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AGO D/A LTR 29 APR 1980; AGO D/A LTR 29 APR 1980

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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (9 Apr 69) FOR OT UT 691077

14 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

AD 501847

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam
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AVFA-GC-OT

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

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1. Section I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

a. (C) General:

(1) During November and December 1968 and January 1969 United States and Free World Military Forces (FWMF) with 37 maneuver battalions (19 US and 18 ROK) supported by 24 artillery battalions (16 US and 8 ROK) and Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with 30 maneuver battalions supported by seven artillery battalions continued operations in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Operations were conducted in the west along the Cambodian/Laotian/Republic of Vietnam border in Quang Duc, Darlac, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces; along the east coast in Binh Dinh, Phu Bon, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa and Ninh Thuan Provinces and in the south in Tuyen Duc, Lam Dong and Binh Thuan Provinces. The quarter started with the initiation of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) throughout II CTZ which continued through the end of the quarter. The APC was initiated to take advantage of the withdrawal of many major enemy units to sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia. It was also decided to take advantage of the enemy withdrawal to probe his established base areas and destroy supplies left behind to make it difficult for him to return. At the same time, friendly forces were used as a shield to provide momentum to the APC. This was accomplished by providing security for the population centers and cooperating to the maximum extent possible with Province Chiefs in the pacification program and areas they desired cleared. Small unit operations, many of patrol size were used to saturate wide areas to detect and destroy small enemy unit formations as they moved. Constant surveillance of the border was maintained to detect movement of NVA forces back into II CTZ and friendly units were prepared to react should the NVA attempt to return.

(2) Friendly losses for the period were 737 KIA and 2668 WIA. Enemy losses were 3508 KIA, 287 captured and 1491 small arms and 101 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, II CTZ accounted for 634 Hoi Chanhs.

(b) (C) Intelligence:

(1) General: As the character of the conflict continued to swing from conventional major unit engagements toward political, small unit and anti-pacification activity by the enemy, intelligence operations during the period were adjusted accordingly. Greater emphasis on the political war heightened the importance of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Friendly efforts to counter the enemy's political activity necessitated greater and more comprehensive knowledge of the enemy's

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operations in this area. Within the I FFORCEV intelligence community, the result was the creation or reorganization of agencies in order to obtain the requisite knowledge of the enemy. The bombing halt and developments in Paris, together with the low level of enemy activity, accentuated the importance of intelligence operations. Monitoring enemy activity, providing early warning of developing enemy threats and forecasting the enemy's intentions were intelligence functions of interest not only to local commanders but were critical in the formulation of national and international policy. In order to meet important needs, intelligence operations were adapted to the demands of this new phase of the Vietnam Conflict.

(2) Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in Order of Battle holdings during the period:

<u>1. Units Accepted:</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
	K37 Sapper Bn	Confirmed	300
	K33 Arty Bn	Confirmed	350
	K34 Arty Bn	Confirmed	450
	246 Trans Bn	Probable	450
	K-45 LF Bn	Possible	200
	74th Arty Bn	Possible	unk
<u>2. Units Removed:</u>	K101 Bn (To III Corps)	Probable	300
	3d NVA Div (To I Corps, except 18th NVA Regt and 300th Sapper Bn)	Confirmed	4260
	95C NVA Regt (To III Corps)	Probable	1500
	320th NVA Regt (To III Corps)	Probable	1400
	1st NVA Div (To III Corps, ex- cept 66th NVA Regt)	Probable	1230

3. Changes in Subordination:

300th Sapper Bn from 3d NVA Div to Binh Dinh
Province Committee.

66th NVA Regt possible from the 1st NVA Div
to the B3 Front.

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(3) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques. Following the battle of Duc Lap, during the last major enemy offensive in II CTZ in Aug 68, there was a gradual change in enemy tactics. Emphasis was placed on small unit operations, usually of company size and smaller. The enemy was evasive, usually avoiding contact and totally unwilling to engage major size units. The majority of activity consisted of standoff attacks by fire and small sapper teams. The most frequent targets were Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) strong points. This unwillingness to fight was due, at least in part, to limited enemy capabilities. Most of the large NVA forces were withdrawn to sanctuary in Cambodia, thus reducing the forces immediately available for combat. Concomitantly, increased responsibilities were delegated to Main Force and Local Force units. The small unit attacks, previously mentioned, were designed to maintain a semblance of military pressure, and at the same time, through the selection of appropriate targets, discredit the GVN and make questionable its ability to maintain the security of the populace. Although these tactics are not new to the conflict in Vietnam, they represent a change from preceding quarters.

(4) Enemy Losses and Strengths.

(a) Enemy losses during the period: (DOW is 35% of KIA per MACV criteria.)

MONTH	KIA	DOW	FW	MILITARY HOI CHANH	SA	CSW
Nov	1096	377	89	55	352	7
Dec	832	285	84	105	385	29
Jan	1580	553	114	100	754	65

(b) Enemy Strengths at the beginning and end of the quarter.

	<u>1 Nov 68</u>	<u>31 Jan 69</u>
NVA	18,160	15,195
LF/MF	8,865	8,860
Admin	4,875	5,375
Guerrilla	12,570	15,940
Infrastructure	<u>16,300</u>	<u>17,800</u>
TOTAL	60,770	63,170

The increase in enemy strength during the quarter is attributed primarily to better defined reporting criteria, particularly in the guerrilla category.

(5) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(a) Capabilities.

1. In Kontum Province, the enemy has the capability to:

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a. Conduct standoff attacks or combination standoff/sapper attacks against US/Allied installations and Kontum City employing mortars of up to 120mm, 75mm RR and rockets of up to 122mm, as well as 100mm/105mm artillery with or without a coordinated ground follow-up attack.

b. Conduct ground attacks against US/Allied bases, vicinity of Dak Seang, Ben Het and Dak To in up to multi-battalion strength supported by RR, mortar, rocket, artillery fire and possibly armor.

c. Employ battalion size NVA/VC forces to interdict and conduct harassing operations along QL 14N, Highway 512 and other major friendly lines of communication (LOC's).

d. Restrict friendly air activity with fire from SA, AW, 12.7mm, 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft weapons.

2. In Pleiku Province, the enemy has the capability to:

a. Selectively attack Plei Djereng, Plei Me, Plei Mrong, Duc Co CIDG camps or Edap Enang, Thanh An and Le Trung in regimental strength supported by mortar, rocket, RR fire, 105mm artillery and possibly some armor.

b. Attack Pleiku City and US/Allied bases utilizing 82mm mortar, RR, 122mm rocket fire and sapper techniques.

c. Employ battalion size NVA/VC Forces against friendly convoys and installations along QL 19E and QL 14N, supported by 75mm RR and 60mm/82mm mortar fire; attack LOCs 509, TL 6C, 437, TL 7C and LTL 7B with company sized VC elements using anti-tank grenades, RR and mortar fire.

d. Conduct standoff attacks against CIDG camps, district headquarters, US/Allied installations and refugee resettlements areas.

3. In Darlac Province, the enemy has the capability to:

a. Attack district headquarters of Buon Ho and Lac Thien and isolated hamlets in up to battalion size force.

b. Conduct ambushes and harassing activities along QL 21.

c. Attack Ban Me Thuot City with multi-battalion forces employing 75mm RR, 60/82/120mm mortars and 122mm rocket fire.

4. In Quang Duc Province, attack Duc Lap in up to multi-battalion size force and conduct standoff attacks at Gia Nghia, Bu Prang and Nhon Co.

5. In Phu Bon Province, the enemy is capable of harassing Cheo Reo and district headquarters.

6. In Binh Dinh Province, the enemy has the capability to attack the population centers, US/GVN/ROK installations and units in multi-battalion strength, and can restrict movement on QLS 1 and 19 by employing mines or conducting standoff attacks and raids against friendly convoys and installations on and along the highways. The enemy is capable of conducting sapper and terrorist activities against friendly installations along the seacoast.

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7. In Phu Yen Province, the enemy is capable of attacking population centers and Allied installations in reinforced battalion strength. The enemy can conduct standoff attacks and terrorist and sapper activities against friendly controlled areas and restrict movement along LOCs.

8. In Khanh Hoa Province, conduct sapper/swimmer-sapper attacks and standoff attacks with 60mm mortar and 75mm RR against Allied installations in the Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang areas and conduct company size attacks against lightly populated areas.

9. In Binh Thuan and Tuyen Duc Provinces, attack local villages and Allied outposts in up to two battalion strength when augmented by LF companies and continue interdiction of QL 1 in Binh Thuan Province.

10. In Lam Dong and Binh Thuan Provinces attack small Allied outposts and villages in up to battalion strength and interdict QL 11 and QL 20.

11. The enemy is capable of employing chemical agents, by various delivery systems, during any attack.

12. Withdraw forces to base areas and sanctuaries for replacements, resupply and retraining.

13. Continue disruption of the GVN nation-building effort.

14. Enter outlying villages without opposition or as a result of minor combat action to conduct propaganda lectures, recruit personnel, impress civilians as laborers/porters and to obtain provisions and information.

15. Establish limited political entities, i.e., liberation councils and committees in contested and VC controlled areas.

16. Receive support from reserves and reinforcements which are located in sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos, the I CTZ and III CTZ border areas. Some enemy units which are currently active in I CTZ and III CTZ could be expected to enter II CTZ, if the enemy shifts his area of interest to II CTZ. Size of reserves or reinforcements in sanctuaries cannot be determined at this time.

17. Employ combinations of the above capabilities.

(b) Vulnerabilities.

1. Enemy LOCs are extended and insecure with the exception of those traversing neutral countries or international waters, which afford some degree of security.

2. The enemy's limited capability to engage in conventional warfare for extended periods makes him vulnerable to superior Allied firepower in any large-scale offensive.

3. The numerous means available to friendly forces to conduct reconnaissance and observation of trail movement, base areas and fortifications, limits the enemy's mobility and activity.

4. Low morale, in many units, is caused by one or more factors, i.e., Allied firepower, sickness and lack of significant victories. Thus the enemy is highly susceptible to friendly psychological operations.

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5. Scarcity of food is causing many hardships for the enemy, especially the interior NVA units. Recent discoveries of numerous rice caches and continued efforts by friendly forces in that area will further aggravate the situation.

(c) Probable Courses of Action.

1. Highland Provinces:

a. Conduct limited ground and standoff attacks against isolated CIDG camps, RF/PF outposts and selected district headquarters.

b. Conduct standoff attacks and ground probes of US fire support bases and Allied installations and standoff and sapper/terrorist attacks against Pleiku, Kontum and Ban Me Thuot Cities.

c. Conduct mining and interdiction operations along LOCs.

2. Coastal Provinces:

a. Conduct standoff attacks on Allied outposts and fire support bases (without rockets).

b. Conduct terrorist and harassing activities on the coast generally along QL 1.

c. Conduct mining, ambush and standoff attacks against convoys and friendly facilities along QL 19E (without rockets).

3. Southern Provinces:

a. Conduct increased military operations in support of political expansion activities.

b. Conduct harassing/standoff attacks on GVN hamlets and outposts (without rockets).

c. Continue interdiction of QL 14 and QL 20 and increase interdiction of QL 1.

(6) Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques:

(a) Changes in Sources, Agencies and Techniques. With the implementation of the BIG MACK Intelligence Collection Program, a new source of intelligence became available, as well as a new collection technique. The various reports in the BIG MACK series provide I FFORCEV and MACV with intelligence on the VCI, guerrillas and local force companies and platoons. The reports originate at district level with the US District Intelligence Operations Control Center (DIOCC) liaison officer and make available more specific and detailed information than was previously accessible to higher headquarters.

(b) G2 Air:

1. During the quarter, the G2 Air Section conducted a two-day conference at the 225th SAC, Phu Hiep, for G2, S2 Air officers and advisors in II CTZ. Twenty people, to include one ARVN and four ROK representatives, attended the conference. The purpose of the conference was to present a thorough briefing on the complete aerial surveillance and reconnaissance program in II CTZ, to familiarize the representatives with capabilities

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and limitations of Army and Air Force sensor systems available and to correct or recommend solutions to existing problems. These conferences will be scheduled in the future as the need arises.

2. During the quarter, a new program was initiated wherein subordinate units were encouraged to submit requests for strip targets for infrared coverage as opposed to area targets. This relatively new concept decreased considerably the number of kilometers flown per month while it has increased significantly the number of targets completed and the number of infrared emissions detected.

3. An Army-Air Force study is being conducted to determine the feasibility of providing in-flight bonus targets for Air Force photo missions. Basically, this system would permit a pilot, who was unable to complete a scheduled target, to request another target from his headquarters while in flight, if he has sufficient fuel available to attempt the target. This system, if approved, would provide greater flexibility to the air reconnaissance effort and assist in intensifying intelligence collection.

4. Early in the quarter, a test was conducted which employed gunships and slicks along with a Mohawk infra-red mission. Communications were established between the Mohawk, gun ships, slicks and the ground sensor terminal. As infra-red emissions were detected in the Mohawk or at the ground sensor terminal, the coordinates were immediately relayed to the slicks which spotted the target area and called in the gun ships to fire on the target. Reports indicated that the coordination was outstanding. Presently, the Mohawk is conducting a similar operation in the Plei Trap Valley area with a Shadow aircraft. Acceptable results have been attained.

5. In an effort to further increase the responsiveness of the reconnaissance and surveillance effort in II CTZ, and infra-red ground sensor terminal was provided the 173d Abn Bde. The terminal will become operational early next quarter at which time the brigade will have the capability to receive instantaneous infra-red ground sensings, enabling an immediate response with artillery fire. An infra-red ground sensor terminal is also scheduled for delivery to Task Force South (TFS) in the near future.

6. During the period 1 Nov 68 through 31 Jan 69, a total of 9,051 Visual Reconnaissance (VR) sorties were flown with an average of 43 aircraft. The VR missions resulted in a total of 957 airstrikes, 413 artillery missions and 281 ground actions in II CTZ. There were also 1,124 photos, 4,091 infra-red and 565 SLAR target areas planned. Results from completed missions were furnished to commanders concerned.

(c) Detachment D, 1st MI Bn (ARS):

1. During the period 1 Nov 68 through 31 Jan 69, Detachment D flew 293 sorties in support of units of the II CTZ, transporting 13,195 pounds of cargo. The Detachment interpreted 1,203 targets (407, 221 prints) and prepared 1,012 Imagery Interpretation (II) reports which contained 1,074 items of significance. The reproduction section processed 302,169 feet of paper to meet the requirements of 688 reproduction requests.

2. Hand-held photographic missions continued to receive emphasis within the detachment's overall operations. It flew three hand-held missions resulting in 2076 developed prints.

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(d) 55th MI Detachment (CORPS):

1. For the period 28 Oct 68 through 31 Jan 69, the 55th MI Detachment, II Section received 832 in-country missions and processed 559. In addition, 33 Dorsal Fin and 46 Yankee Team missions were processed. Sixty-seven Special Photo Interpretation Reports were submitted which included 16 area studies in RVN, five trafficability studies and 46 area studies in Southeastern Laos. Thirty-three supplementary Photo Interpretation Reports were also submitted covering the Dorsal Fin area.

2. In addition to reports submitted, the following projects were accomplished by the Imagery Interpretation Section:

a. Completed 50 town and airfield studies for the 64th Engr Det (T).

b. Continued six area studies covering approximately 18,870 square km in RVN.

c. Constructed six mosaics for requestors.

d. Furnished the 64th Engr Det (T) with updated master plates covering the II CTZ.

e. Furnished the G2 Air and FSCK with three artillery targets.

f. Interpreted numerous missions covering the NVA road network and border area and provided current information on these areas to the G2 Air and 64th Engr Det (T).

3. During the quarter, the Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW) Section screened and classified 221 detainees and as a result of these interrogations, a total of 21 preliminary interrogation reports and interrogation reports were prepared and distributed. Captured documents were screened and 38 feet of documents were forwarded to Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) for further exploitation. IPW teams translated a total of 263 enemy documents. The Technical Intelligence Section processed and evacuated all captured weapons and material through S4 and G4 channels.

(e) Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (Abn):

1. During the month of December, E Co (LRP) 20th Inf was brought under the centralized control of the company commander rather than having platoons placed OPCON to I FFORCEV subordinate commands. From 11 Dec to 23 Dec the company stood down at its base at An Khe for reorganization and training. The reorganization made the company more responsive to the operation requirements of the Field Force, while at the same time resulted in greater productivity in missions conducted. Morale also improved immeasurably as a direct result of the revised concept.

2. During the reporting period, E Co inserted 157 teams which resulted in 112 enemy sightings and 40 enemy KIA (BC). Two-thirds of the results were experienced during the past 30 days, or since the revised concept was placed in effect. Friendly losses were two KIA and 26 WIA.

3. U.S. Mobile Training Team (MTT) assistance to ARVN LRP's and RF Medium Range Patrols (MRP's) terminated during the period. Both programs will be continued at the divisional and PF training centers, respectively, until all training requirements are completed.

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(f) The 64th Engineer Detachment (Terrain):

1. During the quarter the detachment completed annotating the 1607 series mapsheets for II CTZ for overprinted data and returned the information to USARV M&I Branch.

2. During the period all of the 142 sheets comprising the 1:50,000 scale map series coverage of II CTZ, called Tactical Data Overprints (TDO), were updated and revised. The new edition consisted of 250,000 printed sheets which were delivered to units within the areas covered. Although the posting of data continues, a new edition is not foreseen until after May 1969. Nevertheless, TDOs may be updated as necessary and reprinted upon request to meet special requirements such as the commencement of new operations.

3. The detachment continued production of Terrain Studies in anticipation of future tactical operations.

(g) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron

1. The detachment has the mission of supporting I FFORCEV and USARV tactical units in II CTZ. Prior to 8 Dec 68, Detachment 31 also had the responsibility of supporting XXIV Corps, the Americal Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). After that date the detachment was reorganized to provide a more mobile capability and to tighten the span of control. The responsibility of weather support for the above mentioned units was transferred to other detachments in order to effect the objectives of reorganization.

2. Weather support is provided by the 31st Detachment to the following units and installations:

- a. I FFORCEV
- b. 4th Inf Div
- c. Dalat (Cam Ly Airfield)
- d. An Khe
- e. LZ English
- f. Phan Thiet
- g. 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)

(7) Deviations from Current Intelligence Doctrines: The enemy's change of tactics in recent months and his increased emphasis on the political aspects of the war has necessitated modifications in the normal combat intelligence operations functions. The requirement for political intelligence has resulted in the establishment of a political section within G2 Operations. The primary functions of the political section are to monitor DIOCC and PIOCC intelligence functions, conduct liaison relations with CORDS and Office of Special Assistance (OSA), and advise the G2 on all political trends and developments. In view of the participation by conventional military units in counter VCI operations, the establishment of a political desk was essential. The creation of

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a political intelligence capability was a unique development in that prior to that time G2 Operations was concerned exclusively with tactical combat intelligence.

(8) Recommendations of New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization: None

(9) Comments and Explanation of Significant Changes in Variance with the Previous Report: None

(10) Weather:

(a) Interior: The northeast monsoon was in full effect during November, December and January, resulting in generally fair to partly cloudy skies throughout the area with patchy morning fog in the river valleys near sunrise. Heaviest fog occurred in the Northern Highlands. Occasionally strong northeast monsoonal surges spilled across the Annamite mountain range causing mostly cloudy skies with occasional rain and showers lasting for two to four day periods. Rainfall for the period was below the mean by one to two inches. Three typhoons, Mamie, Nina and Ora affected the II Corps weather during the last two weeks of November with Mamie producing most of the weather as she entered the II Corps coast near Phan Rang on 21 Nov. The other two storms entered land south of II Corps. The typhoons weakened rapidly as they approached the coastlines and entered as tropical storms or depressions with winds of less than 60 knots. The effects of these storms on the interior were cloudy skies and intermittent rain with gusty winds to 35 to 45 knots at the peak of the storms. The effects of the storms lasted for two to three day periods before the weather regime returned to normal.

(b) Coastal: Variable weather dominated the period along the coast as intermittent northeast monsoonal surges moved through the area: However, the abnormal southerly position of the subtropical high pressure area during November and December kept rainfall amounts light except for the passages of the three tropical storms in late November. In January, stronger northeast surges pushed across the area causing above normal rainfalls. Weather along the coast was generally partly cloudy to cloudy with occasional light rain and rainshowers during the late night and early morning hours with fair to partly cloudy skies during the afternoon and evening hours and isolated light showers along the coastal ridges. Occasional strong surges kept cloudy skies and intermittent rain and showers along the coast for two to three day periods, primarily during the first half of January. The tropical storms caused heavy rains during the last two weeks of November along with strong gusty winds and low overcast skies with poor visibilities. Damage was light however due to the rapid weakening of the storms as they drew near the coast and passed over a cold tongue of water and lost their energy sources. Maximum recorded winds were 55 knots at Hon Tre Island which occurred with Mamie on 23 November. The Annamite mountain range was mostly cloudy with scattered afternoon and evening showers and occasional to intermittent night and morning rain, drizzle and fog. The poorest weather conditions occurred along the eastern mountain slopes and ridges.

(c) Effects on operations: There were a total of 326 TAC sorties cancelled due to weather from 1 Nov 68 through 27 Jan 69. No other effects are known.

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c. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Plans: During the reporting period the II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) for 1969, one contingency plan and three frag orders were published. Three letters of instruction were also published. The quarterly summary of progress toward achievement of CCP goals was submitted; the quarterly review of progress was cancelled. The monthly measurement of progress briefings and weekly special operations briefings continued throughout the period. Two Senior Commanders' Conferences, a Pacification Conference and a Zone Coordinators' Conference were held.

(a) Contingency Plans: OPLAN 101-69 (Steel Cable) was dispatched on 18 Jan 69. Further discussion of this OPLAN is precluded by the classification of this report.

(b) FRAG Orders: During the period the following FRAG Orders were published:

1. FRAG Order 2-69 was published on 15 Jan 69. This order directed a 10 day 5th Mobile Strike Force (MSF)/Command Battalion reconnaissance in force operation. Further discussion of this order is precluded by the classification of this report.

2. FRAG Order 3-69 was published on 23 Jan 69. This order directed a 15 day three company MSF reconnaissance in force operation SW of Ban Me Thuot, Darlac Province. Further discussion of this order is precluded by the classification of this report.

3. FRAG Order 5-69 was published on 30 Jan 69. This order directed a 15 day three company MSF reconnaissance in force operation in Kontum Province. Further discussion of this order is precluded by the classification of this report.

(c) LOI: During the period the following LOI's were published:

1. LOI 1-69 was published on 8 Jan 69. This LOI is the basic guidance of CG, I FFORCEV for the conduct of operations within the CTZ. It establishes missions and responsibilities for assigned, attached and OPCON units and provides the basic concept for operations within the CTZ. The relationship between the I FFORCEV, CORDS and II Corps Advisory Group staffs are defined. Support of ARVN, RF and PF training and support of civic action and psychological operations in support of the pacification program are emphasized.

2. LOI 2-69 (Fire Base Concept) was published on 10 Jan 69. This LOI provides guidance to the 4th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde and TF South for the destruction and/or neutralization of enemy base areas and selected target areas. Further discussion of this LOI is precluded by the classification of this report.

3. LOI 4-69 (Military Support of Pacification) was published on 22 Jan 69. This LOI outlines procedures for the coordination of military support of pacification by units OPCON to I FFORCEV. OPCON unit commanders, ARVN Senior Advisors (SAs) and Province Senior Advisors (PSAs) are requested to attend a monthly meeting held by the province/sector chief and directed by CG, II Corps to discuss military support of pacification and military/civic action programs. PSAs are requested to submit a brief resume of the meetings to CG, I FFORCEV. Frequent coordination is encouraged and during operations in support of pacification continuous liaison is recommended.

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(d) Combined Campaign Plan:

1. II CTZ CCP for 1969 was signed by the CG, II Corps, DCG, ROKFV-FC and CG, I FFORCEV on 29 Nov 68. This plan provides the overall guidance for the prosecution of the war in II CTZ during 1969. Guidance for the conduct of operations, the furtherance of mutual coordination and co-operation and support of the pacification program is contained therein. Priorities are established for the neutralization or destruction of recognized enemy base areas. Priority pacification areas were also identified. The 1969 CCP formally establishes the "Pair Off" concept and carries the "One War"/combined operations atmosphere into 1969 as a standard method of operations in II CTZ.

2. The quarterly summary of progress toward achievement of CCP goals was submitted to MACV on 17 Jan 69. The formal quarterly review of progress toward these goals, originally scheduled for 28 Jan 69, was cancelled.

3. Annex Q (Quarterly Review) to CCP AB 144 was received on 26 Jan 69. Annex T (Measurement of Progress) to the II CTZ CCP, the II CTZ annex which supports Annex Q, is currently being prepared. This annex will delineate the goals of the II CTZ CCP and outline specific reporting requirements for the measurement of progress.

(2) (C) Summary of Ground Operations: During the quarter, friendly operations throughout II CTZ consisted of small unit operations to saturate large areas to detect and destroy enemy units as they moved and attempted infiltration and resupply; massing units for preemptive attacks on known enemy base areas to destroy LOC's and bases of supply and deployment of forces to support the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Many of these were combined operations of ARVN, ROK and US forces. Throughout the quarter VC/NVA forces for the most part avoided decisive engagement. The following summary covers the significant activities in the four major geographic areas in II CTZ: (Incl 2)

(a) Western Highlands Operations November: Ground combat was characterized by intensified allied efforts to locate and destroy enemy forces and base areas. Maximum effort was devoted towards support of province pacification plans to identify and capture the Viet Cong infrastructure and to regain government control over territory and population. Operations were conducted against enemy lines of communications and infiltration routes. Of particular interest was the Duc Co, Plei Djereng border area west of Pleiku where the 3d Bde 4th Inf Div conducted extensive operations to pre-empt an enemy buildup in that vicinity. Operations were also conducted against the Plei Trap road network to interdict enemy movement and to destroy the road and fortifications in that area. The 2d Bde (-) 4th Inf Div was moved from Ban Me Thuot to Kontum on 15 Nov to support operations in the Plei Trap Valley and to strengthen forces in Kontum Province due to increased enemy activity. Enemy activity during the period consisted primarily of standoff mortar, rocket and artillery attacks. Artillery attacks, launched from sanctuary in Cambodia, were directed at US fire bases near the border. Fire support base 19 (YB 839223) in Kontum Province received over 450 rounds of mixed 82mm and 122mm mortar, 75mm RR and 100mm artillery in a ten-day period. The enemy also conducted several terrorist attacks on population centers and increased mining activities on QL-19, QL-14 and Hwy 509. Towards the end of November the 4th Inf Div had completed plans for redeployment of forces in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces in preparation for Operation CONG KILLER which commenced in early December.

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1. US Operations: On 2 Nov 14 km NW of Plei Me (ZA 023094) elements of A Trp 7th Armd Sqdn 17th Air Cav engaged an estimated enemy squad with gunships and CS. Elements of D Co 1st Bn 35th Inf reinforced. Artillery and air strikes supported. Results were: friendly one KIA; enemy nine KIA and one SA captured. On 2 Nov six km SW of Ben Het, FSB #29 (YB 839223) received 135 rounds of mixed 122mm mortar, 100mm and 105mm artillery. Artillery and air strikes supported. Results were: friendly four WIA(US), one countermortar radar, two fuel blivets and one 81mm mortar damaged and two water trailers destroyed; enemy losses are unknown. On 4 Nov FSB #29 received approximately 100 rounds mixed 82mm mortar, 75mm RR, 105mm artillery and sporadic SA fire. Artillery and air strikes supported. Results were: friendly six WIA (US); enemy losses are unknown. On 11 Nov FSB #29 received 125 rounds mixed 75mm RR, 120mm mortar and 100mm artillery. Artillery and air strikes supported. Results were: friendly two WIA (US), one 106mm RR and unknown number SA's destroyed. On 11 Nov 23 km SW of Pleiku, LZ Oasis (ZA 1127) received 40-50 rounds of 82mm mortar and a sapper attack. Results were: friendly nine WIA (US) and one 1/2 ton truck damaged; enemy six NVA killed and three SA captured. On 12 Nov seven km south of Duc Co (YA 834178), A Co 1st Bn 35th Inf repelled an attack by an unknown size enemy force employing 60mm mortar, SA, hand grenades and satchel charges. Spooky and artillery supported. Results were: two KIA (US), 18 WIA (US), one 3/4 ton truck destroyed and one 3/4 ton truck damaged; enemy six killed, four SA's and one CSW captured. On 13 Nov A Co 1st Bn 35th Inf received approximately 150 rounds 82mm mortar and four rounds 122mm rocket. Artillery, gunships and air strikes supported. Results were: friendly three KIA and 20 WIA (US); enemy losses are unknown. On 17 Nov 19 km west of Duc Co (YA 656261), elements of C Trp 7th Armd Sqdn 17th Air Cav sighted three flat bottom boats, sinking all three. On 20 Nov Pleiku Airfield (AR 785500) received 10-12 rounds of 122mm rockets. Results were: friendly 17 WIA (US), six buildings and five trucks damaged. On 30 Nov eight km NW of Duc Lap (YU 835790), a reinforced squad from B Co 2d Bn 35th Inf ambushed an estimated enemy squad. The enemy reinforced with two platoons. Mortar, artillery and gunships supported. Results were: friendly two KIA and two WIA; enemy seven killed.

2. ARVN Operations: On 3 Nov 20 km SE of Kontum (AR 916692) the 1st Bn 42d ARVN Inf Regt made contact with a squad and later an enemy company. Results were: enemy seven killed and one PW captured. On 13 Nov nine km SW of Duc Lap (YU 823732), elements of the 2d Bn 45th ARVN Inf Rsgt found 15 enemy bodies in graves and estimated an additional 50-60 bodies in graves in the area. Bodies were estimated to be two-three months old. On 13 Nov 38 km SE of Buon Blech (BQ 189262), elements of the 1st Bn 45th ARVN Inf Regt discovered a base camp consisting of 80 newly constructed bunkers and 20 old bunkers, 500 kilos of rice and corn and assorted cooking utensils and items of clothing. On 18 Nov 27 km SE of Kontum (BR 046744), elements of 1st Bn 42d ARVN Inf Regt discovered a large base camp consisting of a 200-bed hospital in 16 huts, one of which was equipped with an operating room and approximately four kilos of medicine. On 20 Nov 13 km south of Ban Me Thuot (AP 786896), elements of the 2d Bn 45th ARVN Inf Regt found a munitions cache containing 63 rounds B-40 rocket, 53 rounds 82mm mortar 34 rifle grenades, 78 blocks of explosives and 37 blasting caps. On 21 Nov 30 km SE of Kontum (BR 056786), elements of the 1st Bn 42d ARVN Inf Regt found approximately 200 lbs of medical supplies and 150 graves containing 150 enemy bodies. On 21 Nov 14 km south of Ban Me Thuot (AP 786936), elements of the 2d Bn 45th ARVN Inf Regt found a cache containing 270 rounds 60mm mortar, 43 rounds 75mm RR, 78 rounds 82mm mortar and 140 blocks of TNT.

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3. CIDG Operations: On 20 Nov vic Pleiku, the Montagnard Training Center (AR 795536) received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar. Results were: friendly four WIA (three ARVN and one civilian) and three houses damaged. On 25 Nov nine km north of Plei Me (ZA 155155), a GSF platoon from Plei Me was attacked by an estimated NVA Company employing SA and mortars. Mortars and Spooky supported. Results were: friendly three WIA; enemy six killed and two SA captured.

4. RF/PF Operations: On 27 Nov eight km NNW of Pleiku (ZA 143497), the 144th RF Company engaged an estimated two enemy platoons. Artillery and gunships supported. Results were: friendly two KIA and two WIA; enemy seven killed and one weapon captured. On 28 Nov 34 km south of Buon Blech, the hamlet of Buon Trinh (EQ 050287) was attacked by an estimated three enemy platoons employing SA, AW, hand grenades, satchel charges and B-40 rockets. The 52d and 74th PF Platoons and a platoon from the 241st RF Company were defending the hamlet. Artillery supported. Results were: friendly 12 KIA (nine PF and three civilians), four WIA (one PF, three civilians), two weapons and two radios lost and one weapon and four houses destroyed; enemy one weapon captured.

5. Other Operations: On 7 Nov 16 km NW of Pleiku (ZA 139579), a Province Reconnaissance Unit team captured 13 enemy. On 21 Nov 15 km west of Pleiku (ZA 087451), a PRU team reacting to an agent report captured nine members of the VCI. On 25 Nov eight km east of Polei Kleng, a group of 10-15 terrorists attacked Plei Krong Village (ZA 102915). The enemy employed SA, hand grenades and B-40 rocket fire and distributed approximately 700 propaganda leaflets in English and Vietnamese dealing with anti-US involvement in the war, VC Chieu Hoi Program and VC policy toward captured satellite troops. Results were: friendly five KIA (two MSF, one PF, two civilians), 17 WIA (one PF, 16 civilians) and one house destroyed; enemy unknown. On 26 Nov 18 km ESE of Ban Me Thuot, Buon Puk Village (AP 965971) received four rounds 60mm mortar. Results were: friendly 12 WIA (civ); enemy unknown. On 28 Nov eight km NW of Pleiku (ZA 191558), a PRU team made contact with an estimated 10 NVA. Results were: friendly two KIA; enemy four killed, three PWs and four SA's captured.

(b) Western Highlands Operations December: Allied units continued to apply pressure against the enemy to prevent infiltration into the highlands. Operations were directed against enemy base areas, infiltration routes and enemy units. In reaction to recent intelligence, Task Force Winner was activated to control 1st and 2d Bde 4th Inf Div elements operating in conjunction with 24th ARVN STZ units in the Dak Payou Valley and north of Hwy 19E. Results of this Operation COHAN GOLD are covered in the Western Highlands January summary. Maximum effort continued to be exerted in support of the accelerated Pacification Campaign. Over 132 cordon and search operations were conducted by the 4th Inf Div since the campaign began. Numerous caches were discovered during the period containing large quantities of weapons and ammunition and in excess of 106 tons of rice. Enemy units continued to avoid contact with Allied forces, resorting to standoff attacks and terrorist activities against the civilian populace. Over 665 rounds of mixed 60 and 82mm mortar, 75mm RR and 122mm rockets were directed against allied units and installations during the month.

1. US Operations: On 1 Dec 24 km east of Pleiku City (BR 007508) an APC from B Trp 2d Sqdn 1st Cav, while on a combined operation with National Police from Le Trung District, hit an unknown type mine on QL 19, wounding 16 personnel (eight US, five district intelligence personnel and three National Policemen) and causing heavy damage to the APC. On 4 Dec 31 km

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north of Kontum (AS 794202), a FAC observed enemy activity within a bunker complex and directed air strikes on the complex. Results were: enemy est ten KBA, 11 secondary explosions, nine bunkers, ten huts and one gun position destroyed. On 10 Dec 25 km east of Dak To (AS 791197), elements of B Co 1st Bn 8th Inf found a cache containing $4\frac{1}{2}$ tons of rice. On 10 Dec 18 km SE of Kontum (AR 925725), elements of D Trp 1st Sqdn 10th Cav and A Co 1st Bn 22d Inf made several contacts with unknown size enemy forces. Results were: friendly one WIA; enemy ten killed and one SA captured. On 23 Dec eight km NE of LZ Oasis (ZA 154369), a 4th Inf Div base camp patrol discovered a foxhole complex containing 21,400 rounds of small arms ammunition (SAA), 77 rounds 60mm mortar and five claymore mines. On 27 Dec 16 km SW of LZ Schuller (BR 250318), A Trp 7th Air Sqdn 17th Cav received SA fire from an unknown number of enemy. Fire was returned and a ground sweep made of the area. Results were: enemy three killed, two PW's and 28 detainees.

2. ARVN Operations: On 6 Dec 25 km east of Dak To (AS 794204), elements of the 2d Bn 42d ARVN Inf Regt found an enemy base camp with 18 houses. Within the area they discovered: six 60mm mortar rounds, nine B-40 rocket rounds, 200 kilos of rice, one partially destroyed 60mm mortar, one pistol, ten kilos of explosives, 700-800 rounds SAA, several documents and miscellaneous items of equipment and clothing. On 7 Dec 25 km east of Dak To (AS 799202), elements of the 2d Bn 42d ARVN Regt found three AK47's, 30 kg TNT, three gas masks, 1,300 rounds SAA, three enemy flags and other miscellaneous items of equipment. On 9 Dec 25 km east of Dak To (AS 805193) the 2d Bn 42d ARVN Regt located an enemy base camp containing 15 structures, 60 sandbags of rice, 100 pigs and training records. In the same vicinity they found a company size base camp with 40 four-man structures. On 10 Dec 25 km ESE of Dak To, elements of the 2d Bn 42d ARVN Regt while conducting sweep operations found a cache containing approximately three tons of rice.

3. CIDG Operations: On 4 Dec 20 km south of Duc Lap (YU 906554), Buon Blech CSF Co made two separate contacts with an estimated enemy company. Results were: enemy nine killed and one SA captured. On 11 Dec 13 km NE of Duc Co (YA 959239), a convoy transporting CSF elements with their families from Duc Co was attacked by an unknown size enemy force employing SA, hand grenades and B-40 rockets. Results were: friendly five KIA (two CSF and three civilians) and 15 CSF WIA; enemy losses are unknown. On 13 Dec eight km west of Dak Pek (YB 882678), CSF elements made contact with an estimated 40 enemy. Tac air supported. Results were: enemy estimated 20 KBA. On 14 Dec 10 km NE of Dak Pek (ZB 034772), CSF elements engaged an estimated 12 VC. Results were: enemy five killed and two PW's captured. On 17 Dec nine km west of Duc Lap (YU 816764), MSF companies 512 and 513 were attacked by an estimated reinforced enemy platoon employing SA, AW and B-40 rockets. Gun ships supported the contact. Results were: friendly nine WIA (eight MSF and one US); enemy ten killed. On 19 Dec 11 km WNW of Dak Seang (YE 789423), CSF elements observed 60-70 NVA. The FAC supporting the contact received heavy ground fire and air strikes were employed. Results were: enemy est 20 KBA and one secondary explosion.

4. RF/PF Operations: On 18 Dec seven km west of Camp Enari (ZA 215355), PF elements from Thanh An District were attacked by an estimated enemy company employing 82mm mortars and B-40 rocket fire. Spooky supported the contact. Results were: friendly two KIA and eight WIA. On 21 Dec 16 km SE of Dak To (ZB 148150), the 64th PF Plat and the 897th RF Co at Kon How Ong Hamlet were attacked by an estimated enemy company employing SA, 82mm mortar and B-40 rockets. Artillery and Spooky supported the contact. Results were: friendly seven KIA (two PF and five RF), five civilians wounded, six PF missing, five SA lost and ten houses damaged.

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5. Other Operations: On 7 Dec 38 km SSE of Pleiku City (AK 876096), three VC platoons entered the hamlet of Plei Potao and burned 95 dwellings. Before departing, the enemy abducted the hamlet chief, his father and one other individual. The enemy platoons then entered the Plei Teng Nang Hamlet approximately 1400 meters to the SSE and burned 30 dwellings and abducted the hamlet chief and the government information representative. On 19 Dec 18 km NNE of Ban Me Thuot (AQ 942196), Darlac Sector PRU engaged an estimated two enemy platoons. Results were: enemy two killed; friendly one WIA. A sweep of the area produced six enemy bodies believed to have been killed by gun ships on 18 Dec. On 23 Dec Ban Me Thuot City airfield was subjected to an enemy mortar attack. Eight of the 22 rounds of 82mm mortar impacted within Ban Ho Sier Hamlet located approximately 500 meters ESE of the airfield. Results were: friendly four civilians killed, 26 civilians wounded and six houses destroyed.

(c) Western Highlands Operations January: Ground combat in the highlands increased during the month. Allied forces intensified operation against enemy units, base areas and lines of communication. Cordon and search operations were conducted to identify and capture the VCI and to assist the GVN in regaining control of contested hamlets. The major activity of significance is Operation BINH TAY 50 which is continuing west of Plei Mrong. Details of this operation are found in paragraph 1. c.(2)(c) 2. ARVN Operations.

1. US Operations: The 4th Inf Div terminated Operation COHAN GOLD/TF WINNER on 3 Jan. This operation, targeted against the 2d Bn 95B NVA Regt, involved a sweep of the Dak Payau Valley area and a search and clear operation north of Hwy 19 west of An Khe. US forces included the 1st Bde Tac CP with 1st Bn 8th Inf and 3d Bn 12th Inf and the 2d Bde Tac CP with the 1st Bn 12th Inf. The 22d and 23d ARVN Ranger Bns and 3d Bn 47th ARVN Regt also participated. Results were: friendly seven WIA (six US, one ARVN); enemy 29 KIA, 400 lbs of medical supplies and 22 tons of rice captured. Several large base camps and training areas were overrun. A total of 734 huts, 354 bunkers, 237 fighting positions and 242 spider holes were destroyed. In addition, 138 caves were destroyed or contaminated. Elements of the 4th Inf Div are participating in Operation BINH TAY 50 west of Plei Mrong (YA 945680). A total of seven ARC Light strikes supported this operation. Elements of the division conducted 51 cordon and search operations resulting in the apprehension of 35 blacklist VCI, 36 Hoi Chanhs and 12 detainees. On 22 Jan 17 km west of Plei Mrong, a Medevac helicopter was shot down killing four crew members and three patients. The aircraft was clearly marked with Red Cross insignia.

2. ARVN Operations: In Pleiku Province Operation BINH TAY 48/49/50 continues west of Plei Mrong. This operation is targeted against elements of the 24th NVA Regt and 304th LF Bn. Major elements of the 24th NVA Regt are apparently trapped in a large base area. The operation began on 6 Jan with two battalions of the 42d ARVN Regt and one Ranger Bn. Two US battalions under the 3d Bde 4th Inf Div reinforced and a third was moved into a blocking position north of the AO. As the month ended the enemy lost 432 killed and 78 SA, 31 CSW, 30 tons of ammunition, 525 tons of foodstuffs and 2.6 tons of medical supplies.

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The operation is continuing. On 26 Jan, 24 km SE of Duc Lap (ZU 065605) 1st Bn 45th ARVN Regt discovered a battalion size base camp during operation TIEN BO 4-69. The camp contained 50 houses, 62 rounds of 81mm mortars, 14 rounds of 82mm mortar, 41 B-40 rocket rounds and 1320 lbs of rice. On 2 Jan 3d Bn 42d ARVN Regt discovered 20 enemy bodies 11 km SW of LZ Oasis.

3. CIDG Operations: On 12 Jan elements of the CIDG camp from Mang Buk (AS 986420) attacked an estimated two VC platoons south of the camp. In the ensuing action 20 enemy were KIA, seven were CIA as were seven SA. On 21 Jan the CIDG camp Duc Co (YA 856257) received 50 rounds of mixed 57mm RR and 82mm mortar fire resulting in four WIA and one building destroyed.

4. RF/PF Operations: On 9 Jan 15 km SE of Dak To, Dak Kon Peng (ZB 086135) hamlet received a ground attack from an unknown number of enemy. The 61st PF platoon defended resulting in three PF KIA, one WIA and three SA lost. One civilian was KIA and four were WIA. Enemy losses are unknown. On 8 Jan 27 km NW of Kontum, Dak Kang Lop hamlet received an attack from an estimated VC company resulting in two PF KIA and three PF WIA. One SA and one CSW were lost. Enemy losses are unknown.

5. Other Operations: Enemy terrorists entered four hamlets 25 km SE of Pleiku on 15 Jan and kidnapped three hamlet chiefs, two assistant chiefs and two other civilians. One other hamlet chief was wounded. On 27 Jan 12 km NE of Pleiku, Plei Pion hamlet (AR 883483) received 32mm mortar and B-40 rocket fire resulting in 11 civilians KIA and 30 civilians WIA. On 30 Jan 15 km SE of Pleiku, Plei Pham Klah Village (AR 892293) was 90 percent destroyed by fire. Friendly aircraft observed VC igniting the houses. Current action on UFOs was initiated in Nov 68 when the 4th Inf Div requested a Restricted Flying Area/Defense Identification Zone in order to aid in the identification of unidentified flying objects. In early Jan 69, a message was received from COMUSMACV directing that HAWK acquisition radars would be furnished by the 6th Bn 56th Arty, to aid in UFO detection and identification. On or about 25 Jan the following radars were received accompanied by operating personnel: (1) Pulse Acquisition Radar; (2) Continual Wave Acquisition Radar; and (3) Illumination Radar. These were placed in operation the night of 31 Jan with the radar CP located at LZ Oasis. The Air Force provided a liaison officer at the CP. Presently, the Air Force and the 4th Inf Div are gathering data for analysis; the Air Force will not grant engagement clearance while objects are in the air as positive identification as hostile has yet to be determined.

(d) Binh Dinh Province Operations November: There was an increase in activity throughout Binh Dinh Province during the month of November in comparison with the previous month. Free World Force efforts combined with ARVN efforts were devoted principally toward screening the civilian population, rice denial and pacification of villages and hamlets. Enemy activity was characterized by stand off attacks, minor ground attacks and harassing action directed against allied installations, units and LOC's. There were 23 separate booby trap incidents throughout the province during the month which killed or injured civilians and/or friendly military personnel.

1. US Operations: The 173d Abn Bde with two maneuver battalions (1st and 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf) continued Operation DAN SINH 22-6 which began on 22 August. This operation was conducted in close coordination with the 40th ARVN Regt and the NPFF. It was directed against the XC-11 Local Force Bn operating from within contested areas mainly in the Bong

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Son Plain. The 173d Abn Bde commenced operations in the plains area with small hunter killer teams on 5 Nov. These "Hawk Teams" (as they have been designated) range in composition from fire team to platoon size depending on the mission assigned. Each infantry battalion maintains a company equivalent of Hawk Teams operating in assigned AO's with the mission to ferret out and destroy VC infrastructure and disrupt enemy lines of communication. Throughout the month, the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Inf conducted a similar operation west of Bong Song with D Co 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf combined with two CIDG companies (Vinh Thanh and Ha Tay). This operation began on 11 Nov. Both of these operations were targeted against the 18th NVA Regt and thus far have caused the removal or destruction of large amounts of food and supply caches in the area. Two major attacks were launched against US installations during the month. The first was against Camp Radcliff on 12 Nov. Radcliff received 111 rounds of 82mm mortar and was attacked by an unknown number of sappers. The attack resulted in 16 US WIA, one US KIA, two 105mm howitzers heavily damaged and 10 aircraft damaged. On 17 Nov LZ English received 10 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar. Three rounds were direct hits on sleeping quarters, wounding 20 US and two ARVN soldiers.

2. ARVN Operations: The 40th and 41st ARVN Regts continued operations in the plains area throughout the month. The 40th ARVN Regt operated with the 173d Abn Bde as discussed above. The 41st ARVN Regt operations west of Phu My in the Suoi Ca Valley had frequent light contact with the enemy. Typical of these contacts was one which occurred eight km south of Phu My (BR 8759) on 10 Nov when elements of the 4th Bn 41st ARVN Regt ambushed an enemy squad killing five and capturing three small arms. Operations of the 41st ARVN Regt were characterized by methodical cordon and search of hamlets in an effort to eradicate the VCI.

3. ROK Operations: The Capital ROK Inf Div (CRID) continued operations in the plains area west of Qui Nhon and in the Phu Cat Mountains north of Qui Nhon. The 3rd Bn 1st ROK Regt joined Task Force 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Inf and one battalion of the 41st ARVN Regt in an operation in the Suoi Ca Valley on 17 Nov directed against the 18th NVA Regt and the 300th Sapper Co. This operation continued into December. The most significant ROK contact occurred on 16 Nov when the 8th Company Cav ROK Regt discovered and attacked a VC base camp located 20 km SW of Phu Cat (BR 8230). The results were 21 enemy killed and nine small arms captured.

4. CIDG Operations: CSF units continued operations oriented toward gaining control over contested population centers within their camp TAQR's. On 23 Nov a CSF Company from Ha Tay received small arms fire from a village 20 km WNW of Ha Tay (BR 6193). The CSF unit returned fire and advanced on the village. Results were: enemy 12 killed; friendly one WIA.

5. RF/PF Operations: Throughout the province during the month the enemy initiated numerous attacks against RF/PF forces. Commencing on 17 Nov in the vicinity of Phu My, seven villages and hamlets were attacked simultaneously. In one encounter a bridge near the village of Trung Thanh (BR 914671) defended by two PF platoons and an RD team was attacked by two VC companies. Results were friendly five KIA, eight WIA; enemy 24 KIA.

(e) Binh Dinh Province Operations December: Binh Dinh Province continued as the most active II CTZ Province during the month of December. Free World Force efforts combined with ARVN and National Police

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continued to be directed toward screening civilian population, rice denial and pacification of villages and hamlets. Enemy activity was characterized by standeff attacks, minor ground attacks and harassing actions directed against these allied efforts. There were 19 separate incidents throughout the province during the month when booby trap detonations killed or injured civilians and/or allied military personnel. There were three major incidents of vehicles destroyed or damaged by mines emplaced on QL 1 and QL 19. There were two major ambushes of allied convoys on these two main routes.

1. US Operations: The 173d Abn Bde with two maneuver battalions (1st and 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf) continued operations in the Suoi Ca Valley area and the mountains east of Vinh Thanh. Operations continued in the plains area with HAWK Teams. The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf continued a security mission of QL 19. On 11 Dec ENE of Vinh Thanh, the command and control helicopter of the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Inf was brought down by ground fire. Nine US personnel on board were severely injured including the Bn CO. On 18 Dec Camp Radcliff received 15 mortar rounds which wounded 11 US personnel and damaged two vehicles. Simultaneously LZ Schuller received approximately 15 rounds. On 22 Dec at 2245 hours the R&R center of the 1st Cav Div at Camp Radcliff received a ground attack by an unknown number of sappers. There were 20 US personnel wounded in the attack. A 27th Trans Bn convoy was ambushed in the An Khe Pass (vic BR 617468) on 19 Dec. There were two US personnel killed and three wounded. Eight trucks received heavy damage.

2. ARVN Operations: The 40th and 41st ARVN Regt's continued operations in the plains area throughout the month. The 41st ARVN Regt operated in the vicinity of Phu My with frequent light contacts. The 40th ARVN Regt continued cordon and search operations north of Bong Son. Operation DAN SINH 22-6 terminated on 12 December. Final results were: friendly 38 KIA, 106 WIA, three MIA; enemy 125 KIA, 295 PW and 28 SA captured.

3. ROK Operations: The Capital ROK Inf Div continued operations in the plains area west of Qui Nhon and in the Phu Cat mountains north of Qui Nhon. In operation JAE KU 17 on 1 Dec, the 3d Bn 1st ROK Regt in five contacts in the vicinity of BR 9258 killed 19 and captured 12 enemy and eight small arms with a loss of only five friendly WIA. Enemy personnel were members of a VC command group enroute to a conference in the Phu My Valley. Among those killed were the E2B Main Force Bn commander and two company commanders of the 300th Sapper Bn. Captured were two company commanders of the E2B Bn. In nine contacts on 2 Dec NW of Qui Nhon (vic CR 0431) the 2nd Bn 1st ROK Regt killed 90 enemy and captured 46 small arms. Friendly losses were two killed and three wounded. In ten contacts on 9 Dec elements of the 1st ROK Regt in Operation HEE HO 18 killed 27 enemy and captured three PW's without friendly loss. The next day the same elements killed nine more enemy and captured seven PW's. These latter contacts occurred NNE of Qui Nhon (vic CR 1044). This very successful operation terminated on 16 Dec. Total results were 79 enemy killed, 25 PW, 48 SA and 18 CSW captured. Friendly losses were four KIA and five WIA.

4. CIDG Operations: CSF units continued operations in their camp TAQR's. On 8 Dec the Ha Tay CSF engaged an unknown number of enemy four km NE of Ha Tay. There were nine enemy killed and six SA captured. Friendly losses were three WIA.

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5. RF/PF Operations: On 15 Dec. three km south of Vinh Thanh, the 119th PF Plat repelled an attack by an estimated VC plat employing SA and AW fire. Results were eight PF KIA and two WIA. On 19 Dec 13 km NE of Phu My, the 291st RF Co repelled an attack by an unknown size enemy force which employed SA, AW and M-79 fire. The enemy suffered four KIA and one SA captured. There was one RF killed. On the same day, ten km NE of Bong Son, the 225th PF Plat repelled an attack by an estimated enemy squad resulting in four PF KIA and one PF WIA. On 22 Dec 12 km NW of Qui Nhon, the 476th RF Co captured six enemy, one AW, and four SA in a cave. On 28 Dec 10 km SW of Phu My, the 156th RF Co ambushed an enemy platoon resulting in eight enemy KIA and two SA captured. One RF was wounded. On the same day, 10 km NE of LZ English, the 217th and 449th RF Companies engaged an unknown number of VC, killed two and detained 12 VC suspects.

f. Binh Dinh Operations January: Activity increased in Binh Dinh Province during the month. Allied forces found with increasing frequency enemy base areas and his supply caches. ROK forces terminated Operation BUN KAE 68-5 on 16 Jan with outstanding results.

(1) US Operations: On 5 Jan 23 km north of An Khe, elements of the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf discovered a large hospital complex containing an operating room, a ward, mess hall and sleeping barracks. Over 30 pounds of medical supplies, 20 pounds of documents and miscellaneous equipment were also captured in the area. On 10 Jan 40 km east of Kontum, gunships from 2d Bn 1st Armd Cav engaged 15 VC in two contacts and killed eight. On 17 Jan 26 km SW of An Khe, elements of 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf discovered an enemy base camp containing 16 huts, nine bunkers, four 82mm mortar rounds and four 60mm mortar rounds. On 16 Jan 45 km NW of An Khe (BR 350280), elements of the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf discovered a cache containing 300 pounds of medical supplies during Operation SKYFIRE. On 15 Jan a strong point (BR 335458) manned by Co A 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf was attacked by an estimated VC company. The enemy had eight KIA, one WIA and four SA captured. Friendly forces had three KIA and 11 WIA. On 26 Jan a Hawk Team from 173d Abn Bde discovered a large ammunition cache on the I and II CTZ border (BS 783238). The cache contained 51,600 rounds of SAA, 31 rounds of 81mm mortar, 48 B-40 rockets, 50 rounds of 60mm mortar, 23 rounds of 57mm RR, one 82mm mortar and one 57mm RR.

(2) ARVN Operations: On 9 Jan 17 km north of Bong Son (BS 872123), elements of 4th Bn 40th ARVN Regt conducted a search and clear operation which netted six VC suspects. On 26 Jan elements of 3d Bn 40th ARVN Regt discovered 3.3 tons of salt on the I and II CTZ border (BS 828224).

(3) ROK Operations: Elements of the CRID terminated Operation BUN KAE 68-5 on 16 Jan. The operation was conducted SW of Phu My (BR 805575) against elements of the E 210 LF Bn. ROK forces killed 170 enemy as opposed to five friendly KIA and 14 WIA. Weapons and ammunition captured included 247 SA, 25 CSW, 80,747 rounds of SAA, 387 rounds 60mm mortar, 353 rounds 82mm mortar, 90 rounds 81mm mortar, 213 rounds 57mm RR, 57 rounds 75mm RR and 102 B-40 rocket rounds.

(4) CIDG Operations: On 5 Jan 23 km south of An Khe (BR 415205), MSF 233 discovered a large enemy stockade complex. The area contained huts and leg irons for 50 individuals. On 3 Jan 22 km south of An Khe, MSF 233 captured an enemy base camp containing numerous huts and bunkers and over 30 tons of rice.

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(5) RF/PF Operations: On 7 Jan 10 km NW of Qui Nhon (CR 130505), elements of the 939th, 114th and 675th RF Companies detained 18 suspects while on a search and clear operation. On 31 Jan two km north of Qui Nhon (CR 087264), elements of seven RF companies with NPPF made contact with an unknown number of enemy. During a sweep, friendly forces found seven enemy KIA and captured two SA. The area had been fired on by artillery and tac air on 30 and 31 Jan. On 17 Jan the 136th PF Platoon discovered a rice cache 10 km NW of Qui Nhon (CR 004376). On 22 Jan three km NE of Bong Son (BR 893967), the 104th RF Company and 226th PF Platoon attacked an estimated enemy company. The enemy had five KIA and lost one SA while friendly forces had three KIA and four WIA.

(6) Other Operations: On 23 Jan nine km south of Phu My (BR 887 572), an unknown number of enemy threw several hand grenades into Tan Xuan market resulting in four civilians KIA and 18 civilians WIA.

(g) Central Provinces Operations November: In Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces the friendly initiated activity was generally characterized by small unit contacts resulting from ambush and cordon and search operations. There were no significant contacts in Phu Bon Province. Although there were no significant actions initiated by the enemy, friendly casualties were inflicted by limited ground attacks, sniper fire, mining incidents, boobytraps and four standeff mortar/75mm RR attacks. On several occasions the enemy attacked using hand grenades unsupported by small arms fire. On six occasions the enemy effort was directed against civilians rather than the military. There were no significant contacts involving US, ARVN, CIDG and RF/PF forces in the Central Provinces during the month.

1. ROK Operations: Three significant operations were conducted by ROK forces during the month of November. From 7 to 10 Nov the 1st Bn 26th ROK Regt conducted Operation WHA RANG 6, 20 km SW of Song Cau. Results were: enemy 29 KIA and nine SA captured. HAE SAN JIN 5 (13 - 30 Nov) was conducted 19 km NW of Tuy Hoa by 11 companies of the 26th ROK Regt. The most noteworthy engagement of this operation occurred on 28 Nov when the enemy sustained 16 KIA, one PW, three SA captured and one CSW captured while friendly forces had no casualties. Total results of the operation are: friendly three KIA; enemy 44 KIA, three PW's, 16 SA and two CSW's captured. During Operation BAN JEE 20 (21-30 Nov) 23 km NNW of Ninh Hoa, ten companies of the 29th ROK Regt killed 24 enemy and captured one PW and seven SA. Friendly casualties were two KIA and two WIA.

(h) Central Provinces Operations December: In Phu Bon, Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces there were numerous small-unit contacts resulting primarily from cordon and search operations and ambushes. In addition to two attacks against RF elements on 17 Dec, the enemy was able to inflict friendly casualties by booby-traps, mining incidents, sniper fire and limited ground attacks. There were no significant contacts against US or ARVN forces in the Central Provinces.

1. ROK Operations: Two significant operations were conducted by ROK forces. From 9 to 24 Dec the 1st Bn 28th ROK Regt conducted a five-company operation, EUN MA 6, approximately 24 km SE of Tuy Hoa (vic CQ 2725). Results were: enemy 14 KIA, six SA and four CSW's captured. SEUNG MA 15 was a seven-day operation conducted by the 2d Bn 30th ROK Regt commencing on 17 Dec, 28 km WNW of Cam Ranh Bay (vic BP 7928). The most significant day of the operation was 19 Dec when friendly forces

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in three separate contacts sustained no casualties while enemy losses were 26 KIA and three SA captured. The total results of the operation were: friendly three KIA and one WIA; enemy 28 KIA, one PW, four SA and four CSW captured.

2. CIDG Operations: On 26 Dec a CSF company from A-502 ambushed an estimated 15 VC seven km west of Nha Trang (BP 978542). Results were: friendly one WIA; enemy 13 KIA and 14 SA captured.

3. RF/PF Operations: Generally RF/PF activities were characterized by light contacts made while conducting ambush and reconnaissance operations throughout the three provinces. On 17 Dec the 151st RF Company was attacked by an unknown size enemy force employing small arms and B-40 rockets four and a half km NW of Tuy Hoa (CQ 128491). This attack lasted for 15 minutes and resulted in two RF KIA and ten RF WIA. Enemy casualties are unknown. Seven and a half km west of Tuy Hoa (CQ 084465) on 17 Dec, the 133d RF Company received a five-minute attack by an estimated reinforced enemy platoon using small arms, automatic weapons fire, B-40 rockets and 57mm RR fire. Results were: friendly four RF KIA and 13 WIA; enemy unknown.

(i) Central Provinces Operations January: ROK forces completed BAK JEE 2-5. One significant operation HAE SAN JIN 6, is continuing. RF and PF elements discovered a VC district headquarters in Phu Yen Province. Elements of Co D 16th Armored teamed up with RF elements and virtually destroyed an enemy company.

1. US Operation: The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf is participating in operation HAE SAN JIN 6 with ROK forces south of Dong Tre. For details of the operation see paragraph 2 below. On 31 Jan three km NW of Tuy Hoa (CQ 125488), elements of the 133d RF company were attacked by an estimated VC company. Three additional RF companies moved into blocking positions and Co D 16th Armored reinforced. Results were: friendly one KIA, seven WIA; enemy 20 KIA, seven SA, two CSW and a few B-40 rockets captured. The application of US fire power accounted for the majority of the enemy casualties.

2. ROK Operations: On 2 Jan the CRID initiated Operation HAE SAN JIN 6 against elements of the 95th NVA Regiment, 87th LF Battalion and local VC. Phase I and II were conducted west of Dong Tre (BQ 745695) and Phase II continues south of Dong Tre (BQ 965535). Results to date are: friendly two KIA, four WIA; enemy 59 KIA, 13 PW and 22 SA captured. The 2d Bn 29th ROK Inf terminated an eight day operation BAK JEE 2-5 conducted 23 km north of Ninh Hoa (BF 965034). Results of the operation are: friendly three KIA, two WIA; enemy 66 KIA, 42 SA and three CSW captured. On 12 Jan SW of Tuy Hoa elements of the 9th ROK Inf Div killed eight enemy and captured an 82mm mortar.

3. RF/PF Operations: On 1 Jan 13 km SE of Dong Tre, RF Companies 130, 202, 728 and the 71st PF platoon discovered a VC district headquarters. The area consisted of two mess halls with an 80 man capacity, six buildings and a dispensary. Five tons of rice, medical supplies and 20 pounds of documents were captured.

(j) Southern Provinces Operations November: The close of the month brought a noticeable increase in activity in the southern provinces of Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong and Tuyen Duc while the overall level of activity continued at a low level. Platoon size attacks of short duration against RF and PF elements constituted the majority of enemy initiated contacts. Terrorist attacks directed against civilians increased in both number and intensity during the month of November, combining

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assassinations of local officials with mortar and rocket attacks of entire villages. VC tax collection points reported by Vietnamese nationals were quickly eliminated by US and RVN forces. Enemy use of booby traps and mines continued as a threat on both roads and in the field to military and civilians alike. There were no significant activities involving CIDG, RF and PF elements.

1. US Operations: Activity against enemy forces was continuous and vigorous throughout the month. He was driven from his base camp and those camps found were destroyed. On 9 Nov 25 km west of Bao Loc (TF 788742) C Co 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf found a base camp area with a tunnel complex. Two tons of rice were found at this location and were destroyed. On 5 Nov the battleship New Jersey fired a total of 46 sixteen inch rounds and 308 five inch rounds on suspected enemy locations and known tunnel complexes. BDA on 26 Nov showed no significant results.

2. ARVN Operations: At Song Mao (BN 282450) 26 Nov the base camp of the 44th ARVN Regiment received a mortar and ground attack. The ammunition dumps of the 44th ARVN Regiment were the focal point of the attack. Casualties and damage: 14 KIA (eight ARVN, two RF, two PF, two civ) 38 WIA (28 ARVN, one US, nine civ) and one 155mm howitzer slightly damaged. Ammunition destroyed included 57,000 rds of 7.62 cal, 1,500 rds of 105mm, 30,000 rds of 30 cal from the 44th ARVN Regt and 700 rds of 155mm from the 39th ARVN Artillery ammo dump.

3. ROK Operations: On 24 Nov 15 km NNE of Phan Rang (EN 924948) 1st Co 1st Bn 30th ROK Regt, participating in operation KUN MA 9 made contact with an unknown number of VC in a cave. Results were: 27 enemy KIA, 7 SA captured.

(k) Southern Provinces Operations December: Ground activity in the four southern provinces continued at a low level of intensity for the month of December. Enemy initiated incidents were oriented toward RF and PF units using minor attacks and harassment tactics. These enemy attacks were usually of short duration and seldom threatened to overrun the friendly unit's position. Enemy units utilized in these attacks were usually limited to platoon size. There were three cases of bridges damaged by explosives, two of which were railroad bridges. Mines again took their toll of both military and civilian lives. Enemy terrorist activity caused the deaths of three hamlet officials in the past month.

1. US, CIDG, RF/PF and ROK operations resulted in no significant contacts in the southern provinces.

2. ARVN Operations: Twenty km north of Phan Thiet (AN 848302) on 15 Dec the 2d Bn 44th ARVN Regt found 2700 kilos of rice. Twenty-five km SE of Bao Loc (ZT 184557) on 19 Dec the 1st Bn 53d ARVN Regt found 4000 kilos of rice. Twenty km north of Phan Thiet (AN 830270 & 281320) two soldiers from the 44th ARVN Recon Co found a rice cache of 1800 kilos of rice. Eighteen km NE of Phan Thiet (AN 863312) on 28 Dec the 2d Bn 44th ARVN Regt found 14,000 kilos of rice. Twenty-two km north of Phan Thiet (AN 842318) on 30 Dec the 2d Bn 44th ARVN Regt found two rice caches totaling 1200 kilos. Twenty km north of Phan Thiet (AN 848302) on 15 Dec the 2d Bn 44th ARVN Regt found 2700 kilos of rice.

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(1) Southern Province Operations January. Task Force South, paired off with the 53d and 44th ARVN Regiments, continued spoiling attacks in the southern provinces. The 53d ARVN Regiment gained its third operational battalion. This added battalion will add immeasurably to the balanced combat power required for security in the vicinity of Bao Loc, Di Linh, Duc Trong and Dalat. Action in the southern provinces showed a distinct increase in activity over previous months.

(1) US Operations: On 3 Jan 40 km NE of Phan Thiet (AN 994463) elements of the 3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf discovered a cache containing 65 rounds of 60mm mortar, 15 rounds of 82mm mortar, 22 boxes of AK 47 ammunition, one SA, three bangalore torpedoes and 125 pounds of TNT. On 12 Jan 5 km west of Phan Thiet elements of the 4th Bn 44th ARVN Regt and a composite US tank platoon repelled an attack on LZ Sherry (AN 825114) killing 18 enemy and capturing one PW, six SA, five B-40 rocket launchers, 18 B-40 rocket rounds and 37 satchel charges. On 20 Jan one km north of Bao Loc (ZT 058785) the CP of 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf and A Btry 5th Bn 27th Arty received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar, B-40 rocket and SA fire. The attack resulted in two KIA (US) and 25 WIA (21 US and four ARVN). Two jeeps were destroyed and a mess hall and motor pool were damaged. On 16 Jan 16 km NE of Phan Thiet (AN 948247) elements of the 3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf discovered a food cache containing over two tons of rice during operation DOUPE EAGLE IV. On 25 Jan TF South terminated operation DOUPE EAGLE IV resulting in 50 enemy KIA and a large quantity of ammunition captured. Friendly forces in the operation suffered only one KIA and eight WIA. On 25 Jan, Phan Rang Air Base (EN 775865) received an unknown number of mortar and rocket fire and a ground probe resulting in 14 US WIA, two F100's destroyed, 11 F100's damaged and three buildings damaged. The enemy had 14 KIA and three PW's, two SA and three CSW captured. On 29 Jan 26 km NW of Bao Loc (YA 851917) 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf discovered a large enemy base area and training facility. The camp contained two large bleacher sites, training aids on claymores, Chicom weapons, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. The area also had living quarters and an extensive bunker complex.

2. ROK Operations: On 9 Jan 27 km NW of Phan Rang (BP 935053) elements of the 30th Regiment, 9th ROK Infantry Division killed 13 enemy and captured four small arms, 35 hand grenades and 1560 kgs of corn.

3. RF/PF Operations: On 8 Jan 23 km NE of Phan Thiet (AN 966326) 784th RF Company made contact with a VC company operating a tax collection point. The 700th RF Company reinforced and became engaged. The RF units had four KIA and 15 WIA. The 1st Bn 44th ARVN Regt swept area the following day and discovered eleven enemy bodies. On 19 Jan five km NE of Di Linh (AN 856851), the 166th RF Company was partially overrun by an estimated VC Company. Friendly forces had 12 KIA (ten RF and two civilians) and six RF WIA. Enemy losses were unknown. On 16 Jan 22 km SE of Dalat (BP 274010) the 25th and 28th PF platoons, one platoon of the 304th RF Company and one platoon of C Btry 23d ARVN Artillery were attacked by an estimated VC company reinforced. The friendly position was partially overrun resulting in 11 KIA and 24 WIA. Two radios were destroyed and one 105mm How and one 3/4 ton truck were damaged. The enemy force withdrew leaving three dead, one SA and one satchel charge. On 17 Jan eight km NW of Phan Thiet (AN 766145) the 953d RF Company was attacked by an enemy company resulting in ten KIA and 30 WIA. On 24 Jan three km NE of Phan Thiet (AN 883122), the 75th and 110th PF platoons repelled an attack by an estimated VC company. The enemy had 10 KIA, one CIA and lost three B-40 rockets, six bangalore torpedoes and two SA. The friendly force had three WIA.

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4. Other Operations: On 22 Jan eight km NE of Phan Thiet (AN 855162), RD Team 13 engaged an estimated VC company which had previously abducted eleven civilians. The RD element routed the enemy, killing three, rescued the civilians and captured three SA. The RD Team had no casualties. On 29 Jan the city of Dalat was shelled by 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar. Seven civilians were WIA.

(m) Results for II CTZ for the period 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

1. Friendly:

	<u>US</u>	<u>ROK</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	118	51	146	321	47	54	737
WIA	723	149	644	731	256	165	2668

2. See page 2 for enemy casualty figures.

(n) Results of US operations for the period 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

FRIENDLY

	<u>WALKER</u>	<u>DAN SINH COCHISE</u>	<u>DAN THANG MCLAIN</u>	<u>DAN HOA BOLLING</u>	<u>BINH TAY MACARTHUR</u>
KIA	11	21	15	11	60
WIA	116	140	84	30	353
MIA	0	0	0	0	0

ENEMY

KIA	75	207	183	31	215
FW	3	17	13	2	45
SA	40	50	98	12	115
CSW	12	15	9	2	2

(o) Cumulative results for US operations:

FRIENDLY

	<u>WALKER</u>	<u>DAN SINH COCHISE</u>	<u>DAN THANG MCLAIN</u>	<u>DAN HOA BOLLING</u>	<u>BINH TAY MACARTHUR</u>
KIA	42	144	69	72	955
WIA	313	870	576	307	4437
MIA	0	0	0	0	5

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ENEMY

	<u>WALKER</u>	<u>DAN SINH COCHISE</u>	<u>DAN THANG MCLAIN</u>	<u>DAN HOA BOLLING</u>	<u>BINH TAY MACARTHUR</u>
KIA	272	943	1042	715	5731
FW	13	75	37	90	301
SA	72	233	334	237	1383
CSW	31	31	40	21	179

(3) Organization and Training Activities:

(a) All units that were assigned or under the operation control of this headquarters as of 31 January 1969 are listed at Incl 3.

(b) The command relationship of major US, ARVN and FWMF units within II CTZ is at Incl 4.

(c) The following unit was assigned to I FFORCEV during the period: 62d Sig Det (Avionics) assigned to I FFORCEV by USARV GO No. 5705, 13 Dec 68.

(d) The following units were reassigned from I FFORCEV during the period: None

(e) Manpower Authorizations:

1. Btry E (MG), 41st Arty (AD) was reorganized under MTOE 44-58G PAC 1/68 by USARPAC GO 554, 7 Oct 68.

2. HHB, 52d Arty Gp was reorganized under MTOE 6-401E by USARPAC GO 384, 1 Aug 68.

3. 54th Inf Det (Radar) was reorganized under MTOE 07-016G, P00168 by USARPAC GO 739, 15 Nov 68.

4. 4th Bn (AW) (SP) 60th Arty was reorganized under MTOE 44-85, 86, and 87G PAC 1/68 by USARPAC GO 554, 7 Oct 68.

5. 272d MP Co (CORPS) was reorganized under MTOE 19-37F, PAC 1/68 by USARPAC GO 303, 17 Jun 68.

(f) Research and Development (R&D) Activities: Requests for information on R&D items from USAKV and ACTIV were monitored by this headquarters. There were no requests for ENSURE (Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment) items received from assigned, attached or OPCON units. No ENSURE requests were submitted to USARV from HQ, I FFORCEV.

(g) Training: Assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, are inspected semi-annually. Three units were inspected during the past quarter and all were rated satisfactory.

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(h) Doctrine: The "Tactical Notes" publication initiated in May 1968 has continued. The overall objective of I FFORCEV Tactical Notes is to provide a recurring publication in which new ideas and lessons learned regarding operational and intelligence matters are exchanged. These tactical notes are attached as inclosures to this ORLL.

1. Tactical Notes for November 1968, Incl 5.
2. Tactical Notes for December 1968, Incl 6.
3. Tactical Notes for January 1969, Incl 7.

(i) ARVN Improvement Programs: During the past quarter, I FFORCEV has emphasized various programs to help make ARVN more effective. It has become apparent that these programs have been instrumental in bringing about an improvement in ARVN within II CTZ. These I FFORCEV programs include the following.

1. Combined Police Patrols. This is a program consisting of combined police patrols of ARVN, ROK, National Police and US Military Policemen or combinations thereof, depending upon the local area requirements. In effecting apprehension, primary responsibility is vested in the combined military police patrol member who is the same nationality as the offender. In addition to improving the effectiveness of military police and police service, an on-the-job training program is established whereby all patrol members benefit from the experience of their counterpart.

2. II Corps Interrogation Center. This program was developed in an effort to reduce the time lag between capture of a prisoner and the receipt of exploitable information from him by the tactical unit commander. It was decided to decentralize the interrogation effort and to develop a II Corps Interrogation Center (CIC). Construction of the CIC began in October 1968 and is scheduled to be completed in February 1969. G2, II Corps is currently preparing a comprehensive set of operating procedures for the center with the assistance of his US advisor. With the CIC operating under the command of the ARVN forces, the Vietnamese are expected to improve their interrogation techniques, reporting systems and dissemination procedures.

3. Development of ARVN Long Range Patrol Capability. This program was initiated to expand the number of ARVN LEP teams to the authorized strength within II Corps. Prior to implementation of this program, only enough LRPs were trained to meet normal attrition with few men available for authorized LRP teams. Mobile Training Teams from I FFORCEV long range patrol assets assigned to Company B (LRP) 20th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade provided instructional assistance to selected personnel from the ARVN 22d Division, 23d Division and 24th Special Tactical Zone. These teams operated as training advisor/instructor on the staff of the senior advisors of the units selected for training assistance. The 60-day training program consisted of two weeks of intensified long range patrol tactics and techniques followed by 45 days of operations with integrated US/ARVN patrols. The US Mobile Training Teams have completed the formal instruction of three training cycles, graduating 421 students. This program is in the process of being transferred over to ARVN. Results to date have been most gratifying.

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4. Pair Off Concept. To increase the effectiveness of ARVN and insure maximum utilization of II CTZ assets, the "Pair Off" concept was formalized in the II CTZ 1969 Combined Campaign Plan published 5 December 1968. This concept calls for the pairing off of units from the 173d Abn Bde to units of the 22d Div; TF South with the 23d Div Light CP; and the 4th Inf Div with the 23d Div and 24th STZ. The most gratifying results of this concept have been increased combined operations and the steady improvement of ARVN forces. Probably the most important result of the "Pair Off" concept has been increased ARVN participation in combat operations. The increased artillery and aviation support provided by pairing ARVN and US units appears to have inspired ARVN to perform an ever increasing number of operations. The continuation of combined operations under the "Pair Off" concept should allow for the continued improvement of ARVN.

5. Senior Commanders' Conferences. The monthly Senior Commanders' Conference was initiated in March 1968 and has become a regularly scheduled event. The commanders meet for the purpose of fostering better understanding of problems and insuring the closest cooperation among the three national forces within II CTZ. These conferences provide the CG, II Corps, DCG, ROKFV-PC, CG, I FFORCEV and selected senior staff officers an opportunity to meet at the conference table to discuss future combined operations, plans, concepts, problem areas and topics of mutual concern. Topics included on the agenda are subjects which require command emphasis and discussion at the highest level within II CTZ. Proposed topics are developed separately by the staffs within each of the three headquarters. Following selection and approval by their respective commanders, representatives from each headquarters meet to exchange topics and draft an agenda. The harmony and coordination emanating from these conferences have provided a unity of effort at every echelon in II CTZ. The "Pair Off" concept came about as a result of these conferences and has aided immeasurably the effectiveness of ARVN.

6. Combat Assistance Teams (CAT) Concept. A test was set up to determine the feasibility of replacing the division and regiment US advisory teams with smaller CATs in order to:

a. Reduce the advisory effort for ARVN to correspond to increased ARVN capabilities to permit US advisory resources to be redispersed.

b. Determine whether ARVN units are capable of making independent use of US combat support.

c. Increase ARVN leadership and initiative particularly at battalion level.

d. Determine whether the CAT can provide adequate assistance in coordinating between ARVN, US and FMAF. The evaluation of the CAT concept within the 22d ARVN Infantry Division resulted in the CAT concept being well received by both ARVN and US advisory personnel. The division concerned maintained a high level of operations and there was no decrease in the use of US combat support. Leadership in the division did not deteriorate and aggressiveness did not decline. The conclusions of the evaluation of the CAT concept in the 22d Division were:

(1) That ARVN initiative and self-reliance has increased.

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(2) That ARVN units can make independent use of US combat support.

(3) That the CAT concept is basically sound.

In the future, other ARVN units will be converted to this successful concept. This reduction of the advisory effort for ARVN units within II CTZ will allow US advisory resources to be re-allocated.

7. ARVN Self-Help Dependent Housing. The morale of ARVN is greatly affected by the lack of adequate dependent housing. Frequently, ARVN troops must travel excessive distances in order to visit or provide for their families. In order to supplement the GVN program in II CTZ, CG, I FFORCEV directed that OPCON US units assist their counterpart ARVN units with material and technical assistance for a self-help program utilizing the "Pair Off" concept. Since funds are not available, the program calls for maximum use of scrap and salvage materials. In addition, the CG directed that an ARVN Dependent Housing Council be established. Its purpose is to inform the CG of current plans, activities and progress, and is to provide a forum for discussion of ideas, problems and solutions pertaining to ARVN dependent housing. This self-help program was initiated in Dec 68. All OPCON units are making progress in the planning stages and in the case of the 173d Abn Bde, construction has already begun. Initial results of the self-help program have been most encouraging. The program should be in full operation by the end of the first quarter CY 69. Its accomplishments will only be limited by imagination, ingenuity and enthusiasm exhibited by participating ARVN and US units.

8. Associate ARVN/US Engineer Program. Basically, the program is being developed along the lines of a "Pair Off" concept in which ARVN and US engineer units located in the near vicinity of each other exchange visits for the purpose of coordinating construction activities, exchanging information, fostering mutual respect and rendering assistance in project accomplishment and training activities. Although this program is in its early stages at this time, there have been significant accomplishments wherein cooperation has resulted in exchange of personnel and equipment, thus obtaining greater efficiency and productivity from available assets. As the program gains momentum, it is expected to be an effective factor to improve the effectiveness of ARVN engineer units. Eventually, it is expected that units within the same AO will coordinate equipment, material and personnel in order to best utilize the total engineer assets to accomplish the tremendous engineer requirements throughout II CTZ.

(4) Chemical.

(a) Herbicide operations during this reporting period have included both crop and defoliation missions. Unfavorable weather conditions throughout the II CTZ have resulted in the cancellation of 437 of 823 sorties scheduled.

1. The results of US Air Force, UC-123 herbicide missions are as follows:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>NO. OF SORTIES FLOWN</u>	<u>HECTARES DEPOLLIATED</u>	<u>M/T CROPS DESTROYED</u>
Binh Dinh	31	2,615	840
Binh Thuan	11	0	1,314

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<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>NO. OF SORTIES FLOWN</u>	<u>HECTARES DEFOLIATED</u>	<u>M/T CROPS DESTROYED</u>
Darlac	16	2,205	0
Khanh Hoa	5	360	24C
Kontum	168	18,862	720
Lam Dong	15	0	1,794
Ninh Thuan	3	0	360
Phu Bon	7	0	840
Phu Yen	21	0	2,145
Pleiku	11	960	360
Quang Duc	98	11,156	360
Tuyen Duc	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	386	36,158	8,973

2. Units in II CTZ are continuing to use UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters and truck based power spray apparatuses to spray small areas not conducive to spray by UC-123 aircraft. The results of helicopter spray operations are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HECTARES DEFOLIATED</u>	<u>M/T CROPS DESTROYED</u>
HQ, I FFORCEV	0	0
ROKFV-PC	265	734
4th Inf Div	382	12
DSA, II Corps	768	0
173d Abn Bde (SEP)	513	0
3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	1,928	746

(b) Riot Control Agents (RCA) are being employed in both offensive and defensive operations. On 2 Nov 68 the 4th Inf Div dropped two E158 CS Canisters from a UH-1 on a suspected enemy location vicinity ZAO209. The drop was followed by gunships and resulted in nine VC/NVA KIA. On 7 Jan 69, C Co 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Inf, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) employed smoke and CS grenades inside a cave vicinity CRO06738 to extract a man who had entered the cave complex in pursuit of the enemy and was trapped by enemy fire. On 9 Nov 68 the 3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf, TF South, used 2,400 lbs of CS-1 to contaminate enemy bunkers vicinity BN 082290.

(c) Personnel detectors (APD and MPD) operating within the II CTZ are providing a continual source of reliable information concerning enemy locations. In most instances, CS, gunships, TAC air or artillery fire was employed against the locations of the heavy readings. All readings were submitted to the appropriate G2/S2 for evaluation.

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1. The summary of personnel detector operations in II CTZ is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MPD MISSIONS</u>	<u>APD MISSIONS</u>
ROKPV-FC	23	0
4th Inf Div	1	120
173d Abn Bde (Sep)	76	41
3/506th Abn Inf Bn	0	32
3/503d Abn Inf Bn	15	0
23d ARVN Div Advisory Tm	20	0
IDC Nha Trang	<u>18</u>	<u>0</u>
	153	193

2. Selected personnel from the CAP ROK Inf Div and 9th ROK Inf Div received in-flight personnel detector training with 173d Abn Bde (Sep) representatives. They are now supporting combat operations in ROK AOs. The 23d ARVN Div continues to be supported by US Advisory personnel detector operators. The 4th Inf Div provides personnel detector support to the 24th ARVN STZ while the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) supports the 22d ARVN Div.

3. On 21 Nov an APD mission aircraft from the 4th Inf Div crashed while conducting a mission 21 km NW of Plei Djereng. The crew, operator and a DA photographer were killed and the aircraft destroyed. On 1 Dec 68 the 3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf employed four E158 CS Canister Clusters in an area vicinity AN755215 where significant readings were noted by the APD. Gunships and artillery were then employed resulting in one large secondary explosion.

(d) The enemy continued to use Riot Control Agents on a small scale during offensive operations. There were two reported actions during which the enemy initiated use of riot control type chemicals. On 18 Dec personnel from A&B Co 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf at Pump station #8 vicinity BR 365454 received a tear agent from an unknown source. One person was overcome by the agent. On 21 Jan 69 Bridge #20 on QL 19 and the MACV compound vicinity BR 469430 received 16 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Upon inspection of five dud rounds it was found that the rounds contained a CS type agent.

(5) G3 Air Operations.

(a) There were a total of 4330 tactical air sorties (3109 preplanned sorties and 1221 immediate) averaging 47 sorties per day flown in support of operations as indicated below:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>TOTAL SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES DAY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
BINH TAY/ MACARTHUR	2452	27	20 KBA (Conf), 141 KBA (Est), 77 secondary explosions, 114 secondary fires, 227 bunkers destroyed, 17 bunkers damaged, 14 bunkers uncovered

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<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>TOTAL SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES DAY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
BINH THAY/ MACARTHUR (Continued)			11 bridges destroyed, five bridges damaged, 90 road cuts, 36 structures destroyed, two structures damaged, two trails uncovered, five AAA positions destroyed, 15 AW positions destroyed, seven mortar positions destroyed, one rocket position destroyed, 18 rocket tubes destroyed, 15 rockets destroyed, one truck destroyed and one 40' X 40' fortification destroyed.
DAN THANG/ MACLAIN	634	7	Two KBA (Conf), six KBA (Est), 12 secondary explosions, 35 secondary fires, 277 bunkers destroyed, 66 bunkers damaged, 18 structures destroyed and nine structures damaged.
DAN SINH/ COCHISE	572	6	Six KBA (Conf), seven KBA (Est), 10 secondary explosions, 12 secondary fires, 29 bunkers destroyed, six bunkers damaged, 25 structures destroyed, three structures damaged and two caves uncovered.
9TH ROK DIV	338	4	Eight KBA (Est), five secondary explosions, 11 secondary fires, 11 bunkers destroyed, 19 structures destroyed, five structures damaged, 10 caves destroyed, two caves damaged and two caves uncovered.
GAP ROK DIV	284	3	16 KBA (Conf), one KBA (Est), eight secondary explosions, 13 secondary fires, one bunker damaged, 14 structures destroyed, five structures damaged, one pack train unit destroyed and four boats destroyed.

(b) B-52 Support: There were 324 B-52 sorties flown this quarter in support of ground operations as indicated at inclosure 8. Last quarter, there were 630 sorties.

(6) Army Aviation Operations

(a) The major objective in employing the tactical aviation assets available to I FFORCEV remains as previously stated in operational reports:

1. Provide air mobility to combat elements of FVMAF in the II CTZ.
2. Provide aviation support to the province senior advisors and COMUS personnel in II CTZ for C&C and resupply.
3. Support the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance program.

(b) Resources available from the 17th CAG are:

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1. Assault Helicopter Assets.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUPPORT MISSIONS</u>
10th Combat Aviation Battalion	GS Southern Coastal, Southern Highlands, Task Force South, Recondo, 5th SFGA, ARVN and 9th ROK Div
48th AHC	
92d AHC	
155th AHC	
192d AHC	
281st AHC	
52d Combat Aviation Battalion	GS Northern Highlands, PRAIRIE FIRE, 4th Inf Div and ARVN
57th AHC	
119th AHC	
170th AHC	
189th AHC	
268th Combat Aviation Battalion	GS Northern Coastal, 173d Abn Bde, CAP ROK Div, ARVN
61st AHC	
129th AHC	
134th AHC (-)	

2. The 335th AHC was placed OPCON to SA IV Corps on 1 Dec 68 and is currently located at Bear Cat in III CTZ.

3. The 7/17th Air Cav Sqd is assigned to 17th CAG, OPCON to I FFORCEV further OPCON to 4th Inf Div and is located at Camp Enari in II CTZ. B Trp 7/17th Cav is further OPCON to TFS and is located at Phan Thiet in II CTZ.

4. Heavy Helicopter Assets.

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>BATTALION</u>	<u>SUPPORT MISSION</u>
335th HHC	268th CAB	GS II CTZ

5. Assault Support Helicopter Assets.

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>BATTALION</u>	<u>SUPPORT MISSION</u>
179th ASHC	52d CAB	GS 4th Inf Div
243d ASHC	10th CAB	GS Southern Coastal
180th ASHC	268th CAB	GS Central Coastal
196th ASHC	268th CAB	GS Northern Coastal

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6. Armed Helicopter Company

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>BATTALION</u>	<u>SUPPORT MISSION</u>
361st Avn Co (Escort)	52d CAB	GS II CTZ

7. The 183d, 185th, 203d and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the Visual Reconnaissance Program and provide GS throughout II CTZ.

8. The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout II CTZ in an aerial surveillance role.

9. The 18th Utility Airplane Company provides GS utility support throughout II CTZ and for the XXIV Corps operating in the I CTZ.

(c) Major Accomplishments.

1. Airmobile assets were provided to the following UE operations during the period indicated.

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>SUPPORTED UNIT</u>	<u>DURATION</u>
WALKER	1st Bn 50th Mech Inf	1 Aug - 31 Jan
DAN HOA/BOLLING II	47th ARVN Regt	1 Aug - 31 Jan
DAN SINH/COCHISE	173d Abn Bde (-)	1 Aug - 31 Jan
BINH TAY/MCARTHUR	4th Inf Div 24th ARVN STZ	1 Aug - 31 Jan
DAN THANG/MCLAIN	TF South/23d ARVN Div 3d Bn 506th Abn Inf 3d Bn 503d Abn Inf 44th and 53d ARVN Regt	1 Aug - 31 Jan
BINH TAY 48, 49 & 50	24th STZ/4th Inf Div	1 Aug - 31 Jan

2. ROKA Forces normally were allocated one AHC and two CH-47 aircraft per division a daily basis. Additional support was provided on a mission basis to support major tactical operations.

3. Airmobile assets were provided to the following special operations directed by MACV:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>SUPPORTED UNIT</u>
PRAIRIE FIRE	CCC (Command and Control Center)

4. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a general support basis:

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I FFORCEV	IDC Nha Trang	CORPS - PSYOPS
21st Signal Group	MACV Engr	100th Log Cnd (ROK)
18th Engr Bde	US Navy Spt FAC	MACV
Cam Ranh Bay Spt Cnd	II ALC (ARVN)	I FFORCEV Arty
Qui Nhon Spt Cnd	V ALC (ARVN)	

d. (C) Logistical Activities

(1) The primary US logistical effort during the period was devoted to operations in BINH TAY/MACARTHUR, DAN SINH/COCHISE, DAN HOA/BOLLING, DAN THANG/MCLAIN and WALKER.

(2) ACoS, G4 continued to monitor the material and supply posture of units assigned, attached and under the operational control (OPCON) of this headquarters. The stock status and scheduled resupply of the following forward activities were monitored daily:

- (a) FSA English - In support of operation DAN SINH/COCHISE.
- (b) FSA Dak To and Ban Me Thuot - In support of BINH TAY/MACARTHUR.
- (c) FSA Phan Thiet and Bao Loc - In support of DAN THANG/MCLAIN

(3) The FSA at Dak To was closed out as of 25 Jan 69 due to the transfer of primary responsibility of Northern Kontum Province from 4th Inf Div to 24th ARVN STZ.

(4) Supply: (a) The overall supply of troop requirements continues to be satisfactory. There are no shortages of supplies and equipment which significantly impair the operational capability of the command.

(b) Emphasis on the identification and retrograde of excess supplies and equipment was increased during the quarter. Monthly reports on this program will be submitted starting in Jan 69.

(c) The ARVN Modernization Program caused a shortage of $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks for US units during the quarter as all receipts of this item were diverted to ARVN. This shortage is expected to continue until Feb 69.

(d) There are 14 items under ASR control at the end of the quarter, an increase of four items over last quarter. The items under ASR Control are:

<u>DDIC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
A137	Ctg, 7.62mm, Tr, Ikd
B534	40mm, MP
B568	40mm, HE
G256	81mm, HE
C445	105mm, HE
C705	4.2", HE

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<u>DOBIC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
C706	4.2", HE
D544	155mm, HE
D572	175mm, HE
D680	Prej, 8", HE
H490	2.75", HE standard warhead
H534	2.74", HE heavy warhead
G910	Gren, Hand, Offensive
L312	Signal, Illum

(5) Services: The I FFORCEV CMMI program was initiated in December with four inspections completed as of 31 January. Of these, two units were rated Satisfactory, one Unsatisfactory and one was scored as a courtesy inspection. Initial results indicated definite weaknesses in the area of Maintenance Management and Operations. To assist in preparations for future inspections, the USARV Readiness Assistance Team was requested for I FFORCEV units. The Team spends approximately one and one-half days with each company/battery size unit, evaluating all aspects of supply and maintenance procedures. One of the four units was inspected subsequent to the Assistance Team visit. The unit received exceptional scores on its CMMI and gave much of the credit to the Readiness Assistance Team.

(6) Transportation:

(a) Air:

1. The volume of airlift operations throughout II CTZ has shown a decreasing trend during the current quarter. Air movement of routine cargo from Cam Ranh Bay Depot to forward areas has shown a decrease as increased emphasis is being placed on highway movement. Qui Nhon Depot made no routine shipments to forward areas.

Supply Movements from Depots to Forward Areas:

	<u>Air (S/T)</u>	<u>Sea (S/T)</u>	<u>Hwy (S/T)</u>	<u>Total (S/T)</u>
Nov	2,647	2,771	25,066	30,484
Dec	1,141	3,989	15,310	20,440
Jan	<u>1,020</u>	<u>4,266</u>	<u>25,348</u>	<u>30,634</u>
TOTALS	<u>4,808</u>	<u>11,026</u>	<u>65,724</u>	<u>81,558</u>

2. The decreasing trend in emergency airlift noted during last quarter has continued during this quarter with only two emergency airlift missions (19 sorties) being flown during December and none being flown during January. This decreasing trend parallels the decrease in enemy activity throughout II CTZ.

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Emergency Airlift (1968 - 69):

	<u>C-130*</u>	<u>C-123*</u>	<u>C-7A*</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>S/T Cargo</u>
Feb-Apr	604	141	0	11,003	7,136
May-Jul	685	49	0	13,569	7,600
Aug-Oct	186	72	42	5,011	2,079
Nov-Jan	54	1	32	3,199	252

*Sorties

3. I FFORCEV-dedicated C7A aircraft movements remained at a relatively constant level.

Dedicated C7A Airlift (1968-69):

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>S/T Cargo</u>
Feb-Apr	4,947	38,679	2,248
May-Jul	5,765	42,005	2,725
Aug -Oct	6,321	50,144	3,255
Nov-Jan	6,108	45,984	2,938

(b) Highway: The major highways in II CTZ remained open throughout this quarter, with a high volume of convoy traffic noted. An increase of ambush incidents during January on QL 19 near An Khe did not significantly hinder convoy operations. LTL-7B from Pleiku to Cheo Reo (HQ for Phu Bon Province) was opened during the quarter to heavily secured US and ARVN convoys. One ARVN convoy went from Phan Rang to Phan Thiet by QL-1 on 17 January. A US convoy took the same route on 28-29 January. Joint US/ARVN convoys are being planned for the next quarter. (See first chart in Para (6)(a) for S/T of cargo moved by highway.)

(c) Water: The only forward area supplied by water in II CTZ is Phan Thiet. This operation is constantly hindered by shifting sandbars and changing tides. During the last quarter and November of this quarter, there was a shortage of LST and LCU type vessels for movement of cargo from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Thiet. Delays due to this shortage and poor beach conditions resulted in cargo arriving three to 21 days after the established RDD. During early December the B.D.L. Page initiated a roll-on-roll-off shuttle between Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Thiet, significantly decreasing the cargo backlog for Phan Thiet. (See first chart in Para (6)(a) for S/T of cargo moved by water.)

(d) Rail: The opening of the railroad to military cargo in much of southern coastal II Corps in October led to an expanded rail movement capability throughout II CTZ. The bulk of the tonnage, however, is still being shipped from Qui Nhon to northern coastal II Corps areas. Thirty-seven percent of the entire II Corps tonnage during this quarter was ammo shipped from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat Air Base.

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Rail Movements (Nov 68 - Jan 69):

	<u>From CRB (S/T)</u>	<u>From QNH (S/T)</u>	<u>Total S/T</u>
Nov	256	4,236	4,492
Dec	396	2,634	3,030
Jan	<u>168</u>	<u>1,918</u>	<u>2,086</u>
TOTALS	820	8,788	9,608

e. (C) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS).

(1) Office of Development Operations.

(a) Agriculture:

1. The fall planting of TN-8 rice is exceeding early predictions. Attempts are being made to move out into insecure areas such as in Binh Dinh Province where hamlets of Hoai An and Vinh Thanh were supplied with TN-8 seed for the first time.

2. The regional vaccine bank in Nha Trang was initiated to support the high priority national vaccine program, and for the first time in the history of Vietnam, vaccines are plentiful. There were over 42,000 doses distributed throughout II CTZ by the bank in December.

3. In Binh Dinh Province, plans are in progress to construct 100 thirty-five metric-ton fishing boats with 100 horse power engines, two of which have been completed and are in use. There are also plans to build 1000-2000 smaller craft to be constructed as orders are received. These will also have engines installed.

4. Protein production increased during December and January as a result of the importation of baby chicks from Singapore. A total of 12,000 were delivered to Region II in December. Orders were taken for 23,000 for January.

(b) Education:

1. The highlight of education activities for this quarter was the successful Helping Teachers Training Course conducted in Nha Trang from 30 Sep to 28 Nov 68. This course has already caused multiplying effects. Several teacher workshops were conducted utilizing graduates of this course as workshop instructors. This multiplying effect will increase during the Hamlet Teacher Training Workshops to be conducted in each province this summer.

2. Of the 613 Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD) programmed classrooms to be constructed in 1968, there were 457 completed and 156 still under construction, for a completion rate of 74.5%. There was 62% of the MORD principals' quarters completed. The majority of those under construction will be completed prior to the end of February.

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(c) Public Administration and Urban Development:

1. Village/hamlet officials training gained momentum during the final months of 1968 because of the emphasis on the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). The quota of 3,500 trained personnel was exceeded by over 400. The emphasis is shifting from hamlet to village level. Binh Thuan Village, Binh Khe District, Binh Dinh Province, was selected as a model village for a concentrated effort by GVN officials and Public Administration advisors to make into a self-supporting governmental agency.

2. The Cam Ranh Labor Housing Project was officially turned over to the GVN for operation on 9 Jan 69. There were 1831 applicants for the 1500 units available. On 24 Dec 68 there were 790 purchase applications processed and "move-in" day was proclaimed. The official opening ceremony has not been arranged as yet.

(d) Ethnic Minorities Affairs: Progress in Ethnic Minorities construction projects increased this quarter, primarily because of the efforts of the Ministry for the Development of Ethnic Minorities (MDEM), the CORDS/EMA (Ethnic Minority Affairs) advisors and CORDS provincial teams. These projects include boarding schools, dormitories, community centers and guest houses. Increases in school and boarding attendance in the II CTZ EMA facilities were noted, as well as improvement in the administration of the food and boarding programs at these EMA facilities. Of special significance was the initiation of a USAID/MDEM audit of all 1966-1968 MDEM construction projects in II CTZ that were funded through American foreign aid channels. The results of this audit will be published at a later date.

(e) Refugees: The purpose of the Refugees branch of CORDS is to assist the civil authorities to improve the handling and use of refugees from reception until their return to normal life.

1. The report period was marked by the completion of Phase I to the II CTZ Resettlement Campaign Plan. Collected data is now being analysed to determine and identify refugee concentrations that can be returned to their original domicile. The coming quarter will realize large numbers of refugees being either resettled in place or returned to their original village.

2. Large influxes of mountain tribespeople from insecure traditional lands to the relative security of GVN controlled areas increased the refugee rolls by more than 13,000. The largest of these migrations was at Buon Ho Cu in Darlac Province where 10,182 new refugees were assisted in re-establishing their lives under the GVN. Other significant resettlements occurred at Plei Ring D and Plei Ia Lu in Pleiku Province. Both projects were completed within the report period with 735 refugees in Plei Ring D and 2,432 refugees in Plei Ia Lu.

3. The first interzonal resettlement of refugees occurred during the quarter with 1,342 refugees from Quang Ngai Province in I CTZ being successfully resettled into Cam Ranh. Consideration is being given to transporting 200 more families to the same area during the first Quarter 1969.

4. Binh Dinh Province continued to receive special emphasis on the relief and resettlement of refugees. Six mobile cadre teams from the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief, a Catholic Relief service

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team for refugee relief and a new Refugee Service Chief were assigned to Binh Dinh in an effort to render relief to the refugees in that Province.

(f) Youth Affairs: Weekend work camps, sports programs, and youth groups organization activities increased throughout II CTZ, due to the release of funds by the Office of the Directorate General of Youth and Sports. There are more than 8,000 youths participating in the Hamlet Youth Groups in II CTZ. Motivation and organization of youth activities committees gained momentum in the fall but received a setback when a large percentage of the high school teachers were mobilized for military training. With the return of these teachers in January, emphasis was placed on this program and it is expected to grow rapidly. A new organization, the Alliance for Freedom, has been formed and conducts night English classes for youths in Nha Trang. This group initiated a program of visiting military hospitals. Boy scouts continue to show progress as security increases, with assistance from military civic action teams.

(g) Self Help:

1. The overall progress in the self help program continued in the majority of the provinces throughout II CTZ. The 1968 goal, as projected in early 1968, was not attained because of slow progress in some high-land provinces partially caused by unfavorable security and GVN release of commodities. The reports indicate excellent progress in the last quarter of the year.

2. Participation by the populace continued to increase during the quarter. Intensive training activities by RD Cadre and village/hamlet officials provided the emphasis, guidance and determination to successfully complete the projects undertaken by the village councils. The increased donation of labor and materials by the hamlet residents progressed during recent months.

3. Initial progress on APC Self Help projects was reported by most provinces. The provinces of Quang Duc, Kontum and Phu Bon, plus the City of Cam Ranh, did not indicate APC progress. Binh Thuan indicated that three APC hamlets have project quotas approved.

(h) Logistics:

1. During the reporting period PL-480 food commodities were in extremely short supply, both in II CTZ and at the national warehouses in Saigon. The method of distribution was changed to cope with shortages. Rather than filling complete requisitions, only partial requisitions were filled, thereby sharing the commodities with all provinces.

2. In order to expedite receipt of PL-480 food commodities into II CTZ, deep draft ships have been scheduled to make ports of call in Qui Nhon and Nha Trang. This will eliminate the requirement to have commodities transhipped from Saigon by coastal vessel or junk.

(i) Public Health:

1. During the quarter, endemic bubonic plague continued to be a medical problem in II CTZ and South Vietnam. The Ministry of Health has now begun the second cycle of the National Plague Program. The

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first cycle of the National Plague Program was completed in Jan 69. Approximately 90% of the projected goals were reached. Difficulties encountered during the first cycle included but were not limited to the following:

a. Equipment distribution was determined at Saigon level without regard to specific problems existing at regional or province level resulting in poor utilization of some equipment.

b. Supplies were not delivered in time to implement the program on the date set by the Ministry of Health. The supplies were also handled outside the normal Vietnamese supply system which left the provincial health personnel inadequate information with which to plan their programs and formulate time tables.

c. Laborers were difficult to hire by the provinces due to the current Vietnamese draft and the inability to compete with the US military in salaries..

2. CORDS II CTZ Engineering Division accepted three impact hospitals from the contractors. These hospitals are located in Phu Bon, Bao Loc and Bon Song. Equipment and supplies are being moved into these hospitals.

(2) Office of Territorial Forces

(a) Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF). Since 1 Nov 68, many significant improvements in the areas of RF/PF training, logistical support, increased advisory effort and force structure have occurred.

1. An increase in authorization of 53 RF companies and 20 PF platoons was effected, bringing the total authorization to 355 RF companies and 1203 PF platoons of which 311 companies, and 1203 PF platoons presently are on-hand. Fifteen RF/PF Group Headquarters and three Intelligence squads were also activated bringing the on-hand status up to the authorized 44 Group Headquarters and 54 Intelligence squads.

2. The advisory effort for RF/PF within II Corps increased during the last three months with the addition of 24 Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs). All 96 teams are presently deployed to improve the combat effectiveness of the RF/PF leaders and individual soldiers. Presently MATs are using all available assets to familiarize RF/PF units with the M-16 Rifle.

3. Forty-five companies, 27 RF platoons and 166 PF platoons were deployed in support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). The increased security provided by these units played an important role in the successful completion of the APC.

4. US artillery contact teams are visiting units in the field to determine adequacy of fire support plans, the firing in or surveying of defensive concentrations, the training of personnel in adjustment of artillery fire, adequacy of communications with fire support elements and reaction to requests to fire by RF/PF personnel.

5. During this period the 4th Inf Div and Task Force South both initiated RF/PF leadership schools in their respective AOs.

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These leadership schools, along with the Jungle Leadership School conducted by the 173d Abn Bde at An Khe have graduated 118 RF officers and 201 RF and PF NCOs. The 23d and 23d ARVN Divisions on 13 Jan 69 and 23 Dec 68 respectively started leadership schools within their AOs for Company Commanders and Executive Officers of ARVN and RF units. The five week FOI qualifies the officers for the Commanders Certificate Award. Fifty-nine officers have graduated from the 23d ARVN Div school. A LRP school continues operation in Binh Thuan. As of 31 Jan 69, 24 personnel have graduated from the school. A Medium Range Reconnaissance Patrol Training Course began 2 Dec 68 for all intelligence platoons and squads in II Corps. It has trained 439 personnel.

6. An impact issue of 480 M-16's was presented to deserving RF companies by CG II CTZ during the month of January. Forty per cent of all the RF/PF units are to due to receive their total authorization during Mar-Apr 69.

(b) National Police Operations

1. National Police activity and deployment showed an increasing awareness in all Provinces of the necessity for prompt and thorough implementation of Director of National Police (DGNP) and Minister of Interior Directives. This implies tighter national control of police and lessening of Province Chief's influence which has in the past been responsible for diversion of manpower to internal security and static guard positions. A national objective of assigning 50% of the National Police during 1969 to Districts and Hamlets has received maximum attention and more than 40% are now so assigned.

2. An increase in traffic accidents and fatalities throughout II CTZ has prompted initiation of a major traffic safety program. This entailed traffic education classes conducted at schools, distribution of traffic safety literature, increased use of traffic signs, more stringent enforcement of traffic laws, extensive use of traffic control devices such as mirror boxes and center lines in roads and organization of Joint Mobile Patrols involving US MP's, National Police and Allied Force MP's as appropriate. Substantial reduction in traffic accidents has resulted in several provinces where traffic safety programs have been fully implemented.

3. Arrests of VC/VCI and all other categories of apprehension have increased with the dispersion of National Police to Districts and the improved security for Police type operations in the countryside. Availability of military forces for cordon and search operations has been a major factor in outstanding successes in Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan and Darlac Provinces.

4. Resource Control checkpoints in II CTZ appear to have achieved the optimum in permitting the relatively free flow of commercial traffic and population while inhibiting the movement of enemy supplies and personnel, contraband and black market goods. Noteworthy confiscations occurred in Khanh Hoa, Binh Dinh and Cam Ranh City.

5. A developing marine police capability in Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, Cam Ranh and other coastal areas shows promise of increasing importance in the enforcement of customs regulations and collection of export taxes. At present, 120 Marine Police are assigned in Binh Dinh, 80 in Khanh Hoa and 50 in Cam Ranh.

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6. National Police Field Forces (NPF) were directed to dispense forces into platoon size elements to operate at District level in support of DIOCCS. Some 35 Districts now have a readily available NPF action arm. NPF results in VC/VCI suspect apprehensions have hit record levels during this quarter. Total apprehensions including draft evaders, deserters and common criminals have also been worthy of note. NPF gained 1089 new personnel in the directed transfer of all 18-21 year old National Police to the Field Forces. As these new personnel are trained and integrated, it is anticipated that an action arm will be available for each district in II CTZ.

7. The Combined Telecom Directorate (CTD) has been concerned with providing supply and maintenance for all Public Safety Division (PSD) radios in II CTZ. The PSD Telecom Officer has also been assigned monitorship responsibility for the Village/Hamlet Radio System. The Village/Hamlet Radio System (VHRS) will ultimately involve more than 4000 radios, however, each Province is now in the process of developing total requirements and CTD will simultaneously increase its maintenance and repair capability as required.

8. Detention facilities and jails in II CTZ have increased in capacity by approximately 1000 spaces during this quarter. Population has remained relatively stable, however, new construction and expansion of present facilities will continue. Sentenced prisoners with more than one year to serve on their sentences are being extracted to National Rehabilitation Centers in order to alleviate crowded conditions.

(c) Self-Defense Division, Office of Territorial Forces

1. Due to increasing emphasis on the APC and Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) by GVN officials, DEPCORDS/I FFORCEV established the Self-Defense Forces Division on 22 Dec 68. The mission of the new division is to be the II CTZ point of contact for all matters requiring staff coordination, advisory guidance and assistance pertaining to the PSDF program.

2. PSDF goals for 1968 had already been established in the APC prior to the establishment of the PSDF Division. These goals were to recruit 170,000 members, of which 136,000 were to be trained, and 39,124 issued weapons. As of 25 Jan 69 the percentage of these goals attained were 88%, 71% and 73% respectively. Despite the fact that this is not total success, it does indicate tremendous achievement. Problems which had impeded progress during the quarter were isolated, analyzed, and resolved.

3. Some of the more significant problems which came to light were:

a. Conflicting reports submitted by US advisors and their counterparts. This was caused by ambiguous instructions to provinces and districts, and by the advisors and the Vietnamese using different cut-off dates for their reports. Both problems have been resolved.

b. US advisors monitor PSDF only on a part time basis, thus are not able to give the program the attention desired by GVN officials. The advisability of adding another officer to the Province Advisory Team, whose sole mission would be to advise PSDF, has been suggested to MACCORDS, Saigon, and is currently being evaluated.

c. The level of proficiency of PSDF members varied considerably throughout II CTZ. Initial study determined the cause to be a vague POI. The current POI is being analyzed to standardize the training program throughout II CTZ.

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(3) Office of Military Affairs

(a) Civic Action:

1. Self-help civic action projects continue to be strongly emphasized throughout II CTZ. A good example of this is the current "clean-up campaign" underway which was initiated by the Commanding General, II CTZ. In Dai Quay hamlet, Lam Dong Province, during December, 52 RF/PF houses were completed with the local populace assisting the soldiers in erecting the house frames. At the same time, the soldiers provided transportation for the movement of civilian homes to a new hamlet site. This was a beneficial project in that it demonstrated to the military that they have the support of the local populace; and to the local populace that the military can and will assist them in their daily efforts for survival.

2. Military Civic Action (MCA) continues to play an ever-increasing role in increasing the favorable attitudes of the people towards US/FWMAF. The most used role of the MCA is to provide valuable technical guidance and assistance in obtaining material support for a particular project. ARVN units in II CTZ are increasing their civic action efforts.

3. Military units throughout the CTZ continue to use MEDCAPS as a major pacification tool. In Pleiku Province the 2d Bn 1st Cav Regt initiated a medical training course which has been sanctioned by GVN. Seventeen students graduated in January, receiving provincial certificates as certified medical aidmen.

4. Present combat casualty inputs to military hospitals are relatively small, enabling the hospitals to increase their medical treatment of the local populace. At present, they are accepting larger numbers of civilians and performing operations ranging from minor surgery to complicated corrective surgery for people with deformities. This program is very well received by the Vietnamese and has greatly aided in building rapport between Vietnamese and Americans.

5. The Pacification Imprest Fund, Assistance in Kind (AIK) was not used effectively prior to Jun 68. At that time, fund use was increased by two factors: Command emphasis and a growing US realization of the fund's capabilities. At the end of 1968, II CTZ had utilized 64.7% of its total yearly allocation, 72,000,000 \$VN. The principal expenditures were for supplies and materials used for public works, education and health. At present, 1969 expenditures and results are running at the same level as the last quarter of 1968. The other programs, e.g., Chieu Hoi, detainees, attack on the VCI, etc, are expected to make greater use of the AIK fund, but expenditures will fluctuate in proportion to the military, political, economical and social efforts in these program areas.

(b) Chieu Hoi:

1. Inducement: The Chieu Hoi Nationwide Rewards Program received priority efforts during this period. The 8th PSYOPS Bn has produced and distributed posters, leaflets, and handout materials to advertise the program. Despite the fact that the returnee rate for 1968 was only 36 returnees per week the trend is definitely on the upswing - with Nov showing 143, Dec 234, and Jan 257. II Corps reports 13.8% of the total enemy neutralization during the month of December is accredited to Chieu Hoi. Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's) continued to concentrate

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their operations in APC target hamlets. Provinces are using all available media - leaflets, posters, face to face contacts to influence the returnee rate.

2. Reception: Reception of Hoi Chanh experienced a set-back in Khanh Hoa province in December when ROKA detained five Hoi Chanh for a nine day period before releasing them to the Chieu Hoi Service. The returnees claimed they had been beaten. Liaison was made with ROKA which gave written assurance that this type of reception would not happen again. ROKA CG said the word on proper treatment of Hoi Chanh would be passed to every member of his command. Occupancy of the Chieu Hoi Centers remained at approximately 15% of capacity. Reception, processing, and housing of Hoi Chanh is generally satisfactory.

3. Activity and Training: Several provinces had difficulty recruiting APT members because of the lack of quality of Hoi Chanh from which to draw. To assist in solving this problem, Kontum asked the Ministry for permission to recruit from Binh Dinh. The Ministry authorized recruiting at any province in order to recruit APTs. Other efforts to improve the APTs include:

a. A 10 day training program was held in Nha Trang. One hundred APT members attended; emphasis was on PSYOP and Political training.

b. An APT convention was held in Tuy Hoa province 21-22 Dec for the purpose of building morale and issuing awards.

c. Assignment of two APT advisors.

d. Distribution of vehicles for APT use in their PSYOP effort. A new authorized strength for APTs was issued by Chieu Hoi Ministry in December. The old authorization was 1418 cadre, the new 1012. II Corps presently has 72% of authorized APT strength. Each OPCON unit of IFFV is concentrating on the recruiting of Kit Carson Scouts (KCS). At present, II Corps employs 169 KCS. The Chieu Hoi division is assisting in the KCS recruiting effort.

4. Tactical and Intelligence Utilization of Hoi Chanh: Hoi Chanh were used on 30 one-time intelligence missions each month. The more significant ones were described below:

a. In Binh Dinh, Hoi Chanh led military units on two operations which uncovered two arms caches and killed six VC. The Province Chief authorized awards of VN\$88,000 and VN\$72,000.

b. In Khanh Hoa, Hoi Chanh assisted in two operations. One resulted in three VC KIA and two VC WIA; the other in one VC KIA and the capture of one AK-47, two magazines of ammunition and some documents.

c. In Binh Thuan, a NVA NCO rallier, who was a member of a nearly all woman company, provided significant intelligence about enemy morale and concealment areas.

(c) PSYOP Division:

1. PSYOP activities continued at a high level during the quarter. Material developed was aimed at both friendly and enemy audiences in II CTZ. Three hundred-ninety million leaflets were disseminated in support of II CTZ operations. The 8th PSYOP Bn locally produced 30,538,980 leaflets while the remainder were acquired from JUSPAO, 4th PSYOP Gp, Saigon, and the 7th PSYOP Gp, Okinawa.

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2. Binh Dinh and Darlac Provinces contributed 50 per cent of the total Hoi Chanh reported in II CTZ during the quarter. The most valuable asset in the Chieu Hoi inducement effort continues to be the utilization of the Armed Propaganda Teams. This is particularly true when the APT is used in conjunction with military operations such as cordon and search. It is noted that three provinces (Binh Dinh, Darlac, and Binh Thuan) reported 50% of the 3,400 APT face to face contacts with VC families recorded in II CTZ. During the month of November, the APT in Darlac Province participated in a highly successful cordon and search operation in Buon Ho District. Twenty-nine Montagnard Hoi Chanh were reported as a result of this operation.

3. Nguyen Trai and the Chieu Hoi Ministry's Third Party Awards Program received priority effort from PSYOP activities during the reporting period. One hundred-thirty million leaflets were disseminated in support of the Nguyen Trai Campaign. The PSYOP support of the Third Party Awards Program reached its peak during the month of December. To date, 5,000,000 leaflets were disseminated in support of the program. In addition, 900,000 leaflets, handbills, and posters were produced locally. The campaign, originally scheduled to terminate on 31 Jan, has been extended indefinitely. Forty per cent of the monthly Hoi Chanh figure (257) for January was the direct result of the Third Party Awards Program. Additionally, intensive PSYOP support has been given to the following operations:

- a. Camel Path
- b. Bolling II (US Military Operation)
- c. Walker (US Military Operation)
- d. McClain (US Military Operation)
- e. Hae Son Gin #5 (ROK Military Operation)
- f. Hae Son Gin #6 (ROK Military Operation)
- g. Wang Ma #7 (ROK Military Operation)

4. Plans were completed during the reporting period for an expanded organization for PSYOP activities in II CTZ involving all free world forces. The organization consists of one PSYOP Coordinating Committee (II CTZ), a Secretariat, and two Regional PSYOP Coordinating Centers. One is located in Nha Trang and the other at Pleiku. In addition, each province has a PSYOP Coordinating Committee and Coordinating Center. All facets of the expanded organization are scheduled to be operational during the next quarter.

5. Two special projects, Flying Banner and Skywriting, were begun during the period. Both projects are designed to add to the versatility of the inducement effort for Chieu Hoi. The banner containing the message "Chieu Hoi" has been completed.

6. The construction for the radio site at Pleiku has been completed at the original location. The reconstructed site has personnel bunkers with interconnecting trenches, three layers of outer perimeter wire and perimeter lights. One RF company is permanently assigned to the site for security. The station is scheduled to resume broadcasting at 50,000 watts of power on 15 February.

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7. The 8th PSYOP Bn has initiated a campaign for rapid PSYOP exploitation of all significant caches found in II CTZ. PSYOP media is produced within 48 hours and disseminated over appropriate areas. The themes depicted by the media are centered around the shortages created by the location of the caches.

8. For examples of leaflets printed during this period see:

- a. Incl 9: Leaflet to follow up tactical airstrikes.
- b. Incl 10: Letter from Province Chief to Lam Dong Province.
- c. Incl 11: Voluntary Informant Program.

(4) Revolutionary Development Cadre Operations.

(a) Revolutionary Development (RD): Of a total of 371 RD and 120 Truong Son RD hamlets planned for construction under the 1968 Pacification Plan, 383 hamlets were completed prior to 31 December with an additional 108 hamlets completed by 31 January. One hamlet in Cam Ranh is scheduled for completion in early February to complete the 1968 Pacification Plan. Corps and Provincial Pacification and Development Councils worked out the final 1969 Pacification and Development Plans which were reviewed and approved by Major General Lu Lan, II Corps Commander, and representatives of Ministry of Revolutionary Development, Saigon. All RD teams were divided into 30-man groups in late January from the original configuration of 59 men. The new groups will move into their 1969 villages during the month of February. Working under the Village Concept, groups will be assigned to a specific village and will move from hamlet to hamlet within the village until the entire area has been covered. Adult literacy courses were conducted in Darlac, Lam Dong and Ninh Thuan Provinces. The RD and TSRD cadre are now conducting classes in their respective hamlets, not only for illiterate adults, but also for children in hamlets where there is no regular teacher assigned. For the Montagnards, the RD Education Advisor provided reading primers and other materials in the appropriate Montagnard dialects. One-hundred ten Montagnard Mobile Instructors were given an intensive three day course of instruction at the Pleiku Montagnard Training Center which stressed organization of instruction for adult literacy courses, thus providing background for instructing TSRD Cadre in their respective provinces. Pleiku Montagnard Training Center (PMTTC) ceased training new TSRD Cadre on 31 December. Training has now been decentralized. The 110 Mobile Instructors, divided into five man teams, will conduct future training of replacements within the provinces to which they have been assigned. Refresher training for entire groups will also be conducted by these training teams. RD Youth Groups became very popular in the quarter with youth groups organized in Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan and Cam Ranh. AIK Funds were used to provide uniforms for the children, while other CORDS offices gave assistance through the GVN technical ministries to provide animals, seeds and seedlings as well as technical instruction. The children engage in hamlet clean-up campaigns, sewing, barbering, animal husbandry, vegetable and flower growing and organized sports. The parents, as well as the children, have shown a great deal of enthusiasm in the youth group program. Joint RD Cadre Division/II Corps RD Council inspections continued with every province visited at least once and many visited two or three times. These joint inspections proved very beneficial to both advisors and GVN counterparts. Since both parties are together with provincial representatives on the ground,

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many problems can be discussed and settled immediately. Also of benefit to the RD Cadre Program were the visits of President Thieu and Major General Lu Lan to the provinces of II Corps during the quarter, which resulted in more attention being directed toward the Pacification and Development program by provincial officials.

(b) PHOENIX (PHUNG HOANG): The attack against the VCI gained exceptional momentum in II Corps during the reporting quarter with recent operational results qualitatively the best ever obtained. Quantitative results (approximately 950 VCI were neutralized) were the best since Second Quarter 1968, and significantly improved over the preceding reporting period. Renewed emphasis was placed on improving intelligence collection during the period, especially to support operational targeting against key VCI at all echelons. Combined operations with GVN PHUNG HOANG elements were continually encouraged. The advice and guidance provided by Vietnamese PHUNG HOANG Inspection Teams, especially from the regional level, continued to enhance the organizational and functional proficiency of Permanent Centers. These inspections were responsible for intensifying support of Province and District chiefs for the PHUNG HOANG Program, which is mandatory for program success. Perhaps the most significant accomplishment during the period was the degree of cooperation and coordination which has been generated at all levels often where little or none previously existed. This includes disparate GVN officials, agencies and military forces. This also includes the establishment of a Corps-wide system of Province Intelligence Operations Control Centers (PIOCCs) and District Intelligence Operations Control Centers (DIOCCs) becoming increasingly capable of supporting military and territorial security as well as anti-VCI operations. The operational effectiveness of these permanent centers varies throughout II CTZ, but continuous advice and guidance from higher echelons, time and added experience should solve current deficiencies of the new centers.

(5) Office of Management Support (OMS).

(a) Civilian Personnel: Under a prior agreement called the Memorandum of Understanding, all Local Nationals in II CTZ who had previously been under the USAID/Embassy personnel and payroll system were processed for conversion to USARV Civilian Personnel System and Army Finance Payroll System. All Direct-Hire employees were converted on 29 Dec 68. Daily-wage employees were processed immediately thereafter. The target completion date is 9 Feb 69.

(b) Military Personnel: On 15 Nov 68, CORDS assumed administrative responsibility for MACV advisors in the civil advisory effort throughout Region II. Immediate administrative tasks centered on the in-processing of new arrivals, arranging air transportation for their shipment to the 13 sector teams, the establishment of two awards and decorations boards, creation of a feeder morning report system, establishment of direct communications with MACV and Saigon, publications procurement, a Corps-level update of the Manpower Authorization Listing and the establishment of CORDC first enlisted promotion board. These tasks were previously administered by DSA II CTZ along with DSA's major responsibility for the advisory mission to ARVN. Ultimately, an estimated 1575 military advisors in civil advisory effort will be served by this new administrative system.

(c) Air Operations.

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1. OMS/Air Operations had three scheduled passenger couriers servicing all provinces within II CTZ Monday through Saturday.

a. South Courier: Serves Cam Ranh, Phan Rang, Phan Thiet, Bao Loc, Gia Nghia, Ban Me Thuot and Dalat.

b. Central Courier: Serves Dalat, Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku.

c. North Courier: Serves Tuy Hoa, Phu Bon, Pleiku, Kontum and Qui Nhon.

d. A new high of 2,518,274 passenger miles were flown. This is an increase of approximately 30% over the last quarter.

2. OMS/Air Operations has one scheduled cargo courier servicing all provinces within II CTZ each Wednesday. In addition, cargo is airlifted to provincial consignees based on aircraft and cargo availability.

(d) Communications:

1. Reorganized the Nha Trang emergency radio nets and increased the number of stations by 60%.

2. Validated radio inventories and established requirements for the CORDS advisory teams in the province, district, sub-sector and MATS levels.

3. Changed the teletype machines on the Saigon net from a 60 to a 100 words per minute capability.

f. (C) Personnel.

(1) Roster of Headquarters I FFORCEV key personnel is at Incl 12.

(2) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and OPCON units is at Incl 13.

(3) Military Personnel Management:

(a) Overall personnel strengths of assigned and attached I FFORCEV units improved during the reporting period. Shortages continue in MOSC 13A10, 05B20 and 76Y40. Heavy input in MOSC 13A10 late in the quarter considerably improved the strength posture.

(b) The infusion program during this reporting period presented no significant problems.

(c) During the reporting period AG Personnel Management (AGPM) absorbed the functions of AOR/ORR reporting for the command. These functions had been the responsibility of the Unit Personnel Office (UPO). This transfer centralized command personnel management functions in one office and enables the UPO to concentrate on local personnel management activities. Prior to the transfer each office performed some command local personnel management functions.

(d) The centralization of E8 and E9 promotions at DA resulted in AG Personnel Management assuming a more active role as monitoring agency

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of command-wide promotion activities. AGPM consolidates requirements and requests allocations from USAKV. Upon receipt of promotion allocations, AGPM distributes them on a percentage basis to promotion authorities and closely monitors the program in regard to total allocations utilized by units and redistribution of unused allocations. Promotion authorities are responsible for convening selection boards and reporting the number of promotion eligibles to AGPM.

(e) A DEROS Loss Report, an additional strength accounting report, was added during this period. This report, prepared by AGPM, furnishes USAKV daily DEROS loss figures for the command and includes a detailed breakout of daily DEROS losses in MOSC's 13A, 13B and 13F. This report is of considerable aid in maintaining accurate strength figures and programming replacements in critical artillery MOSC's.

(f) Officer Retention: The CY 1968 Army-wide officer (OBV II) retention rate was 24.2%. This was announced by DA as insufficient to offset the current imbalance of officer grade strengths, lieutenants (approximately 15,000 over) vs captains (approximately 17,000 short). In attempting to determine the I FFORCEV contribution to the retention effort, a detailed survey was conducted of OBV II officers of all major assigned, attached and OPCON units. The survey was completed during this period and reflected a projected 1969 I FFORCEV retention rate of 46.4%. Detailed results of this survey are contained in Incl 14.

(4) Awards and Decorations: During this quarter Awards and Decoration Boards were established at CORDS and DSA II Corps to review all recommendations for awards within their commands. Only valor awards, service and achievement awards to EM in grade E9 and awards for general and field grade officers are reboarded at I FFORCEV. A new Awards and Decoration regulation, I FFORCEV Regulation 672-1, was published on 14 Nov 68 and distributed to the units. This publication consolidated I FFORCEV policy in regard to initiating and processing recommendations for awards. The Awards and Decorations Section processed an average of 276 per month during the previous quarter. A resume of awards processed is at Incl 15.

(5) Rest and Recuperation: An average of 688 Rest and Recuperation (R&R) allocations were received each month during the quarter. Because of the great number of personnel extending for special leave during the holiday season and the arrival of many replacements, there was a shortage of personnel eligible to fill allocated spaces. As a result, the overall utilization rate decreased. A monthly newsletter will soon be published by the R&R Center to provide units with current information on the various R&R sites. Rest and Recuperation statistics are at Incl 16.

(6) ARVN Interpreters: At the end of this reporting period the total authorized strength of ARVN interpreters with US elements in II CTZ was 849. Detailed status is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
II Corps Adv Gp (Includes CORDS)	*513	**464	*Includes 401 auth for CORDS. **Includes 53 to join o/a 10 Feb 69 from Jan language class.
HQ I FFORCEV	11	0	

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
55th MI Det	19	14	
41st CA Co	2	2	
I FFORCEV Arty	39	33	
4th Inf Div	*125	124	*Includes recent increase of three for Engr Bn. Additional three pending for Med Bn.
173d Abn Bde	*40	58	*Additional one pending for Med element.

Although shortages continue to exist in some areas (i.e, HQ I FFORCEV and CORDS - NLD), these shortages have had minimal impact on mission accomplishment. Interpreter strength should improve in the ensuing quarter.

(7) Civilian Personnel Management:

(a) Civilian personnel management during the period was generally satisfactory in both administration and pay. Coordination was maintained throughout the quarter between the area civilian personnel office and all levels of command. During the period local national direct hire spaces were increased from 276 to 283.

(b) The 4th Qtr CY 68 allocation of AIK funds, Daily Hire Local National (DHLN), (4,180,500 \$VN) was expended to within 300,000 \$VN of the total allocation. I FFORCEV allocation from USARV for 1st Qtr CY 69 (2,760,000 \$VN) has been received and suballocated to the units based on requests. I FFORCEV Artillery headquarters was granted a special allotment of 300,000 \$VN for purposes of assisting in the construction of a new headquarters. I FFORCEV Regulation 616-3 dtd 8 Jan 69 was published. AIK funds for DHLN will be sub-allocated by this headquarters to subordinate commanders based on funds available, past experience and established priorities.

(8) Chaplain Activities:

(a) There were no personnel changes in the Staff Chaplains Section during this period.

(b) II CTZ has 114 US Military Chaplains and 22 ROK Chaplains.

(c) Religious Services:

1. The II Corps Tactical Zone is adequately staffed with Protestant chaplains and no current problems exist in providing adequate coverage for Protestant personnel in the zone. Travel continues to consume a vast amount of time in providing coverage for MACV Teams and Special Forces Camps. Coverage for these teams is on an average of once every two weeks.

2. The Catholic program has, with an increase in Catholic Chaplains, shown improvement with a corresponding drop in dependence upon civilian clergymen. However, in order to provide adequate coverage of Catholic personnel assigned to units operating in the II Corps Tactical Zone, a

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considerable number of civilian clergymen are still employed. Catholic coverage for MACV and Special Forces Camps faces the same problems as Protestant Chaplains.

3. Jewish Area coverage is adequate. Lay leaders continue to be used to organize and conduct services for Jewish personnel as well as to be responsible for all liaison between the Jewish Chaplain and Jewish personnel. All services conducted by Jewish lay leaders are coordinated with the Staff Chaplains. The I FFORCEV Jewish Chaplain spends approximately 60% of his time visiting Jewish personnel, counseling local leaders and coordinating the Jewish program with senior staff chaplains.

4. In the Nha Trang area the following services are conducted:

a. Sunday: 22 Protestant, 12 Catholic, one Lutheran, two Episcopal, one Christian Science and one Latter Day Saints.

b. Weekday: Friday - Jewish Services; Saturday - Jewish Services; Daily - Two masses. Discussion groups are held in the 8th Field Hospital and I FFORCEV Chapel for Protestant personnel.

(9) Military Police:

(a) Discipline, Law and Order:

1. Serious Incident Reporting. The HQ I FFORCEV PM Section has published I FFORCEV Regulation 335-6 which reiterates the serious incident reporting procedures for all assigned, attached, OPCON units, DSA II Corps, the USAAG's and CORDS personnel. One modification was made in the regulation, which is not established in USARV Reg 335-6, in that persons becoming aware of a serious incident or crime are directed to report the facts to the local provost marshal or MP station. This will insure uniformity of reporting and place the facts in the hands of those charged with the investigation.

2. Distinguished Visitor (DV) Security and Special Events: During the reporting period personal security was provided for 13 DV's (DV refers to general officers (O-10), admiral or civilian equivalent and other persons specifically designated as DV by this or higher headquarters from US or allied countries) visiting HQ I FFORCEV and the Nha Trang area. A total of 83 MP's were utilized in providing security and TCP for DV escorts.

a. I FFORCEV Reg 190-10, Security of Distinguished Visitors, was revised by the PM Section and is presently being distributed.

b. Security and traffic control continue to be provided by the 272d MP Co for conferences and special events such as the Zone Coordinators and II CTZ Senior Commanders' Conference and classified briefings. Coordination was also made by the PM Section with the Vietnamese, ROK and other US agencies for a ceremony recently held at the Nha Trang Railroad Station.

3. Installation Security Inspection and Practice Test Exercise: A PM representative accompanies an I FFORCEV inspection team on quarterly inspections of ten major US installations in II CTZ. Installation Security Inspections of nine installations were conducted during the

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reporting period. The PM portion of the inspection is mainly concerned with the identification and control of local national employees. A marked improvement was noted in this area, however, the following common deficiencies still exist:

a. A large percentage of the local national employees do not wear a valid gate access pass on the front of their outer garment when working on installations, as required by para 8f, USARV Reg 190-20.

b. There are insufficient numbers of female searchers to adequately check the large number of female employees which pass through the check-points each day.

c. Searching procedures and methods used in checking local national employees and vehicles entering and exiting an installation are inadequate.

(b) Prisoners of War: To reduce the II CTZ PW Camps' population to an acceptable level, 500 PW's have been transferred to Phu Quoc PW Camp during the reporting period (300 from Pleiku and 200 from Phu Tai). Phu Quoc population increased from 13,147 PW's in the previous reporting period to 15,913 PW's.

(c) Security of the King Duy Tan Hotel: The 272d MP Co assumed the commitment for the security of the King Duy Tan Hotel Compound on 9 Nov 68. The 218th MP Co still provides a reaction force of approximately 12 MP's for the King Duy Tan Hotel during emergencies.

(10) Safety and Accident Prevention (I FFORCEV assigned and attached units only):

(a) The I FFORCEV safety program was reviewed for the second quarter FY 1969 and statistics are included at Incl 17 and 18. Accidental gunshot wounds and motor vehicle accidents continued to be the largest cause of accidents. Command letters were written concerning this problem and improvement should be forthcoming.

(b) USARV proclaimed Jan 69 as USARV Safety Month. The CG, I FFORCEV declared January and the remaining months of FY 69 as I FFORCEV Safety Months. The following actions were taken to insure the success of these Safety Months:

1. Command letters were distributed to all units.

2. A personal message from CG, I FFORCEV was broadcast over the local AFVN station to inform the personnel of II CTZ of the necessity for safety awareness while in Vietnam.

3. Each battalion and separate company was required to forward a copy of its unit safety SOP to this headquarters. The SOPs were reviewed for adequacy and compliance with applicable regulations.

(c) The USARPV Safety Division hosted a safety conference in Dec 68 with safety officers from all major commands in attendance. The purpose of the conference was to improve the overall safety effort throughout Vietnam and to develop plans for the safety month.

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(d) Authorization was received for a civilian Safety Director for I FFORCEV. The Safety Director should arrive in this command the middle of Feb 69. Plans are being developed to establish a safety office adjacent to the G1 Section for use of the Safety Director.

(11) Medical:

(a) The general health of the command continues to be good. There was a decrease in the injuries as a result of hostile action which corresponded to the general decrease in enemy combat activity. Disease rates remained stable with the exception of a substantial decrease in the malaria rate in the 173d Abn Bde.

1. The 172d Preventive Medicine Unit continued to assist commanders in sanitation discipline and unit-level sanitation to improve the general health of the command.

2. The Preventive Medicine Unit also provided outstanding advice and assistance to the 173d Abn Bde and other tactical units in II CTZ in establishing and conducting a urinary chloroquine test program.

(b) The 173d Abn Bde incurred its highest rate of malaria during October, which was 515.5 cases/1000/annum. However, through energetic command emphasis and the use of a urinary chloroquine test the malaria rate for the brigade was reduced to 170.5 cases/1000/annum for the month of Nov 68. The trend of improvement continued through Dec 68 when the malaria rate reached a low of 80.6 cases/1000/annum.

(c) All physicians that rotated during the period were replaced by incoming personnel. The one physician who was lost due to injury was replaced during Jan 68.

(d) The 68th Med Det (Helicopter Ambulance) arrived in country on 28 Nov 68 and was placed under the command of the 43d Med Gp. The detachment is located at Phu Hiep and has six UH1-B helicopter ambulances which became operational 10 Jan 69. The unit presently has 13 of its authorized 14 aviators. The fourteenth is expected shortly.

(e) The 254th Med Det lost three dust-off helicopters during the last week of Dec 68 due to enemy activity. Evacuation effectiveness was not adversely effected because of support from the 68th Med Det. The three ships which were damaged were operational as of 10 Jan 69.

(f) US units in the II CTZ were deeply committed to the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Army Medical Service units in the area supported the effort to the fullest. A greatly increased number of MEDCAP II projects were initiated and new projects and existing projects were increasingly better integrated in support of the plans of the GVN Ministry of Health. As the number of US Army patients in US Army Hospitals decreased with the decrease in combat casualties the number of Vietnamese civilian patients in US facilities was increased. Through the mutual efforts of the MACV Surgeon and the Vietnamese Army Surgeon General a program was initiated to promote better relationships and mutual understanding between US Army physicians and ARVN physicians. The US Army 8th Field Hospital and the ARVN Nguyen Hae Hospital were selected to carry out the pilot project in the II CTZ.

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g. (C) Artillery.

(1) Intelligence. Hostile artillery activity during Nov 68 was concentrated in the three northern Provinces of Kontum, Pleiku and Binh Dinh. Significant enemy artillery activity included employment of 105mm artillery for the first time on targets in the Ben Het area of Kontum Province. He also employed the 100mm gun on targets in the Duc Co area of Pleiku Province. The enemy artillery capability increased significantly during November with the categorization of two enemy artillery battalions as "confirmed" and one enemy artillery battalion as "possible" in OB holdings within II CTZ. Enemy artillery expenditures and attacks during the month of December decreased when compared to November, as evidenced by an enemy artillery expenditure of 81 rounds per day during Nov 68 and 45 rounds per day during Dec 68. An increase in enemy artillery attacks and expenditures was noted during Jan 69 as evidenced by his daily expenditure of 51 rounds per day. The enemy attack on Phan Rang Air Base on 26 Jan 69 is noteworthy in that CMEC identified the rounds as 107mm rocket. Half of the enemy initiated attacks during November, December and January occurred in the Western Highlands. It is estimated that 45% of the enemy's artillery capability is located in this area. In addition to the 105mm and 100mm artillery employed during November and the 107mm rocket in January, the enemy artillery weapons employed during this period included mortars, 122mm rockets and recoilless rifles.

(2) Operations.

(a) During the reporting period, artillery units with I FFORCEV continued support of ARVN, ROK, US, RF/PF and USSF/CIDG forces in II CTZ. The artillery organization remained unchanged from that reported on 31 Oct 68. Continuing operations included BINH TAY/MAC ARTHUR, DAN SINH/COCHISE, DAN HOA/BOLLING, DAN THANG/MC LAIN and WALKER. ARVN and ROK forces were supported in the CRID AO and 9th ROK INF DIV AO.

(b) The I FFORCEV Arty organization remained as reported on 31 Oct 68 with two group headquarters, each with four attached battalions; three separate battalions; three separate batteries and ten detachments. The 41st Arty Gp supported operations basically in the DAN SINH/COCHISE, WALKER and CRID AO and the 52d Arty Gp in the BINH TAY MACARTHUR AO. The 5th Bn 27th Arty (105T) with Btry B 6th Bn 84th Arty (155T) and Btry C 5th Bn 22d Arty (8/175 SP) continued support in DAN THANG/MC LAIN AO. The 6th Bn 32d Arty (8/175 SP) with Btry C 6th Bn 84th Arty (155T) continued support in DAN HOA/BOLLING, CRID and 9th ROK Inf Div AO. The 4th Bn (AW)(SP) 60th Arty with two attached batteries and HHB 8th Bn 26th Arty (TAB) with ten attached counter mortar radar detachments continued support throughout the II CTZ.

(c) On 10 Nov 68, the Darlac Province Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) began operations as the second combined fire support coordination center in II CTZ. The first CFSCC was established in Binh Thuan Province in mid-Aug 68. The Darlac CFSCC is collocated with the 23d ARVN Div TOC and consists of an operations section, targeting section and liaison officers. Communications were established with all fire support organizations and clearance agencies in the Ban Me Thuot City area. The CFSCC reduced by at least five minutes the time required

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for granting clearances to artillery, gunships and Tac Air. A similar organization began operations in Kontum Province on 14 Jan 69. Prior to the establishment of CFSCC in these areas two major problems were encountered.

1. It was difficult to integrate the fire power of allied nations capable of firing in a given area. This frequently necessitated selection of a less suitable weapon for attacking a particular target or the loss of a lucrative target while attempting to coordinate the required fire support.

2. The obtaining of political or military clearances often required an excessive amount of time while an FSCC, working through a liaison officer, attempted to obtain clearances from the political headquarters and several military headquarters.

(d) The CFSCC alleviates these problems by collocating in one integrated facility, representatives from every fire support organization and clearance agency operating in a given area. The advantages are that the maneuver elements receive quick responses to calls for fire because the final authorities for selecting the best available weapon to attack the target and for obtaining political and military clearance are located within the single facility.

(3) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

(a) An average of two ships daily were on station in II CTZ coastal waters during the reporting period to provide naval gunfire support for the 173d Abn Bde, CRID, 9th ROK Inf Div and Task Force South. The USS New Jersey supported operations of the 9th ROK Inf Div and Task Force South during 5 - 7 Nov 68 and returned 26 - 28 Dec 68 to again support the 9th ROK Inf Div. The following is the total expenditures for naval gunfire support during the period:

<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>EXPENDITURE (ROUNDS)</u>
370	17,075

(b) An average of 1953 Immediate Reaction/Hangfire targets were developed each month as compared to the monthly average of 1985 for the previous reporting period. Of significance is the fact that the number of monthly targets varied between 1239 for November and 2684 for January. Several artillery hip-shoots/raids were conducted including one in which a total of 935 rounds of 175mm were expended.

(c) A study to determine appropriate ammunition expenditures on acquired targets was completed and guidance was furnished to all major commands and artillery headquarters in II CTZ.

(d) USARV established a Joint Air Operations Group (JAOG) with the purpose of dealing with current problems and developing an improved structure within the Aviation Artillery Warning System (AAWS). Changes in the structure and procedures of the AAWS are anticipated.

(e) FSCE issued an average of nine ARC Light suppressions of 175mm firing each day of the reporting period. Commanders were requested to

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report informally on the effects of these suppressions on their units' missions. The response indicated that the suppressions had not significantly affected artillery firing.

(f) Plans were made during January for a phased takeover by the artillery FSCE of those ARC Light functions performed by G3 Air, I FFORCEV. The takeover will be effected 5 Feb 69. The elimination of this dual interest should prove to be more efficient administratively in addition to recognizing that the primary responsibility for such action belongs with a FSCE.

(4) US Artillery Assistance and Support to RVNAF.

(a) The three assistance programs, USSF/CIDG, Associate Battery and RF/PF and RD continued during the reporting period. Improvement continues to be realized in the proficiency of CIDG artillerymen manning 105mm howitzers in 10 of the 22 USSF/CIDG camps in the II CTZ. More effective coordination between ARVN and US artillery units in mutual support and increased proficiency in ARVN artillery battery operations and maintenance procedures was noted.

(b) In Nov 68, it was determined that approximately 97% of the RF/PF units in the II CTZ are located within the range capabilities of allied artillery. The increase in coverage was a result of the artillery deployment to provide artillery support along the major lines of communications in II CTZ. Forward observer training for RF/PF continued to receive emphasis during the period. CG, II Corps (ARVN) directed that forward observer training schools be established by ARVN Artillery units in each province. US Artillery units assist in the training as requested by ARVN.

(c) In coordination with CORDS-RF/PF, I FFORCEV Arty developed a requirement for US Advisors to submit a report on the status of RF/PF capabilities to obtain artillery support. A series of questions pertaining to forward observers assigned, communications available and the artillery support provided were distributed to the Advisors through CORDS channels. Responses are pending at this time. A study of these questionnaires will isolate problem areas and provide data on which to base corrective action to improve the fire support for RF/PF.

(5) Artillery Seminar: The Third Allied Artillery Seminar was hosted by CG, I FFORCEV Arty on 29 Jan 69. Senior commanders and selected staff officers of ARVN, ROK and US Artillery organizations attended the one day conference. Included on the agenda were seven topics, presented and discussed by the allied artillerymen, as well as a calibration demonstration employing the Radar Chronograph, M36. The Seminars continue to provide significant results in coordination and understanding among the allied artillerymen in the II CTZ.

(6) Ammunition Expenditure Analysis. The analysis of ammunition expenditures by US Artillery in the II CTZ continued to provide an effective management tool for commanders in obtaining better utilization of their respective artillery support. During the six month period, Aug 68 - Jan 69, 20 percent of the expenditures were in the confirmed target category and 35 percent in the acquired target category. Eleven percent of the expenditures were in the interdiction category. The expenditure analysis emphasized target acquisition and analysis, thereby improving the fire support provided by US Artillery units.

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(7) Artillery Safety. The activities of the Artillery Safety Section, established in Oct 68, included publication of an Artillery Accident/Incident Investigating Officer's Checklist for uniform preparation of investigation reports; publication of nine lessons learned from analysis of artillery accidents; and publication of two letters regarding specific precautions required in the clearance of fires in the II CTZ. It was noted that approximately 20 percent of the accidents are attributed to clearance errors. The lessons learned publications were distributed to the artillery organizations in the I, II and III Corps Tactical Zones of RVN.

(8) Artillery Organization, II CTZ.

(a) Non-divisional

I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm, T)
6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8 inch, SP)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AWSP)
Battery B, 29th Artillery (SLT)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (MG)
Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (TAB)
77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

41st Artillery Group

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm, T)
2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm/155mm, T)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175mm/8 inch, SP)
6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155mm, T)

52d Artillery Group

3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm, T)
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175/8 inch, SP)
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8 inch, SP)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm, T)

(b) Divisional, Brigade and Separate Battalion

4th Infantry Division Artillery

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm, T)
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8 inch, SP)
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm, T)
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm, T)

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173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm, T)

3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division

Battery D, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm, T)

(9) Artillery Strength: The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for ARVN, ROK, US and USSF/CIDG Artillery units in II CTZ at the end of the reporting period. The deployment of the 63d ARVN Arty Bn increased the number of 105mm howitzers by 18 over the reporting period ending 31 Oct 68.

	105mm	155mm	8"	175mm
US DIVISIONAL	84	18	4	0
ROK DIVISIONAL	108	36	0	0
US FORCE ARTILLERY	72	40	22	26
ARVN ARTILLERY	116	42	0	0
SPECIAL FORCES (CIDG)	12	0	0	0
TOTAL	399	136	26	26
GRAND TOTAL	597			

(10) Ammunition Statistics for US Artillery with I FFORCEV during the reporting period.

(a) Expenditures by Target Category:

TARGET CATEGORY	NOVEMBER ROUNDS/MISSIONS	DECEMBER ROUNDS/MISSIONS	JANUARY ROUNDS/MISSIONS
CONFIRMED	27,030/1,005	25,307/1,051	29,634/1,286
ACQUIRED	47,931/9,299	53,333/9,555	72,832/13,046
COUNTERBATTERY	5,912/421	3,190/351	2,968/183
PREPARATION	20,357/1,184	16,844/810	16,170/841
INTERDICTION	13,526/7,841	21,896/10,673	35,367/13,511
SPECIAL PURPOSE	19,242/3,032	20,356/2,702	24,965/3,158
OTHER	2,700/281	2,826/355	3,908/493
TOTAL	136,698/23,023	143,752/25,497	185,844/32,518

(b) Expenditures by Caliber:

MONTH	CALIBER	RDS EXPENDED	% OF TOTAL	RDS/TUBE/DAY
NOVEMBER	105mm	85,315	62%	18
	155mm	23,835	17%	14
	8 in	14,292	11%	18
	175mm	13,256	10%	18
	Sub Total	136,698	100%	17*
DECEMBER	105mm	86,041	60%	18
	155mm	26,307	18%	15
	8 in	12,895	9%	15
	175mm	18,309	13%	23
	Sub Total	143,752	100%	18*
JANUARY	105mm	113,661	62%	24
	155mm	37,086	20%	21
	8 in	14,488	8%	18
	175mm	18,609	10%	23
	Sub Total	183,844	100%	22*
	GRAND TOTAL	466,294		

*Prorated Average

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h. (C) Signal Operations: The continuing upgrade of communications within the II CTZ was the major concern of the Signal Section during the past quarter.

(1) The 54th Sig Bn continued to provide communications support to units within the II CTZ. Radioteletype command Net ALPHA was expanded to include a new station at Di Linh. Multi-channel VHF radio systems were installed from An Khe to LZ English and to the 4th Bn (Avn) 503d Inf Miami Beach to Vung Chua Mountain, Nui Ba to the FSB of the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf and from Hong Kong Mountain to a FSB of the 4th Inf Div. Support continued for TF Spoiler, TF Bright and the 200th Engr Bn. Installation of two new tropo systems, AN/TRC-97B, from Nui Tre Island to Hong Kong Mountain at An Khe and to Dragon Mountain near Pleiku was completed and test circuits established on them. FM radio support was furnished to the CRID LNO for his coordination with US and ROA units.

(2) A combined cable team composed of members of the 54th Sig Bn and the 458th Sig Bn was formed to maintain the cable within the Nha Trang area. A PA system was permanently installed in bldg #5, Grand Hotel Compound, and the AN/TIQ-13, a 50 position Simultaneous Language Interpretation System, was received for use during combined conferences.

(3) The MARS station was moved from the roof of the Grand Hotel to a location at Camp McDermott. The AUTOSEVOCOM installation at the Grand Hotel was completed and is awaiting activation of the Nha Trang switchboard. A 100 word-per-minute Mode V AUTODIN circuit was installed between the I FFORCEV Comcenter and the Nha Trang Automatic Switching Center to provide an access into the worldwide AUTODIN Digital Network.

(4) The Signal Section continued in its resolution of frequency interference, SOI compromise and distribution and security problems. Special projects this quarter were RED ROCKET and BLUE FLARE messages, 54th Sig Bn IG Inspection, Telephone Circuit Quality Control Program, Village/Hamlet Radio System, Buddy System Program, Typhoon Telephone Directory and the Communications Data Analysis Program.

1. (C) Engineer:

(1) During the period of this report the engineer section devoted considerable effort to planning of engineer activities in II CTZ, coordinated and monitored 18th Engr Bde units in combat support of units OPCOM to I FFORCEV and monitored activities of engineer units organic to the 4th Inf Div and 173d Abn Bde. Periodic up-date briefings on engineer activities in II CTZ were given to CG, I FFORCEV. Close contact with engineer units and projects was maintained by frequent field trips conducted by members of the section. Staff projects during this period include:

(a) MIP Program III-6, I FFORCEV Highway Improvement Program (Engr/G-3): Completed.

(b) MIP Program III-5, I FFORCEV Airfield Improvement and Maintenance Program (Engr/G-4): Although this program is complete, the requirement for continued review and periodic revision continues.

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(c) A study of tactical bridge requirements in II CTZ for FY 1970 was initiated within this reporting period and is 60% complete as of 31 Jan 69. Some of the objectives of the study are the development of tactical bridge contingency plans and the refinement of bridge reporting and accountability procedures. The study is scheduled for completion during the next quarter.

(d) A study is in progress directed towards generating recommendations for the improvement of ARVN Engr units and will continue into the next reporting period.

(e) Planning and coordination directed towards the improvement of MACV advisor facilities was conducted during this report period and planning and construction continues to be monitored by this section.

(f) A joint project between this section and the 64th Engr Det (T) was initiated to accumulate and catalogue ground and aerial photographs of all bridges on main LOC's in II CTZ and is 50% complete as of 31 Jan 69.

(2) Support of Tactical Operations.

(a) BINH TAY/MACARTHUR: The 937th Engr Gp was in general support in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces while the 35th Engr Gp extended general support in Darlac Province and the northern portion of Quang-Duc Province included within this AO. Significant operational support missions included:

1. Kontum Province: Daily minesweep of Route 512 and QL-14, construction of a TOC for the 1st Bn 92d Arty, clearing of a minefield near Tan Canh, erection of a control tower at Dak To II Airfield, building of five guard towers and the revetment of the 57th AHC maintenance hangar, the construction of a road around the parking ramp at Dak To II and the continuous peneprizing of Dak To II during the dry season. A dental bunker for the 4th Med Bn at Dak To was also completed by the 299th Engr Bn (Cbt). C Co 299th Engr Bn (Cbt) extracted 23,067 cubic yards of sand from pits vic Kontum for use in Pleiku and Kontum.

2. Pleiku Province: The 20th Engr Bn (Cbt) conducted daily minesweeps of QL-14 from Kontum to Pleiku, QL-19 W and QL-19 E to Mang Giang Pass, built seven track revetments at Blackhawk FB, repaired four damaged gun pads at Plei Djereng and completed the helicopter rearming points at Camp Holloway. The 815th Engr Bn (Const) reveted the power plant for the Log Depot, completed a commo bunker for the 43rd Sig Co and finished reveting the 504th MP Bn Dog Co Kennels in Pleiku. This unit also initiated the revetment of the 71st Evac Hosp on 15 Dec 68 and continues on this project scheduled for completion o/a 20 Jun 69. The Psy War Radio station bunker (Yellowbird) was completed by the 20th Engr Bn (Cbt) on 25 Dec 68.

3. Darlac and Northern Quang-Duc Province: The 70th Engr Bn (Cbt), stationed in Ban Me Thuot (BMT), maintained the LSA at BMT (Z) and expanded the ASP by three cells. Dust suppression operations were conducted continuously during the dry season. An underground medical bunker located at Ban Me Thuot City airfield was initiated on 27 Jan 69.

(b) WALKER: The 20th Engr Bn (Cbt) constructed 17 helicopter revetments for D Troop 2d Bn 1st Air Cav at An Khe/Golf Course, cleared approximately 16 acres around the ASP at Camp Radcliff and commenced repair of the taxiway at An Khe Airfield with a scheduled completion date of 28 Feb 69.

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(c) DAN SINH/COCHISE: The 19th Engr Bn (Cbt) provided engineer general support, primarily to the 173d Abn Bde in the form of engineer equipment on an as needed basis for the construction of helicopter pads and aviation projects. Daily minesweeps were conducted over 41.6 km of QL-1 from Bong Song into I CTZ vic of Mo Duc. Four gun pads were repaired at LZ Pony for the 7th Bn 15th Arty, removed 825 CY of fill from a RR berm near LZ Lowboy and cleared 6550 square yards (SY) in the same location to reduce the danger of ambushes. The majority of engineer effort expended by the 19th Engr Bn (Cbt) within this AO was concentrated on LOC's and airfield construction.

(d) DAN HOA/BOLLING: The 84th Engr Bn (Const), based in Qui Nhon, and the 577th Engr Bn (Const), stationed at Phu Hiep, provided engineer general support within this AO. The 84th Engr Bn (Const) hauled sand and rock to LZ Schuler for the placement of a concrete turning pad in support of the 173d Abn Bde. Limited engineer effort was devoted to the construction of tactical security and operations facilities in the battalion area and at separately located company sites. The majority of engineer effort of this battalion was devoted to numerous and extensive base development projects. One company concentrated on pioneer road building on portions of QL-1 between Phu Tai and Tuy An. The 577th Engr Bn (Const) constructed drainage structures and artillery gun pads at Cung Song fire support base and installed four separate dry-span bridges in support of combat operations along LTL-7B.

(e) DAN TRANG/MCLAIN: Engineer support was provided by the 116th Engr Bn (Cbt) stationed at Bao Loc and the 589th Engr Bn (Const) based at Phan Rang. During this reporting period berms were constructed for the relocation of the ARVN ASP near Phan Thiet. Operational support consisting of protective berms, access roads, drainage structures and shallow walls was provided at fire bases Sandy and Sherry. Considerable effort was devoted to the maintenance of LTL-8B and minesweeps accomplished as required. An area was cleared at Di Linh to provide for relocation of the 53d ARVN Regt Hq. Roads and drainage structures were built at the LSA in Bao Loc and the fire base occupied by the 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf. Numerous interdictions of QL-20 were bypassed or repaired and a new fire support base was begun at Tan My in early January with beneficial occupancy expected in early February.

(f) During the period the 18th Engr Bde reported 226 enemy incidents involving engineer units in II CTZ. The 35th Engr Gp reported seven KIA's and 28 MIA's during this reporting period. The breakout of incidents by type is as follows:

Mine Incidents	127
Sniper Activity	33
Mortar Attack	13
Blown Culverts/Bridges	21
Ambushes	25
Sapper Attack	1
Captured VC	5
Chien Hoi	
TOTAL	$\frac{1}{226}$

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(3) Airfield Upgrading and/or Repair

(a) An Khe (BR478447): One platoon of the 20th Engr Bn (Cbt) commenced the repair of the MSAI taxiways in early January. The work consists of removing the MSAI, excavating the old subgrade and emplacing and compacting new subgrade and MSAI. The EDC for this project is 28 Feb 69.

(b) Ban Me Thuot East (AQB68020): Construction of a taxiway for FAC aircraft began on 17 Jan 69 and the widening of a temporary taxiway for Air Force aircraft use during repair of the runway by Vietnamese contractors began 29 Jan 69.

(c) Bao Loc (ZT065792): This airfield was closed to all but C-74 aircraft on 2 Nov 68 and repairs initiated utilizing soil cement to replace portions of the subgrade which had failed was followed by application of an asphalt seal coat and replacement of MSAI matting. The airfield was reopened to C-123 aircraft on 13 Dec 68.

(d) Ben Het (YB872252): The 299th Engr Bn Cbt) completed expedient repairs on the runway in Dec 68 by injecting grout under the MSAI matting at points with failing subgrade and replacement or welding of damaged matting.

(e) Buon Ba Yang (BQ100030): Due to excessive cross-winds at this airfield an 80° reorientation was required to permit safe use by FAC aircraft. The project was undertaken on 23 Nov 68 and completed 20 Dec 68.

(f) Cheo Reo (BQ233818): Elements of the 20th Engr Bn (Cbt) moved on site in Jan 69 to commence major repairs of the north runway. However, difficulties in securing a contract for crushed rock and a request from the Vietnamese Director of Airbases that airfields accepting Air Vietnam traffic not be closed prior to 10 Mar 69 resulted in the diversion of engineer effort to improving MACV advisor facilities.

(g) Dak Seang (YB895406): Major repairs on this airfield commenced in the previous reporting period but had to be terminated due to the onset of the monsoon followed by extensive damage from enemy attack. During this report period repairs were reinitiated and completed bringing it back up to Type I, C-7A operational status.

(h) Dak To II (ZB012216): The 299th Engr Bn (Cbt) placed peze-prime continuously throughout the dry season for dust suppression and improved the road and drainage network surrounding the airfield.

(i) Dalat/Cam Ly (FP185220): Inspection of 22 Dec 68 revealed slope failure in the embankment on the west end of the runway and failure of the asphalt surface in the touchdown area of the runway. Repairs are currently in progress and will be completed within the next quarter.

(j) Dac Co (YB843255): During the first week of Jan 69, 5th SFGA requested assistance in pezepriming an area for use by Air Force aircraft engaged in classified operations. Work was started on 29 Jan 69.

(k) Dac Lap II (YU906752): Maintenance efforts begun in last quarter continued throughout this report period. By 17 Dec 68 repairs were sufficiently completed to permit operation of C-7A traffic and responsibility for routine maintenance was resumed by the using Special Forces unit.

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(l) English (BS879005): Major upgrading of this airfield by the 19th Engr Bn (Cbt) continued throughout this report period. The southern 1600 feet section of the runway was paved with three inches of asphalt concrete and is operational for C-7A aircraft. Upgrading of the northern 1800 feet consisting of excavation of the old basecourse and replacement with a compacted laterite and crushed rock basecourse is in progress. The EDC is 15 Apr 69.

(m) Lac Thien (AP975736): The extension of the current runway was started 29 Dec 68 to permit the safe operation of FAC aircraft. The extension consists of a sod runway with a concrete transition from the sod to the existing PSP surface.

(n) Phan Thiet (AN801068): Permanent repair consisting of shaping, compaction and placement of a soil cement subgrade and M8A1 surface was accomplished between 10 Dec 68 and 17 Jan 69.

(4) Land Clearing Operations: The 35th Land Clearing Platoon cleared 5889 acres between 1 Nov 68 and 31 Jan 69 in the following areas:

(a) Route 506.

(b) LTL-6B vicinity BR883114 to BR895143 and BR900164 to BR900178.

(c) QL-14 from AQ923682 to AQ923378 and BQ017344 to BQ009525.

(5) Route Upgrading in II CTZ:

(a) During this reporting period 39.22 km of LOC were paved to MACV standard.

(b) Route upgrading in the 35th Engr Gp AO was as follows:

1. QL-1 (between Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro) - the 577th Engr Bn (Const) completed 17.6 km of paving. The EDC for this section is Apr 69.

2. QL-1 (Kien River to Ba Ngoi) - the 87th Engr Bn (Const) continued to place the base course on this section until their deactivation in Jan 69. Raymond, Morrison and Knudsen (RMK) has assumed responsibility for construction and paving.

3. QL-1 (Sip Ja Sung to Minh Hoa) - The 864th Engr Bn (Const) maintained this segment. RMK has started construction and paving of this portion and have an EDC of Aug 69.

4. QL-11: The 589th Engr Bn (Const) has been doing earthwork between Phan Rang and Song Pha and maintaining the remainder of QL-11 to the west. The start of placement of base course work is scheduled early in Feb 69.

(c) LOC upgrading within the 937th Engr Gp AO was as follows:

1. QL-1 (Phu Tai to Tuy An) - The 84th Engr Bn (Cbt) will continue to accomplish pioneer road work until RMK base course and paving operations commence o/a Jun 69.

2. QL-19E (Pleiku to Mang Giang Pass) - The 815th Engr Bn (Const) maintained this section and placed a double-lane bituminous surface. As of 31 Jan 69, 60% of this segment was paved.

3. QL-1 (I CTZ border to LZ English) - The 19 Engr Bn (Cbt)

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commenced paving operations on this section early in Jan 69 and should complete paving prior to the end of the next quarter.

4. QL-14 (Fleiku to Tan Canh) - The 299th Engr Bn (Cbt) continued earthwork from Tan Canh to Kontum while the 20th Engr Bn (Cbt) and elements of the 815th Engr Bn (Const) started paving operations from the asphalt plant, approximately seven km south of Kontum, paving northward. As of 3 Jan 69 paving had reached the city limits of Kontum.

5. Route 512 (Dak To II to Ben Het) - One company of the 299th Engr Bn (Cbt) maintained and improved this route by earth-work and improvement of drainage structures and continued construction of permanent bridges 512-1 and 512-3. Upgrading was temporarily suspended in the later part of Jan 69 due to redeployment of the 1st Bde 4th Inf Div which necessitated the relocation of the 299th Engr Bn (Cbt) from their former base camp near Tan Canh to the evacuated fire base at Dak To II.

(d) During this period maintenance was performed on 642 meters of culvert and 67 bridges. Eleven tactical bridges were installed and 1412.2 meters of new culvert constructed.

(6) Miscellaneous Engineer Activities

(a) MACV "Get Well" Program : During the period of this report 58 sites were selected for construction. Sixteen of these were proposed for let to civilian construction while the remainder are to be accomplished by troop labor. As of 31 Jan 69, the 18th Engr Bde completed required construction at Dong Xuan, Hieu Xuong and Son Hoa and Phu Yen Province and commenced work on five more sites.

(b) The 864th Engr Bn (Const) repaired two Eiffel bridges on a small side-road west of Nha Trang leading to a new RF/PF outpost.

(c) Construction of a sea wall by the Installation Defense Center TOC across from I FFORCEV Headquarters was started by the 864th Engr Bn (Const) and is scheduled to be completed in Feb 69.

(d) Berms were constructed for several villages along LTL-8B by the 116th Engr Bn (Cbt) as part of the Strategic Hamlet Program.

(e) The 589th Engr Bn (Const) rebuilt two ammunition revetments at the Phan Rang LST off-loading beach after they had been destroyed by a tropical storm.

(f) During this report period the following engineer unit changes were effected:

1. The 87th Engr Bn (Const) was deactivated effective 31 Jan 69.
2. The 643d Pipeline Co was redeployed to III CTZ.
3. The 497th Port Const Co was redeployed to III CTZ effective 31 Jan 69.
4. The 35th Land Clearing Plt was augmented and redesignated the 538th Land Clearing Co.
5. The 687th Land Clearing Co was activated on 1 Jan 69 and scheduled for deployment early in Feb 69.

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j. (U) Information Office.

(1) Representatives of the Information Office provided publicity coverage for numerous awards and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during this period, including:

(a) II CTZ Senior Commanders' Conference - 5 Nov 68.

(b) Presentation of the Legion of Merit to LTC Mennona by LTG Peers - 20 Nov 68.

(c) The signing of the II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan by LTG Peers, General Im, and General Lu Lan - 29 Nov 68.

(d) Presentation of the Legion of Merit to COL Rood by LTG Peers - 30 Nov 68.

(e) Presentation of the Legion of Merit to LTC Carmichael by LTG Peers - 10 Dec 68.

(f) Assumption of Command, 173d Abn Bde (Sep), by EG John W. Barnes - 15 Dec 68.

(g) Presentation of the Legion of Merit to LTC Aarestad by LTG Peers - 29 Dec 68.

(h) Presentation of the Valorous Unit Citation to the 272d MP Co by LTG Peers - 30 Dec 68.

(2) Photographic coverage was provided for numerous distinguished visitors, including:

(a) Mr. J. Giffert, Under Secretary of the Army - 16 Nov 68.

(b) General Harold K. Woolnough, CG, CONARC - 28 Dec 68.

(c) Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC - 26 Dec 68.

(d) The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery (D-Miss) member US House of Representatives - 23 Dec 68.

(e) EG Surgeon Neil, CG, 44th Med Bde - 6 Jan 69.

(f) EG Winant Sidle, IO, MACV - 19 Jan 69.

(g) LTG Albert O. Conner, DESPER - 24 Jan 69.

(3) The following media representatives were granted an interview with the CG and/or G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:

(a) Robert Christopher, Senior Editor in Charge of International Affairs, Newsweek, and Joel Blocker, Saigon Bureau Chief, Newsweek - 9 Nov 68.

(b) Mr. Joe Alsop, Washington Post - 24 Nov 68.

(c) Mr. L. James Binder, Editor, Army Magazine - 8 Dec 68.

(4) Command Information Initial Briefings for personnel newly assigned to I FFORCEV were conducted twice monthly.

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(5) On 24 Dec 68, LTC Robert D. Reed assumed the duties of Information Officer, I FFORCEV, replacing LTC Paul A. Teehan.

(6) The 5th Public Information Detachment, under the supervision of the IO, I FFORCEV, published and distributed the "Morning News" on a daily basis, and a bi-weekly summation of news in II CTZ, the "WRAP-UP". The 5th PID also produced a weekly, 15 minute radio program, the "Feature Page". The I FFORCEV magazine, the "TYPHOON", was published in November, December and January.

(7) The 11th Public Information Detachment continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other support to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 461 during the period covered. MAJ C.R. Claypoole, CO, 11th PID, departed for CONUS on 24 Nov 68. MAJ Charles W. Whitney assumed command of the 11th PID on 30 Nov 68 and 1LT Roy C. Russell III was assigned on 30 Nov 68 and assumed the duty of assistant CORDS IO.

k. (U) Inspector General Activities:

(1) COL Albert F. Wilson, Jr. arrived on 3 December 1968 and assumed the duties of Inspector General, this headquarters.

(2) During the period, 22 complaints and 41 requests for assistance were received. Three of the complaints were justified. However, none indicated evidence of trends, irregularities or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(3) Command inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>
Cam Ranh Prov Adv Tm	3 Nov 68
297th Trans Co	8 Nov 68
Phu Yen Prov Adv Tm	10 Nov 68
1st Bn 92d Arty	18 Nov 68
HHC, I FFORCEV	22 Nov 68
7th Bn 15th Arty	25 Nov 68
5th Bn 22d Arty	9 Dec 68
7th Bn 13th Arty	16 Dec 68
3d Bn 6th Arty	6 Jan 69
6th Bn 14th Arty	20 Jan 69
54th Sig Bn	24 Jan 69
209th Sig Det	24 Jan 69
6th Bn 84th Arty	27 Jan 69

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(a) All units were rated satisfactory with the exception of the 5th Bn 22d Arty. Unsatisfactory areas found in this unit were scheduled for reinspection by the 52d Arty Gp.

(b) Command inspections of province advisory teams were postponed, upon the completion of inspection of the Phu Yen Province Advisory Team, until the conclusion of the Accelerated Pacification Program on 31 Jan 69.

(4) The Inspector General accompanied Colonel Ho, II Corps Inspector General, during his inspection of the 5th ALC and subordinate units in the Nha Trang area on 12-13 Dec 68.

(5) A staff visit was made on 28 Dec 68 to Inspector General, II Corps Advisory Group, for purpose of orientation and liaison.

(6) Memorandum, subject: Rights of Military Personnel to Present Complaints was published and distributed on 1 Jan 69 to all assigned and attached units. A similar memorandum was published for the benefit of CORDS personnel on 9 Jan 69.

(7) During the period, one investigation was conducted by the Inspector General.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate Activities:

(1) There were two trials by general courts-martial convened by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, during the quarter compared to six cases the previous quarter. Two hundred sixty-five courts-martial and 134 summary courts-martial records of trial were reviewed for legal sufficiency. This reflects an increase of 140 special and 75 summary courts-martial over the previous quarter. The continued increase of court-martial records is due to the I Field Force assuming jurisdiction over several USARV troop units effective 1 Oct 68.

(2) Twenty-eight claims of Army personnel for loss of, or damage to, personal property incident to service were adjudicated and paid, compared to 40 the previous quarter. The claims totaling \$4341.79 were approved for payment in the total amount of \$3063.00.

(3) Twenty-eight claims of Vietnamese nationals for personal injury or property damage were processed by this office.

(4) The Legal assistance office provided advice and assistance on Civil matters to 575 individuals during the quarter compared to 676 the previous quarter.

m. (U) Command Analysis and Programs Activities:

(1) Organization:

(a) The office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Command Analysis and Programs (SA/CAP) was organized in Sep 68. Its basic purpose is to help improve management of I FFORCEV resources to increase their effectiveness on the battlefield. This purpose is accomplished by:

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1. Assisting the I FFORCEV staff and deputy operating agencies in applying advanced management techniques to management information analysis in their functional fields.

2. Supervising the collection, recording, summarization, reporting, review and use of statistical information for command analysis.

3. Insuring that adequate information flows from all relevant sources in a timely manner, and that intelligent analyses are made of this information as a basis for objectively and comprehensively appraising the operations of the command.

4. Applying computer systems analysis and programming effort as available and as required in the development and control of mission-oriented management systems for command decision making.

5. Recommending the establishment or elimination of management improvement programs.

6. Conducting in-house studies as directed by the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff to improve the management of I FFORCEV resources.

7. Reviewing studies as directed by the Chief of Staff to insure objectivity of conclusions and adequacy of recommendations.

8. Monitoring the management systems analysis and development effort within the I FFORCEV staff and deputy operating agencies.

(b) The SA/CAP directs the HQ I FFORCEV command analysis effort and is the principal advisor to the Chief of Staff and Commanding General on all matters concerning command analysis and programs for management effort. He is assisted by a Command Analyst, a Senior Systems Development Officer, a Systems Development Officer, an Enlisted Systems Analyst and a clerk.

(2) CAP was assigned responsibility for the CG's Multi-Improvement Plan (MIP), a management tool of the highest interest to the CG. The Plan was reformatred and staff efforts were redirected, resulting in a plan that provides the CG with key information on the various projects in II CTZ. The Plan enables the CG to provide direction, assure progress and insure continuity of programs in the many areas of command analysis and resource management.

(3) After coordination with G3 on the concept and preliminary systems design, CAP developed the fully automated I FFORCEV Tactical Air Expenditures Analysis System. PERT techniques were used in planning and controlling the system design. The system became operational on 1 Dec 68 as scheduled.

(4) In a coordinated effort, CORDS, G3 and CAP developed the initial Accelerated Pacification Campaign Plan for II CTZ.

(5) Systems analysis support was provided to the 17th Combat Aviation Group on their design of an automated Aviation Assets Utilization Analysis System.

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(6) CAP devised a simple method of extracting key data on the Accelerated Pacification Campaign Plan from the Hamlet Evacuation System. Data is displayed on a timely basis for three levels of management - CG, DEFCORDS and PSA.

(7) CAP provided the systems analysis for Phase II of an ARC Light Study undertaken by G3. Phase II was a trade-off analysis among ARC Light strikes, tactical air and field artillery using the Battle for Duc Lap as a scenario.

(8) CAP made an extensive study about the command and staff relationships among I FFORCEV, CORDS and DSA II Corps. A 17 Dec Command and Staff Relationships letter was prepared defining roles and explaining the interfaces among the staffs and operating agencies involved. (Incl 20)

(9) CAP provided computer operator support and computer programmers to maintain the Tactical Air Expenditures Analysis System.

(10) Assistance was provided to G3 in devising a system to make the I FFORCEV HQ ORLL Quarterly Report more meaningful.

(11) Preliminary work was begun on analysis systems for signal assets and engineer assets in II CTZ, as well as Army aviation gunship ordnance expenditures. Preliminary work was started on a system to extract key data from the Revised Hamlet Evacuation System.

(12) CAP was assigned responsibility for assembling and publishing a HQ I FFORCEV organization and functions manual. Inputs from the I FFORCEV staff and operating agencies were received and are currently being edited for publication.

(13) CAP provided varying degrees of assistance for the various I FFORCEV staff sections and operating agencies in the three areas of management information: collection of data, analysis of data and presentation of data.

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2. SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The majority of lessons learned by HQ, I FFORCEV during the quarter were submitted monthly by staff sections to a Tactical Analysis Board which, after evaluation, developed them into lessons learned directed specifically to units in the II CTZ. These lessons learned along with ones submitted by units are published monthly as "Tactical Notes" (Incl 5, 6 and 7) and are widely disseminated throughout the II CTZ. The majority of these lessons learned, although oriented toward operations in the II CTZ, would be applicable to operations throughout Vietnam.

a. (U) PERSONNEL: None

b. (C-NOFORN) OPERATIONS:

(1) Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Analysis of cordon and search operations indicate specific reasons for success and failure.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. Successful cordon and search operations have been a direct result of:

a. Emphasis on the need for close and continuous liaison by US units with area officials, Province Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (PIOCCs) and District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCs), National Police and village/hamlet chiefs in order to gain and insure cooperation. This requirement has been stressed by successful unit commanders, staffs and advisory personnel.

b. Availability of current, complete information (black list) on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).

c. Silent positioning of cordon elements prior to daylight.

d. In addition to (a) - (c) above, the simultaneous employment of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT), National Police and Medcap Team elements reassures the populace that an effort is being made to help them.

2. Unsuccessful cordon and search operations have been a direct result of:

a. Inadequate communications for Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PP).

b. Inadequate security and "leakage" which may result from prior coordination with local forces.

c. Failure of local officials to visit villages to indicate a government interest.

d. Poorly trained search and interrogation personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That unit commanders, staffs and advisory personnel review methods and techniques for conducting cordon and search operations in light of the above evaluation.

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(2) AC47 (Spooky) Interdiction Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: AC47 gunships (Spooky) based at Phan Rang, Nha Trang and Phu Cat fly night Combat Air Patrol (CAP) in vicinity of their home base. Should their four hour CAP mission expire without expending in support of troops in contact (TIC), the aircraft commander habitually desires to fire an interdiction mission to maintain crew proficiency. In the past, the aircraft commander would accept a call for interdiction from II Corps elements and forward their target to Direct Air Support Coordinator (DASC) Alpha for clearance. In many cases, these targets of questionable validity could not be cleared due to proximity of friendly troops. This time delay often resulted in aircraft returning to base without firing.

(b) EVALUATION: 1. To minimize problems such as the above and to provide the most lucrative target available, an interdiction program was established with three specific objectives.

(a) To provide crewmen an opportunity to maintain weapons system proficiency.

(b) To engage the most lucrative targets available based on current intelligence.

(c) To have interdiction targets pre-cleared to expedite engagement as the gunships depart CAP.

2. G3 Air Division, I FFORCEV, daily solicits lucrative interdiction targets from each US/FWMAF element along the coast. Coastal units are used solely due to the CAP locations flown. Units may submit multiple targets; however, each is required to provide at least one. These targets are listed with other targets furnished by the I FFORCEV, PSCE and in accordance with current intelligence and latest Intelligence Reports, target priorities are established for each aircraft.

3. Approximately 30 minutes to one hour prior to departing CAP, the aircraft commander requests an interdiction target. A target is selected from the priority list in close proximity to the CAP area and authority to expend is passed to the Spooky gunship via the DASC. The aircraft is cleared on and off the target by DASC.

4. The above outlined program has minimized clearance problems and has provided the best available targeting for the expenditure of ordnance.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the above described interdiction program be pursued with a view toward adoption of it or a variation thereof for use in other corps areas.

(3) (C-MOPORN) ARC Light Clearance Procedures.

(a) OBSERVATION: Indications are that a major threat to US/FWMAF ARC Light security is created by releasing target information to GVN/ARVN agencies in order to obtain political and tactical clearance. Prisoners of War and Hoi Chanh reports indicate that this clearance procedure is a significant source of VC/NVA ARC Light intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION: In an effort to reduce the compromise potential of ARC Light targets throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), a new

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technique in clearing procedures was instituted in November 1968. This procedure was initially established to expedite clearance between the 4th Inf Div and II Corps; however, it proved so satisfactory that it was implemented throughout the II CTZ.

1. To institute this procedure, various sections of the II CTZ were designated by CG, II Corps and precleared by GVN/ARVN agencies. These areas are called ARVN Politically and Tactically Cleared Areas (APTCA) and ARVN Politically Cleared Areas (APCA).

a. APTCA: An area in which all GVN/ARVN clearances, political and tactical, have been granted. It is necessary to obtain only US/FWMAF approval prior to making any type of strike in this area.

b. APCA: An area in which all GVN political clearance has been granted and only tactical clearance from US/FWMAF/ARVN is required prior to a strike.

2. By establishing these areas in II CTZ (approximately 55,000 sq kms as APTCA and an additional 50,000 sq kms as APCA) there has been a marked reduction of ARC Light information placed in GVN/ARVN channels. Should targets fall outside of an APTCA and either political or tactical clearance or both are required, the target data is transmitted via US secure means to the II Corps G3 Air Advisor. The G3 Air Advisor plots this data on a secure map and reveals the exact location of the target to the G3, Chief of Staff or CG, II Corps only. If the target is in such a location that one of these individuals cannot grant the necessary clearances, a large box (some 10 x 10 kms or as close as restrictions permit) is established. This box is passed below Corps level and clearance is obtained for the entire area. Once this is accomplished, clearance is transmitted to the US/FWMAF via secure line. This technique precludes the target location, designation or intelligence from being released below corps level. Targets generated by ARVN forces are not passed below division level, and should a target be generated at the Corps level it is cleared in the same manner as US/FWMAF strikes.

3. Times on target (TOT) of primary ARC Light strikes are passed to II Corps via secure voice and to all units concerned via secure means. The G3 Air Advisor passes this information to the G3, Chief of Staff or the CG, II Corps only. The TOT message is not transmitted to II Corps until approximately two hours prior to the strike. Secondary target TOTs are received in the clear and transmitted via telephone to the appropriate unit. Times are rarely received more than 30 minutes prior to the strike.

4. It is believed that this technique of clearing targets has significantly degraded the VC/NVA ARC Light intelligence gathering effort.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the above outlined technique of clearing ARC Light targets be studied with a view towards implementing it or a variation thereof in other Corps Zones as a step to reduce compromise potential of ARC Light strikes.

(4) Fire Support Clearances

(a) OBSERVATION: Clearance to employ fire support means is normally granted for specific locations which are identified by grid coordinates, generally expressed to the nearest 100 meters. Often neither

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clearing agencies nor requesting units specify the area around the requested location which is cleared for fire.

(b) EVALUATION: There are inherent delivery errors associated with the employment of artillery, mortars, Naval gunfire, Army aviation and tactical air strikes. Also, after observed fires are initially directed on the cleared grid coordinates, there is often a requirement to shift or adjust fires. These two factors necessitate the establishment of a larger area around the initial target coordinates which must be verified for clearance. Experience in II CTZ has shown that a rule of thumb clearance of one square kilometer or 1000 meter radius around a target provides the necessary flexibility for shifting and adjusting fires.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That tactical commands establish standard procedures for clearance of fires so that an appropriate area around the target grid coordinates is cleared for fires.

c. (U) TRAINING.

(1) Training of Interrogators:

(a) OBSERVATION: An interrogator must possess an in-depth knowledge of the enemy to fully exploit PWs and Hoi Chanhs.

(b) EVALUATION: Interrogators frequently skim the surface of a source's knowledge. Greater familiarity on the part of the interrogator with enemy organization and functions will permit a deeper penetration of knowledgeable sources and will increase the output from so-called low-level or valueless sources. This is also true in the fields of tactics, political organization and weaponry. Knowledge of VC political structure is an essential prerequisite for production of VCI intelligence. Again, knowledge of VC weaponry will assist the interrogator in identifying new weapons and alterations in old ones.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That in-depth instruction on the enemy be given to interrogators by appropriate intelligence personnel at division/separate brigade level to include tactics, political structure and weaponry.

d. (U) INTELLIGENCE

(1) Use of Interpreters as a Source of Local Intelligence Collection:

(a) OBSERVATION: Vietnamese interpreters and other Vietnamese personnel working with American units live in local communities and thus are a potential source of intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION: There has been an increasing emphasis on gathering intelligence from the local inhabitants concerning VC taxes, infiltration, prior warning of attacks, VCI meetings, planned enemy actions, etc. Many of the Vietnamese interpreters assigned to I PFORCEV are local inhabitants and live in the city with their families. Since they are intelligence-trained personnel, they are easily briefed on the situation and used as low-level agents to gather intelligence information from their friends and neighbors. Even without extensive training, they have been found to be knowledgeable in areas of intelligence interest.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That exploitation of Vietnamese interpreters and other personnel working with American units as sources of intelligence from the community be expanded and formalized to provide a regular and reliable source of information.

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(2) Use of Translators for Liaison Between Intelligence Agencies.

(a) OBSERVATION: The large volume of intelligence generated within II Corps makes the utilization of liaison personnel necessary between Allied headquarters and intelligence agencies.

(b) EVALUATION: During the past quarter the flow of information between the G2, I FFORCEV, the G2, ROK Field Force and ROK Military Intelligence Group (MIG) has increased significantly. In order to keep current and abreast with the expanded ROK operations and the derivative intelligence information, a more timely exchange was needed than that provided by the forwarding of translated hard copy documents and reports. A Korean civilian, employed as a translator by DA and assigned to the 55th MID (Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section) was given the mission of acting as a liaison representative to the ROK MIG. His duties include checking daily with the MIG to obtain photocopies or hand-written copies of current and significant intelligence information coming from ROK units in the field. This procedure obviates tedious and time-consuming processes of translating, staffing and analysis through the ROK Field Force which would be necessary without a liaison representative. It is especially important to establish this liaison between FWMAF MI elements and US G2/S2's in order to enable the speedy transfer of intelligence between FWMAF field units and US headquarters. The establishment of such a program is of great mutual benefit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel with appropriate linguistic skills be assigned from neighboring FWMAF units to US units in order to serve in a liaison role at all levels.

(3) Acquisition and Dissemination of Information.

(a) OBSERVATION: Positive coordination, cooperation and liaison among all combat units and agencies operating in support of the GVN in the provinces and districts are essential to the efficient accomplishment of the goals set forth in the Combined Campaign Plan and the GVN Pacification Plan.

(b) EVALUATION: Current operational and intelligence information is required by all regular military forces (RVNAF, US and FWMAF); CORDS field and advisory agencies (District and Province Headquarters, Public Safety, Civil Affairs, New Life Development, Psychological Operations, Chieu Hoi and Phoenix); and Territorial Forces (RF/PF, Province Reconnaissance units and Revolutionary Development Cadre). Coordination of all these units and agencies operating within a province will ensure greater success of the many combined programs. The acquisition and dissemination of complete information is a function of the Province and District Tactical Operations Centers (TOC). However, it is the responsibility of the various combat units and action agencies to accomplish the positive coordination, communications and liaison required to maintain a continuous flow of information. All significant incidents involving a combat unit or action agency operating within a district must be reported to the District TOC. At that level, the information is made available to all other units and agencies operating within the district and is reported through ARVN (District Chief) and US (District Senior Advisor) channels to the Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor. Again, the focal point for this information is the Province TOC where the same procedure is followed at the province level. The mutual exchange of information should enable all combat units and operating agencies to react to the information in a timely manner.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That all Province and District Senior Advisors establish control procedures to ensure that operational and intelligence information is rapidly reported to the Province/District TOCs.

2. That Province/District TOCs ensure that operational and intelligence information is made available to all units and agencies operating in the province/district. Additionally, spot report information must be forwarded to higher headquarters through operational channels. See Inclosure 19.

3. That units and agencies operating within a province/district establish liaison with province/district TOCs in order to exchange operational and intelligence information.

(4) Increasing RF Intelligence Gathering Capability.

(a) OBSERVATION: During 1968, the FMMAF, with concurrence of II Corps Headquarters, initiated a Regional Force (RF) Medium Range Patrol (MRP) Training program. Reports indicate that employment of the MRPs has significantly improved the RF combat information/intelligence gathering capability.

(b) EVALUATION: The MRP training program includes all phases of combat reconnaissance and information gathering procedures training except heliborne operations. Initially, four US instructor teams presented the instruction to RF cadre personnel. These cadre personnel subsequently took over control of the training. Current plans call for the training of two RF MRP teams per RF/PF Group Headquarters, one RF MRP team per RF company and all RF intelligence platoons throughout the II CTZ. In all, 2240 RF MRP students will be trained by Oct 69.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That RF MRP training be conducted in the other CTZ's to increase the intelligence capability of RF units throughout Vietnam and that commanders be encouraged to utilize these MRP personnel once they are trained for the gathering of intelligence.

e. (U) LOGISTICS:(1) Deployment of Air Cavalry Troops:

(a) OBSERVATION: Some Air Cavalry Troops have been deployed minus the authorized KD (aircraft maintenance) and Signal (avionics) Detachments.

(b) EVALUATION: The organic maintenance capability of the Air Cavalry Troop is burdened by the requirement to maintain three or four types of helicopter (OH-6A, UH-1H, UH-1C and/or AH-1G). The burden is intensified when the troop is deployed minus the KD and Signal Detachments. These detachments are composed of trained personnel and related tools and test items which enable them to accomplish limited direct support (DS) maintenance. Applicable TOE/MTOE and number of personnel are as follows:

1. KD Detachment	TOE 55-5008	56 Personnel
2. Signal Detachment	MTOE 11-5000	6 Personnel

Experience has proven that an Air Cavalry Troop which is deployed minus the KD and Signal Detachments cannot be supported adequately by a DS

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Transportation Company unless they are collocated. Further study has shown that the fragmentation of a DS Transportation Company to provide a distant on-site maintenance detachment is not feasible due to the limited number of personnel, special tools and test items available. The resulting availability fluctuates between forty-five and seventy percent. During periods of heavy or extended operations, availability can be expected to drop below fifty percent. Separate action is being taken to recommend incorporation of the KD and Signal Detachments as organic assets of each troop.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a KD (aircraft maintenance) Detachment and a Signal (avionics) Detachment habitually accompany each Air Cavalry Troop when it is deployed.

(2) Supply and Maintenance Support of Detached Units.

(a) OBSERVATION: Units detached from divisions or separate brigades and placed under the operational control of a tactical headquarters that does not have a combat service support capability should be supported by the nearest non-divisional direct support unit when the distance separating the detached units from the parent division/brigade is such as to render support by the parent unit impractical.

(b) EVALUATION: Tactical situations frequently necessitate the forming of a composite battalion or larger size task force or similar type mission-oriented organization that deploys beyond the normal supporting distance of the respective parent unit(s). Although placing a unit OPCON to another headquarters normally leaves the administrative and logistics responsibility with the parent unit, the results are frequently unsatisfactory. Once OPCON is lost by the parent unit for any protracted period, the support interest wanes and the system is not responsive to the needs of the task force units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That paragraph 4 of operations order, administrative order, administrative annex or frag orders specify the non-divisional direct support units which will support divisional/separate brigade units/task forces when placed under the operational control of a strictly tactical headquarters and separated from the parent organization by such a distance as to make normal support procedures impractical.

2. That the parent unit be responsible for insuring proper support to its detached unit coordinating with the area logistics activity.

3. That paragraph 4 of the parent unit's order specify the support responsibilities which will be retained and that which must be accomplished by the area support activity.

f. (U) ORGANIZATION.

(1) Command and Staff Relationships.

(a) OBSERVATION: Command and Staff relationships at Field Force level in Vietnam need to be clarified.

(b) EVALUATION: CG, I FFORCEV, has a general staff and two operating agencies (CORDS and US Army Advisory Group for II Corps) as well as

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assigned, attached and OPCON units to execute his three-fold military/advisory/civil mission in II CTZ. Command and staff relationships and the interfaces among the general and special staff, the CORDS staff, and the DSA II Corps staff in this unique organization were not clearly understood nor was there sufficient guidance in FM 101-5. The Special Assistant for Command Analysis and Programs made an extensive study of this problem and on 17 December 1968, HQ I FFORCEV published a letter addressing these command and staff relationships (Inclosure 20). This letter spells out the responsibilities of the I FFORCEV Staff, CORDS and DSA II Corps and sets forth primary points of interface among the staffs. This is resulting in more efficient control and direction for the sprawling and diversified military, advisory and civil complex in II CTZ and better adherence to the "One War Concept."

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Explicit guidance must be provided to clarify command and staff relationships in the unique organization of a Field Force in Vietnam.

g. (C) OTHER.

(1) Multi-Improvement Plan.

(a) OBSERVATION: A workable and responsive management tool was needed to allow the CG, I FFORCEV, to systematically provide direction, measure progress and insure continuity of I FFORCEV programs in areas of command interest.

(b) EVALUATION: There are many significant improvement projects which are to be accomplished in furtherance of the military/civil/advisory mission of the CG, I FFORCEV. The I FFORCEV Multi-Improvement Plan was developed and formalized by I FFORCEV Regulation 11-1 (Inclosure 21) to lend direction to these many diverse programs and focus attention on the entire scope of the II CTZ improvement effort. Significant projects are identified and broken down into specific goals, included tasks and required actions. The required actions are assigned specific time phasing, and the programs are assigned to specific staff sections for supervision and management. Action offices and interested agencies are identified. The Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Command Analysis and Programs monitors the plan and insures that items of significant interest are brought to the attention of the CG when the plan is updated monthly for the CG's review and comments.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That similar multi-improvement plans be considered for use at Field Force level to provide commanders with a systematic means of managing the various programs in areas of command interest.

(2) Senior Commanders' Conferences.

(a) OBSERVATION: The monthly Senior Commanders' Conference held by the commanders of the three national forces in II Corps is an effective means of furthering mutual coordination and cooperation and attainment of the objectives of defeating the VC/NVA and strengthening the GVN.

(b) EVALUATION: Initiated in March 1968, the Senior Commanders' Conference provides the Commanding General, II Corps, the Deputy Commanding General, ROKFV-FC, the Commanding General, I FFORCEV and their senior staff officers an opportunity to meet at the conference table to discuss future operations, plans, concepts, problem areas and topics of mutual concern. Topics included on the agenda are subjects which require command emphasis and discussion at the highest level within the CTZ. The conferences have given rise to the "Pair Off" concept, discussed in previous ORLLs, which has proved to be an effective means of improving combat operations

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and RVNAF effectiveness. They have provided effective measures for increased control of combat support assets, the employment of minefields and the establishment of priorities for herbicide operations. Programs have been developed to increase the security of highways, railroads and urban areas; enhance the overall intelligence collection and reconnaissance efforts; coordinate RF/PF training programs; and focus attention on the continuing pacification effort as a common responsibility of all commanders in II CTZ. The harmony and cooperation emanating from these conferences have insured a unit of effort at every echelon in II CTZ and underscore the fact that there is only "One War".

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the program of Senior Commanders' Conferences be considered for implementation in other corps areas as applicable.

(3) Use of Automatic Data Processing Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: When automatic data processing is initiated, maximum effort should be made to use existing computer systems instead of leasing additional computers.

(b) EVALUATION: This headquarters decided to automate selected analysis systems. Although sufficient applications could have been automated to justify procurement of a small computer, this would have been in essence "buying a computer, then figuring out what to do with it". A USAF computer is located near Headquarters, I FFORCEV at Nha Trang AB. Coordination revealed that sufficient time was available on this computer to meet I FFORCEV requirements and it could be used by the Army on a reimbursable basis. This arrangement has the additional benefit of having direct access to a computer but not having administrative or maintenance responsibilities for the facilities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When automating new applications, an investigation should be made to determine if there are computers and auxiliary equipment already available to accomplish the automatic data processing.

(4) Hamlet Evaluation System.

(a) OBSERVATION: A method of rapidly measuring the progress toward Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) goals was needed.

(b) EVALUATION: The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) is the basic scorekeeper for the entire hamlet pacification effort. Data on hamlets in II CTZ is submitted by District Advisors through PSA's to CORDS, where it is consolidated and forwarded to MAC CORDS for machine processing on central computer facilities. However, the turnaround time from data input by the District Advisor to receipt of the processed data from MAC CORDS is too long (15-25 days) to permit timely indication of progress towards APC goals and identification of problem areas that require management emphasis. The Special Assistant for Command Analysis and Programs, working with CORDS, developed a simple method of manually extracting key data from the HES input reports as they are passed to Saigon. This information is assembled quickly after the end of the reporting period and displayed for three levels of management, i.e., the CG, DEPCORDS and PSA. This permits timely and effective direction for the APC.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever long data processing times are involved for obtaining important information, key data should be extracted and displayed to give commanders a rapid indication of trends and progress.

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(5) Water Problem in Wave Guide of AN/TRC-97B.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the recent typhoon, the dish antennas and wave guides of the AN/TRC-97B were taken down as a precautionary measure and stored until the typhoon had passed. This was accomplished while it was still raining. After reinstallation, the system was degraded beyond use.

(b) EVALUATION: After a complete checkout of the system it was discovered that there was water in the wave guides. This water attenuated the signal to such a degree that the system was not useable. This problem can be prevented by covering the open ends of the wave guides with waterproof material until they are connected. If moisture still collects, it may be necessary to accept downtime after the rain has stopped to clear the water from the wave guides.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That if it is necessary to install a tropo-scatter or microwave system during inclement weather, precaution should be taken to keep water from collecting inside the wave guide.

(6) Combat Assistance Team (CAT) Concept.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Combat Assistance Team (CAT) concept was designed to reduce the US advisory effort for US units. The ultimate objective of the CAT is to have ARVN assume total responsibility for planning, coordinating and executing combat operations with minimum US advisory effort, comparable to liaison officers currently with ROKA units. A test was subsequently set up to evaluate the conversion of the US advisory effort in an ARVN division to the CAT concept within II CTZ.

(b) EVALUATION: The evaluation of the 22d ARVN Infantry Division resulted in the CAT concept being well received by both ARVN and US advisory personnel. Both groups prepared to make the test work well and did so. The conclusions of the evaluation of the CAT concept in the 22d ARVN Division were:

1. During the test period, all regiments conducted operations ranging up to four battalions in size and 28 days in duration.
2. There was no decrease in the use of US combat support.
3. The quality of combat leadership in the division did not deteriorate. There was an aura of pride in being able to operate independently. Under the advisory concept, the tendency is for an advisor to seek out his counterpart to conduct business, whereas, under the CAT concept, the ARVN commander or staff officer either seeks out the CAT members or takes action on his own initiative.
4. There was no decrease in mission performance by division-level commanders and staff officers who no longer had advisors. They maintained a high level of performance in: Artillery, communications, engineers, ordnance, health and sanitation, equipment maintenance, personnel management, intelligence, operations, logistics and political warfare.
5. The division reliance on and use of its own supply system (less helicopter) increased considerably.

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6. As a result of the CAT concept, advisor spaces in the division have been reduced from 166 to 67 spaces. Other regiments within II Corps are being converted to the CAT program. Eventually, all advisory teams within II Corps will be converted to the CAT concept.

7. Notwithstanding the advantages listed above, the CAT concept can introduce problem areas unless there is an alert and well coordinated division advisory team. It is especially important that advisors continue to place emphasis on the production and distribution of intelligence, use of intelligence gathering means and planning and use of tactical air.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to converting other advisory elements within SVN to CAT. This conversion to CAT will allow for US advisory resources to be re-allocated.

(7) I FFORCEV Analysis Systems.

(a) OBSERVATION: An effective management tool was needed to thoroughly analyze the expenditure of combat and support resources in II CTZ to help improve their battlefield application.

(b) EVALUATION: The CG, I FFORCEV has available many varied assets to aid him in the accomplishment of his mission. Included are fire support, Army aviation, engineer and signal assets. Several automated analysis systems were developed in I FFORCEV to provide greater visibility about the utilization of these resources, thereby allowing better management of these resources and improvement in their battlefield application. Examples are the Artillery Ammunition Expenditures Analysis System and the Tactical Air Expenditures Analysis System. Currently under development or consideration are systems to analyze the use of Army aviation, signal and engineer assets. Some comments on I FFORCEV analysis systems are given in Inclosure 22.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That analysis systems such as those discussed above be developed and used at Field Force level to give the commander and subordinate commanders an increased capability to more effectively manage the resources available to them.

(8) Bridge Security.

(a) OBSERVATION: To complement the major ARVN/US Engineer effort to restore major LOC's during 1968 and to counter enemy efforts to interdict the LOC's, it became apparent that a need existed for a program to evaluate and increase the security of critical bridges.

(b) EVALUATION: The first requirement was to establish the criteria for a critical bridge. The I FFORCEV Engineer determined that a critical highway bridge is one which bridges a gap of 38.6 feet or more and has a difficult bypass. (Any bridge that is 38.6 feet or longer cannot be easily replaced by MAT6 Dry Span Bridging.) A letter was then prepared to Province Senior Advisors (PSA's) and to commanders of major ARVN/ROK/US forces to initiate a program of surveying and evaluating the security provided each critical bridge. A parallel program was published to province chiefs by the CG, II Corps. Surveys were conducted at each critical bridge by GVN and US personnel and adjustments in territorial forces disposition were made to provide a maximum defense capability within available assets. Additional protective fortifications were constructed and other measures taken to improve overall security. Action is presently

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underway to encourage the CG, II Corps to expand the ARVN program to include critical bypasses and railroad bridges and, ultimately, to replace the original US program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That similar bridge security programs be considered to improve LOC security in the other CTZ's in SVN.

(9) Utilization of Truong Son Cadre Groups (TSRD).

(a) OBSERVATION: Truong Son Revolutionary Development (TSRD) Cadre Groups assignment to resettlement and refugee hamlets has been successful in dealing with the Montagnard ethnic groups.

(b) EVALUATION: During the quarter many TSRD Cadre Groups were utilized in the formation of Montagnard resettlement hamlets. Large groups of Montagnard people were moved from VC to GVN controlled areas. GVN Service representatives provided the cadre with needed guidance while the cadre provided the workers needed to complete the job. The groups made extraordinary contributions in these Montagnard resettlement and refugee hamlets because of the cooperative efforts of the services. Two examples of such successes are Buon Ho Cu in Darlac Province and Plei Ia Lou in Pleiku Province.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TSRD Cadre Groups be used in Montagnard resettlement and refugee work whenever possible and that similar-type groups be formed and utilized to aid in resettlement and refugee work for each particular ethnic group.

(10) Development of Youth in Rural Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: Rural youth lack opportunities to develop fully their mental, physical and social capabilities. With the exception of a few 4-T Clubs, there are no permanent, constructive organized youth groups in the countryside.

(b) EVALUATION: Existing youth groups are not now able to extend their services into all rural areas. Several provinces in II CTZ, using Revolutionary Development cadre and other motivated agents, have initiated highly successful hamlet-based youth groups.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the following guidelines, learned from these existing groups, be studied for implementation in other areas:

1. Organizational Aspect: The hamlet must be the main source of leadership, support and continuity. The cadre is mainly involved in introducing new ideas, guiding the initial organization and coordinating what material or training is needed from outside agencies. He must immediately begin preparing leaders among both hamlet adults and youth. First, the cadre enlists the support of the hamlet council and people and helps them form a Youth Advisory Council. At a general meeting, the hamlet youth decide if they want a group, then elect their own Euling Council and sub-team leaders and define their objectives. Meetings are held at least once a week. Membership is open to all youth between the ages of 10 to 18. The youth choose a simple uniform of their own design. A shirt is sufficient, but neckerchiefs and hats are also favored. Groups in neighboring areas can get together for sports competitions and joint work projects.

2. Recreational Aspect: The meetings of the group must be fun to gain the interest and allegiance of the youth. Club songs, drill formations, playground games, drama, team sports, arts and crafts, puppets and camping are popular with youth all over the world. The cadre (or other adults) may

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have to provide the organization and skills to get these activities going, but the leadership must be turned over to the youth as soon as they have mastered the necessary technique.

3. Vocational Training Aspect: Vegetable gardens, demonstration plots of IR-8 and poultry, pig and rabbit raising have all been tried with good results. Agricultural competitions can be organized. Other possibilities: carpentry, home economics, weaving, wood carving, barbering, mechanics, bicycle repair, etc. Literacy classes can also be formed. The Hamlet Council should be asked to turn over a plot of land to the youth for agricultural projects. A classroom or hamlet office can be used for meetings, storage, training and literacy classes. If the hamlet cannot provide all the necessary training materials, GVN agencies should be approached at the village, district and province level, e.g., Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Services, Refugee and Social Welfare Office, RD Council and Youth Service. Such outside agencies as churches, voluntary groups and CORDS can also be helpful.

4. Community Responsibility Aspect: The Advisory Council should encourage the youth to become involved in attainable community work projects (hamlet clean-up, aid to poor families, upkeep of school and athletic facilities, small self-help projects, etc.). As with recreational and vocational activities, the club members themselves choose the work projects, form the plans and estimate time and material needed. The Cadre or Youth Advisory Council will review the project for coordination of support. It is best to start with small projects where the youth can realize immediate and visible results. In general, projects should not demand much money or material. These can occasionally be combined with campouts. On national holidays the youth can be the focal point of hamlet celebrations: decorations, sports competitions, award ceremonies, cultural performances, parades, etc.

(11) PSYOP Printed Media in Montagnard Dialects.

(a) OBSERVATION: National and locally produced printed media prepared in the Vietnamese language has little, if any value, when targeted on Montagnard people.

(b) EVALUATION: Although Montagnard people are represented generally throughout II Corps, their numbers become especially important in the highland provinces where they represent a sizeable proportion of the total population of these provinces. A very small percentage of the total media produced at the Saigon level and out of country is prepared in Montagnard dialect. Furthermore, the 8th PSYOP Bn has no organic capability to prepare media in Montagnard dialects. Steps have been taken to obtain ethnic personnel capable of producing such media to fill local requirements. In addition, a project involving the joint efforts of the Military PSYOP Division of CORDS and the Summer Institute of Languages in Nha Trang is currently underway to further improve the ability of the 8th PSYOP Bn to satisfy II CTZ local requirements for media in the Montagnard languages. As an interim measure, media produced in cartoon strip fashion, with little or no written material on it, has been found to be a satisfactory method of communicating ideas to the Montagnard people. Example at Inclosure 11.


(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the cartoon strip method of preparing printed media be used in those cases where the target audience literacy rate is low. That more material be produced in Montagnard dialects at the national level depicting general themes for dissemination in II CTZ.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

22 Incl - Inclosures 6 thru 22 w/d,
as Hq, DA



JAMES G. KALERGIS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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DISPOSITION OF ENEMY UNITS IN II CTZ



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As of 31 January 1969

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Incl 1

- 1 AO BINH TAY-MACARTHUR
- 2 AO WALKER
- 3 AO DAN SINH-COCHISE
- 4 AO DAN HOA-BOLLING
- 5 AO DAN THANG-MCLAIN

II CTZ MAJOR ROAD NET & AIRFIELDS
5 MARCH 1968


LEGEND

- C-130 MINIMUM TYPE II
- C-123 MINIMUM TYPE II
- C-7A MINIMUM TYPE I
- ABANDONED AIRFIELD - MPA
- MAJOR HELIPORT
- MAJOR STANDARD ROAD
(24 FT WIDE, CL 50 ONE WAY, CL 35 TWO WAY)
- MINIMUM CLASS 31 ROAD
- MINIMUM CLASS 16 ROAD
- MINIMUM CLASS 12 ROAD
- STATUS OF ROAD NOT KNOWN OR CLOSED
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- PROVINCE BOUNDARY



NOTE:
 ROAD CLASSIFICATION BASED ON ROAD WIDTH, SURFACE, AND GRADE.
 ROAD CLASSIFICATION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:
 1. ROAD WIDTH (FEET)
 2. SURFACE TYPE (GRAVEL, ASPHALT, ETC.)
 3. GRADE (PERCENT)
 4. ROAD CONDITION (OPEN, CLOSED, ETC.)
 5. ROAD TYPE (HIGHWAY, RURAL, ETC.)

COMPILED BY: FOUR CORNER ENGINEERING STATION
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HEADQUARTERS I FORCESEV INSK ORGANIZATION

AS OF 31 JANUARY 1969

<u>ASSIGNED UNITS</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>AUMCRIFY</u>	<u>LOC</u>
KIC, I FORCESEV	USARV GC 668, 20 Sep 65	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 391, 9 May 67	MLA
HHB, I FORCESEV Arty	USARV GC 1793, 20 Dec 65	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 391, 9 Oct 66	PRC
41st Arty Group	USARV GO 2077, 6 May 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 151, 24 Feb 68	PKU
52d Arty Group	USARV GC 57, 5 Jan 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 30, 20 Jan 68	AKS
4th Bn (AV) (SP) 60th Arty	USARV GC 1195, 18 Mar 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 129, 16 Feb 68	PKG
5th Bn (8"/175mm) (JP) 22d Arty	USARV GO 6496, 18 Dec 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 129, 16 Feb 68	PHE
5th Bn (105mm) (T) 27th Arty	USARV GO 1762, 30 Nov 65	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 311, 2 Apr 68	AKC
6th Bn (8"/175mm) (SP) 32d Arty	USARV GO 1417, 29 Mar 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 151, 24 Feb 68	AKC
6th Bn (155mm) (T) 34th Arty	USARV GO 1126, 15 Mar 68	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 151, 24 Feb 68	AKC
THE, 8th Br (TA) 26th Arty	USARV GO 361, 25 Jan 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 151, 24 Feb 68	AKC
Btry B, 29th Arty (SCHLT)	USARV GO 1205, 26 Oct 65	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 151, 24 Feb 68	AKC
Btry E (MS), 41st Arty (AD)	USARV GO 1195, 18 Mar 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 129, 16 Feb 68	PKU
7th FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 1913, 28 Mar 66	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	AKE
27th FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 1913, 28 Mar 66	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	AKE
241st FA Det (Radar)	USARV GC 5791, 10 Nov 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	LZ
242d FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 5791, 10 Nov 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	SHERA
243d FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 5791, 10 Nov 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	MLA
244th FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 5791, 10 Nov 67	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 724, 19 Sep 68	B II
253d FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 2511, 27 May 68	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 724, 19 Sep 68	F B 12
254th FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 2511, 27 May 68	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 724, 19 Sep 68	AKC
255th FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 2511, 27 May 68	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 724, 19 Sep 68	AKC
256th FA Det (Radar)	USARV GO 2932, 20 Jun 68	Attached HQ I FORCESEV Arty	I FORCESEV GO 724, 19 Sep 68	EMALD

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<u>ASSIGNED UNITS</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>	<u>LOC</u>
2d Bn (105mm) (T) 17th Arty	USARV GO 57,	Attached 41st Arty Group	I FFORCEV GO 8C5,	AKE
7th Bn (105mm) (T) 13th Arty	USARV GO 6208,	Attached 41st Arty Group	I FFORCEV GO 391,	LZL
7th Bn (9"/175mm) (SP) 15th Arty	USARV GO 3467,	Attached 41st Arty Group	I FFORCEV GO 578,	LZL
1st Bn (155mm) (T) 92d Arty	USARV GO 1195,	Attached 52d Arty Group	I FFORCEV GO 324,	PKU
3d Bn (105mm) (SP) 6th Arty	USARV GO 37,	Attached 52d Arty Group	I FFORCEV GO 287,	PKU
6th Bn (8"/175mm) (JP) 14th Arty	USARV GO 120,	Attached 52d Arty Group	I FFORCEV GO 287,	PKU
2d A-1 Sqdn, 1st Cav	USARV GO 5028,	Attached 4th Inf Div	USARV GO 4445,	SP1
1st Bn (Mech), 50th Inf	USARV GO 5381,	Attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep)	USARV GO 4755,	AKE
E Co 20th Inf (LRP)	USARV GO 4916,	Attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep)	USARV GO 4755,	AKE
54th Inf Det (Radar)	USARV GO 3137,	Attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep)	I FFORCEV GO 148,	AKE
68th Inf Det (Radar)	USARV GO -913,	Attached 52d CAB	I FFORCEV GO 415,	PKU
5th PI Det	USARV GO 640,			NHA
11th PI Det	USARV GO 640,			NHA
13th MI Hist Det	USARV GO 526,			NHA
41st CA Co (-)	USARV GO 3434,			NHA
34th Sig Bn (Corps)	USARV GO 640,			NHA
55th PI Det	USARV GO 1229,			NHA
62d Sig Det (Avionics)	USARV GO 5705,			AKE
64th SngR Let (Terrain)	USARV GO 159,			NHA
167th Sig Co (RR)	USARV GO 640,	Attached 54th Sig Bn	I FFORCEV GO 147,	PKU
209th SngR Let (RR)	USARV GO 1590,	Attached 54th Sig Bn	I FFORCEV GO 25,	NHA
272d SngR Let (RR)	USARV GO 640,			NHA
297th SngR Let (RR)	USARV GO 5953,			NHA
HC, Task Force Smith (Frov)	I FFORCEV GO 604,			DLT

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HEADQUARTERS I FORCE V TASK ORGANIZATION

<u>OPCON UNITS</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>	<u>LOI</u>
4th Inf Div	USARV OPLAN 78-66 (OP ROBIN) MACV msg (S) MACCOC12 05002, 171835Z Feb 68, Unit Deployment (U)	ENARI
173d Abn Bde (Sep)	MACV msg (S) MACCOC11 16892, 231133Z May 67, Reinforcement of II CTZ (U)	EGH
II Corps US Army Advisory Gp	MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5(3)	PKU
17th Combat Aviation Gp	MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 Task Organization	NHA
7th Armd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav	USARV msg (C) AVHGC 0 31527 110846Z Jan 68 Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps) and 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)	ENARI
3d Bn (AM) 506th Inf (1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM))	MACV msg (S) MACCOC11 01603, 151110Z Jan 68 Byrd AO (U)	PHT
8th PSYOPS Bn	MACV ltr (FOUO) MACPD dtd 6 Dec 66, Employment of the US Army 6th PSYOPS Battalion (Tactical)	NHA
Co B, 5th SFG	MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 19 Mar 66 paragraph 5(4) MACV msg (S) MACCOC12 02553, 211235Z Jan 67, OPCON of USASF Team in II CTZ (U)	PKU
201st Avn Co (Corps)	USARV msg (C) AVHGC-0 31527, 110846Z Jan 68, Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps) and 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)	NHA
313th RR Bn	HQ Army Security Agency GO 47, 6 Jun 68	NHA

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AVIATION SUPPORT

THE FOLLOWING AVIATION UNITS
(CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE 17TH AVIATION GROUP)
SUPPORT HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

10th Cbt Avn Bn

48th AHC
92d AHC
155th AHC
192d AHC
281st AHC
243d ASHC

52d Cbt Avn Bn

57th AHC
119th AHC
170th AHC
189th AHC
361st Avn Co (Escort)
179th ASHC

223d Cbt Spt Avn Bn

18th UAC
183d RAC
185th RAC
203d RAC
219th RAC
225th SAC

* OPCOM to SA, IV Corps

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
268th Cbt Avn Bn

61st AHC
129th AHC
134th AHC (-)
* 335th AHC
180th ASHC
196th ASHC
355th Hel Co (Hvy)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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AVFA-GC-OT

25 November 1968


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FOR THE COMMANDER:

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ARTHUR B. BUSBEY
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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I N D E X

I F FORCEV TACTICAL NOTES

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ARTILLERY

1. (C) Combined Air Cavalry and Artillery Raid. The VC normally establish their headquarters and base areas outside the range of artillery. To locate and attack VC headquarters positioned outside of artillery range, two 175mm guns were moved to cover the suspected area and an air cavalry troop was given the mission of finding and engaging the enemy. The flexibility and responsiveness of the air cavalry was complemented by the shock action and surprise of heavy artillery. The big guns fired on bunkers and positions located by the cavalry using an attached forward observer to adjust the artillery. (TF South)

2. (FOUO) Counterbattery Programs. Recent enemy activity has shown an increase in stand-off attacks. In order to counter these attacks, counterbattery programs must be thoroughly planned and frequently practiced during periods of reduced enemy activity. In addition to other available fire support means, artillery must be allocated sectors of responsibility, firing data prepared for all targets and artillery pieces laid on primary targets when not engaged in other missions. Ammunition should be prepared depending on the actual or contemplated disposition of the enemy. The conduct of immediate reaction drills to include target acquisition and engagement will ensure responsiveness of the fire direction personnel and gun crews. The end result is to achieve effective counterfires immediately upon the initiation of an attack. (IFFORCEV Arty)

3. (FOUO) Countermortar Radar (CMR) Target Acquisition. Although the sectors of scan for the CMR are based on a daily analysis of the enemy's stand-off attack capabilities, the CMR is not always scanning the area from which the attack is initiated. Also, if incoming rounds do not impact relatively close to the CMR, the crew will probably not know that an attack has been initiated due to generator noise and sound/distance factors. To insure that the CMR is properly employed immediately upon the initiation of an attack, the position fire direction center (FDC) must notify the CMR crew. If possible, the FDC should also give the CMR the azimuth to the suspected enemy firing position so the crew can refine the sector of scan, pick up the incoming rounds and determine the grid of the firing position. Direct land line communications is a practical method for expeditious relay of this information between the FDC and the CMR. (IFFORCEV Arty)

CHEMICAL

4. (U) Evaluation of the XM-28 CS Dispenser. Of the twenty XM-28 CS Dispensers received by the 4th Infantry Division for evaluation, 12 have been employed. Although 20 drums contain 1600 pounds of CS-1 as compared to 750 pounds of CS-2 in the XM-28, the latter system is believed to produce more ground contamination. A significant amount of agent from the drums is lost due to flash, and some agent is lost in the air as drums burst approximately 50 meters above ground. None of the CS-2 of the XM-28 is lost for either of the above reasons as there is no explosive element involved and

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the bags containing the agent break on the ground. Additionally, the CS-2 is nearly twice as persistent as CS-1. In summary, the MM-28 has been found to be much superior to drums. The adaptability and ease of preparation and delivery make it an excellent and responsive munition for aerial delivered CS. (4th Inf Div)

CORDS

5. (U) Psychological Exploitation of Hoi Chanh. The action of taking a new Hoi Chanh into a village and buying him an inexpensive suit of clothes, a few toilet articles and a meal presents a situation that is completely opposite to what the Hoi Chanh's political officer has told him to expect concerning the US/GVN harsh treatment. The action also reinforces the Hoi Chanh's belief that he has made the right decision. The demonstration of good faith, friendship and a concrete example of US/GVN interest in his welfare create an atmosphere of sincerity, confidence and a willing desire by the Hoi Chanh to participate completely in subsequent psychological operations exploitation. Also, when a Hoi Chanh is taken to a village, he has the opportunity to relate his experiences with the VC/NVA and tell why he rallied to the just cause, thereby improving the GVN image. (4th Inf Div)

OPERATIONS

6. (C) Detection of Booby Traps. Booby traps account for a high percentage of casualties. The following techniques to lessen the effect of booby traps should be considered:

a. Even in dense terrain the point man should operate a minimum of ten meters in front of the nearest troops. The point man must be prepared to take cover immediately if a booby trap is tripped.

b. A thin flexible branch, three or four feet long, can often be used to detect trip wires. The point man should carry it loosely with the tip close to the ground. When the branch contacts a trip wire it will bend without dislocating the wires.

c. Personnel should be dispersed throughout the formation to insure minimum casualties should a booby trap be activated.

(1st Cav Div ORLL)

7. (C) Movement of a Long Range Patrol. When patrolling in relatively open or high single canopy terrain, a loose diamond formation is usually more effective than a file formation. The loose diamond formation with four to six meters between personnel has been found to be the best formation for immediate reaction to enemy contact. More fire power can be achieved to the front without sacrificing fire power to the flanks through the use of this formation. In jungle or heavy vegetation a file formation has proven to be more desirable for maintaining control and leaving little sign of movement through the area. (4th Inf Div ORLL)

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8. (C) Friendly Losses Due to the Establishment of a Fixed Routine. While playing volleyball in a hamlet, a PF platoon was engaged by a force of 9-10 VC and suffered heavy losses of personnel and equipment. The VC, wearing RF uniforms, infiltrated the hamlet in groups of threes and fours. This PF platoon was considered first rate by both the province and district senior advisors. The platoon had established a well known routine for playing volleyball and stacking its weapons at a distance from the volleyball court every afternoon. This enabled the enemy to get between the PF platoon and their weapons. The following were lessons learned:

- a. Even the best trained and motivated units can become complacent and/or develop routines.
- b. Daily routines must be avoided to prevent the enemy from detecting and taking advantage of an established pattern.
- c. Security must be maintained at all times. Communication facilities must be secured and alternate communication plans developed so that important information can be transmitted to higher headquarters as soon as possible.
- d. Population control within populated areas must exist to the extent that all incoming personnel must be identified and known to the hamlet defensive forces.
- e. It should be expected that the enemy will attempt to achieve surprise by wearing friendly uniforms or the clothes of local civilians. (CORDS)

9. (C) The Importance of Compound Security. A district compound within II Corps was recently subjected to a two-company VC attack. The defending force suffered severe casualties. The outer defense consisted of four, double apron barbed wire fences which extended to a distance of 50 meters. A minefield of unknown type and age was reported to be around the compound. The basic defense consisted of six, five-man bunkers with individual fighting positions between the bunkers. The bunkers were the only positions physically occupied during the battle. In addition, the compound had an indirect fire capability of one 60mm mortar and one 4.2 inch mortar. Although there were 105mm and 155mm howitzers within supporting range, no defensive concentrations had been pre-planned. The compound's communication capability consisted of two PRC-25 radios. There were no communication systems utilized for internal command and control. The following were lessons learned:

- a. There should be plans for occupying individual fighting positions when under attack.
- b. Defensive concentrations should be pre-planned.
- c. Communication facilities should be available to control the battle.
- d. Fields of fire should be cleared.

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e. Defensive ditches, fougasse mines, tanglefoot wire entanglements and other proven passive defense measures should be used. (CORDS)

10. (C) Importance of Coordination. On 9 September 1968 a CIDG company accompanied by two USASF advisors was moving along Highway 19. At 0940 they were ambushed by two US LRP teams. A brief fire fight followed during which two CIDG troops were wounded; one seriously. As the contact broke, it was determined that the US LRP team had been inserted into the CIDG TAOR on foot along a route which passed through a CIDG operational area within the CIDG TAOR. While the US LRP team AO had been properly coordinated with the USASF Advisor, their route of entry was not. Responsibility for coordination of operations is mutual, but the US commander concerned must insure that this coordination is complete. (G3)

11. (C) NVA Use of AA Positions. Recent documents captured by elements of the 4th Infantry Division, FAC observation and analysis of recent enemy activity revealed that enemy forces encircle their rocket and mortar positions with AA guns when firing upon friendly units. The primary mission of the AA weapons is to provide security for the heavy weapons, and primary targets are G-1's, FAC aircraft and helicopters. The AA positions are dug-in to protect against aircraft and artillery fire. Upon completion of a firing mission the enemy will usually attempt to displace the heavy weapons using the protection of the AA guns which fire upon reconnaissance planes and helicopters. When planning supporting fires or reacting to enemy stand off attacks these enemy tactics should be considered. (4th Inf Div)

12. (U) Tunnel and Bunker Destruction. Several personnel clearing bunkers and tunnels with grenades have been wounded by delayed secondary explosions when they rushed in too soon to inspect the results. When clearing bunkers or tunnels with the use of explosives, personnel should wait 2-3 minutes before entering to preclude the effects of a possible secondary explosion. (4th Inf Div)

13. (U) Clearing Caves with Chemical Munitions. When cave complexes are encountered that house VC/NVA, it is essential that they be cleared with minimum casualties. An effective way to accomplish clearing is by the use of an E-8 Chemical Dispenser. On one mission 24 M-79 rounds were expended in a cave and fire was still received. The E-8 Chemical Dispenser was then used, and by lowering it through an air vent in the cave and then discharging the dispenser, enough dispersion was provided for the CS to enter the various cave complexes and cause the enemy to displace. (173d Abn Bde)

14. (U) Firebreaks. Grass and thin vegetation in Vietnam burn easily, even during a moderately wet period. Around a fire base or any permanent type installation a grass fire can create a serious hazard, especially if POL is being stored nearby. Tracer rounds from a .50 caliber machine gun are capable of starting a fire which can quickly turn into a large blaze. A fire break should be given a high priority when a fire base is established unless the surrounding vegetation is proven not capable of burning (173d Abn Bde)

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15. (U) Collocating ARVN/US Command Post. Communication problems invariably exist when ARVN and US forces conduct joint operations. It has been found that by collocating ARVN and US command posts, communication difficulties can be significantly decreased. Collocating command posts has proven beneficial to all units involved in joint operations. Coordination of areas of operation, movements, supporting fires and other support is made easier. Changes in operations due to the tactical situation can be coordinated more quickly. When operating with the command posts collocated, the individuals in each section can coordinate directly with his counterpart. The use of collocated command posts has decreased reaction times and increased the effectiveness of combined operations. (173d Abn Bde)

16. (FOUO) Coordination of Night Locations. The coordination of night locations between supporting artillery units and the short range patrols (SRP) is essential to preclude undue danger to friendly personnel while maximizing the artillery support available. A method recently used for establishing accurate SRP locations is to utilize pre-planned illumination rounds which can be observed by units in night locations. The illumination is fired with a medium height of burst at several different grids. The ground units report azimuth to each round which is used to resect the unit's location. At least two good azimuth readings should be utilized in determining a location. The location thus determined should be compared with the previously reported or planned location of the SRP. Coordination and training are the key factors in utilizing this method of determining friendly locations. (I FFORCEV Arty)

17. (U) Enemy Wire Breaching Attempts. Several PWs have reported how easy they felt it was to breach outer perimeter wire, thus creating an opening through which ground troops could follow in their assault. While hasty emplacement of wire is necessary during the initial stage of establishing night defensive positions, immediate and continuing construction of tanglefoot patterns, interlaced with flares, mines and other denial material will forestall enemy attack plans. Additionally, enemy sappers will have great difficulty in pushing bangalore torpedoes of sufficient length through both tanglefoot and perimeter wire for a single blowing, and, if carefully booby-trapped, enemy attempts to breach the perimeter will be detected. (G2)

18. (U) Enemy Employment of Booby Trapped Items. The enemy has been stepping up acts of terrorism by taking advantage of the American soldier's innate curiosity about unusual items. Booby traps have always been a favorite method of inflicting casualties on US troops and the enemy has begun to make his weapons more sophisticated and effective. A commonly used method is to booby trap seemingly safe household items (cooking utensils, canned and packaged goods, and furniture) and position these items where they will be moved or examined by a soldier. Casualties have been inflicted because soldiers' curiosity overcame their training and good judgement. Troops should be cautioned that when examining a hut or bunker nothing should be moved that has not been carefully examined for possible booby traps. If objects must be moved, it is

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desirable to utilize a member of the household for the task or to use some mechanical means (stick, wire or string) to disturb the item from a safe distance and location. The enemy's imagination and inventiveness should never be underestimated. (G2)

19. (C) The Use of AN/P153 and AN/PRS-4 Mine Detectors.

a. The AN/P153 should be used at the high sensitivity setting in all areas except high ferrous content soil areas such as Pleiku, where the low sensitivity setting should be used. The AN/P153 should be used at a forward sweep velocity of less than 26 steps per minute if the maximum area is to be most effectively swept. The AN/P153 will detect high metallic content mines at depths less than twelve inches. It will detect less than 50 percent of the low metallic content mines if these mines are buried deeper than six inches. However, in an area of high ferrous content soil, the AN/P153 is ineffective in detecting low metallic content mines. The major factors influencing the effectiveness of sweeping operations using this mine detector are the amount of time allotted for the sweep operation and the amount of metallic debris encountered in the road.

b. The AN/PRS-4 is capable of detecting both metallic and non-metallic mines to depths of twelve inches. When operated under typical field conditions, the AN/PRS-4 averages ten to seventeen false signals per 100 feet. Due to these false signals, which must be investigated as if they were mines, this detector can only be operated effectively by a slow and deliberate search. (Engineer)

20. (C) IZ Selection by Air Just Prior to Assault. Commanders are frequently concerned with the problem of establishing operational patterns which preempt or compromise their combat assaults, i.e., prior reconnaissance by helicopter to select IZs near or on enemy objectives. To increase operational flexibility and deceive the enemy, commanders should select IZs by map, and past knowledge of the area. Reconnaissance by air should be limited or eliminated. Use of air cavalry in this reconnaissance role just prior to assault is an alternative. Movement of air cavalry and air assault units should be separated by time and distance. While cavalry screens the area and conducts reconnaissance, they also select primary and alternate IZs. Deception tactics are also in order to catch the enemy off balance. Assault elements are notified and selected IZs marked and prepped by the air cavalry. The assault can then be initiated with surprise, speed and suppressive fires employed by accompanying gunships. (TF South)

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c.		
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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
13. ABSTRACT		

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Security Classification