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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (7 Aug 68)

FOR OT RD 682186

23 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d  
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96318

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10 May 1969

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RGS-CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

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Section I - Significant Organization Activities

1. (C) General:

This report covers the period 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968, and is submitted in compliance with Headquarters, I Field Forces Vietnam Regulation 1-3, dated 23 March 1967, and Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group Regulation 1-3, dated 12 July 1967.

a. Mission: The mission of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is to command those units assigned and attached to it and provide aviation support as directed by the 17th Combat Aviation Group to U.S. Forces, Republic of Vietnam Forces, and Free World Assistance Forces. Priority has been to 4th Infantry Division, 22d, 23d & 24th Infantry Divisions, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and other units of I Field Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Station Plan: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is located at Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN and is commanded by LTC Raymond G. Lehman Jr. Subordinate elements of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion are: (Detailed list of assigned and attached units are shown in Inclosure 1.)

(1) Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN.

(2) 57th Assault Helicopter Company, Kontum, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) Helicopters.

(3) 119th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) Helicopters.

(4) 155th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Coryell, Dan Me Thuot, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) Helicopters.

(5) 170th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) Helicopters.

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(6) 189th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) Helicopters.

(7) 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company, Camp Holloway, Pleiku RVN. Equipped with CH-47A Helicopters.

(8) 355th Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy), Camp Holloway Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with CH-54A Helicopters

c. Type aircraft authorized and on hand as of 30 April 1968:

	AUTH	ON HAND
(1) UH-1H	115	89
(2) UH-1C(A)	40	35
(3) UH-1C	2	0
(4) CH-47A	16	16
(5) CH-54A	9	3
(6) U-6A	1	1

See Incl 2 Recapitulation of Flying Hours (U) and Aircraft Availability (U).

2. (C) Intelligence: The S-2 section continued publication of the daily intelligence report with the addition of two other recipients of the report. On 7 April 1968 the S-2 was given authority to grant interim secret and top secret clearances, final secret clearances and to validate secret and top secret clearances.

A. Enemy activity. The general TET Offensive which started on 30 January reported in ORILL for Nov 67 - Jan 68, continued into this reporting period. Contact in all major cities, Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot was continuous through 5 Feb 68. Kontum was taken under enemy mortar and 122mm rocket attack on 1 Feb. A combination ground and mortar/rocket attack was launched against the city on 2 Feb and a 122mm rocket attack on both 3 and 4 Feb. The city was secured on 4 Feb. Interrogation of PW's and document analysis subsequently determined all 3 Bn's of the 24th NVA Regiment, MR5, the 304th Local Force Bn and the 406th Sapper Bn were involved in the attack. Elements of the 40th Artillery were attached to the 24th Regiment for rocket support. All 3 major units participating in the attack suffered approximately 50% personnel casualties. One Russian model LFO flamethrower was captured during the city fighting, the first indication of this weapon in Regimental units in the highlands area. Fighting in Pleiku began 30 Jan with the mortaring of the 937th Engineer Compound.

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Camp Holloway came under enemy mortar fire and a ground attack at 0305 and by 0330 action throughout the city was heavy. During the daylight hours, 3d ARVN Cav and 52d Avn Gunships were credited with killing 45 enemy of a unit located in a valley just west of Camp Holloway. Fighting continued through 4 Feb. On 2 Feb, Camp Holloway came under mortar and 122mm rocket fire approximately 0420, sustaining 15 WIA and considerable damage. On 2 Feb, 3d ARVN Cav, with the support of gunships from the 52d Avn Bn, 4th Div, and aircraft from 219th RAC succeeded in trapping the H-15 Local Force Bn on the SW entry to the city and in the ensuing action literally destroyed the H-15 Bn, accounting for 206 enemy KIA and 36 PW's. At 031240, Camp Holloway again came under enemy rocket attack with negative casualties. By 4 February the city was secure, units taking part in the Pleiku portion of the TET Offensive included the H-15 Local Force Bn, 408th Sapper Bn, 21st Det of the K-28 Sapper Bn, 3d, 4th and 9th VC District Local Forces Co's, 6th and 7th District Local Force Platoons, and possibly the 5th VC District Local Force Co's. It was later determined that the main attack against Pleiku was to take place on 2 Feb, using the 32d NVA Regt and the 4th Bn, 95B NVA Regt which waited in an area 15 to 20 KM's west of Pleiku. Destruction of the H-15 Bn (lead element for the attack) caused commitment of the two NVA units to be cancelled. By far the greatest loss to the VC in Pleiku was the hundreds of valuable Local Force personnel and guerrilla cadre thrown into the battle awaiting commitment of the NVA units. In Darlac, fighting centered in and around Ban Me Thout City. The first attack was made on 30 Jan at 0156 hours. During the day all friendly elements in Ban Me Thout came under ground, mortar, and rocket attacks. By 0915 hours the VC occupied a large percentage of the city and areas of nearby villages which were attacked early in the day. On 31 Jan the VC unleashed a ground and mortar attack against Ban Me Thout airfield. The majority of VC in Ban Me Thout City at this time were Local Force. On 1 Feb contact was made by friendly forces with an estimated NVA Regt headed for Ban Me Thout, located approximately 13 km SSW of the city. Heavy contact lasted throughout the night in Ban Me Thout and on 2 Feb elements of the 173d Abn Bde were sent into town to reinforce. On 4 Feb there were still an estimated two VC Co's in the city. On 5 Feb at 0154 Ban Me Thout Airfield received 20 rounds of 60 mm mortar fire, and between 0154 and 0517 another 110 + rounds of mortar fire impacted in the city. The 155th AHC was again mortared at 052300 as was Ban Me Thout East Airfield and 23d ARVN Div supply point. By 6 Feb large numbers of VC were leaving the area and the city was relatively secure by the evening hours. Units participating in the battle included the 33d NVA Regiment, 301st Local Force Bn, 401st Local Force Bn (no information on this unit prior to the TET Offensive), the 39th Main Force Bn, K101 NVA Bn (both of which reportedly had been integrated into the 33d Regt), the 5th and 6th Local Force Companies and rocket elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment. Since the end of the TET Offensive, sporadic attacks by fire have been conducted against 52d Avn elements in Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban Me Thout cities. On 6 Feb Camp Holloway received approximately 20 rounds of 122mm rockets causing light damage

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and no personnel casualties. On 8 Feb, Camp Holloway was taken under fire by an unknown number of VC using 82mm mortars. All rounds landed outside the perimeter at 0210. On 10 Feb Holloway received 120-140 82mm mortar rounds from vic AR 827 490. Results for this attack were 1 US KIA, 46 US WIA, and damage to numerous aircraft, vehicles, and buildings. On 18 Feb, 58th AHC, Kontum received approximately 50 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire with no damage or casualties. On 230200 Feb, the 155th AHC in Ban Me Thuot received an estimated 75 rounds of mortar fire with negative personnel damage and light damage to UH-1H. At 260255 Feb, Camp Holloway received approximately 70 rounds of mortar fire resulting in 11US WIA, one POL tanker destroyed, one 2 1/2 ton van damaged and extensive damage to buildings in the compound. On 4 March there were widespread attacks by fire with Ban Me Thuot, Ben Het, Dak To, Kontum, and Camp Enari being the main targets. Kontum airfield received seventeen 122mm rockets from the northeast at 0300, with negative damage. At 0205, multiple targets in Ban Me Thuot received an unknown number of mortar rounds. The 155th AHC suffered one KIA, 32 WIA and one UH-1C destroyed. On 5 March, within a four minute period, three targets in Pleiku were mortared by the VC. At 0315, the 937th Engr compound and the 330th RRU compound received approximately 17 and 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire respectively, results were nine WIA in the 937th Engrs and three WIA in the 330th RRU. At 0318 hours Camp Holloway received approximately 40 rounds of 82mm fire, seven personnel were WIA and extensive damage to buildings and billeting areas in the compound. An item of interest in this attack was the probable use of 82mm mortar CS rounds which were used, minus the CS agent for delivery of hundreds of anti-Vietnam war propaganda leaflets. The leaflets were evidently printed in early 1967 in North Vietnam for use in the I Corp area. At 060247 March, Camp Holloway was again the target, receiving approximately 33 rounds with two US WIA, major damage to one Helicopter, minor damage to two others and extensive vehicular damage. At 100100 March, Camp Holloway received 43 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting 13 US WIA (10 from the 88th S&S Bn). During the mortar attack the VC succeeded in penetrating the 815th Engr Bn perimeter in the Holloway AO and set satchel charges resulting in one US KIA, two US WIA and extensive damage to engineer equipment. Two VC were killed by small arms within the perimeter. New Pleiku Airbase was also taken under fire by enemy mortars during the same period with no US casualties and light damage to two "spooky" aircraft. On 132227 Mar, Ban Me Thuot City received approximately 200 rounds of mortar fire, 51 of which impacted in the 155th AHC area. Friendly losses were one KIA and 10 WIA. At 172255 Mar, Kontum City received 36 rounds 122 mm rocket fire. Rounds impacted within the vicinity of the 24th STZ Hq, 299th Engr, 2/1 Cav, 57th AHC and 503 Abn Inf Bn. Negative US casualties were reported. Kontum airfield was again taken under fire by rockets with 3 attacks in rapid succession at 202350, 210400 and 211245 April. There were no personnel casualties, and light damage to one UH-1C, one truck and the 57th AHC mess hall. At 241802 Mar the 57th AHC received three rds of 122mm rocket fire which impacted outside the companies west perimeter

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causing negative casualties or damage. At 262310 March, Dan Me Thuot 155th AHC received and unknown number of mortar rounds with negative US casualties. At 290145 March an ammo pad located in the ARVN ASP was detonated by Sapper Personnel. At 0200 Camp Holloway received 33 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in three WIA's, one UH-1H destroyed, three UH-1C and three UH-1H moderate damage, three UH-1C, six UH-1H and one O-1 light damage and light damage to the control tower and several buildings. Enemy activity against 52d Aviation units in April was light. On 4 April, a coordinated sapper-mortar attack was launched against Camp Holloway and the 815th Engineer Compound in the Holloway AO. Sappers attempted to enter the engineer perimeter at 0105, eight NVA were killed in the wires. At 0117 Camp Holloway was taken under mortar attack, receiving approximately 35-40 rounds. No personnel casualties were sustained. A 52d security detachment patrol immediately took the mortar positions under fire with gunships supporting. Four more NVA were killed at the mortar sites and one wounded NVA captured. Material captured at both the quarry and the mortar positions included one 82mm mortar tube and base plate, ten unexpended mortar rounds, three AK-47's, one D40 RK T/three rounds, 31 satchel charges, numerous grenades, and a complete company sized medical kit. Tentative identification of the NVA unit involved is the 408th Bn based on one infiltration pass taken from one KIA at the mortar site. Interrogation of the PW was not possible due to paralysis from brain damage. On 14 April at 2330 hours the VC made another attempt to mortar Camp Holloway. Alert radar crews, however, picked up movement and countermortar fire and small arms fire was brought on the area. The VC left before firing any rounds. A sweep was brought on the area on 15 April revealed three prepared mortar positions and approximately sixty 82mm fuze well plugs. The VC returned on the night of 16 April and mortared 815th Engineer Bn at the rock quarry. The last attack on a 52d unit during the reporting period took place on 26 April at 2315 hours. The 155th AHC received from 40-60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from positions approximately one kilometer NW of the airfield. Results of the attack were nine U.S. WIA, three UH-1H heavy damage, one UH-1C, one UH-1H and one UH-1D moderate damage. Numerous attacks by fire on friendly installations in the Kontum, Floiku, and Dan Me Thuot areas were recorded during the reporting period which did not involve 52d Aviation units.

b. MOVEMENTS

During the reporting period there was a significant shift of enemy forces in the highlands area. In early February, the 174th Regiment, after attacking Tan Canh on 4 February, moved South to positions East and West of Highway 14N between Floiku and Kontum and between mid February and mid March conducted numerous ambushes on the highway. The 32d Regiment, minus the Sixth Battalion, moved to Darlac in February, where it was reported to be the nucleus for a new division. In mid March a new unit, the 209th Regiment, was infiltrated into the western Kontum area from LAOS. Between February and March the NT 1 Division Headquarters

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moved south from the Dak To area to the Pleiku Province. In late March the major portion of the 66th Regiment left the Dak To area and moved south to the Pleiku - Kontum Province western border area. Completion of the Plei Trap road linking route 512 and Laos and from Kontum Province south into Pleiku to a point directly west of Plei Djereng Special Forces camp allows movement of heavy trucks and tracked vehicles along its entire route and as of the closing period, heavy infiltration of both equipment and personnel continues. Work on the Dak Pek road north continues, and contacts by CIDG units with NVA forces has been heavy during the closing two weeks of this period. The future months should show an increase in infiltration into SVN along these routes as the NVA place more importance on action or a major victory in the highlands as a must for establishing a political bargaining position.

**c. NEW UNITS**

During the reporting period several new units were confirmed in the highlands area. The 408th Sapper Battalion, active in Pleiku Province during the last reporting period, participated in the TET attack on Pleiku City and has been thought to be responsible for every mortar attack on Pleiku, and since (then) has been in contact several times during the reporting period. There is sufficient information to carry only the 21st Company of the battalion in order of battle, however, documentation has shown the company probably to have been formed as early as December 1966 or January 1967, and active in Pleiku Province since that time. In late February the entire 209th NVA Regiment (AKA 320th Regiment) infiltrated from North Vietnam entering the Kontum Province from the Tri-border area. The 406th Sapper Battalion is believed to have infiltrated from North Vietnam, placed subordinate to the Kontum Provincial Military Committee, and was first contacted in Ban Mo Thuot City during the TET offensive. There has been one additional contact with the 401st Battalion since then. The K-39 Infantry Battalion was contacted during TET and indications are the battalion, after infiltrating from North Vietnam, was placed OPCON to the 33d Regiment for the TET offensive. During the later part of the reporting period contact was established north of Dak Pek with the 10th Regiment. The regiment is believed to be a transportation-engineer unit subordinate to the NVA 559th Transportation Group, and engaged in resupply and road building north of Dak Pek. There is insufficient evidence to confirm the unit's status at this time. During the latter portion of the reporting period there were continuing agent reports that elements of the NT2 NVA Division had infiltrated into the northern Kontum Province above Dak Pek, however, there is no evidence to confirm these reports.

**d. NEW WEAPONS**

Several weapons, new to the Corps area and of concern to aviation units, were introduced during the reporting period. In late February, the first indication of an AA unit possessing 14.5mm AA MG's and 37mm

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AA guns was received from a PW captured west of Dak To on Route 512. Following this, proof of the guns in the highlands area came with a rash of airburst incidents and gun position sightings by LRP's, particularly in the area west of Kontum City and along the length of the Plei Trap Road. One radar-controlled 57mm gun was verified in country by 7th Air Force at the northern terminus of the Plei Trap Road. Flame throwers were used against friendly troops for the first time in the highlands during the reporting period. On 1 February, one Soviet Model LPO flame-thrower was captured during the city fighting in Kontum from a member of the 24th NVA Regiment. One PW, a company commander in the 24th Regiment, verified there were two of the LPO's assigned to the Regiment. On 26 March 1968, elements of the 209th NVA Regiment used flamethrowers against US forces in an attack against the 3/8th Infantry FSB west of Kontum. Flamethrowers were again used against elements of the US 1<sup>st</sup> Inf Bn during an early morning attack on 29 April. The NVA unit involved is unknown at this time but believed to have been elements of the 209th Regiment. Chemical elements of the NT1 Division were believed to have possessed flamethrowers; however, the 24th NVA Regiment was subordinate to MI 5 during the TET Offensive and there is no indication that the 209th Regiment is subordinate to NT 1 Division at this time. Relocation of the flamethrowers to regimental-sized units indicates the probability of more widespread use of the weapon against friendly units and installations in the highlands during the coming months.

## c. SITUATION

(1) KONTUM: The 24th NVA Regiment minus, is located approximately 30-35 Km W NW of Kontum City. The 6th Bn of the regiment, with rocket support elements, probably from the K-32 Battalion, 40th Artillery Regiment, is located in an area approximately 18 Km north and northeast of Kontum City. The 304th Local Force Battalion, OPCON to the 24th Regiment as the K-3 Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment, is unlocated north of Kontum City, as is the 406th Sapper Battalion. The entire 209th (AKA 320th) Regiment is located 35 to 40 Km west of Kontum. The 66th Regiment minus, is unlocated but believed currently refitting west of Kontum near the Tri-Border area. The 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment is reported OPCON to the 209th Regiment and believed located in the same area. The 179th NVA Regiment is unlocated, as is the supporting AK-6 Battalion, 32d NVA Regiment; both are believed operating in the western Kontum-Pleiku border area, approximately 35 Km southwest of Kontum City.

(2) PLEIKU: The 95B Regiment has split its resources. The regimental headquarters and 5th Battalion are located approximately 40 Km south-east of Pleiku City. The 4th Battalion is located in its base area approximately 26 Km west of Pleiku. The 408th Sapper Battalion is located in its base area 20 Km northeast of Pleiku City. The 31st (AKA X-200) Artillery Battalion is unlocated, but believed located in close proximity to the 4th Battalion, 95B Regiment, west of Pleiku. The H-15 Local Force Battalion, reconstituted since TET, is currently located in its base area

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32-35 Km southeast of Pleiku. The X-17 and X-18 Engineer (Sapper) Companies are currently unlocated in eastern Pleiku.

(3) DARLAC: The 32d NVA Regiment minus the 6th Battalion, is situated in an area generally north of the Mowal Plantation and approximately 28 Km from Ban Me Thout City. The 33d NVA Regimental Headquarters and the 1st Battalion are located on the Cambodian-Darlac border, approximately 50 Km West Southwest of Ban Me Thout. The 3d Battalion, 33d Regiment is located approximately 18 Km North of Ban Me Thout. The K101 NVA Battalion is unlocated, believed to be operating in an area approximately 23 Km south of Ban Me Thout. The K-39 Battalion is unlocated south of Ban Me Thout and the 301st and 401st Local Force Battalions are unlocated.

## f. CAPABILITIES

(1) KONTUM: To attack Kontum City with up to 12 NVA Infantry battalions of the 66th, 209th (AKA 320th), 174th, 24th and 32d NVA Regiments, plus the 304th Local Force Battalion and the 406th and 408th Sapper Battalions, supported by rockets and heavy mortar from the 40th Artillery Regiment. As an alternate course, conduct coordinated attacks against both Plei Kleng Special Forces Camp and Kontum City using the same forces and interdiction of Highway 14N, utilizing elements of the 24th NVA Regiment and the 304th Local Force Battalion.

(2) PLEIKU: To attack Pleiku City with up to 6 NVA Battalions, the 4th and 5th, 95d NVA Regiment, the 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions, 174th Regiment and the 966 (AKA K-6) Battalion, 32d NVA Regiment. In addition, the H-15 Local Force Battalion, the 408th Sapper Battalion and Local Forces from VC Gia Lai Districts 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9 would be used. As an alternate course, using the 174th Regiment and the 966th Battalion, 32d NVA Regiment, conduct multi-battalion attacks against Plei Mrong or Plei Djereng Special Forces Camps, continuous interdiction of Highways 19E and 14 N using elements of the 3d VC District, the 21st Co, X-28 Sapper Battalion, 5th Battalion, 95d NVA Regiment, the H-15 Local Force Battalion and the X-17 and X-18 Engineer (Sapper) Companies.

(3) DARLAD: To attack Ban Me Thout and outlying areas with up to 6 NVA Infantry battalions from the 32d and 33d Regiments, the K101 NVA Battalion and the K-39 NVA Battalion. Additional support provided by the 301st and 401st Local Force Battalions and rocket elements from the 40th Artillery Regiment. Continuous interdiction of Highways 14N and 21E utilizing elements of the 301st and 401st Local Force Battalions and the 5th and 6th Local Force Companies.

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3. (C) Operations and Training:

a. Operations:

(1) Support: The 354 CAB supported numerous operations during the reporting period which included MacArthur; (90 days, Prairie Fire; (90 days), and Omega; (60 days). II Corps DSA was supported with one assault helicopter company minus and the 4th Infantry Division by two assault helicopter companies. ARVN units in the II Corps Combat Tactical Zone were supported by one assault helicopter company. The percentage of the battalion lift capability allocated by month follows:

	FEB	MAR	APR
4th Inf Div	40%	41%	42%
ARVN	15%	15%	15%
OMEGA/PRAIRIE FIRE	20%	14%	14%
II Corps DSA	15%	16%	15%
Other	10%	14%	14%

(2) Operational Statistics (1 Feb - 30 April 1968)

COMBAT SORTIES	OTHER SORTIES	UH-1H HOURS*	UH-1C HOURS*	CH-47A HOURS	CH-54 HOURS*
103,711	7156	25,466	6731	3298	220
TOTAL HOURS	TOTAL PAX	CARGO TCNS	A/C HITS	A/C D/M/DEST	
35,715	151,716	24,980	75	75/14	
CREW INF/MIA	ENEMY KBA	STRUCT DEST	MED EVAC	SORTIES CXL/DELAYED	
24/0	344	177	725	0/0	

(3) UH-1H and UH-1C Support: During the reporting period this battalion had increased difficulty in meeting its commitments as a result of combat damage to aircraft received during several rocket and mortar attacks on the aircraft cantonment areas of Camp Holloway (Ploiku), Camp Coryell (Ban Me Thuot), and Kontum airfields. The major contributing factor was the loss of the UH-1 type aircraft. Replacement aircraft were received, but not in sufficient quantity. This battalion is short an average of two UH-1H and one UH-1C type helicopters per company in addition to shortages that existed during the last reporting period.

(4) The 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) has contributed immeasurably to the combat effort in the 4th Div AO and the II Corps

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tactical zone. The 355th Assault Support Helicopter company became operational on 22 Feb 68. The organic CH-54A helicopters of this unit have moved heavy combat engineer equipment which has played a key role in the success of ground unit's combat mission. In addition to the engineer equipment, the CH-54 helicopters have moved complete 155 howitzer batteries. This lift capability has added to the success of artillery fire support missions through rapid and versatile employment of the artillery units.

(5) CH-47A Support: During this reporting period the CH-47A helicopter has been required to perform an increasing role in resupply of forward combat units. Statistics compiled indicate an increase in combat cargo and passengers moved from secure airfields to secure airfields. As a result a greater number of hours were flown by each aircraft to complete the ground unit's resupply mission. It was necessary to reinforce the 179th ASHC with a portion of two other ASHC's.

(6) Major Operations Supported: During this reporting period the 52d CAB has continued support of Operation MacArthur in the Dak To area. In addition, 52d CAB provided all aviation support of operations conducted by the 173rd Abn Bde and 3d Bde of the 4th Inf Div in the Kontum area.

(7) Weather: Weather has slowly degressed from high ceilings, moderate winds and good visibility to conditions that are beginning to restrict aircraft operations, especially during the early morning and later afternoon hours. Visibility and density altitude were readily affected as the transition to wet season conditions approached. Smoke and haze were very hazardous to flight during the month of April.

## b. Training

(1) During the 90 day reporting period the following subjects outlined in the 17th Combat Aviation Group SOP for training were stressed:

(a.) Aviator Training: The assault companies instructed aviators in tactical instrument procedures. Tactical instrument check rides were given to a maximum of personnel. In addition, aviators received instructions on the following subjects:

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1. Pre-Flight Inspection
2. Rules of Engagement
3. Formation Flying
4. Escape and Evasion
5. Safety and Emergency Procedures

c. Ground Training: This battalion has met the requirements outlined in USAFV Reg 350-1. An eight hour block of instruction was presented to a maximum of personnel in each assault company. Post headquarters completed the zero and qualification range of 25 Feb 68. Maximum benefit is being derived as a result of the bi-monthly firing. The assault companies have presented instructions on the following subjects to a maximum of assigned personnel:

1. Code of Conduct
2. Rules of Engagement
3. Geneva Convention
4. Viet Cong Tactics
5. Security and Sentry Duties

d. Research and Development: The XM229 and XM227 rocket warheads were available in Class V supply channels during the last two weeks of this reporting period. A USAFV project team presented mechanical and tactical employment of these items on 18th April, but insufficient material and statistics are available to make an evaluation of the war-head at this time. There were no other significant evaluations made of other operational equipment.

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## 4. (C)

a. CLASS I: Fresh milk distribution was started during the period. Combat rations were issued during the height of the TET offensive in Kontum and Ban Me Thout. No significant problems were noted during the reporting period.

CLASS II: Command emphasis continues on control and turn-in of excess equipment and canox containers. The 119th AHC underwent a 1st AVN BDE Check on 30 APR 1968. All units are preparing for the annual General Inspection due in May, 1968. Courtesy inspections and assistance visits were initiated at Battalion and Group level to assist each unit and detachment in preparing for the annual General Inspection.

b. CLASS III & IIIA: There were no significant problems in Pleiku or Ban Me Thout, however, fuel availability in the Kontum area is marginal. Non-availability of 10,000 gallons fuel bladders necessitates daily fuel convoys into Kontum. Over 435,000 gallons of JP-4 were dispensed in Kontum for the period. Total fuel consumption for the Battalion exceeded 2,700,000 gallons.

c. CLASS IV: Field fortification materials became critical following the Tet offensive. Bunker construction increased tremendously throughout the period. All units are improving and weather-proofing bunkers in preparation for the rainy season.

d. CLASS V: Ammunition resupply to the Kontum and Ban Me Thout airfields was critical during the TET offensive. Resupply was accomplished primarily by organic aircraft. Rigging equipment hampered the resupply operation and led to all aviation units being required to procure external lift equipment for emergency use. All phases of ammunition supply and storage are receiving command emphasis. Ammunition storage facilities expansion is planned for all three airfields sites.

## 5. (U) Civil Affairs

a. The Tet offensive was a tremendous setback to the local civic action program. At present, the Battalion Civic Action officer is working to make up for the losses suffered in this program during Tet. Goods continue to come in from individuals and organizations in the US. These items include clothing, soap, vitamins, seeds and medical supplies. Presentation of these goods is arranged through the local village chiefs, hospitals, and other church or religious groups.

b. The chaplain has aided the Civic Action program with the following:

- (1) approximately 10 boxes of sheets, clothing, soap and drugs

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were received. These items were distributed to the Christian missionaries and the VNCS Clinic-Hospital.

(2) Three hundred fifty cases of chocolate milk was received and distributed to the Pleiku Catholic orphanage and the Cruz Leprosarium.

(3) Cash donations:

- (a) VNCS Clinic-Hospital-Pleiku \$76.75
- (b) Catholic Church in Ban Me Thout (for repair of damages suffered during Tet) \$71.10
- (c) Baptist Seminary-Siagon \$90.50

(C) Personnel

a. PIO activities during the period February-April 1968:

(1) Printed releases	14
(2) Pictorial releases	12
(3) Hamlet releases	59
(4) Hamlet pictorial releases	30
(5) Number of Taped Interviews	45
(6) Newsmen and representatives Supported	6

(7) The "Dragon Fire" continues to be published although not as often as desired. Limited facilities and periodic shortages of paper are responsible for this.

(8) A new item is the appearance of the public information officer on the local TV station with stories of interest to members of the 52nd Combat Aviation. Also, through the local radio station, periodic taped news briefs were released.

b. Special Services activities for the period February-April 1968.

(1) During the period, a total of 539 out of country I&A quotas were received. Of these, 409 were filled. Also, 115 standby orders were given.

(2) A total of 12 in country I&A quotas were received, 2 for officer and 9 for enlisted men. This is an increase from last quarter.

(3) The Arts and Crafts shop as well as the library have expanded to a seven day a week operation. Also, returned to operation this quarter was the photo lab portion of the crafts shop.

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## c. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Total number of awards and decorations submitted during this period are as follows:

	No. Submitted:	No. Approved:
Silver Star	19	7
Legion of Merit	2	0
Distinguished Flying Cross	67	30
Soldiers Medal	0	4
Bronze Star w/"V" device	42	1
Bronze Star	30	30
Air Medal w/"V" device	61	110
Army Commendation Medal w/"V" device	97	0
Air Medal	1439	2337
Army Commendation Medal	28	29
Purple Heart	119	140
TOTAL	1952	2696

## d. Personnel problems during the period February-April 1968.

The problem of receiving replacements in our critical MOS area still exists. Most critical during the period were Helicopter Technical Inspectors (MOS 67W), Aircraft Armament Repairman (MOS 45J), and Unit Supply Sergeant (MOS 76Y).

## e. Command and Staff Changes

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(1) The following new commanders assumed command and staff changes were made on the dates indicated:

<u>NEW COMMANDER</u>	<u>OLD COMMANDER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1LT Robert L. Litton O5337758	1LT Eroman W. Baker O5421538	52nd Scty Det	5Feb68
MAJ Leon D. Jackson O5310356	CPT Robert C. Hancock O98745	HHD	6Feb68
1LT John A. Bohl Jr. O5332124	1LT John G. Robertson O5330056	Pathfinder Det	10Feb68
LTC Raymond G. Lehman Jr O56021	LTC Edward A. Lukert Jr O63915	52nd Avn Bn	6Mar68
MAJ Walter Urbach Jr O73900	MAJ Billy L. Goodall O90118	155th Avn Co	15Mar68
CW2 Stuart A. Todd W3201019	CPT Albert E. Fisch O5800470	200th Sig Det	16Mar68
MAJ Robert W. Cook O84744	MAJ Jossie L. Stewart O76668	170th Avn Co	25Mar68
MAJ William D. Gess Jr O62300	LTC George L. Burnison O79206	57th Avn Co	3Apr68
MAJ Robert F. Wetherbie O4047425	MAJ Donald C. McCabe O4010223	179th Avn Co	4Apr68
CPT Merrill J. Hirman O5230580	CPT David L. Weinberg O2325544	3th Mod Det	5Apr68
CPT Fred C. Mryxlin O5542726	CPT Valontiro Monis O5541459	94th Mod Det	5Apr68
MAJ William W. Fraker O4010786	MAJ Neil I. Lova O81479	189th Avn Co	15Apr68
MAJ David C. Whitworth O66933	MAJ Richard D. Caldwell O89429	604th TC Det	18Apr68
MAJ Warron A. Porter O4021305	MAJ Joseph K. Campbell O74657	119th Avn Co	24Apr68
LTC Robert D. Craig Jr O107410	LTC Eddie L. Ford O1879032	XO 52nd Avn Bn	11Feb68
LTC Thomas L. Williamson O81560	LTC Robert D. Craig Jr O1887410	DPO 52nd Avn Bn	11Feb68
LTC George L. Burnison O79206	MAJ Richard V. Coulter O87712	S-3 52nd Avn Bn	3Apr68

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(2) The following gains and losses occurred during the period February-April 1968.

(a) Gains	OFF	EM
February	44	396
March	35	376
April	4	47
(b) Losses		
February	73	223
March	41	257
April	5	55

(3) At present, the battalion is 46 enlisted men and 81 officers and Warrant officers below TO&E strength. Unit authorized and present for duty strength is:

(a) Military

UNIT	OFFICERS AUTH/OH	WO AUTH/OH	EM AUTH/OH	TOTAL AUTH
57th AHC	15/14	52/41	152/149	219/204
615th TC	1/1	1/1	70/58	72/60
822nd Sig	0/0	1/1	8/8	9/9
119th AHC	15/14	52/40	152/155	219/209
545th TC	1/1	1/1	70/56	72/58
70th Sig	1/0	0/1	9/9	10/10
155th AHC	11	52/39	152/156	219/206
165th TC		1/1	70/61	72/63
208th Sig		0/1	9/8	10/9
8th MED		0/0	8/8	9/9
170th AHC	3	52/41	152/142	219/196
405th TC		1/1	70/63	72/65
448th Sig		1/0	8/9	9/9
149 ASCH	13/8	25/15	132/121	38/23
402nd TC	1/1	1/0	80/59	82/61

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u> <u>AUTH/OH</u>	<u>WO</u> <u>AUTH/OH</u>	<u>EM</u> <u>AUTH/OH</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>AUTH/OH</u>
189th AOH	15/13	52/39	152/156	219/208
606th TC	1/1	1/2	70/68	72/71
6th TC	0/1	1/0	8/8	9/9
355th AMN CO	16/9	16/7	97/87	111/103
662nd TC	1/1	1/1	57/58	59/60
HEID	22/28	2/6	87/141	111/175
94th MED	1/2	0/0	8/10	9/12
755th MED	1/1	0/0	8/9	9/10
344th ASD	1/0	0/0	20/6	21/6
52nd SECURITY	1/2	0/0	151/140	152/142
68th RADAR	0/0	0/0	19/18	19/18
TOTAL				
52nd CAB	140/124	313/248	1819/1763	2273/2137

(b) CIVILIAN

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAC</u> <u>AUTH/OH</u>	<u>VN</u> <u>AUTH/OH</u>	<u>3rd NATL</u> <u>AUTH/OH</u>
HKD	0 0	19 38	0 0
57th	0 0	14 10	0 0
119th	0 0	11 17	0 0
155th	0 0	13 20	0 0
170th	0 0	11 5	0 0
149th	1 1	9 9	0 0
189th	0 0	11 6	0 0
344 AOD	0 0	3 3	0 0

In addition to the above the following civilian contingents are employed at Camp Holloway:

PL&E - (4) AMERICANS, (14) 3rd NATIONALS (KOREANS), 152 VN.  
 LSI - (14) AMERICANS  
 BELL HELICOPTER - (1) AMERICAN  
 LY CORNING - (2) AMERICANS  
 SY CORSKI - (2) AMERICANS  
 PRATT WHITNEY - (1) AMERICAN  
 DECCA - (3) AMERICANS  
 US ROK ENG/CO - (10) KOREANS

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## g. Morale

The morale of officer and enlisted personnel throughout the battalion continues to be exceptionally high. This is attributed to the following:

- (1) Maximum recognition for job accomplishment through promotions, awards and decorations, and letters of appreciation.
- (2) Liberal leave, pass, and R&R policies.
- (3) Continuous improvement in living standards.
- (4) Improvement to post facilities.
- (5) Continual indoctrination in job performance and mission orientation.

## h. Religious Activities

- (1) During the quarter, the battalion chaplain was responsible for all religious activities at Camp Holloway and the operational sites. Protestant services were conducted at Camp Holloway by the battalion chaplain.
- (2) Religious Services were provided for the 155th Avn Company at Ban Mo Thuot on a weekly basis by the protestant and catholic chaplains from MACV.
- (3) Religious services for the 57th Avn Company at Kontum were provided by the MACV Protest Chaplain and the ARVN Catholic Chaplain.
- (4) Catholic services and coverage for Camp Holloway were provided by the PKSAC Chaplain.
- (5) Transportation was provided for Jewish personnel from Camp Holloway to 71st Evac Hospital each Friday for services.
- (6) LDS, Seventh-Day Adventist and other denominational services were attended by men of Camp Holloway when and where they were provided.
- (7) The Protestant and Catholic congregations continue to designate one offering each month for various in-country religious organizations and activities.
- (8) During the quarter, an electronic organ was acquired and installed along with an amplifier-speaker system in the Camp Holloway Chapel.

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7. (C) Post Headquarters, Camp Holloway:

a. The mission of Post Headquarters is to supervise, monitor and control activities on Camp Holloway (other than tactical operations) and Camp Holloway CA. Post Headquarters is responsible to the Post Commander for overall planning, administration, operations, security and maintenance of Camp Holloway. Its functions generally fall in the following areas:

- (1) Services and Logistics.
- (2) Security and post Operations.
- (3) Airfield Operations/Defense.

b. During this reporting period, Post Headquarters continued normal operations and continued effort was extended on various projects with the goal of improving post facilities and defense structures.

c. The following projects were completed during the reporting period:

- (1) Perimeter lighting
- (2) Two company sized heliports
- (3) Revetments and maintenance hardstand for 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter).
- (4) Completed move to new perimeter defense sites.
- (5) Remodeled Transient Officers' Quarters.

d. The following projects were initiated during the reporting period:

- (1) Construction of two wooden 80' x 144' aircraft maintenance hangar for the heliport. (Estimated completion date 31 May 1968).
- (2) Construction of one 75' x 202' metal aircraft maintenance hangar for the 179th Assault Helicopter Company. (Estimated completion date 30 June 1968.)
- (3) Construction of the cantonment area for heliport to include 14 2,000 square foot BEQ's, two 400 square foot mess halls, and two 1,000 square foot orderly rooms/supply rooms. (Estimated completion date 31 May 1968.)
- (4) Hard surfacing of roads.
- (5) Construction of Montagnard Long House.
- (6) Initiated central sandbag filling point.

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8. (U) Safety and Standardization:

a. Standardization: The Battalion Standardization Pilot flew 24 check rides in February, 11 in March, and 20 in April:

- (1) 4 SIP (Standardization Pilot).
- (2) 6 IP (Instructor Pilot).
- (3) 5 AC (Aircraft Commander).
- (4) 33 Quarterly check-rides and In-Country Standardization and orientation.
- (5) No post accident check-rides were given.

Primary emphasis during all flights has continued to be emergency procedures. Significant indications of impending aircraft failures, proper interpretation of aircraft operating instruments, sources and causes of fire, tail rotor failure, (hovering and cruise), Hydraulic control boost failure and autorotations have been the main points stressed. It is of definite interest to note that no one, with whom the Battalion SIP has flown has been involved in an aircraft accident. Commitment of flyable assets to operational missions continues to prevent having aircraft available for unit flight training on a daily basis. Standardization will be supervised by the training section of S-3 during the next reporting period.

b. Safety:

(1) The accident rate (per 100,000 flight hours) was 29.9%. All were major accidents except for one minor accident.

- (a) February: Four accidents, rate 21.6%.
- (b) March: Four accidents, rate 30.5%.
- (c) April: Three accidents, rate 23.8%.

(2) The following causes are cited:

- (a) 15 Feb 68; UH-1H
  1. Improper hover entry, down-wind
  2. Self-induced haste.

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(b) 23 Feb:68; UH-1H

1. Engine Failure.
2. Failure of maintenance to see trend.
3. Failure to heed warnings of engine failure.
4. Failure to execute proper autorotation.
5. Unsuitable terrain.

(c) 24 Feb 68; UH-1C

1. Airfield obstacle (minor).
2. Failure to recognize obstacle.
3. Overweight condition.

(d) 27 Feb 68;

1. Engine failure.
2. Hidden obstacles in forced-landing site.

(e) 4 Mar 68; UH-1H (2 totaled - 1 damaged)

1. Intermeshing rotor blades hovering.
2. Revetments too close together.

(f) 11 Mar 68; UH-1C

1. Engine Failure.
2. Failure to heed maintenance.
3. Failure to execute successful autorotation.
4. Self-induced haste.

(g) 17 Mar 68; UH-1H

1. Tail rotor strike.
2. Pax debarking at hover in stumpy LZ.
3. A/C followed Bn Cnds, Request and failed to use judgment.

(h) 21 Mar 68; UH-1C

1. Attempted take-off down-wind.
2. No wind indicator at partially constructed airfield
3. Self-induced haste.

(i) 19 April 68; UH-1H (2 totaled)

1. Mid-air collision.
2. Unnecessary close formation.

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(j) 22 April 68; UH-1C

1. Engine failure.
2. Unsuitable terrain.

(k) 26 April 68; CH-47A

1. Mid-air disintegration.
2. Causes unknown.

(3) The traffic flow plan is still to be implemented.

(4) A significant break-through in the reduction of FOD (foreign object damage), has resulted from a battalion policy which requires a rated crew-member to personally perform FOD inspections prior to the first flight of the day. This is intended until a "last chance filter" is produced. The issue of leather boots (without cleats which carry items causing FOD) and strong emphasis on detailed police has also helped reduce FOD.

(5) A battalion policy requires pilots preparing for test flights to review aircraft records for the last 100 hours prior to flight. This is expected to help determine trends in maintenance and reported defects in aircraft. Pilots who have been queried stated that they are in favor of the program and benefits have already been gained.

(6) It was shown that gunships involved in engine failure forced landings were having difficulty jettisoning rocket pods. Armaments section (recently consolidated at battalion level) conducted a survey and found that 75% of the jettison systems were damaged by maintenance personnel not concerned or knowledgeable with the armaments system. All systems were corrected on a one time basis and a letter sent out to educate personnel on this problem and its causes.

9. (c) Signal

a. During the TET Offensive, land line communications between 52d CAB Headquarters at Pleiku, the 155th AHC at Ban Me Thuot and the 57th AHC at Kontum were unreliable and inoperative for a period of five days. Ground mounted AN/ARC-102's were used as primary communications between 52d CAB Headquarters and the two outlying companies.

b. Due to unreliability of land line communications to the two outlying companies, the 17th Combat Aviation Group authorized the issue of two AN/ARC-106 located at this headquarters. Transmission range and voice quality have been increased considerably over the AN/ARC-102's. This increase in range and reliability has enabled this battalion to remain in radio contact with these two outlying companies on a 24 hour basis.

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c. Dial telephone installation at Camp Holloway has been completed. The new dial system has increased the speed of communication between this battalion and its subordinate units. A direct dial capability has also been incorporated into the dial system allowing direct dial service to Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon.

10. (U) Aircraft Maintenance.

a. Maintenance Statistics

	UH-1H	UH-10(A)	CH-47	CH-54
Aircraft Authorized	115	40	16.0	9
A/C Assigned (AVG)	17.9	4.4	15.6	3
Availability Rate	78.5	78.9	68.0	55.0
EDM	17.6	16.9	22.0	36.0
EDP	3.9	4.2	2.0	36.0

(For detailed statistical data, see Incl 2)

b. During the reporting period, the aircraft armament sections of the assault companies were consolidated into one armament pool. There was a shortage of experienced aircraft armament repairmen (MOS 45J20) in the assault helicopter companies. Cross-training of experienced personnel with inexperienced personnel was greatly facilitated. In addition, benefits were gained as a result of combined and consolidated PLL. The armament section now provides a 24-hour response to any aircraft armament problem.

c. Aircraft Status As Of 30 April 1968

UNIT	UH-1H AUTH/OH	UH-10(A) AUTH/OH	CH-47 AUTH/OH	CH-54 AUTH/OH	U6-A AUTH/OH
157th AHC	23/17	8/8			
119th AHC	23/19	8/8			
155th AHC	23/16	8/7			
170th AHC	23/18	8/8			
189th AHC	23/19	8/5			
179th ASCH			16/16		
355th AC(EH)				9/3	
HHD					1/1

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## 11. (C) FLIGHT SURGEON

a. The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Dispensary has continued to increase its patient load. The dispensary currently supports, in addition to 52 CAB, all other United States Army and civilian personnel located at Camp Holloway. A peak in dispensary visits was reached in March, when 3,903 patients were treated.

b. The dispensary functioned with efficiency during the enemy mortar attacks. On the night of 10 February 1968 fifty patients were treated for wounds received in mortar attack. In all of the mortar attacks only one KIA resulted.

c. Following the onset of the mortar attacks the dispensary personnel constructed a bunker which is large enough to hold 18 beds. It is partially under ground and is covered with 7 layers of sandbags.

d. A new addition to the dispensary has been completed with four doctors offices, NCO office, pharmacy and injection and immunization room. This addition makes the dispensary much more efficient and allows adequate storage space for drugs and supplies.

e. The dispensary has started to support the 52d Security Force by assigning a medic to the force each night. He accompanies patrols which are outside the perimeter.

12. (C) Significant Activities: The following is a detailed summary of significant operations and activities as required by: Para 12a, AR 425-15 and USARPAG/REG 525-15. This information is extracted from the DAILY JOURNAL (J), DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (I), DAILY OPREP/5 (W), DAILY AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION (A), JSARVIDR SNOP AT REPORT (H), and AFTER ACTION REPORT FILES (R).

a. Units and activities supported by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion are:

- (1.) 4th Infantry Division
  - (a) Operation MacArthur  
(1st Bde, 4th Inf Div) SPARTZ AO - Search and Destroy
  - (b) Operation MacArthur  
(3d Bde, 4th Inf Div) MIDDLETON AO - Search and Destroy
  - (c) Operation MacArthur  
(3d Bde, 4th Inf Div) SULTAN A) - Search and Destroy
  - (d) Operation MacArthur  
(Task Force 22 4th Inf Div) WAINRIGHT AO - Search and Destroy  
(Anap of the operational area is included as incl. 7)

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(2) ARVN: Includes all II Corps ARVN units primarily in the KONTUM, DARLAC, and PLEIKU PROVINCES.

(a) Road Clearing Operations

(b) Search and Destroy

(c) Cordon and Search

(3) DSA II Corps:

(a) Headquarters II Corps, Pleiku, RVN

(b) Province Chiefs of KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, PHU BOU, and TUYEN DUC-Command and Control.

(c) Senior advisors 23d and 24th ARVN Div - Command and Control.

(4) Project OMEGA, 5th Special Forces - Clandestine Operations.

(5) Operation Prairie Fire - 5th Special Forces - Clandestine Operations.

(6) Company B, 5th Special Forces - Command and Control, and Administrative/Liaison for Special Forces camps controlled by Det C-2, 5th Special Forces.

(7) IFFV Artillery (41st and 52d Artillery Group)-Command and Control and Administrative/Liaison for group headquarters.

(8) Press Camp - Administrative support of authorized representatives of civilian news agencies.

(9) 2/1st Cavalry - Supported convoys with armed helicopter escort.

(10) In addition the following units were support on special aircraft allocation basis and activities varied from direct combat support to Administrative/Liaison.

(a) GRID - DCS (7days)

(b) WHIRL - DCS (5days)

(c) 3/506 ABN INF - DCS (12 days)

(d) 22d ARVN - DCS (9 days)

(e) VIP FLIGHTS - (4 days)

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## b. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

### TET Offensive

The Communist TET offensive in the central highlands consisted of determined attacks against the three major cities of Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot during the period 29 January through 5 February 1968.

The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion participated in 46 airmobile operations during the period of this report. It must be pointed out that the TET offensive in this area terminated on 5 February 1968. Combat actions after that date were in response to the anticipated second phase and consisted of battalion sized operations with a search and destroy mission. As early as 30 January this unit continued its primary mission of providing responsive aviation support to US and ARVN forces throughout the central highlands. Therefore, the total airmobile operations stated above can not be considered solely in direct response to the TET offensive.

Airmobile operations conducted during the period of this report were on a small scale involving the movement of company sized forces. There were no significant airmobile operations in which Army Aviation played a decisive role.

This battalion accomplished 2575 resupply missions during the period 29 January through 29 February 1968. Included were 1219 by UH-1H, 1300 by CH-47 and 56 by CH-54 missions. Armed helicopter escort was required on 268 UH-1, 15 CH-47, and all 56 of CH-54 missions to insure successful accomplishment.

### NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion was on normal operational alert status when the Communist TET Offensive erupted during the early morning hours of 30 January 1968. Though deployed at three separate locations, ranging from Kontum in the north and Ban Me Thuot in the south, attacks were carried out almost simultaneously at all three locations, and moderate to heavy fighting continued until 5 February. The following summation describes the actions of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion during the period in an effort to repel and defeat elements of the North Vietnamese Army and National Liberation Front forces in the provinces of Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac, Republic of Vietnam.

The objectives of the enemy during the considered period is not yet fully understood. However, it suffices to say that the overall offensive plan was well organized, coordinated and executed, with major attacks being launched against civilian government strongholds and US supply and combat support installations.

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30 JANUARY 1968

The first attack against the 52d Combat aviation Battalion was launched against Camp Holloway, Pleiku, at 0140 hours by an unknown main force unit. The enemy mortar crews (three 82mm mortar tubes) moved into position (AR 817477) under the cover of darkness, and at 0140 hours fired ten to fifteen rounds, impacting north to south on a lateral sheath 200 meters wide; the majority of rounds falling within the aircraft refueling area. The location of the enemy position was visually confirmed by the airfield tower, and counter-mortar fire was immediately initiated and gunships launched to neutralize the target. As the gunships were launched, fifteen additional rounds of mortar fire was received in the same general location. The firing ceased however, when airborne gunships engaged the enemy position with aerial rocket and mini-gun fire. At the same time, harassing and interdiction fire was placed on all avenues of approach and escape, virtually eliminating any possible coordinated attack by enemy infantry and sapper elements.

A sustained attack against the 57th Assault Helicopter Company at Kontum began at 0212 hours. The enemy plan was to eliminate support facilities in the Kontum area before seizing the local government and the city itself. The airfield, the primary objective, was attacked by approximately 200 enemy personnel including sapper, security and indirect fire elements. When the enemy was detected during the early morning hours, the enemy had maneuvered to a point within fifty meters of the defensive wire. Upon detection, the 57th brought deadly fire to bare upon the enemy. Gunships were launched from Kontum and shortly received reinforcements from the Battalion at Pleiku. Using mini-guns and 40mm grenade launchers, the enemy attack was broken and escape routes sealed off. Enemy troops were caught in the wire and in ditches adjacent to the wire, and the intense fire cut them down. As daylight came, fifty-nine (59) bodies were counted around the perimeter. Numerous others could not be recovered due to heavy sniper fire along the east end of the airfield. Throughout the day sniper, rocket and mortar fire continued, inflicting only minor damage. 57th personnel were well disciplined and suffered only light casualties; however, combat damage was sustained by seven of the attacking gunships.

Camp Coryell at Ban Me Thuot was attacked by mortars at approximately 0250 hours, when twenty (20) rounds fell within the confines of the 155th perimeter. At the time of the attack, the compound was at one hundred percent alert, with gun and gunships airborne over the area. As the mortar rounds fell, enemy ground probing attacks were launched from the south and east, supported by automatic weapons fire and B-40 rockets. In a coordinated effort, sappers attempted to breach the perimeter. However, friendly fires soon reached such proportions as to drive the enemy elements back, seeking cover. Two of the enemy mortar positions were destroyed and forty (40) of the enemy lay dead in and

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around the perimeter wire. No friendly casualties were sustained, but six aircraft received light to moderate damage during the brief engagement.

As daylight came the morning of 30 January, reports filtered in that the enemy elements near Pleiku were moving in the open, taking advantage of the already breached 1st Cease Fire. One reinforced company was located northeast of Camp Holloway by gunships, but permission to engage was denied at the time, and surveillance instructions were issued. Shortly thereafter, a battalion, later identified as the H-15 Battalion, was reported moving from the south towards Pleiku. Three pairs of 52d gunships were diverted to the reported location, and almost simultaneously the cease fire was cancelled by II Corps Headquarters and permission to engage hostile targets was granted. The first gunship to engage received a withering barrage of small arms fire and took numerous hits. However, his wingman turned in and numbers of the enemy riflemen fell to his guns. Again and again the H-15 Battalion was attacked, and by early afternoon had been completely decimated. The previously reported company size enemy element broke and ran as it was engaged. Though casualties were suffered in their ranks, most managed to reach the safety of a large wooded area further to the north. Gunships were called off and armored cavalry elements pursued in an attempt to seek out and destroy the enemy.

This was one of the most intense engagements ever recorded between enemy ground and Army air elements in the Central Highlands, resulting in an overwhelming victory for allied forces. When captured later in the day, the H-15 Battalion Commander stated his forces no longer existed due to the extremely heavy casualties. Only very minor casualties and light damage was suffered by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion. A confirmed enemy count indicated twenty-five (25) captured and a conservative estimate of two hundred (200) killed. Cavalry elements reported an additional 175 captured and one hundred (100) killed.

On 30 January, all attempts to breach perimeter of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion were thwarted. Though fire continued throughout the day and night, aviation companies continued to fly as directed and meet normal mission requirements and inflict damage on the enemy.

31 JANUARY 1968

During the late evening hours of 30 January and the early morning hours of the 31st, tension continued to mount in the Central Highlands. Enemy elements in battalion strength or larger were reported moving on Pleiku, Kontum and Ban Me Thuot.

Between the hours of 0230 and 0330, a series of reports from the 24th Special Tactical Zone indicated a serious enemy threat was developing in the Kontum sector. An NVA/VC force, estimated at 150 strength,

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was reported overrunning their perimeter and final bunkers had been occupied. A 105mm artillery battery was also reported to be infiltrated and possibly in enemy hands. The 52d TOC was also notified that MACV and the B-24 compounds were being overrun. Tactical air was immediately requested and gunships were again launched to support the beleaguered compounds. In each instance, the enemy was caught in the open, attempting to breach the perimeter wire. Repeatedly, 52d gunships braved heavy enemy fire and made firing passes until the enemy forces withdrew, leaving numerous dead and equipment behind in the wire entanglements. Before dawn, an enemy force of 300-500 troops was reported east of Kontum and moving toward the airfield complex. The 57th Assault Helicopter Company Commander again requested gunship reinforcements. The enemy force was immediately taken under fire by security elements, and shortly thereafter were engaged by UH-1Cs. A devastating array of firepower was unleashed on the enemy, and again he failed to breach the perimeter. As daylight came, seven enemy bodies were counted in the wire and numerous blood trails led the way to the south. Forth-seven enemy dead were counted in and around the B-24 complex, and thirty more were reportedly in and around the other compounds mentioned. Based on the size of the reported attacks, no doubt untold numbers went unreported.

An all out effort was being made by the enemy to occupy the city of Ban Me Thuot. Elements of the 155th were fired on throughout the day, but no concentrated attacks were launched against the airfield. Even so, gunships continued to fly and engage the enemy, while ground personnel bolstered their own defenses.

At Ploiku, the enemy occupied the southern and western parts of the city, and house-to-house fighting ensued. Due to the proximity to civilian personnel, tactical air or artillery could not be employed against enemy positions; consequently, the "Flying Dragons" gunships were called in once again. Throughout the day, cavalry elements fired known enemy pockets of resistance and gunships engaged with rockets, grenades and mini-guns to expel the enemy. Block by block the enemy was driven back, and by nightfall the southern half of the city was in friendly hands.

By the end of the second day of contact, crews of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion had been airborne almost continuously for forth-eight hours. Although gunships were primarily engaged in destruction missions, UH-1H helicopters repositioned ground elements throughout the period to meet new threats. CH-47s worked around the clock resupplying badly needed ammunition and supplies. Though all units were bone tired, personnel began making preparations for another twenty-four hours of the same.

1 FEBRUARY 1968

Personnel of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company at Ban Me Thuot were only to have a brief reprieve, for at 0210 hours, enemy mortar rounds again fell within the compound. Gunships and flareships were

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Immediately dispatched. Once the aircraft became airborne and the enemy mortar crews were engaged, the hostile fire ceased. Nevertheless, the 155th sustained six casualties during the engagement and five aircraft received light to heavy damage. Sniper fire continued as the enemy made an all out effort to totally overrun Ban Me Thuot. Gunships remained over the city and surrounding terrain most of the day inflicting heavy but unconfirmed casualties on the enemy.

At 0230 hours on 1 February, 52d gunships were again diverted to Kontum and were employed throughout the remaining hours of darkness against built-up areas within the city and to the north. During the day sniper fire continued along the eastern and western portions of the 57th perimeter. Another rocket and mortar attack was launched by the enemy at dusk, but ended when counterfire was called in. However, the enemy began to probe the 57th defenses at 1910 hours. Once again gunships were called in to expel the enemy elements attempting to penetrate the perimeter. Repeated firing runs were made adjacent to the wire on all sides of the compound and a concentrated attack failed to materialize.

Elements of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion had sustained heavy aircraft damage during the previous seventy-two hours as a result of rocket and mortar attacks and engagement with enemy ground elements. However, maintenance crews frantically made repairs, as by this time, the mere survival of battalion elements depended on its fleet of helicopters. Under impossible conditions, aircraft were made flyable, and the Battalion made ready for its fourth day of uninterrupted combat.

2 FEBRUARY 1968

In Kontum, a coordinated mortar, rocket and ground attack was launched against the MACV, Signal and Special Forces complexes at about 0220 hours. Six light gunship teams were dispatched to support allied forces in the city against heavy fire. Again, enemy elements were engaged attempting to breach the friendly positions, and gunships inflicted heavy casualties. Scattered fighting continued after the initial assault was broken, and a cumulative body count (NVA/VC) of 203 was reported.

Camp Coryell again came under mortar attack at 0310 hours, suffering moderate aircraft damage. However, personnel discipline remained excellent and no casualties were sustained.

Camp Holloway was attacked by elements of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment at 0400 hours. Twenty-five rounds were fired into aircraft revetments and motor park areas from four 82mm mortar tubes located at AR 815475. Immediately, friendly artillery, mortars and gunships were employed and engaged the enemy firing positions. Enemy casualties suffered were unknown; however, friendly elements suffered light personnel casualties as a result of the attack and moderate equipment damage.

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3 FEBRUARY 1968

In the early morning hours of the 3rd, Camp Holloway was once again attacked by an unknown size element of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment. Six rounds of 122mm rockets were fired into the compound. But of the six rounds fired, only two detonated. The only damage resulted when a 10,000 gallon JP-4 bladder was ignited and destroyed before the fire could be brought under control. The attack was discovered by the 52d Security Detachment when they sighted the first round leaving the launcher. Gunships were sent aloft and the rocket site engaged; whereupon, incoming fire ceased. Possible enemy casualties could not be confirmed, though several blood trails were found at dawn leading away to the north.

In the Kontum and Ban Me Thuot areas, enemy activity decreased noticeably. However, the enemy continued to rocket and mortar the airfields at random intervals throughout the day and night.

For the first time in five days the tempo of action was beginning to wane. Friendly ground forces were securing the cities and surrounding terrain; thus allowing 52d elements to breath again and begin rebuilding and reorganizing against further hostilities.

4 FEBRUARY 1968

Kontum and the 57th Assault Helicopter Company were relatively inactive during the day, except for a 122mm rocket attack at 1600 hours. The city itself was reported secure except for sporadic sniper fire. However, the 57th remained at one hundred percent alert and maintained continuous illumination during the hours of darkness.

Ban Me Thuot was still partially occupied by scattered enemy elements, but resistance was diminishing. Nevertheless, an 82mm mortar attack, supported by B-40 rockets, was launched against Camp Coryell with negative personnel casualties. Equipment damage was reportedly moderate.

Pleiku was completely in the hands of allied forces by 4 February.

5 FEBRUARY 1968

Camp Coryell at Ban Me Thuot was hit by enemy mortars at 0150 hours, as approximately twenty rounds fell within the confines of the compound. Since personnel were already at one hundred percent alert status, no casualties were incurred, and only light equipment damage was reported.

An estimated enemy battalion moved to within three kilometers of the MACV compound in Kontum during the early morning hours, and were immediately engaged by gunships from the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion. After a heavy exchange of fire, the enemy was dispersed and turned back with only minor contact with friendly ground elements. Though the gunships

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obviously killed and wounded numbers of the enemy, no confirmed kills could be established due to darkness.

## Period 1 Feb

### a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 3,500 (Scattered) 8,000 (Thin Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 7-10 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,300 (High 15 Hours)
- (4) Temperature: (High) 80 Degrees (Low) 58 Degrees
- (5) Wind: 110 Degrees at 8-15 Knots (variable)

### b. Aircraft Allocations:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47L
4th Infantry Division	14	9	4
ARVN	10	4	0
IFV Artillery	1	0	0
DSM II Corps	10	0	0
Press	1	0	0
5th Special Forces Group	2	0	0
Prairie Fire	5	4	0

### c. Significant Events:

(1) 1 Feb, normal direct combat support was provided by the battalion. An early morning mortar attack on Camp Holloway delayed aircraft take off times approximately two hours. The 155th AHC was attacked by mortar fire and 20 rounds fell within the airfield contention area causing injuries to staff personnel, minor to moderate damage to four buildings and five aircraft. (For more detailed information see Inclosure 5.)

### d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47L</u> <u>HOURS</u>
1018	63	139	63	19
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>
161	869	154	1/0	1/0
<u>CREW</u> <u>WIL/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES</u> <u>CXL/DELAYED</u>
0/0	0	0	2	0/0

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AVGD-CC (10 May 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS-CSTOR-65 (RI) (U)

Period 2 Feb - 8 Feb 68:

a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 4,000 (Scattered), 7,500 (Thin Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 6-10 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,650 (High 1500 Hours)
- (4) Temp: (High) 82 degrees. (Low) 59 degrees
- (5) Wind: 070 degrees, 5-15 knots variable
- (6) 0500-0800 8 Feb, there was heavy ground fog 1/4 visibility throughout the AO.

b. Aircraft Allocations:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47L
4th Infantry Division	18	9	4
ARVN	7	4	0
IFPV Artillery	1	0	0
DSA II Corps	10	0	0
Press	0	0	0
5th Special Forces Group	1	0	0
Prairie Fire	4	0	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 02 Feb - The Ban Me Thuot (155th LHC), Kontum (57th LHC), and Holloway Airfields (52d CAB), were taken under mortar attacks simultaneously. Information concerning these attacks may be found in After Action Reports attached as Inclosures 3, 4, and 5.

(2) 02 Feb - (189th LHC), Two UH-1C's (66-694 and 66-693) received one hit and five hits respectively in the vicinity of LR 775895. Two crew-members were WIA.

(3) 03 Feb - (119th LHC), UH-1H aircraft (66-16536) received light damage as a result of shrapnel while shut down in LZ (YB874316). Two crewmembers were injured.

(4) 03 Feb - Holloway Army Airfield; six rounds of 122mm rocket were received, but only two detonated. There was negative damage to personnel or aircraft. One building and one POL fuel bladder was destroyed.

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(5) 04 Feb - The Kontum and Ban Me Thuot Airfield Contonments were taken under enemy mortar attacks. (For detailed information see Inclosures 4 and 5.)

(6) 04 Feb - The 119th AHC conducted a CA/FINAL EXTRACTION in the vicinity of Dak To (YB880327), for 1/8th Inf Bn during which 260 pax's were moved in 90 sorties. Five aircraft were hit and one crew-member was injured.

(7) 04 Feb - (189th AHC); UH-1H aircraft (66-16158) received 18 hits from small arms fire in the vicinity of YB880327. One crew-member was WIL.

(8) 05 Feb - The Ban Me Thuot Airfield (155th AHC); was attacked by enemy mortar and small arms fire. In both incidents, the aircraft parking areas were the primary targets. Seventeen aircraft were damaged and eight personnel were injured. (For detailed information see Incl 5.)

(9) 05 Feb - (170th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16532 crashed at YA296204. The aircraft received major damage, negative injury to crew.

(10) 06 Feb - HMAF (52d GAB) was attacked by 18 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. There were no personnel injured and two aircraft received light damage. (For detailed information see Inclosure 3.)

(11) 06 Feb - HMAF (52d GAB) UH-1H aircraft 66-16066 was hit by recoilless rifle fire in an LZ causing major damage to the aircraft, negative crew-members injured.

(12) 08 Feb - HMAF (52d GAB), approximately 30 - 40 rounds of 82mm mortar were fired but impacted outside the Holloway cantonment area. (For detailed information see Inclosure 3.)

## d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH -47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
6917	474	1352	392	223
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/G</u>	<u>A/G</u>
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>HIT</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>
1967	7566	1163	8	7/1
<u>CREW</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
<u>WIL/KILL</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>CXL/DELAYED</u>
5/0	65	64	53	0/0

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AVGD-CC (10 May 1968)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS-CSFR-65 (RI) (U)

Period 9 Feb - 15 Feb 68:

a. Weather: Local summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 4,000 (Scattered) 8,000 (Thin Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 5-7 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,150 (High 1500 hours)
- (4) Temp: (High) 81 degrees (Low) 60 degrees
- (5) Wind: 100 degrees at 5-10 knots (Variable)
- (6) Heavy fog condition existed in the vicinity of Dak To each morning 0600-0800 and delayed arrivals and operations.

b. Aircraft Allocations:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	OH-47A
4th Infantry Division	22	8	6
ARVN	6	4	0
IFFV Artillery	1	0	0
DSM II Corps	10	0	0
Pross	1	0	0
5th Special Forces Group	2	0	0
Prairie Fire	4	4	0
GRID	3(1 day)	0	0
1/503d Infantry Battalion	4(1 day)	4 (1 day)	0
3/506th Infantry Battalion	0	2(4 days)	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 10 Feb - HLF (52d CMB), 80 rounds of 82mm mortar were fired into the billets and aircraft parking areas. Two aircraft received light damage. Personnel injured included one KIA, and 33 WIA.

(2) 19 Feb - (189th AHC) UH-1C aircraft 66-092 received one hit in the cabin area, vicinity of AR 485826 causing light damage to the aircraft and no crew injuries.

(3) 11 Feb - The 119th AHC conducted a C/A from Dak To Airfield to ZB987193 with seven UH-1H's and two UH-1C's. Ninety-six pax's were moved in 36 sorties. The mission was completed without incident and negative contact.

(4) 11 Feb - (189th AHC) UH-1C aircraft 66-693 made a forced landing to Highway 14 as a result of engine failure, causing minor damage to the aircraft and negative crew injuries.

(5) 12 Feb - The 170th AHC used nine UH-1H's and four UH-1C's to conduct a CA for 3/8th Inf Bn and 1/12 Inf Bn in the vicinity of Dak To.

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Six-hundred and ten pax's were moved in 102 sorties. One-hundred and four hours were flown without incident or enemy ground fire. Prestrike was by B-52.

(6) 14 Feb - The 189th LHC lifted two companies of the 1/8th Inf Bn during a CA in the vicinity of YB968265 without incident. A total of 12 hours and 41 sorties were flown to lift 245 pax's.

(7) 15 Feb - (155th LHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-19439 crashed at Gia Hinh Airfield. Major damage. (FOR DETAILED INFORMATION SEE PARA 8).

(8) 15 Feb - The 179th conducted a fire base move for the 173d Lbn Bde in the vicinity of AR139548. One-hundred and thirty pax and 63 cargo tons were lifted by four CH-47A's which flew a total of 16.9 hours to complete the mission.

#### d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>
7569	363	1800	505	142
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>L/C HIT</u>	<u>L/C DLM/DEST</u>
2447	9845	1254	4	5/1
<u>CREW WIL/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KBL</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>
0/0	100	50	69	0/0

Period 16 Feb - 22 Feb 68:

#### a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 4,000 ft (Scattered) 8,000 ft (Thin Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 5-7 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,150 ft (High 1500 hours)
- (4) Temperature: (High) 81 degrees (Low) 60 degrees
- (5) Wind: 100 degrees at 5-10 knots (Variable)
- (6) Heavy fog condition existed in the vicinity of Dak To each morning 0600 hours - 0800 hours and delayed arrivals and operations.

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AVGD-CC (May 10, 1968)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
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## b. Aircraft allocations:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47A
4th Infantry Division	22	7	7
ARVN	6	4	0
IFV Artillery	0	0	0
DSA II Corps	10	0	0
Pross	1	0	0
5th Special Forces Group	2	0	0
Prairie Fire	4	4	0
22d ARVN Division	7(1 day)	4 (1 day)	0
3/506th Airborne Infantry Div	0	2(2 day)	0
OMEGA	4	4	0

## c. Significant Events:

(1) 16 Feb - The 189th AHC conducted a CA for 1/8th Inf Bn with ten UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Thirty hours were flown to move 250 pax's in 100 sorties into an LZ in vicinity of ZB110264. No ground fire was received and the operation was conducted without incident.

(2) 17 Feb - The 119th AHC conducted a CA/FINAL EXTRACTION for 3/12 Inf Bn from YB955245 to YB15325. Four-hundred and eighty pax's were moved in 80 sorties by five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's provided armed escort. A total of 30 hours were flown with negative incidents or ground fire.

(3) 18 Feb - Kontum Airfield (57th AHC), Forth to fifty rounds of 82mm mortar fell outside the perimeter. There was negative damage to the airfield, aircraft, or personnel.

(4) 19 Feb - The 119th AHC completed a CA/FINAL EXTRACTION for 1/8th Inf Bn. One-hundred and twenty-six pax's were moved from ZB1126 to ZB075337 by nine UH-1H's with four UH-1C's in support. A total of 19 hours were flown without incident or ground fire.

(5) 19 Feb - The 119th AHC completed a CA/FINAL EXTRACTION for 1/8th Inf Bn. Two-hundred and forth-six pax's were lifted from ZB145213 to ZB065342. Intense small arms fire was received in the LZ on the first three sorties by both the UH-1H's and the UH-1C's armed escorts. The mission was completed after a fifteen minute LZ preparation fired by 155 howitzers. There was negative damage to the nine UH-1H's and four UH-1C's or crews. The lifted unit made contact with the enemy 400 meters from the LZ.

(6) 19 Feb - The 155th AHC completed a final extraction from BR996336 to BADI with seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. One-hundred and

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ninety-seven pax's were lifted in 20 sorties with negative incident or ground fire during the 12 hours flown to complete the operation.

(7) 19 Feb - 57th AHC UH-1H aircraft (66-16282) was shot down supporting PRAIRIE FIRE in a classified area, two crew-members were WIA and two MIA, the aircraft was destroyed.

(8) 19 Feb - The 155th AHC completed an insertion of 197 pax's of the 22d ARVN Division to coordinates GR160295 after the final extraction to BA G. was completed. A total of 25 hours were flown to complete the operation. Negative incident or ground fire was received.

(9) 20 Feb - The 189th AHC completed two operations for 1/22 and 1/12 Inf Bns. Initially one company, 1/22d Inf Bn, was assaulted from ZB006220 and ZB060264 to YB910122. One-hundred and twenty pax's were moved by seven UH-1H's and two UH-1C's in 40 sorties without incident during a total of 16 hours flown. Additionally, a CA/FINAL EXTRACTION of 144 pax, 1/12 Inf Bn, from ZB010261 to YB929218 was completed. Small arms fire was received in both the PZ and LZ. There was negative damage to aircraft or crew-members. A total of nine hours and 48 sorties were flown during the operations.

(10) 20 Feb - The 155th AHC conducted a CA from BA GI to GR 165295 for the 22d ARVN Division. One-hundred and sixty-five pax's were lifted by four UH-1H's and two UH-1C's in 20 sorties. There were negative incidents during the 15 hours flown.

(11) 22 Feb - The 155th AHC conducted a CA with six UH-1H's and two UH-1C's for the 44th ARVN Regiment. One-hundred and ten pax's were lifted in 35 sorties without incident during a total of 25.5 hours flown between the PZ (Bn810772), to the LZ (Bn827625).

(12) 22 Feb - The 179th ACH completed a fire base move for 1/22 Inf Bn from YA971267 to AR802914. Two CH-47's flew a total of five hours and 16 sorties to move the 28 cargo tons of combat equipment.

(13) 22 Feb - The 189th AHC conducted a CA/FINAL EXTRACTION with seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's for 3/8th Inf Bn. Eighty-four pax's were lifted in 28 sorties during a total of eight hours flown from YB988152 to YB996130. The operation was completed without incident. The lifted unit made contact with the enemy during the insertion.

(14) 22 Feb - The 189th conducted a second CA/FINAL EXTRACTION for 1/8th Inf Bn from YB 007290 and YB972268, ZB008220 and ZB026249 with eight UH-1H's and two UH-1C's. Three-hundred and sixty pax's were lifted in 124 sorties without incident. A total of 22 hours were flown to complete the operation

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RCS-CSPQR-65 (RI) (U)

(15) 22 Feb - The 189th conducted a third CA/FINAL EXTRACTION for 3/12th Inf Bn from YB928298 to YB921259 with four UH-1H's and two UH-1C's. Two-hundred and fifty-two par's were lifted in 84 sorties. Small arms fire was received during the initial assault, however, there was negative damage to aircraft or crews during the 12.5 hours flown to complete the operation.

#### d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
7608	405	1660	415	144	55
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>	
2274	8799	807	4	2/2	
<u>CREW</u> <u>WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KIA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES</u> <u>CXL/DELAYED</u>	
2/0	40	8	27	0/0	

Period 23 Feb - 29 Feb 68:

#### a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 3,000 ft (Scattered) 7,500 ft (Thin Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 4-8 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,450 ft (High 1530 hours)
- (4) Temperature: (High) 81 degrees (Low) 59 Degrees
- (5) Wind: 080 degrees - 110 degrees at 5-15 knots (Variable)

#### b. Aircraft Allocations:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47A
4th Infantry Division	23	7	7
ARVN	8	5	0
IFFV Artillery	2	0	0
DS. II Corps	10	0	0
Press	1	0	0
5th Special Forces Group	2	0	0
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0
OMEGA	4	4	0
GRID	2(1 day)	0	0
	5(1 day)	2(1 day)	0
	11(1 day)	2(1 day)	0

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## c. Significant Events:

(1) 23 Feb - The 119th conducted a CA in support of 3/8th Inf Bn with six UH-1H's and two UH-1C's from YB988152 to ZB095055. Eighty-eight pax's were inserted into the LZ in 13 sorties. Enemy ground fire was not received and the operation was completed without incident. A total of 14.10 hours were flown.

(2) 23 Feb - Ban Me Thuot Airfield (155th AHC), 53 rounds of 82mm mortar were received in the billets and aircraft parking areas. Five aircraft received light damage, negative personnel injuries. (FOR DETAILED INFORMATION SEE INCL 5).

(3) 23 Feb - The 119th AHC conducted a FINAL EXTRACTION in support of 3/8th Inf Bn with seven UH-1H's and two UH-1C's from ZB 095055 to YB988152. Eighty-two pax's were lifted in 13 sorties and a total of 13 hours flown to complete the operation without incident.

(4) 23 Feb - (170th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16596 crashed in the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot. Ten personnel were KIA and the aircraft was a total loss. (For Detailed information see para 8)

(5) 24 Feb - The 119th AHC assaulted 230 pax's from 3/12 Inf Bn in 37 sorties from YB924248 to YB939305 with nine UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Enemy fire was not received and the operation was completed without incident after a total of 18 hours were flown.

(6) 24 Feb - (189th AHC) UH-1C aircraft 66-691 crashed at Old Dak To. The aircraft was a total loss. Negative injuries to crew. (For detailed information see para 8)

(7) 25 Feb - The 179th Airlifted a fire support base from ZB 007217 to YB839203. Four CH-47A's lifted a total of 151.5 cargo tons and 110 pax's in 47 sorties. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 17.3 hours were flown.

(8) 25 Feb - The 179th ASHC conducted a second fire base move for the 173d Abn Bde from AQ810045 to ZU235770 with two CH-47A's. One-hundred and forty-six pax's and 32 tons of cargo were moved in 55 sorties during a total of 13 hours flown. The operation was completed without incident.

(9) 25 Feb - The 189th AHC assaulted 342 pax's from YB973247 and ZB005220 to B840202 in support of 1/8th Inf Bn with nine UH-1H's and two UH-1C's. One cargo ton was airlifted and a total of 23 hours and 116 sorties were flown to complete the mission.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS-00000-85 (R1) (7)

(10) 25 Feb - The 109th supported 1/12 Inf Bn with ten UH-1H's and two UH-1C's on a final extraction. Two-hundred and thirty pax's were moved in 78 sorties from YB932190 to YB973247 and ZB005220. Enemy fire was not received during the total 18 hours flown to complete the operation.

(11) 26 Feb - (119th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16207 was shot down in the vicinity of YB835281. The aircraft made a partial power landing to an unsecured area. All crew-members were extracted, two with injuries, by another aircraft supporting the same mission. The aircraft was unintentionally destroyed on site by an airstrike that night.

(12) 26 Feb - The 119th conducted a CL/FINAL EXTRACTION in support of 3/12 Inf Bn with nine UH-1H's and four UH-1C's from UB939306 to YB832279. Heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire was received in the LZ during the initial assault. Two UH-1H's and one UH-1C received minor damage. Two-hundred and twenty-five pax's were moved in 88 sorties. Ninety hours were flown to complete the operation.

(13) 26 Feb - KONTUM AIRFIELD - (57th AHC), Ten to fifteen rounds of 122mm rocket fire detonated outside the perimeter. Negative damage to the airfield, aircraft, or personnel. (For detailed information see Inclosure 4.)

(14) 26 Feb - The 179th ASHC airlifted a fire support base from YB935188 to YB971267 in support of 3/12 Inf Bn. Two CH-47A's flew a total of nine hours and 35 sorties to lift 207 pax's and 93 cargo tons.

(15) 26 Feb - (119th AHC) UH-1H aircraft took four hits in the vicinity of YB835281. One crew-member injured.

(16) 27 Feb - The 119th supported the 173d Abn Bde with six UH-1H's and two UH-1C's to complete a final extraction of 114 pax's from Z1185770 to the Kontum Airfield. Nineteen hours and 19 sorties were flown to complete the operation.

(17) 27 Feb - HIAF (52d CAB), Sixty-five rounds of 82mm mortar fire landed in the billets and equipment areas. Ten personnel were injured, five aircraft were damaged. (For detail information see Incl 3.)

(18) 27 Feb - (189th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16172 was hit 20 times in the vicinity of YB826283 and made a forced landing causing moderate damage to the aircraft, and two crew-members were injured.

(19) 27 Feb - (189th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16174 had engine failure and crashed eight miles south of BAN ME THUOT. Total loss of the aircraft, negative injuries to the crew. (For detailed information see para 8).

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(20) 26 Feb - The 189th AHC with thirteen UH-1H's and six UH-1C's conducted a CA in support of 1/8th Inf Bn from YB007218 to YB815245. Two-hundred and twenty pax's were lifted in 76 sorties. Light small arms and automatic weapons fire was received in the LZ, but there was no damage to aircraft or crews. A total of 38 hours were flown to complete the operation.

(21) 28 Feb - The 189th conducted a final extraction in support of the 1/12th Inf Bn. Six UH-1H's and two UH-1C's moved 110 pax's in 52 sorties from YB007289 to YB007218. The operation was completed without incident during the total 12 hours flown.

(22) 29 Feb - (189th AHC) UH-1C aircraft 66-690 received five hits of enemy small arms fire in the vicinity of ZB160050. Light damage was received by the aircraft, one crew-member WIA.

(23) 29 Feb - The 155th AHC conducted a CA in support of the Phu Yen Province ARVN units. Five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's lifted 90 pax's from CQ151478 to CQ080420 in 14 sorties. The operation was completed without incident.

(24) 29 Feb - The 189th conducted a second final extraction of 224 pax's in support of the 3/8th Inf Bn, from ZB003213 to ZB140075, with six UH-1H's and three UH-1C's. Heavy automatic weapons fire was received in the LZ. One UH-1C received several hits and one crew-member was wounded. Ninety-seven sorties and a total of 48 hours were flown to complete the operation.

#### d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
9485	487	2933	813	300	7
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>	
4053	12396	2009	16	11/5	
<u>CREW</u> <u>WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES</u> <u>CXL/DELAYED</u>	
4/0	62	5	32	0/0	

Period 1 March - 7 March 68:

#### a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 4,000 ft (Scattered) 8,000 ft (Thin Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 4-7 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,100 ft (High 1500 hours)
- (4) Temperature: (High) 80 Degrees (low) 59 Degrees
- (5) Wind: 090 degrees - at 5-15 knots (Variable)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
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## b. Aircraft Allocations:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47A
4th Infantry Division	21	5	6
ARVN	8	4	0
IFV Artillery	8	4	0
DSA II Corps	9	0	0
Press	1	0	0
5th Special Forces Group	2	0	0
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0
OMEGA	4	4	0

## c. Significant Events:

(1) 2 Mar - The 189th AHC conducted a final extraction for 1/8th Inf Bn from YB972267 to YB953238 with nine UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Three-hundred and ninety-one pax's were lifted in 134 sorties and 78 hours flown. The unit was initially extracted to a fire base for further extractions by CH-47A's but due to a "TAC/E" resupply CH-47A's were not available and a second secure to secure lift had to be made by UH-1's to the final LZ.

(2) 3 Mar - The 155th flew 22 hours in support of Phu Bon ARVN forces with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's. Two-hundred and fifteen pax's were lifted in 75 sorties during the GA from BQ230830 to BQ180650. The operation was completed without incidents.

(3) 3 Mar - The 179th ASCH airlifted 56 tons of combat cargo in support of the 173d Abn Bde from ZA 127791 to AR789947 during a fire base move. A total of 6.5 hours and 48 sorties were flown by two CH-47A's.

(4) 04 Mar - BAN ME THUOT AIRFIELD (155th AHC) eighty-six rounds of 82mm mortar and sapper attack were bruted by units located at the Ban Me Thuot Airfield. The enemy attacked with a company sized force and mortar support. The attack was repelled, but the perimeter was penetrated. (For details of the action see Inclosure 5).

(5) 04 Mar - KONFUM AIRFIELD (57th AHC) - received 23 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. There was negative damage to friendly equipment or personnel injured. (For detailed information see Inclosure 4).

(6) 04 Mar - (155th AHC) Three UH-1H aircraft; 66-16375, 66-16737, and 66-16438, received major damage as a result of ground accident in the aircraft parking area. (For detailed information see para 8)

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(7) 04 Mar - (155th AHC) UH-1C aircraft 66-15191 received four hits in the vicinity of BQ216933. One crew-member WIA. The aircraft received minor damage.

(8) 5 Mar - The 119th AHC supported the 1/8th Inf Bn with ten UH-1H's and four UH-1C's to complete a CA from Dak To Airfield to YB972-267. One-hundred and thirty-eight pax's were lifted in 23 sorties. A total of 23 hours were flown.

(9) 5 Mar - HMLF (52d CAB) Fifty rounds of 82mm mortar were fired into the billets and equipment areas. Seven personnel were WIA, and negative damage to aircraft. (For detailed information see Incl 3)

(10) 5 Mar - The 119th AHC conducted a final extraction in support of 3/8th Inf Bn from ZB012291 to Dak To Airfield. Ten UH-1H's and four UH-1C's flew 20 hours to lift 192 pax's in 32 sorties and complete the operation without incident.

(11) 5 Mar - The 119th AHC conducted a second final extraction in support of the 3/8th Inf Bn with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's from ZB998130 to ZB995165. Eighty-eight pax's were lifted in 15 sorties and a total of eight hours were flown to complete the operation.

(12) 06 Mar - HMLF (52d CAB), twenty-five rounds of 82mm mortar were fired into the equipment and billets complexes. Two personnel were WIA and four aircraft were damaged, one total loss and three light damage.

(13) 06 Mar - (170th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16582 crashed at YB879310 as a result of engine failure and forced landing to an unimproved area. The aircraft was a total loss and one crew-member was WIA.

(14) 7 Mar - The 179th ASCH airlifted 73.5 tons of combat cargo and 122 pax's in support of 3/8th Inf Bn during a fire base move from YB980155 to the Kontum Airfield. Three CH-47A's flew a total of 28 sorties and 6.5 hours to complete the operation.

(15) 07 Mar - The 189th AHC supported 3/12th Inf Bn with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's to execute a final extraction from YB857269 to YB824452. Two-hundred and ten pax's were lifted in 35 sorties. Automatic weapons fire was received in the LZ but no aircraft or personnel were injured or damaged. Twenty hours were flown to complete the operations.

(16) 07 Mar - (57th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-1198 was shot down and crashed in a river vicinity of LA085955. One crew-member injured and the aircraft destroyed.

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RCS-CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A HOURS</u>
8508	444	1826	414	185	12
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C DAM/DEST</u>	
3477	13821	1390	14	10/4	
<u>CREW WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>	
1/0	70	0	48	0/0	

Period 8 Mar - 14 Mar 68:

a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 3,500 ft (Scattered) 8,000 ft (thin Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 4-8 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,300 ft (High 1500 hours)
- (4) Wind: 100 Degrees - 120 Degrees at 5-15 knots (Variable)

b. Significant Events:

- (1) 8 Mar - The 170th AHC conducted a final extraction in support of 1/22d Inf Bn with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's from AR895930 to the Kontum Airfield. Ninety-three pax's and one ton cargo were lifted in six sorties. A total of 5.5 hours were flown to complete the operation.
- (2) 8 Mar - The 170th AHC conducted a second extraction in support of 1/22d Inf Bn. Three pax's and eight tons of combat cargo were lifted from AR828958 to ZL669875 in ten sorties. No enemy ground fire was received during the total 6.7 hours of flight.
- (3) 8 Mar - (170th AHC) - UH-1H aircraft 66-16142 received four hits west of Kontum. There was light damage to the aircraft, negative injuries to the crew.
- (4) 8 Mar - The 189th supported the 1/8th Inf Bn with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's. Ninety pax's were assaulted from ZB03243 to ZB03219 in 40 sorties. A total of 14 hours were flown without incident.
- (5) 8 Mar - The 189th AHC conducted a final extraction from YB887289 to ZB010219 with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's in support of 3/12th Inf Bn. Forty-five pax's and one ton of combat cargo were lifted in 18 sorties and 13.5 hours flown to complete the operation.

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AVGD-CC (10 Mar 1968)

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RCS-GSF0855 (RI) (J)

(6) 9 Mar - The 119th AHC support 3/8th Inf Bn with nine UH-1H's and four UH-1C's on a CA from Kontum Airfield to ZL130990. One-hundred and twenty pax's were lifted in 17 sorties and a total of 13 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(7) 9 Mar- The 119th AHC conducted a second CA in support of the 3/8th Inf Bn with nine UH-1H's and four UH-1C's from Kontum Airfield to ZL085815. Two-hundred and twenty-two pax's were lifted in 37 sorties and a total of 26 hours flown to complete the operation. No enemy ground fire was received.

(8) 10 Mar - HMF (52d CAB) - 88th S&S Bn was mortared. Approximately 40 rounds of 82mm mortar impacted in the billets area. Eleven personnel were WIA and light damage was received by several buildings and equipment contained therein. (For details see Inclosure 3.)

(9) 10 Mar - The 119th supported 3/8th Inf Bn with seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. A total of five hours were flown during the CA/FINAL EXTRACTION from ZL113997 to ZL080012. One-hundred pax's from Dak To Airfield to YB925225 in 40 sorties.

(10) 10 Mar - The 119th AHC completed a CA in support of 1/8th Inf. Bn. Seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's lifted 119 pax's from Dak To Airfield to YB925225 in 40 sorties. Twenty hours were flown without incident to complete the operation.

(11) 10 Mar - The 155th AHC supported Phu Bon ARVN units with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's. One-hundred and eighty-six pax's were assaulted from BQ232835 to BQ113895 in 54 sorties. A total of 15.7 hours were flown without incident.

(12) 11 Mar - (189th AHC) UH-1C aircraft 66-893 crashed and burned as a result of engine failure and forced landing in an unimproved area vicinity of ZL193655. The aircraft received light damage and one crew-member was WIA.

(13) 12 Mar - The 119th AHC conducted a CA in support of the 173d Avn Bde with ten UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. One-hundred and eighty pax's were lifted from ZL82990 to YB045972 in 60 sorties. A total of 30 hours were flown without incident.

(14) 12 Mar - The 119th AHC conducted a second CA in the support of 173d Avn Bde with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Ninety-six pax's were lifted from ZL025937 to ZL113997 in 32 sorties. A total of 12 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

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AVGD-CC (10 SEP 1968)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.  
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(15) 12 Mar - the 119th conducted a final extraction in support of 173d Avn Bde. Ninety-six pax's were lifted from AQ62290 to AR007006 in 32 sorties with eight UH-1H's and 23 UH-1C's. A total of 12 hours were flown without incident.

(16) 12 Mar - The 119th AHC supported 173d Avn Bde with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Ninety-six pax's were assaulted from AR735930 to AS007008 in 33 sorties without incident. A total of 12 hours were flown to complete the operation.

(17) 12 Mar - The 119th conducted a final extraction in support of the 173d Avn Bde with ten UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. One-hundred and fifteen pax's were lifted from ZA115758 to ZA152900 in 36 sorties. A total of 7 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(18) 12 Mar - The 119th AHC supported the 173d Avn Bde during a final extraction from ZA128768 to ZA152900 with ten UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. One-hundred and sixteen pax's were lifted in 36 sorties and a total of 7 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(19) 13 Mar - The 189th conducted an extraction with six UH-1H's and three UH-1C's in support of 1/3th Inf Bn from ZA120994 to ZA 112909. Ten hours and 13 sorties were flown to lift 30 pax's without incident.

(20) 13 Mar - The 189th conducted an extraction with six UH-1H's and three UH-1C's to assault 60 pax's from AR770877 to ZA028936. A total of 13 hours and 10 sorties were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(21) 13 Mar - the 189th completed a CA in support of the 3/8th Inf Bn with six UH-1H's and three UH-1C's from ZA028936 to ZA048968. Seventy-eight pax's were lifted in 28 sorties and a total of 12 hours were flown to complete the operation. Automatic weapons fire was received, but there was negative damage to either aircrafts or crews.

(22) 13 Mar - (189th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-17044 took 17 hits of 30 caliber fire in vicinity of ZA193655. The aircraft received light damage and one crew member was WIA.

(23) 13 Mar - The 189th AHC supported the 3/8th Inf Bn with six UH-1H's and three UH-1C's. Seventy-eight pax's were assaulted from ZA628936 to ZA048968 in 28 sorties. Enemy automatic fire was received in the LZ but caused no damage to the aircraft of crews. A total of 12 hours were flown to complete the operation.

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RCS-CSFORM 5 (RI) (U)

(24) 13 Mar - Ban Lo Thet Airfield (155th AHC) received 80 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Friendly personnel losses included one KIA and 20 WIA. Equipment damage includes light to moderate damage to 7 vehicles, extensive damage to the mess hall and contents, and extensive damage to the electrical power unit. (For detailed information see Incl 5)

(25) 13 Mar - (57th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16154 was shot down in a classified area. The crew was extracted without injuries and the aircraft was intentionally destroyed. The ground situation precluded recovery of this aircraft as it had received major damage during the forced landing and was not worth of recovery.

(26) 14 Mar - The 119th AHC conducted a CA in support of the 3/8th Inf Bn during with 11 UH-1H's and four UH-1C's from YB885215 to YB837223. One-hundred and twenty pax's were lifted in 58 sorties and a total of 15 hours to complete the operation without incident.

(27) 14 Mar - The 119th AHC supported 3/8th Inf Bn during a CA with eleven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's from YB885215 and Dak To Airfield to YB815218. Three-hundred and fifty pax's were moved in 72 sorties. Enemy small arm and automatic weapons fire was received from all quadrants. Two UH-1H's and one UH-1C were shot off the LZ, minor damage was received by all three aircraft. A second LZ preparation was made and the operation was continued with only intermittent small arms. A total of 22 hours were flown to complete the operation.

(28) 14 Mar - The 119th AHC supported the 173d Avn Bde with eight UH-1H's and three UH-1C's during a CA/FINAL extraction from YZ191838 to YA198893. Forty-eight pax's were lifted in 17 sorties and a total of 8 hours to complete the operation. Small arms fire and automatic weapons fire was received in the LZ but there was negative damage to the aircraft or crews. The unit made contact with the enemy 200 meters north of the LZ.

(29) 14 Mar - The 155th AHC supported Det B-23/5th SFG with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from AQ830025 to AQ812945. One-hundred pax's were lifted for a total of 2 sorties and 12 hours flown to complete the operation.

<u>GBT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>	<u>CH-54</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
8746	912	1340	342	220	0

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<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL P/LX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>L/C HIT</u>	<u>L/C D/LA/DEST</u>
1902	13,771	1373	4	3/1
<u>CREW WL/KIA</u>	<u>E-GENY KBL</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>
2/0	0	14	74	0/0

Period 15 Mar - 21 Mar 68

a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged):

- (1) Ceiling: 3500 (Scattered) 7500 (Thin/Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 4-8 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,250 ft (High 1530 hours)
- (4) Temperature: 82 degrees (High) 60 degrees (Low)
- (5) Wind: 100 degrees - 120 degrees at 5-15 knots (Variable).
- (6) Heavy fog conditions existed throughout the LO on 18 Mar and delayed take-offs two hours.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47A
4th Inf Div	23	4	6
ARVN	8	4	0
IFFV ARTY	2	0	0
DSA II Corps	9	0	0
PRESS	1	0	0
ONEGL	4	3	0
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 15 Mar - The 119th supported the 1/22d Inf Bn with ten UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Two-hundred and fifteen pax's were assaulted in 35 sorties from ZL095585 to ZL223685. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 50 hours flown.

(2) 15 Mar - The 189th AHC conducted a final extraction with eight UH-1H's and two UH-1C's in support of 1/22d Inf Bn. Eighty-two pax's were lifted from ZL095535 to ZL195665 in 38 sorties. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 40 hours flown.

(3) 15 Mar - The 179th AHC conducted a fire base move in support of the 1/22d Inf Bn two CH-47A's from ZA097530 to ZA1167. One-hundred and two tons of combat cargo and 73 pax's were lifted in 49

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sorties. Fourteen hours were flown without incident.

(4) 16 Mar - The 155th supported ARVN units in the Phu Bon Province with eight UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from BQ210820 to BQ230651. One-hundred and twenty-eight pax's were lifted in 26 sorties without incident a total of 30 hours was flown to complete the operation.

(5) 17 Mar - (189th LHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16628 crashed. Tail-rotor strike was caused by passenger leaving the aircraft without permission causing an unbalance situation of the aircraft at a hover and the tail-rotor struck a stump. The aircraft was a total loss, one crew member KIA, one was WIA. (For detailed information see para 8.)

(6) 17 Mar - The 179th LHC supported the 173d Abn Bde with two CH-47A's to airlift a fire base from Kontum Airfield to ZA152901. Seventy-four tons of combat equipment was moved in 24 sorties and a total of 12 hours flown to complete the operation.

(7) 17 Mar - The 57th LHC received 14 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. There was negative damage to aircraft, equipment, no personnel KIA, one was WIA. (For detailed information see inclosure 4.)

(8) 17 Mar - The 179th conducted a second fire base move for 3/8th Inf Bn. Two CH-47's lifted 28.5 tons of cargo from YB838224 to YB941267 in twenty sorties. A total of 7 hours were flown to complete the operation.

(9) 17 Mar - The 179th supported 3/8th Inf Bn with two CH-47A's to airlift a fire base from YB873257 to Dak To Airfield. Forty tons of combat equipment were moved in 22 sorties and 5 hours were flown to complete the operation.

(10) 17 Mar - The 170th LHC supported the 3/8th Inf Bn with four UH-1H's to make a secure to secure move of 120 pax's from ZA195673 to ZA189598. The operation was completed without incident with a total of four hours flown.

(11) 17 Mar - The 119th LHC conducted a CA in support of 3/8th Inf Bn from Dak To Airfield to ZB045975 with eleven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Two-hundred and twenty-two pax's were lifted in 37 sorties without incidents. The operation was completed without incident, and a total of 74 hours flown.

(12) 17 Mar - The 119th LHC supported the 3/8th Inf Bn with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Ninety-five pax's were assaulted from YB838202 to YB975255 in 17 sorties. A total of 17 hours was flown without incident.

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(13) 17 Mar - The 119th supported the 3/8 Inf Bn on a second extraction from YB818246 to YB815255. One-hundred and eight pax's were lifted in 18 sorties by eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 18 hours were flown.

(14) 17 Mar - The 119th supported the 3/8th Inf Bn with eleven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a final extraction from YB810270 to YB87255. One-hundred and nineteen pax's were lifted in 20 sorties without incident.

(15) 18 Mar - The 170th supported the 1/22d Inf Bn with four UH-1H's to move 120 pax's in 24 sorties from Z4195673 (Secure) to Z4183-698 (Secure). A total of 5 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(16) 18 Mar - The 179th AHC supported the 3/8th Inf Bn with two CH-47's to airlift a fire base from Dak To to ZB034039. Forth-six point five tons of combat equipment were moved in 14 sorties without incident.

(17) 19 Mar - The 170th AHC supported 3/12 with eleven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's on a CA from Dak To Airfield with eight UH-1H's and three UH-1C's. Ninety five pax's were lifted in 20 sorties and the operation was completed without incident.

(18) 21 Mar - The 57th AHC UH-1H aircraft (66-16164) was hit by an unknown type projectile that caused damage to the fuel cell and aircraft structural frame. The aircraft made an precautionary landing to CP#15 on highway 14, north of Kontum. Negative injuries to crew.

(19) 21 Mar - The 189th supported 3/8th Inf Bn during a CA with nine UH-1H's and four UH-1C's from Z4028928, ZB000045 and ZB034036 to Z4939912. Three-hundred and forty pax's were lifted in 136 sorties and contact was made 200 meters North of the LZ. Enemy small arms fire was received from the north, but there was negative damage to aircraft or crews.

(20) 21 Mar - Kontum Airfield, the 57th AHC received 3 enemy 122mm rocket that impacted and caused a sympathetic detonation of the ammo storage area. No other damage or injuries were sustained. (For detailed information see Incl 4)

(21) 21 Mar - The 189th AHC UH-1C aircraft 66-696 sustained incident damage on take-off from the RAAF refueling area.

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## d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A HOURS</u>
8636	1365	2419	586	273	19
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C DAM/DEST</u>	
3297	12072	1649	0	0/0	
<u>CREW WIA/KIS</u>	<u>ENEMY KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>	
0/0	0	0	57	0/0	

Period 22 Mar - 28 Mar 68

## a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 4,000 ft (Scattered) 8,000 ft (Thin/Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 3-8 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,200 ft (High 1430 hours)
- (4) Temperature: 83 degrees (High) 60 degrees (Low)
- (5) Wind: 100 degrees - 120 degrees at 3-15 knots (Variable)

## b. Aircraft Allocations:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47A
4th Inf Div	23	8	7
ARVN	9	5	0
IFFV ARTY	4	0	0
DSA II Corps	9	0	0
PRESS	1	0	0
OMECA	4	4	0
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0
5th SFG	2	0	0
GRID	2 (2 day)	0	0
2/1 CAV	0	2	0

## c. Significant Events:

- (1) 22 Mar - The 170th supported 1/22d Inf Bn with 6 UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a final extraction from ZA197608 to ZA103685. Seventy pax's were lifted 14 sorties without incident and a total of 7 hours flown to complete the operation.

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(2) 22 Mar - The 170th Supported the 173d Abn Bde with seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA from Kontum to ZB115955. One-hundred and twenty pax's were lifted in 24 sorties. A total of 48 hours were flown to accomplish the operation without incident.

(3) 22 Mar - The 179th ASCH airlifted a fire support base from ZA195666 to ZA095702 in support of 1/22d Inf Bn. Ninety-five tons of combat equipment were lifted in 46 sorties without incident during the 5.5 hours flown by two CK-47's.

(4) 22 Mar - The 179th ASCH supported the 173d Abn Bde with four CH-47's to airlift a fire support base from ZA033039 to YA939912 in 45 sorties. Forty-five tons of cargo were lifted without incident during the total 8.5 hours flown. One-hundred and forty-four pax's were lifted to complete the operation.

(5) 22 Mar - The 155th AHC supported ARVN units in the Phu Yan Province with five H-1H's and two UE-1C's during a CA from CQ070865 to CQ050820. One-hundred and ninty pax's were lifted in 30 sorties and a total of seven hours were flown to complete the mission without incident.

(6) 23 Mar - The 170th AHC supported the 173d Abn Bde with six UH-1H's and three UH-1C's to extract 85 pax's from ZA018858 to ZA068997 in 17 sorties. The operation was completed without incident.

(7) 24 Mar - Kontum Airfield, the 57th AEC came under enemy attack. Seven rounds of 122mm rocket were fired into the airfield complex, but no damage to personnel, equipment or aircraft were sustained. (For detailed information see inclosure 4.)

(8) 24 Mar - The 155th supported Det B-23/5th SFG, with eight UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from AQ725245 to AQ725245. One-hundred and thirty-eight pax's were lifted in 14 sorties. The operation was completed without incident.

(9) 24 Mar - The 155th supported 23d ARVN Div with 5 UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from AN801065 to BNO44243. One-hundred and seventy pax's were lifted in 60 sorties and a total of 25 hours flown without incident to complete the operation.

(10) 25 Mar - The 155th AHC, with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's lifted 198 pax's in 24 sorties from Kontum Airfield to AR8894 in support of 24th ARVN Div during a CA. A total of 21 hours were flown and the operation was completed without incident.

(11) 25 Mar - The 119th AHC supported the 173d Abn with five UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's during a CA from AR 105005 and AR100988 to AR115992. Three-hundred and ninty-two pax's were lifted in 57 sorties, and a total of 3 hours were flown to complete the operation.



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(12) 25 Mar - The 155th LHC supported Det B-23/5th SFG with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA from ZV03524 to AQ767237. One-hundred and eighty-five pax's were lifted in 24 sorties. Heavy fire was received in the LZ and a second prestrike was made with 4 F-4C to suppress 50 cal. machine-gun fire and b-40 rocket fire received in the LZ. The prestrike was effective and the operation was completed without damage to the aircraft or crews.

(13) 25 Mar - The 119th LHC supported the 173d Abn Bde with six UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's during the extraction of 70 pax's in 12 sorties from AR 160950 to AR 030935. The operation was completed without incident.

(14) 26 Mar - The 189th LHC UH-1H aircraft 66-16162 received eight hits from 30 caliber automatic weapons in the vicinity of ZA-C77376 causing light damage to the aircraft and one crew member WIA.

(15) 26 Mar - The 189th supported 1/22d Inf Bn with ten UH-1H's and three UH-1C's during a CA in which 192 pax's were lifted in 72 sorties from ZA065308 to ZA055357 and ZA077378. Small arms fire and automatic weapons fire was received in the LZ, but the operations was completed without damage to aircraft or crews.

(16) 26 Mar - The 189th supported 3/8th Inf Bn with eleven UH-1H's and five UH-1C's during a CA from ZA128962 and ZA130970 to YA 939913. Two-hundred and sixteen pax's were lifted in 72 sorties and a total of 40 hours flown without incident.

(17) 26 Mar - The 155th LHC supported Det B-23/5th SFG with five UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's during a CA in which 182 pax's were lifted from AQ880010 to ZV295195 in 27 sorties. The operation was completed without incident.

(18) 26 Mar - The 155th LHC supported ARVN units of Phu Bon Province during a CA from BQ251957 to BQ190695. Two-hundred and eighty one pax's were lifted in 42 sorties, and a total of 40 hours flown without incidents. A second CA from BQ525695 to BQ708638 was completed after 207 pax's were lifted in 100 sorties. Six UH-1H's and 2 UH-1C's were utilized.

(19) 28 Mar - The 189th LHC supported 1/22 Inf Bn with seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA/Final Extraction from ZA079375 and ZA053364 to ZA113283. Two-hundred and fifty pax's were lifted in 90 sorties without incident. A total of 40 hours were flown to complete the operation.

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## d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
9107	623	2371	599	299	24
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>DAN/DEST</u>	
3293	13865	975	1	1/0	
<u>CREW'S</u> <u>WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES</u> <u>CXL/DELA.ED</u>	
1/0	0	0	88	0/0	

Period 29 Mar - 31 Mar 68

## a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 3500 (Scattered) 7000 (Thin/Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 3-7 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4300 (High 1430 Hours)
- (4) Temperature: 84 degrees (High) 60 degrees (Low)
- (5) Wind: 90 degrees - 120 degrees at 5-15 knots (Variable).

## B. Aircraft Allocations:

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div	22	7	5
ARVN	8	4	0
IFFV ARTY	4	0	0
DSA II Corps	9	0	0
PRESS	1	0	0
OMEGA	4	2	3
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0
5th SFG	2	2	0
2/1 CAV	0	2	0

## c. Significant Events:

(1) 29 Mar - The 155th AHC supported Det C-2/5th SFG with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from II Corps Hq to AR826649. One-hundred and thirth-five pax's were lifted with 15 sorties without incident. A total of 7 hours was flown without incident to complete the operation.

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(2) 29 Mar - The 155th AHC supported ARVN units of Phu Bon Province with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from BQ240820 to BQ137540. Three-hundred pax's were lifted in 40 sorties and a total of 40 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(3) 29 Mar - HMAF, The 52d C/B received 33 rounds of enemy 82-mm mortar fire. The rounds impacted in the aircraft parking area and the following damage resulted; 15 aircraft damaged, 14 personnel WIA. (For detailed information see Insl 4).

#### d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47L HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A HOURS</u>
3792	223	899	276	208	2
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>L/C HIT</u>	<u>L/C D/LN/DEST</u>	
1385	4700	970	0	0/0	
<u>CREWS WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KBL</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EV.C</u>	<u>SCORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>	
0/0	0	0	28	0/0	

Period 1 April - 4 April 68

#### a. Weather: Local Summary (Lveraged)

- (1) Ceiling: 3500 ft (Scattered) 8000 ft (Thin/Broken)
- (2) Visibility: 3-7 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4150 (High 1500 hours)
- (4) Temperature: 82 degrees (High) 60 degrees (Low)
- (5) Wind: 080 degrees - 130 degrees at 5-15 knots (Variable).

#### b. Aircraft Allocation:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47L
4th Inf Div	22	6	6
ARVN	8	5	0
IFFV ARTY	4	0	0
DSL II Corps	9	0	0
PRESS	1	0	0
OMEGA	4	2	0
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0
5th SFG	2	0	0
2/1 CIV	0	2	5 6 0

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c. Significant Events:

- (1) 03 Apr - The 189th AHC supported Det C-2/5th SFG with seven UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA in which 170 pax's were assaulted from AR763505 to YL904742 in 36 sorties. Enemy small arms fire was received in the LZ but there was negative damage to aircraft or crew during the total 15 hours flown to complete the operation.
- (2) 03 Apr - The 189th conducted a second CA in support of Det C-2/5th SFG with seven UH-1H's and two UH-1C's from YL31454 to YL56533. One-hundred and two pax's were lifted in 26 sorties and a total of 11 hours flown to complete the operation without incident.
- (3) 04 Apr - HMF, the 52d CAB received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire that impacted in the CH-47 parking area. Three CH-47's were damaged to include other miscellaneous equipment. There were no personnel injured during the attack. (For detailed information see Incl 3)
- (4) 04 Apr - The 155th AHC supported the 22d ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and Two UH-1C's during a CA of 180 pax's lifted in 88 sorties from CQ112677 to CQ016601. A total of 25 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A HOURS</u>
4473	219	1087	324	124	17
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>L/C LIT</u>	<u>L/C DAM/DEST</u>	
1570	5858	6007	0	0/0	
<u>CREW WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KDA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>	
0/0	3	2	37	0/0	

Period 5 April - 11 April 68

a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 3500 ft to 7500 ft (Scattered)
- (2) Visibility: 3-5 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4200 ft (High 1500 hours)
- (4) Temperature: 80 degrees - (High), 59 degrees - (Low)

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## b. Aircraft Allocations:

ELEMENT	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47A
4th INF Div	23	8	7
ARVN	8	4	0
IFFV ARTY	4	0	0
DSA II Corps	9	0	0
PRESS	1	0	0
OMEGA	4	4	0
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0
5th SFG	3	0	0
2/1 CALV	0	2	0

## Significant Events

(1) 05 April - Kontun Airfield, the 57th AHC received 22 rounds of 122mm rocket fire which impacted in the aircraft parking and billeting areas. Ten aircraft were damaged and eight personnel were WIA. (For detailed information see Incl 4).

(2) 06 April - The 155th AHC supported ARVN units of the Tuyen Duc Province with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's to assault 170 pax's in 20 sorties from BP145001 to AP985138. A total of 28 hours were flown and the operation was completed without incident.

(3) 07 April - The 155th AHC supported the 22d ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA of 180 pax's in 85 sorties from BQ225820 to BR110155. A total of 25.5 hours was flown to complete the operation without incident.

(4) 07 April - The 189th AHC supported 42 ARVN Regt with seven UH-1H's and two UH-1C's to extract 365 pax's from ZB049156 to ZB045225. Eighty sorties and a total of 15 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident. The extracted unit was resupplied and equipped at ZB045225 and combat assaulted to ZB045118 and ZB058124. Eighty sorties and an additional 18 hours were flown during the operation.

(5) 07 April - The 155th AHC conducted a night CA in support of Det B-2/5th SFG. One-hundred and ten pax's were lifted in 36 sorties from Ban Me Thuot AF to AQ810060. The operation was completed without incident.

(6) 08 April - The 155th AHC conducted a CA in support of the 22d ARVN Div. Three-hundred and seventy-seven pax's were lifted in 104 sorties from AQ20825 to BR172283 with six UH-1H's and two

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UH-1C's. No enemy fire was received and the operation was completed without incident.

(7) 09 April - The 155th AHC extracted 331 pax's in support of an ARVN unit of the Phu Bon Province with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's in 83 sorties. A total of 40.5 hours were flown without incident to complete the mission.

(8) 09 April - 57AHC supported 1/22d Inf Bn with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA from ZA028936 to YA998828. Six-hundred and sixty-five pax's were lifted in 81 sorties during the total 60 hours flown to complete the mission without incident.

(9) 10 April - The 57th AHC supported 1/14th Inf Bn with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a Combat Assault of 220 pax's in 42 sorties from ZA028936 to ZB000062. A total of 18 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(10) 11 April - The 189th AHC supported Det C -2/5th SFG with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's to extract 171 pax's in 21 sorties from YA804734 to AR765498. Sixteen hours were flown to complete the operation.

(11) 11 April - The 155th supported an ARVN unit on Phu Bon Province with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from AQ220820 to AQ930830. Two-hundred and fifty pax's were lifted in 90 sorties and a total of 36 hours flown to complete the operation.

(12) 11 April - The 57th AHC supported 1/14 Inf Bn with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA of 150 pax's in 22 sorties from ZA029933 to ZB006060. The operation was completed without incident.

## d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47L</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54L</u> <u>HOURS</u>
9220	459	2118	548	278	22
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>D/M/DEST</u>	
2966	12,373	2035	0	0/0	
<u>CREW</u> <u>WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KIA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u> <u>CXL/DELLYED</u>	
0/0	0	0	59	0/0	

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## d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A HOURS</u>
9220	459	2118	548	278	22
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL TAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C DAM/DEST</u>	
2966	12,373	203	0	0/0	
<u>CREW WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>	
0/0	0	0	59	0/0	

Period 12 April - 18 April 1968

## a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 3500 ft to 7500 feet (Scattered)
- (2) Visibility: 3-5 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4250 ft (High 1530 hours)
- (4) Temperature: 83 degrees (High) 60 degrees (Low)
- (5) Wind: 080 degrees - 140 degrees at 5-15 knots (Variable)

## b. Aircraft Allocations:

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div	23	8	6
ARVN	9	5	0
1FTV ARTY	4	0	0
DSA II Corps	9	0	0
PRESS	1	0	0
OMEGA	4	4	0
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0
5th SFG	3	0	0
2/1 CAV	0	2	0
WHRID	4 (1 day)	0	0

## c. Significant Events:

- (1) 12 April - (189th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-1067 received 9 hits at ZB150750 which caused light damage to the aircraft. Two crew members were WIA.

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- (2) 12 April - The 119th AHC supported 2/35th Inf Bn with eleven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA/FINAL EXTRACTION. Ninety-five pax's were lifted from ZL027906 to YL977923 in 16 sorties. The operation was completed without incident.
- (3) 12 April - The 119th AHC supported 2/35th Inf Bn by lifting 98 pax's in 17 sorties from ZL057991 to ZL065905 during a final extraction. A total of eight hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.
- (4) 12 April - The 189th AHC supported Det C-2/5th SFG with six UH-1H's and four UH-1C's to extract and combat assault 85 pax's from YB952683 to ZB014713 in 28 sorties. The operation was completed after a total of 22 hours were flown.
- (5) 12 April - The 155th AHC supported ARVN units of the Tuyen Duc Province with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from CQ110684 to BQ972662 and BQ970546. Five-hundred and twenty-five pax's were lifted in 127 sorties. A total of 30 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.
- (6) 12 April - The 155th AHC supported the 22d ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from BQ980845 and BQ245835. Two-hundred and fifty-two pax's were lifted in 56 sorties and the operation was completed without incident.
- (7) 13 April - The 155th supported ARVN units of the Phu Bon Province with two UH-1C's and five UH-1H's to complete a CA from BQ 231860 to BQ182671. One-hundred and thirty pax's were lifted in 35 sorties and a total of 30 hours flown to complete the operation without incident.
- (8) 14 April - The 155th AHC supported the 22d ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's to assault 200 pax's in 75 sorties from BQ360175 to BR240830. The operation was completed without incident.
- (9) 15 April - The 189th AHC supported 2/35th Inf Bn with seven UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from ZL035927 and ZL063911 to ZL155937. One-hundred and fifty-eight pax's were lifted in 44 sorties. Twenty-two hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.
- (10) 16 April - The 170th ASCH UH-1H aircraft 66-1210 received five hits in a classified area. The aircraft continued to fly and landed at a secure area. Light damage to the aircraft, one crewmember was WIA.

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(11) 17 April - The 155th supported the 22d ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CL from CQ240825 to CQ260320. Two-hundred and eight pax's were lifted in 44 sorties. A total of 21 hours were flown and the operation completed without incident.

#### d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A HOURS</u>
10390	551	2371	553	317	34
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C D/LN/DEST</u>	
3273	15,243	2048	2	2/0	
<u>CREW WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KBL</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>	
3/0	4	4	46	0/0	

Period 19 April - 25 April 1968

#### a. Weather: Local Summary ( d)

- (1) Ceiling: 3000 ft to 7500 feet scattered
- (2) Visibility: 3-5 miles (Haze and Smoke)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4150 ft (High 1530 hours)
- (4) Temperature: 82 degrees (High) 59 (Low)
- (5) Wind: 070 degrees - 140 degrees 5-15 knots (Variable)

#### b. Aircraft Allocations:

ELEMENTS	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47A
4th Inf Div	23	7	8
ARVN	7	4	0
IFFV ARTY	4	0	0
DSM II Corps	9	0	0
TRESS	1	0	0
CHEGL	4	4	0
IR. IRIE FIRE	4	4	0
5th SFG	3	0	0
CRID	6 ( 2 days)	2 (2 days)	0
WRID	0	2 (2 days)	0

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## c. Significant Events:

(1) 19 April - The 119th AHC supported the 1/8th Inf Bn with six UH-1H's and two UH-1C's. One-hundred pax's were lifted during a CA from YA965855 to YA995825 in 17 sorties. The operation was completed without incident. A second CA was completed by the same aircraft in support of the 1/35th Inf Bn. Seventy-three pax's were lifted from Folie Kleng to ZA170003. A total of 14 hours were flown to complete both operations.

(2) 19 April - The 155th AHC supported the 22nd ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from BQ230825 to BQ 920815 in 60 sorties. A total of 23 hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(3) 20 April - The 155th AHC supported the ARVN units of the Phu Bon Province during an extraction from BQ020910 to Choo Reo Airfield. Two-hundred and thirty-five pax's were lifted in eighty-four sorties and thirty-five hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(4) 23 April - The 57th AHC supported the 2/35th Inf Bn with seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA from YA935938 to YA912921. Eighty-eight pax's were lifted in 15 sorties without incident to complete the operation.

(5) 23 April - The 155th AHC supported the 22d ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from CQ130645 to CQ050760. One-hundred and seventy pax's were lifted in 51 sorties and a total of sixteen hours were flown to complete the operation without incident.

(6) 23 April - The 119th AHC supported the 2/35th Inf Bn with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's to extract 88 pax's from YA912922 to YA 935938 in fifteen sorties. The operation was completed without incident.

(7) 24 April - (57th AHC) UH-1R aircraft 66-1063 received 15 hits from a 50 Calibre weapon and crashed at YA845851. The aircraft was a total loss, three crew members were injured.

(8) 24 April - The 155th AHC supported the 47th ARVN Regt with six UH-1H's and three UH-1C's during a CA from CQ140480 to CQ 028532 in which 1,040 pax's were lifted in 36 sorties and a total of 32 hours flown to complete the operation without incident.

(9) 24 April - (119th AHC) UH-1H aircraft 66-16524 was hit 15 times by 50 Calibre fire. The aircraft made a precautionary landing to a secure area and was later recovered. The aircraft received moderate damage and one crew-member was WIA.

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(10) 25 April - The 57th AHC supported Co B/5th SFG, with twelve UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. Seven-hundred and fourth-three pax's were lifted in 24 sorties and a total of 12 hours flown to complete the operation without incident.

#### d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>	<u>CH-53A HOURS</u>
9035	237	1728	436	270	10
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C DAM/DEST</u>	
2444	10,278	1585	2	2/0	
<u>CREW WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>IED EVAC</u>	<u>SORTIES CXL/DELAYED</u>	
4/0	0	0	54	0/0	

Period 26 April - 30 April 1968:

#### a. Weather: Local Summary (Averaged)

- (1) Ceiling: 2,500-ft 6,000 ft Broken
- (2) Visibility: 3-5 miles (Smoke and Haze)
- (3) Density Altitude: 4,100 ft (High 1500 hours)
- (4) Temperature: 80 degrees (High) 60 degrees (Low)
- (5) Wind: 010 degrees - 120 degrees at 5-15 knots (Variable)

#### b. Aircraft Allocations:

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Infantry Division	22	8	8
ARVN	7	4	0
IFFV Artillery	4	0	0
DSM II Corp	9	0	0
THUSS	1	0	0
5th SFG	3	0	0
PRAIRIE FIRE	4	4	0
OMEGA	4	4	0

#### c. Significant Events:

(1) 26 April - The 155th AHC supported the 22<sup>nd</sup> ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from CG080875 to CR95055 in

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which 540 pax's were lifted in 136 sorties. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 42 hours flown.

(2) 26 April - The 189th AHC supported the 3/12 Inf Bn with seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA from ZB015216 to YB853187 in which 103 pax's were lifted in 38 sorties. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 15 hours flown.

(3) 26 April --The 189th AHC supported 3/8 Inf Bn with seven UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA from ZB015216 to YB882291 in which 103 pax's were lifted in 42 sorties. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 15 hours flown.

(4) 26 April - (57th AHC) UH-1C aircraft 66-15147 received automatic weapons fire (30 Cal) and was hit six times in the vicinity of Y1848899. One crew-member was WIA and the aircraft received light damage.

(5) 26 April - (179th AHC) CH-47A aircraft 66-19669 crashed and burned with ten personnel on board at YA183533. The accident is presently under investigation. The cause is unknown at this time. All ten personnel were KIA and the aircraft destroyed.

(6) 27 April - The 57th AHC supported project Prairie Fire with eighteen UH-1H's and twelve UH-1C's during a tactical emergency extraction of 118 pax's in 18 sorties. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 27 hours flown.

(7) 27 April - The 57th AHC supported 1/12 Inf Bn with ten UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA from YA815963 to YA829909 in which 200 pax's were lifted in 40 sorties to complete the operation. Small arms and automatic weapons fire were received in the LZ but there was negative damage to friendly elements.

(8) 28 April - The 57th AHC performed multiple lifts in support of the 3d Inf Bde, 4th Inf Div, with eight UH-1H's and four UH-1C's. A total of 450 pax's were lifted in 64 sorties during a total of 15 hours flown.

(9) 28 April - (189th AHC) UH-1C aircraft 67-17263 was hit 3 times in the vicinity of YA814893. One crew-member was WIA, the aircraft received light damage.

(10) 29 April - The 155th AHC supported the 22d ARVN Div with five UH-1H's and two UH-1C's during a CA from CQ084884 to CQ042846 in which 170 pax's were lifted in 59 sorties. The operation was completed without incident and a total of 29 hours flown.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS-CSPOR-65 (RE) (U)

(11) 30 April - The 57th AHC supported the 24th ARVN Div with twelve UH-1H's and four UH-1C's during a CA from the KONTUM AIRFIELD to LS945132 in which 505 pax's were lifted without incident. The operation was completed with a total of 30 hours flown.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>COMBAT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
7953	562	1423	465	296	18
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HTT</u>	<u>I 'O</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>	
2202	10260	1559	5	5/0	
<u>CREW</u> <u>WIA/KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVAC</u>	<u>SCRTIES</u> <u>CXL/DELAYED</u>	
2/0	0	0	51	0/0	

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS-CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

II Section II Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel (None)

b. Operations

c. (1) Allocation of assets to perform airmobile tasks:

(a) Observations: Allocations of aircraft to perform airmobile task have been made by ground commanders on numerous occasions without the first step of airmobile planning i.e., liaison between the airmobile task force commander and the air mission commander. This battalion has received requests for the air mission commander to report one hour prior to pick up zone time for recon and selection of an LZ. Often during liaison with the airmobile task force commander, recommendations were made for aviation assets necessary to complete the airmobile task by the air mission commander, to include other support such as T/C/AIR and artillery.

(b) Evaluation: In most cases the airmobile tasks were completed with less than the aviation assets required and without supporting fire due to the short notice and required completion time of the airmobile task. Operating under these conditions have resulted in higher risk rates to the lifting and lifted elements in the PZ and LZ of airmobile operations that require a final extraction in conjunction with a combat assault.

(c) Recommendation: Frequently, very little planning and reaction time will be available to the airmobile task force commander, however, operating principles of an airmobile combat assault are nevertheless valid. Ground commanders can reduce the risk factors by requiring the same short order responsiveness of available artillery fire support for LZ preparation, and insure that the required aviation assets recommended by the air mission commander are made available. The requirement to plan, organize and execute a successful airmobile operation, with minimum risk to both ground and aviation elements on short notice, can be met but ground commanders must adhere to published standard operating procedures of airmobile operations. Further recommend that a review of ground unit SOP's for airmobile operations be conducted to insure that valid operating procedures are included.

(2) Medium Helicopter Operations (CH-47):

(a) Observations:

1. Medium helicopter (CH-47) employment as requested, and directed, is not achieving maximum utilization in its primary role.

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The CH-47 helicopter is being used extensively in lieu of fixed wing, aircraft for the airlift of combat equipment and personnel from one fixed wing landing strip to another.

2. Supported ground units have on numerous occasions scheduled airlift of non-essential cargo for CH-47 delivery to forward units when requirements existed for combat essential cargo. Requirements for combat essential cargo can normally be determined a day prior to actual need. This battalion has received requests for airlift of combat essential cargo as tactical emergency missions the same day that non-essential cargo was being lifted for the requesting tactical unit (normally battalions). CH-47 helicopters have flown during the hours of darkness, at considerable risk of losing both the aircraft and supplies, to complete these emergency resupply missions.

(b) Evaluation: CH-47 helicopter support in terms of flight time, has been improperly utilized and not available to support in its primary role i. e., airlift of combat troops, supplies and equipment to units inaccessible by other expedient transportation means.

### (c) Recommendation:

1. Ground units must be required to submit requests for airlift of combat essential supplies a minimum of 24 hours prior to required delivery. Non-essential cargo will be scheduled as a second priority for movement.

2. Further recommend that fixed wing aircraft (C-7A and C-123) support at division level to release CH-47 helicopters from missions that involve airlift of combat troops and cargo from one fixed wing airfield to another.

### (3) UH-1H Utilization:

(a) Observation: Utilization reports maintained by this unit indicate that an ever increasing number of hours are being flown by UH-1H type aircraft on command/control or administrative/liason type missions to support ground units. In the past those aircraft were allocated to the ground unit to support airlift of supplies and equipment or for troop lift during combat assaults (the primary role of the UH-1H type aircraft).

(b) Evaluation: Aircraft have been flown during the hours of darkness due to improper planning by ground units to effect tactical resupply earlier in the day. Often non-essential cargo and personnel have been moved with a resulting tactical emergency declared as late as 1700 hours to insure adequate class V stores were airlifted in, often after dark. The resultant crew fatigue and delayed maintenance has effected other missions assigned to the aircraft and crews.

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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) Recommendations: Ground units must plan ahead to live within their craft allocations, reduce administrative requirements and accomplish resupply in all categories prior to darkness. Higher tactical headquarters must coordinate resources to assist in their effort when aircraft are utilized on late combat assaults and extractions.

C. Training

(1) Aviation

(a) Observation: USARV Reg 95-6, dated 15 April 67 required flight orientation and training of assigned aviators prior to their operation of aircraft in RVN for the purpose of determining flying proficiency and to insure that aircraft operation and flight procedures are standardized. In addition, 17th Combat Aviation Group Regulation 250-1 requires that all assigned aviators receive, and units to conduct, an instrument flight training and proficiency program. Maximum utilization has been made of aircraft available (not mission scheduled) to meet the requirements as outlined in current directives.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the limited availability of aircraft to be used for training and standardization purposes, standardization and Instructor Pilots (SIPs and IPs) were unable to conduct a comprehensive standardization program. Training flights were conducted during actual missions which does not facilitate the touch-down autorotation, a primary maneuver during emergency conditions, i.e., forced landing. In addition, armament systems must be removed to facilitate autorotation in UH-1C(A) which changes the status of a mission ready and flyable aircraft to flyable not mission ready. Availability of UH-1C(A) has completely precluded standardization and training in this type aircraft. Statistics indicate that no crew member has been involved in an accident or incident who had received a comprehensive standardization flight check.

(c) Recommendations: Aircraft should be allocated to meet unit requirements for standardization and training program. Requests for aircraft to meet these requirements can be made far enough in advance to allow an adjustment of total allocation of aircraft by higher headquarters to make UH-1 aircraft, especially UH-1C(A), available.

D. Logistics:

(a) Operations: During the extended operations from strategically located POL points operated by this battalion, CH-47 helicopters exhausted the JP-4 supply. Valuable flight time was lost as a result of increased elapsed time involved in refueling operation. On several occasions, the strategic POL points were bypassed POL (JP-4) convoys



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resupplying POL facilities of lesser priority. All attempts by this headquarters to route JP-4 to these locations were unsuccessful.

(b) Evaluation: POL consumption of the CH-47 helicopter is a consideration factor which cannot be over-emphasized. Ground planners who are unfamiliar with the operating characteristics of the CH-47 helicopter have invariably under-planned POL requirements.

(c) Recommendation: That aviation liaison officers be included in all planning aspects by logistics personnel involving the resupply of JP-4 to POL refueling points so that proper priorities can be established.

F. Organization: (None)

G. Other-(Aircraft Maintenance), (Safety),

(1) UH-1H transmission input quill seals:

(a) Observation: Numerous transmission input quill seals (FSN 6330-763-1473) are leaking and causing premature removal and excessive maintenance effort in removal of the item, replacement of the seal, and reinstallation of the quills into the transmissions on UH-1 helicopters.

(b) Evaluation: In most cases of input quill seal leakage, the quill seal itself is the cause of the leaks. If the seal is the cause of the leak, the only recourse is to replace the seal. In some instances, the leak has been found to have been caused by a defective "O" ring located behind the input quill seal in the input quill assembly.

(c) Recommendations: In each case of a input quill seal leak, the exact cause of the leak should be determined before automatically replacing the input seal. Further recommend that a study be conducted to determine if the design of the component is a possible cause of input quill leaks.

(2) Protection of Wreckers and other critical maintenance equipment from enemy mortar, rocket, and small arms fire:

(a) Observation: Items of equipment such as wreckers, forklifts and compressors are critically needed in the performance of aircraft maintenance. These items of equipment are highly susceptible to damage during enemy attacks.

(b) Evaluation: In most cases there are insufficient coverments available for storage of critical maintenance equipment.

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(c) Recommendations: Critical items of maintenance equipment should be protected by revetments not occupied by aircraft. If insufficient revetments are available, additional revetments should be constructed which can be utilized for storage of critical aircraft maintenance equipment.

*Raymond G. Lehman Jr.*  
RAYMOND G. LEHMAN JR.  
LTC INF  
Commanding

6 Incl

1. List, 52d CAB Detachments
2. Recapitulation of flying hours and availability
3. After Action Report (HOL Attack)
4. After Action Report (KTM Attack)
5. After Action Report (BMT Attack)
6. Map of operation area

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AVGD-SC (10 May 68) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS-CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96240 25 May 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) The following comments and recommendations on Section II are submitted for review and/or approval.

a. Reference item concerning land line communications and resultant utilization of AN/ARC-102's, Section I, para 9, a, page 22: Concur.

b. Reference item concerning AN/CRG-106, Section I, para 9, b, page 22: Concur. Nomenclature should be radio Teletypewriter Set AN/VSC-2 rather than AN/GRC-106. Authorization previously existed for this radio set, availability for issue merely coincided with need.

c. Reference item concerning installation of dial capability at Camp Holloway, Section I, para 9, c, page 23: Concur.

d. Reference items concerning Allocation of Assets to Perform Airmobile Tasks, Medium Helicopter Operations (CH-47), and UH-1H utilization. Concur with all observations. The 17th Combat Aviation Group presently is implementing an orientation program to be presented to the ground unit commanders throughout II CTZ. This program will consist of conferences, lectures, demonstrations and practical exercises on the capabilities and limitations of the various army aircraft; responsibilities of the ground and air mission commanders in an airmobile exercise; proper procedures of rigging loads for aircraft transport and airmobile mission planning and execution. The program will be supplemented with hand-out material to expand on the oral presentation. It is hoped that such an orientation will provide a better understanding of army aviation assets thus allowing for more efficient aircraft utilization with a corresponding reduction of hours flown to accomplish the same mission.

e. Reference item concerning aviation training, Section II, para c, (1) page 69: Non-concur. Daily commitments normally take 53% of the unit's authorized aircraft. Command interest, proper supervision, judicious management, and utilization of available aircraft provide better answers to the problem. The unit's recommendation is not too well founded as

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combat damage and maintenance problems cannot be forecasted.

f. Reference item concerning Operations, Section II, para d, (a), page 69: Concur. The problem of POL operation was discussed fully in the 17th Combat Aviation Group Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarter ending April 1968.

g. Reference item concerning U-1 transmission input quill seals, Section II, para g, (1), page 70: Concur with recommendations. AMIC is aware of the transmission input quill seal problem because of the number of Equipment Improvement Recommendations submitted. There has been no improvement in subject quill thus far. Units continue to submit Equipment Improvement Recommendations on failures.

h. Reference item concerning Protection of Wreckers, Section II, para g, (2): Concur. As a result of COMF MSG AVMAV-CPT 35185, Palmer Sands, Subject: Protection of Army Aircraft, dated 4 Feb 68, this headquarters established its policy regarding the revetting of vehicles and critical aircraft parts, in the form of COMF MSG AVGD-ED 1672-68, Subject: Protection of Vehicles and aircraft parts, dated 10 May 68.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JERALD K. COCCHI  
1LT, AGC  
Adjutant

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AVFA-GC-OT (10 May 68) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for  
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 8 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96307

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding  
indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT C. GABBARD  
1LT, A3C  
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:  
17th CAG

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AVBA-C (10 May 68) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
BGS CSFOR-65 (RI) From 52d Combat Aviation Battalion

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 JUN 27 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBGC-DST, APO 96375  
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report, considers it to be  
adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



JOHN D. MIXSELL, JR.  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (10 May 68) 4th Ind (C) CPT Arnold/ms/LEN 4485  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS-CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 6 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Reference item concerning UH-1H transmission input quill seal, page 70, paragraph G(1): Concur. The proper maintenance procedure is to determine if the component can be repaired locally before the shaft is turned in and a replacement item installed. Bell Helicopter Company and USAAVCOM are investigating this problem area. Units should continue to submit an EIR when the problem is encountered.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*C. S. Nakatsukasa*  
C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:  
HQ, 52d Cbt Avn Bn  
HQ, 1st Avn Bde

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GPOF-DT (10 May 68) 5th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 52d Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending  
30 April 1968, RCS CSFO-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN  
MAJ, AGC  
Asst AG



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INCL 1

SUBJECT: Organizational Structure of 52d Cbt Avn Bn (U)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>
52d Cbt Avn Bn - "FLYING DRAGONS"	LTC Raymond G. Lehman Jr.
52d Security Platoon	1/Lt Robert L. Litton
57th Aslt Hel Co - "GLADIATORS" "COUGARS"	MAJ William D. Gess
615th Trans Det	MAJ Niles C. Clark
822nd Signal Det	WO1 Harvey Baker Jr.
119th Aslt Hel Co - "ALLIGATORS" "CROCS"	MAJ Warren R. Porter
545th Trans Det	MAJ Hugh H. Rhodes
94th Medical Det	CPT Fred C. Margolin
70th Signal Det	2/Lt Larry T. Beck
155th Aslt Hel Co - "STACEOACF" "F/LOANS"	MAJ Walter Urbach
165th Trans Det	MAJ Eugene P. Malkoff
8th Medical Det	CPT Merrill J. Birman
208th Signal Det	CPT Albert E. Fisch
170th Aslt Hel Co - "BIKINIS" "BUCCANEERS"	MJ Robert W. Cook
405th Trans Det	MAJ Edward D. King
755th Medical Det	CPT David L. Acus
448th Signal Det	WO1 Harold B. Nunday

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
SUBJECT: Organizational Structure of 52d Cbt Avn Bn (U)

179th Aslt Spt Hel Co - "SHRIMPBOAT"	MAJ Robert F. Wetherbie
402nd Trans Det	MAJ Billy W. Cocks
189th Aslt Hel Co - "GHOSTRIDERS" "AVENGERS"	MAJ William W. Fraker
604th Trans Det	MAJ David C. Whitworth
6th Signal Det	1/Lt James R. Conley
344th Avn Det	LTC Robert D. Craig Jr.
355th Aslt Spt Hel Heavy	MAJ Glen E. Morgan
662nd Trans Det	MAJ William H. Hinds

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SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Flying Hours (U)  
 REMARKS: Average number of aircraft is based on those actually on-hand with the following provisions:  
 (1). Aircraft destroyed are dropped from accountability the day following destruction.  
 (2). Replacement aircraft are picked up on accountability on the first day that they become "mission ready" or within 72 hours following receipt, whichever occurs first.

Month	Avg Hr on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Gains	Avail-ability	Avg Hr on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hr on Hand	Hours Flown	Avail-ability	Total Hours	Combined Av. Hours	Percent of Program
57th Feb	7.5	367	4.9	15.7	16.7	1822	97.4	67.0	2189	83.5	139.3	
MAR	8.0	516	66.2	79.4	20.5	1931	94.2	87.4	2477	89.9	148%	
APR	8.0	676	84.5	82.0	16.6	2593	150.8	80.0	3179	129.2	217%	
May	5.5	342	62.2	75.3	20.0	1686	84.4	79.9	2030	79.6	132%	
JUN	7.0	345	49.2	79.6	18.4	1645	83.9	59.3	1990	78.3	131%	
JUL	8.0	286	35.8	66.7	19.0	1479	77.0	75.6	1765	65.4	109%	
ISSUE Feb	6.3	382	60.6	65.7	15.0	1221	81.1	83.0	1603	75.2	125%	
MAR	7.4	346	46.7	63.5	19.4	1781	91.1	80.5	2127	80.9	134%	
APR	7.0	435	62.1	61.3	17.7	1582	85.4	74.1	2017	65.7	113%	
May	7.0	390	55.7	68.5	19.2	1471	76.6	76.9	1861	71.0	118%	
JUN	6.3	472	74.8	80.6	17.9	2133	113.3	60.0	2605	107.6	176%	
JUL	6.0	607	65.9	75.6	18.0	2023	112.3	81.9	2710	104.2	174%	
AUG	7.9	555	70.3	6.1	16.6	1522	90.0	60.8	2077	77.8	132%	
SEP	6.4	531	82.5	82.7	16.7	2034	120.0	78.4	2535	109.7	183%	
OCT	5.6	330	56.9	62.0	16.0	1915	109.9	75.0	2302	96.6	162%	

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SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Flying Hours (U)

REMARKS: Average number of aircraft is based on those actually on-hand with the following provisions:

- (1) Aircraft destroyed are dropped from accountability the day following destruction.
- (2) Replacement aircraft are picked up on accountability on the first day that they become "mission ready" or within 72 hours following receipt, whichever occurs first.

UNIT	MONTH	Avg Nr - UEIC on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Guns	Avg Hours Flown	Avail- ability	Avg Nr. UEIC on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Flown	Avail- ability	Combined Total Hours	Combined Avg Hours	Percent DA Program
522	Feb	34.2	2036	59.5	72.7	72.7	91.7	7724	81.2	76.6	9760	77.5	129%
	Mar	35.1	2240	64.4	79.4	79.4	92.9	9494	100.6	77.3	11734	91.7	153%
	Apr	36.8	2414	65.3	78.6	78.6	89.5	9566	107.1	77.2	11980	95.0	159%

UNIT	MONTH	Avg CH-47 On Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Flown	Avg Hours Per CH-47	Percent of DA Program	Availability
179th	Feb	13.3	904	67.6	51.6	136%	67.0
	Mar	14.6	1259	85.7	58.7	168%	68.0
	Apr	15.6	1246	79.2	50.8	159%	25.4

UNIT	MONTH	Avg CH-54 On Hand	Hours Flown	Avg Hours Per CH-54	Percent of DA Program	Availability
355th	Feb	3.0	53	17.7	59%	60.9
	Mar	3.0	79	26.3	79%	67.9
	Apr	3.0	93	31.0	100.3%	25.4

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SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Availability, Mission ready, EDP and  
EDM percentage taken from DA Form 1352 and Daily Aircraft  
Status. (U)

UH-1C	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	75	72.7	79.5	78.9
Mission Ready	80	53.7	50.8	58.7
EDM	17	20.5	16.0	16.9
EDP	8	6.8	4.5	4.2

UH-1H	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	78	76.6	79.5	78.5
Mission Ready	80	52.8	63.3	64.6
EDM	17	18.7	15.0	17.6
EDP	5	4.7	5.5	3.9

UH-1 COMBINED	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	80	74.6	79.5	78.7
Mission Ready	80	53.3	57.1	61.7
EDM	17	19.6	15.5	17.2
EDP	5	5.8	5.0	4.1

CH-47	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	65	67.0	68.0	68.0
Mission Ready	50	46.1	41.3	47.4
EDM	23	22.0	22.0	22.0
EDP	12	11.0	10.0	12.0

CH-54	STD	FEB	MAR	APR
Availability	67	60.9	68.0	55.0
Mission Ready	30	25.9	66.2	25.4
EDM	23	17.2	5.6	9.0
EDP	10	21.9	26.4	36.0

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SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Holloway Army airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by a supporting element of the 41st NVA Artillery Regiment on 020400 February 68. Twenty five (25) rounds were fired into the aircraft revetment, runway, and motor park areas from four (4) 82mm mortar tubes, located in the vicinity of AR 815475 (See inclosure 1). The attack lasted 10-15 minutes.

2. (C) Sequence of Events and Significant Intelligence Information.

a. The enemy mortar section an estimated 20-25 man force, approached the prepared firing positions from vicinity of AR824752, undetected. After firing 25 rounds in rapid succession, the enemy element moved immediately to the vicinity of AR825477 and dispersed.

b. Following the incoming enemy rounds, friendly artillery, mortar, and gunships were employed to engage the suspected enemy firing positions. The 52d Security Detachment located the enemy firing positions 020900 Feb 68 and ground assessment indicated that the enemy element suffered no damage from the aerial rocket attack made on the suspected positions immediately following the attack.

c. The attack was well planned and executed with precision. The enemy probably selected this course of engagement because:

(1) All movement had to be made during the hours of darkness to avoid detection by increased aerial observation of the area of operation during daylight hours, thus possibly explaining the unusually late engagement at 0400 hours due to approximately six (6) hours of nite movement required to reach the firing positions from the staging area vicinity of coordinated AR824752.

(2) Previously, extended enemy engagements were made from the same location which allowed sufficient time for the gunships to engage the suspected enemy mortar positions while they were occupied. The enemy may have shortened his engagement time to avoid being counter-engaged by gunships.

(3) The enemy may have chosen a later engagement to avoid a pattern set in three (3) previous attacks on Camp Holloway.

3. (C) Damage Information.

a. Personnel losses by unit

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The following personnel received treatment at the Camp Holloway Dispensary and were released:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
PFC LEONARD, Tommie L.	355th ASHC
SP4 EARNEST, Lewis W. Jr.	
SP4 WILLIAMS, Johnny L.	189th AHC
SGT RANSEY, James D.	
SP6 QUEEN, Harold	HHD
CWO DAVIS, Charles O.	
LTC FORD, Eddie L.	
SEA GROSSCHNER, William H. Jr.	170th AHC
WO SLAYDEN, Dan J.	
WO BARTHELMISS, Robert F.	
SP4 WATTS, Luther J.	
SP4 PADGETT, William P.	119th AHC
SP4 PERRY, Ralph B.	
SP4 STARDEY, William L.	
SP5 M.H.DY, Stephan A. III	
1LT WHETSTONE, Charles B.	
SP4 CORNETT, Orrel B.	
PFC HYLTON, Norman C.	355th ASHC
SP4 LEE, George A.	662th Maint Det

b. Major items of equipment damage or destroyed

1. The following damage was sustained by aircraft at Camp Holloway:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>A/C#</u>	<u>TYPE DAMAGE</u>
UH-1H	170th	170	Extensive Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	110	Extensive Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	142	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	995	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	358	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	210	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1H	170th	616	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1C	170th	144	Major Sheetmetal Damage
UH-1C	170th	136	Minor Sheetmetal
UH-1C	119th	588	Major Sheetmetal Damage
UH-1C	119th	560	Minor Sheetmetal (Two holes)
UH-1H	189th	158	Minor Sheetmetal

4. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations.

a. Defense plans are constantly being reviewed and revised as deemed necessary.

b. Planned actions are the same as those proposed in the after action report of 30 Jan 68.

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91 SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked with at least six (6) 122mm rockets by unknown sized element of the NVA 40th Arty Regiment at 0125 Hours on 3 February 1968. The duration of the attack was approximately ten (10) minutes, during which six (6) rounds fell within the confines of Camp Holloway; four (4) were duds, two (2) detonated.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The enemy rocket crew moved into position vicinity AR8452 (approximately 9,500 meters from target center of mass), using the surrounding wooded area for concealment. At 0125 hours the first round was fired. This hit between the POL tanks causing no damage. Approximately 3-7 minutes later, the second round fell fifteen (15) feet from a JP-4 pipeline. Shrapnel from the rocket punctured the line, causing a fuel fire. Approximately ten thousand (10,000) gal of JP-4 burned before the fire was brought under control. The third round exploded in the 604th DS platoon billet, causing extensive damage to the building. The fourth round apparently had a delayed fuze. It landed five (5) meters from the DS billets, resulting in a hole in the ground six (6) inches in diameter and approximately ten (10) feet deep. The last two rounds were duds. Rounds Two (2) through six (6) landed almost simultaneously.

b. The general direction and distance of the enemy position was visually confirmed by 52d CAB Security Forces by the first flash of round number one leaving the tube. The gunships were alerted and airborne in under fifteen (15) minutes. An Air Force C-47 (Spooky) was airborne at the time. He spotted the approximate source of enemy fire and began engaging the target as the last rounds were fired. Gunships arrived on station and also engaged the suspected area with aerial rocket and mini-gun fire. Incoming rounds ceased immediately upon being engaged by aerial fire.

c. During the attack the post was on 50% alert. Individual companies to include the 604th, was on 100% alert in bunkers/defensive positions. This resulted in the DS platoon billets, 604th Trans Co, containing only one individual, a civilian. He was shaken up but received negative injuries. Throughout the night gunships and mortars continued H & I fires with unknown results. There were no indications that the Camp Holloway perimeter was penetrated during the attack.

d. The rocket attack again indicates that the enemy has used his detailed knowledge of the Camp Holloway facilities. Intended targets were the support facilities. Factors that may influenced the enemy course of action are:

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(1) Passive defense measures provide more protection to personnel than IOL and maintenance areas.

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(2) Destruction of support/supply facilities denies combat elements the prime movers of supplies, equipment and troops into forward areas, seriously affecting combat operations.

(3) Armed aircraft located at this installation constitute a major deterrent to ground assaults of installations in the Pleiku area.

(4) Due to the time-on station capability of the C-47 (Spooky) and its relatively slow scramble time, this aircraft should be airborne in the Pleiku area during the hours of darkness.

### 3. (C) Significant Intelligence Information:

a. The reaction of Spooky and the gunships probably caused the enemy to cease fire early. Also, since the last rockets fired failed to detonate, it is possible that pressure from aerial attack caused the VC to fire those rockets without arming them.

b. No reaction force was sent into the area from which the rocket attack was made. Therefore, it is impossible to accurately determine the personnel/material destruction due to aerial attack.

### 4. (C) Damage Information:

a. There were no friendly KIA or WIA.

b. The only item destroyed consisted of approximately 10,000 gal of JP-4. The 604th DS platoon billet sustained heavy damage.

### 5. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations:

#### a. Planned Actions:

(1) When an attack is eminent and we have an excess of fly-able aircraft beyond those required for flare/medical evacuation missions, they will be evacuated from Camp Holloway.

(2) Aircraft will continue to be dispersed as much as possible.

(3) Bunkers will continue to be improved.

(4) When intelligence information indicated an attack is eminent, alert status will be maintained at 100%.

(5) When aircraft requirements permit, the frequency of local area visual reconnaissance missions by 52d CAB aircraft will be increased.

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b. Recommendations:

- (1) Increase the manning level of the assigned security detachment so that it may better patrol, secure and interdict the local area.
- (2) Bring the 52d CAB up to TO&E aircraft strength or reduce commitments to enable us to increase our VR capability.
- (3) When enemy activity in the Fleiku area increases, maximum use of available ground troops be made to close with and capture or destroy the enemy before he gains the initiative.

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SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Holloway Army Airfield  
(52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by a supporting element of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment on 060245 Feb 68. Eighteen (18) rockets (122mm) were fired and impacted within the confines of Camp Holloway. The barrage lasted until 060315 Feb 68, approximately 30 minutes.

2. (C) Sequence of Events and Significant Intelligence Information:

a. The enemy rocket element of unknown size fired from positions in the vicinity of AR840510 and AR842568. There is no information pertaining to the infiltration or exfiltration of this element to the firing position.

b. Following the incoming rockets friendly artillery and gunships were employed to engage the suspected enemy positions. There was no ground assessment made to determine the extent of damage or losses to the enemy element. Incoming rockets had ceased before the gunships engaged the suspected positions.

c. The attack was well planned and executed. The impact area was the same as the attack of 02 Feb 68. Damage to friendly facilities was not serious because the rockets didn't explode in the general proximity of equipment and facilities, even though it was the same impact area. The rocket attack did not saturate the impact area to the extent of the 02 Feb 68 mortar attack.

3. (C) Damage Report:

a. The damage incurred during the attack is negligible. Two (2) UH-1H's received damage but were repaired and mission ready the same day.

b. There were no friendly WIA or KIA.

4. (C) Planned Action and Recommendation: Actions and recommendations are the same as those submitted in preceding after action reports of recent attacks on Camp Holloway.

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SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Holloway Army Compound (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN was attacked by an estimated twenty (20) to twenty five (25) man mortar section on 100205 February 1968. This section was thought to be part of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment. A total of eighty (80) 82mm mortar rounds, counted by a tape recorder turned on as the attack began, were fired into the compound. The majority of these landed in the billets area. The attack lasted fifteen (15) minutes utilizing a total of three (3) tubes.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The enemy mortar section moved into their firing position (AR820477) from the foothills vicinity AR8652. The movement, attack, and subsequent withdrawal were all conducted during the hours of darkness.

b. The general direction and distance of the enemy position was visually confirmed by 52d CAB Security Forces via flashes from the tubes. Mortar concentrations eight (8) and eleven (11), both layed in on old VC mortar positions in proximity to the flashes, were immediately fired. The standby gunships and a C-47 (Spooky) were scrambled. Counter battery fire from the 52d Arty Group was called as the attack began. Twenty three (23) minutes later the first volley was fired; fire continued for about five (5) minutes. The gunships were airborne and in a position to attack before the artillery was prepared to respond but were held off the target area until termination of artillery fire.

c. During the attack the post was on 100% alert. However, not all personnel were in bunkers; the one (1) friendly KIA and most of the WIA were in billets or in the open. Primary target was personnel in the billets area. Factors that may have influenced the enemy course of action are:

(1) During previous attacks, prime targets have been aircraft and aircraft maintenance areas. Enemy follow-up reports have probably indicated little change in our support capabilities following these attacks. Consequently, it can be surmised that, lacking noticeable effect from material target attacks, the enemy elected to try for personnel.

(2) Immediate mortar and aerial retaliation forced the enemy to limit his attack to one of short but violent duration.

3. (C) Significant intelligence information:

a. A ground reconnaissance conducted the morning of the attack located the imprints of three mortar baseplates at AR820477. A blood trail was picked up and followed N-NE to the vicinity of AR8248. At this point, the blood trail seemed to cut off toward the village of Plei Thuan.

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(AR8351) while the main body proceeded towards the foothills vicinity AR8552. A cursory interrogation of indigenous personnel in the village of Psei Thong indicated the VC had passed south of their village for both ingress and egress to the firing positions. The gunships also had a fleeting glance under the flares of approximately fifteen (15) people in a rice paddy moving north between the firing position and the village.

b. With the exception of the (1) blood trail, no indication of personnel/material destruction was found.

4. (C) Damage Information:

a. Personnel:

The following named person was KIA:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SGT SANCER, Eugene V.	119th AHC

The following named personnel were WIA (Med Evac):

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SP4 CLAYTON, Larry W.	119th AHC
PFC BROWN, Robert E.	52d Scty Det
WO1 MATHEWS, Stanley E. III	170th AHC
WO1 SHINN, Edward L.	189th AHC
WO1 STRO QUIST, Lenard P.	119th AHC
WO1 THOMPSON, Edward L.	170th AHC
Pvt THOMPSON, Gilmore C.	52d Scty Det
WO1 WEBSTER, Lawrence S. Jr.	189th AHC
SP5 WILSON, Paul A.	170th AHC

The following personnel were treated and released:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
PFC BETHA, Lee D.	52d Scty Det
MAJ BOIBIN, David L.	HHD, 52d CAB
WO1 BRINK, Thomas L.	170th AHC
SP4 BYRD, Otha L.	HHD, 52d CAB
SP5 CLARK, Simmie (NMI)	52d Scty Det
PFC CONSALVO, Joseph M.	52d Scty Det
PFC COOKSON, Jerry J.	52d Scty Det
SP4 CRITTENDEN, Terry L.	170th AHC
SP4 DICRISTO, James J.	52d Scty Det
WO1 DALLMORE, Dale A.	189th AHC
SP4 FOST, Calvin B.	189th AHC
SP4 GANCE, Chris J.	52d Scty Det

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NAME	UNIT
SF4 HUGHLEY, Homer J.	HHD, 52d CAB
WO1 HYDE, John B.	119th AHC
WO1 KIRBY, Mark A.	119th AHC
WO1 MUMFORD, Harold E. Jr.	119th AHC
WO1 PALMER, Gilford D.	119th AHC
WO1 SPARKS, John W.	189th AHC
PFC TOLLER, Dallas (AWI)	119th AHC
SF4 WILLIAMS, Jonnie B. Jr.	HHD, 52d CAB
WO1 WENDER, Joseph W.	170th AHC
CPT WIRICK, John R.	52d Ccty Det
SF3 ZEN, John A. III	662 TC Det
SF4 ZAVNUSKA, John R.	HHD, 52d CAB

b. The following damage was sustained by aircraft at Camp Holloway:

TYPE	UNIT	A/C#	DAMAGE
UH-1H	119th	527	Light: M/R blade
UH-1H	119th	524	Light: M/B blade

c. The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft:

TYPE	UNIT	DAMAGE
1/4T trk	119th	Moderate damage
1/4E trk	119th	Light damage
1/4T trk	119th	Moderate damage
3/4E trk	119th	Light damage
1/4E trk	189th	Light damage
1/4T trk	344th	Moderate damage
3/4T trk	448th	Moderate damage

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5. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations:

a. Planned actions:

(1) When an attack is eminent all personnel except those necessary for command/control/communications functions will be in bunkers or revetted areas.

(2) When an attack is eminent, a flareship will be airborne. It is interesting to note that the attack initiated immediately after a flareship had landed and before another one had been launched.

(3) A 106mm recoilless rifle has been put on emergency requisition. It will be mounted near the tower for instantaneous reaction to line-of-sight enemy fire.

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(4) Since gunships seem to react faster than artillery, their strikes will not be delayed while waiting for artillery counter-battery fire.

b. Recommendations:

(1) Increase the manning level of the assigned Security Detachment so that it may better patrol, secure and interdict the local area. The Security Detachment set up an ambush position the night following this attack: One NVA with numerous satchel charges and one pair of russian binoculars was killed.

(2) Maximum use is to be made of available ground troops in the Pleiku area to harrass, ambush, and destroy these small enemy groups before they gain the initiative.

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SUBJECT: After action report of mortar attacks on Pleiku Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 2 Feb 68

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by an unknown sized mortar element on 2700-55 Feb 68. This force is believed to be the 408th Sapper Battalion Element. The attack lasted ten minutes and a total of 65 (sixty-five) 82mm mortar rounds were fired into the billets and equipment areas.

2. (C) Sequence of events:

a. The enemy mortar section moved into firing positions in the vicinity of AR823477. The movement to firing positions, the attack, and subsequent withdrawal were conducted during the hours of darkness.

b. The general direction and distance of the enemy positions were not confirmed. Friendly mortar concentrations, a portion of the counter mortar defense plan, were fired immediately after the attack began. Gunships were scrambled but no visual confirmation of the enemy positions could be made. The enemy had stopped firing and was probably displacing once the gunships became airborne.

c. During the attack the post was on 50% alert. Primary targets of the attack were the equipment and billets areas. Factors that may have influenced the enemy choice of time and duration of the attack and target areas are:

(1) Previous enemy attacks have failed to significantly charge our support capabilities through destruction of aircraft and support facilities as primary targets.

(2) Personnel are extremely vulnerable during short violent mortar attacks when the post is not on 100% alert.

(3) The attack started when the flare-ship landed to re-fuel, and the relief ship could not be started due to maintenance difficulty. During previous attacks within the Pleiku area, reports indicated the enemy has waited to commence firing until there were no aircraft airborne to detect through aerial observation the enemy's firing positions.

3. (C) Significant Intelligence Information:

a. A sweep of the area at first light by the 52d Security Detachment resulted in no visible evidence of VC casualties. No equipment was found. Villagers in Plei Monu state that two platoons of VC had arrived outside their village at 0200 hours that morning from the north-east. At the time of the attack, the flare-ship was refueling and there was no aircraft over Camp Holloway. There have been several instances where an attack has occurred in this area during the absence of flare-ship

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coverage. The possibility exist that the VC will set up and wait several hours in the hope that they can fire without the risk of immediate detection by flare-ships.

4. (C) Damage information:

a. The following personnel received treatment at the Camp Holloway Dispensary and were released:

NAME	UNIT
1LT CONLEY, James R.	6th Sig Det
SSG J. PAUL, Duane L.	170th AHC
SP4 LURTANGEN, Lawrence A.	604th Trans Det
PFC CUVA, David W.	755th Med Det
CPT HOWE, Michael B.	189th AHC
CPT HOWLING, Ernest R.	189th AHC
PVT MC CANN, Kenneth W.	179th AHC
PVT KEELER, JOHN T.	179th ASHC
PFC BURSEL, James E.	179th AHC
1LT LINDSEY, Jerald G.	189th AHC

b. Major items of equipment damaged or destroyed:

(1) The following damage was sustained by aircraft at Camp Holloway:

TYPE	UNIT	A/C#	TYPE DAMAGE
UH-1H	119th	609	Minor: Tail boom, two holes
UH-1H	119th	535	Minor: Fuselage & tail boom
UH-1H	119th	520	Minor: Tail boom
UH-1H	119th	522	Minor: Hole in A/C windshield
UH-1H	119th	525	Minor: Main rotor blade

(2) The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft:

TYPE	UNIT	DAMAGE
3/4T M37 (1)	119th AHC	Light damage
1/4T M151 (1)	119th AHC	Moderate damage
1/4T M151 (1)	119th AHC	Heavy damage
2-1/2T M35A2 (1)	5th AHC	Light damage
1-1/2T Trailer (1)	57th AHC	Light damage
2-1/2T Tanker M49A2C (1)	344th AOD	Light damage
3/4T Trailer (1)	344th AOD	Light damage

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SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked on 050310 March 68 by a mortar section of the 408th Sapper Battalion. Fifty (50) rounds fired from two (2) 82mm mortars fell within the billets and equipment complex at Camp Holloway.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The enemy moved to and established their firing position at AR823477. They launched their attack at 0310 hours. The attack lasted approximately fifteen (15) minutes.

b. Immediately after the attack was initiated, friendly counter-mortar fire was employed. Gunships were scrambled, and supporting artillery was called.

c. Within minutes after the initiation of friendly fire, the enemy incoming rounds reduced in intensity. Within fifteen minutes, enemy fire had ceased.

d. Artillery H and I fires were utilized on suspected exfiltration routes. A mobile reaction force was employed to interdict the enemy's withdrawal. This force did not make contact.

3. (C) An agent report on 1 March 68 stated that elements of the 408th Sapper Battalion were located in the vicinity AR843537. The agent further stated that a cache built for the purpose of storing mortar tubes and equipment was located approximately one (1) kilometre north of Camp Holloway. This information corresponds to a previous PW report on 18 Feb 68, describing the general location of the 80th Co, 40th Sapper Battalion. This company appears to move from day to day in a 10-15 square kilometre area north-east of Camp Holloway. No other V.C. units have been known to operate in this area since the V.C. 3d District Local Forces Company was decimated on 30-31 January 1968.

4. (C) Damage Information:

a. Personnel:

(1) The following named personnel received treatment at Camp Holloway Dispensary and were released:

<u>N/LE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
CW2 ST JOHN, Larry W.	119th AHC
PFC THOMAS, Clarence E.	170th AHC
WO1 DONEGON, Michael J.	170th AHC

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CW3 BARNES, Thomas W. Jr.  
CW4 MATTIE, Vernon C.  
PFC CREWS, Charlie S.  
SFC REEVES, Ualmond C.

179th AHC

(2) Equipment other than aircraft which received damage:

TYPE	UNIT	DAMAGE
1/4T M151 (1)	189th AHC	Light Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	189th AHC	Light Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	189th AHC	Heavy Damage
2-1/2T M35A2 Cgo (2)	189th AHC	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T M49A2C Tanker (1)	189th AHC	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T M49A2C Tanker (1)	189th AHC	Light Damage
5T M52A2 Tractor	189th AHC	Moderate Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	170th AHC	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T M109A2 (1)	170th AHC	Moderate Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	179th ASHC	Light Damage
2-1/2T M35A2 Cgo (1)	355th Avn Co (HH)	Moderate Damage
3/4T M37B1 (1)	57th AHC	Light Damage

NOTE: No aircraft Damaged.

5. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations:

a. Due to the number of similar attacks directed against this installation, planned actions and recommendations remain the same as those presented in previous After Action Reports. All previous planned actions have been completed.

b. Recommendations that require action by higher headquarters have not been completed and should be reviewed for further action. The following recommendations pertinent to passive and active defense that remain outstanding are listed below:

- (1) Additional personnel to augment the 52d Security Det.
- (2) Additional fire support weapons, i.e., recoilless rifles and heavy mortars.

c. Consideration should be given to augment the 52d Security Detachment and increase its capability. The detachment can not secure the assigned area of operations to preclude the employment of enemy mortars which have constituted a major portion of damage to the aviation assets on Camp Holloway.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d CAB) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by an enemy mortar section utilizing two (2) 82mm mortar tubes at 0250 hours on 6 March 1968. The attack lasted approximately four (4) minutes.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The unit, an estimated fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, approached their firing position at AR827484 from the foothills vicinity AR8550 through the village of Flei Thung (AR8351).

b. As the enemy launched their attack, the flashes of their tubes were observed by personnel in the tower and the gunner on a .50 cal. machinegun located on the NE side of our perimeter. The enemy position was immediately taken under fire by the 50 cal., friendly mortars were called in on the position and gun-ships were launched.

c. Almost immediately after friendly fire was brought to bear on the enemy, the in-coming mortar rounds ceased. At first light, the Security Platoon swept the area. One (1) 82mm mortar round which had been damaged by shrapnel was found. A blood trail led from the firing position north approximately fifty (50) meters and stopped (man probably treated at this point).

d. The Security Platoon proceeded to the village of Flei Thung (AR8351). The village chief told them the enemy had entered the village from the NE at 2400 hours, pushing bicycles with two (2) mortar tubes attached. After the attack, the enemy again passed through the village and proceeded to the NE, probably returning to a base area in the foothills vicinity AR8752. The Security Platoon did not attempt to follow.

3. (C) Damage Report:

a. The following personnel were WIA, treated at Camp Holloway Dispensary and released:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
PVT FULLER, James A.	179th ASHC
SF4 WEIBKE, Marvin R.	170th AHC

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b. Major items of equipment damaged or destroyed:

(1) The following damage was sustained by aircraft at Camp Holloway:

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LN</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
UH-1H	119th	66-15520	Major Damage--(Turn-In)
UH-1H	119th	66-15523	Minor Damage
UH-1H	119th	66-15527	Minor Damage
UH-1H	170th	66-16616	Minor Damage

(2) The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
3/4T M37E1 (1)	119th	Light Damage
3/4T M37E1 (1)	57th	Heavy Damage
2-1/2T M55A2 (1)	57th	Moderate Damage
1/4T M131 (1)	179th	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T M49A2C (1)	170th	Moderate Damage
2-1/2T M49A2C (1)	170th	Moderate Damage

4. (C) Planned Actions and Recommendations:

a. Planned actions: No change from previous reports.

b. Recommendations: One of the indigenous personnel of Plei Thung be hired as a friendly agent and given an FM radio. This individual could then relay current information concerning enemy activity/movement to us via II Corps HQ.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Holloway Army Airfield (52d C&B) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by two (2) 82mm mortar tubes of an enemy element in support of the 408th NVA Sapper Battalion at 0100 hours on 10 March 1968. The mortar attack lasted approximately ten (10) minutes and was concentrated against the 88th S&S Bn and the 52d C&B billets areas.

2. (C) Sequence of Events:

a. The mortar element, an estimated 15-20 man force, approached their firing position from the east. The two mortars located in the vicinity of AR827484 opened fire on the Camp Holloway Complex, and between 0100 and 0110 hours forty rounds were fired into the billets area. The heaviest concentration fell into the 88th S&S Bn billets area.

b. The enemy mortar locations were not confirmed but immediately following the incoming rounds, friendly counter mortar, artillery, and gunships fire were brought to bear on the suspected positions. Within minutes incoming fire ceased.

c. The subsequent enemy withdrawal was undetected. Artillery fire was called into interdict.

3. (C) Significant Intelligence:

a. Mortar positions for the attack were located approximately 50 meters from the mortar positions used for the 6 March attack against Camp Holloway. Trails leading north from the mortar positions to the river crossing point again indicate the VC used Plei Thung village as a thoroughfare into the area. Only one intelligence report indicating an attack was received prior to the attack, a radio reading on 7 March north of the river line, assumed to be recon personnel. Although it is assumed that the 408th is the responsible unit for the attack, the fact that the attack was coordinated, with mortars against Holloway and New Pleiku, and a sapper attack against the rock quarry, leads to the conclusion that the 408th, understrength at the present, was supported by another unit. There was one agent report of a K-28 Sapper Bn, although currently unaccepted in order of battle, has been reported by three PW's, two from the 408th and in one document. The K-28 supported the 408th Sapper Bn on the 30th and 31st of January in the attack on Pleiku.

4. (C) Damage Information:

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a. The following personnel were WIA, treated at Camp Holloway Dispensary and released:

NAME (U) UNIT (SAS USE) STATUS

WO1 HAWKINS, Dan A. saw WIA, killed (S) 170th AHG (S) (U) (S)  
The 88th S&S Bn had ten WIA's names omitted.

b. The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
1/4T veh	189th	Light Damage
Bldg #134	189th	Light Damage
2 Bldgs	19th	Light Damage
2 Bldgs	170th	Light Damage
1 chair, office type	88th	
2 desks	88th	
2 file cabinets	88th	
4 tents	88th	
Freezer Cabinets	88th	
Telephone TA 312	88th	
1 chair special service	88th	
Dispenser, water	88th	
Tank, Liquid, 600 gal.	88th	

5. (C) Planned actions and recommendations:

Due to the number of similar attacks on this complex, planned actions and recommendations have been omitted.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Heliway Army Airfield (52d C&B) 1 Feb through 30 April (U)

1. (C) 29020 Mar 68
2. (C) Fifty-second Combat Aviation Battalion
3. (C) AR801470
4. (C) Mortar, 20 VC, 33 rounds, 82mm.
5. (C) a. 57th AHC

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>A/C#</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
UH-1H	66-17116	Moderate: holes in fuselage, windscreen M/R blades scissors levers, T/R blades
UH-1H	66-16174	Light: holes in tail-boom and fuselage, in one M/R
b. 119th AHC		
UH-1H	66-16180	Light: holes in tail-boom
UH-1H	66-16535	Light: holes in tail-boom and fuselage
UH-1H	66-16609	Light: holes in fuselage
c. 170th AHC		
UH-1H	66-995	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage, M/R T/R blades, engine and deck areas
UH-1H	67-17246	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage, M/R T/R blades
UH-1H	67-17273	Light: holes in tail-boom, T/R blades, fuselage
UH-1H	66-16394	Heavy: Direct hit to mast head. Extensive sheet metal and components replacement necessary
d. 189th AHC		
UH-1C	66-15213	Light: holes in 1 M/R blade, 1 T/R blade, drive shaft and fuselage
UH-1C	66-690	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage, M/R T/R blades
UH-1C	66-696	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage
UH-1C	66-694	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, fuselage, M/R blades
UH-1C	66-15037	Light: holes in tail-boom and T/R blades
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e. 219th Recon (pl): Co

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0-1D 57-2966 Heavy: holes in engine, fuselage.

6. (C) Following personnel were WIA, treated at Camp Holloway Dispensary and released:

<u>N/ME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
L/SCH, Roger N. WO1	179th ASHC
BOIVIN, David L. MAJ	52d CAB
LEVI, Neil I. MAJ	189th AHC
BOWENS, Charlie Jr. PVT	405th Trans Det
CONNORS, Jerald T. SP5	179th AHC

An additional nine personnel were wounded from the 88th S&S Bn and 85th E.O.D. names have been omitted.

7. (C) One of the OP's spotted flashes from the enemy tubes and called in counter mortar fire. Gunships were deployed from HAAF

8. (C) VC ceased fire and withdraw.

9. (C) Bn went on 100% alert ten minutes prior to mortar attack, due to explosion in ARVN ASP. Personnel were on way to bunkers or already covered positions. Counter mortar fire engaged target. Personnel moved in calm and efficient manner.

10. (C) LTC Lehman, Commanding Officer 52d CAB.

11. (C) 52d CAB

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SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Kontum airfield (57th AHC) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) General:

a. The sustained attack by NVA/VC forces in the Kontum area began 30 January at 0212 hours and was reduced to minor sniper fire and occasional mortar/rocket rounds by 0800 hours on 5 February 1968. This was a coordinated attack against the City of Kontum as well as all U.S. and ARVN military installations in the area. The magnitude of the attack requires consideration of entire Kontum action rather than the 57th Assault Helicopter Company area alone.

b. Indications are that the overall plan called for taking advantage of the isolated location of US and ARVN compounds. The plan was time phased to eliminate specific compounds on given dates. The 57th Assault Helicopter Company was the first to come under heavy ground attack. This attack, from 30 0230 thru 31 0900 January 1968, was by an estimated force of 200 and included sapper, security and indirect fire elements.

c. The major attack on this compound was basically a repeat of the 10 January action. NVA intelligence had not been updated since that time and apparently they were not aware of improvements to the existing defensive posture. The enemy was either over confident in their ability to eliminate this unit or were inflexible to initiate alternate plans once the attack had failed. The action on subsequent days was oriented mainly against MACV, Special Forces, 43rd Signal and 24th STZ compounds.

2. (C) Sequence of Events

a. 30 January 1968

(1) At 300212 hours a coordinated rocket, mortar and ground attack was launched against the 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound. During the battle that followed NVA forces reached a point within 50 meters of our defensive wire. Gunships engaged the enemy outside the entire eastern perimeter at a range of 20-30 meters utilizing miniguns and M-5 systems. This action, combined with ground defensive fire, broke the attack but fighting continued until 0900 hours 30 January.

(2) Defensive fires of this unit combined with those of A Troop, 2/1 Cav inflicted heavy casualties upon the attacking forces and sealed off escape routes for NVA elements.

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(3) The action during the early morning hours of 30 January resulted in one aircraft receiving minor damage on the ground while six additional aircraft, including four gunships, received varying degree of damage from intense enemy fire while performing aerial flight.

(4) From first light until 0900 hours gunships of 52d Battalion engaged isolated units to the east and northeast of this compound. Action was later continued with T/C A-1. A firm body count for all 52d Combat Aviation Battalion gunships was not obtained but 57th guns accounted for 35 NVA bodies during this phase of the action.

(5) A sweep of the area was initiated at 0900 hours to conduct a body count along the perimeter. This action was terminated by intense sniper fire prior to completion. Body count had reached 59 at this time.

(6) Sniper fire continued throughout the day along the east, west and north perimeter.

(7) 122mm rocket and mortar attack was initiated at 1845 hours. Sporadic fire and small scale probes continued until 2400 hours.

b. 31 January 1968

(1) Between the hours of 0230 and 0330 a series of reports from 24th STZ indicated a severe situation in their compounds.

(a) NVA/VC forces, estimated at 150 strength, were overrunning their perimeter and final bunkers were occupied.

(b) The 105mm battery was reported to be infiltrated and possibly in enemy hands.

(c) This unit was notified that M4CV and B-24 compounds were being overrun. (Gunships dispatched and engaged the NVA forces along the wire defenses at which time enemy forces withdrew).

(d) Zone notified this unit of a confirmed NVA forces of 300 - 500 men located 2000 meters to the east of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound.

(e) At this time the Senior Advisor, 24th STZ declared a tactical emergency in an effort to obtain additional gunship and T/C request we relay the situation and declaration to II Corps headquarters through 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

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(2) Enemy forces infiltrated ARVN forces defending the south side of Kontum Airfield and were within hand grenade range of our southern perimeter. Gunships were employed and a low pass with searchlight indicated seven bodies along the fence.

(3) Steady but light contact was maintained on the east and west perimeter between the hours of 1900 and 2400.

c. 1 February 1968

(1) Gunships of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion were employed from 0230 thru 0800 against targets within the built-up area of Kontum and to the north. Targets included buildings, churches, stretches of housing and government complexes. In each case fire was requested and targets identified by ground commander and/or advisers.

(2) Sniper activity continued on east and west perimeter of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company throughout the period.

(3) A rocket and mortar attack was launched by the enemy at 1745 hours. Counter fire in close proximity to our perimeter, when mixed with enemy fire, made it extremely difficult to differentiate between friendly and enemy rounds.

(4) Light probes against the western perimeter were encountered from 1910 hours until the end of this period.

d. 2 February 1968

(1) At 0220 hours a mortar, rocket and ground attack was launched against the MACV, signal and special forces complex. Gunships were dispatched in support of local defense.

(2) Six teams of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion gunships were on-station supporting local forces against heavy enemy fire in and around the city. Methods of control included:

(a) Targets and clearance to fire were obtained from ground commanders.

(b) Those targets familiar to personnel operating Galdiator TOC, for which definite targets identification control measures could be established, were controlled by this unit. Targets that were unfamiliar to TOC personnel were passed to the requesting agency for identification and control.

(c) Gunships not assigned to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion were operating in area without contact and minor control problems were encountered.

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(d) All 52d Combat Aviation Battalion aircraft were given a cease fire and returned to 57th Assault Helicopter Company revetment area until positive fire control was established.

(e) See lessons learned.

(3) Cantonment area received (4) 122mm rockets at 1900 hours setting fire to a 5,000 gallon tanker.

(4) Isolated sniper fire during the remainder of the period. Total cumulative KIA and KBA count was 203.

e. 3 February 1968. Enemy activity decreased considerably however, rocket attacks on this compound occurred at 1040 and 1200 hours.

f. 4 February 1968. Relatively inactive with the exception of (2) 122mm rockets in the compound at 1600 hours. The City of Kontum was reported secure except for sniper fire. The 57th Assault Helicopter Company continued on 100% alert and provided continuous illumination during the hours of darkness.

g. 5 February 1968. An estimated enemy battalion moved within 3 kilometers of MACV compound during the early hours and were engaged by artillery and gunships. Activity was on a small scale and this unit received six unidentified rounds that failed to explode and penetrated to a depth of six feet (assumed to be 105mm illumination). Flare coverage was reduced to a standby status and unit went on 50% alert.

### 3. (C) Significant Factors

a. The NVI intelligence on local defense appeared to be the same as 10 January attack. This possibly is due to control of civilian traffic around the 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound. In addition, local hire personnel are used outside the compound only.

b. The security force of 35 provided to this unit after the 10 January attack was instrumental in improving defensive facilities during the 20 day period between attacks. Major accomplishments included:

- (1) Defensive wire was improved and expanded out to encompass a larger area. This work is still in progress.
- (2) Temporary perimeter lighting had been installed.
- (3) Bunkers had been improved and repositioned.
- (4) A larger force was employed on the perimeter.

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113 c. The NVA/VC body count reached a total of 203 by KIA and KBA. This figure is by no means all inclusive for 52d Combat Aviation Battalion action in the Kontum area. In addition, secondary explosions were obtained during gunship employment against four mortar and rocket positions.

d. A search of the battle area in the vicinity of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company perimeter revealed numerous satchel charges, bangalore torpedes (home made and manufactured), wire cutters and 60mm mortars thus, verifying the intent to destroy this complex to include aircraft.

e. The sequence of events indicates the enemy respected the potential of helicopters being employed against their force and therefore intended to eliminate that threat on the first day of the attack.

f. Continuous illumination of the battle area around Kontum was a major factor in the successful defense by all US and ARVN forces during the hours of darkness.

g. Night employment of gunships in a final protective fire role was a significant factor in preventing enemy penetration of compounds on at least two occasions.

h. This unit suffered no loss or damage to major items of equipment other than aircraft. All aircraft damaged appear to be repairable.

i. The parking area for O-1 and O-2 aircraft (south side of field) was destroyed. An emergency work order is being submitted to prepare temporary parking facilities.

#### 4. (C) Lessons Learned

a. The armed helicopter is an accurate and effective weapons platform that can be integrated into final projective fires. Employment at night, as well as in built-up areas, requires close coordination, target identification and positive location of friendly troops by the commander being supported. These systems are area type weapons and ground commanders must accept a degree of risk that some rounds will inadvertently land within their positions when employed close-up or on point targets.

b. The enemy force, when employing infiltration and sapper tactics, is inflexible to changes in defenses that disrupt his rehearsed plan. Continued improvement to wire locations, bunker locations, and overall security serves to deny him the intelligence, detailed planning and rehearsal so often employed in successful infiltrations.

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c. The lack of combat forces in the immediate vicinity of Kontum and the covered avenue of approach from the north thru the southeast continues to be the major problem in providing adequate security for this compound. An enemy force of any size has a high probability of reaching this unit's perimeter prior to detection.

d. The physical location of US and ARVN compounds are such that any mutual support is denied. This situation favors the enemy in that he can attack and eliminate compounds one by one with minimum interference. The major exceptions are supporting artillery and gunships.

e. The organic fire power of an assault helicopter company and its detachments is capable of defending against a substantial attacking force. However, manning the perimeter on 50% alert during the hours of darkness degrades immensely from the aircraft maintenance effort and results in a slow recovery to full operational capacity.

f. It is essential that one agency have knowledge of all gunships operating in the area. At one time two gun teams (other than 52d (A/B) were operating independently in and around Kontum City. Friendly forces were being fired upon and 57th Assault Helicopter Company TOC had no means of contacting these elements to effect a cease fire.

5. (C) Planned action and recommendations

a. Planned actions

(1) Work will continue to replace defensive wire destroyed, expand the outer perimeter wire and install anti-personnel mines along the north and east side.

(2) Civilian access to the compound is limited to permanent hire and KP personnel who have received a local clearance. Civilian traffic through the area will continue to be denied.

(3) Continued improvement on defensive bunkers.

(4) Temporary perimeter lighting will be improved. The major limiting factor is a readily available power source. This unit has operated on TO&E generators since arrival in-country. The demand for power has reached a stage where lights to the billeting area is occasionally denied to provide perimeter lights.

(5) Defensive plans will continue to be reviewed and updated as required.

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## b. Recommendations

- (1) A US combat unit be stationed in the Kontum area to provide early detection and warning of any forces approaching along the major avenues of approach.
- (2) Designation of one agency to control all gunships operating within the immediate tactical area.
- (3) Immediate replacement of key personnel losses during the month of January.
- (4) Authorization be given to retain the security augmentation from other battalions until planned improvements to local defenses are completed. (Estimated 2-3 Week period)
- (5) USARV approval and engineer tasking for the 57th Assault Helicopter Company base development plan be expedited so that construction of permanent defenses can be accomplished with minimum time delay.

## 6. (c) Listing of damage and casualties

a. During the action of 30 January thru 5 February, 26 personnel were wounded.

b. Of the above total the following individuals have been evacuated and may be a permanent loss of this unit:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NO</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
SULLIVAN, KENNETH J.	MAJ	04030953	57th AHC
LESLIE, JEAN F. SR.	CW2	W3154207	57th AHC
SOPUCH, HERBERT N.	SP4 E4	US52688284	57th AHC
BLANKENSHIP, MARVIN	SP4 E4	US52679955	57th AHC
LITTLE, WILLIAM H.	SP4 E4	US56697966	57th AHC
WASHINGTON, THOMAS	PFC E3	US63001896	57th AHC
HILLS, WILLIAM P.	PFC E3	RA18825173	57th AHC
FANNING, WILLIAM M.	FVT E2	RA18825433	57th AHC
NASH, JOHN C.	SSG E6	RA18532673	615th Trans
SHIRRIFF, JAMES C. JR.	SP4 E4	RA18951430	615th Trans
ELIAS, JOHN JR.	PFC E3	RA18715159	615th Trans

c. The following list shows the maintenance personnel shortages within the 615th Trans Det and Service Platoon at this time. Shortages which are directly affecting maintenance productivity are designated by an asterisk.

615th Det

<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Job Title</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>
(1)	*	Aircraft Maintenance Technician	WO	062B

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- (2) \*1 Detachment First Sergeant (Note 1) E-8 67740
- (3) \*1 Assistant Shop Foreman E-6 67740
- (4) \*2 Senior Engine Repairman E-5 68820
- (5) \*2 Senior Airframe Repairman (Note 2) E-5 68820
- (6) \*2 Airframe Repairman E-4 68820
- (7) 1 Aircraft Electrical Repairman E-4 68820
- (8) \*1 Aircraft Supply Specialist E-5 76850
- (9) 1 Aircraft Supply Specialist E-3 76420
- (10) \*1 Aircraft Tech Inspector (Note 3) E-6 67740
- (11) \*1 Aircraft Armament Repairman E-4 45J20

b. Service Platoon Maintenance Shortages

<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Job Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>
(1)	1	Maintenance Supervisor	E-6	67N40
(2)	5	Senior Helicopter Repairman	E-5	67N20

Note 1. Although the Det First Sergeant does not directly affect the maintenance output, his absence requires most of the time of the Shop Foreman acting as First Sergeant.

Note 2. Includes one man who is DEROS in 10 days.

Note 3. Includes one man who is on emergency leave and is not expected to return.

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Kontum Airfield  
(57th AHC) (Kontum, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) 011004 Mar 68
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Strength of units (2 above): 218 personnel.
4. (C) Estimated number of VC: Unk.
5. (C) Location: Unk
6. (C) Casualties: Friendly, none, VC, unknown.
7. (C) N/A
8. (C) N/A
9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by the VC: 122mm rockets,  
82mm mortars.
10. (C) Gunships and other reinforcements used: Gunships, Spooky,  
Artillery.
11. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

60mm mortar - 5	unk
81mm - 0	0
4.2" mortar - 0	23
Artillery - Unk	0
Gunships - 28 rkts 10,000 7.62mm	0
Other - Spooky expended twice	0

12. (C) VC did not use satchel charges.
13. (C) Distance at which attack was initiated was 6000 meters.
14. (C) Duration of attack: 40 minutes.
15. (C) Engagement broken off due to gunships, artillery and  
Spooky. VC withdrew.

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16. (C) All personnel manned their positions and the alert crews manned their ships and took off.

17. (C) 1st Avn Bde unit officer present was 1st Lt. George E. Burnison.

18. (C) Unit with primary responsibility for protection of installation was the 57th AHC.

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Kontum Airfield  
(57th AHC) (Kontum, RVN) 1 February through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) 17 March 1968
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company.
3. (C) Strength of units (2 above): 12 officers, 44 WO's, 209 EM.
4. (C) Estimated number of VC: Unk.
5. (C) Location AR864935.
6. (C) Casualties: Friendly, 1 WIA. Enemy, Unk.
7. (C) N/A
8. (C) N/A
9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by VC: 122mm rockets.
10. (C) Gunships and artillery were used.
11. (C) Estimate of number of rounds fired: Friendly, unk.  
Enemy, 14 rkts.
12. (C) N/A
13. (C) Distance at which action was initiated: 8500 meters.
14. (C) Duration of attack was 30 minutes.
15. (C) Engagement broken off by VC because of gunships, artillery,  
and Spooky.
16. (C) Friendly reaction and behavior was good. Personnel  
manned defensive positions and alert crews manned their ships and  
took off.
17. (C) 1st Avn Bde unit officer present was LTC Charles E.  
Stanley.
18. (C) Unit having primary responsibility for defense of  
installation was 57th Assault Helicopter Company.

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Kontum Airfield  
(57th ABC) (Kontum, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) 20 Mar 68 2340 hours and 21 Mar 68 0300 hrs.
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Strength of units (2 above): Officers: 12 WO's: 44  
EN: 194
4. (C) Estimated number of Viet Cong: Unk
5. (C) Location: Vicinity of AR862934
6. (C) Casualties: Friendly: 1 WIA, Enemy: Unk.
7. (C) N/A
8. (C) UH-1G (66-15079) Light Damage
9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by VC: 122mm rockets.
10. (C) Gunships, Spooky, and artillery were used as reinforcements.
11. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

UNK

8 rcts 122mm

12. (C) N/A
13. (C) Distance at which action was initiated: 8500 meters
14. (C) Duration of attack, first phase 6 min, second phase 6 min.
15. (C) N/A
16. (C) Friendly reaction and behavior was good. Personnel manned defensive positions and alert crews manned their aircraft and took-off.
17. (C) 1st Avn Bde unit officer present was LTC George E. Burnison.
18. (C) Unit with primary responsibility of defending installation was 57th Assault Helicopter Company.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Kontum Airfield  
(57th AHC) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) DTG 21 March 1968 1235
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Strength of Units (2 above) Officers: 12 WO's: 44  
EM 184.
4. (C) Estimated number of Viet Cong: UNK
5. (C) Location (6 digit coordinates): AR841962
6. (C) Casualties:

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>VC</u>
KIA	0	UNK
WIA	0	UNK
MIA	0	UNK

7. (C) Description of friendly losses of personnel by type N/A  
i.e. (CE, gunner, etc.).
8. (C) Description of equipment losses, friendly or VC:  
(Aircraft, Weapons by type, etc.).
9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by the VC: 122mm rockets.
10. (C) Gunships and other reinforcements used: Gunships, Artillery.
11. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>VC</u>
60MM Mortar	UNK	0
81MM Mortar	UNK	0
4.2" Mortar	UNK	0
Artillery	UNK	3
Gunships	NCNE	N/A
Other	---	N/A

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12. (C) Did the VC use satchel - NO. 122
13. (C) Distance at which action was initiated - 8700 meters.
14. (C) What was the duration of the attack - 06 minutes.
15. (C) Why was the engagement broken off - VC stopped shooting and withdrew.
16. (C) Generally, what was the friendly reaction and behavior - Personnel manned defensive positions, gunships took off.
17. (C) Name of senior 1st Aviation Brigade unit officer present George E. Burnison, LTC Inf. Commanding.
18. (C) Unit having primary responsibility for defense of installation. 57th Assault Helicopter Company APO 96499.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report of Enemy Attacks on Kontum Airfield  
(57th AHC) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) DTG 241803 March 68
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Locations: AR 788898
4. (C) Type of Attack:
  - (a) ground, mortar, rocket: Rocket
  - (b) size of attacking force: Unknown
  - (c) number of rounds by type: (7) seven 122mm Rocket Rounds.
  - (d) any additional pertinent information describing the attack: Rocket came from AR 841961 & AR 849966
5. (C) Description of Aircraft Damage and Loss: None
6. (C) Description of Facilities Damage and Loss: None
7. (C) Description of Communications Damage and Loss: None
8. (C) Description of Casualties to Include Personnel by type (eg, CE, etc): None
9. (C) Distance at which the action was initiated: 8700 Meters and 9900 Meters.
10. (C) Duration of attack: 06 minutes.
11. (C) Description of Sapper Attack N/A.
12. (C) Gunships and other Reinforcements used: Gunships & Artillery.
13. (C) Reasons why engagement was broken off: Gunships & Artillery was Employed and Enemy discontinued fire.
14. (C) Discuss the Friendly Reaction and Behavior: Personnel manned their positions & Gun Crews took off.

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SUBJECT: After action report of enemy attacks on Kontum airfield  
(57th AHC) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

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1. (C) DTG 5 April 68 2210
2. (C) Unit or Units: 57th Assault Helicopter Company
3. (C) Location (digit coordinates): LR788892
4. (C) Type of Attack:
  - (a) ground, mortar, rocket: Rocket
  - (b) size of attacking force: Unknown
  - (c) number of rounds by type: (22) 122mm Rocket Rounds
  - (d) any additional pertinent information describing the attack: Rockets were fired at or near the following locations:  
LR 848966 LR 848958 LR 858933
5. (C) Description of Aircraft Damage and Loss: (5) UH-1C  
Light Damage, (5) UH-1H Light Damage
6. (C) Description of Facilities Damage and Loss: G.I. Medium  
Tent
7. (C) Description of communications Damage and Loss: Damage  
to Communications wire-loss of Communications to outside lines.
8. (C) Description of Casualties to Include Personnel by type  
(eg, CE, etc): 8 WIA
9. (C) Distance at which the action was initiated: Approximately  
8000 meters.
10. (C) Duration of the Attack: 19 Minutes
11. (C) Description of Sapper Attack: N/A
12. (C) Gunships and other Reinforcements used: Artillery and  
Helicopter Gunships.
13. (C) Reasons why engagement was broken off: Enemy ceased  
fire due to arrival of gunships.

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14. (C) Discuss the Friendly Reaction and Behavior: 50% Alert at 2000 hours. Remainder of personnel immediately secured defensive positions, Gunships were unable to get airborne due to the close proximity and intensity of the rocket fire.

15. (C) Name of Senior 1st Brigade Unit Officer and his Primary Duty: Charles E. Stanley LTC TC Airfield Commander.

16. (C) Unit having Primary Responsibility for Defense of the Installation: 57th Assault Helicopter Company.

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell  
(155th AHC) (Ban Me Thuot, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

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1. (C) Following is a narrative of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on 1 February 1968.

a. At 0210 approximately 20 rounds fell within the limits of the compound of Camp Coryell, many of which fell in the cantonment area.

b. Directions for the defense of Camp Coryell were given by Major Billy R. Goodall, commanding officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company, from the combat operations center.

c. Flare and Gun standby ships were instructed to search the area and give support to those units in the area that needed it.

d. Instructions given for the defense of the compound included:

(1) Direction for mortar concentrations of high explosive and illumination rounds.

(2) Directions given for protective fire to those in defensive positions with small arms and machine-guns.

e. Mortar rounds which fell in the cantonment area caused six casualties, two of which were serious enough in nature to require med-evac to Nha Trang.

f. Light damage was incurred by the officers latrine, 165th Maintenance Office, and the 568th Medical Detachment cantonment area.

2. (C) Damage Report: Aircraft:

<u>A/C#</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
66-16387	Heavy: Turn-in
66-16389	Moderate
66-16372	Moderate
66-16377	Moderate
66-16439	Light Damage

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell  
(155th AHC) (Ban Me Thuot, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) Following is a narrative description of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on 2 February 1968.

a. At 0310 hours approximately 25 mortar rounds fell within the limits of the Camp Coryell compound, most of which fell in the aircraft parking area.

b. At the time of the attack the compound was already on alert and most of the personnel on the compound were in bunkers. There were no casualties.

c. Directions for the defense of the compound were given from the command operations center by Major Billy R. Goodall, Commanding Officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company.

d. The gun and flare ships were used for illumination and defense of the Camp Coryell compound.

e. Damage:

<u>L/C#</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
66-16379	Heavy
66-17137	Heavy: Turn-in
66-16216	Moderate
66-16377	Moderate
66-16438	Moderate
66-16046	Heavy

f. Due to the number of rounds that have fallen on this compound during these attacks the exact location of each round's impact area has been impossible to plot.

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell  
(155th AHC) (Ban Lie Thuet, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

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1. (C) Following is a narrative description of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on the morning of 4 February 1968.
2. (C) At 0150 hours approximately 20 rounds fell within the limits of the Camp Coryell compound.
3. (C) Personnel on the compound were on alert and in the bunkers, so no casualties were incurred.
4. (C) Instructions for the defense of the compound and utilization of the flare and gun standby ships were given from the Command Operations Center by Major Billy R. Goodall, Commanding Officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company.

5. (C) Damage

A/C#

DAMAGE

66-16441

Moderate

66-16438

Light

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell  
(155th AHC) (Ban Lo Thuot, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) Following is a narrative description of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on the evening of 5 February 1968.
2. (C) At 2240 hours approximately 30 mortar rounds fell within the limits of the Camp Coryell compound, falling in the aircraft parking area and the cantonment area.
3. (C) Eight casualties were incurred during this attack by persons trying to make their way to their positions.
4. (C) Instructions for defense of the compound by small arms, machine-guns, mortars with illumination and high explosive rounds, and utilization of flare and gun standby ships were given from the command operations center by Major Billy H. Goodall, commanding officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company.
5. (C) Damage Information

L/C#

DAMAGE

66-16215	Heavy: Turn-in
66-16380	Heavy: Turn-in
66-16438	Heavy: Sheet-metal, 2 T/R blades, 2 K/R blades
66-16387	Extensive sheet-metal
66-16216	Moderate: holes in tail-boom, 3 K/R blades
66-16381	Moderate
66-16389	Light: Sheet-metal
66-16090	Light: Sheet-metal; fuel cells, 2 K/R blades
66-16377	Light: Sheet-metal; needs tail-boom
66-16379	Light: Sheet-metal

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66-16441

Light: Sheet-metal,  
T/R Blades

66-16372

Light: Two ~~Syno~~ Elevators

66-16440

Light: Sheet-metal

66-16668(Dust-Off)

Light: Sheet-metal

F-10 L/C# Damaged:

None

66-16580

Light: 1M/R blade  
Sheet-metal

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of enemy attacks on Camp Coryell  
(155th AHC) (Ban No Thuct, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) 0115 23 Feb 68
2. (C) 155th Assault Helicopter Company & attached units.
3. (C) Strength of above units placed at 518 personnel.
4. (C) Estimated number of VC: 50.
5. (C) Location: 1Q805042.
6. (C) Casualties: Friendly; none, VC; unknown.
7. (C) Damage:

<u>L/C#</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
UH-1C	155th	Light
UH-1C	155th	Light
UH-1C	155th	Light
UH-1C	170th	Light
UH-1C	170th	Light
UH-1H	170th	Moderate
UH-1H	170th	Light
UH-1C	355th	Light

8. (C) Weapons used by VC were believed to be 3 tubes, 82mm mortar.

9. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

FRIENDLY

VC

(158) 81 mm mortar

(53) 82mm mortar

10. (C) Distance at which action was initiated is 2000 meters.
11. (C) Duration of the attack was five minutes

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12. (C) Engagement was broken due to counter-mortar fire. Installation defense was adequate. VC stopped shooting and withdrew.

13. (C) Friendly reaction and behavior was excellent. One-hundred percent alert. Responded with counter-mortar fire. Requested artillery support from 23d Artillery Division. All bunkers manned and ready.

14. (C) Senior 1st Avn Bde unit officer present was MAJ. Mullen, CO, 185th Recon. Aplt. Co.

15. (C) Unit with primary responsibility of defending installation was 155th Assault Helicopter Company

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Conyell  
(155th AHC) (Ban Ho Thuot, DM) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) 0350 4 Mar 68
2. (C) 185th Recon, Airplane Co. 155th Assault Helicopter Company and attached units.
3. (C) Strength of units (two above): Approx. 700 personnel
4. (C) Estimated number of VC: Approximately 200 personnel
5. (C) Location: (6 digit coordinates) AQ805042
6. (C) Casualties:

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>VC</u>
MIA	4	8
WIA	27	25 (Estimated)
MIA	0	0 (Unk)

7. (C) Description of friendly losses by type:

- a. 1 CO (185th RAC)
- b. 1 Korean (F&E)
- c. 2 personnel (Det#: 10, 5th Wx Sqdn, USAF)

8. (C) Description of equipment losses, friendly or VC:

- a. Friendly Equipment losses (Captured):

1/4T jeeps (9)	5T trk (6)	Orderly Room (1)
1/4T trks (12)	Forklifts (2)	Pers. prop. \$1200.00
2-1/2T trks (7)	Billets (5)	

- b. Enemy Equipment losses (Captured):

MK-47 Auto. rifles (6)	Directional Mine (CHICQ:) (1)
Bangalore torp. (Bamboo & Comp. B)(12)	Satchel charges (3)
Grenades. hand (CHICQ:) (2)	Var. items indiv. equip & web gear.

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9. (C) Estimate of weapons used by VC: 134

4 tubes, 82mm mortar

1 Bangalore Torpedo

3 B-40 Rockets

10. (C) Gunships and other reinforcements used:

1 UH-1H Flareship

2 UH-1C Gunships

Counter-mortar fire

1 AC-47 (SPOOKY)

11. (C) Estimated number of rounds fired:

FRIENDLY

(286) 81mm mortar

(2) Gunships

ENEMY

(86) 81mm mortar

(3) B-40 rockets

(1) Bangalore Torp.

12. (C) VC attempted to employ satchel charges. They were of hand-made type holding Composition B. Number of satchel charges VC had on hand is unknown.

13. (C) Distance at which action was initiated: 10 meters; B-40 Rockets, 1000 meters, mortars.

14. (C) The attack on Camp Coryell lasted 50 minutes.

15. (C) Engagement was broken by enemy forces due to counter-mortar fire and other protective fires. The installation was adequately defended. VC suffered heavy casualties along NW perimeter as a result of protective fire.

16. (C) Friendly reaction and behavior to attack was good. 100% alert status; all defensive positions manned NLT 0357. Good fire discipline. Reaction force committed 0410. FPL called 0415.

17. (C) Senior 1st Avn Bde unit officer was MAJ. J. Mullen, CG, 185th RAC.

18. (C) Unit with primary responsibility of defending installation

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135 155th Assault Helicopter Company.

19. (C) Three separate mortar barrages were launched. The first attack occurred at 0350 when approximately 46 rounds were fired. The second and third barrages were at 0415 and 0440 respectively. Approximately 24 and 16 rounds were fired respectively. During this period of time the perimeter was breached by the use of a Bangalore torpedo in the vicinity of the P&E motor park. A portion of the ammo dump was destroyed by some means; either mortar rounds or satchel charges. An estimated company size hostile force was repulsed along the NW perimeter. This force fired three E-40 rockets into the perimeter and had attempted to replace Bangalore torpedoes, mines, grenades, and satchel charges along the perimeter.

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell (155th AHC) (Ban Me Thuct, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) Following is a narrative recapitulation of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, (AQ805042), on 13 March 1968. Report submitted IAW 1st Avn Bde Reg 335-1.

a. At 2220 hours, 13 March 1968, the Camp Coryell complex was attacked by a hostile force utilizing an unknown number of 82mm mortar tubes. An estimated 81 rounds were fired in four separate barrages at 2220 hours, 2240 hours, 2315 hours, and 2325 hours.

b. The compound had been on 50% alert. Upon attack, the signal for 100% alert was given and all defensive positions were manned at 100% posture at 2230 hours. Counter mortar fire was immediately delivered on suspectee enemy locations, along with illumination rounds delivered on preplanned concentrations. A total of 317 rounds were expended as follows: He; 229 rounds, WP; 57 rounds, ILLUM; 31 rounds. Result unknown.

c. Continual coordination was effected throughout the night with 23d ARVN Division MACV Advisory Team.

d. Two UH-1C gunships and one UH-1H flareship were airborne at 2250 hours. They continued to search suspected hostile locations throughout the night with negative results.

e. A state of 100% alert was maintained until 0700 hours.

2. (C) There were 20 WIA and one KIA on the compound. Three personnel were medically evacuated during the night utilizing Dustoff and organic aircraft. Casualties are listed below:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>WIA/KIA</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
GOODWILL, Billy R.	MAJ	WIA	155th AHC
BAKER, Charles H.	SSG	WIA	155th AHC
BRENNEMAN, James L.	1LT	WIA	155th AHC
BRADSHAW, Robert J.	SSG	WIA	155th AHC
JARNIGAN, Jack G.	SSG	WIA	155th AHC
MAREE, George R.	PFC	WIA	155th AHC

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KAUS, Gary A.	WO1	WIA	155th LHC
MCNEIFF, Leander G.	SP4	WIA	155th LHC
NEPLEY, Charlie K.	PFC	WIA	155th LHC
PINKSTON, Albert	SSG	KIA	155th LHC
SPECTMAN, Marvin D.	WO1	WIA	155th AHC
WILLIAMS, Lawrence M.	PFC	WIA	155th AHC
PLUMMER, Jan E.	<del>SP4</del>	WIA	208th Sig
ELLIOT, Patrick P.	SP4	WIA	52d Sec. Det.
FUBE, Larry W.	SP4	WIA	52d Pathfinder Det.
PRICE, Thomas W.	CPT.	WIA	185th Recon. Aply. Co.
4th Inf Div Transient Personnel			
ADKINS	WO1	WIA	
DIBBLE	SP4	WIA	
DRANGE	PFC	WIA	
ROLLOFF	WO1	WIA	
WERNER	SP4	WIA	

3. (C) There was negative aircraft damage, as most of the rounds fell in the cantonment area.

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SUBJECT: After Action Reports of Enemy Attacks on Camp Coryell  
(155th AHC) (Ban Me Thuet, RVN) 1 Feb through 30 April 1968 (U)

1. (C) From 262305 to 262310 April 1968.

2. (C) 155th Assault Helicopter Company, 185th Recon. Airplane Company, 165th Transportation Detachment, 70th Engineer Battalion.

3. (C) A9805045

4. (C) A mortar attack occurred at Camp Coryell compound in April 68. Three rounds fell within the confines of the compound. Twenty-three rounds fell on the NE corner of the compound, occupied by the 70th Engr. Bn. Twenty-two rounds fell in the center of the compound in the 165th Trans. Det. aircraft maintenance area, and motor pool area, and in the coral next to the maintenance area. The rounds were fired from the north side of the perimeter, from approximately 500 meters out.

5. (C) Damage Information

UH-1H 67-17235 Moderate damage

UH-1H 67-17152 Moderate Damage

UH-1H 67-17259 Moderate damage

UH-1H 67-17090 Moderate damage

UH-1H 67-17149 Light damage

UH-1D 64-13653 Moderate damage

UH-1C 66-15049 Moderate damage

6. (C) Negative communications damage

7. (C) Personnel wounded:

DAILY, Bruce	SP4	70th Engrs.
RAINER, Raymond L.	PFC	70th Engrs.
WATSON, Charles R.	SF4	70th Engrs.
CAMERON, Ronald J.	PFC	418th Med.
VOIGSCHILD, Jack	SP4	568th Med.
WARD, Robert	CPT	568th Med.

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LOPEZ, Eugenio	PFC	165th Trans.
ALLEN, Clifford H.	SP4	165th Trans.
SMITH, Harold F.	SP4	165th Trans.
BENTON, S. L.	SP4	165th Trans.
COLSON, David E.	SP4	155th AHC
MURRAY, Osborne	SP4	155th AHC
DUBOSE, Alton E.	PFC	155th AHC
HOLLIS, Charlie	SP4	155th AHC
SEVILLA, John R.	WO1	155th AHC
KOSOSKI, Jerry W.	SP4	155th AHC

8. (C) Enemy positions estimated to be 500 meters from the north fence of the compound when attack started.

9. (C) The attack lasted five minutes.

10. (C) Two UH-1C gunships, one UH-1H flareship, counter mortar radar, artillery, mortars.

11. (C) Normal perimeter defense plus counter mortar concentrations.

12. (C) LTC W. M. Toothill

13. (C) 155th AHC, 165th Trans. Det., 185th RAC.


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