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AD 395314

AGAM-P (M) (14 Jan 69) FOR OT UT 684102

17 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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
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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25th INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCDA-CO

16 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operations Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for period ending
31 Oct 68. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

To: See Distribution

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. General Summary

Elements of the 25th Inf Div Artillery were actively engaged in combat operations throughout the reporting period in support of Operation Toan Thang II, which continued from the previous quarter. Greatest enemy activity continued to be centered in the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng area. Enemy tactics varied throughout the reporting period from relatively long periods of avoiding contacts with significant elements of US forces to sudden violent ambushes of armed convoys and coordinated attacks against relatively well defended combined artillery-infantry positions, referred to as fire support bases (FSB). Artillery direct fire against attacks on these fire support bases accounted for a significant number of the high casualties inflicted on the enemy, while sustaining very light casualties themselves. Reinforcement training on Vietnam type operations for new artillery personnel who have not previously served in Vietnam continued to be conducted by the 25th Inf Div Reinforcement Training School. Attendance is mandatory for officers O2 and below, WO, and enlisted men E7 and below. Training lasts 5 days for Artillery personnel. Artillery units continued on the job training to develop proficiency in all phases of artillery with emphasis on duties of the cannoneer and fire direction center techniques at battery level. Also, proficiency training in defense of base camps and fire support bases was conducted continually throughout the period with emphasis on proper planning of defensive fires, direct fires, countermortar/counterbattery fires, use of appropriate ammunition such as beehive or charge 1 fuze time set for minimum range (referred to in Sec 2 as Killer Junior), and immediate preplanned reaction to enemy attack (including predetermined direction for each gun).

b. Specific Activities:

The activities of the elements of the 25th Inf Div Artillery continued to be characterized by frequent moves of individual firing batteries to support relatively small elements of the infantry; companies or battalions.

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(1) On 2 Aug 2/319 Arty returned to FSB Patton (XT5921) from FSB Jackson (XT4216) as it continued to provide direct support (DS) to its own 3d Brigade of the 101st Air Cavalry, which was under the operational control (OPCON) of the 25th Infantry Division.

(2) On 4 Aug C/1/8 deployed to FSB Kaene II (XT6502) from FSB Meade (XT6011) to support the 2/14th Infantry. Operations continued in the area throughout August. The following day A/1/8 moved from FSB Stuart III (XT4919) and C/3/13 moved from Cu Chi into FSB Butler III (XT5404) to support elements of the 3/101 Air Cav in combat assault (CA) and reconnaissance in force (RIF) operations north of Bao Trai. On 7 August these batteries returned to the FSB's from which they had come.

(3) An additional medium battery B/1/27 was assigned the mission of General Support Reinforcing the 25th Inf Div Arty on 6 August at which time it moved into FSB Meade (XT6011). This battery moved to Stuart III (XT4919) on 8 August to replace A/1/8 which returned to Cu Chi.

(4) The following day, 9 August, a new FSB, Buell II, was occupied in grid XT2256. B/7/11 moved from Buell (XT2153) and A/3/13 from Tay Ninh into Buell II.

(5) Between 9 and 17 August several moves were made to maintain artillery support for the fast moving maneuver elements, but no significant action developed. On one occasion the artillery virtually outran the infantry. During the evening of 15 August a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) platoon of 30 men was reported surrounded by an NVA force of 100 or more in the vicinity of XT3377. Immediately, B/7/11 Arty was alerted for a possible move to support the beleaguered force. By midnight 15-16 August a scheme of maneuver and fire support had been developed to relieve the surrounded platoon. At first light 16 August, A/3/13 Arty followed a road sweeping team from FSB Buell II to FSB St Barbara (XT2768) and by 0900 was ready to fire a ten-minute Landing Zone (LZ) preparation for 2/27th Infantry. At the same time C/7/11 Arty prepared for an air mobile move from FSB Rawlins III (XT2948) to FSB Knox (XT2877) to provide direct support to the 2/27 Infantry as it went to the relief of the CIDG platoon. At 0915 and again at 1135 the operation was delayed as G3 and other divisional elements reassessed the situation and coordinated air assets with the needs for both the infantry combat assault (CA) and the artillery air mobile emplacement. The CIDG platoon was extracted at 1200 hrs. Finally at 1310 the relief operation -- now a follow-up operation-- began with the artillery preparation of the LZ in the vicinity of XT2877. At 1435 C/7/11 began the air-mobile move it had prepared for at 0900. The next day, 17 Aug, A/3/13 returned to FSB Buell II (XT2256) and C/7/11 returned to FSB Rawlins III.

(6) The long expected VC/NVA Third Offensive began in the early morning hours of 18 Aug 68, with an attack on FSB Buell II. At 0120 hrs the position was attacked with mortars, rockets, small arms, and foot troops. At 0225 hrs, Tay Ninh base camp was receiving small arms fire and mortars, and at 0245, the Nui Ba Den signal facility came under ground attack.

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A total of 83 NVA (body count) were killed during the attack at FSB Buell II. During the daylight hours continuous contact was made with enemy forces in the Tay Ninh area. As darkness fell it became apparent the enemy would renew his efforts against Tay Ninh, Buell II, Dau Tieng, and Tay Ninh East. An estimated two NVA battalions occupied Tay Ninh East. C/2/13 arrived in Cu Chi from Phu Loi (23d Arty Group) to assume a General Support Reinforcing mission. This 105mm howitzer battery was moved to Tay Ninh by air on 19 Aug 68.

(7) The following two days the enemy continued sporadic attacks by fire on Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh base camps and fire support bases in the area. Div Arty units provided continuous close fire support of the maneuver elements seeking him out. On 21 August, A/2/13 moved from Tay Ninh to Rawlins III (XT 2648) to support 4/23 Mech Inf and A/1/8 moved to Dau Tieng from Cu Chi to support 1/5 Mech Inf.

(8) FSB Schofield III (AT 4144) was occupied on 22 August by A/1/8 Arty from Dau Tieng and C/7/11 Arty from Rawlins III. Two days later, at approximately 0015 hours 24 August this new position received a heavy ground attack. The more than 2000 rounds of artillery fired in defense accounted for a major part of the 62 enemy body count. Schofield III was vacated on 25 August and both batteries returned to the bases from which they came. Also on 25 Aug, A/2/13 Arty roadmarched to Cu Chi from FSB Rawlins III. During the early morning hours of 22 August FSB's Buell II (AT 2256), Rawlins III (AT 2948), and Stuart III (XT 4919) all received attacks by fire and light ground probes. Light friendly casualties and unknown enemy casualties resulted.

(9) On 27 August the enemy lost another 34 men killed in a pre-dawn attack on FSB Rawlins III (occupied by C/7/11 and two companies of 4/23 Mechanized Infantry). The following day three artillery moves were completed in response to a shift of division maneuver elements: Ho and A/1/8 Arty returned to Cu Chi from Dau Tieng, A/3/13 Arty moved into Cu Chi from FSB Buell II, and C/3/13 Arty moved from Cu Chi to FSB Meade (XT 6011), where it remained for the rest of the quarter. The 2/319 Arty (Airborne) relieved its A Battery (at FSB Davis, XT 4822), which returned to the 101st Airborne Division base camp at Phuoc Vinh (XT 9545), with its C battery from Phuoc Vinh. In other action on 27-28 August, artillery fires were concentrated in grid XT 5227 to help the 2/506 Infantry (Abn) kill 40 NVA soldiers. On 29 August C/2/319 Arty moved from FSB Davis to FSB Pershing (vic XT 5025).

(10) August closed relatively quietly as enemy action subsided. On the 31st C/1/8 Arty moved by helicopter from FSB Keene II (vic XT 6502) to a new position, Keene III (vic XT 6001), five Km to the west, where the battery remained in support of the 2/14 Infantry throughout the rest of the quarter.

(11) The lull in activity continued until 3 September when the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng convoy was ambushed. There were some artillery relocations during the lull. On 1 September A/2/13, from 23d Artillery Group assigned the mission of General Support Reinforcing the 25th Inf Div Arty, returned to its parent battalion at Phu Loi (XT 8415) and was replaced at Cu Chi by its sister battery, B/2/13. Meanwhile, to the northwest, C/2/13 at Tay Ninh exchanged positions

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with B/7/11 at FSB Buell III (AT 2153). The tempo of ground action increased on 3 September, and the artillery was again on the move to maintain its support of the infantry: C Battery 2/77 Arty returned to Cu Chi and Div Arty control from operational control of the Capital Military Assistance Command at FSB Danford (XS 7799). Other Div Arty elements fanned out from Cu Chi to the northwest (A/3/13 plus one section of D/3/13 to FSB Patton) and to the north (A/1/8 to FSB Rogers, XT 6827). A 101st Airborne battery, B/2/319, moved from Patton to FSB Shafter (AT 6525) to add its support to that of A/1/8 for infantry operating in that vicinity. The next day, 4 September, artillery movement continued as D/3/13 displaced from Cu Chi to FSB Lincoln II (AT 3825) and A/1/8 made a short relocation from FSB Rogers to FSB Darby (AT 6432). C/2/77 and a fire direction center from 1/8 moved from Cu Chi to FSB Hodges (AT 6232) to support the 1/27 Infantry:

(12) From 5 through 8 September, elements of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, engaged the enemy in significant contacts in the vicinity of XT 5419 (5-6 Sep) and the vicinity of XT 5728 (7-8 Sep). Despite 11,500 rounds of artillery fired in support, the final results were disappointing:

	KIA	WIA	FW
US Losses:	44	50	
Enemy Losses:	59 (Body Count) 19 (Possible)		8
Captured:	2 mortars, 24 individual weapons; assorted rocket propelled grenades, mines, and hand grenades.		

(13) After three days of relatively light contact, enemy activity began to increase. Once again the threat was in the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng area and on 11 September C/2/77 conducted an airmobile move from FSB Hodges (XT 6232) to Tay Ninh. The fire direction element from 1/8 Arty located with C/2/77 returned to Cu Chi. The enemy's activity reached a climax at 0200 hours on 13 September when he launched a massive attack against FSB Buell III (AT 2153). This well dug in position, manned by C/2/13 Arty and 3/22 Infantry, received 1000 mortar and rocket propelled grenade rounds and a heavy ground attack. The attackers left behind 76 dead, but wounded only 17 US defenders. On the 14th B/3/13 Arty displaced to Cu Chi after almost nine months at FSB Harrison (XT 7304). The same day A/2/319 Arty displaced from FSB Shafter (XT 6525) to FSB Pope (AT 5430). On 16 September 23d Arty Group replaced C/2/13 at Buell III with B/2/13. C/2/13 went to Cu Chi and on the 18th was exchanged for A/2/13 from Phu Loi. On 16 and 17 September the enemy lost 104 KIA in ground assaults on B/2/319 at FSB Pope. On 17 September D/3/13 at FSB Lincoln II (XT 3825) and B/3/13 at Cu Chi both were displaced to FSB Hampton (XT 4123) to weight the action against enemy elements engaged in the Trung Lap area.

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On this same date Colonel Gordon Sumner Jr, CO, 25th Inf Div Arty was reassigned as Chief of Staff 25th Inf Div. He was succeeded in command of the 25th Inf Div Arty by Colonel Lucius G. Hill. On 19 September A/1/8, which had been at FSB Sage (AT 5734) since the 15th, relieved B/1/8 at FSB Crockett II (AT 7416). Bravo Battery returned to Cu Chi. Alpha Battery remained at Crockett II through the end of the quarter. On the 20th B/2/319 Arty displaced from FSB Pope to FSB Patton II (AT 5819).

(14) During the last ten days of September 25th Division elements had only minor contact with the enemy. The most significant artillery development was the return of 2/77 Arty to Division Artillery control after eleven weeks under Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) control in the vicinity of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The 2/319 Arty (Abn) and its supported unit, 3d BDE/101st bn Div, returned to their parent organization's control at Phuoc Vinh on 25 September. Also during this period a number of short duration artillery moves were made in the vicinity of the MSR between Tay Ninh and FSB St Barbara (XT 2768) to support the 1st Brigade in opening the MSR and securing the St Barbara FSB, which had been the target of frequent attacks by fire. One of these moves brought B/1/27 from FSB Stuart III (XT-4919) to FSB Briggs II (AT 3958) on 25 September. On 30 September C/2/77 moved from Tay Ninh to FSB McNair (AT 4256) to provide direct support for the 2/22 Inf (Mech), as the 3d Brigade began operations in that area. The lull in enemy action begun on 20 September continued until 3 October, when sporadic contacts began to occur.

(15) Early in the morning hours of 3 October, FSB Keene III was attacked with mortar and RPG's. US casualties were minor, while 15 enemy soldiers were killed by counter-mortar fires. The attack was repeated the following morning, also ending with no significant casualties. On 3 October B/1/27 ended a week long stay at Briggs II (AT 3958) and moved to Rawlins III (AT 2948). The next day A/2/77 at Tay Ninh and A/7/11 at Dau Tieng base camps exchanged positions in order to rejoin their parent units. Further redistribution of artillery assets took place on 6 October as B and D/3/13 departed FSB Hampton (AT 4123): Bravo Battery moving to FSB Wood (AT 4434), and Delta Battery returning to Cu Chi. The redeployment of artillery to the "forward" pattern of direct support i.e. 7/11 Arty DS to 1st Brigade at Tay Ninh and A/2/77 Arty DS to 3d Brigade at Dau Tieng was completed on 7 October. While A/1/13 moved from Tay Ninh to replace B/2/13 at FSB Buell III (AT 2455) and B/2/77 moved in to FSB McNair (AT 4256) from Cu Chi. Enroute to Tay Ninh B/2/13 went to FSB Hull (XT 2638), and enroute to McNair B/2/77 went to FSB Austin (AT 3731) to support 2/22 Infantry operations in the vicinity of AT 2930, during which a nine-ton rice cache was located. The following day B/1/13 returned to Cu Chi from Tay Ninh and its sister battery, Alpha, moved by helicopter from Cu Chi to FSB Ware (AT 5926) in support of 2d Brigade operations. A significant contact developed on 10 October when the 2/22 Inf received sniper fire in grid XT 5322. During the day 3,107

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rounds of artillery were fired into the target areas despite frequent and prolonged check-fires for gunships and airstrikes. During the night 3,000 more rounds were fired. When maneuver elements swept the area on 11 October, 26 enemy bodies were located; 13 of these were officially credited to artillery. Meanwhile, on 10 October, Division Artillery received from 23d Arty Group an additional General Support Reinforcing medium battery, C/1/27, which moved into Cu Chi. On 11 October, D/3/13 (8" Howitzer) moved from Cu Chi to FSB Stuart III (XT 4919) which it continued to occupy at the close of the quarter. The following night B/1/27 Arty at FSB Rawlins III reacted to intelligence indicating an attack on Tay Ninh base camp by making a night march into the camp to provide additional fire power. On the 13th C/1/27 moved from Cu Chi to replace its sister battery at Rawlins III, where it remained as the quarter ended.

(16) On 14 October C/2/77 was displaced from FSB McNair (XT4526) to Tay Ninh West (base camp), where it was attached to the 7/11 to support 1st Brigade operations. Second Brigade operations were supported by A/2/13, which moved from FSB Ware (XT 5926) to Cu Chi on 15 October, and then to FSB Jackson III (XT 4316) on the following day. Also on 16 October B/7/11 moved from Tay Ninh to FSB Hines (XT 0151), where it remained until 21 October, when it returned to base camp. Deep mud at FSB Jackson III, caused by recent heavy rains, prevented A/2/13 from returning to Cu Chi on 22 October, as planned. The battery was bogged down until the following day, when a CH 54 (Flying Crane) helicopter lifted five trucks out of the mud. The battery closed into Cu Chi late on the afternoon of 23 October. The same day C/7/11, which had gone to FSB St Barbara (XT2768) on the 17th, returned to its parent battalion at Dau Tieng. The following day C/2/77 moved to FSB Mahone (XT 5337) to support the 1/27 Infantry, as the Wolfhounds and other 3d Brigade elements spent the last week of October rooting out enemy troops and Viet Cong Infrastructure personnel in the Than An area (XT 5338).

(17) The 23d Arty Group's 2/13 Arty Battalion again rotated two of its light batteries on 26 October. A/2/13 went to Phu Loi from Cu Chi and was replaced by C/2/13, which road marched to Tay Ninh. Also on the 26th C/7/11 moved from Rawlins III to FSB Bragg II (XT 3958), from which it supported 1st Brigade operations through the end of the month. An outstanding example of the close fire support given to the smallest infantry element occurred on the night of 25-26 October. Two ambush patrols from the 2/27 Infantry became engaged with enemy forces in the vicinity of XT 7615, 1/8 Arty fired in support, and the infantry battalion commander credited the artillery support with saving these patrols from being overrun. As First Brigade operations pushed into the southern edge of War Zone C on 27 October, B/7/11 moved to FSB Grant II (XT 3862) from Tay Ninh and remained there as the month ended.

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(18) On the 28th the artillery liaison officer (LNO) with 4/9 Infantry was killed as he and the battalion commander searched the bodies of several enemy killed by an aircraft from the 3/17 Air Cavalry. The following day the LNO with 1/5 Mech Infantry was wounded when the command truck was hit by a rocket propelled grenade between Dau Tien and Toy Ninh.

(19) On 31 October B/2/13 moved from FSS Fatten II (XT 5619) to FSS Gordon (AT 5830) to support two companies of 4/9 Infantry. This brought to a close a quarter in which Div Arty elements had made 255 moves and fired 263,102 artillery rounds.

c. Personnel and Logistics.

(1) The S-1 maintained coordination of the personnel needs of Div Arty with G-1 throughout the quarter. The one major personnel problem was a shortage of artillery captains. This shortage has been pointed out to G-1 and is being attacked appropriately. Div Arty units lost 11 men killed in action and had 166 men wounded in action during the past quarter. Artillerymen received 168 Valor Awards, 361 Service Awards, 130 Purple Hearts and 75 Air Medals during August, September and October.

(2) During the past quarter Div Arty S-4 operations consisted of coordinating resupply activities in support of the firing units. The magnitude of the task reached a peak 7-8 September when elements of the 3d Brigade 101st Airborne Division had heavy contact in the vicinity of XT 5728. Div Arty fired 8400 rounds to support them during this one 24 hour period. All available means of transportation were used for the resupply, including 26 Combat Essential sorties of CH 47. Ammunition was resupplied throughout the night and re-stocking was completed by 1800 the following day. The lack of sufficient vehicles and personnel in the combined headquarters and service battery organic to Division Artillery battalions made the resupply task especially difficult. A separate service battery such as that organic to the non-divisional artillery battalion would provide the necessary vehicles and personnel. (Reference Operational Report Lessons Learned dated 18 May 1968 item 2.f.(1) Service Battery Requirement, page 10 and ORLL dated 15 Aug 68 item 2.e.(1) Class V Transportation, page 7.)

d. The Civil Affairs program realized some success during the quarter. There was increased popular cooperation with Government of Vietnam (GVN) agencies, and more voluntary intelligence reports were made to GVN, US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FJMAF). School buildings in Trang Bang were repaired by the self-help efforts of the local population using materials provided by the Div Arty Civil Affairs section. A badly needed latrine facility was completed at the Loc Du Primary School (AT 4920). The school has several hundred students and this sanitation facility will help improve the hygiene of the students. In Trang Bang proper a much needed bunker for the maternity dispensary was completed. Psychological operations

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included distribution of leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts of tape recordings on the subjects weapons rewards, safe conduct, diary of a Hoi Chan. and reporting of information on mines.

2. Section 2, Lesson Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Operations.

(1) Integrated Fire Support

(a) Observation. The value of the available fire support in Vietnam is frequently reduced by restricting one source of fire support in order to utilize another. Specifically, artillery fires are frequently halted to permit air strikes and gunship strikes.

(b) Evaluation. For an infantry or mechanized unit in contact, artillery is the most responsive means of fire support. There is a tendency on the part of ground commanders, however, to call in tactical air strikes or gunships prior to firing artillery. This sequence denies the ground commander his immediate fire support. The proper procedure is to bring to bear the most responsive means first, and then to augment it with other available fire support. At no time should one means be allowed to eclipse another. All artillery officers, from the Assistant Fire Support Coordinator in the Division Fire Support Element to the Forward Observer with the infantry company, have been trained to coordinate the various forms of fire support. Coordination in the target area can be effected if the ground commander properly uses his fire support coordinator.

(c) Recommendation. That infantry officer training at all levels reemphasize the proper use of the fire support coordinator at each level of command.

(2) Close-in Defensive Fires

(a) Observation. Our tactic of locating fire support bases (FSB) in areas inviting attack and the enemy's tactic of launching attacks from close-in assembly areas occupied under cover of darkness increase the need for close-in defensive fires.

(b) Evaluation. A previously little used 105mm howitzer technique of firing a short-time-fuzed projectile at a low quadrant with charge one has proved very effective. Data is computed from the TFT for a 5-20 meter height of burst at ranges of 200 - 1000 meters from the weapon. This technique was pioneered for the 25th Div Arty by the 1st Battalion, 8th

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Artillery, while commanded by LTC Robert A. Dean (in the battle of FSB Burt, vic XT 4980, on 1-2 January 1968). The theory and practice of the technique were further developed between January and May. On 12 May it was again successfully employed at the battle of FSB Pike VI (vic XS 7395). Since then this method has been used extensively, with great success indicated by secondary explosions and high enemy body counts after all subsequent ground attacks on fire support bases. The technique is known locally as "Killer Junior", a name derived from the radio call sign, Killer, by which 1/8 Arty was formerly known. Killer Junior provides effective interdiction while the enemy is attempting to mass for an attack, and during the attack will annihilate his assault formations.

(c) Recommendations. (Vietnam Operations):

1 All light batteries should be trained in the use of "Killer Junior", and firing data should be stenciled on the shields of the weapons.

2 Prior to darkness lay 1 howitzer in each of the 4 cardinal directions with an area of responsibility 0800 mil. to the left and right of the principal direction of fire.

3 Have the FDC plot approximately 8 to 10 targets between 200 and 1000 meters in range in each howitzer's area of responsibility.

4 Have the FDC provide each howitzer with a card with azimuth, deflection, time and quadrant to each target (i.e. DA Form 6-13).

5 For use of "killer junior" in interdiction provide each howitzer with a timetable for firing on their respective targets. Vary the timetable nightly so as not to indicate a set pattern.

6 Utilize 1 platoon to fire routine missions that might arise during the night, with the remainder of the battery able to react if necessary.

(3) Use of Beehive at Fire Support Bases.

(a) Observation: In some cases the artillery units at a fire support base have been hesitant to fire beehive rounds because of improperly built forward Infantry positions.

(b) Evaluation: The beehive round fired with muzzle action has a devastating effect on personnel to the front, unless they are properly protected by bunkers or foxholes. In cases where the Infantry is not properly dug in or manning their positions, a natural hesitancy about firing beehive results.

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(c) Recommendation: A closer coordination between ground commanders and the artillery battery commanders at fire support bases would alleviate this problem.

c. Training.

Officers' Orientation

(a) Observation. Officer personnel arrive in country with very little, if any, knowledge of rules of engagement and fire clearing procedures.

(b) Evaluation. Rules of engagement and clearance of fires are major factors influencing the employment of artillery in Vietnam.

(c) Recommendation. Appropriate courses at the Artillery School should include thorough instruction in rules of engagement and procedures for clearing fires.

d. Intelligence. None.

e. Logistics. None.

f. Organization. None.

g. Other

Artillery Trajectory Identification

(a) Observation. Aircraft required to operate in the vicinity of artillery fires and air observers adjusting artillery fires frequently have difficulty identifying the artillery trajectories.

(b) Evaluation. The airmobility used in Vietnam frequently requires aircraft to operate in close proximity to artillery trajectories. Air Observers are frequently required to adjust fires from more than one direction and under conditions that make gun-target line identification very difficult. A means of making the gun-target line visible would increase aircraft safety, increase the accuracy and safety of close artillery support to the infantry, and reduce the traffic on radio nets.

(c) Recommendation. That a smoke trailing/tracer round be developed for field testing.

3. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Survey Information - Escape, Evasion, and Survival.

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- a. No 25th Div Arty troops have been separated or cut off from their units.
- b. This unit has no escape, evasion, or survival information or lessons learned to report.

Lucius G. Hill Jr.
 LUCIUS G. HILL JR
 Colonel, Artillery
 Commanding

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AVDCMH (16 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending
31 Oct 68. RCS CSFOR-65

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225, 21 November 1968

TO: CG, IIFFORCEV, ATTN: G-3 (D & T), APO San Francisco 96246

Forwarded with concurrence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. F. Faught Maj AGC

W. F. FAUGHT
/ac LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

AVFBC-RE-H (16 Nov 68) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operations Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for period ending
31 Oct 68. RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 13 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery, for the period
ending 31 October 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



O. B. FORRY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

AVHGC-DST (16 Nov 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operations Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for period ending
31 Oct 68. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 1 DEC 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for
the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 25th
Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ II FFORCEV
HQ 25th Inf Div Arty

GPOP-DT (16 Nov 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

27 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

Organic Units

1/8 Artillery (105 How, Towed)

7/11 Artillery (105 How, Towed)

2/77 Artillery (105 How, Towed)

3/13 Artillery (155/8", SP)

Attached Units

B/5/2 Artillery (AW battery and attached searchlight platoon)

General Support Reinforcing

2/13 Artillery (105 How, Towed) (-)

1/27 Artillery (155 How, SP) (-)

2/32 Artillery (175/8", SP) (-)

Incl 1

Security Classification

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ITEM 5

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PAGE # _____

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

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