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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
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14 April 1967

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, HQ, 199th Infantry
Brigade (Sep) (Lt) [u] (8)

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(9) *Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 67.*

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (SEP) (LT) for quarterly period 1 Nov 1966 - 31 Jan 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (LT)

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OPERATIONAL REPORT -

LESSONS LEARNED

1 NOV 1966 - 31 JAN 1967

(RCS CSFOR - 65)

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
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DOD DIR 5200.10**

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199th Infantry Brigade (Sop) (Light)
Operational Report-Lessons Learned
1 Nov 1966 - 31 Jan 1967

15 February 1967

I Significant Organization and Unit Activities

1. Introduction:

The 199th Infantry Brigade (Sop) (Light), "REDCATCHERS", was activated at Fort Benning Georgia on 1 June 1966. Its mission, to activate, equip and train so as to achieve a RECON 1 by 15 October 1966.

For implementation of the training program, the Brigade was divided into three increments. (Incl 2) Basic Unit Training was conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia. Advance Unit Training (Incl 3) was conducted at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The A.U.T. phase concluded on 6 October 1966.

8 October 1966 marked the beginning of preparation for Overseas Movement. This period extended through 19 November, the date the first main body departed Ft. Benning for deployment to RVN. The second main body departed Ft. Benning, for further deployment, on 21 November. The Brigade, minus the Third Battalion, Seventh Infantry, closed Viet Nam on 12 December 1966. The Third Battalion, Seventh Infantry, closed Viet Nam on 24 December 1966.

After a brief period of "in-country" training, the Brigade began combat operations on 16 December 1966, when the Second Battalion, Third Infantry was committed in Operation UNIONTOWN (INITIATOR). The Fourth Battalion, Twelfth Infantry followed on 17 December 1966 with Operation 173rd TAOR, the first air-mobile "in-country" operation for the Brigade. It is interesting to note, at this point, that the Brigade's heavy equipment did not start to arrive until 21 December 1966, and it all didn't close at Brigade until after 5 January 1967. Units were short heavy equipment but still able to carry out their missions. On 26 December 1966 the Third Battalion, Seventh Infantry relieved the Second Battalion, Third Infantry from the UNIONTOWN MISSION.

The early missions were characterized by search and destroy and ambush operations. On 12 January 1967 the Brigade initiated Operation FAIRFAX. Operation FAIRFAX, a Revolutionary Development and Pacification mission in Gia Dinh Province, covers three districts: Quan Thu Duc, Quan Nha Bo, and Quan Binh Chanh. Joined side by side, these three districts ring the Southern approaches into Saigon. It is essential for the security of this capital city, that they remain under the control of the GVN. The Brigade's position not only serves to block this enemy avenue of approach into Saigon's back door, but it also gives the Brigade the opportunity to assist the Vietnamese people through the (RD) Program.

Working with counterpart ARVN combat forces and in coordination with the local district chiefs, the Battalions of the Brigade have conducted many operations in support of the Pacification effort. They have conducted frequent air-mobile assaults, both conventional and Eagle flights. Saturation patrols and stay behind patrols, as well as cordon and search operations have also been employed very effectively. A thorough study of the program, and its goals, allowed the Brigade to achieve early success as establishing and maintaining the proper rapport in its working relationships with local Vietnamese Government officials. Mutual cooperation has been a key factor in the success gained thus far, in operation FAIRFAX. Operation FAIRFAX was still in progress at the close of this reporting period. The after action report of this operation will be enclosed in the first ORLL after its conclusion.

The Brigade Civic Action Program up to 12 January 1967 was represented by MEDCAP assistance to a few villages. When the Brigade took on the RD mission, the CA program was enlarged to provide more material benefits to the inhabitants of Gia-Dinh Province, the Brigade's area of operation (AO).

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2. Organization:

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The 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light) consists of three Infantry Battalions, a Support Battalion, an Artillery Battalion, a Troop of Cavalry, an Engineer Company and a Brigade Headquarters Company. In addition there are seven detachments, attached to the Brigade Headquarters Company. These detachments represent the following branches, or agencies, of the service: Chemical, Military Intelligence, Signal, Army Security, Military Police, Public Information and Military History. The attached Signal Platoon had not arrived "in-country", at the close of this reporting period.

Each Infantry Battalion has only forty-six wheeled vehicles; no tracked vehicles. A battalion consists of three rifle companies and a combat support company. The rifle companies contain three rifle platoons and an 81mm mortar platoon. The combat support company a reconnaissance platoon, 106mm rifle platoon and an 81mm mortar platoon. MTO&E number 77-102T, CTD USCOMARC 2/67, adds a fourth rifle company to each of the infantry battalions. This fourth company is not expected to join until March 1967, at the earliest.

The Artillery Battalion has as its main armament the (M101 1-1) 105mm (towed) howitzer. It is organized into three firing batteries, of six tubes each, and a headquarters and service battery.

The support Battalion has a headquarters detachment, an administration company, a maintenance company and a medical company. At full strength, the Battalion has the capacity for Brigade level logistical support, to include storage of all classes of supply. It provides direct support maintenance, and can also furnish Brigade medical service, including evacuation, establishment and operations of clearing stations and medical supply. The Battalion has a limited capacity to carry Brigade reserve supplies.

Able to sustain itself in combat, the 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light), is as its motto states: ~~Light-Swift-Accurate~~.

Brigade organization is shown at Inclosure 1.

3. Intelligence:

a. Throughout the reporting period, the Viet Cong avoided direct contact whenever possible. One of the notable engagements occurred on 17 January at 2250 H in the vic of XS944966 in the District of Thu Duc, when a friendly force ambushed an estimated 8-10 man VC squad. Four of the VC were killed in this action. The second incident occurred on 29 January at 1846 H in the vic of XS868808, (NHA BE). An estimated force of 20 VC fired approximately 6 rounds of 60mm mortar into the position of the 52nd Co (ARVN) who were in support of the Second Battalion, Third Infantry. As the VC fled the area in four sampans, they were ambushed by elements of Co B 2/3/. Results were four sampans sunk, 2 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC KIA (TROB). A peculiar incident occurred on 27 January at 2030 H near XS953942 (Thu Duc). An element of Co B, 4/12 Infantry reported hearing a loudspeaker broadcasting, in broken English, "GI come out and fight, you are a yellow belly".

b. Using small arms, mortar fire command detonated mines and booby traps, the Viet Cong perpetrated 54 incidents. There weren't any large scale or serious incidents. This tends to indicate that although the VC are located in the area covered by Brigade operations, they are not willing to risk any involvement that is not to their immediate advantage.

c. VC Losses for the quarter include:

- 72 KIA (body count)
- 52 KIA (probable)
- 55 VCC
- 16 Small Arms
- 85 Grenades
- 1192 pounds of TNT
- 5 Typewriters
- 3 Sewing Machines
- 6 Outboard motors

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d. During this reporting period the 190th Infantry Brigade made contact with the C49 local force unit; 306,307 local force companies; 1st and 2nd companies of the 4th Bn of the 165th Regiment, and the 3rd platoon of 4/165th.

e. Units believed to be within the Brigade's AO, with which no contact has been made, are: 5th and 6th Battalions of the 165th Regiment.

4. Combat Operations:

a. General. The Brigade base is situated at a staging area in Long Binh, VN. All Brigade Operations, except DUCK, have been launched from this base. It is anticipated that the Brigade will eventually move into a permanent base camp; but at the close of this reporting period a site had not been selected. The Brigade does not have a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). Operations conducted during this reporting period varied in size from squad ambushes thru battalion search and destroy missions, and finally to Brigade level Revolutionary Operations.

b. December. The last element of the Brigade closed Long Binh, VN on 24 December 1966. The first combat mission was initiated on 16 December with the Second Battalion, Third Infantry jumping off on Operation UNIONTOWN (INITIATOR). (Incl 14) This was a combination security and search and destroy operation involving the security of the Long Binh Ammunition Complex. It was timely and worthwhile for the battalion in that it was not a "heavy contact" operation. Accordingly, the Third Infantry gained much experience "cheaply". 17 December found the Fourth Battalion, Twelfth Infantry conducting the Brigade's first "in-country" air mobile assault. Further defined as S & D operations in sector of 173rd Abn Bde TAOR, (Incl 15) this was the first combat mission for this unit since its arrival in country on 11 Dec 66. Despite the relative absence of contact with VC forces, it provided an excellent opportunity for a "shake-down" of the Battalion as a whole and for the officers who have joined the unit since its last training exercise in COMUS. Moving its area of operations (AO), the Fourth Battalion, Twelfth Infantry moved by air from their (AO) in the 173rd's TAOR to Camp Martin Cox (Beocat), for operation DUCK (Incl 16). Commencing on 23 December 1966, Operation DUCK involved the security of the Bearcat BMB in preparation for the arrival of the 9th Infantry Division at that location. Navigation was very difficult for ground units in the Bearcat TAOR. The 4/12th Infantry found that the use of ground smoke signals and an aerial observer was an effective solution to this problem. The Third Battalion, Seventh Infantry relieved the Second Battalion, Third Infantry from their UNIONTOWN mission on 26 December 1966. Thus freed, the 2/3rd Infantry started Operation WIGGINS on 28 December 1966. This S & D Mission in Bearcat TAOR North, produced the Brigade's first VC KIA (BC), although several probables had been recorded in earlier operations.

(1) Operation UNIONTOWN (INITIATOR), a battalion operation, continued for the Second Battalion, Third Infantry, through 26 December 1966. Primarily a security mission, the AO provided unlimited opportunity for search and destroy operations. It allowed for the establishment of ambushes and the development of associated techniques. One tactical fire mission and one CAS mission were requested during the operation.

Reported were: 2 VC KIA (PROB) and one VC base camp destroyed.

(2) Operation - S & D operations in Sector of 173rd Abn Bde TAOR, a battalion operation, continued through 23 December 1966. Conducting an air mobile assault into their AO the Fourth Battalion, Twelfth Infantry established company bases and conducted search and destroy operations within designated Co AO's. Although established ambushes produced negative results, procedures were refined and techniques were perfected. Starlight Scopes were used for night observations with M-16 rifles; however, no enemy were seen. Five VC huts and numerous anti-helicopter devices were found and destroyed.

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(3) Operation DUCK, involving perimeter security of Bearcat HMB and search and destroy operations in the Bearcat TACR, found TF 4/12th Infantry conducting an airmobile movement to the Bearcat Staging Area from multiple PZ's in its sector of the 173rd Abn Bde T OR. Three companies of the 4/12th Infantry were kept on S & D operations in Bearcat AO while one company remained at the battalion command post, as the Brigade ready reserve force (RRF). The perimeter was divided among the units OFCON to TF 4/12th Inf. (Incl 16)

(4) Operation WIGGINS, 2/3rd Infantry, scheduled to begin on 27 Dec 66, was delayed one day because aircraft were withheld for higher priority operations. WIGGINS was a battalion operation with organic companies conducting search and destroy operations within assigned AO's. Though no tactical artillery missions were fired during the duration of WIGGINS, H & I fires were employed on a regular basis. The effectiveness of the TAC Air LZ preparation, was very limited because the ordnance was concentrated in only one corner of the LZ. The AO was not a base for any known VC units, rather, it was a known infiltration route from the North. These routes were the primary points for interdiction. Much evidence of frequent use of the trails and base camps was found.

(5) During December, organic artillery fired 68 rounds (1.25 tons) during a total of 7 missions in support of operations. Prior to 30 December 1966, artillery support was provided by C/319 - B/319, 173rd Abn Bde; A 7/9 and B 1/83. Two CAS strikes were flown in support of the Brigade during the month of December:

20 Dec 66 YT113054 (Caves & Bunkers)
ACFT - 4 F-4C
ORD - 16 MK117 (750 pound HE) bombs
20 MM Strafe

28 Dec 66 YT2206 (LZ Preparation)
ACFT - 3 F-100
ORD - 4 MK117 (750 pound HE) bombs
4 MK81 (250 pound HE) bombs
4 PODS 2.75" Rockets

BDL not available (Smoke and Foliage)

c. January. During the month of January 1967 the 199th Infantry Brigade conducted counterinsurgency combat operations in the UNIONTOWN, NHON TRACH, HUE BE, THU DUC, BINH CHANH Areas of Operations and the RUIG SAT S'ECLEL ZONE of the Republic of Vietnam. Participation in Operation FAIRFAX introduced the Brigade to Revolutionary Development activities in the NUA BE, THU DUC, and BINH CHANH Districts of GIA DINH Province and found the Infantry Battalions of the Brigade working in cooperation and coordination with their counterpart ARVN battalions. These activities restricted Viet Cong operations, resupply activities and movement throughout all AO's.

(1) In the NHON TRACH, Operation KELLEY HILL, (Incl 18), (Incl 19), commenced on 2 January with the airmobile insertion of the 2/3 Inf, 4/12 Inf, A/2/40 Arty, C/2/40 Arty and selected Bde Headquarters Forward Command Post Personnel into the AO. D/17 Cav and the remaining Bde/Hq's elements moved overland to the AO on the same day. On 5 January Bde Hq, 4/12 Inf and C/2/40 Arty were extracted by air from the AO and returned to the Brigade Base at LONG BINH where the 4/12 Inf and C/2/40 Arty prepared for air movement to PHUOC VINH. On 8 January the 2/3 Inf, A/2/40 Arty and D/17 Cav were extracted from the NHON TRACH AO bringing Operation KELLY HILL to a close. VC contact during the operation was sporadic with the largest force encountered being an estimated squad. The enemy relied on sniping attacks, mines and booby traps, and light probes of the perimeter at night to harass US elements. One VC KIA (BC) was accounted for in the operation against one US KIA.

(2) On 7 January the 4/12 Inf and C/2/40 Arty was airlifted from Bien Hoa air base by twenty C-130 aircraft to PHUOC VINH to secure the base camp of the 1st Bde, 1st Infantry Division. Upon closing PHUOC VINH the unit came under the OFCON of the 1st Infantry Division. On 11 January the

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4/12 Inf and C/2/17 Arty were extracted by air from HUOC VINH and returned to control of the 199th Infantry Brigade. A change in missions for the 1st Inf Div caused the unit to be extracted prior to its initiation of offensive combat operations against the VC.

(3) The 3/7 Infantry continued the UNIONTOWN mission from 1 to 28 Jan when it was relieved by the 2/28 Infantry of the 1st Infantry Division. S & D operations in the AO resulted in light enemy contact. There were a total of 255 small unit actions; 5 of which resulted in contact. This however does not negate the importance of having successfully secured the vital facilities located in the LONG BINH complex which includes the large ammunition storage area.

(4) Brigade participation in Operation FAIRFAX began when the 2/3 Inf relieved the 3/22 Inf of responsibility for the NHA BE AO on 12 January. On 13 January the 4/12 Infantry relieved the 1/16 Infantry of responsibility for the THU DUC AO and on 31 January the 3/7 Infantry relieved the 4/9 Infantry of responsibility for the BINH CHANH AO. Units of the Brigade have contributed significantly to the pacification of their assigned AO's. Enemy losses for the period are 68 KIA (BC), 58 KIA (PROB), 55 VC PW's, and 579 detainees. In addition 51 sampans, 122 buildings, 54 fortifications, 28 hand grenades, 58 tons of rice, 752 lbs of TNT and 350 rounds of ammunition have been destroyed. Captured were 440 lbs of TNT, 45 hand grenades, 10 individual weapons, 1379 rounds SA ammo, 1 AN/RC 10 radio, 16,492 WFF, 1 claym re (CHICOM), 1M-72 Law, 6 outboard motors, 3 sewing machines, 5 typewriters, assorted medical supplies and medicines, 60 lbs of documents and 1000 lbs of rice. The above figures are the results of 18 AIRMOBILE ASSAULTS, 8 EAGLE FLIGHTS, 2 river operations and 640 night ambushes. Friendly losses for operation FAIRFAX stand at 5 KIA and 14 WIA.

(5) On 29 January the 2/3 Inf inserted Co A into the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE to conduct S & D operations against VC forces and facilities located therein. Co A was relieved by Co B on 31 January. A total of 18 small unit actions; 4 of which resulted in contact have been completed in this area so far. Enemy losses are 4 VC KIA (BC), 500 lbs of rice, 25 bunkers, 55 houses, 30 sampans destroyed and 3 individual weapons captured.

(6) During the month 103, O-1 (FAC & VR) sorties, 101 fighter sorties (37 air strikes) and 2 flare ship sorties were flown in support of Brigade operations. The 2/40 Artillery fired 10,697 rounds (187.9 tons) in support of Brigade operations.

5. Training: The mission of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade on 1 Jun 66 was to activate, equip, and train so as to achieve a RECON 1 by 15 October 1966. This date was derived by backward planning from a prescribed EFD of 5 Nov and PRD 20 Nov. To accomplish this mission the Brigade was to have personnel on hand as of 10 June and equipment on hand as of 20 June. The fact that these requirements were not met until a much later date, and the fact that there was no cadre period, caused the brigade a number of problem areas. The Brigade was placed in the position of activating, equipping, and training simultaneously.

The training portion of the brigade mission was to complete basic unit training and advanced unit training by 8 October 1966. All personnel assigned had completed BCT and ATT. For the Infantry Battalions, Basic Unit Training consisted of eight weeks of scheduled training broken down as follows: Two weeks of Squad training, three weeks of Platoon training, and three weeks of Company training. In each phase a modified ATT was conducted. Modified because the ATT and the training leading up to the ATT was counter-guerrilla/counter-insurgency oriented. In preparation for these ATT's, the troops moved habitually to the field for 3 day periods of nearly continuous training. At least 30% of training was conducted at night. This concept of rigorous and extended training, CI/CG oriented, followed by maintenance and stiff weekly inspections was adhered to throughout the Advance Unit Training phase which ended with the Brigade FTX 2 - 6 October 1966.

The support battalion was largely occupied with normal administrative

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and logistical support, in other words OJT. However realizing the desirability to improve their proficiency in tactical operations, portions of the support battalion and the brigade headquarters communications personnel received squad and platoon tactical training which was presented by the rifle battalions. In the Brigade Headquarters Company, the M platoon and the rifle platoons participated with the rifle battalions through the end of the platoon training period and then picked up their specialist training programs. The brigade communications platoon, under the direction of the brigade signal officer received its initial training from the Infantry School as there was insufficient communications equipment available to the Brigade at that time with which to conduct training. The Engineer company, Artillery Battalion and the Cavalry troop conducted standard unit training modified to prepare them for operations in a counter-insurgency environment.

In order to effectively support both Basic Unit Training and Advance Unit Training an aggressor force was developed during a two week guerrilla training program, and presented by representatives from the JFK Special Warfare Center. The Cav Troop, HHC rifle platoon and the Reconnaissance platoons from the three rifle battalions participated. Once trained, these units were employed as aggressors against other units in the Brigade during company and battalion training. At the request of the Commanding General, USAIC, the 2/506th Abn Inf Battalion aggressed against the brigade during the brigade FTX October 1966.

For implementation of the training program the brigade was divided into three increments. (Note unit listings and dates at Incl 2) The first increment, consisted of the 2/3 and D Troop 17 Cav and began training on 27 June 1966. The second increment 4/12, 2/40, Sst Bn, Engr company, and HHC began training on 5 July 1966. The third increment, 3/7 began training on 11 July 1966.

The training areas used by the Brigade for Basic Unit Training are depicted at Incl 4. Note the Brigade C location on Kelley Hall. The general concept was to achieve uniformity of training by having each increment conduct training in the same area, with a division of responsibility between units for problem preparation. The 1st week of training was conducted in area "BB" and "P", and 2d week in "G" and the 3d week in "O". Then the "round-robin" was repeated engulfing additional areas as the level of training required. Some adjustments of this procedure were necessary due to scheduling problems, but the concept remained sufficiently intact to facilitate planning and problem preparation.

The first week of Advance Unit Training consisted of a Battalion FTX, conducted in area "O". Designed primarily as a vehicle to shakedown the battalion, it exercised battalion tactical SOP's and presented an opportunity for refining command and control procedures. Battalion commanders were chief controllers for their own exercises and no evaluation reports were submitted to Brigade. ASA, working in coordination with the commanders, offered a means to the commander for checking his signal security, and otherwise to improve his communication procedures. After completing FTX 1 units moved to Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

The Advance Party moved to Camp Shelby Mississippi on 22 August 1966 while the three training increments departed for Shelby on 25 Aug, 31 Aug - 1 Sep, and 15 Sep. Troops traveled by commercial bus while TO&E equipment was carried on organic transportation in convoy. Although it was only an eight hour trip by bus, the truck convoys had to remain overnight at the Naval Air Station outside Meridian, Mississippi. After the Advance Unit Training was completed the Brigade returned to Fort Benning, (7-13 Oct.)

Camp Shelby provided a wealth of training areas. Note the contonement area at Incl 5.

The first battalion FTX (FTX 2) at Shelby required the establishment of a battalion base with all around security, conduct of saturation atrolling, a meeting engagement and the concentration of forces and firepower to defeat the enemy. The FTX culminated in a live fire phase.

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The second Battalion FTX (FTA 3) at Shelby consisted of a route security mission, a search and destroy mission, and the employment of a quick reaction force. Brigade Headquarters participated as the coordinating headquarters in conjunction with both of these FTXs.

Battalion ATTs were conducted by a USAIC Evaluation Group working from the Office of the Director of O & T, USAIC. Each consisted of a series of operations in a counter-insurgency/counter-guerrilla environment. The Brigade FTX was also conducted by the USAIC Group and it encompassed a major portion of the reservation.

The Brigade received a significant assist from the Infantry School, instruction wise. Each Thursday, for eight weeks, one of the instructional departments presented a two hour evening class to all officers and on Tuesday night to NCOs filling E-7 and above positions. In addition hundreds of officers and NCOs attended resident instruction for the first several months. In other instances school departments presented training to specific groups on such subjects as demolitions, 106 RR, 81 Mortar, Communications and Pathfinder techniques. On 30 July a training program was developed, in coordination with the Airborne Department, to qualify two men per combat Company/Battery in Pathfinder Techniques. The primary purpose of this one week course being to develop the capability of assisting one, or a few, helicopter (s) in landing for resupply or evacuation missions. Fifty "Red-catchers" were trained under this program.

Additional training support was to provide to one degree or another. For example - the 10th Aviation Group presented a two hour Air Mobile orientation to all company sized units. Subsequently, they provided troop lifts within their capability and consistent with their primary mission of Transition Training in preparation of Aviation units for deployment. Commencing 14 September, and carrying through the Brigade FTX, they supported the Brigade with a HU-ID Company and a Chinook Company, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. During this period, there were 1330 HU-ID sorties and over 200 CH-47 sorties involving troop and resupply missions. Support was also provided from off-post agencies. A four hour block on Air Ground Operations was presented to select Brigade personnel, on 29 July 66, by the JAG IT from Eglin AFB. Live air strikes w/o ordnance were provided during company training and during battalion FTXs/ATTs at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

Shortages of personnel, minimized the value of training conducted by the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, as it was filled at only 46 percent authorized enlisted strength on 6 Aug 66. Although it got a late start, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, pursued the accelerated training program outlined in COMARMC cir 350-33, rapidly reaching a REDCON I. This program consisted of six weeks of BUT, one week for evaluation and one week for participation in a major FTX. This closes the book on stateside training. With elements deploying by sea and air, the Brigade was completely closed in Vietnam on 24 December 1966.

Since arrival in the country the 2/3 Infantry, 4/12 Infantry and D/17 Cavalry have conducted training in the use of inflatable and assault boats and river crossing operations. The 3/7 Infantry confirmed the zero of all M-16's at the THU DUC ranges. Co C, 7th Support Bn (Medical Company) continued formal training along with mission performance.

The Redcatcher Combat Training Center was established for newly assigned replacements to present an intensified refresher course in weapons, demolitions, mines and booby traps, tactics to include patrols, and ambushes, map reading, airmobile operations, intelligence and lessons learned to newly assigned personnel. Fifty four hours of classroom and practical work are presented to the students prior to graduation. One hundred and seventy six (176) replacements have gone through the center during the month of January.

Selected individuals from the 3/7 Infantry participated in three days of training with 1st Infantry Division on one of its operations. D/17 Cavalry held training on the use of the starlight night vision devices. Selected members of the Bde attended an orientation on the use and maintenance of the XM 148 weapons system. 2/40 Artillery continues concurrent gunnery and FDC procedures to insure accurate and timely response to fire missions. The Chemical Section and 503d Chemical Bt presented classes on the

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Mighty Mite to maneuver battalions. Brigade had one graduate from the MACV Recondo School.

6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action:

a. Psychological Operations:

(1) The first operation in which psychological operations were employed by the 199th Infantry Brigade was the NHAN TRACH Operation code named: "KELLEY HILL". During the 4 day period that the Brigade was involved in this area 225,000 199th Infantry "Good Guy" leaflets and 100,000 199th Infantry Intelligence "969" leaflets were air disseminated. Due to the quick curtailment of the operation the results of these activities were never fully determined and are assumed to be negligible.

(2) Since the Brigade has been committed to Operation "FAIRFAX" the 199th Infantry Brigade and supporting units have disseminated over one million leaflets. Emphasis being placed on the "Chieu Hoi" program, "Intelligence" and Support of the Government of Vietnam themes.

(3) Result so far is one "Chieu Hoi" rallier from the PHU DUC District. However, it is felt that this is only the beginning of much greater results.

(4) Currently there is no electronic or printing equipment organic to the brigade for PsyOp purposes. Efforts are being made to procure this equipment. The Brigade receives general support in the air dissemination of leaflets and broadcasts from the 246th PsyOp company in Binh Hoa. They also reproduce any special leaflets requested by the Brigade.

(5) Future operations will emphasize the three themes previously mentioned with the target audience primarily Viet Cong military personnel or their dependents. Short range support of tactical operations will be administered by the Brigade's PsyOp section while long range operations will be left to ARVN and MACV Advisory personnel.

b. Civic Action:

(1) On 15 December 1966 a Civil Affairs Platoon (2 Off, 2 EM) from 2d Civil Affairs Company was attached to Brigade to advise, assist, and support S-5 in Civil Affairs Activities.

(2) During the period 15-20 December 1966 contact was made with S-5, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and guidance furnished on S-5 activities concerning various agencies to be contracted which support civic action in country.

During this period, contact was made and accounts established with Catholic Relief Service, CARE, and MACV Civic Action Fund. Contact was also made with USAID and JUSPAC.

(3) During this reporting period a total of 2,857 patients were treated under the MEDCAP II Program.

(4) Civic Action efforts during this period have included the following:

(a) Establishment of Civic Action Coordinating Committees within each of the three Districts: Quan Thu Duc, Quan Nha Bo, and Quan Binh Chanh.

(b) Construction of 125-meters of roadway; repair 3,610 meters of road.

(c) Repair of two bridges.

(d) Erection of fifty meters of fence and repair of an additional thirty-five meters of fence.

(e) Repair of two school buildings.

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- (f) Construction twenty foot bridges.
- (g) Distribution of 850 pounds of food stocks.
- (h) Completion of three minor drainage projects.
- (i) Completion of 50% of a trash clearance project in one city of 17,000.

7. Aviation:

The Aviation Section 199th Inf Bde has (8) organic, OH-23G aircraft. The section arrived at the port of Vung Tau, aboard the USNS CORE (AC), on 29 Dec 66. The first three aircraft joined the Brigade on the night of 30 Dec 1966. The remainder of the aircraft (minus one down for maintenance) were ferried into the Brigade area on 31 Dec. The section became operational on 2 Jan 1967.

During this reporting period the section flew 1974 sorties, amassing 450 hours, over 795 missions. 1248 passengers were transported.

8. Logistics:

a. General During the period 14 Dec 66 through 31 Jan 67, the 199th Infantry Brigade conducted tactical operations in assigned AOs. Logistical support was provided to Battalion and Company size units from Base Camp and Saigon Support Command. (506th Field Depot and Saigon Ration Break Down) All tactical operations were adequately supported logistically despite difficulties in obtaining required wheeled transportation. With the exception of wheel transportation, no major logistical problems were encountered.

b. Supply and combat service activities (Incl 9).

c. There has been no permanent construction to date.

9. Personnel Administration:

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength:

(a) There was an overall improvement in the Brigade strength during this period. Assigned strength as of 31 January was 101% of the authorized strength. This is an increase of 4% during the month of January. The present for duty strength was 99% of authorized strength. As of 31 January, the Brigade had sustained 5KHA, 37JHA, 1 non-battle dead, 2 non-battle injured and 1 non-battle missing, for a total of 46 casualties. Losses due to rotation, ETS and other administrative causes were insignificant due to the relatively short time the Brigade has been in Vietnam. Brigade gains during the quarter totaled 268. A serious replacement short fall was developing in the Infantry MOS field. The following critical positions are vacant and have no programmed replacements:

- 1 Brigade SI - Major - 2110
- 2 Aircraft Maintenance Officer - Lt - 64823
- 2 Electronics Repair Tech - WO - 286 AO

(b) Brigade strength as of 31 January 1967 is:

	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
AUTH:	256	24	3714	3994
ASGN:	249	16	3712	3977
TDY:	246	17	3664	3927

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(c) Casualt: (by month)

1 November: None

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2 December:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KHA:	0	0	0	0
WHA	0	0	12	12
MHA	0	0	0	0
Non-Battle Dead:	0	0	0	0
Non-Battle Inj:	0	0	0	0
Non-Battle Missing:	0	0	0	0

3 January:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KHA:	0	0	5	5
WHA:	3	0	22	25
MHA:	0	0	0	0
Non-Battle Dead:	0	0	0	0
Non-Battle Inj:	0	0	0	0
Non-Battle Missing:	0	0	1	1

4 Statistical analysis of battle casualties attached at Inclosure 11.

(2) Civilian Personnel:

(a) An initial 170 permanent hire positions were approved by the Manpower Control Div, USARV, on 31 Dec 66. However, a reapportionment of all available spaces now in progress stopped permanent hire effective 7 Jan 67. The Brigade employs no permanent hire personnel at present.

(b) On 1 Dec 66 the Brigade temporary hire program was authorized VN\$ 170,000 for the period 1 Dec 1966 to 31 Dec 1966. The Brigade hired a daily average of 100 local nationals during that period. On 1 Jan 1967 the Brigade was authorized VN\$ 102,000. For the period 1 Jan - 31 Jan 1967 the Brigade hired a daily average of 13 local personnel.

b. Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) The discipline in this quarter has been generally good. There has been 117 instances of punishment under Article 15, UCMJ. Inasmuch as this quarter encompasses the period of POM leaves and the time aboard ship, the amount of punishment under Article 15 is expected to decrease significantly as the Brigade situation stabilizes. No stragglers were apprehended and only two serious incidents were recorded for the quarter.

(2) Courts-Martial rate during this reporting period has remained moderate. There has been a total of two (2) Summary Courts-Martial, sixteen (16) Special Courts-Martial, and one (1) case referred to Superior Headquarters, USARV, for disposition by General Courts-Martial.

(3) There was no appointed Brigade IG during this period. All requests for IG assistance were referred to the IG II Field Force V. Thru 31 January 1967, Brigade personnel had registered one complaint and made three requests for assistance.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The status of morale within the Brigade is excellent. The men realize the task at hand and take pride in the Brigade's ever increasing list of accomplishments.

(2) Finance: Participation in the Soldiers' Deposit Program has remained at a relatively low level, largely due to the fact that most members of the brigade are sending the bulk of their pay to CONUS. Funds remaining in country have dropped to 37% of the latest payroll. The

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overall savings program participation in the Brigade is at 83.4%.

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(3) Chaplain: During the period 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67 the Chaplains conducted 238 religious services with a combined attendance of 7198 personnel. On 14 Jan 67 the 199th Infantry Brigade was visited by Chaplain (Col) Walton G. Sugg, Jr. Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam.

(4) Special Services: The allocations for "in-country" R&R were set at (3) every (3) days beginning 5 Jan 67. On 15 Jan 67 those allocations were increased to (2) every day. As of 31 Jan 67, (51) individuals have taken advantage of "in-country" R&R and (2) have been sent on R&R outside of Vietnam.

(5) Red Cross: Case load figures are not available for the period that the Brigade was at Fort Benning, as it was serviced by the Field Director, Fort Benning, Ga. From 28 Nov 66 through 31 Jan 67, 147 cases were serviced with \$847.00 being given as loans or grants.

Though the final Brigade element didn't close Vietnam until 24 Dec 66, the Red Cross gave a Christmas "ditty bag" to every man on Christmas Day. These "gifts from home" were greatly appreciated.

(6) Awards and Decorations: 1653 Officers and men, were awarded the Combat Infantry Badge; 79, the Combat Medical Badge. Also presented, one (1) Bronze Star (merit); three (3) Air Medals and forty-two (42) Purple Hearts.

(7) Burials And Graves Registration: There is no organic capability within the Brigade. The graves registration platoon of the 483d Field Services Company, which is attached to the 266th Supply and Services Battalion, Long Binh provides this service. During this period the GR Platoon received, processed and evacuated five (5) remains of Brigade personnel.

10. Chemical Operations: There was no significant employment of chemical agents or devices during this reporting period.

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II Commanders Observations and Recommendations

1. Observations (Lessons Learned):

PERSONNEL

Personnel Section AG

Item: Organization of personnel section to support overseas deployment.

Discussion: The Brigade deployed to VN in five groups. An Advance planning Group, Advance Party/Rear Detachment and three (3) Main bodies. There was a requirement to provide administrative support to all groups, except the Planning Group. The Personnel Section contained two officers and thirty-eight enlisted men. In order to provide continuous, and immediate support to the individual, it was necessary to have his records jacket accompany him. To service the records, the section was broken down into groups. The Advance Party element consisted of the AG and six enlisted men. Each Main Body Group was provided a team.

Observation: This breakout of the Personnel Section provided AG support of an immediate nature whenever and wherever required.

INTELLIGENCE

VC Hidden Weapons

Item: Search for missing VC weapons.

Discussion: A recent experience involving the trailing of two wounded VC disclosed a novel technique employed by the VC to preclude capture or discovery of their weapons. In the process of following a blood trail which led to a stream, friendly units discovered 2 VC weapons had been cast into the stream in an attempt to preclude their capture. Apparently, the wounded VC found the weapons to be cumbersome to their escape or evacuation and threw them into the stream. The alertness and experience of an ARVN Fanger unit working with US forces led to the discovery of the weapons discarded into the stream.

Observation: Whenever an encounter with the VC occurs in the vicinity of a fordable river or stream, and VC casualties have been inflicted, search the water for discarded weapons.

VC Identification

Item: Identification of VC Suspects.

Discussion: Examination of the personal effects of VC KIA disclosed a common oddity. The presence of 1 piaster notes appeared to bear significance. It was also noted that the 1 piaster note is uncommon on the Vietnamese economy. Upon querying local GVN officials, it was learned that the VC use the 1 piaster note as a symbol of identification amongst themselves.

Observation: Therefore, interrogate thoroughly, any suspect found to possess a GVN 1 piaster note. It may be the only critical clue to his/her true VC identity.

OPERATIONS

Interdiction of LOCs

Item: VC lines of communication.

Discussion: As a general rule, the VC will utilize the most convenient means of travel between two points. In an area of operations interwoven with rivers and streams, the predominant mode of VC travel is conducted via the waterways by sampans. Along rivers and streams affected by the changes in ocean tides, the bulk of VC waterway traffic occurs at the evening high tide generally between dusk and midnight. This permits the VC to utilize small streams that are unnavigable at low tides. Further-

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more, travel on 1. ming high tide is much easier non-motorized sampans. On the larger streams and rivers, the use of motorized sampans has given the VC the flexibility of movement during either high or low tide. Therefore, reinforced squad and platoon sized ambushes have been extensively used, during hours of darkness, along known or suspected VC lines of communications. In a one month period the Brigade with counterpart ARVN Bns established a total of 947 ambushes of which 70 made contact.

Observations: When it is difficult to fix enemy forces because they operate over widely dispersed areas in small groups, extensive use of nighttime ambushes greatly hamper the enemy's operations and resupply, and are successful in inflicting casualties on his forces with relatively small losses among our personnel.

Ambushes

Item: River and Canal Ambushes.

Discussion: Many expedient devices may be constructed to increase the effectiveness of ambushes along rivers and canals. A claymore mine, placed in a tree and directed downward on a slant, increases the lethality of an ambush directed against personnel in sampans. The claymore may also be placed on a floatation device, camouflaged as a piece of river residue and held in the mainstream by wires. A thorough knowledge of the effects of tides is also necessary to insure that the ambush position is located where rising water will not force the position to move and disclose its location. Recovery of enemy weapons and equipment is very difficult in deep water and some thought should be given to the use of nets or magnets to assist in recovery.

Observation: Ambushes established along river or canal banks require knowledge of tides and provides the small unit leader with many opportunities to increase the lethality of weapons employed in the kill zone. Detail planning pays off.

Riverine Operations

Item: Procedures for Operations in Delta Areas

Discussion: It is absolutely essential that units being introduced to a riverine environment receive extensive practical training on river crossing operations to include expedient methods of crossing men and equipment. Further, non-swimmers must be identified and paired with a strong swimmer through all phases of water operations. Operations must be planned to allow personnel a "drying out" period after being in water for extended periods of time. Close coordination with medical personnel is required and each man should be inspected after operations to prevent needless loss because of immersion foot and infection. Silicone grease spread on the feet and legs helps prevent tissue breakdown.

Observations: Intensive boat and expedient river crossing training is required prior to committing a unit into a riverine environment. Once committed, close personal inspection is required to prevent casualties occurring from immersion foot and other related injuries. Plans must include a "drying out" period for each committed unit. As a general rule, personnel should not remain in water for over 48 hours.

Army Air

Item: Flying the OH-23G faster to preclude effective enemy ground fire.

Discussion: No hits were registered on 199th organic OH-23G aircraft during the reporting period. It is believed that the reason may partially be in the fact that these aircraft are flown at a cruising speed of 75K instead of the normal 60K. This additional speed makes it difficult for the enemy to get a proper lead on the aircraft.

Observation: By tracking the rotor blades of OH-23G aircraft at 75K instead of 60K, as recommended by the aircraft handbook, the aircraft not only flies smoother at high speed, but enables flight up to the maximum

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speed with little vibration on the airframe and pilot.

MEDEVAC at Night

Item: Marking Location for MEDEVAC at Night

Discussion: Squad sized ambush patrols at night normally have little in the way of directing aircraft into a PZ. Should it become necessary to guide in a medevac or resupply helicopter several simple devices may be used. The first item is a hand held flare to guide the aircraft to the general area. A minimum of three flashlights should be carried with each patrol to properly mark the PZ. Also, although it does not fit in with current tactical doctrine, cigarettes or cigarette lighters may be used in the absence of flashlights and fires may be built. The pilot will coordinate recognition signals with the unit on the ground to insure that he is landing in the proper PZ. Patrol members must be prepared to give the pilot proper directional headings for the safest and most secure descent. Scout the area for obstructions that may endanger the aircraft and keep the pilot away from these locations. Talk to the pilot on the radio. Try to land the helicopter in the long axis of the PZ and over the lowest barriers. Wind above 10k should also be taken into consideration. Try to avoid bringing the aircraft in over areas where previous enemy contact has been made.

Observation: Patrol members must be prepared to use all means available to safely guide medevac helicopter's into their location.

LOGISTICS

Maintenance

Item: Special tools, tool sets authorized by Technical Manuals.

Discussion: Many special tools and tool sets are authorized a unit based on the Technical Manual pertaining to the particular equipment to be supported. Since the unit was activated and not all end items were on hand prior to deployment, several special tools and tool sets could not be ordered until arrival in-country and have not yet been received.

Observation: The lack of authorized special tools and tool sets has caused delay in the repair time of many items or required the evacuation to back-up units of equipment which could be repaired and returned at direct support level. This was particularly noticeable in the electronics, armament and aircraft sections. Tools and tool sets on POM requisition were not received and were reordered since arrival in-country. Efforts to fabricate and substitute have been only partially successful. Special emphasis should be placed on obtaining all authorized special tools and tool sets prior to deployment.

Maintenance

Item: Common hardware, shop stock items required during maintenance in shop.

Discussion: The nature of maintenance activities requires that common hardware such as nuts, bolts, screws and other frequently used items such as gasket material, safety wire, insulating tape, etc. be available in the shop when needed. These requirements are difficult to forecast but can cause delay in the repair of equipment.

Observation: With the exception of the items which were brought by this unit, the items required in shop maintenance such as those given above are hard to obtain. A kit could be improvised or developed by commodity group, which would have these necessary items contained in it and issued to a unit prior to departure from CONUS or shipped to them in-country.

Maintenance

Item: Effects of climate on optics.

Discussion: The high heat and humidity causes optical instruments to deteriorate and become unserviceable. The repair of these items is made difficult by the lack of adequate tools and a relatively dust free work area.

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Observation: Items of critical nature such as artillery or mortar sight units have become unserviceable after only a short period due to climate. Each company or battery should have at least one replacement sight on hand.

Maintenance

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Item: Establishment of repair parts supply accounts.

Discussion: During the period from activation to deployment, only one account was authorized to requisition supplies. This resulted in confusion and delays in processing requests.

Observation: Whenever a unit has a multiple supply mission such as repair parts and Class II & IV supply it is essential that separate supply accounts be established as early as possible.

Maintenance

Item: Repair parts in short supply.

Discussion: Several items are in short supply and are difficult to obtain. Long LDP has been experienced, however, these items are not constant but the list will vary from time to time.

Observation: The most difficult to obtain parts experienced during the period were:

2530-737-3716	Shaft, axle, 3/4 ton left
2530-737-3717	Shaft, axle, 3/4 ton right
2920-267-9987	Shaft, 2 1/2 ton M35A2
2930-632-4048	Water pump, 3/4 ton (no repair kit)
6140-057-2553	Battery
6140-057-2554	Battery
6810-249-9354	Battery Acid

This is only a partial listing but points out the necessity for units to deploy with minimum zero balance and a 75 day ASL. While some shortages were anticipated, the shortage of such common items was not expected. New units should put special emphasis on obtaining direct exchange type items, prior to deployment.

2. Recommendations: (NONE)

Charles W. Ryder Jr.
CHARLES W. RYDER JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVFBC-N (15 Feb 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967, 199th Infantry Brigade (Lt)(Sep)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 20 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 21310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt) for the quarter ending 31 January 1967 is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the comments, recommendations and actions taken as stated in the basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


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no


J.L. HITZFELDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From
Classified Enclosure

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16



Inclosure 1

48964 Army-Ft. Benning, Ga. 17 Nov 66

BUT-AUT SCHEDULE

	SEP-JUNE	3 JUL	10 JUL	17 JUL	24 JUL	31 JUL	7 AUG	14 AUG	21 AUG	28 AUG	4 SEPT	11 SEPT	18 SEPT	25 SEPT	2 OCT	9 OCT
	SEP-JUNE	3 JUL	10 JUL	17 JUL	24 JUL	31 JUL	7 AUG	14 AUG	21 AUG	28 AUG	4 SEPT	11 SEPT	18 SEPT	25 SEPT	2 OCT	9 OCT
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LEGEND

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 3RD TAC TNS - 2ND & 3RD TNS
 4TH TAC TNS - CO TNS & OUT - 1ST TNS

1ST FTX & 2ND

3RD FTX

#2

199TH INF BDE

AUT

#3

UNIT	AUG							SEPT							OCT																
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
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ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

27

COMMANDING GENERAL BG CHARLES W. RYDER JR.
DEPUTY-COMMANDING OFFICER. COL GEORGE D. REHKOPT
COMMANDING OFFICER, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY LTC LOUIE W. ODOM
COMMANDING OFFICER, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY LTC WILLIAM F. HARTMAN
COMMANDING OFFICER, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY. . . . LTC JAMES G. BOATNER
COMMANDING OFFICER, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTILLERY LTC HARVEY W. BROOKS
COMMANDING OFFICER, 7TH SUPPORT BN LTC ROBE O. STEVENS
COMMANDING OFFICER, TROOP D, 17TH CAV. CPT MICHAEL C. SMALL
COMMANDING OFFICER, 87TH ENGR COMPANY CPT JACK R. TATE
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 199TH INF BDE CPT ALFRED SMITH
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY. . . CPT ROBERT WAGNER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO A, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY . . CPT LEWIS JOHNSON
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO B, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY . . CPT TEDDY W. TURNER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO C, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY . . CPT JOE E. WILLIAMS
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO E, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY . . CPT HOWARD F. BACHMAN
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY. . . CPT WILLIAM E. McCLELLAND
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO A, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY . . CPT HERMAN T. EUBANKS, JR.
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO B, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY . . CPT ROGER A. DYER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO C, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY . . CPT PHILIP M. WOOD
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO E, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY . . CPT MARSHALL R. GRAY JR.
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY . . CPT LLOYD W. MEINKE
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO A, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY. . CPT JOHN H. MACK
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO B, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY . CPT GEORGE J. JURKOWICH
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO C, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY. . CPT THOMAS H. SELLERS
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO E, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY. . CPT RAYMOND N. SASAKI
COMMANDING OFFICER, HQ & HQ DET, 7TH SUP BN. . . . MAJOR JACK A. LEE
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO A, 7TH SUPPORT BN CPT DAVID L. SCHNITZLER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO B, 7TH SUPPORT BN CPT BERSCHEL L. BRALEY
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO C, 7TH SUPPORT BN MAJ ROLAND J. SYLVESTER
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTY CPT CLAUDE R. DENTON
COMMANDING OFFICER, BTRY A, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTY. . . CPT JAMES ALLING
COMMANDING OFFICER, BTRY B, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTY. . . CPT DERAL E. WILLIS
COMMANDING OFFICER, BTRY C, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTY. . . CPT ALLEN A. MYER

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BRIGADE UNIT SWITCHBOARD DESIGNATORS

199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (LT) REDCATCHER
2D BN, 3D INFANTRY. RASCAL
3D BN, 7TH INFANTRY RANSOM
4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY REBEL
2D BN, 40TH ARTILLERY RED DOG
7TH SUPPORT BATTALION RECKLESS
D TROOP, 17TH CAV RECALL
87TH ENGINEER BATTALION REBATE
298TH SIGNAL PLATOON (NOT JOINED AS OF 31 JANUARY 1967. . RAVEN

REDCATCHER TRUNKS

II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM. HURRICANE
LONG BINH POST LONG BINH

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Inelosure 9. Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt)
31 January 1967. Supply and Combat Service Support Activities.

3/

1. Supply: The average strength supported during the period was slightly under 5,000 troops, the supply levels for the Brigade as of 31 January 1967 were as follows:

a. Class I

<u>Type Ration</u>	<u>Days of Supply</u>	
	<u>Objectives</u>	<u>O/H</u>
(1) MCI		
(a) Forward battalions and separate companies	5	5
(b) Base Camp	3	3
(c) Brigade reserve	5	3.9
(2) B Rations (None)		
(3) A Rations (Only a 2, 2, 1 cycle)		

(4) Class I is operated as an adjunct to the duties of the B.S.O. It was found feasible to tail gate all deliveries. Because of the climate, an attempt has been made to stockpile canned juices, canned milk, coffee and some sundry packs. To facilitate customer satisfaction, unit distribution is effected.

b. Class III

<u>Type Fuel/Commodity</u>	<u>Days of Supply</u>	
	<u>Objective</u>	<u>O/H</u>
(1) At base camp		
(a) JP-4	5	5
(b) Avgas	5	5
(c) Diesel	5	5
(d) Diesel	5	5
(2) Package Lubes and Oils		
(a) At base camp	30	30
(3) Receiving Products:		

The 64th Quartermaster Battalion delivers Mogas and Diesel to this unit in 5,000 gallon tank trucks. JP-4 is picked up at Bismarck Air Base in a tank and pump unit. Most packaged products are picked up at the 64th at the time of requisitioning. Several requisitions have taken 45 days for completion.

(4) Storage:

The original TAGE was not sufficient. In base camp two (2) 10,000 gallon tanks provide a five (5) day storage capability for Diesel and Mogas. The other two tanks are being reserved for JP-4. Presently JP-4 is being stored in a tank and pump unit placed on the ground. In the field 500 gallon collapsible drums are used for ground storage.

(5) Issue:

In the base camp Mogas and Diesel are gravity flowed into vehicles from elevated 600 gallon tanks. JP-4 and Avgas are pumped into aircraft from pump units. In the field either Mogas or Diesel is gravity dispersed into a vehicle from a 2 1/2 ton truck. The other is pumped. JP-4 is dispersed from a tank and pump unit. Avgas is pumped from 55 gallon drums.

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Operational Report on Lessons Learned (Cont)

31 January 1967

Equipment / Deployment in Field

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The infantry battalions have no "in house" petroleum capability. The following equipment is sent forward with them: two (24 tons), two (14 ton trailers), one tank and pump unit for JP-4, four (500 gallon collapsible drums) for Diosol and Mogas, a pump unit for Mogas, a 50 GPM pump for either Mogas or Diosol.

Equipment:

Six additional tank and pump units were needed to support the Brigade. The combining of 10,000 gallon tanks, tank and pump units and 500 gallon collapsible drums requires numerous couplers and reducers. The section has had problems finding some and many more are still needed. An additional mission of water resupply has required seven 600 gallon aluminum tanks and three 50 GPM pumps.

(6) Problem Areas:

If all three battalions are deployed separately, the section will not have sufficient equipment to support them. Nine (9) trucks and thirteen (13) pumps would be needed; the section has four (4) trucks and twelve (12) pumps.

c. Class V

(1) Storage:

Ammunition is stored in its original containers on pallets. In base camp, 10 days of supply is the sought objective. However, there is not sufficient space to meet minimum safety requirements, even in a tactical situation. Additional space is also required for parking of vehicles and establishment of a storage area for defective ammunition, expended ammunition and packing materials.

(2) Issue:

Using units pick up their ammunition from the Class V ASP and transport it themselves to their locations. Forward supply points have been established on two occasions; however, very little ammunition has been issued from these temporary forward locations.

(3) Problem Areas:

The Class V section completely lacks any ammunition handling capability. Because all equipment must be borrowed, its availability is extremely unreliable, and little planning can be done. Personnel consist of 2 stock records clerk and a radio operator/light truck driver. These personnel must be used to actually handle ammunition, which results in inaccurate records and consequent unavailability of ammunition, delays in issue and difficulty in keeping check on suspended lots. An augmentation detail of 4 men has been authorized temporarily to help in this regard.

d. Class II and IV

(1) Receiving Procedures:

Supplies are received either from 266th S&S Battalion in Long Binh, or by unit pick up (by exception only) at the 506th Field Depot in Saigon. Several problem areas are inherent in such a pick-up procedure. It is felt that all requisitions should be submitted directly to the 506th Field Depot and that all supplies should be picked up at that installation, thus eliminating the middle man.

(2) Storage Procedures:

Standard storage practices are used. However, the volume of

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Operational Report on Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

31 January 1967.

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maps requisitioned necessitates the erection of a storage facility and fabrication of storage bins. Clothing and boot storage also require added storage space. Stockage objectives had to be developed both for maps storage and clothing items. Back up storage for expendables is in conoxes; with a self service facility in tentage.

(3) Issue Procedures:

A due out card is made up for each item of issue when passing action is required. When the item is received from depot the card is attached to the due out release thereby insuring that the proper requisitioner receives the supplies. Expendables are issued on "Paper" to build proper demand experience and as a control device.

(4) Field Deployments:

It is noted that additional radios are required in the field for rapid communications. A forward logistical element is in constant communications with a rear logistical element (BLOC). Experience indicates that only small amounts of stand-by stockage of all classes of supply are needed in the forward "BLOC".

(5) Class II & IV - Clothing

It has been our experience that the normal tariff sizes of clothing do not provide the proper sizes for the infantry men in this Brigade. Many more small sizes are required than the normal tariff allows. Consideration should be given to ascertaining if other infantry units have had this same experience.

(6) Publications and Blank Forms:

Current in-country procedures require all supply publications and blank forms to come from Japan. Fortunately this unit brought sufficient quantities to last until supply line is established. Any new unit coming in-country should bring enough of each to last at least four months.

(7) Materials Handling Equipment:

Upon arrival, this unit did not have its authorized (2) 6,000 lb. rough terrain fork lifts. This caused considerable problems in material handling. Another problem area is in operating, training, and maintenance support required for proper handling of MHE fork lifts.

(8) WABTOC:

The WABTOC package arrived without ice chest, 10 KW Generators and refrigerators. All these items are in short supply in-country and many of our problems in the mess halls and in the company areas hinge about these three items.

(9) Transportation:

As in many other areas this section suffers from lack of adequate transportation. An augmentation unit, or added vehicles and drivers, should be assigned. Recommend 20 2½ ton trucks and 5 S & P's.

(10) Lumber:

When this unit arrived it had many, many problems associated with lumber and other Class IV items. We arrived during a rainy period and it was most difficult to "get out" of the mud because of the shortage of lumber.

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Operational Report on Lessons Learned (Cont'd)
31 January 1967.

(11) The following items are in short supply and are required in the Brigade:

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- (a) Replacement radios for combat losses. (New Family)
- (b) Tontago & Polos (GP mediums-life of canvas estimated at 6-9 months)
- (c) Underwear & Socks
- (d) Quick Release Straps
- (e) Armor (Aircraft)
- (f) Generators (5, 10, 60 and 100 KW)
- (g) Watches, Non-Maintainable
- (h) Office Furniture (Desks, chairs, file cabinets etc.)
- (i) Aviators gloves and sunglasses
- (j) Petroleum handling equipment, i.e., mini ports, light and heavy weight pumps, and 10,000 gal tanks.
- (k) Folding chairs
- (l) Camouflage covers for steel helmets
- (m) Pump for water purification unit 1500 gal.
- (n) 4 ea Scoop Loaders
- (o) 600 gal water purification sets
- (p) 2 ea refrigerator vans for Class I
- (q) 20 additional 2 1/2 ton trucks & 10 stake & platform trailers w/prime movers.
- (r) Nylon rope
- (s) 70 cu. ft. refrigerators
- (t) Blank forms and publications
- (u) 4 ea 1650 cu. ft. refrigerators for Class I, receipt, issue and storage.
- (v) Ice chest (75 ea)
- (w) Mess hall equipment i.e., tables, chairs, steam table, etc.
- (x) All items of TA 50-901 (i.e., helmets, liners, pistol belts, air mattresses, ponchos, etc.)

o. Repair Parts:

Parts which were on POM requisitions were considered as invalid and all unit PBL and Support ASL items at zero balance were reordered, if required, starting 11 January.

(1) Following is a summary of requisitions handled by Co "B", 7th Support Battalion Repair Parts Section during the period 11-31 January 1967 (Only data available):

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(a) Requests received

IPD 02 237
IPD 05 982
IPD 12 1695
TOT Request 2915

(b) Requests for ASL items 1495

(c) Requests non-ASL (fringo) 1420

(d) Issues made 767

(e) Requests passed 1601

(f) Requests rejected 24

(2) Reason for rejection of requests

(a) 20 were items issued by Brigade Supply

(b) 2 were duplicate requests

(c) 2 were for direct exchange items

(3) Procedures were established for the processing of "REDBALL EXPRESS" requests. Procedures are in 199th Inf Bde Reg 700-13.

2. Combat Service Support Activities

a. Medical Evacuation. The following number of personnel were treated during the reporting period:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DISE SE</u>	<u>NON-BATTLE INJ</u>	<u>INJ RECEIVED HOSTILE ACTION</u>
Admissions direct	158	132	8	38
Disposition to duty	130	119	5	6
Disposition by transfer	13	6	2	5
Deaths	6	0	1	5

b. Transportation:

(1) During the period from 14 December through 31 January 1967, the Brigade has moved its battalions approximately 17 times. Each battalion size movement requires the minimum of (40) 2½ ton trucks. Each infantry battalion has (9) 2½ tons trucks TO&E. Considering the fact that there is no transportation section, as such, in the support battalion, it becomes necessary to request transportation from local supporting transportation units. It has been found that because of the many commitments imposed on supporting transportation units they have generally only been able to provide the Brigade with 10 augmentation trucks per day for movement. This necessitates the drawing of trucks from our organic Artillery and Support Battalions. The 2½ ton trucks organic to the Support and Artillery Battalions are TO&E vehicles, therefore when they are used to transport the Infantry Battalion, the drivers and vehicles are pulled from their TO&E missions.

(2) The addition of a Brigade Transportation officer would take a burden off the S-4 of the Support Battalion

(3) Within the past two months extensive use has been made of aerial resupply. Normally it requires three HULD Helicopters to resupply the Brigade's three infantry battalions. Headquarters and Headquarters Company has eight H-23 Light Observation Helicopters organic to the company. As these helicopters are

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only designed for observation purposes, the brigade must request helicopter support from local units. To remedy this situation our aviation section has requested to exchange four (4) H-23's for three (3) H-19's giving the Brigade a limited resupply capability as well as an observation capability.

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c. Maintenance Services

(1) Following is a summary of maintenance production during the period:

	<u>JOBS REC</u>	<u>JOBS COMPLETED</u>
Armament	191	153
Automotive	105	97
Electronics	280	238
Engineer	80	68
Office Machine	47	38
Service Section	70	45
Aviation	16	12

(2) The maintenance float authorized by USARV Reg 750-17 was ordered during the period. Procedures were established for the use of such float.

(3) A daily report of equipment status and repair parts levels was established in 199th Inf Bde Reg 750-2. Information obtained is used to brief the Commanding General, and to expedite repair parts required by giving the maintenance officer a guideline for requisitioning.

(4) Procedures were established to obtain information required to be submitted to USARV on selected items of equipment, by publishing 199th Inf Bde Reg 750-4

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS LEAFLETS


PURPOSE: This leaflet serves a dual purpose in that it is both a reward leaflet and also has instructions to those VC who desire to "Chiêu Hồi" to the GVN. This leaflet may be disseminated by hand or air drops.

CÙNG CÁC BẠN TRONG HÀNG NGŨ VIỆT CỘNG

Chính Phủ VNCH sẽ thưởng và giúp đỡ khi bạn trở về.

- * 24* trên cơm mỗi ngày
- * 24* mỗi ngày cho vợ bạn
- * 12* cho mỗi đứa con của bạn
- * Sẽ thêm các Khoản Khác

Những KHÍ GIỚI bạn mang về sẽ được thưởng tùy theo loại.



Front - (translation).

To friends in the VC Ranks:
The GVN will give you reward and help when you return;
24* a day for food
24* a day for your wife
12* a day for each of your children and other allowances.

Weapons that you bring in will be rewarded for according to each type of weapon.

CÙNG CÁC BẠN TRONG HÀNG NGŨ VIỆT CỘNG



Đây là những lời khuyên cần thiết để giúp bạn trở về với Chính Nghĩa Quốc gia.

- 1/ Hãy lấy một tờ thông hành của Chính Phủ Quốc-Gia và giữ cẩn thận để chờ cơ-hội trở về.
- 2/ Trong lúc kiên nhẫn chờ một cơ-hội tốt, cứ tỏ ra trung thành với bạn Việt Cộng để tránh mọi sự nghi ngờ của bạn chúng.
- 3/ Khi cơ-dịp là trời ngay trở về với gia đình.
- 4/ Nếu bạn chỉ có thể trốn đi ban đêm, hãy tìm một nơi để ẩn mình. Hãy đến trình diện với Chính-quyền vào ban ngày. Đưa vũ-khí một chỗ trước khi ra trình-diện. Sau khi trình diện bạn có thể chỉ cho Chính-quyền chỗ bạn giấu khí-giới để lãnh thưởng.
- 5/ Luôn luôn giữ kỹ tờ thông hành trong người bạn để đi; bất ngờ gặp-dịp có thể trở về với Chính Nghĩa hoặc thành lính bị bắt bạn có thể chứng minh là bạn có thiện chí trở về với gia đình và Chính Nghĩa Quốc Gia.
- 6/ Bất luận trong trường hợp nào, ngày cũng như đêm nếu có tờ thông hành là có thể được tiếp đón như một người bạn.

SP-951A

Back - (translation).

To friends in the VC Ranks:
These are the necessary instructions which will help you to return to the just cause:

1. Pick up a National Safe Conduct Pass and keep it with care and wait for an occasion to return.
2. While being patient to wait for a good occasion, you should be loyal to the VC to avoid any doubt.
3. When the chance comes, escape immediately and return home.
4. If you can only escape at night, find a place to hide. Report to the GVN authority in the daytime. Hide your weapons in one place before you rally. After you rally, you can show to the GVN authority where the weapons are hidden to receive the reward.
5. Always keep carefully the safe conduct pass, so that when you can return to the just cause or when you are captured, you have proof to show that you wish to rally to the just cause and see your family.
6. Anytime, day or night, if you have a Safe Conduct Pass, you will be welcomed as a friend.

Inclosure 10

PURPOSE: This is a reward type leaflet designed to induce people to give US Forces information. These leaflets may be disseminated by hand or air drop.



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TIỀN THƯỞNG

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Quân Đội Hoa Kỳ có mặt tại Việt Nam để giúp đỡ Chính Phủ của đồng bào đem lại thanh bình và an ninh cho xứ sở. Để hoàn thành nhiệm vụ này, chúng tôi rất cần sự giúp đỡ của đồng bào. Để bảo vệ đồng bào và nhân dân và tội chúng tôi sẽ thưởng tiền cho đồng bào nào cho chúng tôi biết tin tức về - Mìn, Hầm chôn vũ khí của Việt Cộng. Đường hầm của Việt Cộng.

Cạm bẫy, Những trận phục kích của Việt Cộng.
Hãy liên lạc với binh sĩ Hoa Kỳ gần nhất của Lữ Đoàn 199 Bộ Binh Hoa Kỳ và đưa cho ông ta tờ truyền đơn này hay lá số 969. Quân nhân này sẽ đọc mặt sau tờ truyền đơn viết bằng tiếng Anh và sẽ giúp đỡ đồng bào báo cáo tin tức tại cơ quan thẩm quyền liên hệ. Đồng bào sẽ được thưởng xứng đáng về những tin tức có ích lợi.

LỮ ĐOÀN 199 BỘ BINH HOA KỲ - TIỀN THƯỞNG - LỮ ĐOÀN 199 BỘ BINH HOA KỲ

TIỀN THƯỞNG

TRANSLATION:

The American soldiers are here in Vietnam to help your GVN bring peace and security to your country. To accomplish this task, we need your help. To protect you and other innocent people, we will give a reward to anyone who gives us information on:

VC mines and weapons caches, VC tunnels, VC booby traps and ambushes. Contact the nearest American soldier of the 199th Infantry Brigade and give him this leaflet or number 969. He will read the reverse side of this leaflet written in English and have you report your information to the authority concerned. You will be properly rewarded for valuable information.

199th US Infantry Brigade - REWARD - 199th US Infantry Brigade

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PURPOSE: This leaflet is commonly referred to as "Good Guy" and informs people the reason for the 199th Inf Bde being in their area. The most common means of dissemination is by hand.

LỮ ĐOÀN 199 BỘ BINH HOA KỲ ĐÃ ĐẾN VIỆT
NAM, HỌ CÓ NHỮNG VŨ KHÍ KHỦNG-KHIẾP ĐỂ
TÌM KIẾM VÀ TIÊU DIỆT BỌN VIỆT CỘNG ĐỂ
DÀNG. KHI NÀO HỌ KHÔNG CHIẾN ĐẤU CHỐNG
BỌN VIỆT CỘNG PHÁ HOẠI ĐỒNG BÀO, THÌ CÁC
QUÂN NHÂN THUỘC LỮ ĐOÀN 199 BỘ BINH HOA-
KỲ SẼ GIÚP ĐỒNG BÀO XÂY CẤT TRƯỜNG HỌC,
SĂN SÓC BỆNH NHÂN VÀ PHÂN PHÁT THỰC-PHẨM
NHƯNG HỌ CHỈ CÓ THỂ GIÚP ĐỠ ĐỒNG BÀO
KHI ĐỒNG BÀO GIÚP ĐỠ HỌ. KHI NÀO ĐỒNG BÀO
THẤY NHỮNG BINH SĨ HOA KỲ MANG HUY HIỆU
CÂY ĐUỐC TRÊN VAI HỌ, HÃY NHỚ RẰNG HỌ LÀ
BẠN CỦA ĐỒNG BÀO. 246-190-67

TRANSLATION:

The US 199th Infantry Brigade has arrived in Vietnam. They have mighty weapons that will seek out and destroy the Viet Cong. When not fighting the VC bandits who rebel against their own people, the US 199th Infantry Brigade will be helping to build schools, treat the sick and injured and distribute food to the people of Vietnam.

But they can only help you, if you help them. When you see the American soldiers wearing the Flaming Spear on their shoulders, remember, we are your friends.

PURPOSE: These two leaflets are "scare" leaflets. Their purpose is to bring awareness to the VC of the futility of their cause. These leaflets are designed to motivate VC into surrendering or "Chiou Hoi". Because these leaflets have as their target the VC, it is most commonly air dropped.



Translation (from back of leaflet).

Did you know this man? He was the VC secretary in Tong Duc Village. His name was Nguyen Van Thanh or maybe you know him as Duc. He was killed in Hamlet #2 of Tong Duc village by the soldiers of the 199th Infantry Brigade. Do not let this happen to you. Rally to the GVN now. Do not die a lonely death and be buried in an unmarked grave. No one will know if you die, no one will mourn. To remain with the VC is certain death. Rally to the GVN under the "Chiou Hoi" Program.



DỪNG ĐỂ BẠN LẤN VÀO CẢNH NHƯ THỂ NÀY

HAY QUY-CHANH NGAY BÂY GIỜ

Translation (from back of leaflet).

Each day, each week, each month, more and more of your base camps and tunnels are found and destroyed. You are shelled more often, you are bombed more often. You are forced to move more often, you are forced to dig deeper, you are forced to carry more loads away. You are tired, you are hungry, you are sore, you are sick.

Your leaders tell that victory is near. They are wrong. Only death is near. Do you hear the planes? Do you hear the bombs? Those are sounds of DEATH: your DEATH.

PURPOSE: This leaflet runs in conjunction with the leaflets on page 4 in that a VC, unarmed, may use this leaflet to surrender without bodily harm by any allied forces. Instructions to allied forces are written in English, Vietnamese, and Korean. This leaflet is disseminated by air drop.

SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES



Đây là một tấm Giấy
Thông Hành có giá trị
với tất cả cơ quan Quân
Chính Việt - Nam Cộng-
Hòa và lực lượng Đồng-
Minh.

NO 716964 GS

이 안전보장패스는 월남정부와 모든 연합군에 의해 인정된 것입니다.

TRANSLATION: Safe Conduct Pass



PURPOSE: This leaflet is specifically designed as a "Chiou Hoi" leaflet. By using the comments of a former Viet Cong, our hope is to induce other Viet Cong, especially members of the defector's unit, to return to the GVN with full amnesty. Air drop and hand out are the methods of dissemination. (NOTE: This man was the first "Chiou Hoi" of the 199th. He turned himself in on 24 January 1967 to Co "E", 4/12 Inf Bn, in the Thu Duc Area).



TRANSLATION:

My name is Tran Van Theo, oldest son, 25 years old at Xa Bong Ria Province. I was in a production team. I rallied on 25 Jan 67. I call on Dung, Hai, Ta, Hung, Duc, Nam, Thanh and Miss Hai to come to the national cause. I have been well treated. Return to the national just cause in order to rebuild your family and country.

PURPOSE:

This leaflet is directly related to the MEDCAP program. At those times our units are in villages and hamlets treating people, this leaflet is passed out by hand to as many people in the village as possible for the purpose of encouraging them to avail themselves of medical benefits being presented by all health agencies in Vietnam.


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LỰC LƯỢNG HOA KỲ
ĐẾN VIỆT NAM KHÔNG
NHỮNG CHIẾN ĐẤU
CHỐNG CỘNG SẢN MÀ
CÒN GIÚP ĐỠ CHÁNH
PHỦ VIỆT NAM CỘNG
HÒA TRONG CÔNG TÁC
CẢI THIỆN SỨC KHỎE
CHO ĐỒNG BÀO.



FRONT SIDE:

The American forces in Vietnam not only fight the VC, but also help the Vietnamese government in improving the health of the people.



Trong khắp làng mạc Việt Nam, bác sĩ và nhân viên y tế Hoa Kỳ đều đã đến thăm và săn sóc sức khỏe cho đồng bào. Toàn nhân viên y tế có thể chữa bệnh ngoại thường, nóng lạnh, nhức đầu và tất cả những căn bệnh khác. Toàn y tế Hoa Kỳ rất lấy làm vui sướng được giúp đỡ đồng bào.

BACK SIDE:

In villages all over Vietnam, American Army doctors or medics make visits to give better health to the people. The medical team can help you cure skin diseases, colds, headaches, and most other complaints. When a medical team comes to your area, they will be glad to help you.

Inclosure 11, Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt)
31 January 1967. Statistical Analysis of Battle Casualties.

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TYPE CASUALTIES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MHA</u>	<u>NED</u>	<u>NBI</u>	<u>NEM</u>
2D BN, 3D INF	0	8	0	1	2	1
3D BN, 7TH INF	0	6	0	0	0	0
4TH BN, 12TH INF	5	21	0	0	0	1
2D BN, 40TH ARTY	0	1	0	0	0	0
7TH SPT BN	0	0	0	0	0	0
RHC, 199TH INF BDE	0	0	0	0	0	0
D/17TH CAV	0	1	0	0	0	0
87TH ENGR CO	0	0	0	0	0	0

CAUSE OF BATTLE CASUALTIES (DEATHS)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>Small-Arms</u>	<u>Mines</u>	<u>Booby-traps</u>	<u>Grenades</u>	<u>Frag Wounds</u>
2D BN, 3D INF	2	0	0	4	2
3D BN, 7TH INF	5	1	0	0	0
4TH BN, 12TH INF	6 (3)	9 (2)	4	4	3
2D BN, 40TH ARTY	0	0	0	0	1
7TH SPT BN	0	0	0	0	0
RHC, 199TH INF BDE	0	0	0	0	0
D/17TH CAV	0	0	0	0	1
87TH ENGR CO	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	13	10	4	8	7

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Inclosure 12, Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 199th Inf Bde (Sop)(Lt)
31 January 1967. 'Out-Of-Country' Visitors

Distinguished 'Out-Of-Country' visitors to the 'Rodcatcher' Brigade

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EG (RETIRED) S.L.A. MARSHALL	19 DEC 66
GEN HAROLD K. JOHNSON	24 DEC 66
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY	
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH Y. RESNICK	30 DEC 66
CONGRESSMAN OF THE 28TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, NEW YORK STATE	
GEN EARLE G. WHEELER	8 JAN 67
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	
GEN (RETIRED) WANG	13 JAN 67
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA	
GEN DWIGHT E. BEACH	21 JAN 67
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US ARMY PACIFIC	

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Inclosure 13, Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt)
31 January 1967.

POM Processing
(8 October - 19 November 1966)

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During the latter phase of Advance Unit Training, conducted at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, the need for the initiation of preparation for overseas deployment became acute. Overseas movement was coming so close on the heels of this training, that it had really been impossible to devote full attention to the Brigade's field training exercise and that, in fact, some 15 officers were back at Fort Benning working on the movement problem.

To partly solve the difficulty, two groups were established. One defined as a Movement Planning Group, was charged with initiating the necessary planning to get movement actions underway. A second, which was given the title of POR-POM Coordination Group was charged with the preparation of an individual for overseas shipment, determining the capacity of various Post/Brigade facilities to process the individual and procurement on a recurring basis from subordinate units, of the number of individuals who still require further POR qualification. Those two groups had accomplished considerable preliminary work in the two areas by the time lead elements of the Brigade had returned to Fort Benning.

A schedule was developed providing for: POM leave; Packing-Crating- Loading; POR qualification and necessary Brigade Administration. The schedule was broken into five groups: Movement Team; Advance Planning Group; Carotaker Group; Advance Party/Rear Detachment and Main Body.

Plans were pointed to an overall completion date of 20 November 1966, the Brigade's Personnel Readiness Date.

The fifteen day POM leaves began with the Movement Team, on 8 October 1966. A sixteenth day, at the end of each leave period, was programmed as the return to duty date. This allowed a determination of the exact date when all personnel would be present for duty; this date was 19 November 1966.

Having returned to Fort Benning, from Camp Shelby, 24 September, the POR-POM Coordination group was in full swing. With the POR program formed up the group was in the process of designating troop movements; listing specific personnel on each movement.

The troop movement groups consisted of: Two main body, troop movements; Two, two-hundred and fifty men, voyage staff personnel; An advance planning group; An advance party of two-hundred and eighty men and a breakdown of those personnel accompanying equipment - Major shipment personnel, to accompany other or zulu type equipment - Red TAT, to accompany aboard troop ship - Organic aircraft (8 OH-23), one pilot and mechanics.

Schedules had been arranged for: Dental checks; Health records checks; Training records checks; ID tags, cards and processing and necessary arrangements made for Central Post Clearance.

Although POR qualification is the Command responsibility of the individual units, guidance was given by, and coordination effected through, the POR-POM Coordination Group. In this manner Brigade kept abreast of the situation. As time went on, it became evident that a tight reign was required in order to complete this phase of the operation.

Several problems developed during POR processing. The first was in the area of weapons qualification. The Brigade received M-16 rifles towards the end of October. Though it was known this issue was forthcoming, Post would not allow the Brigade to schedule any ranges until the weapons were in hand. Therefore, the late delivery of the M-16s found the ranges scheduled to Post units. This made scheduling a matter of coordination with other units, as well as with the Post; complicating a program that had an early deadline - NLT 19 November 1966. The qualification was further complicated by the number of personnel who were required to participate. The majority of those not required to qualify had to fire for familiarization. This, all at a time when approximately 30% of all Brigade personnel were on POM leave.

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An associated problem was in the area of transportation to support the exercise. It was necessary to request support from other agencies as most organic vehicles were being processed for shipment.

Relaxation of Post's range scheduling policy or an earlier weapons delivery would have alleviated many problems, as the limiting factor - time, could be changed. 50

Another problem area was in Dental processing. Disposition of dental records made it difficult to screen them to determine the Brigade's status. Due to the physical disposition of Brigade units, elements at Koller Hill and at Sand Hill, the Brigade was serviced by two dental clinics. Brigade dental records were split between two servicing clinics. To further complicate matters, when individuals were transferred from one unit to another, during organizational development, dental records were not always moved accordingly. When a man reached the unit in which he would serve, his records would remain in his old unit's file. Some men joined the Brigade from other units and didn't even bring their records. After due time this problem was solved. Units were required to send two copies of their unit rosters to their servicing clinic. Records were checked against these rosters and misplaced records, searched out and placed in the proper unit file. The clinic was then able to produce rosters, by unit, of those personnel requiring POR checks. The requirement was solved, but time was lost.

If dental records had been retained by the individual, or at a central point, until troop dispositions were firm, this probably would not have become a problem area.

The big problem faced by the Movement Planning Group was a lack of material handling equipment (MHE) and a lack of firm knowledge on train arrival times and train configuration.

This problem was created when the train loading date was moved up one week; from 5 November 1966 to 27 October 1966.

All completion dates were, accordingly, moved up one week. This caught whole teams of men on their POM leaves, creating a requirement to draft new teams from available personnel. The movement training schools, scheduled to be conducted by Post, had to be re-scheduled for an earlier date.

MHE programmed to arrive on 5 November 1966, didn't start to arrive until 7 November 1966, when one fork-lift was delivered. Of five lifts requested, only four were delivered; and the fourth, not until 11 November 1966. The loading task was made even more difficult, as hard-stand type lifts were issued in lieu of the rough-terrain type, requested.

Earlier procurement of trains, necessitated by the revision in the loading schedule, posed a real problem. To fulfill the mission, trains were literally thrown together. It was all but impossible to produce a firm train schedule at this short notice. Brigade found its equipment being loaded, piecemeal fashion on miscellaneous trains of varied configuration. Not being able to arrive at a firm schedule, it was not possible to know when a train would arrive, where it would be positioned or what its configuration would be. As it turned out some trains would arrive with no two cars of the same dimensions. This required a new loading plan, for each car producing unrealistic train loading times.

In order to Load Out, units were required to be prepared to move all, or parts, of their equipment to any one of several loading sites, on a moments notice. As no load time could be programmed to allow a unit to be in position to load when a train arrived, a degree of inefficiency was built into all loading procedures.

These problems might have been avoided by allowing the original train loading date, 5 November 1966, to stand or by readjusting train and MHE availability dates to meet the new load date of 27 October 1966. The mission would have been better served, had the MHE been of the proper type.

In addition to the special problems involved with POR-POM processing, there remained the ever pressing ones, inherent to daily operations, as the Brigade was still in the process of receiving personnel and equipment.

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51 The Brigade found itself with some 221 more enlisted personnel assigned than was authorized. However, 184 of these were non-deployable due to ETS, medical or other reasons. Many of them were non-commissioned officers. In contrast to this overage there were 121 non-commissioned officers or critical specialists positions vacant, or occupied by privates. 18 November 1966 found the Brigade a little understrength with the most notable shortages in the grade of E-7; the Brigade had 61 of 108 (56%) of authorized E-7s.

During this period the Brigade found itself receiving all of the attention that it wished it had received in July. Coming down to the wire, the order of the day, in addition to the obvious maintenance, packing, loading and leaves, was assistance visits, inspections and reports. Nonetheless, the long-standing equipment shortages were being gradually reduced with each passing day.

HEADQUARTERS
3D BATTAL W 7TH INFANTRY
199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)(LT)

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AVBH-C

11 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)
ATTN: S3
APO 96279

1. (C) Name/type of operation: Uniontown/search and destroy.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 261040 Dec 66-281400 Jan 67.
3. (U) Location: Bien Hoa, Long Binh (YT0712).
4. (C) Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt).
5. (C) Reporting Officer: Battalion Commander, 3d Bn 7th Inf-LTC William F. Hartman.
6. (C) Task Organization:

A/3-7

Arty FO Party

B/3-7

Arty FO Party

C/3-7

Arty FO Party

Battalion Control

E/3-7:

Recon Plat
Hv Mort

AT Plat

1st Plat, 87th Eng
1/D/17 Cav

B/2-40 Arty (DS)

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

- a. Artillery, B/2-40 (DS). No tactical missions were fired in support of this operation. H and I fires were planned and fired each night with unknown results.
- b. USAF: 7th USAF. No CAS missions were flown in support of this operation. FAC's were used occasionally for VR. This unit did not have occasion to utilize illumination from supporting units.
- c. Army Aviation: A CH-47 was used to transport an element to a remote site and also to extract this unit. Resupply missions, command and control, and reconnaissance missions were flown daily. Helicopter support was adequate.

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8. (C) Intelligence.

- a. The primary force in this area of operation was local force Viet Cong in small groups (4-5 men). They were reportedly engaged in covert actions of sabotage and theft of ammunition. The above information was supplied in part by the 2d Bn 3d Infantry who was operating in the area prior to our assumption of the South Uniontown mission. 84
- b. During the operation, a total of four contacts with Viet Cong were made by units of the battalion. Of these contacts, a force of an estimated strength 15-20 was the largest encountered. There were no VC captured nor any verified as killed during the operation. There were no hard installations discovered which had not been previously reported by other units.
- c. Terrain. The general area of operations offers good cover and concealment. The area lent itself to the VC operations mentioned in a above. The area was heavily vegetated near the numerous intermittent streams and was marked by a large network of well used foot paths.
- d. Weather. Good visibility and high ceilings were prevalent throughout the operation.

9. (C) Missions: (Incl 1 & 2)

- a. Move by truck to AO's commencing 260900H Dec 66.
- b. Conduct Search and Destroy operations in assigned AO's with primary emphasis on security of the ammunition storage area and provide security for civilian construction equipment in area of operations.
- c. Provide security detachment for 53d Sig Bn relay site.
- d. Assume attachment of D/17 Cav (-) to include mission of securing sand dredge.
- e. Maintain a minimum of 1 company in 173d TACR (North Uniontown).
- f. Maintain a minimum of 2 companies in South Uniontown.
- g. Rotate companies throughout AO's and BMB for maintenance.

10. (C) Execution:

- a. Warning order to conduct operations in Uniontown was received on 25 Dec and was issued to subordinate units 2100 hrs on the same day as HQ 3-7 Inf OPORD 9-66 dated 251700H Dec 66.
- b. Motor movement to Uniontown AO's commenced 260900H. Last element closed 261040H and Bn assumed responsibility for Uniontown mission. Co A, B, C and E established company bases and commenced search and destroy operations in assigned AO's by patrolling during daylight hours and establishing ambush sites during darkness. All of the activities were closely coordinated with 3d Ordnance Bn and Long Binh Post Headquarters. CONFIDENTIAL

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- c. On 26 Dec B Co established first contact at YT089088 at 1515 hrs by firing at 1 VC. He fled to the Northeast. The 5 rds fired at the enemy flushed 2 more VC who ran to the Southeast. A thorough search of the area was conducted with negative results. The Battalion established 9 squad size ambushes on the night of 26 December.
- d. On 27 Dec, the battalion conducted patrolling and established 11 ambush sites. Co A received sniper fire at 2230 hrs which resulted in the B's first casualties, SGT Spriggs and CPL Mizzell.
- e. On 28 Dec, companies conducted patrolling and S&D operations. B Co established contact with 15-20 VC at 2025 hrs, while en-route to an ambush site. The Plat SGT maneuvered his element and fought his way back to friendly positions. VC casualties were unknown, however the VC were heard screaming in the area. 1 US casualty (PFC Johnson) resulted from an enemy grenade.
- f. From 29 Dec to 31 Dec, units conducted patrolling and established ambush sites without contact.
- g. On 1 Jan, companies continued S&D operations in assigned AO's except C Company which was rotated to BMB for maintenance.
- h. On 3 Jan, C Co commenced operations in 173d TAOR (North Uniontown). E Co & B Co mortar platoons in South Uniontown received SA fire at 0400 hrs which resulted in 3 US WHA.
- i. On 4 Jan, B Co was extracted to BMB for maint.
- j. On 6 Jan, A Co was extracted to BMB for maint.
- k. On 7 Jan, AT Plat conducted airmobile move to radio relay site of 53d Signal Bn, to provide security.
- l. Aggressive patrolling and ambushes were conducted daily throughout the remainder of the mission with no positive contact. Companies were rotated throughout the AO's and BMB for rest and maintenance.
- m. All companies extracted over land from AO's to BMB commencing 281355H. Extraction completed 281445 hrs.

11. (C) Administration:

- a. Because of the closeness of the area of operation to the Battalion Base area no significant problems were experienced in supporting the Battalion's operation.
- b. The following administrative activities were conducted during this period with results as indicated:
 - (1) Reports.....Good.
 - (2) Administration.....Good.
 - (3) Mail.....Good.
 - (4) Finance.....Good.
 - (5) Morale.....Excellent. In-country R&R quotas were established and filled.

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- (6) Religion.....Good. Chaplain led to vary schedule but all services were held each week.
- (7) Military Justice.....Good. Special courts were held during the period when they did not conflict with operational commitments. 3

- c. Recommendations: It is recommended that officers be placed on the payroll with their respective companies thus eliminating a separate pay roll for officers which will eliminate the requirement of an additional Class A agent in order to pay officers.

12. (C) Logistics.

- a. Generally, the logistical support of the Uniontown mission was accomplished with little difficulty; however the following observations are made.
 - (1) The late arrival of resupply helicopters at times prevented initiation of planned early morning operations.
 - (2) The non-availability of helicopters at various times for retrieving residue delayed tactical movements.
- b. Initially the Battalion experienced difficulty in obtaining the following supply and items of ammunition:
 - (1) Sandbags
 - (2) 40mm HE ammunition.
 - (3) LAW
 - (4) Claymore mines
 - (5) Fragmentation Grenades
 - (6) Smoke Grenades
 - (7) Hand Held Flares
- c. The Battalion began tactical operations prior to the arrival of its organic equipment which caused several transportation problems for Command and Control and resupply. Efforts were made to attach cargo trucks and utility vehicles to the Battalion but these attachments met only the very bare minimum of transportation requirements.
- d. The Battalion hand receipted kitchen equipment from other units in order to feed the battalion during this operation.
- e. Recommendations:

It is recommended that each Battalion involved in an operation be allocated daily one helicopter for resupply and Command and Control.

13. Commanders Analysis.

This operation commenced one day after the battalion closed in country providing an excellent shakedown and training period for all elements.

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
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57 For the first time individuals were issued ammunition without excessive control and safety measures being applied. Through continued carrying, handling and firing of these munitions, individuals to include leaders at all echelons became less apprehensive about probable accidents and individuals acquired confidence in themselves and their units.

Extended periods of operations within the same limited assigned areas without contact with the enemy causes units to relax and become less alert. To overcome this trend, companies were rotated to other areas within the Battalion operational area as often as feasible.

Because of firing restrictions the mortar platoons and the anti-tank platoon contributed little to the overall operation. The mortar platoons of the rifle companies normally utilized one mortar and the other squads were utilized for other missions. E Company (CS) was reorganized into a reduced strength rifle company consisting 2 rifle platoons and a mortar platoon of two squads; however the company still maintains a capability to employ two 106 RR if the need arises.

It is felt that the Battalion contributed to the security of the Long Binh complex and at the same time benefited immeasurably from the training received in a relatively quiet combat area.


WILLIAM F. HARTMAN
LTC Inf
Commanding

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
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


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
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
4TH BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY
199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)(LIGHT)
APO San Francisco, Calif 96279

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AJILI-DOT

17 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)
APO 96279

1. Name and Type of Operation

OPERATION DUCK/Perimeter security of Bearcat BMB and search and destroy operations in Bearcat TAOR.

2. Dates of Operation

230730H Dec 66 - 311700H Dec 66.

3. Location

Bearcat TAOR (Camp Martin Cox)

4. Control or Command Headquarters

Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)

5. Reporting Officers

Bn CO	LTC James G. Boatner
Co A CO	CPT John H. Mack
Co B CO	CPT George J. Jurkovich
Co C CO	CPT Thomas H. Sellers
Co E CO	CPT Raymond N. Sasaki
HHC CO	CPT Lloyd W. Meinke

6. Task Organization

a. Control Hqs: Hqs, 4-12 Inf

b. Attachments: (1) Engr Plat, 87th Engr Co

(2) IPW Team, HHC, 199th Inf Bde

(3) Bde HHC Rifle Plat (29 Dec - 31 Dec)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Hqs, 4-12 Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)
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d. Detachments: None

d. OPCOM (For perimeter security only):

2-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div
Co A, 3-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div
Co B, 3-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div
Co C, 36th Signal Bn
Hq & A Btry, 7-9 Arty
15 Engr Bn

7. Supporting Forces

a. Btry A, 7-9 Arty and Btry B, 7-9 Arty fired a total of 189 H & I rounds during the operation. Lack of clearance limited arty support.

b. Troop D, 17th Cav escorted daily resupply convoys between LONG BINH and Bearcat.

8. Intelligence

a. Prior to operations: Agent reports indicated that occasional small unit activity of an harassing nature could be expected. No large units were known to be operating in the TAOR.

b. During Operations: Only light contact was made during the operation. Co B found and destroyed a small VC base camp (YT 174053) and pursued, but lost contact with 3 VC who fled. Co C found and destroyed an empty underground storage area at YT 139041. Co C suffered 3 WIA from a boobytrap at YT 143034. Co A, 3-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div received 5 or 6 40mm or 60mm rounds at YT 148996.

c. Terrain and Weather: Terrain was generally flat with very thick, heavy vegetation around the Bearcat Perimeter. About 400 meters from the perimeter, the vegetation thinned out and tall timber was abundant. The Eastern portion of the TAOR afforded the best avenue of approach. Weather was generally clear and hot, with infrequent afternoon showers.

9. Mission

The mission of TF 4-12 Inf was to supervise the perimeter security force for the Bearcat staging area, conduct S & D operations in Bearcat AO, and provide one company on call as the Brigade RRF.

10. Concept of Operation

a. S & D Operations - TF 4-12 Inf conducted an airmobile movement to the Bearcat Staging Area from multiple LZ's in its sector of the 173rd Abn Bde TAOR. Two rifle companies plus Co E (-) were kept on S & D operations in Bearcat AO, while one company remained at the Bn CP as the Brigade RRF.

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Hqs, 4th Bn 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)
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Companies were rotated, having 4-days in the field and 1 day at the Bn CP for maintenance and rest.

b. Perimeter Security - The perimeter was divided among the units of TF 4-12 Inf. Rules of engagement, SOP's, and reporting procedures were disseminated to the units.

11. Execution

a. Day 1 (23 Dec 66)

The Bn was alerted to move to Bearcat from its operation in the 173rd Abn Bde TACR at 221130H Dec 66. OPORD 4-66 was issued at 221545H Dec 66 and an airmobile extraction began at 230730H Dec. The movement was completed by 1132H and by 1500H, Co's A & B had moved by foot to their assigned AO's and were conducting S & D operations. Co C assumed the mission of Brigade RRF. Six reinf sqd night ambushes made negative contact.

b. Day 2 (24 Dec 66)

The Recon Plat and Co's A and B conducted S & D operations with negative results. Six reinf sqd night ambushes made negative contact.

c. Day 3 (25 Dec 66)

Co C replaced Co A at 1400H. Co C and Co B conducted S & D operations and each established 3 night ambushes with negative results.

d. Day 4 (26 Dec 66)

Co E (-) moved by foot to its assigned AO and together with Co's B & C conducted S & D operations. Co B located a small VC base camp at YT 174053 and pursued 3 VC's who fled south. Contact was broken. Co C found and destroyed an empty underground storage area at YT 139041. Eight reinf sqd night ambushes made negative contact.

e. Day 5 (27 Dec 66)

Co A replaced Co B which had been operating for 10 days. Co's A, C, & E(-) conducted S & D operations with negative results. Co C suffered 3 WIA from a boobytrap at YT 143034. Twelve reinf sqd night ambushes made negative contact.

f. Day 6 (28 Dec 66)

Co's A, C, & E (-) conducted one company, two platoon, and four squad size sweeps with negative results. At 0315H, Co A, 3-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div received 5 or 6 40mm or 60mm rounds at YT 148996. There were negative casualties and search patrols made no contact. Seven reinf sqd night ambushes made no contact.

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4th Bn 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)
JACT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

g. Day 7 (29 Dec 66)

With the Bde HHC rifle platoon, Co B replaced Co C, which returned to the Bn CP as Bde RRF. Two company, three platoon, and two squad size sweeps were conducted with negative results. 17 reinf and night ambushes made negative contact.

h. Day 8 (30 Dec 66)

Co C returned to LONG BINH. Co E (-) returned to the Bn CP as Bde RRF. Co's A & B conducted S & D operations with negative results. 14 reinf night ambushes made negative contact.

i. Day 9 (31 Dec 66)

Co's A & B returned to the Bn CP. All units were trucked to LONG BINH, with the last element closing at 1700H. Responsibility for perimeter security was turned over to the 9th Inf Div at 1330H.

12. Results

a. Personnel:

	Friendly	Enemy
KIA	0	0
WIA	3 (Co C)	0
MIA	0	-
KBA	-	0
VCS	-	0
VCC	-	0

b. Equipment and Material: There were no friendly or enemy losses.

13. Administration Matters

a. Supply: Daily resupply of all classes were effective by motor convoy to Bearcat. Mess operations were moved to Bearcat. During field operations, classes I & V were provided by helicopters from Bearcat.

b. Medical Services: The Battalion aid station moved to Bearcat base camp. Dustoffs and resupply helicopter were utilized to evacuate patients from the field.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. Starlight scopes were utilized.

b. Chain saws and TPT were utilized to construct IZ's.

15. Commander's Analysis

a. On one occasion during this operation, it was discovered that because

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Hqs, 4th Bn 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)
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of inaccuracy in boundaries, a night ambush patrol from this unit and one from the adjacent 11th Cav Regt had been established very close to one another. The 11th Cav Regt had received their TACR boundary from the 173rd Abn Hq and this unit had received its TACR boundary from the 199th Inf Bde Hq. Although no incident occurred, this emphasized the necessity for close liaison between adjacent units on the battalion level.

b. During this operation, Co B had to clear a landing zone in their AO in order to effect resupply. Engineer troops with chain saws were used initially. This method proved to be too slow and TNT was later used to fell the trees. While blasting with TNT was considerably faster, the project still consumed the major portion of the daylight hours. This experience emphasized the necessity for carrying the maximum load of supplies possible into thickly vegetated areas to reduce or eliminate the requirement for resupply. In addition, natural sources of water in the area of operation should be considered when planning routes of movement so as to reduce the requirement for water resupply.

c. Navigation was very difficult for ~~getting~~ units in the Bear Cat TACR. The use of ground smoke signals and an aerial observer proved to be a very effective solution to this problem.

16. Recommendations:

a. That great care be taken by Brigade and Regimental-level headquarters in establishing boundaries for subordinate units. This is particularly critical for boundaries between units under the command of two different Brigades.

b. See Para 15b and c above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

John W. Cheatham, Jr.
JOHN W. CHEATHAM, Jr.
1ST, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 3d Infantry
"OLD GUARD"
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt)
APO San Francisco 96279

AVBH-A-CO

20 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light)
ATTN: S-3
APO San Francisco 96279

1. (C) NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATIONS: WIGGINS - Search and Destroy.
2. (C) DATES OF OPERATION: 271024 Dec 66 - 311300 Dec 66.
3. (C) LOCATION: BINH HOA, DU TU.
4. (C) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light).
5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER:
 - a. Headquarters, 2d Bn, 3d Inf - LTC Louis W Odom
 - b. Co A - CPT Edwin Y Jones Jr
 - c. Co B - CPT Teddy Turner
 - d. Co C - CPT Joe E Williams
 - e. Ron Platoon - 1LT Wayne L Williams
 - f. Mortar Platoon - 1LT James P Thomas
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

Co A
A/2-3 Inf
Engineer Team
1 Interpreter

Co B
B/2-3 Inf

Co C
C/2-3 Inf
Engineer Team
1 Interpreter

Bn Control
HV Mort
Recon Plat
Engineer Team
1 IPW Team

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVBH-A-00

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

20 Jan 67

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery. 7/9 Arty and C/319 Arty. A 6 Min preparation was fired on LZ BLUE with negative results. No tactical missions were fired during the entire operation. H & I fires were utilized during the entire operation.

b. TAC Air - 7th Air Force. LZ Preparation was flown with 3 F100 D aircraft utilizing rkte and 750 lb bombs. Effectiveness was very limited because ordnance was concentrated in only one corner of LZ.

c. Army Aviation. Initial airmobile assault was supported by 173d Assault Helicopter Co, utilizing 95 sorties of UH1D slicks and 4 sorties of UH1B Gun Ships. Total time of operation was 3 hrs 26 min. This was the most effective and timely support received by this unit during any operation. Extraction on 3 Jan was supported by 118th Assault Helicopter Co. Support received was less than satisfactory due to last minute changes made in PZ FORMATIONS and number of aircraft by the 118th Aviation Co. 104 sorties were utilized for extraction requiring approximately 5 hours.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. The AO is predominately utilized by local forces, VC units of squad, platoon and company size. These elements are armed with a profusion of small arms automatic weapons, grenades, mines and mortars. These elements may be found anywhere within the AO, but primarily around the rubber plantations and along the waterways.

b. The AO is not a base for any known VC units, rather, it is a known infiltration route from the North. These routes were our primary points for interdiction. Much evidence of frequent use of the trails and base camps was found.

c. No enemy troop units were identified during operation WIGGINS.

d. The terrain is generally characterized by flat land with dense evergreen forests covering 80% of the AO. The Song La Buong River provided the western AO boundary. The trails and foot paths in the area are numerous and well used. To the south is a rubber plantation. Cover and concealment is generally excellent. There are no major obstacles to foot movement, but the area is virtually denied to wheeled-vehicles with the exception of one or two trails. Adequate landing zones are scarce.

9. (C) MISSION:

a. Return to Staging area 26 Dec upon relief by 3/7 Inf.

b. Conduct Helicopter assault on 27 Dec and assume responsibility for AO (Incl 1) effective 271200 Dec 66.

c. AO includes SAN LA BUONG River.

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AVBH-4-CO

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

20 Jan 67

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d. Be prepared for extraction by air to staging area on 30 Dec.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: This operation was planned in three phases:

a. Phase I: Conduct an airmobile assault to seize and assume LZ BLUE commencing 271010 Dec with Rcn Plat. (Incl 2)

b. Phase II: Conduct search and destroy operations employing A/2-3 Inf, C/2-3 Inf and Recon Platoon in AO's JANE, JUDY AND BETTY respectively. B/2-3 Inf battalion RRF via LZ BLUE.

c. Phase III: On order Bn extracts from area of operation on 30 Dec 66. (Incl 3)

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Warning order for Operation WIGGINS was received on 24 Dec. A warning order was issued to subordinate units on 24 Dec. Written order for operation was issued 261300 Dec. Operation was delayed one day because aircraft were withheld for higher priority operation. Airmobile assault was conducted on LZ BLUE utilizing 95 sorties of UH1D helicopter on 28 Dec. First Element departed PZ at 1024 hrs and last element closed LZ at 1350 hrs. TAC Air and Arty preparation was utilized on the Landing Zones. Suppressive fire was also used by 1st flight of "slicks." Company C detained 3 suspects via coord 217062 for interrogation, and they were identified as wood cutters. All units occupied areas specified in operations order and established ambush sites during hours of darkness with reinforced rifle squads maintaining one platoon as RRF.

b. On 29 Dec units continued to operate in assigned AO's. Co C detained 2 suspects. Both were identified as wood cutters and released. All units established ambush sites during hours of darkness with negative results. Rcn Platoon located base camp, via coord 235071, with 6 fire sites that appeared to have been used in the past 72 hrs. At 1430 hrs a base camp with 11 dug-in positions was located via 237073. Camp appeared to have been used in the last 2 weeks.

c. On 30 Dec operation continued in all AO's. At 0800 one VC was killed via YT 236069. All articles found on the VC were evacuated to higher Headquarters.

d. On 31 Dec Bn extracted from AO by UH1D helicopters. 1st element departed at 0730, last element extracted at 1300 hrs.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly casualties - None

b. Enemy casualties - 1 VC killed (BC)

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

20 Jan 67

c. Captured or suspected enemy. No VC captured. Five suspects detained, but later identified as wood cutters and released.

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d. Search of air strike area. A ground search of the area was conducted.

e. Number of personnel lost separately by participating units. None

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: The Brigade Administrative Order was adequate to support the operation.

a. Supply: Resupply for this operation was strictly aerial. Lack of helicopters was a major drawback to resupply missions. Having the use of only one chopper during our resupply hours hampered the movement of the companies since they had to wait for the one helicopter to make several trips between the company locations and the resupply point at the heliport. Comments on specific areas are as follows:

(1) Our resupply schedule was as follows: The line companies that were our maneuver element were resupplied as early as possible in the mornings. This gave them more time for movement during the day and also prevented the appearance of a helicopter to give away their base camp for the night. Our Battalion CP and its security elements were resupplied during the evening after the companies had completely resupplied.

(2) The basic load of ammunition for deployment on this operation was 400 rounds of 5.56mm per man; 1500 rds of 7.62mm per machinegun; 12 rounds of HE, 8 rounds illumination, and 6 rounds WP for each mortar tube; and 40 - 50 rounds per M-79 grenade launcher. These loads were augmented by the separate Co Commanders to suit any special situation, e.g. a radio operator would perhaps carry only 200 rds 5.56mm while a rifleman would carry as much as 300 rounds of 5.56mm.

(3) We received 8 starlight scopes prior to this operation and 2 during the operation. Using these in conjunction with our TOE infrared device, we were able to improve our night movement and security greatly.

b. Maintenance: Maintenance proved to be no problem on this operation.

c. Treatment, evacuation and hospitalization of casualties:

(1) Treatment. Patients were examined and treated at the Battalion aid station when possible. Many minor abrasions were caused by bamboo thorns, two of which became infected even after hydrogen peroxide and merthiolate were used to treat the wounds.

(2) Hospitalization. Normal procedures were followed.

d. Transportation: Air transportation was used exclusively.

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e. Communications: Some difficulty was experienced with communications, especially at night. This was due mostly to atmospheric disturbances. The frequency assigned to our unit was assigned to several other units operating in our vicinity. Lack of alternate frequencies hindered our communication somewhat.

14. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: No special equipment or techniques were used on this operation.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: This operation was initiated in an area where there was no significant intelligence. Our concept was to cover as much of the area as possible, developing sufficient intelligence on which to base platoon and company S & D operations. Daylight S & D operations, and patrols; and night ambushes were used to try and intercept the enemy during his movement. Other than a few wood cutters, the only activity was 1 enemy Killed (BC). Since numerous areas resembling way stations were found along trails and streams, it appears that the area serves VC mainly as covered route. Some defoliation missions have "Opened up" large areas to aerial observation. More of this would further limit enemy capabilities to move undetected in daylight. The battalion did not remain in the area long enough to give us a good feel as to its overall value to VC. The LZ preparation by Air was unsatisfactory in that each attacking aircraft put his ordnance in almost the exact spot marked by the FAC. This resulted in practically no coverage of the LZ fringe areas. Artillery preparation was likewise "pin pointed." It is possible that aerial observers had not been pre briefed that theirs was more of an area target mission as opposed to a point target one. Armed helicopters did come in 2 minutes prior to LZ time and fired excellent area suppressive fires. The operation provided the battalion with excellent refresher training in air mobile operations, land navigation and night ambushes. Starlite scopes were used for the first time.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: I have no significant recommendations that are not apparent in the analysis above.

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LTC INF
Commanding


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


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
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Incl 3

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HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 3d Infantry
"OLD GUARD"
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light)
APO San Francisco 96279

AVBH-A-CO

25 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light)
ATTN: S-3
APO San Francisco 96279

1. (C) NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION: BUFFALO/Sec 1 & Destroy.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 011400 - 081400 Jan 1967
3. (U) LOCATION: BIEN HOA, NHON TRACH (Coord 0983)
4. (C) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light).
5. (O) REPORTING OFFICER:
 - a. Battalion Commander, 2d Bn, 3d Inf - TEC Louis W Odum
 - b. Co A/2-3 Inf - CPT Lewis Johnson
 - c. Co B/2-3 Inf - CPT Teddy W Turner
 - d. Co C/2-3 Inf - CPT Joe E Williams
 - e. Co E/2-3 Inf - CPT Howard F Bachman
 - f. Ron Platoon - 1LT Wayne L Williams
 - g. AT Platoon - 2LT Frances J Kelble
 - h. HV Mortar Platoon - 1LT James P Thomas

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

25 Jan 67

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION.

Co A

A/2-3 Inf

Co B

B/2-3 Inf
1 Interpreter

Co C

C/2-3 Inf
1 Interpreter

Bn Control

HV Mort
Recon Plat
1/87 Engr Co (-)
1 PW Team
Civil Affairs Team
MP Squad

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. Artillery. A/2/40 (DS). No tactical missions were fired in support of this operation. H & I fires were planned and fired each night. One VC (BC) KIA was as a result of Artillery H & I fire.

b. USAF. 7th Air Force. No CAS missions were flown in support of this operation. Immediate request was processed through Army and Air Force nets for illumination. Reaction time was 15 minutes and effectiveness was rated as excellent. Mission was flown by one C47 Aircraft.

c. Army Aviation. 118th Assault Helicopter Company and 148th Helicopter Company. Airmobile assault for this operation was conducted utilizing 63 sorties UH1D helicopters and 10 sorties CH47 helicopters. Support provided by both units was timely and effective. Extraction from area of operation was conducted with 10 sorties UH1D and 17 sorties of CH47. Extraction was conducted with CH47 to extract the Bn (-) from the AO and UH1D helicopter to extract the LZ security. Helicopter support on extraction was outstanding.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Local force Viet Cong are quite active in the Nhon Trach area. Very little of the AO has been pacified. Much of the AO is under VC control both day and night; the exception being the Northeastern sector where the 1st Bn 48th Inf (ARVN) has been working and the area to the West along Highway #319 from YS 993857 to XS 990790. The local force units in the area have been known to be supported by hard core units of the GIA, DINH and LONG AN Provinces.

b. Numerous supply and infiltration routes are suspected to exist throughout the area.

c. No enemy troop units were identified during Operation BUFFALO.

d. The area of operation is generally level terrain with varying vegetation. There are two rubber plantations within the AO. The rest of the area consists of cleared areas with minor vegetation bounded by bush and dense forest. Observation and fields of fire are generally good.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

25 Jan 67

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e. Concealment is fair to good within wooded areas. The villages hamlets are natural havens for VC snipers. The rubber plantations provide fair concealment in the tall grass that grows within it. The soil is primarily silt and sand and will accommodate wheeled vehicles. Foxholes and fixed defensives can be dug. The drainage is good throughout. The entire AO may be traversed by foot, but some parts with extreme difficulty due to dense undergrowth. The Bung A-t Special Zone (RRSZ) which borders the AO, provides VC with a haven. The swamp conceals VC movement very effectively.

f. The enemy is very susceptible to the "Open Arms" program. Many VC have come over to GVN control in this area recently. Exploitation of this program to the fullest by any unit should have satisfactory results.

9. (C) MISSION: (Incl 1)

a. Move by truck to REARCT beginning 011400 Jan 67 with D/17 Cav (-) as escort.

b. Conduct E & D operation in AO SWIFT.

c. Conduct airmobile assault into multiple LZ's in AO SWIFT beginning 012000.

d. Provide one Co to secure Bde Fwd CP site and act as Bde RRF.

e. On order, conduct S & D ops in AO LIGHT with emphasis on clearing road.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: (Incl 2)

a. Maneuver. This operation was planned in five phases:

(1) Phase I - 2-3 Inf moves by motor at 011400 Jan 67 to the REARCT forward staging area to marshall for an airmobile operation.

(2) Phase II - 2-3 Inf conducts airmobile assault to seize and secure LZ's ACE, KING, and QUEEN commencing 020900 Jan 67.

(3) Phase III - 2-3 Inf conducts search and destroy operations employing B/2-3 Inf in AO EVILYN and C/2-3 Inf in AO GISELA. A/2-3 Inf secures Bde/Bn base and Bde RRF. Recon, Bn RRF initially and on order conducts search and destroy operations in AO DLANNE.

(4) Phase IV - On order, 2-3 Inf conducts search and destroy operations in AO LIGHT with emphasis on ROUTE BLUE.

(5) Phase V - On order, 2-3 Inf extracts from area of operation.

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25 Jan 67

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b. Fires. A/2-40 Lrty DS.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Warning order to conduct operation BUFFALO was received on 30 Dec and was issued to subordinate units on 31 Dec. Written order was issued to subordinate units on 011030 Jan. Verbal air movement schedule was received from Bde at 011300 Jan 67 and written air movement plan was issued subordinate units 011830 Jan 67.

b. Started move to BELRCAT forward staging area at 011330 Jan 67. Last element closed BELRCAT 011325. Established Bn perimeter and prepared for airmobile assault on LZ's ACE, KING and QUEEN with Co A, Co B and Co C respectively. First element of Co A departed BELRCAT at 0930 utilizing UH1D helicopters and landed LZ ACE at 0935. Co B conducted airmobile assault on LZ KING as Recon and HQ Co continued movement into LZ ACE by CH47 helicopters. Assault on LZ QUEEN was made, by Co C utilizing 9 sorties UH1D helicopters and 3 sorties CH47. Last element of Bn closed LZ at 1205 hrs. No contact was established during airmobile assault. At 1315 hrs Co C reported finding village of B. BOUG deserted except for two women and a small child. Numerous bowls of warm rice were found in the village indicating personnel had departed as US unit moved in. Approximately 25 tunnels were found in the village. Units established 5 platoon sized ambushes during night of 02 Jan with negative contact. Co A provided security for Bn CP, Fire Support Base and Bde Forward CP; and acted as Bn HRF.

c. On 3 Jan Bn conducted Search and Destroy Operation in EVELYN, GISELA and DLNNE with Co B, Co A and Recon platoon respectively. At 1325 hrs Co B moved two platoons into AO LIGHT. Night reinforced squad ambush sites were established during the night of 3 Jan with negative contact. At approximately 032102 Jan, Bn perimeter received light probing action from an estimated 10-15 VC. Fire was returned with unknown results. Action lasted approximately 1 hr. 81mm mortars fired 42 rds illumination and 6 rds HE in support of perimeter.

d. On 4 Jan Bn continued Search and Destroy operations in AO EVELYN, LIGHT and GISELA. Conducted MEDCAP program in village of XEM QUOI TELNE via coord 069805. 363 villagers were treated including 33 dental patients. Co B located a VC base camp that would accommodate approximately 300 men. Camp included numerous bunkers with interconnecting trenches. Seven ambush sites were established during the period with negative contact. Bde perimeter received light probing action during the night, with negative results.

e. On 5 Jan a MEDCAP program was conducted in HUNG MY treating 22 patients. Search and Destroy operations in AO's LIGHT, GISELA, and DLNNE. A VC Base camp with tunnel complex covering approximately 1 acre was found via coord 118878. Night ambush sites were established during the period, had negative contact.

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f. On 6 Jan continued S & D operations in AO LIGHT, DIANNE AND RUN. An area of fresh digging was found via YS 121814 and YS 115795. Eight ambush sites were established with negative results. Received warning order to extract from AO on 8 Jan and plan for operations in NEA BE.

g. On 7 Jan convoy departed Bn Base Camp for LONG BINH with all equipment and supplies not needed for present operations. At 0940 4 armed VC were reported via coord 133857. At 1017 one element engaged in fire fight for 18 minutes with an estimated 4 to 5 VC. At 1149 one man was wounded in both feet via coord 134865. A Dust Off was called in and was downed by ground fire via coord 134865. A light fire team was called in to assist in securing the chopper. One gun ship received several rounds of small arms fire during the extraction of the chopper. Liaison was established with lift unit for Bn extraction on 8 Jan beginning 0700 hrs.

h. On 8 Jan Bn extracted from AO to BELRCAT utilizing 17 sorties CH47 helicopters and 10 sorties of UH1D helicopters. Beginning 0700 hrs and completed at 1103 hrs. Bn moved to BMB by truck closing at 1155 hrs.

-12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly casualties. 1 WEA

b. Enemy casualties. 1 KIA (BC)

c. Captured or suspected enemy. NONE

d. Equipment and Material Losses. One "Dust Off" helicopter was shot down while attempting to extract the wounded man. The helicopter was later recovered.

e. Search of Air Strike Areas. No air strikes were requested by this unit. A search of air strike area conducted by other units via coord 131284 and 151283 was made approximately 24 hours after the strike with negative results.

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: The administrative Order from Brigade was adequate to support the operation. The timing of the Admin Order was good, giving us time to plan our logistical operations.

a. Supply: Supply for this operation was a two step affair. By land convoy the supplies reached BELRCAT and from there were flown to units in the field. A 3 day level of supplies was stockpiled in the Bn CP area. Helicopter support for resupply missions was excellent.

(1) Receipt of 200 collapsible water jugs greatly improved the ability of our elements to move more freely since they no longer had to carry empty 5 gal cans from one resupply to the next.

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(2) Due to the late arrival of Zulu equipment from CONUS, we were unable to use cargo slings for resupply. Consequently, all resupply runs were internal loads. This greatly increased considerably the time aircraft had to be on the ground.

b. Maintenance: During this operation we evacuated 2 M-16's, 1 - 81mm mortar, 1 mortar night sighting device, and one night sighting light for maintenance and repair.

c. Treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization of casualties:

(1) Treatment. Patients were examined and treated at Bn Aid Station when tactical and medical situation permitted. Malaria control pills were given each Monday and sick call was held on a 24 hour basis.

(2) Evacuation. All patients were evacuated by air during this operation. One patient required evacuation through "Dust Off" facilities. Minor casualties were not returned to duty as soon as preferred due to the Bn Aid Station being located at Long Binh.

(3) Hospitalization. All patients were evacuated to the 199th Brigade Clearing Station and the 93d Evacuation Hospital. No evacuation procedural problems were encountered.

d. Transportation. Brigade organic transportation was used for transportation to BE-RCAT. Transportation for resupply to BE-RCAT was by vehicles organic to Bn. From BE-RCAT to the forward area, transportation was furnished by helicopters assigned to our Bde. On 7 Jan 67 a land convoy was escorted to our location by "D" Troop, 17th Cav to extract our extra supplies. The convoy was loaded and left the same day. The next day the Bn was extracted by air.

e. Communications. Communications on this operation were greatly enhanced by use of one of our vehicular radios and the RC 292 jungle antenna. We experienced no great problems with commo or maintenance of commo equipment.

14. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES: No special equipment or techniques were used on this operation.

15. (C) COMMANDER ANALYSIS: Intelligence information on NEON TR.CH indicated that we could expect considerable enemy activity in the area. Although the Battalion fire support base was harassed almost nightly by a few VC, companies encountered nothing during daylight S & D operations and night ambushes; except on the day before extraction. On that day Company A encountered about 12 VC in AO SWIFT. Because it was late afternoon before an early AM Bn extraction, we could not exploit contact and continue to search the area. Discussions with the District Chief, and his US Adviser,

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indicated that all villages east of AO's RUN and SWIFT were VC controlled. This is evident in that they "butt" against the RUNG S.T. We had tentatively planned cordon operations against those villages, but were unable to execute them since our stay was out short.


16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That operations be conducted in AO's RUN and SWIFT, and against the VC villages to the east and southeast of them.

b. That, after the above operations PF/RF outposts be re-established in the vicinity of the villages to signify re-control by the governments.

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LTC INF
Commanding



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1-67 (Gulf Air)

References: pages 1-67 (summary)

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
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HEADQUARTERS
4TH BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY
199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)(LIGHT)
APO San Francisco, Calif 96279

AJILL-DOT

17 January 1967

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)
APO San Francisco 96279

1. Name and Type of Operation

OPERATION KELLEY HILL/ Search and Destroy.

2. Dates of Operation

020800H Jan 67 - 051435H Jan 67.

3. Location

Maps, Vietnam, 1:25,000, Sheets 6330I & 6330II. Area defined by YT 1614, YT 2414, YS 1803, YS 2703 (Phon Trach District).

4. Control or Command Headquarters

Hqs, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)

5. Reporting Officers

Bn CO	LTC James G. Boatner
Co A CO	CPT John H. Mack
Co B CO	CPT George J. Jurkovich
Co C CO	CPT Thomas H. Sellers
Co E CO	CPT Raymond N. Sasald
HHC CO	CPT Lloyd W. Mainke

6. Task Organization

a. Control Headquarters - Hqs, 4-12 Inf

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

- b. Attachments - (1) Engr Plat, 87 Engr Co
(2) IP/ Team, HHC, 199th Inf Bde
(3) MP squad, HHC, 199th Inf Bde

c. Detachments - None.

7. Supporting Forces

Btry C, 2/40 Arty provided DS & fired 205 H&I rounds plus one night illumination mission.

8. Intelligence

a. Intelligence prior to operation: The AO is controlled by local force VC units of platoon and company size. The villages located along H&Y 319 from PHU HOI (YS 0888) to PHUOC AN (YS 1478) are considered to be under strict VC control. The most likely avenues of approach lie to the south and east. The local VC forces of the NHON TRACH District have been supported in certain operations by units of the 5th VC Bn and the 165A VC Regiment. There are definite indications of infiltration/ supply routes in existence in AO. The route appears to pass through PHU HOI (YS 080878) to PHUOC THO (YS 140820) generally following existing trails between these two points.

b. During the operation: Although only four VC were spotted and engaged at coord YS 139795 with negative results, the entire area had a vast network of trenches and trails. These two factors plus the overhead cover afforded by the forest would permit 2-3 VC battalions to move into the area undetected and remain concealed with excellent cover.

c. Terrain: The general area of operations offers excellent cover and concealment. The area is especially suitable for the type of VC operations mentioned in para 8a above. Hill mass at coord YS 130794 is the highest elevation in the southern sector. Observation was generally limited due to the significant amount of dense forest. The best avenue of approach is from the south. The mangrove swamps bounding the AO will conceal movement into the AO.

d. Weather: The weather was suitable for search and destroy operations and saturation patrolling. The weather was usually hot and clear with occasional late afternoon showers.

9. Mission

The mission of TF 4-12 was:

- a. Conduct truck movement to DEAR CAT commencing 020800 Jan.
- b. Conduct automobile assault into multiple LZs in assigned AO.
- c. Conduct search and destroy operations in AO FAST.
- d. Prepare to conduct search and destroy operations in AO RUN.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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10. Concept of Operation

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a. Maneuver:

- (1) Phase I - Truck convoy movement to BERA CAT
- (2) Phase II - Airmobile assault into multiple LZs in AO FAST.
- (3) Phase III - Company size sweep operations in AOs CROWN, ROYAL, and SCHILTZ.
- (4) Phase IV - Platoon size saturation patrolling and ambush operations in AOs CROWN, ROYAL and SCHILTZ.
- (5) Phase V - Search and destroy operations in AO LUN, on order.

b. Fires:

- (1) C Btry, 2-40th Arty supports from positions vic coord YS 169865 initially.
- (2) A Btry, 2-40th Arty supports Bn on C/2-40th Arty air movement to LrB from positions vic YS 095825.
- (3) C Btry, 2-40th Arty continues to support Bn upon completion of air movement.

11. Execution

a. Day 1 (2 Jan 67)

4-12 Inf received the Brigade OPORD at 010930 Jan 67 and issued its final OPORD, 1-67, at 1800H. The Bn (-) trucked to Bearcat from 0800 - 0900H. An airmobile assault was conducted into LZ TRAY (YS 152792) by Co's A & B, LZ JACK (YS 114786) by Co C, and LZ DEUCE (YS 142781) by Bn Hqs, Co E, HHC (-). The assault commenced at 1400H and terminated at 1510H. Company sweeps were then conducted with negative contact and nine squad(+) night ambushes made no contact.

b. Day 2 (3 Jan 67)

Eleven platoon sized forces conducted sweep operations throughout the day without contact. Numerous tunnels and trenches were destroyed. Platoons from C Co with IPW assistance and National Police searched villages at YS 116785, YS 115786, and YS 123796. No VC were found, but five usable, unoccupied huts were destroyed. One of the ten night ambushes exchanged fire with four VC at 139795 at 1930H. There were no casualties and a search of the area yielded negative results.

c. Day 3 (4 Jan 67)

Nine platoon sized forces conducted S&D operations with negative results. Nine squad(+) night ambushes made no contact. A VC claymore (Chinese make) was command detonated via Recon Platoon (131813) at 1930H. There were no casualties. A search party received one round of sniper fire and, although pursuit was made, contact was broken.

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d. Day 4 (5 Jan 67)

4-12 Inf returned to Long Binh by helicopter and truck. Movement began at 0932H and the last element closed at 1435H.

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12. Results

a. Personnel:	<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
MIA	0	0
MIA	0	0
MIA	0	-
MIA	-	0
VCC	-	0
VCS	-	0

b. Equipment and Material: No friendly or enemy losses.

13. Administrative Matters

a. Supply: The Bn S4 section moved from Long Binh to Bearcat and effected all resupply to forward areas from Bearcat by helicopter.

b. Medical Services: The Battalion Aid Station was located at the Bn forward CP. Resupply helicopters were used to evacuate patients.

c. Communications: Radio battery life was about one half normal life during the operation. It is believed that humidity plus showers contributed significantly to this.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques

- a. Starlight scopes were utilized, although no enemy were engaged.
- b. Chain saws were used to improve LZs.

15. Commander's Analysis

a. On this mission, Bn Hqs back-carried all the equipment necessary for its operation. Complete and successful functioning was effected, thus proving the flexibility and mobility of Bn Hqs.

b. Our recon platoon was claymored, but no casualties were sustained. It appears that the main reason this happened was due to the platoon moving into the CP for the night at a time when 2½ hours of daylight remained. Emphasis must be placed on not moving into a position too early, thereby permitting the VC to recon the position.

c. Our TAOR was crisscrossed by many trails and many trenches. The overhead cover afforded by the forest plus the trails and trenches would hide 2-3 VC battalions. This should be kept in mind for any future operations in this area.

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16. Recommendations

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a. Closer coordination should be effected between Brigade and supporting aviation units to prevent aircraft from showing up two hours prior to ETA disseminated to the battalions.

b. The companies need more water carrying capacity. Two two quart containers must be obtained and distributed.

c. A daylight C&C ship (preferably a buoy) must be available at all times to each battalion.

d. See para 15b above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Calvin W. Castellano, Jr.
CALVIN W. CASTELLANO, Jr.
2Lt, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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HEADQUARTERS
4TH BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY
199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (LIGHT)
APO San Francisco, Calif 96279

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WILLI-101

14 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt)
APO 96279

1. Type of Operation

S & D operations in sector of 173rd Abn Bde TAOB.

2. Dates of Operation

170730H Dec 66 - 230730H Dec 66.

3. Location

Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6330 I & 6331 II;
area defined by YT 0418, YT 1018, YT 1114, YT 0314.

4. Control or Command Headquarters

Hqs, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt).

5. Reporting Officers

Bn CO	LTC James G. Boatner
Co A CO	CPT John H. Mack
Co B CO	CPT George J. Jurkovich
Co C CO	CPT Thomas H. Sellers
Co E CO	CPT Raymond N. Sasaki
HHC CO	CPT Lloyd W. Meinke

6. Task Organization

- a. Control Headquarters - Hqs, 4-12 Inf.
- b. Attachments: Engineer Plat, 87th Engr Co.
- c. Detachments: None.

7. Supporting Forces

- a. Btry C/319 Arty, 173 Abn Bde was in DS of 4-12 Inf. The Btry fired 174 rounds of H & I fire during operation. Arty support was

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restricted due to the many "no fire" zones in the 4-12th Inf TAOR.

b. One platoon from D Troop, 17th Cav provided convoy escort to move a small element into the TAOR on 17 Dec and to move out equipment on 23 Dec.

8. Intelligence

a. Prior to Operations: Intelligence indicated that the area was considered one of the most peaceful regions in Vietnam and pro-government. No battalion-size units were known to be located in the area. No recent enemy activities were recorded.

b. During Operations: Six incidents occurred in scattered areas.

c. Terrain and Weather: The terrain was largely flat area with numerous rice paddies, except for a plateau area in the SW sector of the TAOR. This area had a dense evergreen growth varying from 2-5 meters. Few roads existed. Observation and fields of fire were excellent, except in the plateau area where visibility was extremely limited. The main natural avenues of approach were from the North and the East (via YT 050166 and YT 1018). Weather conditions were excellent with occasional heavy morning fog dissipating by 0800H.

d. Fortifications: Anti-helicopter devices (crippled structures) were found and destroyed at YT 088166. These had not been recently constructed.

e. CA/Psy Ops: The Bn medical platoon made two trips to the surrounding villages and with 173rd Abn Bde medical personnel ministered to the inhabitants.

9. Mission

The mission of TF 4-12 was to assume responsibility for a sector of 173rd Abn Bde TAOR and to conduct search and destroy operations.

10. Concept of Operation

An initial airborne assault was conducted into multiple LZ's by each company. The companies then set up separate bases and conducted search and destroy operations. The organic mortars were in vicinity of the Bn CP and C/319 Arty was in DS from the 173rd Abn Bde base. B Co (-) was retained at the Battalion forward base. The Recon Platoon and 2d Plt, Co B were the Bn reaction forces, assisted in an CP security and conducted patrolling operations during the day and ambushes at night.

11. Execution

a. Day 1 (17 Dec 66):

This headquarters received the final OPORD from Brigade at

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161500H Dec 66 and issued OPORD 3-66 at 161930H Dec 66. At 170730H Dec 66, the Bn (-) moved to the Bde airstrip. The air assaults commenced at 1212H with the last serial departing at 1315H. By 1320H, the three rifle companies were conducting S & D operations in their assigned AO's. They closed on their CP locations for the night between 1700H-1730H and each established two (2) reinforced squad ambushes at night. There was no enemy contact on day 1.

b. Day 2 (18 Dec 66):

Three (3) company S & D operations were conducted and six (6) squad (+) ambushes were set out at night with negative contact.

c. Day 3 (19 Dec 66):

The Recon Plt was fired on by two (2) VCs at YT 078178. The VCs were pursued, but contact was broken. Co E with an engineer team destroyed several AP mines (086191) and a series of foxholes (078178). Co A destroyed five (5) VC huts and miscellaneous cooking and eating utensils scattered in the 0516 grid square. Co C, with engineer support destroyed anti-helicopter devices at 088166. Nine (9) squad (+) ambushes were established that night with negative contact.

d. Day 4 (20 Dec 66):

The companies continued S & D operations. The Bn CP, Co A, and Co B each received several sniper rounds during the day. There were no casualties and search patrols made no contact. Nine (9) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

e. Day 5 (21 Dec 66):

One company and four (4) platoon S & D operations were conducted. Several sniper shots were received (073182, 098179) but no contact was made. Co C turned a possible VC (found at 098179) over to the District Advisor. Co E dismantled two boobytraps (085175 & 080189). Ten (10) squad (+) night ambushes made negative contact.

f. Day 6 (22 Dec 66):

None of the patrols or sweep operations made contact nor did the eleven (11) squad (+) night ambushes. The Bn was alerted at 1130H to be prepared to move to Boarcut TAOR (Camp Martin Cox) to assume the missions of born security plus S & D operations. A Bn FRAGORD was issued at 1545H to alert the companies.

g. Day 7 (23 Dec 66):

The Bn began an airmobile extraction and movement to Boarcut at 0730H, with the last serial departing at 1120H and closing Boarcut at 1132H.

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12. Results

a. Personnel:	<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
KIA	0	0
WIA	1 (Co B)	0
MIA	0	-
KBA	-	-
VCS	-	1
VCC	-	0

b. Equipment and Materials:

There were no friendly or enemy material losses.

13. Administrative Matters

a. Supply: Class I resupply was excellent. Hot "A's" were flown to the Bn by helicopter for every evening meal. Mess operations remained at LONG BINH. Sundry packs were provided to each company. An operational load of ammunition was carried by each man. Additional 81 mm mortar ammunition was brought by helicopter to the forward area.

b. Maintenance: Preventive maintenance was accomplished daily (per Battalion TSOP) on weapons and some equipment. No vehicles were used on this operation.

c. Medical Services: Medical treatment in the field was excellent. A complete Battalion aid station was set up. Dustoffs were utilized unless a supply helicopter was in the area and could evacuate the patient.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques

Starlight Scopes were utilized for night observation with M-16 rifles. No enemy were engaged with the scopes.

15. Commander's Analysis

This was the first operational mission for this unit since its arrival in country on 11 Dec 66. Despite the relative absence of contact with VC forces, it provided an excellent opportunity for a "shake-down" of the Battalion as a whole and for the officers who had joined the unit since its last training exercise in COMUS. No major operational problems were encountered and a multitude of operational techniques were either instituted or refined. The most important of these techniques are covered in the attached Commander's Notes #1.

Some confusion and misdelivery of personnel occurred during the airmobile assault into the Bn AO when the number of troop lift helicopters programmed did not materialize. This shortage was not known until

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the ships were on the ground at the pickup zone.

An aerial reconnaissance by the ground force commander and the airlift unit commander was conducted only minutes before the first troop lift departed the pickup zone. The result was that neither the aircraft commanders nor the ground force company commanders knew exactly where the landing zones were.

A critique was held at the conclusion of this operation. This was very helpful to refine SOP's and share experiences. The Battalion SOP will be changed to include a past operation critique as a SOP item.

16. Recommendations

a. A coordination and planning meeting should be held for every airborne assault between the ground force commander and the airlift unit commander. This should be conducted the day before the airlift and should include a joint reconnaissance of the landing zones. This would allow for subsequent detailed briefings for aircraft pilots and ground force company commanders.

b. The ground force Departure Airfield Control Officer must formulate and disseminate plans in advance for realignment of personnel in aircraft chocks in the event that the number of planned troop ships do not arrive at the pickup zone.

c. Brigade should conduct periodic critiques with principle staff and commanders attending to exchange information and refine the Brigade SOP.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1. MICHAEL R. MULLA
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS
4TH BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY
199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (LIGHT)
APO San Francisco, Calif 96279

26 December 1966

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SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #1

TO: All Commanders

1. This is the first in a series of commander's notes concerning combat operations which will be published on as-needed basis to serve as a reference for all small leaders on the battalion Commanders policies.

a. When companies are being resupplied by air they must be in their location for the night by 1500 hours.

b. Companies will habitually keep battalion informed of their activities by reporting when ambushes are in position, when patrols depart or return and the results thereof, when the company begins movement or arrives at a new location, and any other significant activity or occurrence.

c. Reports by all units must be timely, concise and complete. Too many incomplete reports are being received. Use The Key and SALUTE.

d. It is mandatory that units in a stationary position continually improve these positions as long as they remain there.

e. "Stand To" will be conducted each day 30 minutes prior to MMT. "Stand Down" will be held each day at 30 minutes prior to MMT. All weapons will be checked by squad leaders at Stand To to insure that no rounds are in the chamber.

f. Companies will at all times have a reaction force on hand and thoroughly briefed on the current operation. This force must be prepared to move by any means available to reinforce other elements of the unit.

g. Units of any size must be prepared to mark LZ's for helicopters and guide them during landings. To the extent practicable all units operating independently during daylight hours will carry smoke grenades with them.

h. The requirement for flank security cannot be overemphasized. All leaders will maintain flank security whenever their unit has an exposed flank.

i. Artillery or mortar concentrations or both should be planned as an integral part of every ambush. In most cases these concentrations will not be registered by actual firing, however, the coordinates should be

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sent through fire request channels, the data computed by the FDC and a concentration number assigned. These concentrations should be planned at least 200 yards beyond friendly troops at the ambush sites and "walked in" to the ambush site at the time the ambush is triggered.

j. The new series of FM radios must be operated in the "Old Squelch-Off" position whenever communicating with Army aircraft, dust off ships and FAC's.

2. Copies of these and subsequent commanders notes will be distributed to all small unit leaders down to and including squad leaders. A file of these notes will be permanently maintained by all company headquarters as a reading file for newly assigned platoon/section/squad leaders.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S/C Calvin W. Chonathan
2LT, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

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