

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD392116

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution
unlimited

FROM:

DoD Controlling Organization: Department
of the Army, Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

9 May 1980 per DoDD 5200.10 document
marking; Adjutant General's Office [Army]
ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (31 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682132

19 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 214th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.


BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Aviation School



Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

AD392116

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

CONFIDENTIAL

3
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 214TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96530

AVGC-EC

9 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL)
(RCS CS FDR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1968 (UIC WDX 5AA-A)

See Distribution

1. Section 1. SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES (C)

a. MISSION

(1) To provide aviation support to United States, Republic of Vietnam, Free World Military Armed Forces in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones as directed by the Commanding General, II Field Forces, Vietnam and the Commanding Officer, 12th Combat Aviation Group.

(2) Commands and administers assigned and attached Army Aviation and support units.

b. ORGANIZATION: (Inclosure 1)

(1) Organization of the 214th during this reporting period changed numerous times. On 9 Feb 68, the 17th APC and 195th AHC were assigned to the 308th CAB and the 135th AHC was assigned to the 145th CAB leaving this battalion with the 191st AHC, 200th ASHC, and the 240th AHC. On 9 Mar 68, the 200th ASHC was assigned to the 308th CAB and the 117th and 195th AHC's were reassigned to the 214th CAB. At the close of this reporting period, the 214th CAB had four Assault Helicopter Companies.

c. PERSONNEL CHANGES & STATUS

(1) On 5 Feb 68, MAJ Colbert L. Dilday, 088658, assumed command of the 191st Assault Helicopter Company replacing MAJ William H. Spurlock, 067400.

(2) On 12 Feb 68, MAJ Richard H. Hummel, 085420, assumed command of the 195th Assault Helicopter Company replacing MAJ Earl C. Carlson, 085407.

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS, DECLASSIFY
AFTER 12 YEARS

FOROT RD
682132

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) On 14 Mar 68, MAJ Edmund L. Fuchs, 01936032, assumed command of the 117th Assault Helicopter Company replacing MAJ J. O. Weight, 04063739. 4

(4) On 18 Mar 68, MAJ Jesse H. James, 075629, assumed command of the 240th Assault Helicopter Company replacing MAJ Glenn F. Hoffman, 072899.

(5) On 5 Apr 68, MAJ Johnny K. Gower, 04077216, assumed command of the 117th Assault Helicopter Company replacing MAJ Edmund L. Fuchs, 01936032.

(6) On 17 Feb 68, MAJ David G. Jayne, 04021234, replaced LTC James H. McWhorter, OF106186, as Battalion XO.

(7) Unit strengths as of 30 Apr 68:

(a) Military:

Subordinate Units	Officer		WD		EM		TOTAL	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
HHC	22	22	2	5	94	163	118	190
117th AHC	17	17	53	38	231	186	301	241
191st AHC	16	18	54	42	230	192	300	252
195th AHC	17	17	54	40	238	202	309	259
240th AHC	16	21	54	43	230	206	300	270
TOTALS	88	95	217	168	1023	949	1328	1212

(b) Civilian:

Subordinate Unit	DAC		VN		3rd Natl		Contractor	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
HHC	0	0	3	12	0	0	0	0
117th AHC	0	0	11	11	0	0	0	0
191st AHC	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
195th AHC	0	0	7	12	0	0	0	0
240th AHC	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	0	0	21	42	0	0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5 d. ADMINISTRATION

(1) Casualty Information:

HOSTILE

Lightly Wounded: 25
VSI: 2
KIA: 9

NON-HOSTILE

Lightly Wounded: 14
VSI: 1
KIA: 3

(2) Strength: In this reporting period the battalion's authorized strength decreased from 1890 to 1328. The assigned strength was 1212 or 91.1% at the close of the period. This battalion had 215 personnel rotated to CONUS and 174 assigned from CONUS. There were 25 emergency leaves and 4 compassionate leaves granted. With the arrival of new companies and infusion, the personnel section in or out processed 2563 individuals.

(3) Civic Action:

(a) The 214th CAB sponsored two projects during the reporting period. Civic action support in the hamlet, Tan Mai II, continued and project T/RP was initiated at the Orphan's Village at Bear Cat.

1. Civic action in Tan Mai II continues to be restricted while the 9th Div Provost Marshal completes the investigation of the stolen goods found in the village. Food, clothing, toys, and candy were allowed to be distributed to the children of the Village during TET.

2. Battalion contributions for project T/RP (TET Aggression Relief Project) amounted to \$559. Building materials and supplies will be bought for the new classrooms and living facilities at the Orphan's Village.

(4) Chaplain's Activities:

(a) Chaplain services performed during the reporting period were as follows:

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>OCCASIONS</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Group Worship	26	525
Visits (Includes Hospital, Stockade, & Duty Areas)	90	
Counseling	70	
Off post Projects	1	
Memorial Services	3	313

(b) The situation on religious coverage for the two companies (117th & 195th) at Long Binh changed. They no longer have access to the 199th Lt Inf Bde services and plans are being worked out to utilize the II Field Forces Chapel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Information: 6

(a) During the reporting period the battalion information program has shown steady progress. The weekly newspaper (Cougar Weekly News) resumed publication this quarter. An active information program is being maintained to insure that the battalion and its personnel get proper recognition in the various news media.

(b) The Home Town News Release program remained active with many stories being submitted to accompany the releases.

(6) Education: The battalion education program has shown continuous progress in spite of the long daily hours of operation within the units. The 9th Inf Div "full service" education center is open six days a week and is available to all personnel at Bear Cat. The education center at Long Binh services the units in that area.

(7) Morale:

(a) The morale of the battalion continues to remain in a high state. A continuous period of successful operations again is probably the most important contributing factor. Letters of commendation and appreciation from supported units continue to flow in and are indorsed down to the lowest possible echelon. In addition to the active and responsive awards and decoration and information programs, an all out effort to maintain a successful R&R program has been in effect.

(b) All units within the command are working together to improve the physical facilities within their areas. Significant improvement in living and recreational facilities have also contributed to the increased morale.

(8) Discipline: Disciplinary actions showed a significant decrease during the reporting period indicating a high state of discipline within the command. Article 15's numbered 37, Summary Court-Martials numbered 0, and Special Court-Martials numbered 4. This represents a decline of 5 Court-Martial actions and a decline of 9 Article 15's. Four AHC's were present for the major portion of the reporting period.

(9) Awards and Decorations: The awards and decorations program showed a slight increase over the last reporting period. Emphasis is still being placed on the NCO's and officers in supervisory jobs to recognize and be responsible for submitting their people for awards. The number of awards submitted and received attests to the fact that the battalion awards and decorations program is operating smoothly and efficiently.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>SUBMITTED</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>
LOM	1	0
Distinguished Service Cross	1	0
Silver Star	5	4
Distinguished Flying Cross	20	15
Soldiers Medal	5	0
BS "V"	5	1
AM "V"	18	30
ACM "V"	3	7
Bronze Star	20	18
AM	330	311
ACM	20	24
PH	9	16
TOTAL	432	422

e. OPERATIONAL STATISTICS as of 30 Apr 68 -- See Incl 2

f. AIRCRAFT STATUS as of 30 Apr 68 -- See Incl 3

g. INTELLIGENCE

(1) General

(a) In addition to normal activities, the S-2 Section assisted the newly assigned 117th AHC in establishing document security and validated 149 clearances for the unit.

(b) The 195th AHC once again became assigned to the 214th CAB on 9 Mar 68, however, it had been in-country since Nov 67 and did not require the initial security orientation and their security clearances had already been processed.

(2) Security

(a) A total of 894 classified documents were processed by the S-2 Section during this period.

(b) The semi-annual inventory of classified documents was completed on 1 Apr 68. A total of 7 SECRET documents were destroyed and 2 were downgraded in accordance with instruction from 12th CAG. At the close of this period, 17 SECRET documents were on hand.

(c) This battalion had 2 security violations. One was an administrative violation and the other required a formal investigation. The formal investigation concerned the loss of an SOI which was on board a downed aircraft and is presently in progress.

(3) Counter-Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) This unit had 6 suspected acts of sabotage during the reporting period. Such items as safety wires being cut, bolts removed, and cotter keys removed are the main items of concern.

(b) Requests for CI assistance were forwarded to higher headquarters. Investigation is still in progress, however, no significant evidence has been uncovered.

h. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

(1) Hq & Hq Co, 214th CAB, 191st, 195th, and 240th APC's were operational for 90 days during the reporting period. The 117th AHC was semi-operational 70 days during the period, and non-operational 20 days due to having received a maintenance stand-down. Training is done on an integrated basis as often as possible. Bi-weekly range firing was initiated and weapons are being regularly zeroed during these range visits. See Inclosure 2 for other operational statistics.

(2) Operations:

(a) Significant activity for the period began one day before the effective date of this report, but initiated succeeding activities. On 31 Jan 68 at 0305 hours, the Long Binh complex came under mortar attack with incoming rounds entering the Plantation Strip area from East to West. No damage to facilities or personnel was experienced from this attack. At 0500 hours enemy small arms fire was received on the West side of the 195th ramp and the Hurricane CP responded by providing illumination and gunship support. VC were probing and in sight, but did not succeed in penetrating the perimeter. Attacks on the compound were continued throughout the morning and prevented additional crews from becoming airborne. One man from the 17th received a slight wound in the arm and became the only casualty throughout the day. At 1022 hours the 17th and 195th again came under mortar attack but received no significant damage. Gunships from the 195th (Thunder Chickens) had taken the wooded draw to the East of the strip under rocket fire during the attacks and a later search discovered slit trenches and a machine gun nest. Attacks on the area ceased prior to noon and aircraft became airborne for the days activities. Earlier in the day, two UH-1D aircraft from the 191st had been dispatched to the American Embassy on a TAC E to deliver badly needed ammunition. Boomerang 13 landed on the Embassy roof at 0715, delivered the ammo, but lost transmission oil pressure after receiving 23 hits during take off. He was successful in making a forced landing into one of the few available clear areas without injury to the crew, aircraft, or casualties he had picked up from the embassy. C&C aircraft and LFT from the Battalion had been on standby for Checkmate the preceeding night and were dispatched to assist in recovering the crew and extracting the aircraft. Meanwhile, a LFT from the 191st (Bounty Hunters) encountered VC activity East of Long Binh where two pilots were wounded but managed to kill eight VC prior to terminating the engagement. The companies reverted to assigned missions of IIFV GS for the 191st and IIFV standby for the 17th. The 191st gunships, operating East of Bien Hoa, accounted for 17 VC killed and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9 the destruction of ten structures in response to Checkmate instructions. Three gunship crews were wounded and four slick crew members were also hit by enemy fire while conducting GS throughout the AO and a passenger was critically wounded on a trip from Nha Be to Saigon. During the course of their standby, the 17th AHC flew 46 hours of C&C and fire support East and Southeast of Bien Hoa, destroying six structures and damaging thirteen others. Two aircraft were hit but sustained no casualties.

(b) On 1 Feb 68 the 214th CAB responded to a T/C E called by 9th Inf Div to relieve pressure on Ben Tre. (YS5030) The Battalion, supported by the 17th, 128th, 173rd AHC's reported to Dong Tam (XS4040) at 1800 hours. 225 troops and 11 sorties of supplies from the 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div were lifted from Dong Tam into the MAAG compound at Ben Tre. Due to enemy activity on the South, North, and East sides of town, the ships were required to make low level approaches into one and two ship LZ's on the congested compound. Light fire was received and 2 aircraft sustained blade strikes while making blackout approaches to the minimum lighted LZ's. Suppression was fired by gun ships on tree lines south of the city. The troops placed on the ground came under immediate fire but provided a force of sufficient size to prevent loss of the position. During the morning of 2 Feb 68 the 191st and 240th AHC's participated in a Battalion size operation to continue clearing the Ben Tre area. Troops were lifted from the base camp at Bear Cat and married up with other 9th Inf Div units at Dong Tam. A simultaneous two company lift placed troops in a position to cordon numerous VC in a treeline North of the river. Gunships from the 191st took the enemy under fire and accounted for 31 VC KBA (Conf) and destroyed 17 structures despite heavy automatic and small arms fire. Two gunships were hit but continued to fly. The escort platoon from the 240th (Mad Dogs) also took the enemy under fire and accounted for 35 confirmed VC KBA, 5 VC estimated KBA, and one structure destroyed. Five 240th aircraft were hit; none were downed. Of particular interest was an observation that the VC had tied large leaves and other foliage to their backs in an attempt at camouflage. They ran when not in sight of gunships, and went prone as aircraft came over them. The inserted force later flushed this enemy and they fell prey to gunships overhead. Phase 2 of the operation accounted for a total of 659 troops and 10 tons of cargo moved during 262 hours of flying time and 454 sorties. This two day operation served to neutralize the enemy activity in the Ben Tre area, and could not have been successfully accomplished by any other type of force. Since the VC were close to overrunning the compound, an air assault was the only way of providing the needed response. One company remained in support until 2230 hours and was given a two hour standby to repair battle damage the next day.

(c) Again on 1 Feb 68, the 191st AHC lifted troops of the 1st ATF from Mui Dat to several LZ's in the vicinity of Ba Ria (XS3841). The enemy had surrounded the village and was on the verge of overrunning defensive positions. The insertions were completed and gunship activity accounted for a total confirmed kill of 47 VC. There is little doubt that the outcome of this defense would have been grave without airmobile reinforcements. Gunships were appropriate due to the close proximity of the enemy to friendly positions and the difficulty of identifying troops. Normal

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

procedures were employed during this assault and only the critical state of the objective made the operation unique. Shortly after the completion of this action, a semi-tactical lift was conducted to move troops from Gia Ray (YT6010) into the Xuan Loc base camp of the 18th ARVN division to reinforce its defensive posture. An attack on the compound was executed later this same evening and gunships assisted in maintaining the perimeter. 10

(d) At 0104 hours on 28 Feb 68, Camp Martin Cox, Bear Cat, was attacked by a hostile force utilizing 122mm rockets and 120mm mortars. An estimated fourteen rounds impacted throughout the compound. The Berm Guard had been strengthened due to hard intelligence and protective bunkers were completely occupied a few minutes after onset of the attack. The Bear Cat Checkmate C&C was airborne from 2100 to 0600 hours and a LFT was up from 2330 to 0130 hours. Although the fire team leader detected mortar firing positions, he was not able to engage because of a patrol in the general vicinity. Artillery was later adjusted by the LFT on suspected firing positions. A 100% red alert was maintained until 0425 hours at which time the posture was reduced to 50%. Two personnel from the 9th Div were the only sustained casualties and damage was insignificant. A small probe was attempted on the West side of the compound but was unsuccessful due to the reaction of the RTAVF.

(e) On 15 Mar 68, the 214th CAB supported by the 117th and 195th AHC's, lifted 2 battalions of the 2nd Rde, 9th Inf Div from Dong Tam into an LZ at XS605523. Initial insertion of one battalion was made at 0730 hours with negative enemy contact. The second battalion was on strip alert at Dong Tam for reaction to any situation that developed. Due to lack of enemy contact, the alert battalion was inserted into selected LZ's in the vicinity of SX595522. Sporadic sniper fire was received throughout the day, however, contact was of no significance.

(f) Sweeping operations continued during Mar 68 with two other battalion size operations. On 20 Mar 68, the 2nd Rde, 9th Inf Div was inserted into LZ's north of My Tho for a reconnaissance in force. These same battalions were lifted and reinserted into an area closer to My Tho for the evening. No enemy action was encountered. An operation to lift a 9th Div battalion from the FSB Falls was conducted on 28 Mar 68 using the 191st and 117th AHC's with insertions into several LZ's northeast of the FSB. Artillery and gunships prepared the LZ's and all insertions were accomplished without enemy contact. A company size security force had been moved to the FSB to provide security for the base while the tenant units were absent.

(g) On 3 Apr 68, a battalion of the Royal Thai Regiment was inserted into LZ's in the vicinity of YT235966 and YT263978. Two companies, the 195th and 191st AHC's were utilized in this operation which was completed without enemy contact.

(h) On 24 Apr 68, the 6/31st Inf (9th Inf Div) was lifted from Bear Cat into 3 LZ's in the vicinity of YS304857. The 191st and 195th AHC's supported the 214th CAB on the operation which was completed with negative

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

// enemy contact. Although this was the first Combat Assault for the 6/31st Inf, no problems were encountered throughout the entire lift.

(3) Training:

(a) Continued emphasis is being placed on the flying standardization program to curb accident trends. Facilities at which to conduct autorotations and tail rotor failures are scarce and cause excessive dead-head time enroute. In addition, the surface of existing airfields is "torn up" and deteriorates excessively when "ground-run" landings are executed. Consequently, all facilities may be closed at any one time for maintenance and refurbishing, and the rides may be postponed.

(b) Thai Training: Thai aviator training was completed and all personnel departed for Bangkok on 29 Mar 68. Average time of the 13 aviators was 118 hours; 80 being the low and 166 the high. There were no significant training problems and four students were noted as having Instructor Pilot potential, four were recommended for aircraft commander duties, and the balance as first pilots.

The twenty-seven enlisted personnel were extremely enthusiastic and worked side-by-side with our maintenance people. All indications are that they will be able to operate a successful maintenance program around this well-trained nucleus.

Unfortunately, there were some extremely frustrating problems which could not be solved despite our continued efforts. Administrative details for the program had been outlined at one time, but the follow-up was grossly neglected. The Thai Regiment, co-located at Bear Cat with the 214th CAB, was directed to provide necessary administrative support. Either they didn't understand their responsibilities, or were not provided the proper written authority to act accordingly. The results severely hampered our efforts, and assistance requested from MAGTHAI was entirely unsatisfactory. It was requested that we be allowed to dispatch an officer to Thailand for liaison, but this was disapproved by higher headquarters. The Thais could not obtain ration cards from the regiment, did not have proper identification cards, and did not have sufficient money for health and comfort items. The regiment stated they had no authority to pay these people, and the absence of individual pay records did not help the situation. Ration cards were issued by the 214th CAB under a rather dubious authority but as an absolute necessity. I.D. cards were obtained through the 1st Avn Bde, and money was borrowed on an individual basis from friends each man had in the Regiment. Later contact with MAGTHAI resulted in an amendment to the travel orders to include a funding cite, and the Regiment drew money for the payroll.

With this problem somewhat resolved, Lt Pimol was wounded while on a combat assault and this created another difficult situation. Despite our briefing and re-briefing, a serious doubt as to the degree of their participation in combat operations now existed. The aviators, not out of a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12

sense of cowardice but with concern for their future, refused to fly until they could be assured that they would receive all combat benefits in the event of injury or death. Our project officer visited the Free World Forces Headquarters and obtained written clarification of their responsibility to fly on all types of missions. Several days of flying were lost during this exercise.

All reports submitted to higher headquarters continuously outlined administrative problems. The S-3 office of the 1st Avn Bde purportedly extended every assist possible by providing a contact with MAGTHAI. However, this was usually cumbersome and often to no avail and personal contact with MAGTHAI indicated they were not fully cognizant of the problem.

The entire program could have been an outstanding success had these people been fully briefed, received proper administrative support, and had the system been more sympathetic and responsive to problem areas. A liaison officer from this battalion should have accompanied the group from Thailand to Bear Cat, rather than just placing them on an airplane.

(c) A NETT team from Picatinny Arsenal visited the battalion during April to introduce the WDU-4A/A and XM229 war heads, XM429 proximity fuse, and assist in firing practice. Each gun platoon fired all aircraft commanders and most pilots and ammo handling crews were supervised in building the various rounds. The NETT team was the most enthusiastic and knowledgeable group of this type the battalion has had the pleasure of working with.

(d) Unsatisfactory response to recovery requirements of downed aircraft prompted training of organic rigging crews for each company. Several CH-47's are in any given area during normal support missions and can be diverted for recovery when needed. Under the proposed procedure, units would rig the downed ship and assignment of a recovery aircraft would be expedited by II FF A&E.

1. LOGISTICS...

(1) During this period normal supply activities were conducted by all units of the battalion. Major shortages of equipment affecting unit operation were aircrafts mechanics tool sets, two (2) 5-ton tractors, one trailer, cargo, 12-ton, and one Shop Set, Sheet Metal and Welding A-2. Shop Set Prop and Rotor G/S with Expandable Van was drawn in lieu of the A-2 Van, pending receipt of the A-2 Van.

(2) Body armor and ballistic helmets for air crew members are still in critically short supply. The situation is such that at least two or three air crews are required to fly combat assault missions daily without the protection of body armor. In some units, gunners and crew chiefs are required to give up their body armor to the pilots.

CONFIDENTIAL

10

CONFIDENTIAL

13 (3) The 117th AHC was assigned to this battalion on 9 Feb 68 and because of the unsatisfactory property records a board of officers was requested to investigate the numerous irregularities. This board of officers was appointed by the 12th Cbt Avn Gp to determine property accountability. The board action has been completed and is pending approval to authorize adjustments to the unit property books.

(4) Inspection of supply activities within this battalion was conducted during Apr 68 in conjunction with the battalion CMMI inspection. All units were rated satisfactory.

(5) Maintenance:

(a) The equipment serviceability profile for the battalion during this period as reported on DA Form 2406 was 86.7% green, 4.3% amber, and 9.0% red. These percentages are within the C-1 profile limits established by AR 200-1 and represent significant advances over the previous quarter.

(b) Availability of aircraft in the UH-1D and UH-1H types was 83%. This percentage could be further increased by shortening the order and shipping time for critical aircraft parts.

(c) UH-1C availability was 77% for the battalion during this quarter. This was mainly due to extensive down time awaiting parts. (NORS)

(d) Aircraft replacement parts became very critical due to the high number of hours flown by this battalion during this quarter. This battalion flew approximately 31,035 hours during the quarter, which is approximately 50% over the flying hour program.

(e) All units of this battalion now receive their direct support from the 56th Transportation Company. The 191st and 240th AHC's came under the 56th Transportation Company on 10 Apr 68 and the 117th AHC on 1 Apr 68. All units submitted their ASL's for review and appropriate supply action.

(f) This battalion assisted the 117th APC by furnishing an aircraft maintenance officer, maintenance supervisor, two (2) aircraft supply specialists, motor maintenance officer, supervisors and personnel, communications and unit supply assistance. The 34th General Support gave assistance by performing 100% technical inspections of all aircraft. This inspection resulted in seven (7) aircraft being retrograded to CONUS for rebuilding. The 1st Avn Bde performed a complete CMMI. The 135th Maintenance Battalion inspected all vehicles and as a result eighteen (18) vehicles were turned in for retrograde.

(g) The battalion conducted a CMMI inspection during this quarter on all units except the 117th AHC. There was a definite improvement noted from the previous battalion CMMI.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

14
(h) The ~~1st Assault Support Helicopter~~ Company and the 611th Transportation Detachment moved from Camp Martin Cox during this quarter. At the time of the move CH-47 parts were in very short supply. This shortage of repair parts made it necessary to cannibalize one aircraft. It is estimated that the cannibalized aircraft will be mission ready during the month of May.

(i) During this reporting period the battalion experienced a critical shortage of automotive repair parts. If this situation continues to exist it will adversely effect the status of the next quarter report. The following is a list of the critical parts required:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>FSN</u>
Spark Plug	2920-752-4558
Pump, Water	2930-678-1849
Pump, Water	2930-632-4048
Tire, Pneumatic	2610-262-8677
Tire, Pneumatic	2610-051-1700
Tire, Pneumatic	2610-678-1363
Tube	2610-269-738
Belt,V	3030-684-1487
Tire Patches	2640-052-0828
Carburetor	2910-678-1857
Carburetor	2910-096-6169
Battery	6140-066-4984
Battery	6140-057-2554
Radiator	2930-737-3692
Oil Filter	2940-895-6448
Bearing, Cone	3110-678-1863

(6) Construction:

(a) The battalion has expended more than 15,000 US man hours

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15

and over 7,000 daily labor man hours during the period on self help construction projects. This includes one base operations bunker, one 84 man BOO, two 68 man HEO's, one orderly/supply room and 15 personnel bunkers. All of these have been completed with the exception of the 84 man BOO.

(b) The battalion has expended 2,000 US man hours in preparing the site for aviation maintenance facilities. The 93rd Engineers Battalion is presently constructing one hanger to facilitate one Assault Helicopter Company and one Medium Helicopter Company. They have also been issued a construction directive to construct two 5' x 80' ammo storage facilities, two operations buildings, two technical supply buildings, and one rotor blade balancing building.

(c) This battalion is working closely with the 9th Aviation Battalion and the 93rd Engineer Battalion in constructing three POL tanks for the airfield refueling points.

j. AVIATION SAFETY

(1) During the reporting period, this battalion has reduced the quarter accident rate from 39.9% to 13.9%. This reduction is a result of an aggressive pre-accident plan and increased command emphasis.

(2) To identify the safety problem, all accidents were reviewed and categorized. The "pilot error" accident indicated two main problem areas.

(a) Lack of Standardization: Aviators were weak in autorotations, tail rotor failures (this battalion has experienced four with no damage), and dust or IFR procedures.

(b) Single Ship Missions: Our accidents indicated a lack of judgement on the part of the aviators while operating in a single ship role.

(3) To preclude a recurrence of these accidents, an aggressive standardization program was implemented, starting with the IP's of each unit. Emphasis was placed on emergency procedures, autorotations, and IFR procedures.

CONFIDENTIAL

13

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Section 2, COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (C)

16

a. Part 1, OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

(1) PERSONNEL: None

(2) OPERATIONS:

(a) Item: Lack of selective firing of the 2.75 inch rocket with VT Fuse.

1. Discussion: Presently armed helicopter firing systems do not have a means of selecting any certain rocket tube for firing. When two different types of fuses or ammunition are desired on present systems, very little latitude is available to the pilot. Certain rockets can be loaded in each pod and cannon plugs taken off of one to the other as on the XM 159C. This system is restrictive and time consuming when engaging the enemy. To increase the versatility of our present rocket firing systems a means of selecting certain tubes to be fired is desired. This selective firing system will allow the pilot to engage various types of targets whether close to friendly troops or in a situation where unrestricted firing can be employed.

2. Observation: There is a lack of selective type firing of the 2.75 rocket on all helicopters.

(3) TRAINING & ORGANIZATION: None

(4) INTELLIGENCE:

(a) Item: Request for MI and CI Support.

1. Discussion: The 1st Avn Bde does not have it's own MI and CI detachments and has to rely on II FF for this support. At battalion level, once an incident is reported, it may take a week to get the support needed because of the numerous headquarters one must go thru. By this time, the incident is not fresh in anyone's mind and vital information is forgotten.

2. Observation: The addition of an MI and CI detachment to Brigade would expedite assistance to aviation units at battalion and lower levels.

(5) LOGISTICS:

(a) Item: Transportation for Relocating Units

1. Discussion: The 200th ASHC and 611th TC Det were relocated from Camp Martin Cox, RVN, to Hue Phu Be, RVN during this period.

CONFIDENTIAL

14

17
CONFIDENTIAL

Movement was by air and sea. Although not assigned to this battalion at the time, this headquarters was given the responsibility to coordinate movement requirements. To provide necessary non-organic transportation to the aerial and sea ports required coordination with the Transportation Officer, Saigon Support Command. The air movement required coordination with the aerial port at Bien Hoa and the Sea Movement required coordination with the Transportation Movement Agency. It was extremely difficult to effect this coordination due to the uncertainty of the available loading times at the ports and the availability of non-organic transportation from base camps to ports. The port call for the Sea Movement was received only six hours prior to the loading time. This failed to provide sufficient lead time to Saigon Support Command for necessary non-organic truck transportation, causing a delay in loading the LST.

2. Observation: A coordinating agency for unit moves which could schedule and provide transportation from point of departure to ultimate destination, rather than piecemeal scheduling, would provide a more efficient system for relocating units.

(b) Item: Device to prevent loss of XM-21 Armament System.

1. Discussion: The XM-21 gun ships system has been in use in RVN since 1965. Since this time numerous inadvertant losses have occurred. Even though these losses have occurred, no fix or device has been developed to prevent further losses. This weapon is held to its mounting by two restraining pins subjected to vibrations caused from firing; vibrations causing metal fatigue to the pins, locking devices and buffer assemblies. When metal fatigue occurs and no other restraining device is employed, the weapon falls free. To prevent further losses, a restraining cable could be attached. One end of this cable would be attached to the pylon assembly where it joins the bomb rack, and the other end attached to the point where the recoil adapter assembly bolts to the gun itself.

2. Observation: Inadvertant losses of the XM-21 armament system can be prevented.

(6) AVIATION SAFETY: None

b. Part 2, RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) PERSONNEL: None

(2) OPERATIONS:

(a) A selective firing system for rockets be designed and installed on all helicopter gun ships equipped to fire rockets.

(3) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: None

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18

(4) INTELLIGENCE:

(a) CI and MI detachments be assigned so as to be more responsive to aviation units.

(5) LOGISTICS:

(a) A coordinating agency be established to coordinate all modes of transportation during unit moves.

(b) A restraining cable system be designed and made standard on all helicopters equipped with the XM-21 armament system.

3 Incl

1. Organization
2. Operational Statistics
3. Aircraft Status

Leo C. Bryan
LEO C. BRYAN
LTC, CE
Commanding

Distribution:

- 1-Copy thru Channels to DA
- 1-Copy thru Channels to USARPAC
- 1-Copy thru Channels to USARV
- 1-Copy thru Channels to II FFV
- 1-Copy thru Channels to 1st Avn Bde
- 3-Copies to CO, 12th CAG
- 3-Copies to CG, USARV
- 2-Copies to CG, USARPAC
- 2-Copies to CG, 1st Avn Bde
- 1-Copy to CO, 11th CAB
- 1-Copy to CO, 145th CAB
- 1-Copy to CO, 222nd CAB
- 1-Copy to CO, 269th CAB
- 1-Copy to CO, 3/17th Cav Sd

CONFIDENTIAL

16

19
AVGC-SC (9 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 214th Combat Aviation
Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RUS CSFOR - 65 (RI)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 21 May 1968

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, APO 96266

1. In compliance with AR 525-15 and USAFV Regulation 525-15, one copy of subject report is forwarded.


2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the following comments are made:

a. Reference, page 11, para 1i(5)(d): While the organization did overfly the flying hour program by 3,336 hours it was not by 50%. The organization was using the D.A. flying hour program which is lower than the USAFV flying hour program. The organization has been informed of the flying hour program used in Vietnam.

b. Reference, page 14, para 2a(5)(a): At the present time there are 3 different agencies that must be contacted before moving a unit in III Corps Tactical Zone. Even though air and sea movement is handled by the same TMA, organizations must go through II Field Force V for priority. For over-land transportation, another agency must be contacted. Many moves are conducted by a combination of land, sea, and air, thereby requiring a great deal of coordination. Sometimes, ground transportation is unavailable to move the unit to the proper place for other transportation. If one office could be set up to enable all transportation mediums to be coordinated at one place and priorities established to enable the unit to move smoothly from one location to the other, it would save time and effort, as well as ensure that equipment is at the proper place at the proper time. Recommend consideration be given to the establishment of a central transportation section which handles all modes of transportation, thus enabling an organization to deal with only one agency.

c. Although format of this report is incorrect, all required information is included. Future reports will be in the correct format.

FOR THE COMMANDER


JAMES E. LYBRAND
Major, Infantry
Asst. Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H (9 May 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (UIC WDX 5AA-A)

20

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 11 JUN 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (C) This command has reviewed the attached Operational Report - Lessons
Learned of the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with it with the
following exceptions, relating to para 2a(5) (p 14) and para 2b(5) (p 16).

a. The movement of a unit by sea or air requires considerable coordi-
nation by unit personnel to request air or sea transport, common-user
trucks and busses. A coordinating agency to handle all transportation re-
quirements, while desirable, is not feasible as no one agency handles all
transportation assets (TMA handles Sea/Air movements; Saigon Support Command
has the trucks and busses).

b. A six hour port call is unacceptable. Units must be given time to
close their mess halls, load last minute equipment, and close their former
locations in an orderly fashion. Hq, TMA has promised to make every effort
to give units notice of port calls 24 hours in advance. When the sea move-
ment request has been submitted, with availability date for loading shown
on the request, unit representatives should contact the POE so that loading
and messing arrangements at the port can be made.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


O. B. FORRY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

18

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

21

AVBA-C (9 May 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (LCS CSFCA-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (UIC WDX 5AA-A) from 214th Combat Aviation Battalion (U)

Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

JUN 21 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVI.CC-DST, APO 96375

Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GICP-CI, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) This headquarters has reviewed subject report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed except as follows:

Paragraph 2b(4)(a), page 16. Non-concur with recommendation that CI and LI detachments be assigned to aviation units. This would duplicate the units already assigned to other headquarters which provide area coverage.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 1i(2), page 10. Ballistic helmets will be available by the end of June 1968. Body armor, however, continues to be in short supply.

b. Paragraph 1i(5)(i), page 12. A temporary shortage of these parts existed at the time the operational report was prepared. This headquarters is recommending that the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion validate its current requisitions in a move to insure lost and misplaced requisitions are detected. On completion of this action this headquarters will assist as necessary to obtain the required parts.

c. Paragraph 2a(4)(a), page 14. 1st Aviation Brigade S-2 has coordinated with USAF G-2 who has sent a message to subordinate LI detachments, outlining responsibilities for support of units who are O'CCN to same headquarters to which LI detachments are O'CCN, (i.e., Field Force HQ's, Div HQ's, etc.). Requests for LI support should be the simple matter of a telephone call to control headquarters, G-2, who in turn tasks the nearest LI detachment to provide support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



J. D. SEGAL
LTJ, AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

19

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

22

AVHGC-DST (9 May 68) 4th Ind (C) CPT Arnold/hga/IBN 4885
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (FCS CS FDP-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (UIC WDX 5AA-A)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 9 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning lack of selective firing of 2.75 inch rocket with VT fuze, page 14, paragraph 2a(2)(a) and page 15, paragraph 2b(2)(a): Concur.

(1) There are two actions pending at DA concerning selective firing of the various warhead/fuze combinations of the 2.75 inch rocket.

(a) ENSURE 187 - Improvements to 2.75 inch FFAR and Aerial Delivery System, dtd 24 Mar 67.

(b) QMR - Selective Effects Armament Systems (SEAS), dtd July 67.

(2) The completion of the ENSURE action and/or QMR development should satisfy the requirements.

b. Reference item concerning device to prevent loss of XM-21 armament system, page 15, paragraph 2a(5)(b); and page 16, paragraph 2b(5)(b). Concur. Other similar losses have been reported. The 214th Combat Aviation Battalion has been requested to submit appropriate EIR's. Recommend USAFECOM develop a safety cable or chain for use with the M-134 on the M-21 and XM-27E1 subsystems.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, 214th Cbt Avn Bn
HQ, 1st Avn Bde

20

CONFIDENTIAL

23

GPOP-DT (9 May 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 214th Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

Offshoot
C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

25

CONFIDENTIAL



214th Combat Avn. Bn.

Incl 1, Page 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~214th Combat Aviation Battalion - 1st Air~~

26

UNIT	APD	LOCATION
<u>214th CBT AVN BN</u>	96530	Bear Cat
Hqs & Hqs Co	96530	Bear Cat
772nd Med Det	96530	Bear Cat
Pathfinder Det	96530	Bear Cat
<u>117th AHC</u>	96384	Long Binh
140th TC Det	96384	Long Binh
256th Sig Det	96384	Long Binh
<u>191st AHC</u>	96530	Bear Cat
606th TC Det	96530	Bear Cat
26th Sig Det	96530	Bear Cat
<u>195th AHC</u>	96384	Long Binh
609th TC Det	96384	Long Binh
366th Sig Det	96384	Long Binh
93rd Med Det	96384	Long Binh
<u>240th AHC</u>	96530	Bear Cat
619th TC Det	96530	Bear Cat
932nd Sig Det	96530	Bear Cat

23

Incl 1, Page 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

27

214th CAB OPERATIONAL STATISTICS
CTR. ENDING 30 April 1964

UNIT	SORTIES FLOWN	TROOPS LIFTED	CARGO TONS	ENEMY KIA	STRUCTURES DAY DEST	SAMPAKS DAY DEST	AIRCRAFT CONFIRMED LOSS	AIRCRAFT DAMAGED
* 17 AHC	2411	3904	33	12	87	3	0	15
* 117 AHC	8994	13466	190	6	11	2	0	16
* 135 AHC	1961	2479	63	2	28	1	2	10
191 AHC	26651	47550	338	191	0	40	1	38
195 AHC	12739	21502	308	23	29	3	0	21
* 200 ASHC	3881	12523	5905	0	0	0	0	10
240 AHC	19606	36780	360	51	0	0	3	45
214 CAB	76143	138204	7197	285	155	8	6	144
17 AHC	AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: 7 UH1C, 8 UH1H							
117 AHC	AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: 10 UH1C, 5 UH1D							
135 AHC	AIRCRAFT LOSS: 1 UH1C, 1 UH1H, AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: 3 UH1C, 7 UH1H							
191 AHC	AIRCRAFT LOSS: 1 UH1C AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: 18 UH1C, 20 UH1D							
195 AHC	AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: 10 UH1C, 11 UH1H							
200 ASHC	AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: 10 CH 47							
240 AHC	AIRCRAFT LOSS: 2 UH1C, 1 UH1H, AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: 11 UH1C, 24 UH1H							

* NOT ASSIGNED TO 214th CAB FOR ENTIRE REPORTING PERIOD.

Incl 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28

214TH CAB AIRCRAFT STATUS
30 April 1968

Subordinate Unit	UH-1C		UH-1G		UH-1H	
	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H
214th HQ	0	0	0	1	0	0
117th AHC	8	5	23	20	0	0
191st AHC	8	7	23	23	0	0
240th AHC	8	6	0	0	23	21
195th AHC	8	8	0	0	23	20
214th CAB	32	26	46	43	46	41

CONFIDENTIAL

29

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		Confidential	
		2b. GROUP	
		4	
3. REPORT TITLE			
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CO, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
9 May 1968		26	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
8. PROJECT NO.		682132	
c. N/A		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

26

DD FORM 1 NOV 55 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

31

The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE _____
** FOR OT RD # _____
***PAGE # _____

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

32

-FOLD-

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OACSFOR
Washington, D.C. 20310

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

STAPLE

STAPLE

DA Label 18, 1 Apr 89 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS LABEL ARE OBSOLETE.

16-78645-1

-FOLD-