boasting good organization and experienced politicians. It will probably support President Thieu's proposed front, but says it is waiting for more word on what policies the front will advocate.

There are recent indications that the Nhan Xa, at least in the Delta, is trying very hard to purge itself of its Diemist aura in an effort to attract a wider following. The party will soon elect a new Committee which is supposed to reflect this change in direction. One hint as to what that direction will be can be inferred from the fact that the party recently asked a prominent supporter of the Progressive Nationalist Movement to become its chief representative in IV Corps. If the Nhan Xa can in fact add to its considerable organizational talent a broader base in the Delta, its influence then will become more of a factor for southern-dominated parties to contend with.

Something should be said about the President's attempt to form a political front, and how this is being greeted in the Delta. Thieu's first venture in this direction was the Lien Minh, founded in July, 1968, and thought until recently to be the front that would be the government's support when the "political war" began in earnest. It has had scant success in the Delta. In October, 1968, an embassy provincial reporter wrote that the Lien Minh had thus far aroused, "little comment". Most Vietnamese, once the front is identified for them, claim that it has yet to do anything in their areas. Many feel that it is just another in the long series of such organizations run by a few tried, true, and (to these people) uninspiring figures ..."

That picture did not change substantially until President Thieu's speech of April 7 set off a flurry of activity that seemed at first destined to revitalize the Lien Minh, but by now looks to have been the beginning of its demise. Most observers now agree that a completely new front will be formed, of which the Lien Minh may be a part.

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Reaction in the Delta to chances of success for the new front are not enthusiastic. Everyone agrees that a coalition of like-minded parties to support the government is supremely desirable, especially since the not distant future holds the prospect of political competition with the NLF. But observers to a man stress the obstacles to the kind of meeting of the minds that must be the basis for such a coalition: perhaps chief among these obstacles is the problem of single parties' losing their "individuality", the corollary being that there exist more leaders than there will be positions of leadership available. Thus, according to most Southerners, personal and party rivalries--whether petty or based on serious disagreement--constitute the main threat to the success of President Thieu's venture.

This paper has described only three of the numerous parties active in the Delta. An exhaustive list would mean filling up a considerable amount of space with accounts of activities that, in the main, have lost what little importance they may have had when they occurred. The most important period of political ferment in IV Corps during the past year and a half is happening right now. The question is whether pro-government and nationalist, anti-communist groupings will be able effectively to compete with the NLF (or its successor) when the war is finished. It is too soon, of course, to predict outcome.

### D. Popular Attitudes in the Delta Toward the GVN

The feeling of the Delta populace toward their government is too complex a subject to be expressed in generalizations that purport to represent the attitudes of all--or even a huge majority--of the people. Generalizations must, of course, be employed, but this presentation will qualify them as to time and place when appropriate, and attempt to be specific whenever possible.

#### 1. GVN Ability to Protect its People

Since January, 1968, two events have affected the security situation in the Delta more than any others: the 1968 Tet Offensive, and the recently completed Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). By August, 1968, according to one of the IV Corps provincial reporters, security in the countryside had not yet reached pre-Tet levels. Village and hamlet officials, except in some very secure areas, did not dare sleep in their homes, and this was true even in some district towns. The APC, starting in September, 1968, improved the situation a great deal, although by December there was still skepticism, at least among lower level officials, as to how long the improved security would last once the

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VC decided to challenge it. By now it is clear from intelligence reports that the VC during the spring of 1969 made disruption of the newly pacified areas one of their two top priorities (the other being the killing of American soldiers), but they have been largely unsuccessful, and the gains registered during the APC are still intact.

As for the cities, the People's Self Defense Forces have performed well. City dwellers have been very cooperative with the plan, and the low number of incidents of terrorism in a large town like Can Tho, for example, attests to their effectiveness. Complaints are sometimes heard that the people are prone to relax their vigilance excessively during calm periods, but this is a natural phenomenon for which there is probably no fully adequate remedy.

In general, people in the Delta feel that their security has improved over the last year and a half. Inevitably, however, there have been lapses, and these have led to criticism of the GVN. During February and March, 1969, for example, the VC attacked several Hoa Hao areas in Chau Doc that had been untouched by the war for many years. During the first of these attacks, February 22-23, the GVN retaliated by air, causing substantial property damage, and few enemy casualties. When Hoa Hao village was attacked on March 15-16, and the VC were driven out by several Hoa Hao RF companies, some leading Hoa Hao figures said they wanted more GVN help in the future. Others qualified this by adding that they wanted GVN assistance only if unnecessary destruction could be avoided.

The GVN has been similarly criticized by the Cambodians, many of whose pagodas were destroyed by air attacks at Tet 1968. The Cambodians charged that such destruction was unnecessary, and that it reflected the general disregard the GVN has for Cambodian welfare. Subsequently, the GVN aided in the rebuilding of the pagodas.

In neither of the above cases was support for the GVN appreciably lessened, although this is probably due more to the two groups' anti-VC convictions than to the feeling that their relationship with the GVN is satisfactory.

### 2. Corruption

As of January, 1969, Vietnamese in IV Corps were saying that little progress had been made in fighting corruption. They claimed that, although province and district officials are somewhat better than previously, this has not significantly reduced the amount of corruption in the Delta. Too many officers and civil servants are still more concerned about personal gain than about serving the

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government. The effect this has on the morale of the average citizen, and of those soldiers and government employees who are honest, is extremely deleterious. Sources often stated that the problem of corruption must be resolved before the VC can be defeated: although support for the VC has diminished, this has not meant more adherence to the GVN. The comments heard from most Delta Vietnamese on this score give the lie to contentions that Vietnamese accept corruption as part of their "way of life". They may have learned to expect it, but they resent it deeply, and all indications are that only significant improvements among GVN officials will earn genuine popular support for the government.

### 3. Favoritism

The practice within the GVN, and within the ARVN in particular, of rewarding people on bases other than merit and performance has not yet been substantially changed. The 1969 Tet promotion list provides a case in point. Many good, dedicated men were ignored, and a seemingly disproportionate number of officers in non-combat jobs were promoted. In particular, two former Delta province chiefs were promoted to full colonel, Ly Ba Pham of An Giang, and Huynh Van Du of Kien Hoa. Pham was legendary for his corruption, and Du was Province Chief in Kien Hoa during Tet 1968 when his province had perhaps the worst post-attack recovery effort in the Delta. Both men left office under a cloud, but only a year later have been promoted.

### E. GVN Administration in the Delta

Although, as the previous two sections indicate, progress in the upgrading of GVN officials in IV Corps has been slow, there have been improvements. As of August, 1968, and beginning from Tet of that year, nine province chiefs had been replaced. In March, 1969, two more were removed, and an additional four were switched around within the Corps. These changes were generally regarded as good. The new men appeared more intelligent than their predecessors, had in general achieved a higher level of education, and had undergone more complete and sophisticated military and intelligence training. In addition, they were making creditable efforts to get out and meet the people and their representatives.

It would be a mistake to exaggerate the overall improvement in IV Corps administration caused by these changes. The man, for example, who was thought to need replacing most, the province chief of Vinh Binh, has still not been moved. Also, many district chiefs were changed, and not all switches were improvements.

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There have been favorable changes in village and hamlet administration, changes that are more significant because they concern more than a shake-up of personnel. At this writing, most of the villages and hamlets in the Delta have elected officials, and--more importantly--these officials have been given significantly greater powers and responsibilities than they possessed previously. Village chiefs are now authorized to control local PF forces and RD self defense cadre, as well as the village budget. The question at this juncture is whether they will in fact begin to exercise these new powers, or whether they will be pressured and intimidated by district and province officials into maintaining the same relationships that have existed heretofore.

### F. Delta Attitudes Toward VC and NLF

The Tet attacks of 1968 caused deep resentment against the VC in the Delta and the VC's popularity since then has steadily decreased. An embassy provincial reporter wrote in June, 1968, that the VC were "making increasingly onerous demands on the population. Taxation ... continues to be extremely heavy. Recruitment of teenagers is going on at a high rate, and rural parents are increasingly dubious of VC promises to return the youth to their homes after a few months. In addition, there seems to be growing resentment at VC "terrorist tactics". The same assessment could be made today as well.

As far as the NLF is concerned, some politically aware people in the Delta are adopting a more flexible line regarding eventual political dealing with them. In January of this year, for example, Phong Dinh Lower House deputy Ngo Van Hieu said he hoped for a quick cease fire, as do most Vietnamese, and recommended that the Vietnamese constitution be amended to allow for an NLF role. Similar sentiments have been expressed more and more frequently since then, probably for a variety of reasons. People realize, for one thing, that the US will not be in Vietnam indefinitely, and may be adjusting their thinking accordingly. In addition, the somewhat freer climate may be encouraging people to say publicly what they would have hesitated to say previously. Thus, lately, there seem to be more people demanding an end to the war than before.

This does not mean that people have begun to trust the NLF, or that they think the NLF has changed its objectives. Almost everyone cautions against even the slightest capitulation. Many people, therefore, are torn: they fear dealing with the NLF, but they find intolerable a continuation of the status quo.

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### C. Economic Development

Though economic factors may have been important in founding the NLF, they did not contribute to sustaining the insurgency in the time frame January, 1968 to June, 1969. The Delta dweller is prospering; materially and economic inequities are gradually declining.

Since commercial support and massive U.S. military spending began in 1965, the fruits of modern technology have spread throughout Vietnam, with television antennas sprouting from the homes, boat motors omnipresent on the canals, and fertilizer available in quantity for the fields.

The farmers of the Delta have particularly benefited by the rise in general prosperity. The distortions of inflation have shifted the terms of trade in their favor. Since 1965, the prices of agricultural products, which the Delta sells, have gone up three times as fast as the prices of manufactured products, which the Delta buys. At one point in late 1968 a large hog equaled a 50 cc Honda and a healthy chicken bought the material for an ao dai of the finest quality. The residents of the Mekong Delta have always been well fed. They are now provided increasingly with durable consumer goods which add to the material accouterments of life.

Economic and social injustices probably are more directly causal in an insurgency situation than is the absolute level of the standard of living. Though such injustices readily are apparent in the Delta, they must be kept in perspective. In the first place, the view that the tax collector is the bane of the peasant's existence is a myth. In 1968 all taxes collected by all levels of the GVN in the Delta increased 114 piasters per capita. Even if illegal exactions are assumed to be several times legal taxes, the result is very small in monetary terms. It is particularly small in comparison with VC taxation: the total GVN tax on rice production amounts to less than 1% of the crop, while the VC take from 6% to 30%.

Land reform has always been a more burning issue on Capitol Hill than in the Delta, where an abundance of uncultivated land has denied the landlord any strangle hold on his tenant. It is nevertheless a real issue and the following steps have been taken to alleviate the problem: 1) distribution over the last year and a half of the bulk of the land titles to old French land and Ordinance 57 expropriated land. 2) One year moratorium on rent collections in areas undergoing pacification. 3) A firm Presidential commitment to a reduction of the retention limit from 100 hectares to the vicinity of 10 hectares per person.

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The U.S. effort in the Delta has naturally had far more success in the simple matter of inducing material change than in effecting institutional change. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Delta dwellers are prospering both absolutely and relatively: they are receiving a bigger pie. At the current stage of insurgency, it is probable that allegiances are determined more by prior commitments and the status of security than by fertilizer and miracle rice.

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### D. New Life Development

#### (1) Community Development

The implementation of the Self-Help Program under the Ministry of Revolutionary Development began in 1964. The ultimate objective of this program, as part of the total revolutionary development effort, is to help the people help themselves, in partnership with their government, to improve their socio-economic life. To carry out this objective, the people are encouraged and assisted in the undertaking of developmental activities by the government. Accomplishment of projects is largely through their own initiative and resources with fiscal and technical support furnished by the government.

The 1968 Self-Help Program initially suffered setbacks as a result of unseasonable weather. Chau Doc, Kien Phong, and Kien Tuong provinces were inundated by flood that caused considerable damage.

The 1968 Viet Cong Tet Offensive damaged and destroyed many Self-Help projects in the provinces of Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long and Bac Lieu.

Following the 1968 Tet Offensive, government effort was concentrated on the Recovery Program. As a result, the Self-Help Program was temporarily relegated to a lower priority from the standpoint of resources and emphasis. All available resources were mustered to repair and rebuild damaged and destroyed buildings and homes.

In spite of the Tet Offensive, by the end of June 1968, Self-Help operations were back to near normal. In fact, the number of Self-Help projects completed during the first six months of 1968 exceeded the total number of completed projects for the entire year 1967. A total of 1,232 projects were completed in 1967 as opposed to 1,677 projects completed in the first six months of 1968.

The second half of 1968 was characterized by a marked acceleration in the implementation of Self-Help projects. The people contributed free labor, money, and materials amounting to 182,948,851\$VN, while the government assisted in terms of money and commodities amounting to 185,613,399\$VN. By the end of December 1968, a total of 4,819 Self-Help projects had been completed in IV Corps.

The 1969 Village Self-Development Program does not have numerical goals for project completion but is premised on basically the



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same principles as the 1968 program. The people's involvement, support, cooperation, and continuing participation are still the anchors of the program. The primary change has been the increase in operational latitude given the village government. In the past, the District was the lowest echelon with authority to render decisions involving fiscal matters. In 1969, the village can approve and implement projects up to 50,000\$VN.

A vast training program in the mechanics and organization of the Village Self-Development Program has been implemented, and some province have completed the training of officials. Funds have been released to village authorities in Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa provinces and others are expected to follow shortly, contingent upon the completion of the training of officials.

The concept of Self-Help and Community Development is accepted by the Vietnamese people in IV Corps. They have seen and benefited by a myriad of completed Self-Help projects and fully appreciate the philosophy behind the program. Since 1965, nearly 11,000 Self-Help projects have been completed in IV Corps and from this effort has come the understanding and appreciation of the program.

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## (2) Agriculture

The Delta is Vietnam's primary source of food. The Region produces 75% of the nation's rice crop on 1.5 million hectares of land. Livestock products from the Delta dominate national markets, producing 75% of the chickens and hogs, 80% of the ducks, and 70% of the buffalo and cattle.

Rice Production: During the past 18 months, dramatic advances have been made in rice production in IV CTZ. This advance has been sparked by the carefully planned introduction of IR-8 rice to the Delta farmers. The miracle rice, developed in the Philippines, has introduced an entirely new concept of rice production. In the past, floating and traditional rice varieties, grown only during the wet season, has yielded an average of two metric tons per hectare. IR-8, renamed TN-8 by the Vietnamese, has opened the prospect of year-round use of land resources.

The 1969 target goal for IR-8 rice was 109,000 hectares. Field indications are that this goal will be exceeded by as much as 20%. Yields are expected to average over five metric tons per hectare. A yield as high as 16 metric tons per hectare has been reached on one occasion. TN-8 rice was introduced to the Delta after limited adoption research. The program is based on the new variety, proper irrigation and water control and the proper use of fertilizers and pesticides. These techniques have been taken to the Delta farmers through an educational program conducted by GVN agricultural officials with assistance by U.S. field technicians.

Protein Production: Rapid strides in the production of livestock has been sparked by high market prices and strong demand. Improvements in production techniques have been based upon.

- a. Introduction of new livestock breeds.
- b. A successful immunization program.
- c. Improved feed supplies.

The importing of improved chicken and hog strains from the U.S. is having a marked effect upon the protein production program. New poultry and hog strains are improving the genetic capability of these production units in the Delta. A privately owned, parent breeder flock and hatchery, has been established and others are planned for Region IV. Additional imports of hogs will be made this year with 22 units totaling 195 hogs scheduled for distribution.

A vaccine center was established in Can Tho in mid 1968 and in the first four months of 1969 nearly 200,000 doses of various vaccines were distributed. Vaccination teams are working throughout

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the Delta, training local people in vaccination methods and improved livestock health techniques.

Improved livestock feed supplies have been made available through the introduction of milling and mixing equipment. An educational program aimed at improved livestock nutrition has resulted in better livestock rations and improved feeding efficiency. Feed grain imports have supplemented the traditional mill waste feed to make more nutritious rations possible.

Agricultural Development Bank: The Agricultural Development Bank issued loans totaling 937 million \$VN to approximately 49,000 customers in 1968. Loans totaling 50 million \$VN were made to farmers for production of TN-8 rice. Improved banking services were made available in 1969 by the introduction of mobile teams designed to call directly on the farmer.

Agricultural Organizations: There are forty-seven active Agricultural Cooperatives and twenty-three Farmers Associations in IV Corps. Together, they have distributed over 16,000 tons of fertilizers, 11,000 kilograms of insecticides, and also made available hand sprayers, water pumps, kerosene and roto tillers.

Summary: New agricultural techniques, supplanting those long based on tradition, are causing the radical transformation of agricultural production in the Delta. The new varieties of rice and the introduction of new techniques should lead to food self sufficiency in Vietnam. Increased livestock and livestock products forecast better balanced diets for the people and diversification in the agricultural production base. The steps toward needed institutional development for education, agri-business, research, extension and farm to market roads are taking place. As food production and marketing potential are developed in the Delta, Vietnam will be in the position to enter world agricultural markets and is strategically located to help supply world food needs in the last quarter of this century.

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### (3) Logistics

The Logistics Branch of NLD is the US counterpart to the GVN Regional Central Logistics Agency which is responsible for ensuring the smooth flow of construction commodities, PF 480 foodstuffs and refugee and voluntary agency commodities from Saigon depots to regional and provincial warehouses for eventual delivery to field project sites.

Administratively, IV Corps is sub-divided into two areas: the Upper Delta, comprising the eight provinces north of the Bassac River and An Giang province, and the Lower Delta comprised of the remaining seven provinces. Upper Delta provinces receive their commodities directly from Saigon after administrative clearance from Can Tho. Lower Delta provinces are serviced from Can Tho regional warehouses.

Commodities are shipped from Saigon to regional and provincial warehouses under contracts with Vietnamese trucks and barge firms. Some are shipped by air. On arrival at provincial warehouses, the delivery of commodities to project sites becomes the responsibility of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD).

Increasing commodity requirements, spurred by Project Recovery and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, placed a strain on the then existing warehouse capacity, and construction of additional warehouses and expansion of older ones began. Two regional warehouses are planned, one for Can Tho and one for Sa Dec.

In addition to increasing physical facilities, accounting procedures were improved; audit is now possible to account for commodities down to the project site level. Previously, the span of control extended only to district warehouses.

A provincial maintenance shop is planned for each of the 16 provinces. Construction of the shops has begun and 11 of 16 planned are in various stages of completion, and 5 shops are in operation. Training teams are installed in 12 provinces currently, and are programmed for the remaining 4.

By the end of 1969, the GVN should be fully capable of handling the volume of commodities projected for use beyond 1969.

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### (4) ENGINEERING

At the beginning of 1968, GVN Directorate of Highways and Province Public Works Service capabilities were at a low ebb. Equipment and materials were in short supply and skilled manpower was lacking or in danger of being drafted.

During the Tet Offensive 1968, roads and bridges sustained the most damage of all facilities assigned to Public Works. Approximately 65 bridges of all types and classifications were damaged or destroyed. Several thousand mines and roadblocks were implaced by the Viet Cong.

Post-Tet developments were not completely favorable because of the repairs required on national and inter-provincial roads. As a result, little was done on rural roads and the Delta Transportation plan fell behind schedule.

In mid 1968 responsibility for national and inter-provincial roads was transferred to the military with the Ministry of Public Works maintaining responsibility for the rural and secondary road program.

In other engineer areas more progress was reflected in 1968. The electrification program progressed slowly with eight new generators installed in eight provinces. The electrical systems are still in a poor state of repair as a result of a shortage of technically qualified personnel.

The opening and bringing up to capacity of the rock quarry at Nui Sap mountain in An Giang province has been a major engineering accomplishment. Present production from the quarry exceeds the targeted 26,000 tons per month. This quarry is the primary source of rock in the Delta. As such, it is of extreme importance to the road construction program and a source of rock for building material.

The dredging operations in IV Corps are going well. Currently four dredges operating under contract to GVN from the Retired Servicemen's Engineering Association are successfully completing the first year of their contract. Projects completed included canal clearing, fill for schools, piers, warehouses, and fill for Can Tho University. Three GVN owned dredges also work in the Corps giving a total dredge capability of 5,000,000 cubic meters of fill each year.

Engineer design has become a major effort of the CORDS Engineer's office, and additional staff members have been added to

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meet the demand. Currently design projects in progress include the areas of public health, water supply, electric power, agriculture, education, irrigation, logistics, and roads and bridges. These projects range from complex university and hospital design to rural water systems, self-help projects, and complete electrical distribution systems for villages and province capitals.

Fresh water is a serious problem in the Delta and well drilling has been a major project. In January 1968 four drilling rigs were in operation in IV Corps. None were seriously damaged during Tet 1968 but the rigs were slow in returning to full production. A total of ten producing wells were completed in 1968. It must be noted that the geology of the Delta, particularly in salt intruded areas, requires that extremely deep wells be drilled to find fresh water. Improvement has been made in 1969 with the addition of two heavier drilling rigs. Plans for 1969 include the completion of wells for seven Delta provinces.

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### (5) Youth Affairs

The purpose of the youth program is to afford young people the opportunity to channel their energies into constructive undertakings and to dry up a potential recruiting base for the Viet Cong.

The program was only moderately successful during the period January 1968 to May 1969. It was hampered by several factors including:

- a. Lack of clear objectives; and policy guidance from Saigon.
- b. Rapid turn-over of ranking GVN officials in the Ministry of Youth.
- c. Lack of continuity.
- d. Slow release of funds.
- e. Increased enemy activity curtailing on-going programs.

Despite the considerable handicaps, the GVN was able to mobilize large numbers of youth to participate in "Operation Recovery", a post-1968 Tet Offensive undertaking designed to rehabilitate the country. Youth participated in construction of refugee camps, census taking, distributing food, clothing and medical supplies to the refugees. Youth received training in weaponry and methods of self-defense and were active in training Peoples Self-Defense Groups. They also were active in weekend work camps wherein youth helped villagers in reconstruction projects and conducted sports activities.

In late 1968, a Regional Youth Council was established for the purpose of focusing high-level regional interest in youth affairs. Results to date include increased numbers of youth groups such as the Boy Scouts, 4T clubs, sports organizations, high school groups and private youth organizations. It remains to be seen, however, if the youth program has any sustainable vitality.

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### (6) Civic Action

Civic Action is the use of military personnel and resources to support or implement the Revolutionary Development Program.

The Civic Action Goal in IV CTZ has been to achieve the highest possible participation from military units available. Participation by military not only enhance the image of the military but as representatives of the Vietnamese government provides tangible, concrete evidence of Government concern for the people.

In early 1968, the Civic Action program suffered a set back as a result of the Viet Cong Tet Offensive. Military units were, of course, concerned with the re-establishment of security and civic action waned. Following Operation Recovery, the military units returned to a more normal routine and civic action projects were again undertaken.

The Regional and Popular Forces have provided IV CTZ with the main source of energy for civic action projects. These units have consistently led the nation, month after month, in total 10-hour man-days contributed to projects. IV Corps ARVN forces, though ranking only third nationally in man-hours contributed, have been a steady subscriber to the program.

U.S. Combat forces in IV CTZ, consisting primarily of the U.S. 9th Division minus one Brigade, has provided a large input to the overall program contributing 5,000 or more 10 hour man-days per month to projects. U.S. Navy Seabee teams through RD work and training programs have had a solid impact. During the past eighteen months the number of Seabee teams has increased from five to ten in the Delta. Engineering Coordinator Advisory Teams (ECAD Teams) working on the repair and construction of water purification plants and systems have made an invaluable contribution to the Vietnamese in solving the age old problem of the lack of fresh water. Four teams currently operate in the Delta.

Improvement in the Civic Action program in IV CTZ can be attributed to:

- a. Improvement in RF/PF housing.

The effect on troop morale has been clearly indicated in the civic action program. Where troop morale is at its highest the desire to assist the local populace is the greatest.



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### b. The Military Support to Pacification Fund.

The purpose of this fund is to provide the necessary money to complete high impact projects where GVN programmed funds were insufficient or where no funds were budgeted. The impact of this fund on the civic action program has been substantial.

### c. Command Emphasis

The needed emphasis was initially lacking but following the recovery from the 1968 Tet Offensive the Commanding General, IV CTZ has demonstrated an increased interest in the participation of troops in civic action projects.

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### (7) Education

The goal of the CORDS/NLD Education Branch from February 1968 to May 1969 has been to advise GVN and CORDS/NLD Officials in the development of a realistic education program that would result in increased pacification of the countryside and a better life for Vietnamese people.

In Elementary Education, 1,000 new hamlet school classrooms were built, in addition to repairing schools damaged from the 1968 Tet Offensive and refugee occupancy. An additional 1,200 hamlet school teachers were recruited and trained in province 3-month accelerated hamlet school teacher training courses. These new facilities provided for 60,000 additional pupils.

In an eight-week Regional Inservice Teacher Training Workshop, 32 "Helping Teachers" were trained to provide inservice training at the provincial level to 1,500 hamlet school teachers who had been trained in 3-month province accelerated teacher training courses in former years.

An estimated 1,500,000 textbooks were distributed to elementary schools to upgrade the instructional program. Training courses were geared to teaching teachers how to use textbooks.

At the Vinh Long Normal College, 400 elementary school principals and teachers were graduated to staff new schools and replace staff lost to attrition and the military draft. Two new student dormitories were constructed at the College to increase the enrollment of teacher candidates.

The prime problem encountered during the period was the military drafting of teachers and school administrators, often affecting 50 percent of the personnel in a given province. Coupled with the teacher shortage, was the destruction of many schools by the Tet Offensive and a worsening security situation in the countryside that forced the closing of some schools and hampered the construction of classrooms in new hamlets. The lack of any appreciable budget for school building maintenance in Vietnam is a continual problem in all Vietnamese education. This problem was partly overcome through the use of AIK (Assistance in Kind) funds to repair and renovate school buildings.

In secondary education development, 117 additional classrooms were built to provide student stations for 13,000 more high school students. Enough elementary school classrooms were borrowed to increase the total secondary school enrollment by 20,000

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students. The Ohio University Contract advised the University of Can Tho in initiating an accelerated high school teacher training program that will shorten the training of first cycle high school teachers by 18 months. The University is well on the way in the construction of facilities for its new College of Education. It graduated its first 148 first cycle teachers and assigned them to teach in high schools constructed in the rural areas.

The Ministry of Education, advised by the Ohio University Contract, initiated the Pilot High School Program in the Can Tho, Ben Tre, Long Xuyen and Rach Gia Secondary Schools. This program was designed to change the traditional French oriented academic curriculum through the introduction of Business Education, Home Economics, Industrial Arts, Science Laboratories, Libraries and Student Counseling. These pilot high schools will serve as a pattern for future high school development.

The construction of three new Vocational Agriculture High Schools was started at Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong and An Giang Provinces to begin the training of Agricultural Extension Agents, Home Demonstration Agents and farmers in the Region.

The partly completed Junior Technical High Schools were utilized to train refugees from the Tet Offensives. Little progress was realized in getting the technical high schools completed and equipped.

The prime problems encountered in secondary school development were the lack of facilities to accommodate more than 14 per cent of the secondary school age youth and the teacher shortage caused by the military drafting of high school teachers and administrators. Since 1964, there has been a terrific expansion of elementary school facilities from the hamlet school program without a corresponding increase in high school facilities. Currently, there is an upsurge of pupils graduating from elementary schools and not enough increase in high school classrooms and staff to accompany them.

The University of Can Tho made an impressive adjustment after the February Tet Offensive when the science building and main classroom building were demolished by air strikes. Classes were resumed in rented building and the enrollment increased by 700 students in the five colleges at the beginning of the 1968-1969 school year. Currently, the main classroom building has been rebuilt and the new science building is almost completed. It appears that the University of Can Tho is well on the road to reaching its goal of 10,000 students enrolled over a ten-year period.

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Vietnam has been increasing the literacy rate of its population. During the period covered, 1,200 Rural Development Literacy Teachers were trained and 20,000 students from the countryside completed literacy training classes.

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### E. RD Cadre Program

The RD Cadre program has shown steady growth throughout the Delta, increasing from 176 fifty nine man teams in January 1968, to 300 teams in December 1968. During the months of January and February 1969, the Cadres were reorganized into 504 thirty man teams.

The 1968 Pacification Plan began according to schedule and progress was beginning to develop when the onslaught of the VC Tet Offensive caused GVN officials to recall the Cadre Teams into district and province towns. Soon after the second offensive in May, the Cadre were sent back into the field to resume their work as scheduled. The realization that many months of pacification progress had been lost to inactivity following the VC offensives lead to the creation of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. This campaign, lasting from November 1968, through 31 January 1969, placed a majority of the Cadre Teams into hamlets that had not been previously occupied by the GVN. The campaign was accompanied by a realistic reduction in the number of tasks that were to be performed in each hamlet; from 98 tasks to 36. Each team remained in a hamlet for one month and then moved on to fly the GVN flag over another hamlet. This campaign not only successfully reclaimed those hamlets lost during the Tet and post-Tet offensives, it also raised the HES rating of many additional hamlets to a solid "C" category. During the entire campaign the enemy initiated relatively little offensive action against the Cadre Teams and the hamlets undergoing RD operations. Therefore, the absence of systematic and continued opposition permitted the Cadre Teams to realize unprecedented success.

Concurrent with the reorganization of Cadres into 30-man teams was a redeployment of teams into new hamlets identified for RD operations in the 1969 Pacification Plan. The majority of these hamlets are located in contested and VC-controlled areas. Many of the hamlets are only accessible via aircraft or relatively strong ground troop movements. The weakened, 30-man Cadre Teams deployed into such areas, without their attendant RF or PF Platoons are experiencing some security problems. The success realized during the APC and ambitious movement into 1969 Plan hamlets has caused the Viet Cong to view the Cadre with renewed interest. The incident rate initiated against the Cadre Teams has been increasing steadily throughout this year. There were 79 incidents experienced in January and the rate has now progressively climbed to 130 experienced in April 1969. The smaller teams, armed with weapons possessing a lesser fire-power capability than the enemy, are finding it difficult to provide

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security at night and then perform their pacification tasks during the day. It is impossible to expect these small teams to work a continuous 24-hour cycle for any protracted period and still produce results of an acceptable standard. This situation is having an adverse effect on the Cadre morale, a fact that is reflected by the growing numbers of deserters and resignees. Recently, three provinces found it necessary to dissolve six Cadre Teams to generate additional filler personnel for their other understrength teams. This practice, should it be permitted to continue, will seriously impair their ability to attain the established goals of the 1969 Plan. Intelligence reports indicate that the RD Cadre Teams will continue to receive increased enemy pressure. Already the VC have formed a number of reinforced guerrilla units with the primary mission of targeting and attacking Cadre Teams and hamlets undergoing RD operations. The progressively increasing number of attacks against the Cadres substantiates the reported enemy intent to disrupt pacification progress. These problems of security are presently top priority for the Corps Commander and a concerted effort is being made to relieve this situation before it deteriorates farther.

Launching into the ambitious 1969 Plan has presented the Cadre with many difficult obstacles, some of which have not been resolved. The reorganization took place in an orderly fashion, it left many of the newly created teams with extremely weak leaders. Teams were then assigned and moved into their new villages without undue delay. After arriving at their villages the teams found that they had been placed under the operational control of Village Chiefs who either did not possess the requisite qualifications for leadership or who had no knowledge of the 1969 Plan. Most frequently the Cadre Teams were placed into areas without the preaccompanying RF or PF Platoon to provide the necessary security screen behind which pacification (construction and development) could develop. Being placed into inaccessible areas has prevented the Cadres from receiving the necessary technical and commodity support from the provincial headquarters. This factor prevented many teams from initiating major development and construction projects that would cause the rural population to realize their aspirations and therefore identify more closely with the GVN.

The single most difficult problem confronting the RD Cadre program is that of control. The reorganization into twice the number of teams and their deployment into widely scattered rural areas, has far exceeded the Province Cadre Chief's "span of control". A provincial logistics problem is also attendant to the "span of control" problem. Efficient or effective control and resupply of Cadre Teams no longer exists. This problem should be alleviated by a current effort to train elected village officials, to upgrade the Cadre leadership through an

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increased effort in leadership training at the National Training Center and to transfer advisory responsibility to MACV with the almost subsequent involvement of District Chiefs in supervising RD Cadre.

The RD Cadre program like many other programs has leadership weaknesses. Regardless of this the program has made strides forward particularly in upgrading security through organization and training of the PSDF and establishing GVN presence in the countryside.

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## F. Chieu Hoi Program

### 1. Inducement and Returnee Input

a. The 1968 Tet Offensive paralyzed the Chieu Hoi effort in the Delta; nevertheless, IV Corps still managed to induce a total of 10,369 VC to rally during 1968 under a goal of 11,000. The Truong Cong Dinh Campaign, supported by a Special Rewards Program for the payment of rewards to Third Parties who assist in the inducement of Hoi Chanh, was launched in the 2nd quarter of 1968. The initial success of this special inducement effort prompted Vinh Long Province to apply a modified version supported by AIK funds. This was later adopted by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi for national application in support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The term of application of this Third Party Inducement Program has been extended by the Ministry to the present time.

b. In June 1968, Go Cong Province initiated what is now commonly known as "Turnaround Operations", i.e. sending back selected Hoi Chanh to their former areas of operations for the purpose of inducing others. This approach met with such remarkable success that it was later adopted by about one-half of the Delta provinces.

c. The last quarter of 1968 opened with greater military pressure being brought to bear upon the enemy. With well established Third Party Rewards Programs and with Turnaround Operations working smoothly, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was launched preempting the enemy in contested areas and moving into VC-controlled areas for the first time in years, thus giving VC recruits the first opportunity to take advantage of the Chieu Hoi Program. Large numbers of returnees flocked to the Chieu Hoi Centers from each new area opened.

d. 1969 started off with all the above favorable factors contributing heavily to a significant increase in the returnee figures of the Delta. The first four months of the year alone realized a total of 10,144 Hoi Chanh, nearly equalling the 10,369 Hoi Chanh for the whole of 1968. In spite of the enemy's harassing attacks which started in February 1969, and continuing terroristic activities, the Chieu Hoi Program, supported by effective, PSYOP efforts, continues to attract more men from the enemy's ranks.

### 2. Reception, Interrogation and Training.



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a. Chieu Hoi Center expansion programs resumed during the third quarter of 1968. Chieu Hoi Centers in IV Corps can normally accommodate 100 Hoi Chanh each, while the bigger provincial centers have emergency capacities of up to 400. Nevertheless, the heavy influx of returnees, starting in the last quarter of 1968, have continuously congested about half of the Delta provincial centers, requiring the construction of temporary shelters. Additionally, 16 district reception centers have been completed and 15 others are under construction. Under emergency conditions these district centers will relieve the overcrowding of provincial centers.

b. Interrogation techniques improved during the Third Quarter of 1968 when increasing number of returnees arrived at the Centers. Provinces adopted standardized interrogation procedures. Priority was given to the questioning of Hoi Chanh regarding arms/ammo caches and the VCI. Mistreatment of Hoi Chanh during interrogation was very rare. More detailed interrogation was required for the determination of Third Party Rewards. This, compiled with the unusually large influx of returnees, all but rendered the few police and intelligence interrogators in the Centers inadequate. More Police Special Branch and S2 interrogators must be trained and assigned to the Centers to insure complete interrogation of all Hoi Chanh in all the provinces.

c. Late in the Third Quarter of 1968, a special seminar for political indoctrinators was held in Saigon. This is responsible for the improvement of the quality of political classes given to the Hoi Chanh in provincial centers. The Regional Chieu Hoi Center opened special political courses to middle-ranking returnees. Career-oriented vocational courses were offered almost continuously in the provinces. The Regional Center began advanced courses in carpentry, masonry and tailoring and technical courses, Generator Operation and Maintenance and Automotive Repair, were also initiated. It also opened six-week basic courses for Armed Propaganda Teams graduating a total of about 400 recruits during 1968 and 200 during the first four months of 1969. The unusually large influx of returnees posed difficult problems to the centers training programs. Neither funds, instructors nor facilities were available to give proper political, literacy or vocational training to all the returnees.

### 3. Intelligence, Tactical and Psywar Utilization.

a. Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) - The performance of the APT's was laudatory throughout the period. The units in Vinh Long, Sa Dec, Dinh Tuong and Ba Xuyen were exceptionally effective.

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APT reorganization and provincial and regional training programs were undertaken. At the APC, more than 50% of the APT's were being utilized for operations and the remainder maintained security in Chieu Hoi installations. In spite of their low quality weapons, superior performance was displayed by APT's whether on tactical or psywar missions. There are at present, 1,350 operational APT members all over the Delta out of an authorized 1,526. Hundreds of APT members have been recipients of individual awards and/or rewards for outstanding performance in APT operations.

b. Kit Carson Scouts. - Recruitment for the Delta version of the Kit Carson Scouts Program started during the early part of 1968. The KCS authorization of 200 Scouts have been recruited. The most outstanding among this group were the KCS in Kien Hoa, Go Cong and Chau Doc. Kien Hoa's were used for guiding tactical operations and Go Cong's were utilized more for intelligence purposes. Chau Doc's KCS were employed during the operations in the Coto Mountains where they identified VC political and military cadres from among apprehended suspects.

c. Hoi Chanh. - Better quality Hoi Chanh came in during the later part of 1968 and early 1969. An NLF official who rallied in Ba Xuyen, the Logistics Officer of Military Region II, the Regimental Staff Officer who rallied in Dinh Tuong and three Battalion Executive Officers (from Chuong Thien, Bac Lieu and Dinh Tuong) were the higher ranking returnees who were continuously exploited both for psywar and tactical purposes. Several large arms caches were uncovered by Hoi Chanh-led operations during the year. Most noteworthy are those captured in Bac Lieu (worth \$VN 1,040,000 in rewards), Kien Giang (\$VN 707,000), Sa Dec (\$VN 560,000), Ba Xuyen (\$VN 500,000) and Phong Dinh (\$VN 200,000). More individual weapons were also turned-in by returnees during the period, forcing at least four provinces to request additional funds to pay individual weapons rewards. Many successful operations were launched throughout the Delta with the cooperation and assistance of newly-arrived Hoi Chanh. Sa Dec, Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong and Kien Phong were the more successful provinces in the intelligence and tactical exploitation of Hoi Chanh. Valuable information taken from Hoi Chanh, in many cases, was properly exploited in the campaign against the VCI.

#### 4. Resettlement and Follow-Up.

a. Construction of two additional Chieu Hoi Hamlets was started during 1968. Only one, in Ba Xuyen, became operational. Construction of housing units in the Phong Dinh Hamlet slowed down after a VC attack. At the end of the year, only seven hamlets

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were operational (An Giang, An Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Kien Giang, Kien Tuong and Vinh Binh) by Vinh Binh had completed housing units and public buildings.

b. Military and para military units continue to absorb more of the released Hoi Chanh. Private employment for the Hoi Chanh remains difficult to find. The mobilization program assisted in the resettlement of military Hoi Chanh, who comprise about 70% of all the ralliers. During 1969, a monthly average of 350 ex-Hoi Chanh are being integrated into military units.

c. The Follow-Up phase of the program remains one of the most difficult tasks to accomplish. In spite of the organization of Special Follow-Up Teams in ten provinces, Follow-Up reports remain unreliable. Ineffective supervisory methods and lack of security in outlying areas severely limited the effectiveness of the teams. It was only during the Fourth Quarter of 1968, following deeper penetration into contested areas, that more contacts were made and more reliable information was received from released Hoi Chanh. Ba Xuyen organized one of the biggest, most active and better supervised Follow-Up Teams. Operations were systematic and well planned, however their efforts were, somewhat frustrated by the kidnaping of some team members. They were later employed more successfully for inducement purposes.

### 5. Problem Areas.

a. This is basically a sound and effective program. Since the last quarter of 1968, the IV Corps Chieu Hoi Program has accounted for about 70% of the national returnee input. The problems that remain to be solved are those concerning expansion of reception facilities and the absorption of Hoi Chanh back into the Vietnamese society.

(1) Chieu Hoi Center facilities in at least 6 provinces are inadequate due to overcrowding. This is being corrected by the construction of temporary shelters and double-decked bunks.

(2) Vocational, literacy, and political training programs are inadequate and cannot provide for the large number of returnees. Preprocessing and interrogation of Hoi Chanh is brief and selective instead of complete due to the large numbers involved.

(3) Resettlement of thousands of Hoi Chanh has become a major problem in the Delta. Only about 20% of those released each month can be absorbed by civil government and military organizations or private enterprise.

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b. The 20,000 men and women that rallied to the GVN in IV CTZ during the last 16 months constitutes a tremendous manpower loss to the VC. About 20% of 4,000 have returned to contested or VC-controlled areas, but the rate of actual re-defection is estimated as not more than 5% of the overall total. The Viet Cong concern for the continued drain on their manpower has been evidenced by the enemy attempts to harass and attack Chieu Hoi installations. Attempts on the lives of Hoi Chanh has also increased. In spite of the Viet Cong attempts to tighten control over their personnel and to dissuade defectors the current rate of ralliers is expected to continue.

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### G. Psychological Warfare and Information

#### 1. Media Employed and Effectiveness

##### (a) Mass Media (except aerial psywar)

(1) Community television is one of the most effective mass media and draws audiences from 50 to 400 per set. There are 870 community TV sets in place, about 65 percent of which are operating regularly. About 35 percent of the sets are currently inoperative and need either set or generator repair: some are not operated for reasons of security from time to time.

In addition to community TV sets, there are an estimated 30,000 privately owned TV sets in IV Corps. A thriving small business has developed in the sale and repair of TV sets. Most of them are imported from Japan.

In November, 1968, a TV station was opened by the GVN. It offers considerable Delta programming entertainment, news and propaganda coverage. People in the Upper Delta normally tune to Saigon TV, although the Can Tho station signal covers the IV Corps area.

(2) Radio is the most effective mass medium in terms of numbers of people reached. VIS operates 2,100 community sets in hamlets and in district and province towns. Cheap Japanese transistor sets are sold everywhere, and the GVN radio service estimates that there are nearly one million privately-owned receivers in IV Corps.

Radio Can Tho was increased in power from one to ten kilowatts in November 1968; it relays Radio Saigon broadcasts and also originates local news and propaganda programs in both Vietnamese and Cambodian languages. Radio Saigon and ARVN radio also are heard throughout the Delta, as well as NLF radio and Radio Hanoi. People in secure areas attach credibility, in descending order, to BBC, Voice of America, Radio Saigon-ARVN radio - Radio Can Tho, NLF radio Radio Peking and Radio Hanoi. The latter is trusted less, because its lies have been revealed too often.

(3) Motion Pictures. Most province towns have commercial theaters (Can Tho has four) which occasionally show GVN-prepared newsreels and VIS/JUSPAO documentaries. Documentaries also are shown by ARVN Polwar units and by VIS in towns and hamlets to troops and civilian. VIS/Polwar averages 1,800 monthly showings during the reporting period. Audiences reached total around 450,000 each month.

(4) The use of posters, banners and slogans are in the Vietnamese cultural tradition, and probably are as effective as

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American billboard advertising where VIS conducts an active program. About 150,000 posters, banners and slogans are posted monthly on walls and bulletin boards, nailed to trees or suspended over streets.

(5) Province Newspapers. This program broke down after 1968 Tet and was not re-established by the Ministry of Information until the closing months of the reporting period. Three provinces have not yet resumed publication. Thirteen provinces newspapers are published semi-monthly or monthly, and consist, usually of four pages each. They are distributed free by VIS to the public. The good papers effectively backstop radio/TV information and propaganda with the printed word, and effectively emphasize local GVN programs. Print runs of the 13 papers published total 353,000 copies per month.

(6) Free South is a single-sheet JUSPAO newspaper, is distributed partly by hand, but primarily by air at the rate of 1.85 million copies monthly. The target audience is VC and VC sympathizers.

(7) Magazines produced by JUSPAO for VIS distribution include Free World, Rural Spirit (for hamlet dwellers) and Mother's Heart. The latter promotes the Chieu Hoi program. The total monthly distribution is 330,000. Rural Spirit is a farm-journal type magazine. It includes soft-sell propaganda. It is probably the most popular periodical in Vietnam, and from the PSYOP standpoint is very effective.

(8) Daily or weekly commercial newspapers are not published in IV Corps. Copies of Saigon newspapers come down by bus, but in insignificant quantities. However, contents of the Saigon newspapers spread rapidly by word of mouth, particularly when controversial situations are included--such as politics. The Delta's "bamboo telegraph" may be the most effective bush-telegraph system in the world.

(b) Face-to-face PSYOP, backstopped by mass media, is proving to be very effective. Assets include:

(1) Armed Propaganda Teams. There are 17 in the Corps. This program disintegrated during the 1968 Tet, when Province Chiefs pulled in teams for static defense. Training and utilization of APT's improved during the period and now all teams but one are performing their assigned functions with from reasonable to great effectiveness. APT PSYOP activities concentrate almost entirely on the Chieu Hoi program.

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(2) Cultural Drama Teams. The highly effective JUSPAO "Van Tac Vu" program fell apart in the field during the period--a victim of the draft. PSYOP developed an alternate program and established Cultural Drama Teams. There are currently 36 teams in the Corps, an average of two for each province. Fifteen of these are controlled and supported by VIS/PSYOP. The teams present traditional Vietnamese entertainment to hamlet audiences which range up to 800 people; propaganda messages are included in program content, as are patriotic songs. Performances at the close of the period averaged 370 monthly.

(3) Ground and waterborne loudspeaker operations average around 14,500 hours per month. These range from tapes played over fixed-loudspeaker systems in province towns to speeches by public officials in hamlets. Waterborne operations from Navy patrol boats are especially effective, since almost all Delta people live on or very near waterways.

(4) Handbills are distributed at the rate of more than five million monthly by ARVN and GVN cadres, and by U.S. Army and Navy personnel. They range in type from leaflets to single-sheet newspapers to mimeographed messages. Handbills are especially effective during hamlet pacification operations and when distributed during resource control operations on the waterways. They are also effectively used at ferry landings and checkpoints on highways.

### (c) Aerial Psywar

(1) A standard scheduling routine was utilized until November 1968 to drop about 50-70 million leaflets monthly on enemy units or VC-controlled hamlets. In the planning stage of the "Speedy Express" campaign, PSYOP blanketed enemy areas with propaganda messages, and filled enemy air with sound. Procedure were revised on 1 December, and the assignment of a second C-47 aircraft resulted in greatly intensified operations.

(2) The number of targets for leaflets were multiplied three-fold and now average 2,100 monthly. An average of 165 million leaflets are dropped on these targets monthly.

(3) Aerial loudspeaker targets were multiplied four-fold and now average 3,000 monthly. Aerial loudspeaker hours average 550 hours monthly.

(4) The new scheduling routine was worked out by PSYOP, 10th PSYOP Division and C Flight, 5th Special Operations Squadron. PSYOP believes these intensified operations had much to do with the record Chieu Hoi rates established during the period.

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## 2. Techniques Used

(a) TV programming is encouraged; ARVN Polwar and Can Tho TV cameramen produce frequent TV programs and much news footage. These films, after showing on Can Tho, are forwarded to Saigon for inclusion in national TV programs. Cultural Drama Teams are encouraged to develop sufficient professionalism to be brought to Can Tho for appearance on TV.

(b) VIS is encouraged to feed news information to the TV station and Radio Can Tho. A study of VC listening habits resulted in Radio Saigon's concentration of Chieu Hoi messages in the hours between 0001 and 0300 hours.

(c) Operation "Kon Tiki" was conducted in May 1968 in cooperation with the U.S. Navy's river patrol force, TF116. Some 153,000 sealed plastic bags containing simple gifts and propaganda materials were floated simultaneously from 44 locations and reached VC-controlled hamlets on tides and currents just before dawn. This "wicked and willy" scheme (quote from VC) increased Chieu Hoi defections in the areas involved. It was imitated at Tet 1969 by the enemy, who floated propaganda materials into GVN areas on small bamboo rafts. Further U.S. experimentation with this technique is planned.

(d) At various times, ARVN and RF/PF soldiers take handbills and paper RVN flags when they go on operations for distribution among the people. Usually each soldier carried five handbills which he is told to distribute to five different civilians.

(e) An innovation was the development of the Spooky/Gabby technique. This is a night operation in which a blacked-out Spooky accompanies a C-47 psywar aircraft. When Gabby draws fire, Spooky moves in. Tapes developed for aerial psywar include ghostly sounds intended to inspire fear among the VC.

(f) A concerted PSYOP plan targeted to people living along National Route 4 in Dinh Tuong province is credited with assisting to keep this vital LOC open despite strong enemy efforts at interdiction.

(g) Progress is being made in getting ARVN Polwar and VIS to work more closely in provinces, and in involving RF/PF, PSDF, National Police and other GVN elements in local PSYOP.

3. Third country support. Not applicable.



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## 4. Major Problem Areas

(a) Indoctrination of U.S. troops with regard to Vietnamese culture and customs, the American role as an ally, the overall program to build Vietnamese confidence in GVN is inadequate. Troop attitude and behavior in too many instances are bolstering the enemy contention that we are here as conquering colonialists.

(b) VIS remains a very weak service and leans on JUSPAO for almost all program funds and support; province VIS chiefs lean on APAs/PSYOP for almost all local program funds. Printed materials are transported by JUSPAO and CORDS, because VIS lacks an effective distribution system.

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## H. Public Health Program

Public Health services in general support of counter-insurgency are provided in the public sector and available to Vietnamese civilians through the GVN Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief. This national health system is centered around the provincial hospital and provincial health service, supported and augmented by various US and TCN elements.

### 1. Clinical Medical Care

Clinical services, provided primarily at province hospitals, are augmented by Provincial Health Assistance Program (PHAP) teams, both US Military (MILPHAP) and Free World (FWPHAP). During the period, three additional FWPHAP teams were deployed (two Korean and one Swiss) providing a team for each province in the Delta. In addition, the ten MILPHAP teams (2 Army, 3 Navy, 5 Air Force) are being reorganized under a JTD rather than TOE to provide increased flexibility to meet requirements. The workload accomplished at the province hospitals, so augmented, has remained rather stable since the Tet offensive of 1968, roughly approximating 12,000 admissions monthly, 100,000 outpatient visits, and 1,000 major operations. The tendency is for a gradual increase in admissions and outpatient visits as facilities and security improve.

The rural health program, centered about the district Maternity/Infirmary Dispensary, has been augmented by MILPHAP enlisted personnel working under the direction of a MILPHAP team physician. This program has expanded to provide continuous coverage in 53 districts with visiting coverage in an additional 14 districts, a total of 67 of the 92 districts in the Delta. In this program, as in the hospitals, emphasis has shifted from augmentation to the advisory role as circumstances permit.

### 2. Nursing Services

Augmentation and advisory services provided at province hospitals in the general duty nursing field reached its peak at 26 nurses in 1968. This program is being phased out in favor of specialist nurse advisors but unfortunately recruiting has not kept pace and the number of American nurses on duty has fallen to 12. Public Health Nursing is being emphasized with the assignment of one PHN and programming of two more to be assigned in the near future.

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## 3. Staffing

The general mobilization has had a devastating effect on staffing of Ministry of Health facilities despite efforts at "mobilization in place". Sanitarians and health educators in particular were lost to the system almost completely, leaving no one for American advisors to work with. Nursing at the province hospital level was also seriously affected. There has been a gradual recovery from this situation through detail of selected ARVN personnel to the MOH system and increased training efforts. Two assistant nurse schools have graduated first classes and are maturing in their capacity so that they hope to double enrollment shortly. Sanitarian refresher and retraining courses are being given at Can Tho to bolster personnel levels in this field. An anesthesia training school established at Can Tho will graduate its first class in June 1969.

The most encouraging development has been the revision of civil service classifications and establishment of new technician categories of health personnel which will allow MOH to pay employees a salary more competitive with the private sector and thus retain employees they are now losing.

## 4. Facilities

Efforts to upgrade medical facilities have concentrated on improving utilities and selected specialty areas of hospitals, rather than large scale new construction. Moderate damage to facilities which occurred during Tet 1968 has largely been repaired. Currently the only major new construction project is the provision of medical logistics warehouses in five provinces.

Better utilization of facilities and personnel will be obtained under the current MOD/MOH plan for joint utilization of medical facilities to care for both military and civilian patients. This program will go into effect in 12 Delta provinces, four of which are currently in Phase I of the project.

## 5. Logistics

The USAID subsidized MOH medical logistics system has matured into a very effective operation, with a current requisition fill-rate approaching 80%. Medical equipment maintenance personnel are being trained as well as automotive maintenance personnel. Korean medical logistic personnel, who were used to augment establishment of the system, are being phased out as competent Vietnamese personnel take over.

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The USAID contract management team (PERIL) has completed its work in establishing a requisition and accounting system at each province hospital. Refresher courses in the system are conducted by the Vietnamese at the Regional Medical Depot.

## 6. Preventive Medicine

The communicable disease situation in the Delta has changed only slightly. There are no threats of disease of epidemic proportion. Cholera continues to decline in incidence. There has been a gradual scattered increase in incidence of falciparum malaria. Plague has occurred in small numbers, principally in Dinh Tuong province and the Delta north of the Bassac will be included in next years national plague campaign. Infectious hepatitis and hemorrhagic fever continue increased incidence during the rainy season.

The Vietnamese Health Service, assisted by the Regional Korean Preventive Medicine Team, has been quite effective in dealing with the sporadic outbreaks of the above diseases. Instruction in plague surveys and inoculation techniques is being expanded. Immunization programs have grown to the level of 750,000 inoculations a month. Health education instruction has been introduced into the normal school curriculum and a weekly TV health program is presented in Can Tho.

## 7. Comment and Recommendations

The present scope and direction of the program appears to be adequate for counterinsurgency objectives. The chief deficiency appears to be the lack of capitalization on the impact of this program from the psychological operations standpoint. Some thought should be given to expanding the publicity of this program to bring it more closely to the attention of the people. Medical professionals tend to overlook this aspect so that it would most likely be best managed by Psyops personnel.

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## I. Phoenix Program

1. During the first seven months of 1968, Phung Hoang operations in IV CTZ were largely ineffectual because of an almost total absence of command emphasis on the GVN side. Most District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCs) and many Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (PIOCCs) existed in name only, and results in terms of VCI neutralized were dismal. Another factor in the poor showing made in Phung Hoang operations during this period was the fact that only slightly over half the DIOCCs has US Phoenix coordinators assigned.

2. In late July 1968, this situation changed dramatically upon receipt of two documents, Presidential Decree No. 280-a/TT/SL, dated 4 Jul 68, and a Standing Operating Procedure promulgated by the Chairman (Minister of Interior) of the Central Phung Hoang Committee on 23 July 68. These two documents supplied what had been sorely needed on the GVN side--a clear statement of the high priority assigned to the Phung Hoang Program at the national level, and the authority needed to assure the cooperation of participating GVN agencies at subordinate levels. Armed with this authority and statement of priority, GVN officials in August 1968, initiated a crash program designed to vitalize the Phung Hoang Program in IV CTZ. On the US side, steps were taken to assign a US Phoenix Coordinator to each District. This was accomplished by the end of December 1968.

3. By mid-September 1968, operations of DIOCCs and PIOCCs had improved to the point that a concerted effort to greatly increase the number of VCI being neutralized was feasible. To this end, October 1968 was designated "Phung Hoang Month" by the IV Corps Commander. The results for October exceeded all expectations with 585 VCI neutralizations as compared to a total of 325 for the preceeding three months. The national level PHUNG HOANG DONG TIEN campaign which was launched on 20 Oct 68 intensified and continued the momentum generated by "Phung Hoang Month". Since October, both the quantity and quality of VCI neutralizations had increased with each succeeding month. In March 1969, the 1309 VCI of all categories which were neutralized represented the highest total yet achieved in IV CTZ. Complete figures for the month of April 1969 are not yet available, but preliminary reports indicate that yet another "high" has been achieved.

4. Despite the considerable progress which has been made in IV CTZ Phung Hoang operations since 1 October 1968, significant problem areas still exist in the program. These are:

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(a) In some Districts there still exists considerable reluctance on the part of agencies represented in the DIOCC to cooperate with one another to the extent required for a truly effective District Phung Hoang program. Considering the long-standing animosities and petty jealousies which exist among these agencies, particularly the ARVN and the National Police, this situation is not surprising. In some areas, this situation has been accentuated by the fact that some agencies have detailed their least proficient personnel to be their fulltime representative in the DIOCC. In IV CTZ, this problem of lack of cooperation among agencies has been made a matter of command interest. The Commanding General's Special Assistant for Intelligence and Polwar, Col Nguyen Van Phuoc has harped on this theme during all of his many visits to subordinate echelons, with considerable effect. The one thing which has probably done the most to improve cooperation between DIOCC agencies has been success in Phung Hoang Operations. When participating agencies become convinced that working together will produce results which they could not otherwise achieve, and that these results will be recognized and commended by their superiors, improvement in cooperation invariably occurs. DIOCC Coordinators have also been very effective in improving cooperation among participating agencies.

(b) DIOCC personnel are frequently poorly trained. Preliminary work on establishing a IV CTZ Phung Hoang School is in progress. US funds to defray the costs of leasing a building for the school and to pay students per diem have been made available, and work on a program of instruction has begun. In the interim period until this school becomes operational, some formal instruction is being conducted by the agencies involved in the Phung Hoang Program. In early May 1969, the National Police, IV CTZ, commenced a series of six-day training courses for District Police Chiefs. Four of the six days are devoted to Phung Hoang or related subjects. When all District Police Chiefs have completed the course, other District police personnel will be required to attend. Most of the provincial Phung Hoang Centers conduct short training courses for DIOCC personnel. In some provinces, a provincial mobile training team is used; in others, DIOCC personnel are brought to the province capital for the training.

(c) A major problem which has plagued the Phung Hoang program from its inception has been the absence of an effective system of accounting for VCI once they are apprehended. Records detailing the disposition of VCI have been poorly kept or non-existent. Processing through release or sentencing has been far too slow, and this has caused serious overcrowding of IV CTZ detention facilities. A series of Ministry of Interior/Central Phung Hoang Committee directives issued in March and

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April 1969 can solve these problems if they are conscientiously implemented at all levels. Because of dissemination difficulties, these documents were not received by IV CTZ Province/District Chiefs until early May; therefore, it is impossible to yet say whether they will achieve the desired results.

5. By US count, 7,691 VCI were neutralized during the period 1 Jan 68 - 31 Mar 69. Of these, 5,273 were neutralized during the six month period 1 Oct 68 - 31 Mar 69. GVN statistics for the same periods run approximately 40% higher. That the Phung Hoang Program has caused serious problems for the VC cannot be doubted, and this will become increasingly more evident as the monthly neutralization rate continues to climb. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the ultimate goal of the Phung Hoang Program--a neutralization rate which will exceed the VC replacement capability--has yet been reached. If the neutralization rate can be accelerated from month to month on a continuing basis, as has been the case since 1 Oct 68, this critical point could be reached in a matter of months.

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### III. STATUS OF PACIFICATION

In January of 1968, the Communist "Tet Offensive" was unleashed throughout IV CTZ. Although these attacks proved to be a military and political defeat for the communist forces, they did seriously effect the pacification program in IV Corps. As a result of Tet, the HES ratings for the Corps showed a five percent drop in population and hamlets classified relatively secure. By the end of March 1968, only 50% of the Delta's population and 35% of the hamlets in the Corps were rated in the A, B, C category in the HES. This was the low point in the pacification effort.

The immediate tasks of repairing the damage to the urban areas and caring for the refugees created by the Tet Offensive delayed the entire pacification effort in the Delta. However, the Vietnamese Armed Forces and civil authorities had proven that they were able to absorb, without disintegrating, the hardest blows the communist forces could deliver. The actions of the civil population proved that if they were not pro-government at least they were not going to rally to the communist call for a general uprising. The pressure placed upon the government institutions by the Tet Offensive and the GVN's response to this challenge proved to many Vietnamese that the GVN was viable and could defeat the enemy.

By the end of October 1968, the Corps had recovered from the "Tet Offensive". The HES ratings for both population (57%) and hamlets (41%) had climbed above the pre-Tet levels. At this time a major pacification effort, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), was launched. This campaign was designed to take advantage of some momentum being generated by GVN forces, and test the depth with which the VC was holding the countryside. The goals of the three month campaign were to secure as many people and hamlets as possible with the resources, military and civil, already on hand. In IV Corps a goal of securing 400 hamlets was established. By the end of the campaign 404 hamlets had been entered and their security status raised to a C, or better, on the HES. The overall effect of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign was to raise the security rating of 770 hamlets and bring 1,004,000 people into areas of relative security.

The command emphasis placed on the APC resulted in a well coordinated pacification effort in most provinces. At the end of this effort 67% of the population in the Delta were rated as relatively secure.

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The result of the rapid recovery from the Tet Offensive and the successful Accelerated Pacification Campaign generated a feeling of optimism throughout the Delta. In a one year period the GVN had shown it could survive the communists hardest blows, rally and not only recover its former position but expand the government's presence into areas that had been considered enemy strongholds. The result of accomplishments was the creation of considerable momentum on the Government side as the 1969 campaign began. This momentum carried the Government forces forward so by the end of April 1969, 74% of the population and 60% of the hamlets in the Corps were considered relatively secure. This is an overall gain, in the 16 month period since the end of the 68 Tet Offensive, of 24% of the population and 25% of the hamlets in the Delta. It must be stressed here that these gains were made primarily by the Vietnamese with limited US support. The US resources in IV Corps (with the exception of Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces) are still mainly of an advisory and support nature.

During the months of March and April the progress of the pacification effort has slowed. The reasons for this are as follows:

- a. Over-extension of local forces.
- b. Enemy counter-offensives.
- c. Lack of Vietnamese Civil Agency support.
- d. Confusion concerning 1969 Pacification and Development program.

1) Local Forces: The provincial local forces, RF/PF, are the backbone of the pacification effort. There are the troops responsible for the daily security of newly entered and pacified hamlets. The gains of the past few months have extended the geographical area and the number of people for which these troops must provide security. These increased responsibilities have stretched the capabilities of the local forces close to their limits. At present there are not enough RF/PF available in IV Corps to both provide security for the population under government control and expand into additional VC or contested areas. This situation will ease as RF/PF now in training are returned to their provinces. However, the troops now being trained will not be enough to meet the needs of IV Corps Pacification Plan for 1969. (See cover letter RF/PF).

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2) **Enemy Counter-Offensives:** While not being of great military importance, or strength, the recent enemy attacks have slowed the deployment of RD Cadre to 1969 Target Hamlets. It is not the strength of the enemy attacks that have caused this delay, but the need to defend newly secured areas from the threat of attack that has limited the number of local forces available to support the RD Cadre. Without a supporting PF platoon the cadre will not, and often cannot, move into a new hamlet. This is a problem caused primarily by the shortage of local forces but the enemy counter-offensive has compounded it.

3) **Vietnamese Civil Agency Support:** At the time the Vietnamese Armed Forces have been strengthened and made impressive territorial gains the civil agencies have often been unable to take advantage of these gains. This inability has been caused by the civil agencies remaining static or becoming less efficient, due to qualified men being drafted and replaced by less qualified personnel, while the agencies responsibilities have increased. This has created an imbalance in the pacification program which, because of the lack of participation of the civil agencies of the Vietnamese Government, often resembles a military occupation instead of a balanced, mixed pacification program. It is urgent that the Vietnamese civil agencies assume greater responsibilities in the 1969 target areas in order to give real meaning to the term pacification.

4) **Confusion over the 1969 Pacification and Development Program.** The 1969 program has radical changes in philosophy, methods, and goals from the former Revolutionary Development program. The introduction of the new program was hurried and poorly handled. Not enough time was given for province and village level officials, even though they are more important in this year's program than under the old RD concept, to learn, and develop, an understanding of the new programs methods and goals. Planning at the provincial level was rushed and superficial with only a few days given to the provinces to compile their 1969 plans.

The major cost from the manner in which the 1969 Pacification Plan was introduced was loss of some of the momentum and direction developed during the APC campaign. For a period of two or three months, as the new system was being adjusted, there was a sense of confusion and missed opportunities because we had not yet learned to use the new system at the same level of efficiency as the old RD program. This problem is being resolved as village and province officials become familiar with the program. However, this period of adjustment has cost valuable time and momentum, especially in the civil side in the pacification effort.

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There has been outstanding progress in the pacification programs since the bleak days following the 1968 Tet Offensive. Today the Government's position in the Delta is stronger than it has been since the early days of the insurgency. The VC hold has been broken on areas they have controlled for years. However, the resources, both military and civil, at the command of the GVN in IV Corps are stretched very thin.

At present they do not have what is needed to complete the pacification of Delta. If additional resources are provided, if the territorial forces and civil cadre needed are made available, the Government control over 90% of the Delta's population by the end of 1969 is a realizable goal. The destruction of the enemy as a major threat to the Government, except from across international borders, could be accomplished in 1970.

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### IV. GOVERNMENT FORCES

#### A. Intelligence

1. Combat intelligence in the insurgency situation deals mainly with variables in enemy order of battle, capabilities, and probable courses of action as influenced by the relative constants of geography and a two season, monsoonal climate. Thus, during the period January 1968 - May 1969 a significant modification and re-allocation of resources among the agencies and activities which had burgeoned during the preceding two years was effected to meet the unique requirements of IV CTZ. With a primary mission as advisors and yet a requirement to supply the CG, DMAC and COMUSMACV with timely intelligence, an organizational concept was formulated which effectively combines US advisory assets with the various independent US intelligence collection agencies in the Delta. This total effort simultaneously serves as a model and provides catalytic assistance and guidance to the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

2. Three new agencies were added to the Senior Advisor's assets in furtherance of this concept. A Special Security Office was established in February 1968 to provide special intelligence for tactical coverage of the Delta. This element enhanced the reliable early warning capability and proved of incomparable value in assessing current enemy capabilities and intentions, the primary tasks of the IC Corps Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). The JIC itself was opened in July 1968 to integrate all available intelligence reports from Delta agencies and to provide a central site for coordination and continuing liaison among collectors. It has been successful in all areas and has improved the exchange of information and the quality of current intelligence produced in the Delta. The opening of the Corps Interrogation Center will greatly enhance the exploitation of human sources and documents throughout the IV CTZ. It will interrogate selected sources, both prisoners and ralliers, who have information of strategic and/or specific tactical value. This combined center will provide facilities for housing 26 sources and the simultaneous interrogation of eight. In addition, it will have a "go team" capability which will be able to support--on a request basis--division operations and the provinces whenever their local interrogation assets cannot cope with the volume of interrogees.

3. During the same period, the G2 staff was reorganized and augmented to strengthen the production, planning and targeting capability required by IV Corps' dual role. The addition of a plans and operations section has provided the headquarters with a capability for contributing to contingency and operational planning--joint and unilateral--and handling special tasks--targeting and source

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control--without depriving the other G2 elements of needed manpower. The resultant B-52 target program has been cited as the most effective in country with the highest KBA/strike and 100 percent ground follow-up. The G2 Air office has been instrumental in the development of the hunter-killer team concept of combining sensor/surveillance aircraft with gunships. The Delta Blackhawk, Delta Hawk and Spooky/Mohawk are all derivative programs from this idea. The monthly reconnaissance plans submitted by the divisions and Special Zone for their areas of operations are now prepared entirely by VNAF personnel attesting to the success of the Advisory effort. Hand held photography as an adjunct to the targeting program and overall intelligence effort has been most effective in augmenting normal reconnaissance coverage.

4. The improvement in both US and ARVN intelligence planning, collection, processing and dissemination has been exceptional. Most noteworthy as an indicator of product value has been the increased acceptance and reliance on intelligence by the operational element.

### B. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

1. Organization, activity, and capability (to include methods of operation). ARVN military intelligence (MI) in the IV CTZ has all the same components as a normal US MI organization with the exception of an internal counterintelligence capability. The Corps, divisions and Special Zone G2/S2 sections have MI detachments under their operational control which develop and process intelligence from the G2/S2 air, collection, order of battle and exploitation of human sources, materiel and documents sections. The more sophisticated collection tools such as side looking airborne radar (SLAR) and infra-red detectors and photographic reconnaissance are supplied from US assets through the advisory effort. The counterintelligence support is supplied by the Military Security Service (MSS) which operates under the direction of the Military Security Directorate, Saigon. Detachment 68, Unit 101 gives additional support in the tactical military intelligence collection operations. The S2 of each province also has organic order of battle, interrogation and collection assets. The refinement of techniques and the improvement of procedures have been the principal efforts of ARVN MI and their US advisors. Now that the enemy has been forced into conservation of force tactics and even in some areas to a withdrawal to phase one insurgency tactics, the emphasis has swung toward the rooting out of the enemy infrastructure. The intelligence portion of this task has been

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assigned primarily to paramilitary, police and security organizations, but the participation of military unit S2's and G2's in regional Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (PIOCC's) is resulting in the coordination of all intelligence down to the district level. Military and political intelligence cannot be separated in an insurgency situation and an increased emphasis on this dual purpose and reaction based on both products will be the measure of future success.

2. Penetration of insurgency forces: One of the main aims of friendly collection operations is the penetration of the hostile force and its controlling infrastructure. These efforts can be considered only moderately successful and then only in the infrastructure. Difficulties in safe and timely communication with an agent travelling in an unscheduled and purposely erratic manner with a VC unit through a country without sophisticated public communications system is extremely difficult. Indirect efforts through relatives and acquaintances of force members is more readily accomplished but still suffers from the unstructured movement of units and returns are sporadic and of limited tactical value.

3. Employment of the civil populace for intelligence purposes: Civilians are extensively exploited for intelligence purposes by the large number of low level agents employed by G2's and S2's on a flood principle. Such agents rely on hearsay from the populace for a large portion of their product. The voluntary informant program (VIP) has moved into this gap with remarkable success. VIP offers monetary or comparable goods rewards for verifiable information on the enemy or for enemy equipment. It has been in existence since early 1967 but has been effectively implemented only since fall 1968. Funds are distributed through advisory intelligence channels to district and separate battalion level and are disbursed on a simple receipting system which entails little paperwork for all concerned.

4. Communication: The deployment of secure voice communication in advisory channels down to district level now provides a channel for the rapid passage of valuable information. Technical difficulties initially limited the effectiveness of this program but these are being rapidly reduced. Concurrently, the improvement of ARVN COMSEC is being stressed through JGS emphasis on COMSEC briefings, training in communications security instruction and in the operation and maintenance of crypto equipment. Given the known VC intercept capability these steps are mandatory. Agent net communications are hampered by factors mentioned previously. Improvements are being made as government influence is extended and agents can be trained to utilize radio equipment to speed reporting.

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### B. ARVN Forces

Currently three ARVN Division, the 7th, 9th, and 21st Divisions are assigned to IV Corps Tactical Zone. Each Division is assigned a Division Tactical Area, consisting of several provinces. The 7th ARVN DTA includes the provinces of Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa. The 9th ARVN DTA consists of Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, Sa Dec, and An Giang provinces. The 21st ARVN DTA, the largest in the Delta, includes Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Phong Dinh, An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, and Kien Giang provinces. The remaining provinces, comprising the international border with Cabodia, are consolidated within the GVN 44th Special Tactical Zone. These province, Chau Doc, Kien Phong, and Kien Tuong present unique problems to the Vietnamese as a result of the common border with Cambodia and more specifically as a result of the Viet Cong use of the border as an invisible shield from pursuit and friendly action.

#### Tactics Used in the Delta Include:

1. Blackhawk Operations (Multiple Insertions): This type of operation is ideally suited for the terrain in this tactical zone. Light observation helicopters (supported by gunships) recon known or suspected enemy locations. When a sighting is made the enemy is fixed in position by gunship fires and a waiting reaction force is inserted by slicks to further engage and destroy the enemy.

2. Recon in Force (Search and Clear): This is perhaps the most common type of operation conducted by forces in the IV CTZ. Formerly known as the Search and Clear operation this tactic encompasses a force deployed in a tactical formation, (dictated by terrain), to sweep through an assigned area on a pre-determined route searching for enemy installations and cache sites. This operation is quite similar to the Approach March or Movement to Contact employed in a conventional environment is usually a multiple company size effort in ARVN divisions. Success in this type of operation is primarily predicated on sound and timely intelligence, the element of surprise, adequate blocking forces and supporting fires.

3. Cordon and Search: The concept of this operation dictates that a force cordon a designated village or area to prevent both infiltration and exfiltration of enemy personnel, while a second element conducts a thorough search of the target

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area. To successfully conduct this operation detailed planning, coordination, and execution are of the utmost importance. National Police Field Forces or Provincial Reconnaissance Units are required to be present under these conditions of search to insure that personal property and possessions are not illegally confiscated. Cordon and search operations are generally targeted against the Viet Cong Infrastructure and CSF or MSF troops are seldom employed in this role because of the inherent problems of control and the possible repercussions of employing paramilitary forces against the civilian populace.

4. Stay-Behind Operations: This is a very common tactic employed throughout the Corps area. A unit will conduct an operation in an AO and prior to departure emplace one of its subordinate elements in an ambush position. This element is normally small enough to not be noticed by someone observing the parent unit, and large enough to be tactically sufficient until reinforced, should it become necessary.

5. Combat Reconnaissance Platoon Operations: These operations are conducted throughout the Special Forces TAOR's. Each platoon consists of thirty-four men and is targeted by the A-Detachment Intelligence Sergeant. They are assigned specific intelligence gathering missions and are often employed as trail watchers on known or suspected infiltration routes. Information gathered by these units often serves as the basis for Recon in Force or other type operations.

6. Saturation Patrolling: This concept employs a number of platoon size patrols operating in conjunction with one another in a designated area. Routes and the duration of each patrol is varied to preclude any pattern setting. This tactic has been highly successful as a harassing interdictory measure.

7. Eagle Flights: The technique is frequently used with notable success. It capitalizes on maximum coverage of terrain with a minimum amount of troops. A variation of the technique being planned for future use is the "Jitterbug" concept in which platoon size units are moved rapidly over large AO's on short combat sweeps. When a unit establishes contact, supporting forces are "Piled On" to exploit the situation.

8. False Landing Zones: The use of false landing zones has proven its worth in several sector operations. The technique involves an air mobile lift with troops on board approaching low



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over a treeline and hovering low over the false LZ. The enemy will then believe the troops have been inserted and react by running in the opposite direction. After an appropriate time lapse the helicopters lift off with the troops still on board and drop into one or two LZ's in the vicinity of the retreating VC thus gaining immediate contact. A variation of this technique which has been used following the above described concept has been to actually insert troops in the first LZ. This concept is based on the assumption that the VC had learned a lesson from the original LZ false insertion and had reacted accordingly by moving into the original LZ believing they were moving away from the friendly troops. This technique has met with some success but cannot be used repeatedly in the same area.

9. Infantry OPCODE to Air Cavalry: The 9th ARVN Division practice of placing a reconnaissance company or an ARVN Infantry Company OPCODE to the Air Cavalry has met with considerable success. The Air Cavalry Troop, when given an OPCODE Company, performs an economy of force mission using the Eagle Flight technique. By placing the company OPCODE to the Air Cav, and assigning the Cav Troop a free fire AO, maximum freedom of action is then permitted. Contact is frequently established developed by the Cavalry Troop and eventually exploited by "Piling On" with the normal division helicopter assets. The Air Cavalry then moves its operation elsewhere, attempting to develop a new situation.

10. Ambushes: This is simply the practice of placing ambushes (day and night) throughout the tactical area of operation to prevent the enemy from having free movement throughout the area.

11. Riverine Operations: This tactic involves the use of Navy forces to insert ground troops into an area and provide support for the ground troops. Navy boats are also used to seal off the escape routes in this type of operation.

12. All of the above operations have proven to be very effective as long as the type operations varied within the area. If only one or two types of operations were conducted the enemy would soon learn what to expect and how to turn it to his advantage.

### Adequacy of CI Training:

A majority of the Vietnamese soldiers receive counter-insurgency training during their formal basic training at the division or national training center. They also receive some CI

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training when their unit goes to a training center for refresher training. This CI training received consists of insurgent tactics and objectives, psychological warfare used by the insurgent and used by us to counter it and other subjects involved in defeating the insurgent on the battlefield. Once a soldier is assigned to a unit he receives very little if any CI training. This is a definite inadequacy in that the individual soldier is not kept abreast of the latest techniques used in combating the insurgent or of the latest tactics being used by the insurgent against the GVN forces. The tempo of combat operations preclude in most cases the conduct of any type of unit training.

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### C. US Military Forces:

1. Degree of Involvement: The IV CTZ has two Infantry Brigades of the 9th Infantry Division and 164th Combat Aviation Group involved directly in combat operations. Other units operating within the IV CTZ but not under operational control of DMAC commander are Sealords and IV Direct Air Support Center. Both these units are involved directly in combat and combat support missions. In addition to the above, IV CTZ has a large advisory element as well as technical service units. These elements are involved in both combat and non-combat support of Vietnamese units and advising and assisting same.

2. Command structure and relationships with government forces: All US elements within the IV CTZ are under the command of US commanders, All ARVN units with the exception of some Special Forces elements are under the command of ARVN Commanders. The relationship between forces is based on a cooperation and coordination basis. Combined plans are developed and combined operations are conducted, however, the relationship is still based on the understanding and cooperation of respective commanders. US advisors do influence to varying degrees their Vietnamese counterparts. Within IV CTZ we have been able to maintain outstanding relations with the ARVN.

3. Levels at which US personnel actually located: Within IV CTZ US personnel are located at hamlet-village (MATs), District, and Province in relation to civil government and Battalions, Regiments, Divisions and Corps in relation to military units. In addition advisory teams are located in Vietnamese Naval and Air Force units, RF/PF, National and Division training centers, and the National Police.

4. Functions actually performed at various levels: At all levels the main mission is the same: to advise and assist the Vietnamese in all aspects of nation building. The complexity of the effort varies at each level. Province, District, Village/Hamlet, Battalion and Regiment are predominantly involved in advising and assisting their counterparts in relation to combat and pacification type operations rather than in establishing any broad major policies. The other advisory elements mentioned are involved more in advising in relation to development of major plans, policies, and program designed to support the overall Nation Building Mission. US also advise in staff and logistical procedures at all levels, again the complexity of the effort depends on the level of operations.

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5. Effectiveness of US Military Support: The US military support is an absolute necessity in the Delta due to the tremendous amount of land area that is inundated, especially during the wet season. ARVN does not have adequate Air Force and Naval assets in the Delta to carry on at the present intensity of effort without US support. Land mobility is very restrictive and many areas cannot be covered by combat operations unless water craft or air craft are used. The effectiveness of US support can be easily determined by comparing the combat statistics that existed prior to receipt of the Speedy Express assets in the Delta with those that exist today.

6. Areas of inadequacy regarding training and equipment: The effectiveness of the ARVN Divisions have improved, however, this has been the result of better support and better weapons and equipment being given to ARVN rather than improved training. Large units, battalion and higher operate for longer periods. Basically however, the training of the individual soldier, small unit leadership and small unit operations has not improved. Fire teams, squads and platoons rarely if ever operate independently. Company level operations are rarely undertaken in the daytime and night company level operations are almost unknown.

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## D. Regional Forces/Popular Forces

Regional Forces (RF) are recruited from province with at least a tacit understanding that they will serve within their home province. Popular Forces (PF) are recruited with the tacit understanding that they will serve within their home district. Although occasionally RF/PF are required to serve outside their home areas, this is not the normal area of assignment. When RF/PF serve outside their home areas, unless they voluntarily agree in advance, morale problems normally occur with a corresponding increase in the desertion rate.

RF consist primarily of rifle companies, although administrative and direct support logistics companies, mechanized platoons, boat companies, heavy weapons platoons, intelligence platoons, intelligence squads, and company group headquarters are also included in the RF force structure. In January 1968, the IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) was authorized 327 RF companies. By June 1969, this authorization had been increased to 532 RF companies.

1 PF consist entirely of separate platoons. In January 1968, IV CTZ was authorized 1967 PF platoons; however, this authorization was increased to 1999 platoons by June 1969.

RF and PF, because of their nature, i.e. pay, equipment, command structure, and restrictions on deployment, are assigned territorial security missions, primarily defensive in orientation.

Even though the mission of RF/PF is to provide territorial security, i.e., protection of the populace, lines of communication, key military and civilian installations, etc., offensive operations are conducted. These operations are categorized as reconnaissance in force, cordon and search, and raids. From a low of 136 daylight operations at province and district level in February 1968, the total number of these operations has risen to 2,761 in April 69. The corresponding figures for night operations are 4 and 23. These figures must be tempered by the increase in forces and the fact that RF/PF have night security missions such as ambushes that prevent a large number of night operations. Of the operations conducted, throughout the period January 68 to May 69, significant contact was made on relatively few (200-400) operations. During March 69, RF/PF night ambushes achieved significant contact on 124 occasions.

The effectiveness of training and the caliber of the individual soldier is best judged by KIA and weapons captured/lost ratios. In January 1968, the VC/RF KIA ratio was 4.4/1 and the VC/PF KIA ratio was 0.9/1. By April 69, these rates had risen to 5.6/1

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and 2.2/1 respectively. The weapons captured/lost ratio in January 68, was 3.7/1 for RF and 0.4/1 for PF. In April 69, these rates had risen to 6.3/1 for RF and 1.7/1 for PF.

Enemy information in the classic sense is relatively nonexistent in RF/PF units. This is because units do not remain in contact for extended periods of time. Acquisition of information by clandestine agents is now beginning to be correlated and collated at Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCC) and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC). In addition to information from clandestine agents, the populace is beginning to be used as sources of information. The continued improvement of the Phoenix Program should increase the amount of intelligence available to the Province and District Chiefs. When adequate intelligence is available, operations can be planned to exploit it and the number of operations with significant contact should continue to increase.

All RF/PF soldiers receive Counter Insurgency training during their basic and advance individual training. This is called Revolutionary Development (RD) training. In addition, each province has conducted RD training for companies using mobile training teams.

The necessity to improve the RF/PF was recognized in late 1967 and upgrading of the units began in 1st quarter CY68. This upgrading program was directed toward improving personnel management, training management, and logistics management as well as equipping RF/PF units with modern weapons, i.e., M-16 rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-60 Machine Guns. To assist in accomplishing this task, Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) were formed to extend advisory capability down to the RF company included the assignment of two officers, one light weapons advisor, one heavy weapons advisor, and one medical advisor.

Major problem areas are shortage of RF NCOs, training management, and inadequate forces.

1. In January 1968, RF units were short 1000 NCOs or 9.6% of authorized strength. In May 69, the units are short 3400 NCOs or 20.8%. Vietnamese regulations provide NCOs through formal schooling, regular and special promotions, and battlefield promotions. Formal schooling is addressed in 2 below. Due to internal policies of Headquarters, IV CTZ, less than maximum use is made of battlefield promotions to promote deserving enlisted men to NCO status. A considerable amount of advisory effort has been expended to solve this situation, however it remains a major problem area.

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2. Training management, from Saigon to the provinces remains a major problem area. At the Saigon level, an annual training program is published but IV CTZ quotas are not announced until approximately 30 days in advance of course starting dates. The CYC training program has approximately 40 published changes as of this date. Headquarters, IV CTZ does not insist that quotas for subordinate element be filled. Province chiefs, for many reasons, do not fill quotas, thereby failing to avail themselves of a method of acquiring school trained personnel. Items such as lack of per diem, no guarantee that graduates return to their organization, family separation, and substandard living conditions in training centers all contribute to failure to fill quotas.

3. The last major problem area is inadequate forces to complete pacification in IV CTZ. Studies have been conducted by Delta Military Assistance Command to determine the number of additional forces necessary to complete pacification of the Delta. Additional forces, i.e., 134 RF companies and 528 PF platoons, have been requested. This remains a major problem area, because without forces to provide security, pacification of the Delta can not be brought to a successful conclusion.

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### E. National Police

1. National Police Field Forces (NPF) have been deployed as the primary reaction force of the DIOCCs. Used in platoon strength, as opposed to the company-sized deployment used prior to July 1968, the effectiveness of these forces has increased considerably. Based on neutralization statistics, the IV Corps NPF have surpassed accomplishments of the other three Corps Areas. In January 1969, one U.S. Army NCO per province was assigned on 120-day TDY as NPF Advisors. This has contributed notably to the improvement in NPF operational effectiveness.

2. The Marine Police have been built from a force of approximately 200 in January 1968 to its present strength of 800 men. Its original base at Can Tho, a tent-type base with two surplus boats (LCPL), has been built into a permanent base with 3 sub-bases built under self-help. The fleet of boats now consists of 32 police patrol boats (40-foot length); and 56 interceptors (17-foot-length); powered by 75HP outboard motors. The bases and detachments are so located that coverage has been possible for all critical areas of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers, from the Cambodian border to the South China Sea. This force has been used to great effect in the Resources Control Program and in regulating shipping on these waterways.

3. The Police Special Branch (PSB) has been utilized by the National Police as its intelligence-gathering agency. Advisory assistance to this branch is provided by OSA. Phoenix, and DIOCCs are the primary intelligence-gathering units that provide target information for the NPF, with the PSB, which operates the Police Interrogation Centers, feeding intelligence information to Phoenix and DIOCCs. This is a decided improvement over the former procedure whereby the NPF was the reaction arm of the PSB instead of the DIOCC, and solely operated on the limited intelligence provided by the Provincial Intelligence Centers.

### Training

1. In April 1969 a training program was initiated for District and Sub-District Chiefs of Police. The objective of this program was to familiarize them with the role of the National Police in the 1969 Pacification plan. This training program is still continuing. As an adjunct to this, mobile training teams are being formed to train national police in their new role as law enforcement offices in the villages and

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hamlets. This training is expected to commence prior to the end of May 1969. Daily police roll-call training has, at the same time, been upgraded to include problems that can be expected by police at village/hamlet levels.

2. In many provinces of IV Corps it has been noted that the National Police have taken the lead in providing instruction to People's Self-Defense Force personnel in weapons training, outpost duty, and intelligence reporting.

### Major Problem Areas

1. The major problem area at present exists in the logistic support field, namely: procurement of vehicle, marine, and generator spare parts.

2. The National Identification registration program has been another problem area. However, advisor efforts have succeeded in revising local team processing procedures to more streamlined, systematic operations, and a recent increase in production has been noted. Further improvements are to be expected as the teams gain in experience.

3. The problem of corruption, while by no means limited to the National Police, does present problems from time to time. As the professionalism of the police increases with experience, however, problems arising from corruption will tend to diminish. This fact has been observable even within the past year, with a steady decrease in problems arising from corruption.

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### F. Logistical Support

Logistical support of IV CTZ Forces is provided by the 4th Area Logistics Command, a general support organization structured along technical service lines with complete supply, maintenance, and transportation capabilities. Direct support is provided the infantry division by its organic support battalion composed of a supply company, maintenance company, and transportation platoon.

Direct support of Regional and Popular Forces is furnished through province Administrative and Direct Support Logistical (A&DSL) companies, which provide personnel, finance, supply, maintenance, medical, transportation, and burial services.

The Vietnamese logistical system in IV CTZ is responsive to operational requirements. Excellent area coverage is achieved by the A&DSL company concept. The many airfields of IV Corps provide a suitable emergency resupply line in the event of surface interdiction.

Over the past year emphasis has been toward modernizing GVN forces and supporting an intensified force structure increase. The logistical system readily assimilates and disseminates the vast quantities of new equipment incoming to this program. For the most part, all mission essential items are issued new units during their training phase so that an operational status is attained by deployment time. Conversion programs are well underway to outfit GVN forces with the latest in weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment.

The dedication of US Engineer units to highway construction in IV CTZ will have a marked impact on the GVN effort in the Delta. The US 34th Engineer Group, in general support of Delta Military Assistance Command, has three of its five battalions engaged in upgrading National Highway QL-4, the primary road artery of the Delta. The remaining two battalions are committed to operational support missions, airfield maintenance, and repair of secondary roads.

The most singular logistical weakness in IV CTZ is the lack of dredges to provide land fill for construction projects. The terrain of IV CTZ demands land reclamation prior to any base development. Significant delays are being experienced in preparing sites for dependent housing and cantonment construction.

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