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
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (27 Nov 67) FOR OT-RD-670664

8 December 1967

AD 386520

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 13th  
Combat Aviation (Delta) Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1967

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure  
appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current  
operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 13TH COMBAT AVIATION (DELTA) BATTALION  
APO San Francisco 96215

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AVBA-DB-3

22 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967  
(RCS CS For 67)

SECTION I

Significant Organization or Unit Activities

A. Organization: During the reporting period the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion included.

1. (U) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment with the 52nd and 24th Quartermaster Detachments and the headquarters element of the Security Platoon attached.

2. (U) The 345th Airfield Detachment (Opns), with the 62nd Quartermaster Detachment and the 1st Section of the Security Detachment attached.

3. (U) The 347th Airfield Detachment (Opns), with the 53rd Quartermaster Detachment, Section 1, 69th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar), the 41st Medical Detachment (O.A.), the 78th Artillery Detachment (Counter-Mortar Radar), the 2nd Detachment of the Pathfinder Platoon, and the 2nd Section, Security Platoon attached.

4. (U) The 346th Airfield Detachment (Opns), with the 5th Quartermaster Detachment, Section 2, 69th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar), the 33rd Medical Detachment (O.A.), the 1st Detachment of the Pathfinder Platoon, and the 3rd Section of the Security Platoon attached.

5. (U) The 336th Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) with the 167th Transportation Detachment (KD), and the 277th Signal Detachment (RL) assigned.

6. (U) The 121st Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) with the 80th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 257th Signal Detachment (RL) assigned.

7. (U) The 114th Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) with the 544th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 96th Signal Detachment (RL) assigned.

8. (U) The 175th Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) with the 150th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 23th Signal Detachment (RL) assigned.

9. (U) The 199th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1).

10. (U) The 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1) with the 325th Signal Detachment (RL) assigned.

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(RCS CS For 67) (Cont'd)

11. (U) The 244th Airplane Company (OV-1) with the 502nd Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 537th Signal Detachment (RL & RX) assigned.

(See Organization Chart Attached) 4

B. Significant Changes:

1. (U) On 10 ~~August~~<sup>July</sup> 1967, the Commanding General, MG George P. Seniff, 1st Aviation Brigade, conducted a change of command ceremony installing LTC Robert L. McDaniel as Commanding Officer of the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) The outgoing Commanding Officer, LTC William H. Harper, moved to Soc Trang to begin organizing the Phantom Combat Aviation Battalion (Provl). The Soc Trang Battalion will become operational in August 1967. Command will be through the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion.

3. (C) The 179th Reconnaissance Company (O-1) closed at Vinh Long on 22 July 1967. Inprocessing and unit training were completed in seven days. The unit mission will be to provide direct visual-reconnaissance support to the ARVN 7th and 9th Divisions, under operational control of AC of S G-2 Advisor, IVth Corps.

4. (C) The 244th Airplane Company (OV-1) closed at Can Tho Installation on 29 July 1967. Inprocessing and unit training are presently being conducted. This unit, under the operational control of the Corps G-2 Advisor will provide immediate visual and electronic surveillance within the IVth Corps Tactical Zone.

5. (U) On 1 July 1967, at a ceremony held at Can Tho Airfield, the Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, designated Can Tho Army Installation as the Jack T. Dempsey Installation. A bronze plaque, engraved with a likeness of Col Dempsey, his dates of service and year of birth was unveiled as a lasting memorial. The plaque was purchased by funds donated by members of the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion. (See ORL dtd 15 May 1967 for discussion of Col. Dempsey's death)

6. (U) The new medical dispensary for the Dempsey Installation was opened 5 June 1967. The building offers a ten bed ward, a dental clinic, examining rooms, an operation room and complete laboratory facilities. The Battalion Flight Surgeon and the 774th Medical Detachment operate the new facility for over 1,000 Americans based or working at the Dempsey Installation.

C. Operational and Administrative Aviation Support:

(U) The 13th Combat Aviation Battalion assigned and attached units continued to provide direct support to the ARVN IVth Corps, the IVth Corps MACV Advisory Force, Special Forces and CORDS. These missions included command liaison, outpost resupply, medical evacuation, radio relay, aerial escort and visual surveillance. Statistics generated in support of all assigned missions are as follows:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967  
(RCS CS For 67) (Cont'd)

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	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HOURS FLOWN	7,996	9,157	9,074	27,227
SORTIES	21,492	23,441	23,104	68,037
PAX MOVED	61,124	51,807	61,319	214,250
CARGO TONS MOVED	622	442	1,547	2,591

D. Tactical Aviation Support:

(U) Tactical army aviation support was given to ARVN IVth Corps, its subordinate units and Special Forces. Specific support during this period included airfield assaults, aerial direct fire support, reconnaissance and surveillance of the battle area, leaflet dissemination, armed aerial escort, aeromedical evacuation, canal curfew enforcement (Firefly) and aerial application of riot control agents. Statistics generated in support of these missions are listed below:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HELIBORNE ASSAULT MISSION	49	44	41	134
HOURS FLOWN	4,912.2	4,331.2	5,476.7	14,770.1
SORTIES	13,372	12,383	16,070	41,825
TROOPS MOVED	44,726	42,321	49,514	136,561
FIREFLY MSNS.	51	58	65	177
VC-KBAA	294	500	364	1158
VC SAMPAN DESTROYED	288	408	558	1254
VC STRUCTURES DESTROYED	159	231	328	718

E. Significant Operations Conducted During This Period:

1. (C) Cuu Long 65/12/67, 10 - 11 June 1967.

On 100700 June 1967 the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion staged at Vinh Long in support of the ARVN 7th Division. Aviation support consisted of 14 transports, two armed platoons and two command and control helicopters. Task organization of the ground forces was:

- (a) Headquarters, 12th Regt.
- (b) 2/12th Battalion
- (c) 32nd Ranger Battalion
- (d) 7th, 11th and 12th Reconnaissance Companies.

(e) Eight tubes of 105mm and two tubes of 155mm artillery were in direct support.

The operation was conducted in the southern half of the VC Thien Ho Base area in the western portion of Dinh Tuong Sector. Intelligence indicated that elements of the 263rd Main Force Battalion were in residence. The 12th Regt. attacked at 0700 hours with three recon companies and one infantry battalion, air landed, and one ranger battalion advancing by road.

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**SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967  
(RCS CS For 67) (Cont'd)**

The recon companies were landed on schedule and met scattered light resistance. The 2/12th battalion was diverted from its original LZ to assist the recon companies. Upon landing they came under intense VC fire from distances of 200 to 500 meters. Four armed helicopters were damaged by VC fire while providing direct fire support. A heavy fire team of gunships was committed to the operation to reinforce the aviation direct support. The 32nd Ranger Battalion, who had made no contact, was picked up and air landed on the east flank of the 2/12th within 30 minutes to relieve VC pressure. Friendly units remained static throughout the day while air strikes, artillery and armed helicopters placed fire on the VC forces. There were no extractions this day. The VC broke contact during the evening. Units on the morning of the 11th commenced their search without further contact. Medical evacuations were completed in the early morning hours. Units were extracted and returned to home station by 1600 hours.

Ground Forces reported 157 VC KIA, and 4 VC were captured. Two 50 cal. machine guns, 25 small arms, assorted ammo, mines, tools and medical equipment/supplies were captured. Two medical stations, a medical supply store-house and a machine shop were destroyed. Armed helicopters claimed 13 VC KBAA, nine structures and 17 sampans destroyed.

Army Aviation provided the ground commander with the mobility needed to quickly reinforce and influence the action. In the environment of the Delta where ground movement is slow at best, resources other than by air, would not have arrived in time to prevent the VC from destroying a major portion of the 2/12th. Armed helicopters, by providing aerial direct fire support allowed the 2/12th to organize and effectively defend until pressure was relieved by the air landed 32nd Ranger Battalion.

2. (C) Dan Chi 239/A, 12 - 14 June 1967.

The 13th Combat Aviation Battalion supported the 21st ARVN Division on a three day multi-area search and destroy operation. At 120630 June, 44 aircraft staged at Soc Trang to airlift elements of the 21st Division into VC controlled areas South of Cai Tac in South Phong Dinh Sector and South of Phung Hiep along the Northern border of Ba Xuyen Sector. The Phung Hiep and Thuan Hoa local Force Companies, supporting elements of the infamous Tay Do Battalion, habitually operate in these areas. Ground maneuver elements crossed their lines of departure at 0730 hours. At 0800 hours the first airmobile forces were landed. A total of 1231 troops were air-landed into two LZ's. Light contact was made with an estimated VC platoon by elements of a RF battalion. The VC broke contact after a short fire fight. Although armed helicopters over the operational area drew light fire throughout the day, there was no further contact by the ground forces. Extractions were begun at 1620 hours. All airmobile forces were back at their base camps by 1725 hours. Armed helicopters claimed one VC KBAA, four structures and eight sampans destroyed.

D+1 activities commenced at 0730 hours. Ground elements consisting of three RF battalions, 2/33rd Infantry Battalion and the 1/19th Cavalry crossed their LD's to sweep South towards the LZ's. Ground fog and haze

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delayed the airmobile execution until 0900 hours. The first lift was then landed and by 1000 hours five lifts totaling 775 troops were made to introduce two ranger battalions and a ranger combat group headquarters. Again contact was light and sporadic throughout the day. Extractions were begun at 1445 hours and all units were returned to their base camps by 1555 hours. Armed helicopters claimed seven VC KBAA, four VC WBAA, 20 sampans and 12 structures destroyed.

On D + 2 the area of operation was shifted to the West and Southwest of the Ba Se Road. The Ba Se Road encircles the Sensitive Zone of the Binh Thuy - Can Tho Airfield complex. This area is habitually used by elements of the Tay Do Battalion and the O Mon & Chou Thanh Local Force Companies to stage in the shelling of the Binh Thuy Airfield and Phong Phu Subsector strong points. The general plan of operation was to saturate the area with multiple search columns in order to conduct a through sweep and search. Blocking forces were deployed by foot and the airmobile forces were emplaced by 20 UH-1D transports staging from Vi Thanh. Initial lifts carried 830 troops of the 2/31st, 3/31st Infantry Battalions and were completed by 0840 hours. Sector forces made light contact at 0332 hours and detained eight VC suspects. Armed helicopters were employed in reconnaissance and reported moderate ground fire throughout the battle area. Sector forces again reported contact at 1000 hours. Estimate of VC strength was approximately 200 troops. The 31st Regt. Hdqs. was then ordered to advance its units to contact. At 1330 hours, contact was made with the VC force. Armed helicopters supporting the 31st Regt. began receiving 50 cal fire and observed numerous troops in foxholes wearing steel helmets. Resistance of the VC was heavy and TAC air together with continuous helicopter aerial direct fire support was emplaced 300 meters to the front of the 3/31st Infantry Battalion. Documents captured at this time indicated the engagement was with elements of the Tay Do Battalion. Additional armed and transport helicopters were requested and received from IVth Corps. Reinforcements consisting of the 41st and 46th Ranger Battalions were then lifted into LZ's to the rear of the 3/31st Infantry Battalion. By pushing up on both sides of the canal line objective, the VC were routed from their defensive positions into the open rice paddies where armed helicopters could engage them. By 1800 hours all effective VC resistance had terminated. The 31st Regt was extracted and the ranger group remained in the area over night. Throughout the day, 1600 troops were airlifted into the operational area and 810 troops were extracted. Three armed platoons provided aerial escort, armed reconnaissance and aerial direct fire support for the maneuver elements claiming 128 VC KBAA, ten VC WBAA, nine structures and ten sampans destroyed. Intimate coordination and effective communications between the troop commander advisors and the aviation elements provided a combination of combat forces against which the VC could not stand.

Reported results of this three day operation were 220 VC KIA and 17 VC captured. Equipment consisting of one 57mm RR rifle, one 7.92mm MG, 39 small arms, assorted ammo, mines and grenades and one kilo of documents were captured.

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3. (C) Chu Long 64/67: 25/00 July - 41/00 August 1967.

This 7th ARVN Division search, clear and destroy operation commenced on 26 July 1967. The operation was conducted in ten daily consecutive phases to close with and destroy VC main force and district local force units operating North of National Highway Four in Dinh Tuong Sector. The area of operations encompassed six separate sections in Dinh Tuong Sector from Ben Tranh to Giao Duc subsectors; an area between National Highway Four and the Ba Beo-Tang Doc Loc canal. A large percentage of the area is VC controlled containing two major base areas, Ap Bac and Thien Ho. Enemy units operating in the area are the 263MF Bn, 261MF Bn, 514th Provincial Mobile Bn, several separate companies, three district companies and local guerillas.

On the 28th of July 1967, the U.S. 9th Division began staging units into Dong Tam, the 2nd Brigade Base Camp on the My Tho river, to conduct a search and destroy operation South of Highway Four from Dong Tam to Cai Be. This operation was in conjunction with but, separate from, the ARVN operation to the North. (See Operation Coronado II, U.S. 9th Infantry Division, After Action Report.)

a. Phase I - 26 July: Staging from Binh Duc, the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion, with 47 aircraft, supported this 7th Division two TASK Force operations. Task Force 10th Regt. and Task Force Dinh Tuong (RF) was airlifted into the operational area North of Tan Hiep commencing at 0745 hours. By 1034 hours, 1200 troops had been placed in the operational area by 25 armed transports. At 1016 hours, TF Dinh Tuong encountered a small VC force vic XS411668 and reported 3 VC KIA. At 1425 hours, 7th Recon Company captured one VC at XS370522. No further contact by the ground elements was experienced this day. Armed helicopters provided escort, armed aerial reconnaissance and direct aerial fire support for the ground elements. They claimed four VC KBAA, 11 structures and 8 sampans destroyed. There were no extractions this day. Ground elements returned to home stations by ground movement.

b. Phase II - 27 July: Staging from Binh Duc and Tan Hiep airfields with 38 aircraft, units of TF, 10th Regt. were lifted into the phase II operational area. This area was West of phase I; bounded on the North by the Kinh Tong Doc Loc canal, on the West by the Rach Ba Rai-Kinh Xang canal, on the South by Highway Four and the East by the Kinh Son-My-Tho canal. Airmobile forces were landed in the North, North East and East of the area to move into the operation area pushing suspected VC forces to the Southwest against the 2/6th and 3/6th armored cavalry troops moving Northeast. The 3/11th Infantry Bn. made contact at 0815 with 2 VC squads. Light intermittent contact was experienced the remainder of the day. Armed transports made nine lifts positioning 920 troops in the operational area. Armed helicopters claimed 3 VC KBAA and 5 sampans destroyed.

c. Phase III - 28 July: Staging from Binh Duc, the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion continued supporting the 7th ARVN Division this day with 39 aircraft. TF, 10th Regt. was airlifted into the objective area commencing at 0700 hours. The center of mass of the area was ten kilometers West of the Dinh Cai Chuoi - Rach Ba Rai canal river line. Again Inf Bns. were implaced by armed transports

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9 along the West, North and Northeast periphery to move South against the 2/6 Armed Cavalry Troop advancing to the North. CIDG forces were employed in the North East portion of the area to search along the Rach Bang Day stream line. At 0938 hrs, the CIDG from My Phuoc Tay discovered a rice cache. At 1157 hrs they made contact with an estimated VC platoon. Light contact was experienced throughout the day by friendly forces. A total of 1170 troops were lifted into the operational area between 0700 and 1238 hrs. Transports extracted 220 troops this day. Armed helicopters, in supporting the transports, and providing reconnaissance and aerial direct fire support, claimed 29 VC KBAA and three sampans destroyed.

Phase IV, 29 July: At 0615 hrs, Delta battalion staged from Vinh Long with 38 aircraft to continue combat support of the 7th ARVN Division Forces. The operational area this fourth day was moved West 6 kilometers; bounded on the West by the Kinh So Bao-Song Tra Lot river canal line. A total of 1490 troops were implaced by armed transports; again around the Northern periphery from NW to NE to push south against blocking positions. Dinh Tuong Forces made contact at 1510 with a platoon size VC unit. TF, 12th Regt experienced no contact this day. The 41st Ranger Bn had light contact during the afternoon. A total of 1490 troops were lifted this day. 810 were extracted at the close of the day. Armed helicopters claimed two structures destroyed.

Phase V, 30 July: The 5th day saw Delta battalion continuing support with 42 aircraft staging from Vinh Long at 0645 hrs, 11 lifts were made to airlift 1190 troops from TF 11th Regt and the 41st Ranger battalion. The operational area center of mass was 3 kilometers West of the phase IV area bounded on the west by the Kinh Tong Duc Loc canal and on the Southwest by the Kinh Hoi Muot Tam canal. Again airmobile elements were introduced into the northern periphery to move south against blocking forces. Ground forces experience light contact during the day. At 1336 hours the 41st Ranger Bn was airlifted in the south east portion of the area to move north west they encountered little resistance. Armed helicopters claimed 3 VC KBAA, 13 structures and three sampans destroyed. Three extractions were flown removing 360 troops from the operational area at midafternoon.

Phase VI, 31 July: Thirty aircraft staged from Vinh Long to pick up troops of the 10th Regt. from field locations and insert them into an area 8 kilometers south west of the phase V area. This area was bounded on the West by the Kinh Luu Thong Duc canal, the south west by the Kinh So Mot and Kinh Co Co canals to Highway Four and on the North and East by the Kinh Hai Muot Tam canal. 1410 troops were inserted into the center and along the west boundary to move south against blocking positions. One extraction of 290 troops was made in the late afternoon. Intermittant contact was experienced by the ground forces. An ARVN 9th Division operation supported with 20 aircraft was mounted along the western boundary of this day's operational area. A total of 580 troops were helilifted into five LZ's. Armed helicopters claimed 12 VC KBAA, 1 VC SBAA, 4 structures and 14 sampans destroyed while supporting the 9th Division Troops. All troops of this supporting operation were extracted before dark.

Phase VII, 1 August: This seventh day operation was staged from Moc Hoa. Control passed from 7th ARVN Division to Kien Tuong sector. CIDG units were employed to search an area north of the Kinh Tong Duc Loc canal bounded on the west by the Kinh Luu canal, on the north by the Kinh Nam Ngan canal

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**SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967**  
(RCS CS For 67) (Cont'd)

and on the east by the Kinh Ca Nhiep canal. Blocking positions were set up along the Southern boundary and on the main routes of withdrawal on the East and West boundaries. Five LZ's were utilized along the Northern boundary and two LZ's along the East to insert 650 CIDG troops into the operational area. Although a thorough search of the area was made, only light contact was experienced. A total of 1240 troops were extracted at day's end to return to evening base defense areas. Armed helicopters claimed 7 VC KBAA and two structures destroyed during their support of the maneuver elements. /0

Phase VIII, 2 August: Support continued this day with 32 aircraft staging from Vinh Long at 0730 hours. This day's area was located 13 kilometers west of Cai Lay. TF, 10th Regt. was airlanded into 3 LZ's to search assigned areas along major waterways. A total of 310 troops were airlanded. Blocking forces were positioned by ground movement. Only light contact was experienced during the day. Eight extractions were flown repositioning troops from 0915 to 1506 hours. Armed helicopters claimed 21 VC KBAA in support of the maneuver elements and arm-  
ed transports.

Phase IX, 3 August: The ninth day's operation continued with 36 aircraft staging from Vinh Long at 0700 hours. The operational area was expanded from 2 August to include all the area bounded by the Kinh Tong Doc canal on the North, the Kinh Cai Chuoi-Rach DA Rai to Cai Lay on the East and the Kinh So Bay-Roc Tra Sot on the West. Units that remained overnight continued to search in assigned sectors while TF, 11th Regt. was airlanded in the Northern section of the operational area to search South along major water routes. A total of 1060 troops were airlifted into the area. Heavy contact was experienced by TF, 11th Regt. elements and three recon companies were airlifted into the area between 0900 and 1200 hours. Two armed helicopters were hit by enemy ground fire. They claimed 12 VC KBAA while supporting the maneuver elements. There were no extractions this day.

Phase X, 4 August: On this tenth and final day the 13th Battalion staged from Vinh Long with 33 aircraft. The objective area remained West and Northwest of Cai Lay. TF, 11th Regt. continued its search in the sector. TF, 10th Regt. was airlanded in the Northwest to sweep South towards Highway Four. Light contact was experienced throughout the day. Extractions were begun at 1330 hours. 800 troops were returned to home stations prior to darkness.

**REPORTED RESULTS:**

234 VC KIA  
88 VCC  
138 Suspects

1 - 76mm recoilless rifle, 1 - B40 rocket launcher, 1 - BAR, 3 - AK47, 3 - K50,  
1 - SMG, 20 assorted small arms, 1 - switchboard, 8 - telephones, 1 - radio,  
- 30, 650 rds AK47 ammo, 24 - 81mm Mortar rds, 51 - 10 kilo mines, 40 sampans,  
1 machine shop, 1 dispensary and a large quantity of grenades.

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AVIATION ACTIVITIES:

Hours flown 2,105.9  
Troops lifted 15,260  
VC KBAA 89  
 sampans destroyed 33  
Structures destroyed 33

Advisor's Analysis: "Although the early phases of this operation did not produce spectacular results, the operation is considered as highly successful from the standpoint of casualties inflicted on the enemy and disruption to the VC campaign to cut Highway Four. The most significant contact by the 7th Infantry Division occurred on 3 August. Although tactical air, artillery and gunships were heavily employed in support of the troops in contact, the enemy position was not assaulted. The enemy was severely mauled but managed to exfiltrate during the night."

F. (C) Tactics:

The numbers and intensity of VC initiated incidents during the reporting period deviated sharply from the trend of the last two years; especially during the month of May. In May 1965, there were 868 VC incidents while in May 1966 there were 970 incidents. During May 1967 there were 559 incidents, the majority of which were harassments. The weakening VC position in the IVth Corps was particularly evident on Ho Chi Minh's birthday, 19 May, when the increased Allied alert status and aggressive operations in key areas forced the enemy to postpone or cancel many attacks. The delayed VC celebration of this event, which took place on the night of 21 May, included a number of shellings of sector and sub-sectors, towns and one major airfield but, did not achieve the intensity of years past.

There were 619 VC initiated incidents during the month of June and 500 incidents during July. The type and intensity of VC activity changed significantly during these two months. Attacks and shellings decreased while sabotage activity against LAC's (roadblocks), ambushes against USN PBR's and ground to air fire increased markedly.

A total of 712 spot reports were received from Delta Battalion aircraft during this quarter. In May there were 161 enemy sightings resulting in 89 reactions by IV Corps assets. In June there were 243 enemy sightings with 110 reactions and 308 in July with 100 reactions. With the end of this reporting period the spot reporting system has been in effect for 13 months with more than 3,000 reports submitted.

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G. Logistics:

1. (C) Expenditures of Ammunition and Fuel

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	MAY	JUNE	JULY	TOTAL
7.6mm (LRB)	1,875,985	3,271,606	2,618,172	6,585,763
4.2" rockets	9,498	12,156	10,531	32,175
4.2" Grenades (LRB)	2,883	3,961	9,111	23,875
J1/4 (Gals)	1,356,369	1,320,414	1,237,132	4,115,915
J20's (Gals)	243,635	221,435	171,177	791,297

2. (C) 1st Logistical Command's Class I unit's Breakdown Point began distribution at Can Tho on 15 July 1967. The movement of rations to Soc Trang and Vinh Long has now become the responsibility of this battalion. 1st Log Command does not make distribution to headquarters lower than separate brigades since this battalion does not have the assets to do so. The movement to Vinh Long is requested through J1 at Can Tho. The supply situation at Vinh Long necessitates the use of battalion transport helicopters for ration movements. (The significant increase in number of transport helicopters, para - C) IVth Corps support requirements are such that current allocations of C-7A's does not allow for habitual support of this battalion. Missions have been cancelled or delayed causing some food spoilage. On occasion, air rations have been truck convoys to Soc Trang and Vinh Long to reduce the number of aircraft requirements. The activation of a Class I forward warehouse unit at Can Tho has not alleviated the ration problem but added an additional burden upon this unit to obtain transportation for distribution to base halls at Vinh Long and Soc Trang. Resupply of various stage fields throughout the delta has been slowed due to the lack of aircraft support caused by increased requirements throughout Vietnam. Ammunition for all locations is being ordered on a 30 day cycle to effect a continuous supply. The use of CH-47 reserves to effect ammo resupply to various locations has been an effective supplement. This has been done by utilizing CH-47's on their initial route movement to the delta from Vung Tau.

H. Training:

1. (U) Training continues to be conducted at company level. Mandatory subjects, as directed by Da and H44, are normally scheduled in the evening hours after flight missions are completed. This allows maximum attendance. Flight training composed primarily of aviator qualification, both basic in-country orientation and advanced training (aircraft commander check-out) are conducted concurrently with operational activities.

2. (U) Transition training for both aviators continues with two aviators assigned to each air assault company. Eight aviators are currently in residence and will graduate in mid-August. The assignment of two aviators to each company lessens the initial impact of unit H44 and offsets the wealth in additional aviators. Once these aviators complete the required transition time they are deployed in the same roles as one would expect a aviator in the unit with the exception of gunship pilot roles.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967  
(RCS CS For 67) (Cont'd)

SECTION II PART I

A. Observation (Lessons Learned)

13  
1. (U) Item: Combat Readiness

a. Discussion: The combat environment places great demands upon a unit from a personnel standpoint and is an ever continuing job of qualification and training.

b. Observation: A unit's effectiveness can be greatly increased by insuring a manning level at or near full TO&E strength. Units are currently authorized to 90% of TO&E strength for officers and 100% for EM.

2. (U) Item: Survival Kit, Individual, Light weight.

a. Discussion: O-1 aviators have been issued the survival kit, individual, light weight. Contents of the kit are considered to be excellent in variety and quantity. Two methods of carrying the kit have been tried. One is wearing the kit attached to the web belt and secured around the thigh. This arrangement has caused some discomfort among tall aviators. The kit is not long enough to prevent the thigh strap from fitting uncomfortably under the crotch. A second method of wearing the kit is the chest carry. This method is not recommended when worn over the flak vest as the kit restricts the movement of one arm.

b. Observation: Recommend those personnel who have problems as discussed above use the following method: Prepare the kit for wear in the chest manner. Drape the kit around the back of the pilot's seat; placing the kit to the rear of the seat with the shoulder strap between the seat and the parachute. The kit is secure in this location and is readily available when exiting the aircraft.

3. (C) Item: Concurrent employment of armed helicopters and high performance aircraft.

a. Discussion: Once the pattern and the limits of an airstrike have been established, armed helicopters can work very close to an airstrike especially along avenues of escape away from the area. During one operation, a large size VC unit was spotted by a FAC. The armed platoon on station immediately engaged the target and maintained contact until the enemy entered a heavily vegetated area along a canal and broke contact. As contact was broken, the FAC brought in a flight of A1E's which proceeded to strike the last known enemy location while the armed platoon orbited the area. After the first pass the enemy broke cover and spread out away from the strike area. At this time the FAC called off the airstrike which enabled the gunships to re-enter the area and resume contact with the VC. Again the VC entered the covered area and again the airstrike was initiated. This process of alternating airstrikes with gunships resulted in many confirmed VC KIA.

b. Observation: Armed helicopters and airstrikes by high performance aircraft can and should be used concurrently to contain and destroy the enemy.

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967  
(RCS CS For 67) (Cont'd)

4. (U) Item: Unit Deployment to RVN.


a. Discussion: Incoming units have arrived at destination in Vietnam without adequate billeting facilities. Sponsor units normally do not have the facilities to accommodate the incoming units, ie: tents, cots, etc. and are forced to requisition necessary materials to house the new units. WABTOC (with authority by theater operations commander) and REDTAT (to accompany troops but not accessible during transit) equipment, which includes tents, normally arrives after the units are in country. 14

b. Observation: WABTOC should be shipped in advance to arrive at a unit's destination a minimum of two weeks prior to troop arrival. REDTAT should be shipped to arrive not later than a week prior to troop arrival. This will provide the sponsor unit resources to establish initial facilities for incoming units prior to arrival at assigned stations.

SECTION II PART II

Commanders Recommendations

Recommend that WABTOC and tents be shipped to arrive at an incoming unit's destination two weeks prior to unit arrival.

  
ROBERT L. McDANIEL  
LTC, Infantry  
Commanding

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AVBA-C (22 Aug 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lesson Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967  
(RCS CSFOR-67) UIC WAX1AA

15 HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 10 September 1967

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH,  
APO 96375

Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOH-MH,  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army (ACSFOR DA), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 13th  
Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 July 1967 and concurs with  
the contents.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Reference Section I, para G2, page 10: No place in RVN does  
the area support command make unit deliveries for class I supplies. It is  
the unit's responsibility to effect pick up for all rations from their re-  
spective ration breakdown points. This procedure was agreed upon by Head-  
quarters, 13th CAB prior to the establishment of the new ration breakdown  
point. On 14 August 1967 this headquarters was advised that the 13th CAB  
was experiencing difficulty in obtaining sufficient aircraft to move rations.  
This difficulty was referred to Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam,  
Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and Saigon Support Command for assis-  
tance. Queries by higher headquarters through the class I supply officer at Can  
Tho revealed no such difficulties existed. Rations have been truck conveyed  
to Soc Trang and Vinh Long. This procedure should continue to be followed in  
the future as the MSR is open. S-4 13th CAB will maintain appropriate records  
in order to accurately record all instances of cancelled or late USAF mis-  
sion support with particular reference to food spoilage.

b. Reference Section II, Part I, para 2b, page 11: Nonconcur.  
To insure that the survival kit is always available in survival, escape  
or evasion situations it must be secured to the body at all times. The  
carry holster has sufficient adjustments to fit the 5-95 percentile man  
as shown in the accompanying instruction booklet. For those individuals  
outside the 5-95 percentile, it is recommended that the kit be removed  
from the holster and carried in the pocket of the armored chest protector  
carrier.

c. Reference Section II, Part 1, para 3, page 11: Concur. The  
combined use of tactical air and armed helicopters should be used when-  
ever the tactical situation will permit. This type of combined serial

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AVBA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967  
(RCS CSFOR 67) UIC WAX1AA (CONT'D)

fire power should not be attempted without control of a forward air controller. Common communications between mutually supporting elements and the supported ground commander is essential. 16

d. Reference Section II, Part II, page 12: Tentage for deploying units should be included as TAT (red) and should accompany the advance party. Arrival of the advance party should be ten days to two weeks prior to the arrival of the main body. This time spread will permit the accomplishment of required liaison and coordination with sponsor unit, Military Airlift Command, port authority and surface transportation officers.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
nc

s/Lewis T. Turner  
t/LEWIS T. TURNER  
Captain, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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AVHOC-DST (22 Aug 67) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 13th Combat Aviation (Delta) Battalion ( AXIA ) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning delivery of supplies; paragraph G2, page 10 and paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement: Concur in the proposed solution contained in paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement. The system, as it is presently being administered, is in accordance with standard procedures. No additional aircraft are available to support the supply effort at this time.

b. Reference item concerning the survival kit; paragraph 2b, page 11 and paragraph 2b, 1st Indorsement: Concur with paragraph 2b, 1st Indorsement in its entirety. At the time of an emergency exit from an aircraft the crewmember can be assured of having only those items contained within his pockets or securely fastened to his person.

c. Reference item concerning employment of armed helicopters and high performance aircraft; paragraph 3, page 11 and paragraph 2c, 1st Indorsement: Concur with the imaginative employment of this highly effective team. This method of employment will not allow the enemy to escape. When teamed with aggressive ground forces it represents maximum combat efficiency.

d. Reference item concerning WABTOC; page 12 and paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement: Concur. CONARC LOI for deployment to USARPAC prescribes WABTOC items which all units are to bring to RVN unless otherwise directed. Tentage is included. Items are intended to arrive prior to or concurrently with the main body. However, since shipping delays are possible LOI states advance parties will deploy with tentage.

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18 OCT 1967

AVHGC-DST (22 Aug 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

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3. (U) Unit will be notified of action and comments by routine  
intersement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*W. L. Kenney*  
*9*

1 Incl  
nc

**E. L. KENNEY**  
C. I. ACC.  
Assistant General

10-80

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GPOP-DT (22 Aug 67) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967  
from HQ, 13th Combat Aviation Battalion (UIC: WAX1AA) (RCS  
CSFOR-65)

19 HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 15 NOV 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding  
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
HEAVRIN SMYER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

1 Incl  
nc

# ORGANIZATION AND STATIONING



2/

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