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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (2 May 69) FOR OT UT 691315

7 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps
Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 96308

AVII-ATC

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of XXIV Corps Artillery for Period ending
31 January 1969 RCS-CSFOR-65 (U)

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1. (C) Section 1 Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Organization.

(1) With the firing of its first rounds on 13 November 1968, the 2d Battalion, 138th Artillery (155SP) became operational. This unit was called to active duty from the Kentucky National Guard in May of 1968. It arrived in XXIV Corps area during October 1968, and was assigned to XXIV Corps by USARV GO 4881, 20 October 1968. Infusion of the unit was ordered late January 1969 but not started during the reporting period. A detailed after-action report on significant aspects of the sponsorship, training, materiel readiness, leadership and general performance of the unit was submitted to USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DC in letter, HQ, XXIV Corps, Subject: Mobilization Data, dated 14 Dec 68. Briefly, the unit was very well trained and competent, it was deployed without difficulty, it received exceptional support from its sponsoring unit, and it has displayed a most professional attitude, a high level of training, and an excellent performance record to date.

(2) On 20 November 1968, the 1st Field Artillery Group (USMC) was re-deployed out of the Corps area. The unit included the 3d 155 Gun Battery and Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines (155SP). The move was anticipated several months prior to November 1968, was scheduled to occur after operational deployment of the 2d Battalion, 138th Artillery, and was accomplished without difficulty.

b. Significant Activities.

(1) Unit Actions. Unit actions were primarily a continuation of offensive and defensive activities in the assigned areas of operation. XXIV Corps Artillery participated in combat operations 92 days during the reporting period. Major operations in progress at the end of the reporting period were SCOTLAND II, KENTUCKY, MARSHALL MOUNTAIN, DEWEY CANYON, and NEVADA EAGLE. In addition to

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providing counterbattery fires in and south of the DMZ, and interdiction of the A Shau Valley, support was provided to 3d Marine Division, 101st Airborne Division (AM), 1st ARVN Division and, at the start of the period, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). A resume of operations follows:

(a) 1st Cavalry Div (AM) AO: Corps Artillery units participated in OPERATION JEB STUART III and COMANCHE FALLS. Both operations were cordon and search operations characterized by air assaults and rapid deployment of forces. Corps Artillery supported these operations from Fire Support Bases Nancy YD435395, and Jeannie YD548388. In addition, Corps Artillery units fired in support of OPERATION LIBERTY CANYON, which was the redeployment of 1st Cavalry Div (AM) south to the III Corps Tactical Zone. Redeployment occurred in November and was accompanied by expansion of the areas of operation for the 3d Marine Division and 101st Airborne Division (AM).

(b) Third Marine Division (Reinforced) AO: The Division extended its southern boundary to the Thua Thien/Quang Tri Boundary as a result of the departure of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The Division further expanded operations to the west in the Scotland and Dawson River AO's and continued pressure all along the DMZ. In the second week of December 1968, two battalions of the 3d Marine Regiment, with Batteries A and C (105T), 1st Battalion, 12th Marines and the 2d Provisional Battery (155T) departed for 1st Marine Division for several months as part of OPERATION TAYLOR COMMON. At the end of the reporting period OPERATION DEWEY CANYON was underway in the Da Krong Valley, just north and west of the A Shau Valley. The division closed out LANCASTER II on 23 Nov 68, closed NAPOLEON SALINE, an area of operation of the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), and started a new operation, MARSHALL MOUNTAIN, on 5 Dec 68. In general the operations conducted were search and clear or cordon type. There was continued emphasis on airmobility with fire support units giving continuous support from mountain top fire support bases. Corps Artillery supported these operations from bases at Rockpile XD986548, A-4 YD118701, C-1 YD213674, C-2 YD135643, Vandegrift YD002493, A-2 YD213743, Tombstone YD393587, Nancy YD435395, and Jack YD494282.

(c) 101st Airborne Division (AM) AO: The division continued operation NEVADA EAGLE and moved its northern boundary to the Thua Thien/Quang Tri province boundary. Continuous search and clear operations were conducted in the coastal plain. These operations enhanced and improved the intensified pacification program. Corps Artillery units participated in the extensive RIF operations which took place in Base Areas 114, 101 and the Ruong Ruong Valley. Two operations were completed, RAWLINS VALLEY, a joint search and clear operation in BA 114, 17-23 Dec, and TODD FORKST, a joint combat assault into BA 101, 31 Dec to 13 January. Three more operations were still underway at the close of the reporting period: PLATTE CANYON, an over land assault into the Ruong Ruong commenced on 8 Jan 69; OHIO RAPIDS, a joint probe west of BA 101; and SHERMAN PEAK, a joint probe south of BA 114. Corps Artillery supported these operations from Fire Support Bases Nancy YD435395, Jack YD494282, Sally YD642273, Boyd YD740130, Bastogne YD620095, Panther II YD800109, Anzio YD934070, Quick I YD903035, Quick II YC894997, Tomahawk ZD112017, Hill 88 AU808018, Los Banos AU830002, Phu Bai YD882135, and Gia Le YD836152.

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(d) 1st ARVN Division Operations: The 1st ARVN Division has five areas of operation and received support from Corps Artillery as follows:

1. 2d ARVN Regiment. Batteries B and C, 1/40th Artillery fired in support of the 2d Regiments OPERATION LAM SON 271 which was conducted from A2 to A4 along the DMZ and south to Dong Ha. Other 108th Artillery units in range also fired support for this regiment.

2. 1st ARVN Regiment. The 1st ARVN Regiment conducted OPERATION LAM SON 261. This operation, characterized by many short duration search and clear operations, was supported by elements of the 108th Group.

3. 3d ARVN Regiment. OPERATION LAM SON 265, a continuous stabilization and pacification program near Hue, was supported by Corps 105mm, 8" and 175 batteries.

4. 5th ARVN Regiment. LAM SON 245, a search and cordon operation on Vinh Loc Island, was supported by Corps Artillery and 108th Group firing units.

5. 7th ARVN (Cavalry) Task Force. This task force conducted OPERATION LAM SON 270, a cordon operation in the Loc Tu area, and then moved to a new operational area south and west of Hue. Corps Artillery supported these operations from fire bases at Los Banos AU830002, Hill 88 AU808018, and Anzio YD936070.

(2) Battle Damage Assessment. Battle damage assessment for the period is listed below.

<u>TARGET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bunkers	730	220	950
Structures	115	20	135
Rockets	2	0	2
Mortars	3	0	3
AA Weapons	5	1	6
	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>PROBABLE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Personnel KIA	117	6	123
Secondary Explosions			326
Secondary Fires			30
Trench Line Destroyed			1,680 meters

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(3) A Shau Valley Interdiction. Just before this reporting period, (28 October) the XXIV Corps Artillery 175mm battery (C/1/83) at FSB Bastogne YD6209 was moved back to FSB Boyd YD7412, out of range of the A Shau Valley. The approach of the monsoon season required the closing of FSB's that would be inaccessible once the monsoons began. Also, surveillance of the valley revealed little activity in those areas that were within range of FSB Bastogne and responsibility for interdiction of the valley was assumed by the Air Force.

(4) Effects of the Bombing Halt. On 1 November 1968, the cessation of all US offensive actions in and north of the DMZ was ordered. The enemy's apparent intent to refrain from long range fires from north of the DMZ required a new assessment of unit dispositions and tube configurations. It was decided that two 175 batteries in the northern part of the Corps AO would be sufficient to carry the weight of the long range counterfire effort. The remaining two 175 batteries were retubed to 8" and redeployed to provide more extensive 8" coverage throughout the AO.

In summary, the primary long term effect of the bombing halt has been to decrease the concentration of heavy artillery just south of the DMZ, to change some tube configuration from 175 to 8", and to provide better coverage by all calibers throughout the Corps AO. An additional less significant effect of the bombing halt involved the move of A/1/40 (105SP) from Hai Lang YD4147 to A4 YD1170. This move placed a light, quick-response unit with ammunition capabilities for HE, illumination, and ICM into a position where enemy DMZ violations could be attacked quickly and massively. Finally, a minor effect of the bombing halt has been a reduction in ammunition expenditures due to the decrease in counterbattery fires.

(5) Closing of Camp Carroll. On 15 Dec 68, Camp JJ Carroll, YD0656 was closed by the 3d Marine Division as an important economy of force measure. The closing was important to XXIV Corps Artillery because the base had certain major advantages as a 175 gun location. Twelve concrete heavy gun pads and permanent underground facilities for the headquarters, 2/94th Artillery and one firing battery were located at Camp Carroll. The position provided excellent communications capability, was high and dry, and afforded no masks for 360 degree firing. Coverage was excellent and check fires for air activity were infrequent because of the location well to the west of Dong Ha. The firing battery at Camp Carroll moved to Thom Son Lam (Rockpile) XD9854 where heavy pads had to be constructed on short notice. Certain hills mask fires to the north, but coverage was extended to the west as far as the Laotian border. The headquarters moved to LZ Nancy YD4339.

(6) Move of headquarters, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery. In late November 1968, the Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery moved from LZ Sharon YD349 to Phu Bai YD8912. This move was made to provide better command and control of subordinate batteries.

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(7) Firing Battery Inspection Team. Just before the beginning of the reporting period, XXIV Corps Artillery established a Firing Battery Inspection Team. The team is headed by a Major who provides overall control and who checks gunnery procedures in detail. He is assisted by two Captains who check battery operations and position defense measures. The objectives of the inspection are to identify areas of strength and weakness for the inspected unit, to provide the parent unit with an outside agency evaluation of its batteries, and to upgrade firing battery and gunnery performance, particularly in techniques used only occasionally. The team completed inspections of all Corps Artillery units during the reporting period. At the end of the reporting period, at the request of the CO, 101st Airborne Division Artillery, the FBIT started inspections of his units.

(8) CMMI Team. A XXIV Corps Artillery Command Maintenance Management Inspection (CMMI) team was established in December to determine the status of maintenance management within the command and to assist unit commanders in improving supply, maintenance, and mess operations. All batteries assigned or under the operational control of Corps Artillery have now been inspected. Unannounced reinspections are presently being conducted in units which had unsatisfactory and marginal areas. These inspections have significantly improved the status of maintenance of all units within XXIV Corps Artillery.

(9) FO/FDO School. During the reporting period, the Corps Artillery FO/FDO school continued classes, generally on the basis of one FO and one FDO School per month.

(10) Establishment of Unit Basic Loads. During the reporting period, all Corps Artillery units completed formal basic load studies for all types of ammunition.

(11) Heavy Gun Pad Construction. To assure all-weather, 24 hour capability for heavy artillery, permanent heavy gun pads are necessary. In December, a study of heavy pads in the Corps area was made. The objective of the study was to determine what additional construction was necessary to assure availability of permanent pads at any of the fire support bases where future operational needs for heavy artillery could be anticipated. As of the end of the reporting period, only three heavy battery positions remained to be constructed in the Corps area.

2. (C) Section 2. Part I, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Item: High Burst Registrations.

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(a) Observation: Registration of Artillery units has been a continuing problem in the Northern I Corps Tactical Zone. Target area survey is rare and most registrations are conducted with AO's using map spotted registration points. The problem with this method is that registration corrections are dependent on map accuracy plus observer estimates. This type of registration degrades desired standards of gunnery accuracy.

(b) Evaluation: A solution to the problem was based on the simple idea of having artillery units on occupied fire support bases (FSBs) provide flash base observation posts (OPs) for other units conducting high burst registrations. Implementation of the solution was accomplished by publication of a registration capabilities letter. The FSBs, plus a number of existing or added surveyed OPs, provided pairs of flash bases permitting high burst registrations in many parts of the Corps AO. Minimal training in flash base operation, in special techniques for large variations in altitudes, and in coordination was required. The high burst registration areas were augmented by AN/MPQ-4 radar registration areas and by emplacement of a few carefully selected and surveyed permanent registration point targets. When large altitude differences produce angles of site over 50 mils, a potential problem arises with the fuze action range to burst error due to the complementary site factor. This problem is solved by using 8" nuclear delivery techniques for fuze setting data. Corps Artillery units have increased the number of registrations by using the techniques discussed above and in the published letter. A certain amount of additional training in flash base observation techniques and in the complementary site gunnery problem is required.

(c) Recommendation: That additional training training and emphasis be placed on high burst registration at FT Sill, not only from the gunnery aspect but from the standpoint of training in observation techniques.

(2) Item: Low level wind data ICM missions.

(a) Observation: Evaluation of ICM fire missions within the XXIV Corps has revealed that most units rely entirely on line 01 of the most current MET message to obtain data for low level winds.

(b) Evaluation: While line 01 may be the best data available, the validity may be questionable, especially, if the met is several hours old and the terrain difference between the Met station and the fire support base is considerable. The best data for low level wind is the timely data from the target area that can be provided by the trained forward observer. To insure that FO's are familiar with methods to estimate wind speed and direction, Corps Artillery has put out a letter explaining procedures outlined in FM 23-71, and asked that FO training include these procedures.

(c) Recommendation: That in-country FO schools include training in measuring wind direction and estimating wind speed and that FT Sill include this training as part of FO training in the Officers Basic Course.

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(3) Item: Impact data for ICM projectile shell casing (debris).

(a) Observation: The situation has arisen where it became necessary to compute impact data for the ICM projectile shell casing (debris), and there is no published procedure or tables to aid in these computations.

(b) Evaluation: Until XXIV Corps Artillery receives formal guidance in this matter the following procedure, which is included in the XXIV Corps SOP, will be followed when computing ICM debris impact:

1. Determine range to target for ICM projectile from chart.
2. Apply wind correction and determine range to offset position.
3. Determine HE QE for range corresponding to offset pin location.
4. Add to HE QE the number of mils required to correct for ICM projectile.
5. Subtract (algebraically) any site which has been added in.
6. Determine range corresponding to ICM elevation on HE GFT.
7. Resultant range is maximum possible projectile casing impact range.

(c) Recommendation: The Artillery Board should determine information needed to compute ICM projectile casing (debris) impact range and provide all field units with computation method.

c. Training. None.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Item: Survey Control Points.

(a) Observation: Destruction of Survey Control Points continues to be a problem area throughout the XXIV Corps AO.

(b) Evaluation: Many survey control points have been destroyed or rendered unuseable for a variety of reasons. The most prevalent reasons have been the construction of bunkers, observation posts and/or signal relay sites on commanding terrain features where survey control points are normally established, and the destruction of fire support bases upon evacuation by tenant units. In order to provide timely survey support to firing units, a continuing program must be established to verify the existence of survey control points and the re-establishment of survey control points where necessary. This headquarters is preparing a standard requirement to insure that each survey control point is physically checked each quarter. This will provide current survey information for use by subordinate units and for planning future survey operations by division, group and Corps artillery survey elements.

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(c) Recommendation: That survey schools discuss the problems cited with a view toward better selection of SCP locations on fire support bases and toward the importance of regular periodic checks of established control.

(2) Item: Metro for mountain top fire support bases.

(a) Observation: On several occasions, metro data have been needed for firing batteries that were situated on mountain tops where space limitations or other considerations precluded the emplacement of an electronic metro section. The production of a "pure visual met" based on the departure tables in FM 6-16 was not desired because temperatures and densities computed from that method suffer somewhat in accuracy. The climatological density tables published as addendums to the "Ballistic Meteorology Information Letters" were more accurate but terminated at NATO line 7 whereas the usual message requirement was for 14 NATO lines.

(b) Evaluation: To provide sufficiently accurate metro data in such situations, a visual met team was sent to the firing battery position. The team tracked a pilot balloon and made surface temperature, humidity, and pressure readings. This flight was made coincident with an electronic flight from a nearby low level station. At the electronic station, the surface virtual temperature and pressure obtained from the mountain station were plotted as a point on the ML-574 chart upon which the electronic virtual temperature curve previously had been drawn. Following that, a curve was drawn from the point. This curve was joined to the electronic curve at a height of 2000 meters above the mountain stations' surface plot. It was a curve that would very nearly approximate an electronic curve at the mountain site if it were possible to emplace an electronic metro section there. This new curve was then zoned and temperatures and densities were extracted in the same way as electronic metro data are produced. The procedure produced more accurate metro data and considerably improved artillery accuracy.

(c) Recommendation: That the mountain met procedure described herein be adopted for artillery use in preference to the visual met technique described in FM 6-15, in all cases where an electronic metro section is situated within the valid distance prescribed in FM 6-15.

e. Logistics.

(1) Item: Assembly of the M-60 Machine Gun.

(a) Observations: During CMMI inspections conducted by XXIV Corps Artillery, a number of M-60 machine guns were found to be assembled improperly.

(b) Evaluations:

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(1) Through carelessness or lack of proper training, it is relatively easy for the sear spring and plunger to be placed upside down in the trigger mechanism grip group. In this position the sear may not be forced to engage the bolt when the trigger is released. If this occurs, the weapon will fire fully automatic until feeding is stopped.

(2) It is also possible for the gas piston to be placed in the gas cylinder backwards. Assembled in this manner, the gas piston will not force the operating rod far enough to the rear to cause the cartridge casing to be completely extracted. If this happens the weapon will cease to fire.

(c) Recommendation: Training conducted prior to deployment and in-country should stress strict adherence to assembly procedures prescribed in TM 9-1005-224-25.

f. Organization.

(1) Item: FADAC and FADAC Generators.

(a) Observation: Corps Artillery units have experienced a considerable amount of non-operational time for both FADAC and the FADAC generators.

(b) Evaluation: Without FADAC or its generator in operation, a firing unit has lost its primary method of developing fire commands. To preclude this situation from occurring too often in the future, Corps Artillery has requested that an additional FADAC and two additional generators be added to the MTOE for each artillery battalion. This was also included in the annual MTOE update.

(c) Recommendation: In the interest of MTOE standardization it is recommended that an additional FADAC and two FADAC generators be included in the MTOE for all field artillery cannon battalions.

g. Civic Action. None.

h. Signal.

(1) Item: Receipt of Metro Data.

(a) Observation: Metro data is being broadcast over FM radio instead of over AM radio as prescribed by artillery communications doctrine.

(b) Evaluation: Use of FM radio allows the receiving station to acknowledge the receipt of metro data. In this manner, garbled transmissions are corrected immediately. Also, since most radios are dismounted from vehicles and placed in underground bunkers, power (rectifiers) requirements are reduced by releasing this FM radio for other purposes during non-broadcast periods of metro data.

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(c) Recommendation: That auxiliary FM receivers be utilized by FDCs in the monitoring of metro broadcasts rather than AM radios.

(2) Item: Multi-channel Radio Relay.

(a) Observation: Almost all artillery communications between battalion headquarters and its firing batteries is over FM radio. Doctrinal wire circuits from battalion FDCs to firing battery FDCs are not used, since the distances between units surpass organic wire capabilities.

(b) Evaluation: For operational missions, the FM radios are working adequately, but many other elements of the unit do not have adequate means of conducting official business with corresponding elements of higher headquarters.

(c) Recommendation: That a lightweight tactical multi-channel radio relay capability be made available for communications between artillery battalions and their batteries in place of wire systems.

(3) Item: SB-86.

(a) Observation: That tactical field switchboard, SB-22/PT is not adequate for handling the telephone traffic load at a battalion headquarters and should be replaced by the larger tactical switchboard, SB-86/P.

(b) Evaluation: At many of the battalion headquarters, as many as five SB-22 switchboards are stacked in order to provide enough service to a large number of necessary subscribers. This stacking places undue strain on the operator line pack and also the subscriber line packs. The SB-86 is designed to handle as many as sixty subscribers and will integrate with more efficiency in the direct dial system being installed through Vietnam. The SB-86 does not hamper movement if mobility is maintained as requirement.

(c) Recommendation: That an SB-86 be doctrinally added to the necessary equipment for communications at a battalion headquarters.

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XXIV Corps Arty
Organizational Structure

Allan G. Pixton
ALLAN G. PIXTON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVII-GCT (15 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of XXIV Corps Artillery for Period Ending 31
January 1969 RCS-CSFOR - 65 (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96308 28 MAR 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The ORLL of XXIV Corps Artillery has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Except as noted below, HQ, XXIV Corps concurs without further comment on commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations listed in Section 2 of the report. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning metro for mountaintop fire support bases, para 2d(2), page 8. Concur. The Meteorological Section of XXIV Corps Artillery will provide further data to support the evaluation and recommendation to the US Army Artillery and Missile School and the Combat Developments Command Artillery Agency.


b. Reference item concerning FADAC and FADAC generators, para 2f(1), page 9. Concur. This recommendation was included in XXIV Corps' letter to HQ, USARV, subject: Annual Update of Phase 1 Standardization MTOE, dated 28 Jan 69.

c. Reference item concerning multi-channel radio relay, para 2h(2), page 10. Concur. The recommended multi-channel capability must be designed to minimize the problem of frequency congestion. Sets now available are in the 30.0 to 75.95 MHZ range. This part of the frequency spectrum is saturated. XXIV Corps Artillery has been notified to submit an ENSURE request IAW USARV Reg 705-2.

d. Reference item concerning SB-86 switchboard, para 2h(3), page 10. Concur. The requirements for local telephone service within a battalion headquarters in a semi-fixed environment exceed the capabilities of the SB-22 switchboard. An SB-86 switchboard will significantly improve service due to its larger subscriber capability, power ring, supervisor lamp and common battery signal capability. However, an SB-86 switchboard will not contribute to the efficiency of a direct dial system. This recommendation was included in XXIV Corps' letter to HQ, USARV, subject: Annual Update of Phase 1 Standardization MTOE, dated 28 Jan 69.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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nc


H. R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
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
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of XXIV Corps Artillery for Period Ending
31 January 1969 RCS-CSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963751 4 APR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps Artillery and concurs with the report as indorsed by the intermediate headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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nc

Cy furn:
XXIV Corps Arty
XXIV Corps

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GPOP-DT (15 Feb 69) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps Arty for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl
nc


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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XXIV Corps Artillery Organizational Structure (U)

UNIT

HQ & HQ Btry
1/83d Arty (8"/175SP)
2/138th Arty (155SP)

HQ 108th Arty Gp

8/4 Arty (-)(8"/175SP)

2/94th Arty (8"/175SP)
6/33d Arty (105T)
1/40th Arty (105SP)
F/26 (TAB)
1/44th (M42 AW)(SP)
G/65 (M55)(SP)

G/29 (SLT)

235th FA Radar Detachment
238th FA Radar Detachment
239th FA Radar Detachment
240th FA Radar Detachment
245th FA Radar Detachment
250th FA Radar Detachment

1st 8" How Btry (FMF)(USMC)

5th 155 Gun Btry (FMF)(USMC)
(155G/8"SP)

STATUS

Assigned to XXIV Corps
Assigned to XXIV Corps
Assigned to XXIV Corps

Assigned to USARV, attached to XXIV
Corps for OPCON and court-martial
jurisdiction, to include GCM
authority

Assigned to 108th Arty Gp; B/8/4 OPCON
to 1st Mar Div in Southern ICTZ

Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp; attached to
1/44 Arty

Under OPCON of HQ, III MAF; attached
to 1/44 Arty for administration
and military justice

Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
Assigned to 108th Arty Gp

OPCON to XXIV Corps Arty, further
OPCON to 108th Arty Group

OPCON to XXIV Corps Arty, further
OPCON to 108th Arty Group

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