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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (12 Jan 68) FOR OT RD-670609

18 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96377

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96377

AVGD-AE

10 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarter Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS GSFCR-65)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I - Significant Organizational Activities

1. (C) General. The units assigned to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion remained the same at the close of this period with the following exceptions:

a. In accordance with Paragraph 1, General Order 551, HQ IFFV, dated 10 July 1967, the 238th Field Artillery Detachment Counter-mortar Radar, was reassigned from the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion to 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, APO 96295, effective 28 April 1967.

b. On 8 July 1967, the 188th Assault Helicopter Company with its supporting detachments, 603d Transportation (CHFM), 4th Signal Detachment and 154th Medical Detachment were placed under the operational control of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

c. The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion is commanded by LTC Eugene S. Crooks who assumed command during a change of command ceremony on 28 July 1967 at Dong Ba Thin. LTC Henry L. Wilkins commanded the battalion since the departure of LTC Benjamin L. Harrison on 3 July 1967. On that date, LTC Billy G. Estes became the Deputy Battalion Commander for Support. LTC Carl H. Sawls replaced LTC Dean G. Boyle as the Deputy Battalion Commander for Operations on 28 July 1967.

d. Changes of Command within subordinate units during the reporting period were limited to one. On 1 May 1967 Major Joel J. Williams relinquished command of the 48th Assault Helicopter Company to Major Robert L. Young.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. In the Dong Ba Thin area, the S-2 officer continued to conduct daily briefings to exchange and coordinate intelligence. These briefings were attended by representatives of various local agencies. These daily meetings provided timely intelligence and enabled everyone to maintain a current picture of activity within

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the Dong Ba Thin area.

b. In the forward area of operation, which was established on 3 July, 1967, intelligence information is obtained from the supported units by way of INTSUMS and close liaison. The supported units normally conduct a daily briefing at which a current intelligence picture is presented. The liaison officer, a member of the S-3 section, always attends these meetings. In supporting the Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROK FV) liaison has been established with the 9th ROK Infantry Division, the Capitol ROK Infantry Division and with ROK FV. An intelligence map and summary is maintained at the battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC). Additional intelligence information is obtained from the companies, Inter Communications Center (ICC), and Military Intelligence (MI) units located in the area of operations.

3. Operations and training activities.

a. Plans: At the close of this period, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion is located at Dong Ba Thin while a forward TOC is being maintained at Phu Hiep. This TOC was established in support of Operation HONG KIL DONG, which began on 9 July 1967, and is continuing at the close of this period. The forward CP coordinates the efforts of the 48th Assault Helicopter Company, DS to the 9th ROK (White Horse) Infantry Division, the 129th Assault Helicopter Company DS to Capitol ROK (Tiger) Infantry Division, the 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company GS, and the 188th Assault Helicopter Company GS. The 48th, and 129th AHC's have maintained their respective supporting roles since 2 May 1967. On that date the 117th Assault Helicopter Company was placed in general support of the II Corps Tactical Zone, Coastal Region. The 281st Assault Helicopter Company, with headquarters in Nha Trang, continued to provide direct support to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) until 1 July 1967, when it was given a mission of GS of II Corps Tactical Zone. In addition, the 281st continues to support 5th Special Forces' B-52's Project DELTA. The 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company provided general support to the 52d Battalion in the Central Highlands from 6 May until 7 July 67, and also continued to support the two ROKA divisions.

b. Operations: At the beginning of the period the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion returned from its year long nomadic odyssey to its home base at Dong Ba Thin, closing at home station on 3 May. Upon receipt of their new missions, and after leaving a small rear element behind in Phan Rang and Dong Ba Thin, the 48th and the 129th AHC set up operations in Ninh Hoa and An Son respectively to facilitate aviation support to the ROKA divisions. The 117th, operating out of Dong Ba Thin, stationed aircraft in convenient locations along the coast and inland, from Qui Nhon to Kontum to Nha Trang to provide general support. Meanwhile, the 281st continued to support Project DELTA until its termination on 15 June. After a brief retraining period, Project DELTA was renewed on 15 July. The

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180th ASHC provided 4 CH-47's daily in support of the 173d Light Infantry Brigade in the highlands of Pleiku Province from 6 May until 7 July. Each company supporting the ROKA divisions conducted independent operations along the coast during May and June. The major operation for the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion during this period was HONG KIL DONG, a joint operation by both the White Horse and Tiger Divisions, which is still underway at the end of the reporting period.

(1) Operation HONG KIL DONG.

(a) The task organization of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion during Operation HONG KIL DONG was as follows.

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| Infantry Division. | 1 | 48th Assault Helicopter Company - DS 9th ROK |
| ROK Infantry Division. | 2 | 129th Assault Helicopter Company - DS Capitol |
| | 3 | 188th Assault Helicopter Company - GS. |
| 10 July 1967) - GS. | 4 | 155th Assault Helicopter Company (9 July, |
| | 5 | 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company - GS. |
| aircraft per day) - Reinforce 180th ASHC. | 6 | 196th Assault Support Helicopter Company (One |
| Battalion - GS. | 7 | Pathfinder Detachment, 10th Combat Aviation |

(b) The mission of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion during the initial phase was to:

- 1 Conduct a simultaneous assault by helilift-ing elements of the White Horse Infantry Division and Capitol Infantry Division from multiple PZ's to multiple LZ's. Copies of the operations orders are attached as Inclosures #1 and #2.
- 2 Provide direct support to each of the divi-sions after the initial assault, utilizing the 48th and 129th Assault Helicopter Companies.
- 3 Provide general support to each of the divi-sions after the initial assault utilizing the 188th Assault Helicopter Company and the 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company.
- 4 Be prepared to conduct company sized assaults as directed by each supported commander.
- 5 Be prepared to mass aviation support as di-rected by the supported commanders.

(c) The operational accomplishments of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion during this operation are reflected in the following statistics:¹

³
1Statistics compiled from OPREP 5 reports 10th Cbt Avn Bn 9-31 July 67.

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1 Initial assault on 9 July 1967:

<u>Nr & Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Cargo(In Tons)</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hrs Flown</u>	<u>Ay Per A/C</u>
52 UH-1D	98.1	4,758	1,849	467.7	9.0
16 CH-47	521.5	2,294	475	142.3	8.8
16 Gunships			369	77.5	4.8
Totals	<u>619.6</u>	<u>7,052</u>	<u>2,703</u>	<u>687.5</u>	<u>---</u>

2 Results of operations through 31 July 1967:

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Cargo(In Tons)</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours Flown</u>	<u>Ay Per A/C Per Day</u>
UH-1D	3,472.3	37,452	23,132	5733.4	6.1
CH-47	4,654.7	13,419	4,926	1016.5	4.4
Gunships			4,626	968.3	4.6
Totals	<u>8,327.0</u>	<u>40,871</u>	<u>32,684</u>	<u>7718.2</u>	<u>---</u>

3 Comparison of daily commitment and average flying hours.

<u>Company</u>	<u>Average Hours Per A/C Per Day</u>	<u>Average Daily Commitment</u>
188th AHC	UH-1D	6.6
	UH-1C	5.2
129th AHC	UH-1D	6.5
	UH-1C	4.9
48th AHC	UH-1D	5.9
	UH-1C	3.5
180th ASHC	CH-47	5.3
196th ASHC	CH-47	3.5

4 Combat assaults.

Company size. 14
 Battalion size. 14
 Regimental size. 4

5 Combat Extractions.

Company size. 8
 Battalion size. 5
 Regimental size. 2

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6 Ammunition expended through 31 July 1967.

7.62mm.	381,385
2.75"	2,050
40mm.	2,895

7 Night time.

48th Assault Helicopter Company. . .	84.2
129th Assault Helicopter Company. .	120.7
188th Assault Helicopter Company. . .	55.9
180th Assault Support Helicopter Company	.19.2

8 Anti-Aircraft fire.

Number of aircraft receiving fire. . .	15
Number of aircraft receiving hits. . .	3
WIA.	0
KIA.	0

9 Medical evacuations.56

(d) Discussion of the operations:

HONG KIL DONG is a legendary hero in Korean folklore similar in many ways to Robin Hood. Like HONG KIL DONG, the Tiger and the White Horse Divisions have aggressively roamed the jungles in the vicinity of the Tuy Hoa - Cung Son - Dong Tre - Tuy An complex to search and destroy, to take back from the VC that territory he had always claimed as his own, and to give it back to the free people of South Vietnam. The presence of the 95th NVA Regiment in this area made this operation even more vital. At 0700 hours on 9 July 1967, the operation began with the first element of both divisions touching down in a simultaneous multi-landing zone assault. In all, 52 UH-1D's and 16 CH-47's were used in successive lifts from several pick-up zones. Sixteen gunships provided LZ prep and escort for the troop-carrying aircraft. Despite the language barrier, effective liaison and superior pathfinder support produced efficient control and coordination during the assault and in the ensuing resupply sorties. The uniqueness of this operation lies in the fact that though this was two separate and distinct operations with two mission commanders, the assaults were conducted simultaneously with coordination effected by the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion TOC. The 5,400 initially helilifted troops were in their combat positions in less than four hours, and the supporting elements, CP's, artillery, and resupply points were established by the close of the day. As the tabulated entries indicate, numerous smaller C's were conducted during the month as the ground elements pursued the elusive enemy. A two company night combat assault was called ASAP after the Tiger Division TOC was mortared at 2030 hours on 15 July. Within ten minutes 12 UH-1D's were launched; eight as lift ships, one as C&C for the 129th CO and

three as flare ships. In one hour, the two companies were helilifted from two PZ's into one LZ. On another occasion, the 129th AHC conducted a battalion size assault at dawn in an effort to avoid ground fog delays. During this assault, the C&C aircraft spotted two NVA camp sites and directed gunships and ROKA infantry into the area, resulting in 47 NVA KIA and 26 weapons captured, including 9 light machine guns. On 26 July the Tiger Division, alerted to the location of a concentration of NVA, was helilifted from its initial area to the northwest in an intricately planned and executed combat assault using 30 UH-1D's and 16 gunships and eleven CH-47's. Eighteen companies were lifted into fourteen LZ's. A detailed breakdown of this 10th Combat Aviation Battalion operation is covered in Inclosure #3. The combat assaults were highly successful and executed exactly as planned. There was no incident or accidents. HONG KIL DONG continues to enjoy a high degree of success with more than 400 confirmed KIA in the twenty-two day period. Friendly casualties have been negligible.

(2) Operations of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company.

(a) During May and June 1967, the 281st Assault Helicopter Company continued to provide airlift support to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) as its primary mission. This support was divided among the lettered companies, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), the MACV Recondo School and Detachment B-52 (Special Operations). Since 1 July, its mission has been changed to provide general support to the II Corps Tactical Zone, Coastal Region.

(b) Presently, the 2nd Platoon and Gun Platoon (-) are providing direct support to detachment B-52's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) and Road Runner operations while the 1st Platoon and remaining elements of the company provide support to the MACV Recondo Training in addition to its GS mission.

(c) During operations this quarter, the 281st Assault Helicopter Company provided an average of six UH-1D and 4 UH-1B aircraft in support of Detachment B-52. Armed helicopter support was furnished to "C" Company, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in II Corps. A summary of these operations is contained below.

Project DELTA (12 April - 15 June 1967)²

1	Total flying hours.	1656.4
2	Total sorties.	2,844
3	Total troops carried.	2,657
4	Total cargo flown.	22.8 (tons)
5	Total LRRP.	20
6	Total Roadrunner Teams.	17
7	Night extractions ³	4
8	Medical evacuations.	32

²A detailed report of this operation, classified SECRET, is on file at HQ 5th Special Forces Group (ABN) Nha Trang.

³A discussion of these night extractions is contained in Inclosure #4.

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9	Ranger operations.	9
10	Aircraft hit by enemy fire.	19
11	Aircraft lost to enemy fire (3 UH-1D's). (1 UH-1B)	4
12	KIA.	1
13	WIA.	3
14	MIA.	1

(d) A heavy fire team supported Company "C" 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Danang, for the period 23 June through 30 June 1967. The purpose of this support was to augment a Mike Force operation by providing air cover on an "On Call" basis.

Results of this operation

1	Total flying hours.	46.7
2	Total sorties.	69
3	Ammunition expended - 2.75".	248
	40mm.	1,251
	7.62mm.	84,400
4	Structures destroyed.	26
5	Secondary explosions.	7
6	Structures damaged.	5
7	Cave entrance blown.	1
8	Bunkers damaged.	2
9	KBA confirmed by Mike Force Personnel. .12	

(e) No report is available at this time on Project DELTA which commenced on 15 July 1967. This action will be covered in the next ORLL.

(f) Support to the MACV Recondo School was provided throughout the period. The school trains US, ROKA, and RVN troops in tactics of LRRP. The course is three weeks in duration and the men receive training in rappelling, rope ladder and McGuire Rig extractions and techniques of infiltration. Four UH-1D's and 2 UH-1B's provide the required support.⁴

(g) Other combat/combat support operations - Throughout this period, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was committed to combat operations daily.

1 Operation PRAIRIE FIRE.

The 117th Assault Helicopter Company has provided continuous gunship support to this operation since 1 May 1967.

2 Operations JACKO KYO (1 May - 31 May 1967).

129th AHG received missions from CRID as the division was engaged in coastal security and increasing numbers

⁴A detailed account of the training provided is discussed in the 10th CAB ORLL for the quarter ending 30 April 1967.

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of search and clear operations. All these operations were collectively called Operation JACKO KYO. The area of operation was from Phu Cat to south of Tuy An and inland for 10 NM.

Statistical highlights.

Combat assaults.	23
Sorties flown.	13,287
Troops carried.	19,846
Cargo (in tons).	2245.6
Hours flown.	2495.2

3 Operation DOC SU RI (1 June - 30 June 1967).

Again the 129th AHC provided aviation support for CRID as the division increased combat assault activity involving larger sized units. The area of operation was in the same general area as JACKO KYO with the bulk of the activity centered between Tuy An and Dong Tre.

Statistical highlights.⁵

Combat assaults.	30
Sorties flown.	14,932
Troops carried.	20,990
Cargo (in tons).	2209.0
Hours flown.	2533.2

(h) Summary of Operations - The following is a summary of the statistical highlights of the helicopter accomplishments of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for the reporting period.

1 Troops carried.	197,360
2 Cargo (in tons).	20,428.6
3 Sorties flown.	118,964
4 Time flown.	31,959.5 hrs
5 Combat assaults (Battalion Size).	30
6 Number of aircraft receiving fire.	58
7 Number of aircraft receiving hits.	24
8 WIA.	4
9 KIA.	1
10 MIA.	1
11 Med Evacs.	102

c. Training: The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion has conducted various training activities in conjunction with combat operations. Pathfinder teams were put in direct support of the two ROCKA divisions for the first two months of this quarter. A summary of pathfinder activities is discussed further in this report. Night tactical lighting kits are presently being tested in night formation

⁵Statistics compiled from 129th AHC OPREP 5 reports.

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training and a final evaluation will be available in the next ORLL. Each company, excluding the 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company, prepared a tactical contour flying area for its own use in checking out newly assigned aviators and for maintaining proficiency in this technique. Other projects include training in the use of the 50 foot MK-24 flare lanyards as well as advanced individual and platoon size training.

(1) Night - The battalion conducted extensive individual and unit night training throughout the period. A total of 544 hours were flown at night for training during the quarter. The battalion SOP requires each aviator to fly, as a minimum, one hour of night time and to accomplish at least three night take-offs and landings from the right pilot's seat each month. Since the companies now operate from diversified locations, it is difficult as well as impractical to mass the assets for battalion size night training combat assaults. Instead the companies are concentrating on platoon and company training exercises to maintain a high state of proficiency in night assault techniques. Whenever possible, this training is incorporated into the ground unit's tactical plans, frequently as a deception maneuver within the supported units area of operation.

(2) A total of 16 instrument tickets have been renewed during the quarter. The expected loss of seasoned aviators in the Fall will be felt most by the standardization and unit IP positions which will have to be filled by incoming first tour aviators. A program to train and establish these positions is currently under way within each of the companies. The program consists of screening individual flight records and training a minimum of two aviators in each company as standardization pilots. The goal set for instructor pilots is to have one per each platoon. Company standardization pilots will supervise the instrument training, the periodic checking of IP's and the overall unit training. A standardization SOP is currently being revised at battalion headquarters to implement the program.

4. (C) Logistics.

a. Combat support activities.

(1) Class III - During the current reporting period, most battalion operations were conducted from semi-permanent field locations. The program to provide large capacity POL storage and dispensing equipment for use at fixed bases continued.⁶ Upon completion of this program, all TO & E mini-port equipment will be maintained in an operational standby status for use at field sites.

(2) Class V - A study of the tactical employment of the MK-24 illuminating flare using an improved lanyard. Additional fifty foot safety lanyards were procured and have been distributed for further operational testing.

⁶This program is discussed fully in 10th CAB ORLL for the period ending 30 April 1967.

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(3) Airmobile maintenance equipment⁷ - The battalion has materially improved its airmobility capability during this quarter. With the arrival of the airmobile shop sets, which are expected during the next quarter, the transition to 100% airmobility will be completed.

b. Post Development Activities.

(1) Construction of the telephone switching central facility for Dong Ba Thin was initiated and communication trunk lines have been installed.

(2) The cantonment area for an assault support helicopter company, as yet assigned, has been 90% completed during the quarter.

(3) Construction of the battalion headquarters permanent cantonment area through self-help has been essentially completed.

(4) Strengthening and clearing of the Dong Ba Thin Post perimeter was continued. An additional five guard towers were completed.

(5) The concrete structure for the new Battalion TOC at Dong Ba Thin was completed during the quarter.

c. Revetment program.

(1) Aiming at the 1 September 1967 deadline, the companies have concentrated maximum efforts toward the construction of adequate revetments for the aircraft. The companies listed below are responsible for revetments to be constructed in the area indicated.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Company</u>
Phan Rang	48th AHC
Dong Ba Thin	117th AHC
Nha Trang	261st AHC
Ninh Hoa	48th AHC
Pnu Hiep	180th ASHC
An Son	129th AHC

(2) Although construction is gradually proceeding, a lack of necessary engineer equipment has handicapped the construction program. Equipment needed has been identified and request for support has been submitted.

5. (U) Civil affairs.

a. The civic actions program has been considerably enhanced during this quarter. Added command emphasis has been placed on the

⁷A list of the airmobile equipment is given in 10th CAB ORLL for the period ending 30 April 1967.

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program whereby the civic actions officer, the Chaplain and the battalion surgeon are working closely together to arrive at specific goals.

b. Considerable effort has been added to maintain our good will with the outlying villages of Dong Ba Thin and Cam Ranh City. Particular efforts in building religious service facilities and providing medical care have been initiated for the children at the Tan Binh and Ba Ngoi orphanages near Dong Ba Thin.

6. (C) Personnel.

a. During the reporting period, the battalion lost 513 enlisted men and 81 officers due to normal rotation. Out of this total, 4 enlisted men were assigned to Fort Lewis, Washington for lack of specific duty station orders.

b. Personnel problems, thus far, have had no adverse effect on combat operations but the possibility exists that at the present rate of replacement of commissioned officers, a critical shortage will develop. The experience level of warrant officers is presently being studied in each of the companies to select those most highly qualified to fill leadership positions normally assigned to commissioned officers.

c. Morale has been high throughout the period. There have been no major disciplinary problems in the command.

d. During this period, two units, the 129th and 48th AHC, have felt the effects of the requirement to maintain two base camps. The self-help construction of new billets at Dong Ba Thin has required additional personnel simultaneous with the requirements for the forward base camp. These requirements, in addition to having to provide normal detail personnel, have resulted in the undesirable necessity of placing flight crew members on details by night and flying by day. Additionally, the requirement for each company to provide mess personnel at two mess halls has thinned the available number of personnel considerably, as have the requirements for the revetment program.

7. (C) Other.

a. Information Officer.

(1) The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion public information program continues to be active providing coverage of the forward areas as well as the Dong Ba Thin complex.

(2) A summary of the battalion news release is as follows:

1	Feature articles.	11
2	Picture releases.	21

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3	Home town release.	441
4	Illustrated articles.	81
5	Formal press interviews.	3

(3) The battalion continues to utilize the PIO capabilities of higher headquarters to cover the important events.

(4) The acquisition of a movie camera to cover some of the units' activities, such as assaults, training, and significant unit achievements could be of value to this section as well as to maintain a living history of the unit.

(5) A plan was initiated in this quarter, in which as a part of the inprocessing, the newcomer completes a hometown release in duplicate. One copy is released immediately and the other is placed into an alphabetical file for future reference. When the individual is involved in combat actions or receives an award, this information on him is immediately available and valuable time is saved in releasing the news story.

b. Signal.

Landline communications continue to plague the field operations. It has been difficult to predict the reliability of the service. With an increase in communications traffic, invariably, there is a comparable increase in carrier problems. Despite the efforts of all communications personnel to maintain these land lines continuously, the failures continue to occur.

c. Surgeon.

The services of a flight surgeon have been made available to personnel in the 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company through the establishment of a dispensary in the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion located at Phu Hiep. However, the critical shortage of a flight surgeon with the 129th and 48th AHC has not been alleviated at this time.

d. Pathfinder operations summary of activities.

Upon the termination of Operation SUMMERALL,⁸ the 10th Pathfinder Detachment returned to Dong Ba Thin on 3 May 1967. As the 48th AHC and the 129th AHC were placed in direct support of the 9th and Capitol ROK Divisions respectively, the detachment was divided into two teams; one going to Ninh Hoa with the 48th AHC and the other proceeded to An Son with the 129th AHC. From 8 May 1967 to 1 July 1967, both Pathfinder Teams, after having trained themselves, instructed key ROKA field personnel in the techniques of Chinook ladder insertion and extraction. In addition they were trained in the proper techniques of sling loading various types of cargo and equip-

⁸For a discussion of this operation, see ORLL for the quarter ending 30 April 1967.

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ment such as 105mm artillery pieces, A22 ammunition containers, barbed wire coils, water barrels, Class I sling loads. Pathfinder techniques such as the proper selection of resupply points, aircraft hand and arm signals (day and night), and use of colored smoke were included in this instruction. Running concurrently with the ROKA training program, the detachment supported all the companies in the Battalion by organizing troop pick up zones for combat assaults, air traffic control, and establishing landing zones for the monthly training requirements. In the vicinity of An Son, the Pathfinder team organized tactical night LZ's for actual combat assaults by the 129th AHC in Viet Cong held territory. The two teams were combined once again on 1 July as the detachment prepared to provide aviation support to Operation HONG KIL DONG. During the operation, the Pathfinders continued to provide exceptional PZ control support and night tactical landing zone training for the companies involved. The duties performed by the pathfinders included improving the security of the TOC by revetting the area, as a security platoon for the defense of the forward area, and as a security force and recovery team for downed aircraft.

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SECTION II COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS PART I OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

✓ 1. (C) PERSONNEL.

a. ITEM: Assignment Orders.

DISCUSSION: Assignment orders on enlisted and officer personnel are arriving at this headquarters often less than 30 days prior to DEROS. Large programmed losses in the next quarter indicate that the situation may become even more critical.

OBSERVATION: The adverse effect on morale that this has, is readily apparent, particularly for married personnel with school age children, as this creates an additional monetary and dependent movement burden.

b. ITEM: Security guard requirement.

DISCUSSION: The requirement to furnish security guards in two different locations (129th AHC and 48th AHC) seriously impairs the combat efficiency of the unit.

OBSERVATION: There are no security guards authorized by TO & E for an assault helicopter company. At the present time, crew members of the flight platoon and mechanics from the maintenance sections are levied each day to meet the guard requirements. The use of these people for this duty does not permit the unit to operate at full combat capability and will invariably result in a reduced number of mission ready aircraft in the affected units. The battalion S-3 and S-2, met with 17th CAG staff in July to consider this problem. The results and recommendations have been forwarded for corrective action.

2. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. ITEM: DA Form 759 Discrepancies.

DISCUSSION: During the recent annual review of individual flight records, common discrepancies were prevalent. The basic underlying reasons for these fault areas follows:

(1) Failure to adequately fill out blanks as specified.

(2) Failure to comply with directives covering the proper wordage to be used in remarks.

OBSERVATION: It is apparent that the companies either do not have all the directives pertaining to the proper use of the

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DA 759 or that they are not sufficiently familiar with those directives when preparing the forms. If it is a matter of interpretation, then the final authority should be the higher headquarters. Any questions on this should be resolved from one source, i.e., the reviewer.

b. ITEM: Fire prep C&C.

DISCUSSION: A combat assault was made involving the landing of troops simultaneously into a multitude of LZ's, each of which required a fire preparation by armed helicopters. Although a fire prep overlay was prepared and followed during the assault, it was extremely difficult for the C&C ship to closely monitor the plan's progress.

OBSERVATION: It is readily apparent that close control over the fire teams is as equally important as the control over the lift flights. Whenever six or more fire teams are used, a fire team C&C is necessary to monitor the progress of the preps and to insure that each prep is timely as well as accurate. Normally, an alternate mission commander is designated and this monitoring of the fire plan by him as his primary duty would be beneficial.

c. ITEM: PZ loading of non-English speaking personnel.

DISCUSSION: Because of the language barrier in working with non-English speaking personnel such as the ROKA, it is difficult to get the correct troops for a particular LZ on board in an expeditious manner.

OBSERVATION: In the case of RVN troops, this is not too much of a problem since each unit has its own advisor and the loading is adequately controlled. With ROKA personnel, this is not the same and an interpreter must be physically present to assist those on the ground charged with the responsibility for loading successive lifts and insuring that the right troops board the designated aircraft. This has been discussed with ROKA staff personnel and they are aware of this requirement.

d. ITEM: Use of gunships at night.

DISCUSSION: Gunships, during the current operation, have been placed on a 24 hour standby role. Frequently ASAP fire missions have been answered rapidly and efficiently both day and night. The use of a Star Cluster to identify the general friendly positions and "Flashlights on Call" (On command from the ROK aerial observer on board one of the gunships) to positively located friendly positions, have favorably enhanced the missions at night. On two occasions, 129th AHC gunships were able to bring fire onto NVA positions only 50 meters away from ROKA positions at night using this identification system.

OBSERVATION: Effective employment of gunships can only

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be realized through positive control. Because of communications problems and possible language barriers when supporting non-English speaking ground forces, it is imperative to have an observer on board each fire team at night to insure that the gunships engage the proper targets. An identification system is essential also and should be varied as required to preclude its compromise.

e. ITEM: Command and Control.

DISCUSSION: One innovation that arose in Operation HONG KIL DONG, due to the numerous large scale assaults conducted, was the use of assigned colored smoke for each tactical air column in marking PZ's and LZ's. This practice eliminates much confusion and excessive radio transmission. The formation of tactical air columns was also noteworthy. This procedure merges the supporting gunships with the UH-1D lift ships and the reinforcing CH-47's into one unit under the control of the air column leader.

OBSERVATION: Employment of tactical air columns, when several LZ's and PZ's are used with multi-aircraft lifts limits the total number of separate flight units directly controlled by the C&C aircraft, allowing more time for consideration of unscheduled occurrences, changes, etc., and provides a minimum of radio traffic. The C&C aircraft's control is increased since all aircraft monitor a single command frequency while conducting intra-flight direction on another frequency.

f. ITEM: The use of the CH-47A helicopter troop ladder in combat operations.

DISCUSSION: The troop ladders that are presently in the inventory do not have a recovery apparatus that would enable the crew to recover the ladder in a reasonable time. The absence of a quick release to jettison this ladder in an emergency makes it extremely hazardous operating the ladder during combat operations. The flight crew has a difficult time recovering more than 60 feet of ladder under its present configuration. The ladder becomes easily tangled in the heavy undergrowth due to the velocity of the wind from the aircraft's down wash, which cause excessive movement of the ladder at ground level.

OBSERVATION: An efficient, electrical or hydraulic power system to recover the ladder is essential if all safety requirements are to be met to encompass all ladder requirements. A quick release is also necessary to insure that the aircraft is not in a position to be endangered by the inability to jettison the ladder.

g. ITEM: The observation helicopter versus the utility helicopter in the assault support helicopter company in RVN.

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DISCUSSION: The observation helicopter is limited in its lift capability and is not designed for carrying bulk items of equipment or cargo. This helicopter's flight operation is restrictive because of the fuel rating of its engine, 115/145 octane gasoline. This fuel rating is not compatible with the mini-port system employed throughout RVN. The inability to refuel, except at major airfields, restricts the tactical use of the helicopter. The assault support helicopter company has a continuous combat mission to make detailed coordination on all airlifts and to be able to respond to the unit's aircraft emergencies. The demand to fly nine CH-47A's daily requires a steady flow of spare parts. Often, the maintenance activity for the CH-47A company is located a considerable distance away and is accessible only by air. To insure that the necessary parts are received in a timely manner, valuable CH-47A hours are used by the company to pick up spare parts and to return repairable parts to the support maintenance facility. Further, the ability to field a maintenance "Jump Team" to make necessary repairs on disabled aircraft is essential to insure that the aircraft is not lost to hostile force.

OBSERVATION: The assault support helicopter company requires a helicopter that can deploy a maintenance element to recover downed aircraft. The helicopter must have a sufficient space and lift capability to carry 2-4 personnel and 100-1000 pounds of equipment. This increased lift capability would enhance the responsiveness of the unit to meet its emergency requirements. The observation helicopter is limited in its tactical usage by its fuel rating.

h. ITEM: Use of base ejection smoke rounds to augment artillery advisory.

DISCUSSION: In a tactical area of operation, the congested air traffic and numerous artillery fire missions create a hazardous flight condition. Often artillery advisories are not issued soon enough and even then, not all aircraft may hear them.

OBSERVATION: The use of base ejection smoke rounds by the artillery battery as a marking round can considerably assist the aviator to determine the impact area as well as the gun target line. This, coupled with artillery advisories, can be beneficial to both the required on-call fire missions and to the aircraft in the area.

3. (C) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION.

a. ITEM: Sling load training.

DISCUSSION: Sling load training has been provided to ground supported units throughout this quarter by personnel from the 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company, and by the 10th Pathfinder Detachment. The necessity for providing thorough training

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to the ground units is emphatically revealed in the concern expressed by higher headquarters recently over the unnecessary dropping of sling loads by army aircraft.

OBSERVATION: The ROKA Infantry use the sling load capability of UH-1D and CH-47 aircraft extensively and as such must be thoroughly knowledgeable in the proper techniques and requirements of this mode of transport. Since the beginning of this quarter, 10th Battalion Personnel have concentrated on teaching selected ROKA personnel in both Divisions the type loads, procedures for slinging and attaching the loads to the aircraft. Such a program must be continuous due to rotation of personnel within the units and it should be the responsibility of the ground units to insure that they have qualified rigging personnel at each pick up zone to accomplish this task.

b. ITEM: Night training.

DISCUSSION: In view of the increased emphasis being placed on night combat assaults, each company is still required to conduct a minimum of one company size night CA monthly. This may be purely a training exercise, as a diversionary tactical operation or an actual tactical operation.

OBSERVATION: The night CA demands a high degree of individual proficiency. The only way to maintain this proficiency is to practice the techniques frequently. If it is not possible to conduct a night CA in conjunction with the tactical situation or with the supported unit. A practice night CA can be arranged, using the organic pathfinders with battalion supervision.

c. ITEM: Running takeoff techniques.

DISCUSSION: Normally, a fully loaded UH-1C helicopter needs a larger area in which to make a modified running takeoff (Air-speed over altitude). This results in a nose low attitude, and should it have a protruding turret, like the M-5, on its nose, such an attitude could result in damaging the weapon on the ground surface. Particular emphasis has been placed on teaching newly assigned gun pilots the techniques involved in this type of take off.

OBSERVATION: It is important to note that the techniques of running takeoffs and landings are no longer a portion of either the CONARC school curriculum or in current standardization manuals. This technique in addition to low RPM recovery, another often neglected but useful skill, is in daily usage throughout RVN by both slick as well as gunship aviators.

d. ITEM: Training ROKA aviators and mechanics.

DISCUSSION: The 129th and 48th AHC have, since 15 May, been training ROKA fixed wing aviators in UH-1D helicopter flying.

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Each of the aviators flew an average of 250 hours on all missions with the exception of CA's. The mechanics and crew chiefs were given OJT by the 129th AHC.

OBSERVATION: This program was successfully accomplished through close liaison with supported units. The ROKA personnel progressed very well but the need for formal school training was still apparent at the close of the program on 21 July 1967. These aviators are considered proficient only as copilots for administrative type missions. An evaluation of each aviator made by the companies at that date, clearly indicate the need for additional training.

4. (U) INTELLIGENCE. None.

5. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. ITEM: Organization of remote area refueling/rearming points.

DISCUSSION: Logistical planning by ground forces in connection with combat operations has not been given adequate consideration to terrain security and safety requirements for helicopter refueling and rearming points. At times, the battalion has been required to place large POL storage containers and dispensing equipment as well as rearming points within a perimeter too small to permit adherence to safe practices. FSA/FSE commanders have been reluctant to provide even the minimum required terrain for this purpose. Defensive plans have not given consideration to the large parking area required at a battalion size mini-port. Consequently, it has been necessary to land aircraft outside the perimeter, many times within the destructive range of defensive mines. Traffic congestion, in those instances, has been aggravated by the lack of parking space for queuing up waiting aircraft.

OBSERVATION: Helicopter refueling/rearming at field sites can be accomplished more safely and efficiently through adequate site selection and organization. This has been discussed and emphasized through liaison visits with the supported units.

b. ITEM: Operational use of Mk-24 illumination flare, aircraft.

DISCUSSION: Operational employment of the MK-24 aircraft flare using the four foot safety lanyard has proven to be unsatisfactory from a safety standpoint. Several incidents of ignition within, or in close proximity to, the helicopter have resulted in damage to the aircraft and injury to the crew.

OBSERVATION: The addition of a safety lanyard package (lanyard length - 50 foot)(FSN 1370-937-7806) permits a greater degree of safety in the employment of this device, with no decrease in effectiveness. Operational tests of this lanyard have been completed with no mishaps.

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6. (C) OTHER.

a. ITEM: Evaluation of the UH-1 tactical formation lighting system (TFLS).

DISCUSSION: Four flights have been conducted in the evaluation of TFLS. The configuration for evaluation consists of three exterior cabin lights and one tail boom light. The cabin lights are installed at a 35° sight angle and can be seen only when at this angle.

OBSERVATION: The installation of these lights on the UH-1 aircraft is supposed to facilitate formation flying at night. Evaluation is continuing and a report will be prepared in September 1967. At present 16 hours have been devoted to this project. Obvious shortcomings in this system are that the rate of closure and horizontal distance cannot be determined. The lights are mounted for a 35° angle of sight, as opposed to the 45° angle of sight normally used for formation flying.

b. ITEM: LZ construction using TAC air.

DISCUSSION: The 9th Infantry Division, ROKA, has attempted to construct landing zones in mountainous and jungle terrain with the use of TAC air. This system has proven ineffective. None of the areas cleared were suitable for landing a helicopter.

OBSERVATION: The Air Force had expended 183,000 pounds of high explosive bombs in an attempt to clear out thirteen landing zones. These areas were not suitable for landing in that the resulting rubble and craters made the area as unusable as it was before. The use of TAC air would probably be effective to penetrate dense jungle canopies so troops could rappel through trees. Once the troops were on the ground, they could construct the LZ's. This usage would be more effective and efficient than the use of high explosive air ordnance to attempt to clear LZ's with assets presently in USAF inventory.

✓ - c. ITEM: Poor land line voice capability.

DISCUSSION: Certain land lines used for communications have often failed to meet the required quality necessary for continuous reliability in combat operations.

OBSERVATION: Frequent checks on land line routing indicate that the primary reasons for failure are normally due to carrier and VHF radio. Further inspection indicates that the VHF (AN/TRQ-24) circuits, which cause primary difficulties, "shoot" for distances in excess of 60 miles. This is an overextension of VHF capability which is normally 35 to 40 miles as a maximum. Shortening these distances appears to be the only logical corrective measure. This can be accomplished only by installation of additional carrier equipment and increasing the number of carrier facilities.

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PART II - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (C) Personnel.

-a. Reference: Reassignment orders for DEROS.

Recommend that additional emphasis be placed upon receipt of assignment orders by at least 30 days in advance of DEROS to facilitate ability of personnel to adequately plan for their personal matters.

-b. Reference: Separated Units' Augmentation.

Recommend that additional security forces be provided to aviation units which are required to maintain two separate bases.

2. (C) Operations.

a. Reference: CH-47A troop ladder employment.

Recommend that a recovery apparatus and a quick release device for the CH-47A troop ladder be developed to insure that safety requirements are met. An EIR is currently being prepared on this subject.

b. Reference: Utility versus observation type helicopters in use within CH-47 companies.

Recommend that utility helicopters replace the observation helicopters presently in assault support helicopter companies. An action letter will be submitted through channels, endorsing this view.

3. (C) Training and Organizations.

Reference: Training in Running Takeoffs and Landings.

Recommend that renewed emphasis be placed on these valuable flying techniques stressing also low RPM recovery.

4. (U) Intelligence. None.

5. (C) Logistics.

-a. Reference suitable refueling/rearming sites.

Recommend that division and brigade/regimental (ROK) logistical planning procedures be amended to include detailed planning for terrain, security and safety requirements for supporting helicopter units. The controlling aviation agency should be represented at these planning meetings for the purpose of monitoring refueling/rearming site selection and organization.

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b. Reference use of 50 foot lanyard with MK-24 flare.

Recommend that all units using MK-24 flares for illumination include in their SOP the use of the 50 foot lanyard for safety reasons.

6. (C) Other.

Reference: Limitations on carrier and VHF systems (Land lines communications).

Recommend that carrier and VHF systems adhere more closely, by the use of additional equipment or relocation of existing equipment, to recommended maximum transmission distances (40 miles as a maximum).

Eugene S. Crooks
EUGENE S. CROOKS
ETC, INF
Commanding

4 Incls

- 1. ~~OPORDER 30-67 (129th AHC)~~
- 2. ~~OPORDER 30-67 (48th AHC)~~
- 3. ~~OPORDER 1-67~~
- 4. Night Extractions

Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

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AVGD-SC (10 Aug 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 67, UIC
WFAJAAK, RCS CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, 17TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96240 25 Aug 67

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 67 is forwarded for information and necessary action.

2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this ORLL and concurs with the report as modified herein.

3. (C) Reference Section I, Significant organizational activities.

a. Reference para 6b. The 10th CAB is being maintained very close to the authorized manning level for aviators. This results in some warrant officers in command positions. Hq, USARV has been made aware of this situation. Every effort is being made to keep the aviation units at their manning level.

b. Reference paragraph 6d. This problem will solve itself with the two companies being reassigned; they will then be relieved of the requirement of maintaining two base camps.

4. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, 6c. Communications service in the Tuy Hoa - Phu Hiep area has been of poor quality in the past; Additional communications facilities are programmed to be in operation within the next 60 days which will improve telephone service in the Phu Hiep area.

5. (C) Reference Section II, Part II Recommendations.

a. Reference para 1a. This is a command-wide problem. G-1, USARV has responsibility in this area and reports that this situation should improve shortly.

b. Reference para 1b. A request has been submitted through command channels for additional security forces. There is a definite requirement for forces to provide adequate security at the various operating bases.

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c. Reference para 2b. The observation helicopter assigned to the CH-47 units has proven to be ineffective and will be replaced as utility aircraft become available.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for s/J. G. Connor, CPT
t/A. R. ZENZ
LTC, CE
Adjutant

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AVFA-GC-OT (6 Sep 67) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 67, UIC
WFAJAAK, RCS CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 13 Sep 1967

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96307

(C) This headquarters has reviewed the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1967 and concurs with the recommendations and observations as modified by the 1st Ind and the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 6c, Section II, Part I (page 20)-Commander's Observations: Non-concur. See discussion para 4, this indorsement.

b. Reference Section II, Part II (page 21 and 22)-Commander's Recommendations:

(1) Reference paragraph 1a. This problem has been discussed with USARV G1 and AG. Improvement is being made but continued emphasis is required to insure that individuals receive their orders in a timely manner.

(2) Reference paragraph 1b. A letter has been submitted requesting additional spaces for personnel through CG, 1st Avn Bde to CG USARV.

(3) Reference paragraph 5a. ACofS, G4, Hq IFFORCEV will advise the ROK Liaison Detachment of the need to have Hq, ROKFV incorporate into all SOP's procedures for detailed planning of terrain, security, and safety requirements for supporting helicopter units.

(4) Reference paragraph 4. Non-concur. The observation appears to address only the VHF terminations in Dong Ba Thin when, in fact, elements of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion and Phan Rang, Nha Trang, Ninh Hoa, Phu Hiep, An Son and other locations are serviced through a mixture VHF, microwave and tropospheric scatter links that comprise the in-country communications system. The control of circuits and the means over which circuits are routed is determined by MACV. Circuit quality and circuit restoration are supervised meticulously and troubles are recorded as a basis for system analysis and improvement. These detailed records do not support the contention that failures are due primarily to VHF radio. MACV is aware of the present long line system shortcomings. Field operating agencies are engaged in a continuing improvement program. The final answer to improved quality of circuits serving the sidely dispersed elements of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion and other subscribers lies in upgrading the total in-country systems. The observation with respect to the overextension of VHF systems is quite correct in many instances. However, positioning of these terminals and relays is a considered judgment which usually reflects a compromise between the ideal and the realities of terrain and security in the current tactical environment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Declassified at 8 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10*

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s/B. L. Chenault
t/B. L. CHENAULT
2LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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SEP 30 1967

AVBA-C (10 Aug 67)

3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarter Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-05)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC-211, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CROP-MHI, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army (ACSPOR DA), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Reference Sect II, Part I, par 2a, page 14: Concur. Specific instructions for completion of DA Form 759 are contained in AR 95-04 and USARV Reg 95-1. Each headquarters preparing DA Form 759 have the appropriate references. Each succeeding higher headquarters is responsible to monitor the preparation and submission of DA Form 759 and insure their accuracy prior to forwarding thru channels.

b. Reference Sect II, Part I, par 2b, page 15: Concur. Close and continuous control over gunships must be maintained when multiple teams are used to prepare multiple M's. If alternate mission commanders are not appointed for this purpose, the senior armed platoon leader should be appointed gunship C&C. The sequence of events for gun operations is reported to him on the designated gunship frequency thereby eliminating that traffic from the command nets. The gunship C&C will coordinate all phases of gun operations with the air mission commander.

c. Reference Sect II, Part I, par 3c, page 18: Procedures outlined in applicable - 10 publications prescribe proper techniques to operate aircraft in a safe manner. While the procedure discussed is commonly used by aviators in heavily loaded helicopters, it is a poor substitute for good pilot technique and will create a false sense of security. The procedure should be avoided when possible and used only in emergency situations.

d. Reference Sect II, Part I, par 5a, page 19: Forthcoming revision to the logistics chapter of the brigade operations manual will contain complete guidance on refueling and rearward operations to include terrain evaluation, task organization site selection, operation of refueling equipment, and personnel and equipment capabilities and planning consideration.

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Unclassified after 12 years.
DOD Dir 5200.10

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SEP 30 1967

AVLA-C (10 Aug 67)

3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarter Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

e. Reference Sect II, Part 1, par 5b, page 19: The supply and maintenance notes to be published by this headquarters in October 67 will contain guidance for use of the 50 foot lanyard with the M-24 flare.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
no

LEWIS T. TURNER
Captain, ACG
Asst Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375-7 NOV

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion (FAJA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning assignment orders, section II, part I, paragraph 1a, page 14: Concur. It is recognized that the late receipt or non-receipt of assignment instructions prior to DEROS causes personal inconvenience. This headquarters makes every possible effort to obtain a firm unit of assignment for each individual departing this command.

(1) This headquarters has instituted procedures to provide each major commander with machine prepared assignment instruction listings or sequentially numbered assignment instruction letters for individuals assigned to his command. Each commander is also furnished a listing of those individuals for whom assignment instructions have not been received 30-60 days prior to DEROS for verification and return. These listings provide for closer control of these personnel and identify individuals on whom special attention should be focused by DA, this headquarters, and the major commander. Further improvements of the assignment procedures can be made by Department of the Army, Office of Personnel Operations in providing more timely notification to this headquarters of individual's assignment.

(2) Special attention by the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion to insure that eligible personnel are reported for reassignment at the proper time will also assist in solving this problem.

b. Reference item concerning the CH-47 helicopter troop ladder, page 16, paragraph f. Concur in the requirement for rapid rollup and quick release on equipment of this type. At the present time, two separate actions concerning this equipment are pending.

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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(1) A product improvement action is in progress to provide motorized rollup and quick release capability.

(2) A request to the field will be dispatched in the near future to determine present requirements for this equipment. Continuation of the product improvement action will be predicated on present and future requirements for this equipment.

c. Reference item concerning observation helicopters versus utility helicopters, page 16, paragraph g. Nonconcur in the use of utility helicopters for maintenance support or administrative missions. The UH-1 helicopter is presently in short supply in RVN and inputs for the next two month period have been greatly reduced. U-6 and U-1 aircraft are being made available to this command and will be used for the above mentioned missions. USARV message AVHAV-R 64796 dated 1 October 1967, allocated 10 U-1 and 27 U-6 aircraft to the 1st Aviation Brigade to support these activities.

d. Reference item concerning running take-off techniques, page 18, paragraph c and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2c. Nonconcur in the requirement to lower the helicopter nose to effect a take-off. Lowering of the nose below the horizontal plane is a dangerous and unacceptable technique. Instructing newly qualified aviators in a technique of getting a heavily loaded gunship off the ground in this manner, rather than emphasizing safe procedures such as reducing total aircraft weight, is considered an invitation to disaster. All USARV aircraft should be operated with strict adherence to accepted techniques as taught at the aviation school and to gross weights not exceeding those allowable for existing conditions.

e. Reference item concerning tactical formation lighting system, page 20, paragraph 6a. Nonconcur in the observation that a 35 degree angle of sight is faulty. Night formation flying is presently taught using a 35 degree rather than the 45 degree sight angle used for daylight formation flying. The 35 degree sight angle provides better observation of the forward helicopter and better allows for adequate rotor separation.

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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

U. S. K. A. K. T. S. U. K. A. S. A.
C. S. N. A. S. T. S. I. K. A. S. A.
Captain AFG
Assistant Adjutant General

4 Incl
nc

cc: HQ, 10th Combat Avn Bn
HQ, 1st Avn Bde

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GPOP-DT(10 Aug 67)

5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 10th Cbt Avn Bn (UIC: WFAJAA) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 4 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

4 Incl
nc

K. F. OSBOURNE
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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NIGHT EXTRACTIONS

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During this reporting period, the 281st Assault Helicopter Company conducted a total of four LRRP night extractions in conjunction with the 5th Special Forces Group, (Airborne) B-52's Project DELTA. A summary of these operations is discussed below.

A total of four night extractions were performed, although it must be emphasized that each was under extreme emergency conditions. The following factors were evident after the successful completion of each.

1. In each instance the recovery flight was able to become familiar with the area during the remaining daylight that existed at the time of the insertion. This also enabled the armed helicopters to be able to establish their protective cover orbits since they too were involved in the insertion. This familiarity was essential to observe the condition, location and any unusual characteristics of the landing zones. The same crews involved in the insertion made the extractions.
2. The rapid reaction of the recovery elements and the armed helicopters was instrumental in the successful completion of the operation. In two instances, intense large caliber automatic weapon fire was received and in both cases, the armed helicopters suppressed the fire.
3. During two night extractions which were conducted with the aid of flares, the initial orientation of the recovery flight was difficult. After operating in minimum light or darkness and then suddenly having a tremendous amount of light, the aviators experienced considerable orientation problems. After a few minutes, an adjustment was made and there were no further difficulties. Again, emphasis is placed on the fact that reorientation would have been far more difficult had the recovery element not been familiar with the proposed landing zone and the surrounding area.
4. Each extraction was made on favorable terrain. The areas were well defined and easily located. Trees, stumps or the steep slopes present in three of the four landing zones prohibited touch-downs and rope ladders had to be used to achieve the recovery. The time involved to effect this method of extraction is excessive and a maximum of only four to five people could be picked up at a time.
5. During one extraction of a downed helicopter crew member, his position was located by the use of a signaling mirror reflecting light from MK-24 flares.

The complete understanding between the aviation and ground forces with each other's procedures was the key to the success of the night operations. This mutual understanding was the direct result of con-

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tinuous operations over an extended period of time and a familiarity of each other's capabilities and limitations. The successes achieved in these night extractions may result in a temptation to rely more on this method as a normal procedure. One of the more obvious disadvantages of night extractions is that after the reconnaissance element has departed the infiltration landing zone and requires an emergency extraction hours later, the recovery element may be totally unfamiliar with the new pick up zone and area. Another disadvantage is that no time is available to evaluate or prepare the pick up zone. Use of flares in this situation is mandatory.

The greatest obstacle in night extraction techniques is the insufficient amount of training time available between actual operations. Familiarization training is provided but the desired degree of proficiency cannot be attained in the allotted time. This technique is and should be considered only as valid emergency procedure.

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