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THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF  
MILITARY PROGRAMS: SOME INDICATIONS  
FROM LATIN AMERICA

Charles Wolf, Jr.

PREPARED FOR:  
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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(16) THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF  
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FROM LATIN AMERICA,

(10) by Charles Wolf, Jr.

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PREFACE

This RAND Memorandum is a result of RAND's continuing study of various problems of the less-developed countries, and in particular of U.S. military and economic assistance programs in these countries. Previous RAND research has dealt, for example, with problems of coordination between economic and military aid programs (RM-3449-ISA, Methods for Improving Coordination Between Economic and Military Aid Programs (U), by Charles Wolf, Jr. (Confidential)), and with the evaluation of military assistance in less-developed countries (RM-2717-PR, Evaluating U.S. Military Assistance in Less-Developed Countries: A Comparison of Alternative Programs in Viet Nam and Iran (U), by Charles Wolf, Jr. and Paul G. Clark (Secret)).

The present Memorandum was prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA). The study grew out of conversations with ISA in mid-1962 that touched on the subject of political consequences of military aid programs. At that time, a question was raised as to the possibility of testing whether any predictable relationships seemed to exist between the size of U.S. military aid programs in the less-developed countries, and the occurrence of authoritarian, antidemocratic regimes in these countries.

The purpose of this study is to formulate as testable hypotheses some of the views that have been advanced in public discussion of the problem. The several hypotheses are then subjected to various crude tests on the basis of rough data dealing with the Latin American countries. Although a number of important qualifications and reservations must be attached to these data, and hence to tests that make use of them, the study suggests that there does not appear to be any significant relationship in general terms between (a) either the scope of authoritarian institutions and practices or the changes in authoritarian institutions and practices, and (b) the size of U.S. military assistance programs or of domestic defense programs in the Latin American countries.

The author wishes to acknowledge comments that he has received from several RAND colleagues, including Luigi Einaudi, Olaf Helmer, Richard Kao, Robert Levine, Frederick Moore, and Roberta Wohlstetter, as well as the assistance of Janina Bonczek in some of the research. He is also indebted to Russell Fitzgibbon of UCLA for comments and for the use of some of the data from Professor Fitzgibbon's basic work on political development in Latin America.

### SUMMARY

Public discussion of the political effects of military programs in the less-developed countries has usually concentrated on the effects of U.S. military aid programs, rather than on the effects of the domestic defense programs within these countries. This emphasis has been due to the fact that the discussion has frequently been connected with Congressional consideration of military aid programs. One of the central themes in the discussion has been the claim that such programs tend to be associated with repressive, authoritarian, and dictatorial governments.

There are several variations of this central theme. One view, the "erosion-of-democracy" view, holds that military programs, and in particular military aid programs, tend to increase the threat of overt military takeover, and that military takeover in turn is characterized by dictatorial and repressive government. Another version, the "support-for-authoritarianism" view, focuses instead on the types of regimes that tend to desire and to require military programs, rather than on the changes in governmental forms and processes that are generated by military programs. This view suggests not that military programs lead toward authoritarian regimes, but that such regimes, however they come into being, tend to generate relatively large demands for military assistance and defense budgets.

To test these hypotheses, the present study makes use of political data based upon the basic work done over the last 15 years by Russell Fitzgibbon, Professor of Political Science and former Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles. On four occasions, 1945, 1950, 1955, and 1960, Fitzgibbon conducted a survey among specialists on Latin America to elicit from them an evaluation of the political climate and the character of political institutions in the individual Latin American countries. From these data, it is possible to rank the Latin American countries according to (1) level of political democracy, and (2) the



change in this level relative to the other Latin American countries, based on the subjective estimates of the survey respondents.

Each of these political rankings is then successively compared with several indicators of the size of military programs in the Latin American countries: total U.S. military assistance in the period from 1950 to 1960; military assistance on a per capita basis; average annual defense expenditures over the same period; and average annual per capita defense expenditures.

Whether we consider U.S. military aid programs or domestic defense programs in Latin America, both the support-for-authoritarianism and the erosion-of-democracy hypotheses appear to be contradicted by the statistical results that are summarized in the study. Larger military programs do not appear to be associated with more restrictive and authoritarian political institutions, nor do larger military programs appear to be associated with movements toward more restrictive and authoritarian political institutions. Moreover, both of the preceding statements apply whether we consider the total quantity of military aid or of defense outlays, or whether per capita quantities are considered instead.

A number of important qualifications and reservations that must be attached to the data used in the study are discussed. Consequently, the results that have been obtained must be interpreted with the caution warranted by a preliminary examination of a highly complex subject that cannot be fully understood without further and deeper research. Pending such further research, it would be well to bear in mind that, although civilian and military dictatorships are frequent and disturbing phenomena in Latin America, their recurrence does not appear to be explained by simple causes like military aid or domestic defense programs. Indeed, the study suggests that these factors do not appear to play a significant role in the process at all. Rather, the explanation lies in a complex set of influences rooted in Latin American history, social structure, and political tradition.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The political effects of military programs,<sup>1</sup> like those of economic development programs, are hard to unravel for reasons that are powerful and familiar. In the first place, political effects are themselves difficult to identify, let alone measure. The kinds of political change that we can observe directly tend to be confined to sharp, discrete changes: a coup or a revolution; a sharp outbreak of guerrilla activity; a new constitution; the signing of a treaty or alliance agreement. Even in such cases, the apparent meaning of an abrupt change may be erroneous, or the change itself short-lived. Gradual changes -- for example, in the extent of public participation in politics, in the degree of "competitiveness," in the political environment, in attitudes and preferences on foreign policy and defense issues -- are usually still more ambiguous and more difficult to observe accurately.

Moreover, besides the difficulty of accurate observation, political effects tend to be plausibly attributable to many causes -- to so many, in fact, that the role of any single cause becomes highly conjectural. If, for example, a military coup occurs, is it to be explained by the increased strength or size of the defense establishment, or by its impoverishment; by the resistance of a conservative elite to the process or threat of change, or the impatience of a modernizing elite at the rigidity, venality or ineffectuality of the civilian government; by personal animosities between military and civilian leaders, or within the military itself; by too rapid or too slow a rate of economic and social change, and so on? Not only may there be many possible explanations, but we frequently are confronted by the plausibility of opposites.

A further difficulty arises from the fact that the connection between such possible causes, on the one hand, and military programs -- or, for that matter, economic development programs -- on the other,

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<sup>1</sup>As used here, "military programs" refers both to military aid programs (MA<sup>2</sup>) and to domestic defense programs.

is often hard to establish. Even if we think we know which cause applies in a certain case, it is by no means evident how much of a role has been played by a particular foreign or domestic program.

Because of the difficulties of accurate observation, and the multiplicity of plausible causes, it is easier to formulate gross and simple assertions about the causal connections that are at work than to dispel them. The present Memorandum tries to examine one set of such assertions about the political effects of military programs in less-developed countries. The Memorandum uses data relating to Latin America to test some of the hypotheses that seem to be implicit in these assertions.

Perhaps the broadest generalization that emerges is the truism that, in this case as in others, it is unwise and unwarranted to offer simple explanations for complicated phenomena. If this strikes the reader, as it does the writer, as rather bland, it might be said in extenuation that eliminating easy misunderstanding is often a prerequisite to arriving at a better understanding.

## II. SOME VIEWS OF POLITICAL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS

Public discussion of political effects in the less-developed countries has concentrated on the effects of military aid programs in particular, rather than of defense programs more generally. This emphasis has been due to the fact that the discussion has usually been connected with Congressional consideration of military aid programs. One of the central themes in the discussion has been that such programs tend to be associated with repressive, authoritarian, and dictatorial governments that are either under military control or have distinctly military overtones.

### THE EROSION-OF-DEMOCRACY VIEW

There are several variations of this central theme. One view holds that military aid tends to increase the threat of overt military takeover or overt military control of the political process. Military influence or intervention in the political processes of developing countries is presumed to be repressive, and is also presumed to increase as a result of military assistance provided by the United States, often leading ultimately to direct military takeover. For example, the point was stated by Senator Fulbright in the Senate Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as follows:

It is true, is it not, that three of the countries which have received the largest amount of our military aid -- outside of the Western European countries -- Turkey, Pakistan and Korea, have all had military coups supplanting a civilian government, and now are under what could be called a military dictatorship....

I was wondering whether there is any relationship here between these events and the extent of our military aid. This is in contrast to one other country that has been a heavy recipient of non-military aid. I speak of India... in which there has been a relatively stable, civilian administration throughout this period, and the reports are that it is making considerable progress.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>International Development and Security, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, Part II, May 1961, pp. 610-612.

And again:

How do you explain this unusual coincidence that countries where you put the most military aid -- the underdeveloped countries, not Germany, France, or developed countries -- are the very ones who have lost their civilian governments....?<sup>1</sup>

The same point was echoed by Senator Aiken:

The experience of some of these countries has been that when they get a strong military force, the military just takes over.<sup>2</sup>

Essentially the same point, though this time relating to defense expenditures generally rather than to military aid in particular, was also made by Senator Fulbright in the Senate Hearings:

The only point is that these big military expenditures do not contribute to political stability or economic growth. On the contrary, they contribute to the creation of a military dictatorship.... The countries where there have been the biggest military programs all seem to turn up with a military dictatorship.<sup>3</sup>

An editorial in the New York Times endorsed this view with particular reference to Latin America:

The countries in Latin America which are most stable and most democratic, such as Uruguay, Costa Rica and Mexico, spend little or almost nothing on military defense. Arms only encourage right-wing military dictatorships.<sup>4</sup>

Various explanations are offered of the process through which the erosion of civilian control and its replacement by repressive military authority occurs. One view is that military programs simply contribute to increasing the absolute and relative power of the military elite, thereby changing the internal pattern of

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 661.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 669.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 732. Similar views have also been expressed by H. L. Matthews; for example, in "When Generals Take Over in Latin America, New York Times Magazine, September 9, 1962, p. 144.

<sup>4</sup>The New York Times, June 13, 1961. Quoted in Seymour Melman, The Peace Race, George Braziller, New York, 1961, pp. 58-59.

political checks and balances, and replacing it with a new balance in which the military has primary power. Frank Tannenbaum expresses the point, in regard to Latin America, as follows:

The arming of the central government's forces upset the traditional bridling of tyranny at the center and made it impossible for anyone to overthrow the government except the army, which means that no one can be elected or keep office unless he is acceptable to the army. All of civilian government (or nearly all) is at the mercy of the army.<sup>1</sup>

Another view of the process holds that the effect of large military programs is more indirect. Such programs tend to lead to still larger programs. The result is to overburden a country with expenditures it cannot support," leading to inflation, political instability, and the erosion of civilian government as a result largely of financial and internal difficulties.<sup>2</sup>

Whichever view of the process is adopted, the result is essentially similar. The implication is that the greater the quantity of military aid, the greater the tendency toward an erosion of civilian and competitive political institutions, and their replacement by military and authoritarian controls. If we assume that the relationships are continuous rather than discrete,<sup>3</sup> this reasoning implies that political institutions would become more tightly controlled and authoritarian as military aid -- or more generally, as the size of the military establishment and its claim on natural resources -- grows. This view suggests, as a research hypothesis, that relatively large

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<sup>1</sup>Frank Tannenbaum, "Considerations for the Latin American Policy," in The Liberal Papers, Doubleday and Company, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 281.

<sup>2</sup>International Development and Security, p. 681. The quotation is from Senator Fulbright's interrogation of Secretary McNamara, and referred specifically to Turkey. A similar view, relating to South and Southeast Asia, is expressed by Vera Michaels Dean, "Southeast Asia and Japan," in The Liberal Papers, pp. 267-268.

<sup>3</sup>That is, if we assume that there is not a threshold below which military programs are "safe" or neutral in their political effects, and beyond which they are harmful, but that their political effects grow with the size of the program.



military programs will tend to be associated with relatively large political shifts toward authoritarianism and away from democracy. For easy reference, we call this view the "erosion-of-democracy" hypothesis.

#### THE SUPPORT-FOR-AUTHORITARIANISM VIEW

Another version of the connection between political consequences and military programs focuses on the types of regimes that tend to desire and to require military programs, rather than on the changes in governmental forms and processes generated by military programs. This view suggests not that military aid and other programs lead toward authoritarian regimes (the "erosion-of-democracy" view), but that such regimes -- however they come into being -- tend to generate relatively large demands for military assistance and defense budgets, for a number of reasons that will be noted below. In this view, the connection between military and political factors thus takes a different form. Military programs do not necessarily create authoritarian regimes, or increase the probability of their occurrence. Instead, such regimes generate a relatively large demand for military programs. Again, assuming that the relationships are continuous rather than discrete, this view suggests, as a research hypothesis, that large military programs will tend to be associated with less democratic and more authoritarian regimes. We call this the "support-for-authoritarianism" hypothesis.

Reasoning along this line lay behind the restriction contained in recent foreign aid legislation against providing military aid in Latin America for "internal security purposes" except in case of a special Presidential determination to the contrary.<sup>1</sup> Underlying this view has been a feeling that internal security requirements,

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, the comments by Senator Morse in International Development and Security, pp. 618-620, and along similar lines in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, April 1962, pp. 420-421.

particularly in Latin America, were generally of moderate size and easily within each country's financial capabilities. Where such requirements became sufficiently large to generate a need for U.S. military aid, the presumption was that the regime requiring the aid was likely to be a repressive, dictatorial, and reactionary one. The view was expressed, for example, by Senator Carlson in the Senate Hearings on foreign aid in 1962:

Is it not true that in many of the Latin American countries they are either military dictatorships or other dictatorships, and with our military assistance programs, and probably other programs, we maintain the governments in power? ...

... I am concerned about our Nation, through military assistance and Federal funds maintaining governments that I do not believe would be classed as democratic or representative of the people.<sup>1</sup>

A similar view was advanced by David Scull, a member of the policy committee of the Society of Friends:

I would like to record our conviction that military assistance...determined primarily by military considerations, often bolstered totalitarian dictatorships which may have as many unpleasant characteristics as any Communist regime.... I know that members of this Committee have expressed concern over the possible misuse of military aid to Latin America. We Friends would be pleased indeed if such aid were ended....<sup>2</sup>

The New York Times advanced the same view in the 1961 editorial previously referred to:

Representative O'Hara...put his finger on the main objection to the proposed policy [that is, of enlarged military aid to Latin America] when he said that the Pentagon is asking for 'a blank check from Congress to maintain governments in power'; they can be strong only if cherished in the minds and hearts of the people.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, pp. 76-77.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 490.

<sup>3</sup>Melman, p. 58. Explanatory words implied in the text have been inserted in brackets.

Similar views about military aid were expressed earlier in The Nation by Stanley Meisler:

In most cases, military aid... has tended (1) to force weak nations into devoting huge percentages of their vital capital to armaments; (2) to entrench undemocratic, military governments; and (3) to promote arms races between the governments.<sup>1</sup>

The reasoning behind the "support-for-authoritarianism" view can be summarized as follows: (a) military aid helps to keep recipient governments in power; (b) dictatorships, oligarchies, or otherwise unrepresentative and antireformist governments, are more difficult to keep in power than are democratic and representative governments; (c) therefore, reactionary governments are likely to desire and to require relatively larger military expenditures and military aid; and (d) hence, the size of military aid and other military programs in such countries will tend to be relatively large. In discussion of the support-for-authoritarianism hypothesis, the operative words are "maintain," "support," "bolster," and so forth. By contrast, in discussion of the erosion-of-democracy hypothesis, the operative words are "takeover," "military coup," "creation of dictatorship," and the like.

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<sup>1</sup>The Nation, April 16, 1960, p. 334. Emphasis added.

### III. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES WITH LATIN AMERICAN DATA

In this section our aim is to test in a rough way the erosion-of-democracy and the support-for-authoritarianism views of the connections between military programs and political effects. The tests are admittedly crude, both because of the nature of the problem itself and because of limitations in the extent and quality of the data that are available. The tests are confined to Latin America because of the availability for that region of a unique set of data on political development over the last decade. From these data it is possible to rank the Latin American countries according to:

- (1) the level of political democracy, and
- (2) the change in this level relative to the other Latin American countries,

over the period 1950 to 1960. The tests consist of comparing these political indicators with data, first, on U.S. military aid programs, and then on the domestic military budgets in these countries, to see whether significant relationships appear to exist.

#### THE DATA

The political data that we use are based upon work done over the past 15 years by Russell Fitzgibbon, Professor of Political Science and formerly Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles.<sup>1</sup> On four occasions, 1945, 1950, 1955, and 1960, Fitzgibbon conducted a survey among specialists on Latin America to elicit from them an evaluation of the political climate in the individual Latin American countries.<sup>2</sup> Each of the

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<sup>1</sup>See Russell H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," American Political Science Review, September 1961, pp. 515-526; and by Russell Fitzgibbon, "How Democratic is Latin America?" Inter-American Economic Affairs, Spring 1956, pp. 65-77; "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin American Democracy," Western Political Quarterly, 1956, pp. 607-619; and "Measurement of Latin American Political Phenomena: A Statistical Experiment," American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, 1951, pp. 517-523.

<sup>2</sup>A list of the specialists participating in the surveys is attached as the Appendix.

respondents was asked to rate the 20 Latin American countries according to 15 political, social, and economic criteria, using a five-point rating scale for each criterion. The criteria included freedom of elections, of the press, of party organization, and of judicial processes. Also included were several criteria, that are possibly less directly relevant and also perhaps more easily subject to misunderstanding, relating to educational level, standard of living, and "a sense of internal unity and national cohesion." Although one criterion dealt explicitly with civilian supremacy over the military, this was not the main focus of the surveys. Instead, their main concern was to evaluate the general character of institutions and practices in each country "according to a scale of political change relevant to democracy."<sup>1</sup>

The initial scores of each respondent were adjusted by a proportional method, so that each respondent's total scores for all countries would amount to 1,000 points (compared to a theoretical maximum of 1,700), in order to allow for subjective differences between the optimists and the pessimists. In the tests discussed here, the adjusted scores are the basis for a rank ordering of countries according to their level of political development at a given point in time. Changes in the rank ordering of individual countries are used as a basis for judging the direction of political change over time, as explained below.

There are many shortcomings in the Fitzgibbon method and data, including the ambiguity and heterogeneity of the criteria, the weights applied to the criteria (the criterion relating to free elections was given a weight twice that of most of the other criteria, freedom of the press a weight half again as large, and so on), and the qualifications and prejudices of the respondents (nearly all of the respondents were from the United States). Some of these difficulties could be overcome by independent work with the original raw data. For example,

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<sup>1</sup>Fitzgibbon and Johnson, p. 516.

it would be possible to separate out responses to the more distinctly relevant and unambiguous criteria, to change the weights, and to separate the responses of the more qualified respondents. It should also be possible to improve the quality and test the reliability of the Fitzgibbon data by comparing the subjective estimates of the respondents with objective data relating to the courts, educational practices and school attendance, press circulation, the frequency and character of elections, and so on.<sup>1</sup> In the present Memorandum however, we confine the analysis to Fitzgibbon's own results as they stand, without these modifications. Notwithstanding their limitations, the Fitzgibbon data represent a pioneering and useful effort in a field whose complexity is equalled by its importance.

Table 1 summarizes the Fitzgibbon data that we have used. Column (7) shows the sum of the scores given to each country by all respondents during the three survey periods: 1950, 1955, and 1960.

In the statistical tests to be described below, we use Column (8) from Table 1 (the rank ordering of countries in accordance with their total scores on the three surveys) as a crude measure of each country's relative level of political democracy over the 1950-1960 period. To obtain a rough measure of the change in political level relative to other countries over the period, we use Column (9), which shows the difference in each country's rank between the 1950 and 1960 surveys. As Table 1 indicates, there are numerous ties in Column (9) which are inconvenient (for example, five countries showed no change, four countries moved down by one rank, and so forth). We therefore make use of change in position simply to establish a dichotomous grouping of the countries in terms of whether their rank according to political

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<sup>1</sup>It would also be possible to test how meaningful the data are by considering whether the variation in evaluations by all respondents for each country is significantly less than the variation in their combined evaluations for all countries, as we would expect. The raw data needed for this analysis of variance were not included in the referenced sources. However, preliminary work done at UCLA with the raw data apparently suggests that the expected result would probably be obtained.

Table 1  
FITZGIBBON INDEXES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA - 1950, 1955, 1960

Country	Adjusted Scores from Specialists' Responses to Questionnaires <sup>a</sup>										Rank	Political Development (Sum of Adjusted Scores) Column (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)	Rank	Change in Rank Order 1950-1960 (Column (8) - Column (6)) <sup>c</sup>
	1950		1955		1960		Index of		Rank					
	Weighted Points	Rank	Weighted Points	Rank	Weighted Points	Rank	Factor of Column (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)							
Argentina	548	8	513	7	648	4	1707	7	1					
Bolivia	335	17	304	15	406	16	1185	15	1					
Brazil	618	5	651	5	600	7	1863	4	-2					
Chile	760	2	737	3	688	3	2163	3	-1					
Colombia	608	6	586	6	608	6	1788	6	0					
Costa Rica	713	3	773	2	713	2	2199	2	1					
Cuba	(667)	(4)	(513)	(7)	(482)	(18)	(1602)	-	(-10) <sup>d</sup>					
Dominican Republic	318	19	318	19	290	18	980	18	1					
Ecuador	479	9	498	10	514	10	1491	8	-1					
El Salvador	482	14	449	11	468	12	1359	11	2					
Guatemala	478	10	398	14	445	13	1321	12.5	-3					
Haiti	331	18	375	17	283	19	989	17	-1					
Honduras	378	15	426	12	414	15	1218	14	0					
Nicaragua	370	16	417	13	413	14	1240	13	2					
Panama	351	16	336	18	341	17	1088	16	-1					
Paraguay	446	11	505	9	478	11	1451	9	0					
Peru	393	13	377	16	261	20	651	19	0					
Puerto Rico	495	11	378	16	518	9	1321	12.5	4					
Uruguay	624	1	650	1	767	1	2421	1	0					
Venezuela	446	12	404	13	564	8	1416	10	4					

Source: R. E. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," American Political Science Review, September 1961, p. 518.

Notes: a. For a list of Latin American specialists, see the Appendix. Fitzgibbon describes the scores as comprising "a scale of political change relevant to democracy." The scores shown are based on the weighted ratings given on fifteen criteria of political development by 10, 20, and 40 respondents in 1950, 1955, and 1960, respectively. Fitzgibbon adjusted the raw scores to allow for differences in opinion or pessimism of the respondents, and for changes in the number of respondents in each poll. See text discussion, pp. 9-11.

b. The point scores for Cuba are included for comparability, but excluded from the rankings because the available data on U.S. military aid and Cuban defense expenditures with which the political scores are to be compared cover the period from 1950 through the middle of 1958 only, and hence are not comparable to the corresponding military data for the other Latin American countries which extend through 1960.

c. A positive figure indicates that the country's rank among the Latin American countries, in terms of its adjusted political development score, rose by the number of places shown between 1950 and 1960. A movement from rank 10 in 1950 to rank 6 in 1960 would be shown as 4.

d. The decline in Cuba's rank by ten is based on a twenty country ranking for 1950 and 1960.

development did or did not rise relative to the other countries. A rise in a country's rank between 1950 and 1960 indicates that the country improved its democratic standing, as measured by the Fitzgibbon rankings, relative to the other Latin American countries.<sup>1</sup> This split was then compared with a dichotomous grouping of the military aid data, classified in terms of whether the size of military programs did or did not exceed the median.

The data on total and per capita military aid programs in Latin America for the 1950-1960 period are summarized in Table 2.

#### MILITARY AID AND LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY

The first hypothesis that we test -- a variant of the support-for-authoritarianism view -- concerns the association between total military aid and level of political development as indicated by the total Fitzgibbon scores. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient,  $r_s$ , was computed from the MAP ranking shown in Column (1) of Table 2 and the political-level ranking shown in Column (8) of Table 1. The coefficient,  $r_s$ , is .2654, which is not significantly different from zero at a 25 per cent level of significance.<sup>2</sup> The assertion that the total

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<sup>1</sup>The method used thus focused on political change in relation to the other countries, rather than on the absolute change in the Fitzgibbon score indicated by subtracting Column (1) from Column (5) in Table 1. Our method seemed preferable because the technique used by Fitzgibbon in normalizing the point scores of respondents had the effect of making the "value" of a point in 1950 slightly different from that in 1960. Hence changes in absolute scores between the two periods might be misleading. However, as a check on the results obtained from our dichotomous-grouping method, we also examined changes in absolute scores. The check confirmed the results reported in this study that were obtained with the dichotomous groupings.

<sup>2</sup>The significance of  $r_s$  was tested by the value of  $t$ , where:

$$t = r_s \sqrt{\frac{N-2}{1-r_s^2}}$$

with  $N-2$  degrees of freedom, and  $N=19$ . A two-tailed test was used on the assumption of a null-hypothesis that  $r_s$  is not different from zero. (See Sidney Siegel, Non-Parametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1956, pp. 210-212.)



Table 2

MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1950-1960

Country	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Total MAP <sup>a</sup> (1950-1960 in Millions of Dollars)	Rank	MAP Per Capita <sup>c</sup> (1950-1960, Dollars)	Rank
Argentina	0.07	16	0.003	18
Bolivia	0.44	14	0.14	14
Brazil	164.8	1	2.82	7
Chile	48.1	3	7.11	2
Colombia	30.6	4	2.37	8
Costa Rica	0.005	18	0.005	17
Cuba <sup>b</sup>	(16.0)	-	(2.61)	-
Dominican Republic	8.0	8	3.17	6
Ecuador	18.7	7	5.07	4
El Salvador	0.02	17	0.009	16
Guatemala	1.1	12	0.34	11
Haiti	2.0	10	0.17	13
Honduras	0.82	13	0.49	10
Mexico	3.2	9	0.11	15
Nicaragua	1.4	11	1.12	9
Panama	0	19	0	19
Paraguay	0.36	15	0.23	12
Peru	50.9	2	5.42	3
Uruguay	24.0	5	9.18	1
Venezuela	21.6	6	3.74	5

Source: Military Assistance Programs - Programs and Deliveries, FY 1950-1961, Department of Defense, Director of Military Assistance, May 1961.

- Notes:
- a. Total military aid program (MAP) includes grant aid, credit assistance, and deliveries from excess stocks.
  - b. Equipment deliveries to Cuba were ended in March 1958. The Cuba figures are included for general interest but excluded from the rank-order comparisons because the MAP deliveries are for a shorter period than the other countries.
  - c. Population figures used in per capita calculations are estimates for 1955 from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (1959).

amount of military aid is unrelated to the level of political development cannot be rejected. In fact, the positive sign of the rank correlation coefficient provides more support (although it is rather weak support, at that) for a conjecture that the amount of military aid tends to be positively associated with the level of political development than that the two are negatively associated.<sup>1</sup>

The second version of the support-for-authoritarianism hypothesis concerns the association between military aid per capita and level of political development. Spearman's coefficient (computed from the per capita MAP ranks shown in Table 2, Column (4), and the political-level ranks shown in Table 1, Column (8)) is .1285, which is not significantly different from zero at a 50 per cent level.<sup>2</sup> The assertion that the amount of MAP per capita is unrelated to the level of political development in Latin America cannot be rejected.

#### MILITARY AID AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL LEVEL

The third and fourth hypotheses are related to the erosion-of-democracy theme, and are concerned with the association between change in relative political ranking and (a) total MAP, and (b) MAP per capita. To test the degree of association we use the Fisher exact-probability test which is a useful non-parametric test for the association between two independent samples where the sample size is

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<sup>1</sup>If some of the previously cited conjectures were accepted (see above, pp. 3-7), we would expect that a higher rank in the amount of military aid would be associated with a lower rank in the scale of political development. In this case, the null-hypothesis would be that  $r_s$  is not different from zero, and the alternative hypothesis that  $r_s$  is less than zero. Here a one-tailed test would be appropriate. To reject the null-hypothesis (in favor of the alternative hypothesis) at a significance level of 10 per cent,  $t$  would have to be  $< -1.333$ . Actually, with the present data,  $r_s = +.2654$  and  $t = +1.1331$ , which provides more support for an alternative hypothesis to the effect that higher MAP rank is associated with a higher level of political development.

<sup>2</sup>Again, a two-tailed  $t$ -test was used.

small ( $N < 20$ ), and where the observations from each sample fall into one of two mutually exclusive classes. The test determines whether the two groups from one sample differ in the proportion with which they fall into the two classifications of the other.<sup>1</sup>

To measure change in political position, the Latin American countries are divided into two groups: those whose level of political development rose relative to the other countries (Group A), and those whose political level did not rise relative to the others (Group B). According to the changes in ranking shown in Table 1, Column (9), 8 countries are in Group A and 11 in Group B.<sup>2</sup>

For comparative purposes, the MAP totals are also divided into groups for which total military aid from 1950-1960 exceeded the median (Group I), and those for which total military aid did not exceed the median (Group II). Similarly, the figures on per capita military aid are divided into two groups: those above the median (Group III); and those not above the median (Group IV). Given a unique median, there are obviously 9 countries in Group I (and Group III), and 10 countries in Group II (and Group IV).

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<sup>1</sup>See Siegel, Non-Parametric Statistics, pp. 96-104.

<sup>2</sup>Group A: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela.

Group B: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay. Group B includes both countries whose rank fell, and those whose rank did not change.

As an alternative, the countries were grouped into those whose political rank fell relative to the others (Group B'), and those whose political rank did not fall (Group A'). In this dichotomy, countries whose rank did not change between 1950 and 1960 (Colombia, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as shown in Table 1, Column (9)), were included in Group A', along with countries whose rank rose. In testing the relationship between political change and military programs, separate computations were made using the "Fall" versus "No-Fall," as well as the "Rise" versus "No-Rise" dichotomy. Only the latter results are reported in this Memorandum because in every case the unrelatedness between change in political level and size of military program persists for both types of grouping.

First, consider the comparison between grouping according to change in political ranking, and grouping according to military aid. The following contingency table (Table 3) shows the frequencies.

It should be evident from the table that there is no marked association between the frequencies in Group A or B, and those in Group I or II. If there were a close connection between change in political rank and military aid, we might expect, for example, that those countries receiving relatively more military aid (Group I) would be the countries whose political rank did not rise (Group B), and those countries receiving relatively less military aid (Group II) would be the countries whose political rank rose. Actually, the distribution of frequencies is remarkably evenly balanced. In fact, the Fisher test computations show that the exact probability of occurrence of frequencies distributed as evenly as those in Table 3, or more unevenly, is 60 per cent, if there were no relationship between military aid grouping and political change grouping. Clearly, the assertion that there is no association between the two groupings cannot be rejected.

Next, consider the comparison between grouping according to change in political rank, and grouping according to military aid per capita. Table 4 shows the frequencies.

The distribution of frequencies in Table 4 is again balanced quite evenly, though not as evenly as in Table 3. The probability of occurrence of a distribution as even as, or more uneven than, that in Table 4 is 39.5 per cent, if there were no relationship between the two groupings. The null hypothesis, that there is no association between grouping according to per capita military aid and grouping according to change in relative political standing, cannot be rejected.

#### DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND POLITICAL LEVEL

The hypotheses so far considered have been concerned with the relationship between military aid data and the Fitzgibbon political indexes. But military aid has comprised only part of the resources

Table 3  
MILITARY AID AND POLITICAL CHANGE GROUPINGS

	Rise in Political Ranking (Group A)	No Rise in Political Ranking (Group B)	Total
Total MAP Exceeds Median (Group I)	(4) (Peru, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Mexico)	(5) (Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia)	9
Total MAP Does Not Exceed Median (Group II)	(4) (Bolivia, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Argentina)	(6) (Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Paraguay, Haiti, Panama)	10
TOTAL:	8	11	N=19

Table 4  
PER CAPITA MILITARY AID AND POLITICAL CHANGE GROUPINGS

	Rise in Political Ranking (Group A)	No Rise in Political Ranking (Group B)	Total
Per Capita MAP Aid Exceeds Median (Group III)	(3)  (Peru, Venezuela, Dominican Republic)	(6)  (Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua)	9
Per Capita MAP Aid Does Not Exceed Median (Group IV)	(5)  (Mexico, Bolivia, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Argentina)	(5)  (Honduras, Guatemala, Paraguay, Haiti, Panama)	10
TOTAL:	8	11	N=19

devoted to military establishments in the Latin American countries, and generally a small part at that. In fact, for 14 of the Latin American countries for which unclassified data are available on domestic defense budgets, during the 1950-1960 period total defense expenditures annually averaged about 25 times more than the average annual amount of military aid to these countries. Table 5 shows average annual per capita defense expenditures for these countries, expressed in 1960 U.S. dollars.

The data in Table 5 are of interest in their own right, quite apart from the specific purposes for which we use them. For example, the per capita figures show that the highest annual per capita defense expenditures have been in Venezuela (since 1958 a relatively liberal, if embattled, country under the leadership of Romulo Betancourt), whereas the second-from-lowest per capita defense outlays over the 1950-1960 period were in Haiti. Evidently, a strongly repressive regime can get along adequately without much military equipment. Bully clubs can be used to support a repressive, dictatorial regime, and tanks and automatic weapons can be used to protect a democratic regime from the use of organized terror and violence against it. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that annual data for Venezuela indicate that total and per capita defense expenditures have been as high under Betancourt's presidency since 1958 as they were at the end of the repressive regime of Perez Jimenez in 1957-1958.

Relationships that do not seem to apply to military aid might nevertheless apply to domestic military programs. We shall therefore investigate whether there appears to be an association between political development indicators and defense expenditures in Latin America, even though no such association appeared in the case of military aid and political development. In this section and the next we reconsider the support-for-authoritarianism and the erosion-of-democracy hypotheses that were previously tested, but with defense expenditures substituted in place of military aid data.

Table 5  
AVERAGE ANNUAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1950-1960  
(in 1960 U.S. dollars)<sup>a</sup>

Country	Average Annual Defense Expenditures, 1950-1960		Average Annual Per Capita Defense Expenditures, 1950-1960	
	(in millions)	Rank	(dollars per capita)	Rank
Argentina	234.82	2	13.43	3
Bolivia <sup>b</sup>	3.34	13	1.03	14
Brazil	265.46	1	4.50	5
Chile <sup>c</sup>	104.58	4	14.88	2
Colombia	50.55	6	3.88	6
Costa Rica	1.73	14	1.78	12
Ecuador	14.33	8	3.71	7
El Salvador	5.89	10	2.63	8
Guatemala	6.93	9	2.09	11
Haiti	5.25	11	1.57	13
Honduras	3.73	12	2.25	9
Mexico <sup>d</sup>	68.79	5	2.14	10
Peru	42.85	7	5.26	4
Venezuela	107.64	3	17.97	1

Sources: 1. For defense expenditures in local currency at current prices: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (Volumes for 1954 through 1961).  
2. For price indexes and dollar exchange rates: Above source plus International Financial Statistics (monthly), and Agency for International Development, Regional Data Book for Latin America.  
3. For population data: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1960.

(continued)



Notes to Table 5

- a. Defense expenditures in current prices were converted to 1960 U.S. dollars, using price indexes based on 1960 as the deflator, and 1960 official dollar exchange rates. No attempt is made to adjust for possible overvaluation of local currencies.
- b. Based on annual figures for 1953, 1955, 1956, 1957 only.
- c. Based on annual figures for 1953-1960 only.
- d. Based on annual figures for 1955-1960 only.

The data and rankings on defense expenditures in Table 5 are used with the Fitzgibbon political-development measures from Table 1 for the 14 relevant countries.<sup>1</sup> Since 5 countries had to be omitted for data reasons, including 3 that had highly repressive and authoritarian regimes during the 1950-1960 period, the results obtained from the 14-country tests should be treated with particular caution.

The next hypothesis we test concerns the association between average annual defense expenditures and level of political development, as indicated by the rank ordering according to Fitzgibbon scores. The rank correlation coefficient between the two series is .4604, which is significantly different from zero at a 10 per cent level of significance (degrees of freedom equals 12), for a two-tailed test. If we had previously expected higher defense expenditures to be associated with lower political level (that is, one of the hypotheses implied by some of the previously quoted observations), we could now confidently reject this hypothesis on the basis of a positive coefficient of .46. Indeed, a positive coefficient as large as this provides some support for the hypothesis that defense expenditures tend to be positively associated with the level of political development in Latin America.<sup>2</sup>

A similar picture results if we compare per capita defense outlays with the Fitzgibbon political-development rankings, derived from Table 1. In this case,  $r_s$  is .3967, which is significantly different from zero at a 20 per cent level, using a two-tailed test. Again, a positive coefficient of this size permits us to reject the notion that per capita defense expenditures tend to be inversely related to

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<sup>1</sup>Country rankings, Columns (8) and (9) in Table 1, were recalculated excluding Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Panama, for which data on defense outlays were not available. Subsequent computations are based on the 14 remaining countries.

<sup>2</sup>If we had previously expected this hypothesis, we could now accept it at a 5 per cent level of significance, using a one-tailed test.

political development; in fact, the coefficient provides support for the contention that per capita defense outlays tend to be higher in countries with a higher political level. The positive relation between per capita defense expenditures and political democracy is not as surprising as it might seem, in view of the generally positive correlation between each of them and per capita income.<sup>1</sup>

#### DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL LEVEL

Finally, we turn to a comparison between defense expenditures and change in relative political ranking in order to test the erosion-of-democracy hypothesis. Using the Fisher test, as in the corresponding examples relating to U.S. military aid, we find essentially similar results in the case of defense expenditures. Table 6 shows the grouping of countries according to annual defense outlays and change in relative political level.

Again, the distribution of frequencies is fairly evenly balanced among the cells. The Fisher test computations show that the exact probability of frequencies as evenly balanced as, or more unevenly balanced than, those shown in Table 6 is 29.4 per cent, if the two sets of data were unrelated. The change in relative political standing appears to be unrelated to defense expenditures as well as unrelated to military aid.

When defense expenditures are put on a per capita basis, and compared with the change in relative political rank, the results are as shown in Table 7.

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<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of the observed association between per capita income (as well as other measures of economic development) and political democracy, the standard references are G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1960; S. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, March 1959; and Everett Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change," in Development of the Emerging Countries (Asher, et al.), The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1962.

Table 6  
AVERAGE ANNUAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS AND POLITICAL CHANGE GROUPINGS

	Rise in Political Ranking (Group A)	No Rise in Political Ranking (Group B)	Total
Total Defense Outlays Exceed Median (Group I)	(4) (Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela)	(3) (Brazil, Chile, Colombia)	7
Total Defense Outlays Do Not Exceed Median (Group II)	(2) (Costa Rica, El Salvador)	(5) (Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras)	7
TOTAL:	6	8	N=14

Table 7  
ANNUAL PER CAPITA DEFENSE OUTLAYS AND POLITICAL CHANGE GROUPINGS

	Rise in Political Ranking (Group A)	No Rise in Political Ranking (Group B)	Total
Per Capita Defense Outlays Exceed Median (Group III)	(3) (Argentina, Peru, Venezuela)	(4) (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador)	7
Per Capita Defense Outlays Do Not Exceed Median (Group IV)	(3) (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico)	(4) (Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras)	7
TOTAL:	6	8	N=14

The probability of frequencies as evenly balanced as, or more unevenly balanced than, those shown in Table 7 is 54.5 per cent. Change in relative political standing appears to be unrelated to per capita defense expenditures as well.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

Whether we consider U.S. military aid programs or domestic defense programs in Latin America, both the support-for-authoritarianism and the erosion-of-democracy hypotheses appear to be contradicted by the results summarized in the previous section. Larger military programs do not appear to be associated with more restrictive and authoritarian political institutions. Nor do larger military programs appear to be associated with movements toward more restrictive and authoritarian political institutions. Moreover, both of the preceding statements apply whether we consider the total quantity of military aid or defense outlays, or whether per capita quantities are considered instead.

Dictatorships, military and otherwise, are a frequent and disturbing phenomenon in Latin America. But their occurrence and recurrence is not properly attributable to simple causes like military aid or defense programs. Indeed, these factors do not appear to play a significant role in the process at all. Rather, the explanation lies in a complex set of influences rooted in Latin American history, social structure, and political tradition. One qualified student of Latin American politics, George Blanksten, makes this observation:

Involved in the problem of political instability... is the phenomenon of recurrent dictatorship. While the situation is continually changing, it is generally true that at any given moment at least a half-dozen Latin American countries are governed by dictatorships, normally military in orientation. The reasons for this are many and deep-seated; among them is the authoritarian political tradition the Spanish Empire imposed upon its American colonies.... Indeed, this tradition was so marked that many of the nineteenth-century leaders of the movements for Latin American independence believed that monarchy should be retained as the newly independent states' form of government.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Fidel Castro and Latin America," in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1962, pp. 115-116.

Moreover, the occurrence of specifically military dictatorships is a much more widespread, frequent, and long-standing phenomenon in most other areas of the world, outside Latin America, than is usually realized. Indeed, the British and American tradition in this respect is more of an exception than a rule. The point is made in a striking form by S. E. Finer, in a perceptive study of the historical reasons behind military interventions in political activity.<sup>1</sup> As Finer notes, of the 51 states existing in or before 1917, all but 19 have experienced military coups since 1917; and of the 28 states created between 1917 and 1955, all but 15 have had military coups.<sup>2</sup>

Viewing the matter in this light may not make authoritarian regimes, whether of a military or nonmilitary character, more acceptable in American eyes. But it should make them more understandable, and it should make us more skeptical of easy explanations or quick solutions -- in particular, of explanations that stress military aid or defense programs, or solutions based on reductions of these programs as a contribution to discouraging such regimes. At the same time, the fact that military programs do not appear to contribute to dictatorships certainly does not provide a justification for such programs. Such justification as there may be clearly must depend on other considerations.

Returning to the statistical results, it should be noted, finally, that the only significant relationships emerging from the preceding tests provide mild support for the notion that there may be a positive relationship between the level of democracy and either

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<sup>1</sup>S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 3. Of course, such numbers obscure the equally important fact that military coups may be extremely different from one another in their character, motivation, duration, and effects. In one context, the "man-on-horseback" may be a modernizing, reforming, even liberalizing influence; in another, he may be a reactionary and repressive traditionalist.



total or per capita domestic defense programs.<sup>1</sup> A general political rationale for these unexpected relationships is beyond the scope of this study, but they suggest at least one among a number of questions raised by the previous discussion that warrants further consideration. Perhaps one plausible explanation for the positive relation between per capita defense outlays and level of democracy is that both tend to be positively correlated with per capita income.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time as these conclusions are noted, the major qualifications and uncertainties concerning the data that have been used should be re-emphasized. The Fitzgibbon measures of political development deal in an admittedly imprecise way with some of the most complex sorts of intercountry comparisons -- an always difficult and hazardous exercise. The ambiguity of some of the criteria, the possible irrelevance of others, and the inevitable subjectivity of the responses warrant considerable caution and tentativeness in interpreting the results. The comparisons of defense budgets which have been used also must be treated with reservations because of the well-known problems associated with such international comparisons.

When one dwells on these qualifications, it becomes evident that conclusions drawn from such data warrant a healthy dose of skepticism. Lest the reader move too far in this direction, however, he should ask himself what his reaction to the data would have been if the results had seemed to confirm his preconceptions. At the least, perhaps, what the previous discussion suggests is that simple and easy assertions about the political effects of military programs should be discouraged. We need closer study, better observation, and more understanding before we can make accurate and useful generalizations in this field.

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<sup>1</sup>Although it should be recalled that the tests performed with the defense budget data warrant special reservations, because unavailability of data made it necessary to drop five countries from the tests.

<sup>2</sup>For this reason, it might be interesting to use defense outlays as a percentage of gross national product (or what is the same thing, per capita defense outlays as a percentage of per capita GNP), for comparison with the Fitzgibbon data.

Appendix

PARTICIPANTS IN FITZGIBBON SURVEYS  
1945, 1950, 1955, 1960

The list of participants and their institutional affiliations is reproduced from R. H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, 'Measurement of Latin American Political Change, American Political Science Review, September 1961, p. 515.

"In the first two surveys ten persons participated each time; in the third survey, twenty; and in the fourth, forty. The following list identifies by a superscript 'all' those taking part in each of the four surveys and by the appropriate numbers those participating in fewer instances: Robert J. Alexander<sup>4</sup> (Rutgers), Marvin Alisky<sup>4</sup> (Arizona State), Samuel F. Bemis<sup>1,2</sup> (Yale), George I. Blanksten<sup>2,3,4</sup> (Northwestern), Spruille Braden<sup>4</sup> (former Assistant Secretary of State), Frank R. Brandenburg<sup>4</sup> (National University of Mexico), James L. Busey<sup>4</sup> (Colorado), Howard Cline<sup>4</sup> (Director, Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress), Harold E. Davis<sup>3,4</sup> (American), Jules Dubois<sup>3,4</sup> (Chicago Tribune), Russell H. Fitzgibbon<sup>all</sup> (California, Los Angeles), William Forbis<sup>4</sup> (Time), Jesus de Galindez<sup>3</sup> (Columbia), Federico G. Gil<sup>4</sup> (North Carolina), Rosendo Gomez<sup>4</sup> (Arizona), Stephen S. Goodspeed<sup>3,4</sup> (California, Santa Barbara), Paul E. Hadley<sup>4</sup> (Southern California), Robert M. Hallett<sup>3</sup> (Christian Science Monitor), Clarence H. Haring<sup>1</sup> (Harvard), Hubert C. Herring<sup>all</sup> (Claremont Graduate School), Henry F. Holland<sup>4</sup> (former Assistant Secretary of State), Preston E. James<sup>4</sup> (Syracuse), Bertram B. Johansson<sup>4</sup> (Christian Science Monitor), Miguel Jorrin<sup>3,4</sup> (New Mexico), Harry Kantor<sup>3,4</sup> (Florida), Merle Kling<sup>4</sup> (Washington, St. Louis), Leo B. Lott<sup>4</sup> (Ohio State), Austin F. Macdonald<sup>all</sup> (California, Berkeley), William Manger<sup>4</sup> (former Assistant Secretary General, Organization of American States), Herbert L. Matthews<sup>4</sup> (New York Times), J. Lloyd Mecham<sup>all</sup> (Texas), Edward G. Miller, Jr.<sup>4</sup> (former Assistant Secretary of State), Dana G. Monroe<sup>all</sup> (Princeton), Harry B. Murkland<sup>3,4</sup> (Newsweek), L. Vincent Padgett<sup>4</sup> (San Diego State), William L. Schurz<sup>3,4</sup> (American Institute of Foreign Trade), Robert E. Scott<sup>3,4</sup> (Illinois), K. H. Silvert<sup>4</sup> (Tulane), James H. Stebbins<sup>4</sup>

(Executive Vice President, W. R. Grace and Company), William S. Stokes<sup>all</sup> (Claremont Men's), Graham H. Stuart<sup>1,2</sup> (Stanford), Philip B. Taylor, Jr.<sup>3,4</sup> (Tulane), Martin B. Travis, Jr.<sup>3,4</sup> (Stanford), Arthur P. Whitaker<sup>all</sup> (Pennsylvania), A. Curtis Wilgus<sup>4</sup> (Florida).