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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (14 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674134

20 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1967(U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. Stanfiel

C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO 96289

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"EXEMPLA PROPONERE"

AVCC-AC

1 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL)(RCS-
CSFOR-67) For Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1967 (UIC WFAAA)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMMAND.

1. (U) General. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion made substantial gains in all areas of performance during this reporting period. 89 percent of the battalion effort during this period was in support of U.S. Forces. The majority of Army Aviation support provided was oriented toward the 1st Infantry Division on Operations Portland, Bluefield II, Shennandoah II, and Lam Son 67. UH-1's of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion averaged 151 percent of the programmed flying hours for the quarter. OH-47's of the two assigned Assault Support Helicopter Companies averaged 150 percent of the programmed flying hours for the quarter. The O-1's in the Reconnaissance Airplane Company averaged 176 percent of the programmed flying hours for the quarter.

2. (U) Mission. The Mission of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is to provide:

a. Tactical Army aviation support as directed by the 12th Combat Aviation Group, to elements of U.S., ARVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces within the III Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Command, control, administration and communications to units assigned to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

3. (C) Organization.

*Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
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a. Current organization of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is as shown in Annex 1.

b. Organization of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period is shown below:

11th Combat Det, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion - Phu Loi

128th Assault Helicopter Company - Phu Loi

162nd Assault Helicopter Company - Phuoc Vinh

173rd Assault Helicopter Company - Lai Khe

184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company - Phu Loi

205th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Phu Loi

213th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Phu Loi

4. (C) Command and Staff Structure.

a. Current command and staff structure is shown in Annex 3.

b. Significant changes in the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion command and staff structure during this reporting period are shown below:

(1) On 2 August 1967, LTC Neal C. Petree, Jr. replaced James H. Patterson as the Battalion S-3.

(2) On 2 August 1967, MAJ Stanley W. Gibson replaced LTC Neal C. Petree, Jr. as the Commanding Officer of the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company.

(3) On 2 August 1967, MAJ Robert G. Stafford replaced MAJ Benjamin L. Collins as the Commanding Officer of the 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company.

(4) On 4 August 1967, LTC Richard B. Schaefer replaced MAJ Daniel S. Knight as the Battalion Executive Officer.

(5) On 4 August 1967, MAJ Herbert T. Fink replaced LTC Richard B. Schaefer as the Commanding Officer of the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company.

(6) On 10 August 1967, MAJ Lonnie T. Howard replaced LTC Daniel A. Lenz as the Commanding Officer of the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company.

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(7) On 15 August 1967, LTC Robert A. Duvall replaced MAJ Malcolm D. Rixon as the Battalion S-4.

(8) On 28 August 1967, CPT Ronald A. Brooks replaced CPT Jackie D. Catt as the Commanding Officer of HHD, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(9) On 10 September 1967, MAJ Richard A. Lilly replaced MAJ Larry G. Miller as the Commanding Officer of the 128th Assault Helicopter Company.

(10) On 21 September 1967, MAJ William H. Smart replaced MAJ John J. Keefer as the Battalion S-2.

(11) On 1 October 1967, LTC William A. Hobbs replaced LTC Richard B. Schaefer as the Battalion Executive Officer.

(12) On 1 October 1967, MAJ Ralph E. Naumann replaced MAJ Clyde F. Klick as the Battalion S-1.

(13) On 1 October 1967, CPT Donald A. Williamson replaced LTC Robert A. Duvall as the Battalion S-4.

(14) On 20 October 1967, MAJ Harold J. Hill replaced CPT Isaac H. Metzler as the Battalion S-5.

B. PERSONNEL, MORALE, DISCIPLINE, INFORMATION AND CIVIC ACTION.

1. (U) Personnel.

a. The personnel section maintained support of approximately 1800 records during this reporting period.

b. Planned infusion of all CH-47 and UH-1 units was initiated during this period.

c. Personnel section processed 73 requests for foreign service tour extensions during this period and of this figure, 51 were for the full six month period.

d. Assigned gains during this reporting period were 300.

e. Losses during this reporting period were 330.

2. (U) Morale.

a. The following awards and decorations were recommended and approved during this reporting period:

(1) Recommended

	DSC	SS	LOM	DFC	SM	BS	BS"V"	ACM	ACH"V"	AM	AM"V"	PH	COA
AUG	0	0	0	14	0	24	12	29	33	1612	14	26	9
SEP	0	0	2	13	0	15	4	38	15	564	22	4	13
OCT	0	0	1	11	0	16	3	24	23	226	17	0	11

(2) Approved

	DSC	SS	LOM	DFC	SM	BS	BS"V"	ACM	ACH"V"	AM	AM"V"	PH	COA
AUG	0	0	2	28	0	39	0	67	10	451	16	27	37
SEP	0	0	0	8	0	6	0	9	4	1590	9	19	8
OCT	0	0	1	15	0	13	34	76	60	305	49	5	7

b. Special Services

Three USO shows were sponsored by the battalion and improvements on the swimming pool is a continuous process. The emphasis that is placed on securing, distributing and maintaining special service equipment is instrumental in keeping morale at a high level within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

3. (U) Discipline.

	Summary Court	Special Court	General Court	Art 32 Inv
AUG	0	1	0	0
SEP	0	1	0	0
OCT	1	2	0	0

4. (U) Information.

Information personnel have been working on an average of 18 hours daily to provide proper coverage for all noteworthy events occurring within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. 101 daily summaries, 56 home town news releases, and nine feature stories were submitted during the reporting period. Continued liaison with outside news media has given

the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion greater recognition in radio, television, and newspaper coverage.

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5. (U) Civic Action

a. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion civic action program has progressed well, considering the accelerated military operations, availability of manpower and materials. At the present time emphasis is being placed on Christmas holiday activities. Participation by all units is encouraged. The mission is to include as many local national children of all ages, in as many activities as possible, and promote the true spirit of Christmas.

b. The school at Lai Khe continues to increase their enrollment to the present 110 students. Supplies are distributed on a continuing basis. Space available is the only limiting factor in the growth of this project.

c. Direct medical assistance continues to be rendered by Battalion medical personnel.

(1) Phu Loi	80 patients
(2) Lai Khe	60 patients
(3) Phuoc Vinh	80 patients

d. The 128th Aslt Hel Co continues the sponsorship of the Vietnamese orphan student in Phu Cuong.

e. Supplies, clothing, and commodities continue to be distributed as they become available.

C. INTELLIGENCE.

1. (U) Significant Activities.

a. On 27 Aug 67, S-2 received OPLAN 2-67 from HQ, Division Artillery, 1st Infantry Division. The plan outlines the defense for the Phu Loi complex against mortar and rocket attacks.

b. A summary of normal S-2 actions for the past three months is as follows:

(1) Number of clearances validated	20
(2) Number of requests for N/C	8

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- (3) Number of clearances granted 29
- (4) Number of requests for record checks 19
- (5) Number of individual debriefings 10
- (6) Daily INTSOMS written 20
- (7) Weekly INTSOMS written 10
- (8) Hit reports recorded and forwarded to 7th Air Force 60
- (9) PAMINTREPS written 10
- (10) Order of Battle map VF datings 12
- (11) Number of Secret documents received 4
- (12) Number of Secret documents processed for destruction 5
- (13) Number of Confidential documents handled 200
- (14) Number of personnel finger printed 30

2. (U) Escape and Evasion (E&E).

During this period four officers attended the Navy Jungle Survival School (Cubi Point, Republic of the Phillipines). The allocations for E&E school were allocated as follows:

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Unit</u>
1	Hq & Hq Det
1	128th AHC
2	184th AHC

At present there are 11 E&E qualified officers in the Battalion.

3. (C) Security.

a. Work continued on the 11th CAB sector of the Phu Loi perimeter defense with 12 new bunkers being completed. Work is continuing on Fougasse and Hush Flares.

b. The Battalion experienced no security violations during the period requiring investigation under the provisions of para 72, AR 380-5. No administrative violations were received

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4. (C) **Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Reports.**
The Daily and weekly intelligence summaries and bi-weekly PERINTREP were continued throughout this period.

D. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

1. (C) Plans.

a. During this reporting period the concept of planning airmobile operations continued to be centralized planning and decentralized execution.

b. Planning of airmobile combat assaults, extractions and major resupply effort was conducted within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Operations Center. Execution of airmobile combat assaults involving 20 UH-1's or less were decentralized to company level by designating one company commander as air mission commander for the operation. Execution of airmobile combat assaults, extraction and/or major resupply efforts involving more than 20 UH-1's and CH-47's were controlled by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Commander from his Airborne Command Post.

c. Coordination of aviation support was effected by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Operations Center (BOC), S-3 Section.

d. Liaison requirements were ascertained by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and liaison with the supported unit was conducted by the designated air mission commander.

e. During this reporting period, the methods used for planning, coordinating and liaising aviation support proved very effective. By continuous planning, coordinating and liaising, standard procedures with supported units have evolved, and command relationships with supported units were firmly cemented.

2. (C) Operations.

a. Operation Portland 12 August - 21 August 1967. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) conducted two combat assaults on 12 August in support of the 1st Infantry Division. UH-1D aircraft from the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company (AHC), the 173d AHC, the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company (ASHC) and one heavy fire team (HFT) augmented by the 188th AHC, 259th CAB inserted the 1/2nd Infantry from Tong Le Chon to XXIV ABZ. Artillery fire and Tac Air Strikes were placed on the LZ prior to the insertion. The 11th CAB's "smoke ship" was used to screen the south east edge of the LZ during insertion.

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This same task organization then inserted the 1/16th Inf from Lai Khe to XT712763. On 14 August, UH-1D aircraft of the 128th and 173rd ACO's, augmented by an ACO from the 269th CAB, conducted an administrative move of the 1/18th Inf from Lai Khe to Chon Thanh. Later this same task organization extracted the 1/18th Inf from Minh Thanh to Lai Khe. On 18 August, the 11th CAB, under the control of Red Dog 6, airlifted three Infantry Battalions and two Artillery Batteries in support of the 1st Infantry Division. The purpose of this insertion was to secure the LZ so that two batteries of artillery could be airlifted from Lai Khe to establish Fire Support Base "Doughboy". On 21 August, the 11th CAB lifted the 1/16th Inf from Lai Khe to Bau Bang; the 1/26th Inf from XT673399 to Phuoc Vinh; the 2/18th Inf from Phuoc Vinh to Bau Bang and the 1/18th Inf from XT662413 to Phuoc Vinh. The Task organization received light to moderate enemy semiautomatic and automatic weapon fire at all LZ's but no hits were sustained. Gunships engaged the area from which the fire came with unknown results. The 1/16th Inf closed Bau Bang at 0728H in 45 UH-1D sorties. The 1/26th Inf closed Phuoc Vinh at 1115H in 50 UH-1D sorties. The 2/18th Inf closed Bau Bang at 1055H in 49 UH-1D sorties and the 1/18th Inf closed Phuoc Vinh at 1402H in 75 UH-1D sorties.

Operation Portland statistical summary:

Total sorties - 3541
Total passengers transported - 9185
Total cargo transported - 1698 tons
Total hours flown - 1003

b. Operation Shelby 17 August - 24 August 1967.

On 17 August, the 11th CAB, augmented by two ACO's from the 214th CAB, conducted a lift of two Inf Bns in support of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade to begin Operation Shelby. The task organization for the lifts were 10 UH-1D's and one HFT from each of the following companies: 128th, 162nd, 173rd, and the 191st and 240th of the 214th CAB. Working from four LZ's, this task organization inserted the 3/7th Inf, 199th AIB, and the 33rd Vietnamese Ranger Battalion into five LZ's. Artillery and Tac Air strikes were used on the LZ prior to the insertion. Gunships suppressed the LZ as the lift ships touched down. The lifts began at 1015H and were completed at 1100H. Black Jack 6 was the Air Mission Commander for these lifts which were conducted without incident. The total statistics for this lift, not including support from the 214th CAB, are as follows:

Total sorties - 327

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Total passengers transported - 768
Total cargo transported - 7.1 tons
Total hours flown - 110.7

c. Operation Bluefield II 23 September - 28 September 1967. The 11th SFG made one combat assault for the 1st Infantry Division on 23 September 1967. UH-1D aircraft from the 162nd and 173rd AHC's lifted the 1/26th Inf from XT667495 to XT853427. On 24 September, 10 UH-1D and 2 UH-1C aircraft from the 162nd AHC flew one combat assault mission in support of the 1st Inf Div when they lifted the 2/23rd Inf from LZ XT921204 to LZ Lai Khe. On 25 September, the 162nd AHC again flew in support of the 1st Inf Div with a task organization of 10 Vultures, 10 Robin Hoods and 2 Light Fire Teams (LFT) with Vulture 6 as air mission commander. They flew one combat assault to move the 1/28th Inf from LZ XT887376 to LZ Phuoc Vinh. On 26 September, the 128th AHC, augmented by the 173rd AHC lifted the 1/2nd Inf from LZ Phuoc Vinh to LZ XT9243. The 128th AHC augmented by the 162nd AHC lifted the 1/26th Inf on 23 September from LZ XT852360 to LZ Phuoc Vinh. Negative enemy contact was reported during this operation.

Operation Bluefield II statistical summary:

Total sorties - 965
Total passengers transported - 2366
Total cargo transported - 82 tons
Total hours flown - 174

d. Operation Shenandoah II 29 September - 31 October 1967. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion's support of Operation Shenandoah II was primarily for the 1st and 3rd Brigades, 1st Infantry Division and is summarized below:

1 Oct 67, the 128th and 173rd AHC's flew in support of the 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div by moving the 1/16th Inf from Lai Khe to XT699445. The LZ was prepared by artillery, Tac Air and gunships. The gunships and slicks had full suppression going into the LZ. This same day, the 173rd AHC flew eagle flights for the 2/16th Inf, 1st Bde from Phuoc Vinh to XT923443.

2 Oct 67, the 128th and the 173rd AHC's moved the 2/23rd Inf, 3rd Bde from Lai Khe to XT699445.

5 Oct 67, the 173rd AHC moved the 2/23rd Inf, 3rd Bde from Lai Khe to XT743551.

8 Oct 67, the 173rd AHC was part of a task organization of 10 Robinhoods, five Bulldogs, 10 Black Widows, two Crossbow HFT's and one Spider HFT which made one insertion and one extraction for battalion size units of the 1st Inf Div. The

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insertion for the 2/28th Inf, which was prepared with arty, tac air and gunships, was from Chon Thanh to XT658559. The 1/2nd Inf was extracted from XT725538 to Chon Thanh where they were later picked up and moved by CH-47's to Phuoc Vinh.

17 Oct 67, "A" Company and "D" Company of the 2/28th Inf were being overrun by an unknown enemy force at XT683584. The 162nd AHC, augmented by five Bulldogs and two LFT's inserted "C" Company of 2/28th Inf and a Recon platoon, and later extracted numerous Med Evacs. There were a total of 106 VC KIA (BC), 58 US KIA and 61 WIA.

18 Oct 67, the 11th CAB augmented by units of the 269th CAB inserted 1/16th Inf and 1/2nd Inf into the LZ occupied by the 2/28th Inf. This same task organization extracted the remainder of the 2/28th Inf and later the 1/16th Inf to Phuoc Vinh.

21 Oct 67, the 173rd AHC flew in support of the 1st and 3rd Bdes, 1st Inf Div by moving the 1/2nd Inf, 1st Bde from Chon Thanh to XT6953. The lift started at 1405H and was completed at 1440H. The 1/16th Inf, 3rd Bde was moved from XT683599 to XT692547. This lift started at 1524H and was completed at 1647H.

23 Oct 67, the 173rd AHC made one combat assault, moving the 1/26th Inf, 1st Inf Bde from Chon Thanh to XT651460.

24 Oct 67, five UH-1D's and one LFT from the 162nd AHC flew eagle flights for the 2/18th, 3rd Bde. The battalion was moved from XT823335 to XT809302 and later extracted back to XT823335. The 173rd AHC moved the 2/39th Inf, 1st Bde from Binh Chanh to VT293073.

27 Oct 67, the 173rd AHC flew eagle flights for the 2/16th Inf, 3rd Bde from XT8732 to XT867215.

28 Oct 67, the 173rd AHC, augmented by 10 UH-1D's from the 269th CAB extracted the 1/2nd Inf, 1st Bde from XT635513 to Chon Thanh. This same task organization moved the 1/26th Inf, 1st Bde from XT652460 to Lai Khe and the 2/16th Inf, 2nd Bde from XT908320 to Normandy II.

29 Oct 67, all companies of the 11th CAB supported the 1st Inf Div with 3 battalion size lifts. The first lift was for the 1/18th Inf, 1st Bde, which was moved from Lai Khe to Chon Thanh by UH-1D, from Chon Thanh to Quan Loi by CH-47 and from Quan Loi to XT699105 by UH-1D. The second lift was for the 1/28th Inf, 2nd Bde. They were moved from XT659529 to Chon Thanh by UH-1D and from Chon Thanh to Quan Loi by CH-47. The third lift was for elements of the 1/26th Inf, 2nd Bde which were moved from Lai Khe to Quan Loi by CH-47.

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30 Oct 67, the 173rd AHC flew three combat assaults and one administrative move for the 1st Inf Div. The first lift was for the 2/16th Inf, 2nd Bde from Lai Khe to Normandy III. The second lift was for 2/18th Inf, 2nd Bde from Normandy III to Lai Khe. The admin move was for the 2/28th Inf from Loc Ninh to An Loc.

31 Oct 67, the 173rd AHC, augmented by 10 Black Hawks, flew five combat assaults in support of the 1st Inf Div. The first lift was for the 1/28th Inf, 1st Bde from Quan Loi to XU770080. The second lift was for the 2/28th Inf, 3rd Bde from An Loc to Loc Ninh. The third lift was for the 1/26th Inf, 1st Bde from XT774816 to An Loc. The 4th lift was for the 1/2nd Inf, 1st Bde from Chon Thanh to XT765726. The fifth lift was for the 1/16th Inf, 3rd Bde from Lai Khe to XT786455, and from Caisson V to Lai Khe.

Operation Sherrandoah II statistical summary through this reporting period:

Total sorties - 3197
Total passengers transported - 8455
Total cargo transported - 795.4 tons
Total hours flown - 968.5

e. Operation Lam Son 67 1 August - 31 October 1967. A continuous operation conducted by the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th AAVN Division; supported by UH-1, CH-47 and O-1 aircraft from the 11th CAB as follows:

4 Sep 67, the 11th CAB, augmented by three assault helicopter companies from the 269th CAB conducted a lift of 2 Infantry Battalions whose mission was to search and seal the village of Chanh Luu. Ten UH-1D's and one LFT from each of the following companies, 128th 162nd and 173rd AHC's and 10 UH-1D's each from the 116th, 187th and 188th AHC's (269th CAB) inserted the 2/18th Inf into an LZ at coordinates XT829303 and the 1/16th Inf into a LZ at coordinate XT820308. Because the mission of the operation was to search and seal a village, no arty, air or gunship preparation was made. However, artillery blocking fires to the North were used. The lifts began at 0605H and were completed at 0800H.

13 Sep 67, the 128th, 162nd and 173rd AHC's of the 11th CAB, augmented by the 187th and 188th AHC's of the 269th CAB flew in support of the 1st Inf Div whose overall mission was to seal 3 villages: Chanh Luu, located at XT8232, Bo La, located at XT8232 and a smaller village located approximately 500 meters South of Bo La. The first assault was for the 1/2nd Inf, 1st Bde into six LZ's in the vicinity of coordinate XT706428. The second lift was for the 1/28th Inf, 1st Inf Bde

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into two LZ's vicinity of coordinate XT848362. The third assault was in support of the 2/18 Inf, 2nd Inf Bde into seven LZ's in the vicinity of coordinate XT826305.

The 11th CAB supported the 1st Inf Div in numerous village seal, search and destroy operations throughout the Lam Son 67 area of operation. Operation Lam Son 67 continues at the end of this reporting period.

Operation Lam Son 67 statistical summary through this reporting period:

Total sorties - 5918
Total passengers transported - 15876
Total cargo transported - 1440.3 tons
Total hours flown - 1747.5

f. 5th ARVN Division Direct Support 29 September - 31 October 1967. The 128th AHC, 11th CAB has flown daily in direct support of 5th ARVN Division as summarized below:

30 Sep 67, the 128th AHC flew one combat assault in support of the 5th ARVN Div with Tomahawk 6 as AHC. The Tomahawks lifted one battalion from XT796206 to LZ's at XT717246 and XT732235. Task organization was 10 UH-1D's, two LFT's and a C&C ship. Gunslinger (gun platoon) reported two VC KB's (estimated) by 40mm and one bunker destroyed at XT675255 by 2.5 rockets. Five ARVN were Med Evac by the slicks from XT722239 and 8 ARVN Med Evac from XT7323 to Lam Son.

2 Oct 67, a task organization of 10 UH-1Ds, one C&C ship and two LFT's were committed to move elements of the 5th ARVN Div from Chon Thanh to XT861591 at 0925H and were placed on Ready Reaction Force status (RRF) at Phu Loi at 1015H. At 1400H the element inserted made heavy contact with a force of unknown size. The Tomahawks were scrambled to Ben Cat to pick-up reinforcements to be inserted into the same LZ. Two Tomahawks were sent directly to the LZ to make Med Evacs. At this time, the AHC requested assistance from the Vultures (162nd AHC). The Vultures sent two UH-1D's to augment the Tomahawks on the insertion. The Tomahawks continued to shuttle troops from Chon Thanh to the LZ and completed the move at 1910H. Two UH-1D's Med Evaced seven walking wounded ARVN from XT8661 to Chon Thanh and three walking wounded ARVN from Chon Thanh to the 93rd Evac. They also Med Evaced the US walking wounded from Chon Thanh to 93rd Evac. Casualties for ARVN unit were six KIA, 32 WIA and 69 MIA. There were two US KIA advisors and one MIA.

10 Oct 67, while lifting a platoon of the 5th Recon Co from Lam Son to XT737315, one UH-1D received light small arms fire sustaining one hit in the chin bubble. The aircraft continued to fly and assaulted the target with unknown results.

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12 Oct 67, the 128th AHC supported the 5th ARVN Div with 11 UH-1D's, one C&C ship and three gunships with Tomahawk 6 as AMC. The mission was to move the 4/8th Infantry Regiment from XT760307 to XT823237. At 0655H, six members of the 11th CAB Pathfinders made a combat parachute jump on to the LZ. Their mission was to provide landing information, a mark for the touchdown point and a small security force. At 0700H, the first flight of troop carriers touched down in the LZ. 433 troops were landed in 134 sorties flown. The second mission was for the 5th Recondo Company with 10 UH-1D's, one C&C ship and a HFT. The Tomahawks moved the 5th Recondo Company from Lam Son to LZ's XT877136 and XT879132.

16 Oct 67, the 128th AHC supported the 5th ARVN Division with 11 UH-1D's and one HFT. The Tomahawks flew one combat assault starting at 1000H and completed at 1210H moving a CIDG element of the 4/8 Inf Regt from YTC79755 to XT937821. One UH-1B while attacking the target at XT860002 received automatic weapons fire but took no hits. The source of fire was assaulted and the Gunslingers estimated three VC KBA.

29 Oct 67, the Tomahawks moved the 5th Recondo Company, with 10 slicks, one C&C ship and one HFT from PZ's Lam Son and Hon Dong to Loc Ninh. One UH-1B received intense small arms fire from XU735080 and took two hits. The aircraft was at 300 feet on a close air support mission and continued to fly. During this operation, the Tomahawks moved 29 stretcher cases from Loc Ninh to Hon Quan, 18 walking wounded from XU731085 to Hon Quan and nine walking wounded from Loc Ninh to Bien Hoa.

The 128th AHC supported the 5th ARVN Division daily from 29 September 1967 thru the end of this reporting period. The following is a statistical summary of the Tomahawks support:

Total Sorties - 3863
Total passengers transported - 8848
Total cargo transported - 17.6 tons
MEDEVAC of WIA & KIA - 147
VC KBA (128th AHC) - 31

g. Other continuous operations supported by this battalion during the reporting period 1 August - 31 October 1967 are as follows:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Unit Supported</u>
Barking Sands	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
Kolekole	2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div
Diamond Head	3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div

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Riley	1st Bde, 9th Inf Div
Union Town	1st Bde, 9th Inf Div
Enterprise	3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div
Fairfax	199th LIB, 9th Inf Div

h. Other Significant Activities 1 Aug 67 - 31 Oct 67.

3 Aug 67 - A gunship in a 162nd AHC LFT supporting the III Corps Tactical Zone was forced to land at XT325095 when one of the rocket pods exploded. Two of the crewmen were injured and were evacuated to Chu Chi. The aircraft was evacuated by a CH-47.

4 Aug 67 - Eight enemy mortar rounds landed within a 10 minute period in the 173rd AHC base camp at Lai Khe, resulting in one WIA, one KIA and five aircraft slightly damaged.

14 Aug 67 - Eleven UH-1D's and a HFT from the 162nd AHC were used to conduct a combat assault in support of the 3/39th Inf, 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div. Arty and gunships were used on the LZ, however the Vultures received intense auto wps and small arms fire during the initial landing at XS714697. A total of four UH-1D's and two UH-1C's were hit. One UH-1D was forced to land with excessive damage to the transmission and tail boom. A UH-1C was also forced to land due to punctured fuel cells. Both of these aircraft were recovered by a CH-47. The remainder of the aircraft continued the mission. There were no injuries. The source of fire was silenced by slick doorgunners, and gunships.

14 Aug 67 - One 173rd AHC UH-1D received moderate enemy auto wps and SA fire from XT821314 while enroute at 100' altitude. Low ceiling required that the aircraft proceed low level. The aircraft sustained 4 hits but continued to fly. The aircraft commander and gunner were wounded and evacuated to the 93rd Evac Hosp. The source of fire was not assaulted.

19 Aug 67 - A 128th AHC LFT augmented 11 UH-1D's supporting the III Corps Tactical Zone engaged several enemy targets. They were credited with two VC KBA (Confirmed) and three VC KBA (Estimated) at XT315003. At XT3100, the Gunslingers destroyed nine structures and damaged 12. These targets were engaged with 2.75 rockets and 40 mm.

20 Aug 67 - One 205th ASHC CH-47 received intense automatic weapons fire from XT612434 while landing during a resupply mission. The aircraft sustaining 10 hits continued to fly. The gunner was slightly wounded. The source of fire was not assaulted.

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23 Aug 67 - During a troop extraction, one 205th ASHC CH-47 received intense 30 cal auto wpons fire while at approximately 1000' altitude. The CH-47 continued to fly, however the pilot received a minor leg wound and was evacuated to Dau Tieng.

24 Aug 67 - The 173rd AHC supported the III Corps Tactical Zone with 11 UH-1D's and a LFT. One VC estimated killed and one structure damaged at coord XS3501 by gunship with 7.62 and rockets. One sampan destroyed at XS4981.

28 Aug 67 - While supporting the 2/28th Inf, a 128th AHC LFT estimated killing five VC at XT846280 with rockets and doorguns.

29 Aug 67 - One 205th ASHC CH-47 while supporting the 25th Inf Div received light enemy SA fire from XT0654. The acft sustained two hits and continued to fly. The gunner was slightly wounded. The source of fire was not assaulted.

2 Sep 67 - A 128th AHC LFT scrambled in spt of 1st Inf Div to coord XT877132, killed an estimated 25 VC with rockets, miniguns and grenade launchers.

2 Sep 67 - The 162nd AHC gunships encountered heavy auto wpons fire while marking the LZ for a 1/2nd Inf lift. Both gunships received strike damage and were forced to land at Phuoc Vinh. The aircraft commander (AC) and doorgunner of the lead acft were wounded and evacuated to Phuoc Vinh for medical attention.

12 Sep 67 - The 173rd AHC, Crossbows (gun-platoon), had five VC KB. (Confirmed), one VC KB. (Estimated) and one VC WB. at coord XT3715, all by 2.75 or 7.62 weapons.

13 Sep 67 - The 11th CAB augmented by the 269th CAB made 3 CA's in spt of the 1st Inf Div to seal 3 villages in vicinities of coord XT706428, XT848362 and XT826305.

17 Sep 67 - One 205th ASHC CH-47 flew one sortie for the 1st Div, Chemical carrying .5 tons of cargo in .3 hrs. This was an experiment in defoliation.

26 Sep 67 - Two 128th AHC UH-1B's while flying 18 sorties in 14.0 hrs for the 5th Special Forces confirmed 2 VC KB., estimated two VC KB., destroyed three structures, one sampan and one bunker in vicinity of XT335030.

30 Sep 67 - The 128th AHC flew one CA in spt of the 5th ARVN Div with 11th CAB Pathfinders to organize the PZ. The lift started at 0755H and completed at 0925H with full suppression on both LZ's. There were 136 sorties and 454 pax

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in 35.4 hours. The Gunslingers reported two VC KBs (Estimated) at XT675255 by 40 mm and one bunker destroyed at the same location by 2.5 rockets. Five ARVN were Med Evaced by the slicks from XT722239 and eight ARVN Med Evaced from XT7323 to Lam Son.

3 Oct 67 - The 128th AHC Tomahawks flew re-supply and medevacs for the 2/8th Inf Regt and 4/9th Inf Regt. They moved a total of 6 ARVN WIA, 45 ARVN KIA and three US KIA.

3 Oct 67 - An 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (RAC) O-1G while enroute received unknown type of fire from XT667414. The round made a 3" by 2" hole in the windshield. The aircraft was at an altitude of 1100' and continued to fly. The source was not assaulted.

4 Oct 67 - Two 184th RAC O-1G's reported receiving fire. One received small arms, automatic tracer fire from YT085370. He received no hits. He called in Arty and accounted for three VC KIA (Confirmed). The other O-1G received light estimated 50 cal fire from XT683420 while flying at 1400'. The source of fire was not assaulted.

7 Oct 67 - While landing in a field resupply area, a 205th SHC CH-47 was hit by a claymore mine. The mine was located in a tree. The ship took numerous hits wounding the gunner slightly. The aircraft proceeded to Lai Khe with the injured man.

11 Oct 67 - The 128th AHC Gunslingers were credited with six VC KBs (Confirmed) at XT761185. A suspected VC Base Camp was reported at XT075202. Four hoatches were reported at this same location.

i. QUARTERLY STATISTICAL SUMMARY AUG, SEP AND OCT

(1) Hours flown	UH-1	-	24,272
	CH-47	-	7,474
	O-1	-	<u>8,569</u>
	Total		40,315
(2) Sorties flown	UH-1	-	72,999
	CH-47	-	25,821
	O-1	-	<u>6,408</u>
	Total		105,228
(3) Passengers transported	UH-1	-	45,903
	CH-47	-	<u>38,981</u>
	Total		84,884

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- (4) Cargo transported UH-1 - 2,454
CH-47 - 44,332
Total 46,786
- (5) Medical Evacuation - 356
- (6) Aircraft Recovered - 32
- (7) Ammunition expended:
- 7.62 mm - 2,018,431
2.75 mm - 10,122
40 mm - 36,920
- (8) Enemy losses: VC KIA (BC) 28
VC KIA (EST) 50
Structures destroyed 63
Sampans sunk 31
- (9) Friendly Summary: US KIA 11
US KIA 0
Aircraft hit 60
Aircraft destroyed 0

3. (C) Training.

a. Pathfinder Training. One pathfinder training course was conducted during the reporting period. The course was conducted 21 - 31 August 1967. Nine pathfinders from the Battalion attended the course which presented the basic requirements as stated in USARV message AVHLV 26232. This training was designed to qualify the students sufficiently to apply for permanent designation as pathfinders upon completion of a six month on the job training or 25 combat missions of a specific nature.

b. AANTAP Courses. 28 students from the 11th C.B. attended classes at Vung Tau A.F. conducted by the 765th Transportation Detachment. Attendance figures are shown below:

<u>Course</u>	<u>Student Input</u>
UH-1 Airframe	9
UH-1 T53 Engine	2
UH-1 T53-L-13 Engine	1
CH-47 Airframe	6
CH-47 T55 Engine	8
Supply Course (Avionics Tech Supply)	2

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c. VNMF Aviator Training. The 11th CAB had three VNMF aviators attached for transition and tactical training in the UH-1 on 21 August 1967. The three VNMF aviators were attached to the 173rd AHC at Lai Khe. Training of the VNMF aviators has progressed smoothly and as of the end of this reporting period all three VNMF aviators are proficient in all maneuvers in the UH-1D and were being utilized daily as operational pilots on all types of missions.

d. In-Country Flight Crew Training and Aviator Orientation. During this reporting period, pilots and air crews from the 135th Assault Helicopter Company and three Australian Navy Pilots assigned to the 222nd Combat Aviation Battalion received flight crew training and in-country orientation with the 11th CAB. This training was conducted without incident in a highly satisfactory manner.

E. LOGISTICS.

1. (U) Significant activities. The major logistic effort during this period have been directed toward:

- a. Improving administrative supply procedures.
- b. Assisting units in the fields of supply, logistics and related activities.
- c. Construction of the Canonment area.
- d. Construction of Aircraft Revetments.

2. (U) Supply.

a. Assistance visits for the purpose of determining unit's status, identifying weaknesses and assisting in detail to correct deficiencies, with emphasis on material readiness.

3. (U) Construction.

a. Operational administrative, mess and billet facility construction has continued under the self help program.

b. The 34th Engineer Battalion (Construction) has taken over the construction of the three maintenance hangers started by the 554th Engineers.

c. Personnel bunkers have been constructed in all billet areas.

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F. SIGNAL.

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1. (U) Work on the extension of the Communications Center has been finished. All Signal Operations are in a new building constructed by the Communications Section. This has enabled the Commo Section to release two Shop Vans for use within this Headquarters.

2. (C) A Crypto Room has been set up and is completely operational. In addition to the "Land Line"/VHF teletype circuit, the 11th CAB has installed a radio teletype (RTT) system as an alternate means of passing traffic when the VHF circuit is out.

3. (U) The new Repair Shop is capable of giving 2nd and limited 3rd echelon maintenance support for all ground communication equipment for all subordinate units of the Battalion.

4. (C) The Commo Section has been able to adapt Security Gear (KW-7) to the AN/VSC-2 Radio Teletype configuration. This has given the Battalion the secure RTT capability installed in our Crypto Facility.

5. (C) The 11th CAB has received another radio teletype configuration called the AN/MRC-19. The configuration is mounted in a jeep with a trailer which carries additional radios.

a. Fully loaded, the configuration carries the following:

(1) HF RTT system: AN/MRC-95

(2) 1 FM AN/VRC-46

(3) 4 FM AN/PRC-25

(4) 2 HF AN/PRC-47

(5) 1 UHF AN/PRC-41

(6) Necessary storage area for all batteries for PRC-25, 41 and 47.

b. Three MRC-119's have been received. Two have been distributed to outlying companies (162nd and 173rd). The third will be distributed to the 128th.

6. (C) The 11th CAB has received the AN/MSC-10 and AN/MSC-11 Communications Consoles. These sets will be installed in the Command and Control aircraft. These consoles will have a secure voice capability utilizing the new KY-28.

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G. MAINTENANCE.

1. (U) The completion of one maintenance hanger has enhanced working conditions greatly during the daylight hours, but the lack of lighting facilities in the structure has hampered night maintenance operations. A second maintenance hanger is nearing completion and will provide the same facilities with lighting limitations.
2. (C) The Battalion has received seven UH-1D and one UH-1C aircraft to replace losses. At the end of the period the units are short three UH-1D and one O-1G aircraft, using the criteria of 21 UH-1D's per assault helicopter company. A shortage of UH-1D float stock in the supporting aircraft maintenance company exists, and replacements for aircraft down for extensive maintenance are not available in adequate quantities.
3. (C) Lateral search throughout the Battalion has proven extremely successful in filling EDP requisitions. Supply support in most cases has shown improvement and with the introduction of the NCB 500 computer system in the supporting DSU, further improvement is anticipated.
4. (U) Revetments for protection against mortar and rocket attacks have been completed for all aircraft in the Battalion.
5. (C) Due to an increase in the number of aircraft being supported by our supporting maintenance company, the Battalion is experiencing a slower turn around time on aircraft work ordered to the DS maintenance Company.
6. (C) FOD continues to be the greatest cause of premature engine failure. FOD accounted for 40% of the engines requiring change, while bearing failure and high EGT claimed another 23%. The remaining 37% was attributed to miscellaneous failures. The average time for early engine change was 425 hours, far below the programmed 1200 hours.

H. AVIATION SAFETY.

1. (U) There has been a gradual increase in the accident rate during the past ninety days though the overall accident rate has been low. Over half the accidents during this period were caused by pilot error while the remainder were caused by material failure.
2. (U) There have been eight major accidents, one minor accident, twelve incidents, ten precautionary landings, eight forced landings, and three combat damages reported

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during this period. Six of the major accidents and the minor accident were in UH-1 aircraft, the other two major accidents were O-1G aircraft.

3. (U) The following is a summary of the accidents and incidents reported during this period:

<u>ACCIDENTS</u>		<u>INCIDENTS</u>	
Engine failure	3	Mushed through on landing	1
Tail rotor strike	2	Jeep antenna hit blade	1
Downwind takeoff	1	Ground guide error	1
Downwind landing	1	Aircraft hit tree	1
Landed long during rainstorm	1	Rocket exploded leaving aircraft	1
Fuel starvation	1	Gunner walked into tail rotor	1
Over gross for conditions	1	Tail rotor failure	2
		Lost RPM	1
		Engine failure	1
		Landed short, hit ditch	1
		Flap failure	1

4. (U) The principal cause factor that required forced or precautionary landings to be made are:

<u>FORCED LANDING</u>		<u>PRECAUTIONARY LANDINGS</u>	
Short shaft failure	1	Engine oil seal failed	1
Fuel starvation	2	Fuel leak	2
Hydraulic failure	1	Lost transmission oil pressure	1
Engine failure	2	Cyclic servo mount broken	1
Power loss	1	Hydraulic failure	2
Tail rotor failure	1	Power loss	1
		Fuel line quick disconnect failed	1
		Stud bolts on oil filter came off	1

5. (U) A noteworthy cause of accidents and incidents is downwind takeoffs and landings. Continued emphasis must be placed on avoidance of this type of procedure unless it is absolutely required by tactical necessity.

I. SURGEON.

(U) The medical resources of the 11th CAB remains relatively unchanged, however the magnitude of support offered by them has greatly increased. The 11th CAB Medical Detachment has the responsibility for providing medical support for two non 11th CAB units which bring the total for the battalion dispensary to support to over 2,500 personnel. This increased requirement is a direct consequence of the reduction of fixed post medical facilities by the 44th Medical Brigade. The battalion dispensary now provides 24 hour emergency medical officer coverage and basic medical laboratory support for the entire post.

SECTION II, PART I

LESSONS LEARNED

A. (U) PERSONNEL.

Item. Personnel Infusion Program.

Discussion. During the month of October 1967, command emphasis was placed on the infusion program. A survey of supposedly infused units assigned was conducted and it was determined that none of the units were properly infused. An immediate program was undertaken to infuse all units within the battalion. This "crash" program necessitated the transfer of approximately 100 personnel, within the battalion, resulting in a reduction of combat effectiveness of all the units for a period of approximately two weeks. A much longer period of ineffectiveness would have resulted if the units had been required to infuse on this scale with units outside the battalion, especially if personnel were infused from units equipped with the UH-1H. Both pilots and maintenance personnel trained on the UH-1H require additional training before they are mission ready to fly and maintain the UH-1D helicopters. During the month of October, twelve aviators from a unit equipped with UH-1H aircraft were in fact infused from the 188th AHC, 269th CAB into the three assault helicopter companies assigned to the 11th CAB. The infusion was accomplished on two separate dates, 23 and 30 October. On each of these dates two aviators from the 188th AHC were infused into each assigned assault helicopter company and were replaced by two other aviators from the receiving unit. The personnel infused from the 269th CAB had been flying the UH-1H helicopter and the unit into which they were infused were equipped with the UH-1D. This necessitated the staggering of the infusion to preclude any reduction in the degree of combat effectiveness of the companies involved.

Observation. Commanders are reluctant to have their units participate in the infusion program because it requires the giving up of aviators and enlisted personnel with known qualities and abilities for other aviators and enlisted personnel with unknown qualities and abilities. Additionally, the replacement aviators and enlisted personnel might require additional training in the particular type equipment assigned to the unit, prior to becoming operationally proficient. This additional training, when required to be given to a relatively large number of personnel and the resulting loss of operational quality, reduces the combat effectiveness of the unit. The need for infusing a unit is evident. However the plan by which a unit is infused must be well thought out to minimize the loss of combat effectiveness and preclude

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and preclude unnecessary personnel inconvenience. Once the plan is implemented, it must be forcefully executed, and the required infusion goals attained within the prescribed time limit. Failure to accomplish the infusion goals will result in the unit being unable to accomplish its mission when the preponderance of its assigned personnel rotate as a group, leaving a void of trained personnel which are difficult to replace and only perpetuates the DEROS hump into yet another year.

B. (C) OPERATIONS.

Item. Defoliation Operations by CH-47.

Discussion. Testing the CH-47 as a defoliation delivery aircraft was initiated on 11 September 1967. Four test flights were conducted and testing was completed on 18 September 1967. On this date, the chemical section, 1st Infantry Division deemed both equipment and CH-47 delivery 100% effective. Normal procedure for conducting a defoliation mission is as follows. The CH-47 furnished by 11th C.B reports to HQ, 1st Inf Div for briefing and loading. The CH-47 crew receive a briefing on target area and are given maps by a representative of the chemical section while personnel from the section load the dispensing apparatus on the CH-47. The defoliation apparatus includes a 500 gallon fuel pod, a gas powered motor, fuel hoisting, and a spray boom. The aircraft ramp is lowered and the spray boom extends seven feet aft of the ramp section. After apparatus is installed, the fuel pod is filled with 500 gallons of defoliant. Rate of dispensing has been computed at 50 gallons per minute, for a total of 10 minutes of continuous spraying. A total of 209 acres can be covered with 500 gallons. The spray boom allows for a 100 foot wide strip to be defoliated. The most effective speed while spraying is 90 knots. The desired altitude is between 25 and 50 feet absolute altitude. Twenty seconds before the defoliant is released, the CH-47 aircraft commander notifies the chemical personnel onboard by turning on the red troop warning light. Two seconds prior to reaching target area, the aircraft commander turns on the green light and activates the troop alarm bell. At this time, personnel from the chemical section activate the dispensing apparatus. Dispensing apparatus is deactivated when red troop light is turned on by aircraft commander. Due to vulnerability to enemy fire while operating at lower altitude, defoliation missions have been restricted to perimeters of base camps and areas that have previously been cleared by some plow. When security is in question, a light fire team will escort the CH-47. Defoliant has recently been obtained thru supply channels and actual missions will be conducted in the near future.

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Observation. Advantages of the helicopter over fixed wing delivery is the ability to become discreet with target areas. Fixed wing aircraft often had overlap affecting friendly crops. This application of imagination in aviation has given the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division the ability to deny cover and concealment to the enemy along heavily traveled roads and around base camps.

C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION. NONE

D. INTELLIGENCE. NONE

E. LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE.

1. (U) Item. Thirty GPM Kenco Pump.

Discussion. All units were surveyed to determine the suitability of 30 GPM Kenco Pumps for mini-port operations.

Observation. The 30 GPM pump was found to be unsatisfactory and a recommendation was made to delete this item from the TOE and replace them with 350 GPM pumps.

2. (U) Item. Foreign matter in aircraft fuel tanks.

Discussion. Although POL pumps and M49C tank trucks have filter separators, foreign particles may be pumped into aircraft or vehicles fuel tanks because both the filter element and the dispensing hoses are subject to deterioration.

Observation. This problem can be corrected by inserting nozzle strainers in the dispensing nozzle and checking them daily.

3. (U) Item. Lack of adequate lighting facilities to perform night maintenance.

Discussion. To support the flying hour program it is necessary to establish a 24 hour a day maintenance operation. The lighting sets provided by the unit TOE is inadequate in type and number to support such an operation. So long as this condition of poor lighting exists, the efficiency of night maintenance operations will be below par and potential safety hazards will continue to be an ever present problem.

Observation. Plans to construct adequate lighting in newly constructed maintenance hangars will solve this problem for units occupying such facilities. Hangars of this

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nature are not feasible for field sites. and still a requirement for 24 hour operation exists, therefor TO&E equipment should be changed as follows:

	<u>R&C</u>	<u>CbtSpt& Cbtaslt</u>	<u>Maint Det</u>
Floodlight Set, Portable, Model NF-2 FSI. 6230-752-2082	1	3	2
Floodlight Set, FSN 6230-299- 5642 2 Boxes per Set	2	2	2
Floodlight Set Elect, Portable Tripod Mount, 4 Flood Lights, 120V (Xmas Tree) FSN 6230-299- 5879	6	2	2
Light Set, General Illumination 25 Outlet FSI. 6230-295-7077	1	2	2
Light Set, 100 Watt Lamp W/25 Foot Long Cable FSN 6230-239- 3518	4	3	3
Light, Extension, 100 Watt Lamp W/100 Foot Cable FSN 6230-268- 9246		3	3

It is felt that the lighting sets listed above will best meet the needs of units operating in the field.

4. (U) Item. Shortage of qualified airframe repairmen (MOS 68G20) and non availability of replacement aircraft for those meeting criteria for the aircraft Depot Exchange Program (2200 hours).

Discussion. At the present time the Battalion is experiencing a critical shortage of airframe repairmen (MOS 68G20). It appears that no relief for this shortage is in sight. This situation when combined with the fact that high time old aircraft require extensive sheet metal repair, present a critical problem.

Observation. It has been requested that civilian airframe repairmen be provided at unit level to off-set this critical personnel shortage. As of this date information is not available on the status of this request. It appears that the Aircraft Depot Exchange Program is falling behind schedule and as a result units will continue to fly high time aircraft until such time as replacements are made available.

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5. (U) Item. Shortage of maintenance float aircraft.

Discussion. Aircraft estimated to be down for extensive maintenance at the Direct Support Company should be replaced with maintenance floats. Due to a lack of available maintenance floats, the operational units are experiencing an excessive amount of aircraft down time. An increase in the turn around time for aircraft in the supporting maintenance company is attributed to a substantial increase in the number of aircraft they are required to support and a shortage of personnel.

Observation. When maintenance floats are available for issue, operational commitments can be met and additional time is available to the maintenance company to correct maintenance deficiencies which might otherwise be overlooked. If in fact, supporting units are required to accept additional work loads beyond their capability, all supported units suffer. A definite need for additional maintenance support exists.

F. SURBEON. NONE

SECTION II, PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

NONE.



LEO E. SOUCEK
LTC, CE
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- A - Current Organization
- ~~B - Command and Staff Structure~~
- ~~C - Distribution~~ Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

AVGC-SC (1 Nov 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period Ending
31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 18 November 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) One copy of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion's Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65) for the period ending 31 October 1967, is forwarded in compliance with USAF Regulation 1-19, dated 3 November 1967.

2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the following comments are made:

a. Reference: Section I, paragraph G. 4., page 20. Monthly revetment report indicates that six (6) aircraft revetments were still incomplete.

b. Reference: Section II, Part I, paragraph E. 3., page 24. Recommendations were solicited from all battalions as to the type of lighting set desired. The most popular set desired was the Floodlight Set, Portable, Model MF-2. Action has been initiated by this headquarters to procure 166 sets through the INSURE program.

c. Reference: Section II, Part I, paragraph E. 4., page 25. Hiring of civilians has been initiated by 34th Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Group. However, the assignment of civilians to combat units is still a matter of discussion at 34th Group and USAF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



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AVFBC-RE-H (1 Nov 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO) (U)

DA HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 7 DEC 1967

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHCC-DH, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached report and concurs with
the comments and recommendations with the following comment:

p(25), para(4), Shortage of airframe repairmen, (ILS 68G20).
MDS 68G20 is an Army wide shortage. This shortage in Vietnam is USARV
wide and relief does not appear to be in sight.

FOR THE COMLANDER:


R. E. WAMBSGANSS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVBA-C (1 Nov 67) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (O.L.L.) (HCS-CSFOR-67) For
Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (UIC WFAAAA) (U)

DEC 16 1967

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, ATTN: AVBA-C, AFO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, AFO 96375
Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, AFO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army (AGSFOA DA), Washington, D.C. 20310


1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 11th Com-
bat Aviation Battalion, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the
contents as indorsed.

2. (U) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph E1, page 24: USAFV
unclassified message AVHGD-SD 63350, DTG 230733Z Sep 67, subject: Pump,
Fuel Dispensing, 30/40 GPM Kenco, changed the authorization to 100 GPM pumps.

b. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph E2, page 24: USAFV
unclassified message AVHGD-SF 17817, DTG 211106Z Mar 67, gave instructions
for construction of field expedient strainers. USAFV unclassified message
AVHGD-SD 64413, DTG 290246Z Sep 67 listed FSN of correct strainers and out-
lined appropriate requisitioning instructions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES M. GOLDFARB
LTJ, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 67) 4th Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL)(RCS-CSFOR-65) For Quarterly
Period Ending 31 October 1967 (UIC WFAAAA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 11 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GOPP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion (FAKA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning lack of adequate lighting to perform night maintenance, page 24, paragraph 3; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1b: Nonconcur with 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1b. Requests for additional lighting sets should be submitted as MTOE action by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.


b. Reference item concerning shortage of qualified airframe repairmen (MOS 68G20), page 25, paragraph 4; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2. Based on projection of input through 30 April 1968, it is anticipated that the 12th Aviation Group will be at strength. Requisition shortfall in MOS 68G20 has contributed to the USARV shortage in this MOS.

c. Reference item concerning shortage of maintenance float aircraft, page 26, paragraph 5. During the period, USARV averaged 80 UH-1 type helicopters short of authorizations which significantly reduced the number of float aircraft available to operational units. Programmed input of UH-1D/H aircraft should eliminate shortages by May 1968. UH-1B/C and AH-1G input should eliminate gunship shortages by February 1968. Programmed deployments of additional aircraft maintenance companies will also alleviate some of the present shortages.

3. (U) Correct UIC Number WFAKAAA.

4. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AIG
Assistant Adjutant General

cy furn:
HQ, 11th Cbt Avn Bn
HQ, 1st Avn Bde

*Downgraded at 8 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10*

CONFIDENTIAL

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GPOB-DT(1 Nov 67) (U) 5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1967 from HQ, 11th Combat Avn Bn (UIC: WPAKAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 29 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CURRENT ORGANIZATION

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ANNEX A

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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