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# AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY · OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

#### AGAM-P (M) (1 May 69) FOR OT UT 691179

7 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

eth G. Nickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM Major General, USA The Adjutant General

l Incl

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#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARHY HEADQUARTERS, 307TH COMBAT AVIATION (Phantom) BATTALION APO San Francisco 96215

AV W-P

15 Tehruary 1969

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Feriod Ending 31 January 1969, RCS, CSFOR-65 (RI)

#### 1. (C) SECTION I OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. (U) <u>MI3SION</u>: There has been no change in the battalion mission since the last reporting period.

b. (U) <u>ORGANIZATION</u>: The flexibility of the battalion was augmented by the addition of the 271st Aviation Company (Mdm Hel), which provides medium lift capabilities to include missions of transporting personnel and cargo for combat service support and combat support within the IV CTZ. The battalion lost the 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company to the 13th CAB. The 235th Armed Helicopter Company was redesignated the 235th Aerial Weapons Company. The battalion was also affected by a new TOE, which provided for the merging of companies with detachments that were in their support.

(See Organization and Station Chart, Incl 1)

c. COMMAND GROUP PERSONNEL:

(1) (U) Twenty-five percent of the hattalions principal staff positions were affected by personnel changes. The addition of an S2 officer was the only change not resulting from normal replacement. The duties of the S2 were previously handled by the S3 section and intelligence sergeant.

(2) (C) Composition of the Battalion Command Group:

POSITION	RANK	NAME	ASN	ASSIGNED	RELEASED	
Cormander	LTC	Charles N. Allcood	0614 <sup>00</sup>	11 July 64	3 Jan 69	
Commander	LTC	Pilly E. Rutherford	0=103021	3 Jan 69	M/A	
Foxec. Off	LTC	Pohhie Perry	07102816	1 Nov 69	24 Jan 69	
Exec. Off	MAJ	Robert S. Borer	091556	24 Jan 69	R/A	
S-1	MAJ	James O. Starker	05405768	28 Oct 68	N/A	
S-2	MAJ	Thomas E. Murray	096097	6 Teh 6R	24 Jan 69	
S-2	MJ	Franklin W. Berry	04045241	24 Jan 69	N/A	
S-3	MAJ	Leonard L. Boswell	078572	12 July 69	1 Nov 68	
S-3	MAJ	Rex E. Saindon	05700172	2 Nov 68	N'A	
S-4	MAJ	Jamos 'R. 4111	072483	8 Aug. 68	10 Dec 68	
5-4	MAJ	Karl A. Brugger	082311	18 Jan 69	N/A	
A/C Maint	MAJ	Donald A. Couvillion	093640	24 Jug 68	2 Tec 68	
A/C Maint	CPT	Jerry 4. Ross	0=104265	24 Jan 69	N/A	
•						
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POSITION	RANK	NATE	ASN	ASSIGNED	RELEASED
Safety	CPT	John Grilli	05240178	1 Nov 68	N/A
Signal	CPT	Joseph Smith	05537569	13 May 68	N/A
Medical Off	MAJ	Iarry B. Rohinet	05514041	6 Nov 68	15 Jan 69
Supply Tech Motor Maint	CM2	Walter C. Capron	WB430928	11 Dec 68	N/A
Tech	CN2	Elcene Hamilton	W3200P42	26 Apr 68	r/a
Personnel	CN2	Everett E. Koth	W2218073	26 Mar 68	25 Nov 64
Personnel	ONI	Stephen T. Walston	W3155408	28 Nov 68	N/A

(3) (C) Subordinate Unit Commanders: (Changes)

(a) Commanding Officer, 199th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, 307th Combat Aviation Pattalion; MAJ Pobert S. Borer, 091556, commanded from 1 July 68, to 31 Dec 68; MAJ Gary L. Kline, 086377, assumed command on 1 Jan 69.

(b) Commanding Officer, 235th Aerial Weapons Commany, MAJ William R. Lenderman, 079596, commanded from 27 July 6°, to 26 Jan 69: HAJ Charles A. Teague, 0F102281, assumed command on 27 Jan 69.

(c) Commanding Officer, 244th Surveillance Airplane Company, NAJ Joe E. Neely, OR4097, commanded from 20 Aug 68, to 27 Jan 69; MAJ Edward J. Horton, 04044875 assumed command on 28 Jan 69.

(d) Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 307th Combat Aviation Battalion; CPT Walter (. Hicks, 05317127, commanded from 3 Sep 68, to 19 Jan 69; CPT James C. Wilson, OF105305, assumed command on 20 Jan 69.

TOTAL SUPPORDINATE OFFICER WO EM AUTH O/H UNIT AUTH O/H AUTH O/H AUTH O/H 112 138 138 199th RAC 26 2 0 104 32 235th A"C 17 199 175 255 21A 10 39 33 244th SAC 19 22 22 2 291 305 332 329 269 271st Avn Co 17 26 20 224 203 240 15 HHC. 307th 14 88 109 19 3 3 87 109 307th CAB 101 94 92 5R 910 882 1103 1034

d. Unit strength as of 31 Jan 69:

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(2) (C) Civilians

to a new wheel

SUBORDINATE UNITS	DAC AUTH 0/H	VN <u>AUTH</u>	0/H	3rd NATIL		RACTOR
199th RAC 235th MC						
244th SAC		2	2			
271st Avn Co MHC		1	3		4	4
307th C.19		3	5		4	4

e. (U) AWARDS PRESENTED 1 NOVEMBER 1968 TO 31 JANUATY 1969:

<u>A''ARD</u>	<u>199th</u>	<u>235th</u>	<u>244th</u>	271st	ЧНС	<u>307th</u>
Silver Star Distinguished Flying Cross Soldier's Medal	1	1 # 1		1		1 10 1
Bronze Star Army Commendation Medal	11 15	14 15	10 17	13 21	11 10	59 74

f. (C) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 31 JANUARY 1969:

SUBORDINATE <u>UNIT</u>	UH-1 <u>AUTH</u>	<u>0/h</u>	CH-4 <u>AUTH</u>		11-11 1117H		0-1 <u>АПТЧ</u>	0/ዝ	OV-1 AUTH	0/H	11-6 AUTH 0/H	(H-6 11114	
199th RAC	•	•			-		24	28			1		
235th // C 244th SAC	3	2			21	17			1#	18	1		
271st Avn Co HHC, 307th		1	16	15								3	9
307th C18	3	2	16	15	21	77	21.	28	18	18	2	3	10

g. (U) RAR ALLOCATIONS: 1 NOVEMBER 1969 TO 31 JANUARY 1969:

CITY	NOVEMETR	DECEMPER	JANU ARY
Bangkok Hawaii Hong Kong Kuala Jumpur Manila Penang	8 21 9 2 4 3	8 21 6 2 3 1	9 21 11 1 3 3
	COM	IFIDENTIAL 3	

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#### g. (U) RIR ALLOCATIONS: 1 NOVEMBER 1968 to 31 JAMUARY 1969: (Con't)

CITY	NOV-MIER	DECEMBISE	JANIIARY
Singapore Sydney	3 13	3 17	4
Taipei Tokyo	5 3	9	4
TOT 'LS:	71	73	73

#### h. (C) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND EVENTS:

(1) (C) Hunter Killer missions, employing two OV-1s and two AV-19 aircraft, were flown on request from IV GTZ. Reportable results of these missions were continuously limited because the total effect on enemy infiltration and night operations could not be evaluated by sector intellirence agencies. Hunter Killer operations were exclusively conducted at night to interdict enemy movement. Many operations were cancelled because of had weather, which is the reason only seven (7) missions were flown during the reporting period. Of the seven missions flown, only the mission of 21 December 1969, produced significant results, causing six secondary explosions. Hunter Killer Operations have not been flown since 21 December 1968.

(2) (C) The Phantom III Operation, the Battalion's own offensive effort, was conducted on an average of sixteen days per month during the reporting period. In mid December, Phantom III Operation moved into Kien Giang Province on an experimental basis. Staging out of the Bach Gia stagefields, Phantom III successfully engaged numerous enemy targets. The results of operations in Kien Giang were so impressive, the province was added to the Phantom III schedule. On 13 January 1969, however, the enemy attacked the Can Tho Airfield damaging seven (7) AH-16 Cobras. Scheduling of Fhantom III was reduced in order to meet the aircraft commitments of other support missions. This reporting period, Phantom III resulted in the following toll of enemy personnel and equipment:

KBA CONF/EST 321/0 STRUCTURES DEST/D4M 1135/1145 SAMPANS DEST DAM 242/224

(3) (U) The 271st Aviation Company (Mdm Pel) supported IV CTZ by participating in napalm drops, recoveries of downed aircraft, C.S. mas drops, insertion and extraction of ground forces and equipment, numerous recoveries of enemy caches, and the delivery of C-4 cargo. The company was also involved in the 44th Special Zone operations at Mui Coto and operations with the 21st ARVF Division in the U Minh Forest, both operations resulted in the recovery

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of enemy caches. The success of the 271st is best illustrated by the high number of requests for their support and their ability to continuously provide a sufficient number of mission ready aircraft despite the taxation of many flying hours.

(4) (C) The 244th Surveillance Airplane Company continues to provide intelligence information by flying missions over the coast and mainland using Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), infrared (IR) and photographic equipment. Side Looking Airborne Radar missions were flown over the coastal territories and border areas to detect waterborne targets and enemy infiltration activities. SLAR missions over the interior, covered ninety-five percent of the primary water routes. Infrared missions were flown daily to provide surveillance of areas of interest. Day and night photo missions were flown on request. A total of two 3LAR and four IP missions were flown in support of the U.S. Air Force. Thirteen missions were flown for the Navy in support of operation "SEALORD", for the purpose of detecting and interdicting enemy infiltration and efforts to ambush PBRs.

(5) (U) The 235th Armed Helicopter Company was redesignated the 235th Aerial 'eapons Company on 1 November 1968. The company underwent its first CIMI on 17 December 1968, and AGI on 7 January 1969, receiving satisfactory ratings. During January the TOT of the 235th was changed from 1-770 to 1-1117, resulting in the merging of the 608th and 190th Detachments with the 235th. The combining of the 235th and its detachments is expected to simplify both operation and administration procedures. The company has supported the IV CTZ by providing an average of twenty (20) mission ready aircraft per day for the reporting period.

(6) (U) The 199th Reconnaissance Airplane Company was reorganized under MTOF 1-25F on 20 January 1969. This reorganization brought about the addition of a communication section and additional personnel for motor maintenance. The acquisition of these personnel will be of significant value in maintaining communications and vehicular squipment. MTOE 1-25F, however imposes a significant reduction in aircraft maintenance personnel by cutting nine (9) mechanics slots from the previous authorized strength. With an average of one aircraft in PE each day, this reduction in personnel could increase aircraft down time and will impose a greater workload on the assigned aircraft maintenance personnel.

(7) (U) The aviation safety program within the battalion has resulted in a low accident rate. During the reporting period only two accidents resulted in the loss of aircraft. The first accident occurred during a night force landing of A4-LG Cobra. The pilots emergency procedures were near perfect, however, the aircraft hit a dike that could not be seen until the aircraft had touched down. The second accident occurred during a night landing approach to a ship. A one hundred feet altimeter error resulted in the aircraft being flown into the sea. The crews of both aircraft escaped unharmed.

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The excellent safety record of the battalion is the result of command emphasis on safety at Battalion and Company level.

UNIT	FORCE LANDING	PRECAUTIONARY LANDINGS	ACCIDENTS	ACCIDENT RATES	INCIDENTS	COMBAT DAMAGE
199th 235th 244th	2	5	2	42.3	2 1	1
271st HHC	1	2			*	ī
307th C	NB 3	16	2	42.3	3	3
		1000 Contraction 1000	Science Sciences	Muchiles Series		

SAFETY	STATIST	ICS ]	NOVTHACK	1968 TO	31 J	WHINK	1969:

2. (C) SECTION II LESSONS DEAPNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) (U) Incentive pay for the M-1G Crewchief:

(a) Observation: The A4-IG crewchief has preater responsibilities, is required to possess a higher skill level, and is required to regularly fly to forward area stagefields for the purpose of maintaining aircraft and weapons systems engaged in combat support activity. For accomplishing this task he receives less compensation than does the UH-1 crewchief. This situation has a decidedly adverse effect upon the morale of the AH-IG crewchief.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the complexity of the aircraft and its armament system, the AH-IG requires more time and a higher skill level to maintain, than many other helicopters. During the day the crewchief is often required to fly to outlying stagefields to service the aircraft and maintain its armament system. He then returns and works into the night preparing the aircraft for the following day. This mans work load and proficiency level is necessarily higher than most other belicopter crewchiefs. The AH-IG crewchief is expected to carry this load and maintain his proficiency level without the benefit of incentive may that is awarded to other helicopter crewchiefs.

(c) Recommendation: That incentive pay commensurate with their skill level, be awarded the AH-1G crowchief. Surveys should be initiated in other commands to determine the percent of crewchiefs receiving pay as compared to how many AH-1G crewchiefs receive the pay.

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b. OPERATIONS:

(1) (U) More efficient use of the CH-47 Chinook:

(a) Observation: Misutilization of the CH-47 Chinook has been evidenced in many instances where the aircraft has been required to wait for the load of the supported unit. The reporting times of the chinook are determined by the requesting organization through higher headquarters, however, higher headquarters has no means to moritor the preparation of cargo that is to be lifted. Thus many aircraft hours are wasted due to lack of coordination of lower organizations with supporting aviation units. Instances of wasted CH-47 time could be avoided with better prior planning on behalf of the requesting unit.

(c) Recommendation: That requesting agencies receive verification of mission requests and advise 164th CAG TOC of any change in the starting time if load cannot be ready at assigned time. This procedure would eliminate wasted time and provide maximum aircraft availability on later dates.

(d) Command Action: This headquarters is closely monitoring times aircraft have to report to pickup points and how much time is spont waiting for the supported unit. Requests for aircraft divertions to more profitable missions are sent directly to next higher headquarters.

(2) (U) Use of certain major airfields as staging areas for CH-47 Tactical Operations:

(a) Observation: The use of major airfields as tactical staging areas is impractical and results in considerable delay in the accomplishment of the tactical mission.

(b) Evaluation: There are four major airfields in the TV CTZ where traffic density procludes the efficient use of the CH-47 as helicopter staging areas. These airfields are Dong Tam, Vinh Yong, Soc Trang, and Binh Thuy. The daily volume of air traffic at each of these airfields is such that it is not practical to use them as medium lift helicopter staging areas. Delays as long as thirty (30) minutes have been experienced by a single aircraft attempting to enter or depart from the airport traffic area. When a tactical artillery move is in progress, involving several CH-47 sircraft, the problem is further compounded. An area, large enough for a CH-47 to pick up and land a slingload, is often unavailable, due to the proximity of parked aircraft on or near the active runway. This results in entries and departures being dependent on gaps of inbound and outbound traffic. The extremely heavy volume of traffic precludes efficient insertion or extraction from these areas. The cumulative delays experienced by several CH-47 aircraft supporting a tactical move have amounted to several hours in some cases.

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(c) Recommendation: That tactical units whose base camp area is located in proximity to these major airfields, refrain from using the major airfields as a staging area for tactical moves. A cleared area sufficiently removed from the major airfields traffic pattern area should be selected and prepared. In the event that it is not practical to prevare such an area, an alternate area such as a road should be utilized. If these steps are taken, the tactical unit commander would realize a time savings that would result in quicker mission completion.

(d) Command Action: Higher headquarters has been advised of the problems relating to staging from major airfields. Whenever rossible, staging from these stagefields is avoided. There are tactical situations which currently require the use of these airfields regardless of existing conditions. When operations from major airfields can not be avoided, this headquarters or the subordinate CH-47 unit contacts the control agency at the airfield in order to predict the density of air traffic and the length of time necessary to extract or insert mon and equipment.

(3) (C) Use of Aircraft Revetment Guards:

(a) Observation: Prior to the 13 January 1969 attack on the Can The Army Airfield, it has been airfield policy to station guards in individual aircraft revoluents when the alert status was YELLOW or RED.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy menetrated the airfield verimeter while the airfield was on a GRAY alert and the guards were not in the rovotments. The enemy moved through the aircraft revolment areas and destroyed numerous aircraft. Had guards been placed in each revolment or had a walking guard been placed as as to say a say and a walking guard been placed as as to say a say and a says a say and been to the atraeraft might have been less or even prevented.

(c) Recommendation: That reveluent guards be placed near the aircraft, regardless of the airfields alort status.

(d) Command Action: This Battalion has instituted seven guard posts within the Battalion's revetment area. All seven are manned regardless of alert condition. Guards are checked by the duty officer every night to insure they know their duties.

(4) (U) Inconsistencies of the Modified TOTS:

(a) Observation: All five companies in the Pattalion are in the process of being reorganized under the applicable MTCE as specified in USARPAC Concral Order 771, dated 22 November 1968. The most significant changes resulting from the reorganization is the deactivation of three TC Detachments and two SC Detachments. Generally the personnel and equipment along with the mission of the deactivated detachments were absorbed by the aviation companies which the detachments had previously been supporting.

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(b) Evaluation:

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/1/ Section I, paragraph 3 (Capabilities) of the modified TOEs fails to add the direct support level capabilities for aircraft, aviation maintenance and repair marts, thus having the nowly reorganized aviation company with authority for organizational maintenance only. The General Orders made no mention of the increased capabilities either.

/2/ The majority of the shon sets, both organizational and direct support level, have been replaced by new sets on the MTOPs. The organizational sets are to arrive in RVN during February or March. The direct support shop sets (LIN T 17090) for the 235th AWC and (LIN T 17011) for the 271st Avn Co are not yet identified in 39 700-20. No supply catalors are available for the sets and a determination as to their adequacy, or that they are in fact DS level shop sets, can not be made at this time.

(c) Recommendation: That the MTCE be clarified to include description of the direct support level capabilities for aircraft, aviation maintenance and repair parts. Catalors should be made available for the shop sets (LIN T 17090) and (LIN T 17011) in order to determine if these sets belong to DS level shops.

(d) Command Action: MTOE will be instituted to add the DS lovel capability and to add items of equipment which were deleted but are nueded to accomplish the mission. Request for temporary loan will be submittud IAW USARV Men 700-20 for all tool and shop sets until the new equipment is issued.

(5) (1) Engine Change Down Time:

(a) Observation: Aircraft are often down excessive veriods of time for an engine change.

(b) Evaluation: On occasion, aircraft have been down in excess of ten (10) days avaiting engines, due to normal time changes, or changes resulting from malfunctions. An additional 72-96 man hours is normally required to transfer accessories from the old engine to the new engine and complete the installation. If a spare engine was available, it could be prepared as a Quick Change Assembly (QCA) prior to the time of actual need, and an engine change could be completed in one working day or less.

(c) Recommendation: That units be permitted to stock a minimum of one engine (QCA), or that engines be shipped to the units assembled as QCA's.

(d) Command Action: This battalion has considered the possibilities of relocating one replacement engine at company level. The

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relocation of an engine at company level is feasible, if the control of the employment of the engine remains with a central control facility. The companies would then have a spare engine on hand, but would be required to requisition the use of the engine from the central control agency. Shipping time is saved since the engine is already located at the company.

f. ORGANIZATION: None

g. OTHER: None

3. SECTION III DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY PERSONNEL: ESCAPE AND EVASION AND SURVIVAL: None

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BILLY E. RUTHERFORD LTC, INF Commanding

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AVERAGE-U (15 Feb 69) 1st Ind SUEJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Thantom) Eattaicon for Feriod Ending 31 January 1969, 200, 03POA-65 (21)

DA, Hu, 1642H JORDAY AVIANTON GLOOF, AND 96215, 22 February 1969

SEE DIST. C.BUTCA

1. (U) Section II Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) <u>Incentive pay for the AH-1G Crewchief</u>: This headquarters concurs with recommendation.

b. Operations:

(1) <u>Hore efficient use of the CH-47 Chinook</u>: This recommendation is already in practice. Aircraft are diverted to: missions which are more profitable.

(2) Use of certain major airfields as staring areas for GI-47 factical Overations: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.

(3) Use of <u>aircraft wevetment Guards</u>: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.

(4) Inconsistencies of the field fiel Mills Whis headquarters couply with the recommendation and action taken.

(5) <u>Ensine Change Down Time</u>: This headquarters concurs aircraft engines should be an item of unit inventory carried on the Authorised Stockage List (ASL). With a minimum of one engine on hand within the unit, preparatory work can be accomplished by the maintenance engine shop to prepare the item as a quick change assembly. This would save many man hours that are normally required for an engine change.

11.

(i) la

JACK V. MACKMULL Colonel, Infantry Coumanding

DISPATEUTTON: 2 DA ATTN: ACSFOR 1 CG, 1st Avn Bde ATTN: AVEA-C AVBAUC-O (15 Feb 69) 2nd Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS, CSF(R-65 (RI)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 5 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: UPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed, except as noted below:

a. Paragraph 2a(1), Page 6: Crew chiefs for the AH-1G aircraft perform no in-flight duties, consequently, there is no basis for award of flight pay. This condition has a serious impact on morale and is more dramatically pointed up when personnel on flight statum as onew obters of other rotary when aircraft much, because of shortages in h08 6/Y he diverted to monifight duty with AH-1G aircraft. This headquarters previously recommended that crew chiefs for AH-1G aircraft be authorized a higher level of proficiency pay or a higher grade in recognition of their advanced skill and level of responsibility.

b. Paragraph 2b(4), Page 9: Concur with command action taken. This headquarters realizes that there are errors and deficiencies in the new standardized MTCEs. Action is currently being taken to obtain recommendations for possible changes to MTCEs.

c. Paragraph 2b(5), Page 9 and paragraph 1b(5), 1st Indorsement: Nonconcur. Aircraft engines in RVN are AIMI items. Stockage of engines as QCA items is not authorized IAW USARV Reg 711-1, dated Aug 68. Para 3c quote, "Units not authorized AIMI stockage may request these items only to satisfy a valid EDP requirement or forecasted for specific aircraft requiring the AIMI within 30 days," end quote.

FOR THE CONDIANDER:

DAVID E. ANDERSON

Col. AGC

AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 69) 3d Ind

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HFADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 8 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Incentive pay for the AH-1G Crewchief, page 6, paragraph 2a(1) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph a; nonconcur. Flight pay is intended to compensate for the increased hazards encountered in inflight operations. To grant a higher grade for one select group of personnel would establish a precedent which is in conflict with the purpose of the promotion system. Concur in the recommendation for a higher level of proficiency pay.

b. Reference item concerning Inconsistencies of the Modified TOEs, page 8, paragraph 2b(4). Concur in the recommendation, however, action is already being taken. The airmobile shop sets listed in the new MTOEs have only recently been developed; consequently, the line numbers and federal stock numbers are not listed in SB700-20 dated October 1968. These numbers will appear in the next issue of SB700-20. The 34th General Support Group recently received copies of the new shop set catalogs and is currently distributing them.

c. Reference item concerning Engine Change Down Time, page 9, paragraph 2b(5); nonconcur. Engines are a critical item managed under the Closed Loop Support (CLS) concept. Sufficient engines are not available to permit the use of the pre-positioned Quick Change Assembly (QCA) concept. Time required to build up an engine is not considered prohibitive.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON 1LT, AGC Assistent Adjutant General

Cy furn: 307th Combat Avn Bn 1st Avn Bde GPOP-DT (15 Feb 69) 4th Ind (U) SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 307th Cbt Avn (Phanton) Bn for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

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FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEFE

CPT, AGC Asst AG



307th COMPATAVIATION (Phantom) BATTALION OPERATIONAL STATISTICS 1 NOVTMEER 1968 - 31 JANUARY 1969

TIMU	SORTIES		HOURS	HOURS FLOW!			STRIIC	STRUCTURES	SAUDANS	SNY	AV GND	LIPARD CHER	L'E
	NHOTE	NOI	D.C	JAN	TOTAL	KBA	N:U	DEST	DAY	NEST	32.14	7.	DEST
199th R/C	6089	2187	530.6	2346 2332	6905	59	49	32	51	34	10	6	c
235th MG	7102	1657	1768	1581	5026	437	437 1220 1704	1704	310	363	25	8	æ
271st Am Co	9577	THEI	1222	1182	3684				ļ		6	7	4
244th Sic	1802	331	954	1005	2890						9	9	0
HHC, 307th	945	EM1	155	208	1351		:	•	1			·	
307th CAR	26235	6152	6505	6308	19456						20	23	12

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