

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD501572

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; 01 FEB 1969.
Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 29310.

AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

SECURITY

MARKING


The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

CONFIDENTIAL



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (25 Apr 69) FOR OT UT 691151

29 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 269th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Kenneth G. Wickham".

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

**Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified Inclosure.**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO 96353
"DISCIPLINED PROFESSIONALS"

AVGC-F-SC

1 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Chronology of Significant Events.

(1) The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, composed of two assault helicopter companies, and one assault support helicopter company has continued its airmobile support required by all allied forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone, with primary support being to the 25th Infantry Division.

(2) The frequency of combat assaults performed by the battalion has remained at the same high level as the past quarter. The battalion continues to be committed daily to tasks varying from combat support missions to battalion sized combat assault operations, with emphasis being placed on company sized combat assault operations. The battalion flew a total of 143 combat assault days of the possible 184 days. The battalion is normally committed daily for two combat assault companies, two general support aircraft (UH-1D) and six OH-47 aircraft for general support. The normal mission profile for the assault helicopter company is nine UH-1D/H lift helicopters, one command and control helicopter, one maintenance helicopter, one smoke helicopter, and four armed helicopters from the units assets.

(3) The 116th and the 187th Assault Helicopter Companies continues as

FOR OTUT

691151

Inclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

the primary aviation support units for the 25th Infantry Division; however, tactical situations required their use outside the Division AO. Both assault companies have conducted operations in support of the 1st and 9th Infantry Division, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, ARVN forces and Special Forces.

(4) The 242nd Assault Helicopter Company maintained its high level of support for all allied forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The 242nd is normally committed each day for two aircraft in support of the 25th Infantry Division and four aircraft in support of IIFV. With the use of our organic Pathfinder Detachment, the 242nd has expedited the movement of artillery batteries and large scale troop movements. The Pathfinders, being more experienced in aviation operations, can assist the ground commander in rigging heavy loads, positioning troops in the PZ and actual radio control of aircraft in the PZ's and LZ's.

(5) During this reporting period there was six battalion controlled operations. One of these was significant and did produce a lesson learned.

(a) At 1230 hours 8 November 1968, the 25th Infantry Division requested an LNO be sent to the 2nd Brigade to establish coordination for a two company assault to be conducted as soon as possible. At the 2nd Brigade TOC we were given a brief orientation on the overall mission which was to cordon a tree complex in the vicinity of XT3737. Following the establishment of the cordon by four rifle companies and the 3/4 Cav Aero Rifle platoon, a search of the complex would be conducted in an attempt to locate the VC Tay Ninh district headquarters reported to be in the area. The first two rifle companies to be inserted were from the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry and were located in PZ's in the vicinity of XT5020 and XT5127. The second two companies from the

In closure

CONFIDENTIAL

4th Bn, 9th Inf were to be transported by CH-47 from the vicinity of Trung Lap to a PZ area at XT4435. This transmovement of the personnel was accomplished in order to reduce the turn around time between the first and second lifts to a minimum. Four LZ's were selected and the order of insertions were: LZ#1 (XT377374), LZ#2 (XT368377), LZ#3 (XT376370), and LZ#4 (XT374366). One stipulation however was placed on the LZ's selected. The Brigade Commander would confirm the locations when he arrived in the area of operation. The final coordination consisted of the exchange of frequencies and call signs, coordination of supporting fire if used (none were planned) and exchange of C&C parties from one supported battalion to another. The Brigade Commander desired that the aviation units meet a pick-up time of 1400 hours and an LZ time of 1415.

(b) When the coordination meeting was over the time was 1325. This did not leave any time for a satisfactory briefing of the aviation units. Via telephone and a hurried conversation on the way to the C&C aircraft, the companies were given the frequencies and call signs of the supported units, their PZ locations and the general area of the landing zones. A common point of origin was established on the map so that exact locations could be easily transmitted over the air.

(c) As the C&C was picking up the 2/12th command party at 1350 hours, the 116th Hornets reported they were inbound to the first PZ for their loads. As they picked up their troops, the 187th Crusaders reported inbound to their PZ. Both assault companies were loaded and off the PZ's by 1402 hours. They proceeded to an orbit point in the vicinity of Go Da Ha to await the call for landing.

(d) Upon arrival in the AO the landing sequence was finalized

and touchdown points coordinated between the air mission and supported infantry battalion commander. The Hornets were to land first in LZ#1 on the west followed by the Crusaders in LZ#2 on the east. At this point the first of many difficulties arose. We were informed by the Brigade C&C that the AO had not yet been cleared by the ARVN and that landing would be delayed slightly. The flights maintained their orbit until it appeared that further delays were going to develop, at which time they were told to return to Cu Chi, refuel and stand by for call off. The flight had almost reached Cu Chi when the word came through that the area was cleared for operations and that the flight was to return for landing. A total of one hour and twenty minutes had now elapsed since the flights had departed Cu Chi for the first pick up at 1400 hours.

(e) At this time we were notified by the infantry battalion commander that he had received information from the Brigade C&C that the Brigade Commander would not only confirm the touchdown points but also that he would mark the locations from his C&C. This proved to be an unsatisfactory arrangement as the pilot flying the Brigade Commander had never led a flight from an RP to an LZ. However, the decision stood and the Brigade C&C rolled into mark LZ#1. Both the 2/12th Battalion CO and the air mission commander could see the aircraft heading in the wrong direction, it was going to LZ#2 and the troops in the flight that was following were supposed to be landed in LZ#1. We told the Hornet flight to go around, ordered the Crusader flight to turn inbound to the RP and asked that the Brigade C&C depart the AO as we had seen his mark and we would lead the flight in. While this was accomplished, the Brigade C&C could mark his desired location for LZ#1 and we would lead that flight also. This done, we got the correct rifle company in the correct LZ by 1525 hours.

CONFIDENTIAL

Shortly thereafter, we dropped off the C&C party and proceeded to the pick-up point for the 4th Bn, 9th Inf command group.

(f) Upon departing their respective LZ's, the assault companies proceeded directly to the 4/9th PZ to load their troops. However, due to all the delays in getting the first two lifts on the ground, it was necessary for all aircraft to return to Cu Chi and refuel before the 4/9th could be inserted. While the assault companies refueled at Cu Chi, the gunships and C&C refueled at Dau Tieng. At 1615 all aircraft were refueled and the insertions continued. Much the same technique was used on the insertion as was used on the first two. The Brigade Commander marked his desired location for LZ#3 and the location was noted by the gunship lead who subsequently led the flight to touchdown. The Battalion Commander of the 4/9th decided at this point to select his own touchdown point for LZ#4. It was quickly coordinated between himself and the air mission commander and the last rifle company was on the ground 2 minutes after the third.

(g) The insertions completed, the 187th Assault Helicopter Company was released to return to the 3rd Brigade. The 116th flight was released to standby at Cu Chi and the Stinger gun team maintained an orbit over the objective area to provide fire support if needed. As soon as the Hornet C&C arrived on station the command parties were changed and the Battalion C&C was released.

(h) Because of the numerous problems encountered on this operation, a critique was held the following morning with the 2nd Brigade. The details were discussed and several lessons learned. The lessons learned by this battalion are presented in Section II of this report.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) Command

a. Mission: There was no change in the mission of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period.

b. Organization: There were minor changes to the organization of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period. Under the new standardized MTOE's the Signal and maintenance detachments were deactivated and became a part of the parent organization. Present organization is attached as Inclosure 1.

c. Personalities:

(1) Commander: The Commanding Officer of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion is LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE W. MC ILWAIN, 069741, Infantry. LTC MC ILWAIN replaced LIEUTENANT COLONEL DELYLE G. REDMOND, 064450, Infantry, on 16 December 1968.

(2) Staff: The principal staff officers during the reporting period were:

(a) Executive Officer: LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT E. LEE OSBOURN, 04011639, Artillery, no change.

(b) S-1: MAJOR FRANK E. NICHOLAS, 076466, Signal Corp, no change.

(c) S-2: CAPTAIN ROBERT H. OSTLER, 02320098, Artillery, no change.

(d) S-3: MAJOR RAYMON L. HARDY, 05308387, Infantry, who replaced LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALBERT R. WOODRUFF, on 28 December 1968.

(e) S-4: CAPTAIN GEORGE D. CRITCHEMDE, 05424547, Artillery, who replaced MAJOR ROSWELL HOORE, on 9 December 1968.

(3) Subordinate Unit Commanders:

(a) Headquarters Company: CAPTAIN BALLARD M. BARKER, 0F104611, Infantry, who replaced CAPTAIN JOHN T. HITE on 20 December 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) 116th Assault Helicopter Company: MAJOR HOHN N. TRAGESSEY II, OF114518, Artillery, who replaced MAJOR GEARY D. MARTIN, on 10 January 1969.

(c) 187th Assault Helicopter Company: MAJOR JAMES J. GAFFNEY, 076140, Artillery, no change.

(d) 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company: MAJOR ROY H. HERRON, 083921, Artillery, no change.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) Personnel and Administration

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength: The battalion strength as of 31 Jan 69 is shown at Inclosure 2. The summary of projected losses during the next 90 days is shown at Inclosure 3.

b. Replacements have been requisitioned in accordance with current directives. Although there remains some critical enlisted MOS shortages, the overall replacement program has functioned smoothly and efficiently. Following is a summary of personnel gains and losses during the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969.

(1) Assignments:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
25	39	124

(2) Rotation to CONUS:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
17	18	142

(3) Casualties Returned to Duty:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
0	0	0

(4) Casualties Evacuated:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
3	3	13

(5) Killed in Action:

<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
1	5	8

c. Reenlistment: There were a total of 5 reenlistments in the battalion during the quarter.

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Promotions: Promotions during this quarter were as follows:

<u>LTC</u>	<u>CPT</u>	<u>1LT</u>	<u>CW2</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
1	11	0	15	10	9	138	56

e. Reclassification: A total of 106 enlisted personnel were administratively reclassified during the quarter. The primary reason for this action was upgrading of MOS skills. Adjustments in MOS to jobs performed, enlisted promotions, and reorganization under the new standardized MTOE.

f. Retirements: There were no retirements or reversion to retired status during the quarter.

g. Civilian Personnel: There have been no changes in the civilian personnel program administered by this battalion. Permanent hire personnel levels continue to be allocated by 12th Combat Aviation Group IAW USARV Reg 690-7. There has been a general cut back in the number of daily hire personnel. This reduction has been necessary in light of the reduced funds available.

h. Morale and Personal Service: The overall morale of the battalion personnel remains at an excellent level. Contributing factors toward the maintenance of this morale have been increased attention to personal services, an active recreation program and an enlivened spirit of competition within and between subordinate units.

(1) The P&R program is continually stressed throughout the battalion. During the quarter the battalion received and filled 225 quotas.

(2) Leaves granted during the quarter were as follows:

	<u>EMERGENCY</u>	<u>COMPASSIONATE</u>	<u>SPECIAL</u>	<u>ORDINARY</u>
OFFICERS	3	0	0	0
WARRANT OFF	1	1	0	0
ENLISTED	9	2	19	15

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Postal Services: Postal services have continued to be excellent there by greatly assisting the morale of battalion personnel.

(4) Religious Services and Character Guidance:

(a) Religious services of the three major faiths are available through Chapels located at the Cu Chi and Tay Ninh Base Camps. The Battalion Chaplain conducts services for battalion personnel three times each Sunday. In the morning, Protestant services are conducted at the 242nd ASBC area and the Headquarters Company area. Evening Protestant services are conducted at Tay Ninh in the 187th AHC area. The 116th AHC attends Protestant services at the 25th Division Memorial Chapel. Services for Catholic personnel are provided by Chaplains from adjacent units. Catholics in HHC 242nd ASHC and 116th AHC attend mass in the 2nd Brigade Chapel at 0830 hours, the 20th Trans Company dayroom at 1130 hours, or in the 25th Division Memorial Chapel at 1030 hours and 1900 hours on Sundays. Masses are held at 0900 and 1400 hours in the Memorial Chapel at Tay Ninh. These services are available to Catholic personnel of the 187th AHC.

(b) The Battalion Chaplain has continued his program of education and consultation through a briefing and letter of welcome given to all new arrivals. He also conducts frequent visits to subordinate units to better avail himself to those personnel seeking his assistance.

(c) Memorial Services are held for all personnel who lose their lives while in the command. These services are usually conducted by the Battalion Chaplain and, in cases of Catholic personnel, a Catholic Chaplain is also present to say the Requiem Mass. These services are held in the Division Memorial Chapel or the area of the unit concerned.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) Character Guidance classes are held each month on the topic prescribed by higher headquarters. The Chaplain conducts these classes for subordinate units whenever requested. In addition, a supplemental orientation sheet is prepared by the Chaplain and distributed in sufficient numbers to the unit training officers for all officers and enlisted men unable to attend the formal class.

i. Discipline, Law, and Order: During the past quarter the following disciplinary actions have been conducted:

- (1) Special Court Martial - 9
- (2) Summary Court Martial - 1
- (3) General Court Martial - 0
- (4) Article 15 Impositions - 58
- (5) Three (3) cases of confinement have been suspended.

j. Headquarters Management: There have been no changes in Headquarters Management Procedures in this reporting period. No major problems have developed in this area.

k. Safety: The battalion safety program continues to receive command emphasis at all levels. Safety information is disseminated to subordinate units through the "Black Baron" Safety Newsletter. This letter is published monthly and contains articles written by personnel within the battalion.

l. Marriage to Foreign Nationals: None

m. Exchange Facilities, Club and Messes: There has been no change in these facilities during the quarter.

n. Information Activities:

- (1) No major changes have been made in the Command Information Program

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

of this battalion, although new ideas and concepts have been incorporated into the existing information program.

(2) Command emphasis at all levels, has increased participation and resulted in more personal interest stories, stressing an individuals achievements and the job performed by the personnel. The number of hometown news releases have been increasing, and the primary objective being stressed is the achievements in all areas of aviation and combat operations.

o. Awards and Ceremonies: Six awards ceremonies have been hold during the quarter. Headquarters Company held 3 ceremonies, with the Battalion Commander presenting the awards. Two awards ceremonies were held at the 242d ASHC area with the company commander presenting the awards. One awards ceremony was held in the 187th AHC area with the company commander presenting the awards. In all cases awards ranging from the Distinguished Flying Cross to the Purple Heart were presented. Change of Command Ceremonies were conducted on 16 Dec 1968 at the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, LTC GEORGE L. MC ILWAIN assumed Command of the Black Barons. On 10 Jan 1969 MAJOR JOHN N. TRAGESSE II assumed command of the 116th Assault Helicopter Company.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (C) Intelligence and Security

a. There have been no significant changes in the policies and procedures of the intelligence section. The primary mission has been to gather and disseminate timely and accurate intelligence from all reliable sources for use by the companies to assist in the accomplishment of their assigned mission.

b. Due to the increase in terrorist activities in and around the Cu Chi Base Camp, the 25th Infantry Division has initiated a policy whereby all frequently used facilities must be inspected daily.

c. All mess halls are to be inspected before each meal. All clubs are being inspected at least once each day. Any area that is being used regularly by a large number of troops must be checked daily. A check must also be made of any Vietnamese concession that is operating in the company area. All these areas are to be checked for booby traps, explosive devices, or signs of tampering as well as any stay behind Vietnamese personnel in the area after 1700 hours. Reports are due from each company to the battalion S2 office the day following the date of the report. A monthly report is due from the Battalion Commander to Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, ATTN: AVDCOM, certifying that units are making the required inspections. The results of all inspections so far have been negative.

d. The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion continues the mission of commanding Sector "E" of the Cu Chi Base Camp defensive perimeter. During January a practice RED ALERT was conducted on Sector "E". All units manning the sector were given prior notice of the alert. This was intended to give the units an opportunity to revise procedures and responsibilities for newly assigned personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Due to the fact that we have eight different units working positions in the sector, it was felt that a rehearsal would be of more benefit than a surprise alert. Several weak points were noticed during the practice alert. All units have been instructed on the discrepancies and the overall condition of the sector has shown a noticeable improvement.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. (U) Operations and Training

a. Operations. Combat assaults continue to be the primary mission performed by this battalion. The two assault helicopter companies continue to conduct combat assaults approximately 25 of every 30 days. For exact statistical data see Inclosure 5.

(1) This battalion attempts to maintain the habitual association down to company levels by assigning missions to specific brigades within the Division. The 116th Assault Helicopter Company located at Cu Chi provides the primary air assets for the 2nd Brigade which is located Cu Chi. The 187th Assault Helicopter Company located at Tay Ninh provides the primary air assets for the 1st and 3rd Brigades located at Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng respectively.

(2) The majority of the combat assaults conducted by the battalion are controlled by the individual companies. The 25th Infantry Division seldom initiates assaults of multi-company size. During this past quarter six (6) battalion lifts were conducted and controlled by the battalion. Coordination of effort of all assigned units is maintained through the battalion operations center. By maintaining a close monitoring of mission progress and unit status, BOC duty officers can readily shift assets within the battalion to meet unforeseen requirements.

(3) Pathfinder Support. The battalion pathfinder detachment supports both battalion and company size operation, as well as assisting divisional units in heavy lifts operations.

(a) Support rendered during combat assaults generally consists of pick-up zone organization and establishment of night lighting and control facilities. Pathfinders have been found to insure a more successful operation

in the FZ when they have been inserted into the ground elements position the day prior to an early morning lift. This affords the Pathfinder personnel sufficient time to brief ground forces on the location of loads, number of loads, pick up formation, etc.

(b) The battalion pathfinder detachment continues its extensive support of CH-47 heavy lift operations. Pathfinder personnel are present in the division resupply area to assist units in rigging loads and inspection of rigging equipment. This support continues to prove beneficial to both ground and aviation units and has resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of dropped loads due to improper rigging and the use of faulty rigging equipment.

b. Training. Mandatory training as outlined in USARV Regulation 350-1 and 12th Combat Aviation Group Regulation 350-1 is being conducted by all units of this battalion. Initial in-country training is conducted in conjunction with the 25th Infantry Division replacement training center. Upon completion of in-country orientation training, training records are initiated by the battalion S-3 section and forwarded to the individuals unit of assignment. This program seems to be beneficial in that it gives both the division troops and the aviation troops an opportunity to learn mutual respect for the others job. Requirements for recurring training are maintained at battalion level. Each month mandatory subjects to be taught during the month are forwarded to subordinate units.

(10 Specialized Training:

(a) Jungle Environmental Survival: Five (5) allocations were received and filled for this course conducted by the USAF and USN in the

Phillipines. The following units filled these quotas:

1. 116th AHC -2
2. 187th AHC -1
3. 242nd ASHC -1
4. HHC 269th CAB -1

(2) Army Aviation Refresher Training School: The following ARTS school quotas were received and filled by personnel from units indicated.

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>116th AHC</u>	<u>187th AHC</u>	<u>242nd ASHC</u>
UH-1 Airframe	1	1	0
OH-47 Airframe	0	0	6
T-53 Engine	1	2	0
T-55 Engine	0	0	0
Tech Supply	1	0	1
A/C Armament	2	1	0

(3) Aviator Training and Standardization

(a) Two allocations for the UH-1 IP course were received and filled by the following units:

1. 116th AHC -1
2. 187th AHC -1

(b) Primary training to newly assigned aviators is conducted at subordinate unit level. In-country orientations are given by company level instructor pilots, as are the various stages of training required to insure an aviators proficiency in the techniques peculiar to combat operation in Vietnam.

(c) Standardization is maintained throughout the battalion

through 90 day standardization checkrides. These rides are given by company and battalion instructor pilots who insure adherence to battalion standards. Battalion standardization pilots continually monitor the standardization program with an aggressive policy of frequent flying with subordinate units.

6. (U) Logistics

a. Logistic support of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion has been very routine in nature during this reporting period. No major problem areas have been encountered.

(1) Command Maintenance Management Inspections: During this quarter pre-CMD's were performed by the 12th Combat Aviation Group on all units of this battalion. All units received an overall satisfactory rating.

(2) Services: Engineer construction of facilities, revetments and parking area for the 116th Assault Helicopter Company has been completed except for electrical wiring which is expected to be completed by the end of February. These facilities have greatly increased the working conditions for all aircraft maintenance personnel of the 116th AHC.

(3) The overall status of equipment within the battalion for both on hand quantities and standards of maintenance, remains at a satisfactory level. During this reporting period an automotive maintenance officer has been assigned to the battalion. His assignment has greatly increased the standards of automotive maintenance throughout the battalion.

7. (U) Aviation Maintenance

This battalion has made significant improvement in aircraft maintenance efficiency. This is clearly illustrated by our aircraft availability statistics. For the reporting period an availability of 84.9% was maintained as compared to 72.3% and 66.6% during the two previous quarters. The increased availability is attributed to several important factors, including strong command emphasis, improved working areas, decreased combat damage, and better response from the supply system. This improved availability has been accompanied with a slight increase in flying time. Average time being 94.7 hours per aircraft per month - an increase of 2.1 hours over the previous reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. (U) Aviation Medicine

a. Dispensary Operations: The combined 269th Combat Aviation Battalion dispensary has worked well and has efficiently served the needs of the companies located at Cu Chi which are the 116th Assault Helicopter Company and the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company. The new TO&E which has recently been implemented, will markedly change the capabilities of the combined dispensary by adding: X-Ray equipment, audiometer equipment and other equipment to facilitate a more comprehensive medical care. The 541st (O.) detachment serving the 187th Assault Helicopter Company has made needed improvements on its building and are in the process of obtaining needed equipment to facilitate their medical care.

b. Preventive Medicine: Malaria prophylaxis has been extremely effective by using the weekly chloroquine-primaquine tablet. This battalion had no cases of malaria during the last quarter. Immunizations are maintained at a near 100% level through a constant check of shot records. We have had no diseases which we have immunized for, with the exception of several minor cases of influenza. Sanitation inspections are carried out on a regular basis and have proved valuable in keeping the incidence of gastroenteritis to a minimum.

c. Aviator fatigue has markedly decreased in importance with the arrival of additional aviators to the battalion bringing the strength near the 100% level. During the last month only 7 out of approximately 160 aviators flew over 140 hours.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. (C) Signal

a. During the last quarter the Battalion Signal Section has implemented the changes noted below, both strengthening and improving the communications capabilities of the unit.

(1) KY-28: This period included the receipt and final issue of TSEC/KY-28 equipment and included total installation in all UH-1 aircraft, with partial installation in CH-47 aircraft. The battalion now has complete air to ground secure FM communications with each unit operations center.

(2) KY-38: When the initial issue of AN/PRC-77 radios occurs the unit will have completed the projected idea of totally secure FM voice communications. This will be most useful for standby missions and also the Battalion Pathfinder Detachment.

(3) The Battalion Signal Section concerted all its efforts toward construction of a new and better crypto-facility-the results were quite apparent. In the old facility equipment failure was occurring on a regular basis, especially the AN/TCC-114. The TH-5/TG was failing so frequently it became difficult to get equipment repaired on a timely basis. It was decided the failure was due to the cramped and unventilated quarters. A large bunker was constructed providing for the teletype equipment, SB-86 switchboard, and an office/storeroom for the SOL-Crypto Clerk. The Battalion S-4 submitted paperwork to requisition an air conditioner from PA&E which was approved and the unit issued, subsequent installation has reduced equipment outages to a minimum.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned:

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) Marking of Landing Zones.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel must be trained in the techniques of leading assault flights if they are to mark touch down points in a landing zone.

(b) EVALUATION: During a recent combat assault operation the Infantry Brigade Commander decided that he would mark the touch down points for the assault flights in pre-selected landing zone areas. This commander was in his own C&C aircraft and was not in communication with the air mission commander, except through the infantry battalion commander in the back seat of the air mission C&C or through the pilot of the Brigade C&C. The pilot of the Brigade C&C had never led a flight from an RP to an LZ and marked an LZ. Normally, the touch down point is selected by the infantry battalion and air mission commanders from the same aircraft and this information is passed to the armed helicopter platoon commander who leads the flight to touchdown. Because the pilot flying the Brigade C&C aircraft did not know how to properly lead a flight to landing, the mark was in the wrong landing zone, the smoke was not streamered prior to dropping, so it was not identified by the flight lead until too late to land. Thus the entire approach was forced to abort at a critical time and all aircraft crews and passengers were unnecessarily exposed to possible enemy fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the selection of a touchdown within the landing zone area be decided between the air mission commander and the

supported infantry battalion commander and that the marking of the touchdown point be accomplished only by crews trained for the job.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** The selection of landing zones is accomplished through the air mission commander and the airmobile task force commander, both of which are located in the same C&C aircraft. Flights are led and the landing zones are marked by trained crews normally the armed platoon commander.

(2) Supported Unit C&C Party Changes.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** On occasion, more than one infantry battalion is assaulted into an objective area during the same operation which requires a change in C&C parties.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Naturally, an infantry battalion commander desires that he and his command party be aboard the C&C helicopter when elements of his battalion are being committed on a combat assault. However, flight time of lift ships is wasted and the smooth continuity of insertions is lost when the C&C aircraft must depart station to change parties from one battalion to another.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That when more than one infantry battalion is employed in the same assault operation that all battalion commanders be in the same C&C throughout the entire assault phase of the operation or that C&C party changes be coordinated to coincide with lift aircraft refueling.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** When more than one infantry battalion is employed in the same operation, both battalion commanders are located in the C&C aircraft.

(3) Selection of Landing Zones.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Extensive combat damage and casualties were

suffered by this unit in the completion of an insertion into an area pointed out by a recent defector.

(b) EVALUATION: Even though two air strikes, a ten minute artillery prep and gunship prep were employed, an intensive volume of fire was received on landing. It is suspected that the Hoi Chanh tip was in fact an ambush. The enemy knows just as well as we do what a favorable LZ looks like.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That in similar cases the second best LZ be employed. Additionally, gunships should mark two LZ's, both the actual landing zone and the landing zone that has been pointed out. This gives an added measure of deception.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: When landing zones are specified by recent defectors or POW, an alternate LZ is selected if it will accomplish the mission and support the ground tactical plan.

(4) Utilization of Pathfinders.

(a) OBSERVATION: A reduction in the number of dropped loads as reaffirmed continued use of Pathfinders in heavy lift operations.

(b) EVALUATION: The ground commander who has requested resupply by heavy lift helicopters (sling loads) expects the supplies on station as requested. A dropped load while enroute doesn't provide the required support. Any delay in a combat essential Class V resupply could be the turning point in the tactical situation. Employment of pathfinder personnel in rigging and checking the rigged loads has minimized the number of dropped loads experienced by this battalion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Pathfinders be used whenever possible in rigging sling loads.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** Pathfinder personnel of this battalion are employed daily in the resupply areas to assist in rigging and checking loads that have been rigged by the ground unit.

c. Training:

(1) Position of Cargo Ramp in Flight.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** CH-47 aircraft have been observed with the cargo ramp in a horizontal position in flight.

(b) **EVALUATION:** In some cases, the flight engineer has been observed standing on the ramp. This procedure is most common during repositioning between POL and resupply points. The fact that the cargo ramp will drop fully open in the event of a utility hydraulic failure makes this an unsafe practice.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Flight engineers should be trained in the proper procedures for positioning cargo ramps, and the hazards involved when the ramp is left in the horizontal position.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** Enlisted crewmember on CH-47 aircraft have received instruction on proper position of cargo ramp and the hazards involved when it is in the horizontal position.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics: None

f. Organization: None

g. Other:

(1) Treatment of Gonorrhea.

(-) OBSERVATION: Many cases of gonorrhoea seen in Vietnam are difficult to treat.

(b) EVALUATION: Strains of gonorrhoea have been seen in our dispensary which have been resistant to the usual penicillin-benzamid therapy and also to large doses of penicillin therapy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a combination of high doses of penicillin and tetracycline be used for the treatment of gonorrhoea, particularly the resistant cases.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: We have adopted the treatment for all cases of gonorrhoea of 3 million units of penicillin daily for three days along with 500 milligrams tetracycline four times per day for five days. With this treatment, we have found only a rare reoccurrence which has cleared with a second course of treatment.

(2) Epidemic Pruritis.

(a) OBSERVATION: Each November an epidemic of severe itching has hit several base camps in the Saigon area.

(b) EVALUATION: This itching is caused by particles from moths floating through the air and landing on susceptible individual's skin causing an allergic reaction. This condition is usually not accompanied by hives, rashes or other allergic manifestations. Treatment with usual antihistamines and steroid creams was found usually to be unsuccessful.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Croteniton cream (Eurax by Geigy) FSN 6505-116-C200 be used for the treatment of this condition.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All cases of this moth pruritis were treated with crobaniton and proved to be markedly successful in relieving the itching.

(3) Neoprene Landing Pads.

(a) OBSERVATION: A recent accident involving a CH-47A was caused by a piece of a neoprene pad being torn loose and pulled through the aft rotor system resulting in major damage.

(b) EVALUATION: Several of the fire support bases continue to use neoprene pads which could result in similar type accidents.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all neoprene pads be inspected daily by using units and a weekly inspection by engineer personnel.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Coordination has been made with supported units to insure that all pads are inspected by qualified personnel. The battalion safety officer conducts a monthly inspection of all resupply pads used by this unit.

George W. McIlwain
GEORGE W. MC ILWAIN
MTC, Infantry
Commanding

5 Inclosures

1. 269th Cbt Avn Bn
 - ~~2. Unit Strength as of 31 Jan 69~~
 - ~~3. Summary of Losses for Next 90 Days~~
 - ~~4. Aircraft Status~~
 - ~~5. Operational Statistics~~
- Inclosures 2 - 5 wd Hq DA

AVGC-SC (1 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1969 (UIC: WDUTTO) (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)


Dr, Hq, 11th Cbt Avn Gp, APO 96266 17 Feb 69

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

1. In accordance with USARV Reg 525-15, the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, for the period ending 31 January 1969, is forwarded.

2. Reference Section 2, Para 2b(3), the selection of the LZ should be a matter of agreement between the Ground Tactical Commander and the Air Mission Commander. The possibility that an ambush could exist must be considered in the selection of the LZ in this situation. It should not, however, be the overriding consideration as it would appear to be in the recommendation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


ARTHUR M. MOUNTCASTLE
Captain, Infantry
Assistant Adjutant

AVFBC-RE-H (1 Feb 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1969 (UIC: WDUTTO) (RCS CSFOR - 65) (RI)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 6 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA - C, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC - DST, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP - DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, for the period end-
ing 31 January 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



B.G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

AVBAGC-0 (1 Feb 69) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1969 (UIC: WDUOTO) (RCS CSFOR - 65) (RI)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 **11 MAR 1969**

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents, as indorsed, except as noted below.

a. Paragraph 2b(1), page 23: Concur. An Airmobile operation can be conducted with the AMTF Commander in one aircraft and the air mission commander in another aircraft, but experience has proven that this is an unsatisfactory method in which to conduct an efficient and properly executed operation. The air mission commander has the responsibility of providing technical advice on selected LZ's and for control of all aviation elements on that specific mission or operation. A much smoother, more efficient and properly executed insertion or extraction will result when the AMC and AMTF Commander are in the same aircraft controlling the operation. Each party must understand the responsibilities inherent with each position. The AMC should be given the widest possible latitude for control of the aviation assets which includes marking of the selected touchdown point for the flight(s). It must also be understood that when a decision conflict exists the decision of the tactical commander will be followed.

b. Paragraph 2c(1), page 26: Nonconcur. The observation, as stated, is a normal and safe procedure. The cargo ramp lever must be retained in the "Stop" position if a level ramp condition is desired. In the "Stop" position the cargo ramp will not drop down because of trapped hydraulic fluid in the actuator, regardless of the utility hydraulic pump operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DAVID R. ANDERSON
Cpt, AGC
Asst. AG

AVHGC-DST (1 Feb 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1969 (UIC: WDUTTO) (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963752 0 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 269th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

5 Incl
nc

Cy furn:
269th Combat Avn Bn
1st Avn Bde

GPOP-DT (1 Feb 69) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 269th Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report, as indorsed, except as
indicated below.


2. Reference paragraph 2g(1): Nonconcur. The use of 9 million units
of penicillin for the treatment of gonorrhea is not indicated. Should
a case be resistant to the usual dose of 2.4 million units plus
probenecid, pennicillin should be discontinued, and treatment with
tetracycline only instituted.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


FRED E. HANSARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Cy furn:
CG USARV

CONFIDENTIAL



ENCLOSURE 1 (269th Service Aviation Battalion)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
<i>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)</i>		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Confidential
		2b. GROUP 4
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 269th Combat Aviation Battalion		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 269th Combat Aviation Battalion		
6. REPORT DATE 1 February 1969	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 37	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 691151	
b. PROJECT NO.		
c. N/A	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

35

DD FORM 1473
1 NOV 65

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification