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31 Aug 1979, DoDD 5200.10; D/A ltr, 31 Jan 1981

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (11 Dec 67) FOR OT RD 670600

14 December 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

JAN 16 1968

1 Incl
as

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
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Commanding Officers
 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry
 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry
 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry
 31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)
 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery
 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery
 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery
 63d Signal Battalion (Radio/Cable)
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2

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM



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1967 **7015282** SECRET

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
(RCS CSFOR - 65)
1 MAY 1967 - 31 JULY 1967

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
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S-87-2711998

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

15 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period 1 May 1967 to
31 July 1967 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU: Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. COMMAND

1. (U) Distinguished Visitor Summary. During the period 1 May 1967 to 31 July 1967, 39 parties of distinguished visitors (Incl 2) visited this command. These included 5 congressional, 6 cabinet level, 5 civilian, and 23 military. In addition to the principal individuals involved in the 39 visits, there were 109 other personnel who accompanied the official parties.

2. (U) Key Visitors.

a. Vice Admiral John J. Hyland, Commander, US Seventh Fleet, visited this command 11-13 May 1967 in order to gain a first-hand knowledge of the current operational situation in RVN.

b. Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific visited units and commanders in RVN during the periods 18-21 May and 31 July - 1 August.

c. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, visited RVN 27-29 June 1967 to obtain a first-hand knowledge of the situation in Vietnam and to tour selected installations.

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d. The Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, visited Vietnam during the period 7-11 July 1967 to review the strength and posture of forces in Vietnam. His official party, consisting of 26 individuals, included The Honorable Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State; General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. William Leonhart, Special Assistant to the President; and Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific. Briefings and discussions were held at HQ USARV 7 and 8 July, and at HQ MACV on 11 July. Visits were made to various US, ROK, and ARVN units on 9 and 10 July, to include II FFORCEV, Task Force OREGON, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st ROK Infantry Division (Tiger Division), 1st ARVN Division, and III Marine Amphibious Forces.

e. General Dwight E. Beach, Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific visited this command 19-26 July to obtain a first-hand knowledge of the current situation. His visit included I FFORCEV, 9th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and the 1st Cavalry Division.

3. (U) Key Staff Changes.

a. Lieutenant General Jean E. Engler, Deputy Commanding General, departed this command 14 May 1967 on PCS. Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr. assumed command.

b. Lieutenant Colonel Debold Freed, Executive Officer, DCS (P&A) departed Vietnam 13 June 1967 on PCS. The position was filled by Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Rose.

c. Major General Frank D. Miller, Assistant Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff, departed the command on 11 July 1967 on PCS. The position was filled by Brigadier General Robert C. Taber.

d. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick E. Tibbetts III was assigned as the Secretary of the General Staff on 31 July vice Lieutenant Colonel H. M. Hawkins.

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ENSURE REQUEST SUBMITTED

PERIOD 1 MAY - 31 JULY 67

7
May 1967

Lifting Device for the M113/A1 (DA #200)	Pending DA Approval
Mine Clearing Roller Device (DA #202)	Approved
Universal Unit Floatation System (DA #203)	Pending DA Approval
Canadian 5 gal Plastic Water Container (DA #204)	Approved

June 1967

Universal Field Maintenance Shelter (DA #205)	Pending DA Approval
Flight Gloves, Fire Retardent (DA #207)	Approved
Footprintless Shoe (DA #206)	Approved
Flamethrower Service Unit, Tracked Vehicle (DA #199)	Approved

July 1967

Development of Improved Still Combat Camera (DA #201)	Approved
Portable Floating Bridge (DA #208)	Approved
Signal/Flare Cartridge, 40mm Colored for M79 Hand Held Grenade Launcher (DA #209)	Pending DA Approval
Herbicide Spray Can (DA #210)	Approved
Minature CS Disseminator (DA #211)	Approved
Floating Landing Zone Marker	Pending DA Approval
Mulcher Blower	Pending DA Approval

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B. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE.

1. (U) Strength. In order to ensure USARV and MACV strength reports reflect the same data from unit morning reports for the same time frame, this headquarters began, on 22 June 1967, to compile the USARV Periodic Personnel Report from data shown in the USARPAC RCS CSGPA 840 Report. These data are taken from the unit morning reports as they are received by the servicing DPU in USARPAC. Strengths of attached units are included in the strengths of the major commands to which they are attached.

2. (U) Military Personnel Management.

a. In February 1966, HQ USARV, was given authority to approve direct appointments of warrant officers and enlisted men as second lieutenants, USAR, with concurrent call to active duty. Eligibility does not differ from the provisions of AR 135-100, except for the requirement that the applicant will have been assigned in RVN for a minimum of six months (three months may be waived). Quotas for appointment are requested from Department of Army as needed. To date, 251 individuals have applied against a total quota of 244 appointments. From 1 May - 31 July 1967, USARV had tendered 136 direct appointments. Of this total 82 had been aviation warrant officers and 54 had been enlisted men. Their average age was 22 with 5 years of prior service. Following is a breakout by branch:

Infantry	49
Armor	5
Artillery	19
Corps of Engineers	7
Signal Corps	6
Transportation Corp	50
Total	136

b. The record of voluntary extensions during the period 1 April - 30 June 1967, varied from the upward trend since enactment of PL 89-735 on 2 November 1966:

	<u>3d Qtr FY-67</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
6 months or more	7542	1844	1915	1516	12817
Under 6 months	4849	1616	935	1128	8528

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c. During the period 1 April - 30 June 1967, USARV second in-country promotion authority reached a peak:

	<u>To Grade E5</u>	<u>To Grade E6</u>
Total	2060	217
April	595	51
May	698	77
June	767	89

These figures represent a continuing upward trend and increase over the previous quarter, when a total of 1289 were promoted to Grade E5 and 132 to Grade E6. Utilization of the time-in-service and time-in-grade exemptions were as follows:

	<u>To Grade E5</u>	<u>To Grade E6</u>
Total	509	67
April	79	6
May	113	18
June	317	43

The 3d Qtr, FI-67 produced 169 to Grade E5 and 30 to Grade E6, using TIS-TIG exemptions.

d. DA Msg 816160, 24 May 67, lifted restrictions for the period 25 May - 30 Jun 67 on the number of times individuals may be promoted during a 12 month period of assignment in RVN. It also authorized acceleration of specified percentages of promotions to Grades E4, E5, and E6. This temporary policy change was transmitted to USARV commands in Msg AVHGA-PE 35542 on 25 May 67. Observations concerning the effect of this change are contained in Section II, Part I, of this report.

3. (c) Civilian Personnel Management. On 15 July, 35 local national Drilling Machine Operators, assigned to Co A, 69th Engr Bn, Vung Tau, refused to go to work. The cause was determined to be that they were not receiving sufficient pay; and they demanded additional overtime work and increases in pay. These employees were formerly employed by RMK and were hired when Vung Tau quarry was transferred to Army Engineers. These employees were hired by USARV at the V-5 level, VN \$22.3 per hour with advancement to the journeyman level V-6 when performance achieved this

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level. However, in view of the strike, favorable consideration for promotions was tabled. The Vung Tau ACPO met with these employees on 17 July and explained that they were violating their employment conditions as they had signed a no-strike affidavit when they went to work for the Army. They were further informed that if they did not return to work it would be necessary to take appropriate disciplinary action. The CO was advised not to acquiesce to their demands unless continuance of the strike would cripple his operation. As of 21 July, six days after the beginning of the strike, all but two employees had returned to work, a total of 92 man days were lost due to the strike. A relatively small loss in view of the fact that the Army did not give in to the workers' demands. When the employees have demonstrated proper conduct, improved performance and understanding of their responsibilities, the CO with the assistance of the ACPO will determine which employees should receive promotions.

4. (U) Personnel Services.

a. To ensure equitable representation in the management and direction of morale, welfare and recreational programs in RVN, the USARV Central Post Fund system was reorganized to more closely align welfare fund channels with command channels. Also, the reorganization simplifies welfare fund transactions and permits the efficient use of these funds to supplement appropriated funds for base camp development. This reorganization has prompted an increase in the number of Central Post Funds from six to sixteen, which will serve selected base camps of brigade size or larger.

b. The USARV Central Mess Fund was established in May 1967 to provide an in-country source to support essential command morale, welfare and recreational projects. It provides grants and loans to commands requiring financial assistance. Initial working capital of the fund was established by liquidating excess of a 2 to 1 ratio of assets to liabilities. The Fund will be sustained by monthly assessments of each open mess for 1/2 percent of gross sales. It is administered by a Board of Governors with representatives from all major commands. There are currently 84 open messes in the command.

c. The first Annual Budget for the USARV Central Welfare Fund was presented to the Fund Council on 21 June 1967 and approved by the Deputy Commanding General. This Budget programs the expenditure of approximately \$13,000,000 for FY-68. It provides for 52 swimming pools (1 per 5,000 men), 120 prefabricated buildings for service clubs, libraries, and craft shops, and the distribution of magazines, periodicals and sports equipment to company level.

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d. On 9 May 1967 a draft manuscript for a HELPFUL HINTS PAMPHLET for Vietnam was submitted to USARPAC for further submission to DA. Upon approval by DA this manuscript will be published as a DA Pamphlet. Upon publication, this pamphlet will be issued to all individuals in a POR status for Vietnam. This pamphlet will be updated as required in order to provide military personnel ordered to RVN useful information prior to their departure from CONUS or other overseas commands.

e. USARV CONFIDENTIAL Regulation 600-15, "Processing of Missing in Action, Returned, Exchanged, and Escaped Personnel (U)," was published on 6 June 1967. In addition to providing all commands with guidance pertaining to the processing of these personnel, this regulation established the policies, procedures and responsibilities for the administration, debriefing, medical treatment and disposition of US Army, US civilian and third country civilian personnel who are returned to US Army Control.

f. Rest and Recuperation (R&R).

(1) USARV R&R continued to be a popular and important morale program for members of the command. During the Quarter, 55,041 personnel traveled to the nine out-of-country (excluding Guam) R&R sites. The utilization rate for the Quarter was 99.1 percent of the spaces allocated to USARV.

(2) On 15 May 1967, in-country R&R at Vung Tau was expanded to provide junior officers (O1, O2, WO), living under austere conditions, an opportunity for three days of rest and recuperation. Facilities for the officers are located in the Pacific Hotel. Free swimming, fishing, boating, and water skiing are available at the Back Beach area, which is reserved for US and FVMAF personnel.

g. On 5 May, upon invitation from MACTHAI, the dance band section of the 266th Army Band participated in the Annual Coronation Ball, held on the Palace Grounds, Bangkok for the King and Queen of Thailand. The 45 minute performance was televised to the Thai people.

h. The Awards and Decorations Program shows an increase in decorations approved. For this Quarter, the number of valorous awards approved was 18,138 and the number of meritorious awards approved was 54,337; for a total, at the close of the Quarter, of 72,475. This is an increase of 21,757 over the 3d Qtr FY-67 total of 50,718.

i. USARV Regulation 621-5, General Educational Development, was published on 18 July 1967. The directive is a revision of USARV Reg 621-5, published on 17 January 1966. The latter was general in content and did not anticipate that troops would respond to education services in the great

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numbers experienced. Resultantly, the revised regulation gives specific operating procedures, rates for instructor pay, and directs the submission of reports of the activities accomplished.

j. Safety.

(1) During the month of July, staff visits were performed to the 199th Infantry Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, I Field Force Vietnam, 4th Infantry Division and Task Force Oregon. Safety Officers and other staff officers contacted during these visits were provided guidance concerning USARV safety policies and the safety standard of performance expected of the organization to which they are assigned.

(2) USARV Regulation 385-55 was published on 19 July 1967. This is the first comprehensive traffic safety regulation published in this command and provides sufficient guidance to commanders at all levels to substantially reduce loss of personnel and equipment caused by motor vehicle accidents.

k. Religious Activities.

(1) An adequate religious program was provided for all personnel of the command. Assigned chaplains conducted an average of 5.1 services per week. The average attendance at these services remained at approximately 160. The Sacraments of Baptism, Marriage, Confession and Holy Communion were available to personnel throughout the command.

(2) The assigned chaplains increased from 315 at the beginning of the period to 323 at the end. The increase of 8 is due to the overlap of incoming and outgoing chaplains. Chaplain strength remained adequate to maintain religious coverage on an area basis throughout the command.

(3) The increase in the percentage of Catholic chaplains arriving in-country as replacements increased the command-wide percentage from 23 percent to 24 percent. This remains below the minimal goal of 20 percent required for effective Catholic religious coverage.

(4) The Staff Chaplain's Office monitored all requisitions and assignments for chaplain's assistants as required by AR 165-20. During the period adequate replacements to meet incumbent DEROS were arriving in-country. It continues to be necessary to replace unprogrammed losses with MOS's from related fields; however, this presents no problems as there is a surplus of volunteers for the assistant's MOS.

l. Medical Activities.

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(1) During the report period, the USARV Surgeon's office continued to review and revise the medical aspects of long range plans, to include reevaluation of medical troop requirements. A related study on air ambulance and crash rescue aircraft requirements for 1968 was among the studies prepared. This study included the support for a nine division equivalent force composed of US and Free World Military, provision for air ambulance evacuation support for Civilian War Casualties, and back up evacuation for Republic of Vietnam armed forces personnel.

(2) The malaria admission rates for May and June 1967 were 32.4 and 35.2/1000/year respectively, compared to a low of 21.9 in February and March. Steps were taken to emphasize to commanders the importance of malaria control measures. During the report period, USARV Reg 40-4, Drug Prevention of Malaria, was revised. An important change was the requirement that the administration of antimalarial drugs be under the supervision of a non-commissioned officer. A command letter was also published calling the attention of commanders to the requirement for issuing antimalarial drugs to personnel returning to CONUS, along with adequate instructions for self-administration of these drugs after arrival. The US Public Health Service is becoming increasingly concerned at the number of cases of malaria diagnosed in Vietnam returnees. Rigid adherence to the post-return antimalarial prophylactic regime will do much to reduce the number of cases of malaria in CONUS, particularly vivax malaria.

(3) The diarrheal disease admission rate rose in April to 62.3/1000/year from a low of 36.9/1000/year in January, and the rate remained at approximately this level throughout the report period. Comments appearing in subordinate unit Command Health Reports, indicated that poor food service sanitation was largely responsible for the continued high rates. During the same period, a large outbreak of infectious hepatitis occurred in the 1st Infantry Division due to the consumption of non-potable ice. A command letter was dispatched pointing out the need for increased supervision of messes and improvement in mess sanitary practices. It directed that non-potable ice for chilling food and beverages not be purchased under any circumstances.

(4) A new Command Health Report regulation, USARV Reg 40-24, was published. Major subordinate units are now required to consolidate reports from their subordinate units. A new appendix was added to the report requiring information on the geographical occurrence of malaria.

(5) Over 30 new water sources for USARV cantonments were evaluated and appropriate treatment prescribed. An evaluation of a water chemical analysis kit was conducted and recommendations were made to CINCUSARPAC that the kit not be standardized and that a new kit be developed. Desired technical and military characteristics for the new kit were stated.

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(6) Investigations to provide a basis for consultation on the design, construction, and operation of sewage stabilization ponds in RVN indicated the need for research into the performance of such ponds in a warm, wet tropical climate.

(7) A command policy regarding procedures to prevent the exportation of disease vectors in retrograde cargo leaving USARV ports was developed, and new controls and depot requisitioning objectives for insect and rodent control material were established.

(8) A new draft regulation on sanitary standards for barber and beauty shops, including a translation in Vietnamese, was approved.

5. (U) Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order.

a. A study of the confinement program in Vietnam concluded, that planning for a 2d USARV Installation Stockade should be initiated. The present Stockade capacity and location placed an administrative burden on the northern units serviced by the USARV Installation Stockade at Long Binh, thus prompting explorations of a site in the Qui Nhon area.

b. On 4 July 1967, at the request of 7th US Air Force, a formal reciprocal confinement agreement between HQs USARV and HQs 7th US Air Force was initiated. This agreement will provide policy and procedures for the confinement of all Air Force prisoners in US Army confinement facilities in Vietnam.

c. The USARV Provost Marshal assumed command of the 18th Military Police Brigade on 31 July 1967. This results in the Provost Marshal functioning as both CG, 18th Military Police Brigade and as the USARV Provost Marshal.

d. In the field of military justice, 17 general court-martial cases were tried during the Quarter ending 31 July 1967. Subordinate units under the general court-martial jurisdiction of CG, The Support Troops, held 272 trials by special court-martial and 104 trials by summary court-martial. Pursuant to paragraph 94, MCM, 1951 and Article 65 (c), UCMJ, the records of trial by special and summary court-martial were reviewed in the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal sufficiency.

e. US personnel presented 97 claims against the government for loss or damage to personnel property. Adjudication of these claims was made by the Staff Judge Advocate, The Support Troops, and a total of \$13,139.30 was paid to the claimants.

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f. During the quarter legal assistance was given to 931 military personnel.

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C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ←

1. (C) MAY 1967

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a. In I Corps Tactical Zone, elements of the NVA 325th Division were confirmed as having infiltrated into western QUANG TRI Province. Contrary to normal operations, enemy forces northwest of KHE SANH Special Forces Camp (XD 85 38) attempted to defend key hills when faced with heavy Marine attacks. Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, and plans for a major offensive operation most probably were disrupted. Operation HICKORY in and below the DMZ established contact with probably four North Vietnamese regiments, three of which withdrew to positions north of the BEN HAI River. The fourth, the 29th Regiment, NVA 325th Division, and from one to three battalions of the 31st Regiment, NVA 341st Division, were cut off by friendly forces southwest of CON THIEN (YD 11 72). Enemy forces reoccupied DMZ positions quickly after friendly forces withdrew and continued to launch small-unit ground attacks and standoff attacks with mortars, rockets and artillery. The discovery of 130mm field guns north of the DMZ increased the threat of artillery attacks as far south as KHE SANH and QUANG TRI City (YD 35 52). Information from a variety of sources indicated rapid replacement of losses in the DMZ area and continued reinforcement. Northern Front units equivalent at least to division strength continued preparations for offensive operations, but plans apparently were disrupted by friendly operations during the early part of May. Northern Front elements evaded friendly forces during the later part of the month but maintained a significant capability to launch standoff and limited ground attacks. Infiltration of personnel and supplies continued along Route 922 in LAOS and into the ASHAU Valley. Six installations in HUE (YD 78 25) were attacked by fire on 16 May. HUE again was attacked by fire on 29 May along with three outposts nearby. Actions by the 9th ARVN Battalion in late May resulted in at least 164 deaths in the NVA 806th Battalion, NVA 6th Regiment, reducing the battalion's estimated combat effectiveness to marginal. Operations by US Marines and Task Force OREGON forces also caused significant enemy casualties. The enemy lost 865 killed during one week in the QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN Province border area to US Marines on Operation UNION; at the same time Task Force OREGON forces accounted for nearly 200 enemy killed on Operation MALHEUR. As a result, the NT 2 Division and elements of the NT 3 Division were forced to evade and probably to postpone offensive operations. However, enemy forces in the area continued to harass friendly installations and operations and to interdict lines of communication.

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b. In II Corps Tactical Zone, elements of the B-3 Front continued reconnaissance and reinforcement apparently in preparation for offensive operations later in the Summer Campaign. Two detainees captured in late May said they were part of an infiltration group of 200-250 replacements for the NVA 66th Regiment, NT 1 Division. This was the first evidence of replacements from North Vietnam to units of the B-3 Front since August 1966. According to a captured notebook which probably belonged to an NVA cadre of the 95B Regiment, the B-3 Front planned to encircle DUC CO Special Forces Camp (YA 84 26) in May and June and disperse, tie down, and destroy American forces in the area to prevent them from reinforcing the coastal lowlands of Military Region 5. The discovery of bivouac sites and supply caches near DUC CO and PLEI ME Special Forces Camps (ZA 18 09) indicated that the enemy was preparing the battlefield for operations in western PLEIKU Province. Mortar attacks and contacts with elements of the NVA 32d and 66th Regiments, NT 1 Division, and the independent NVA 88th Regiment north, west and southwest of DUC CO between 10 and 26 May confirmed plans mentioned in the notebook and other sources. During May the strength of the B-3 Front was estimated to be about 12,500.

c. In III Corps Tactical Zone, analysis of documents captured in Operation JUNCTION CITY indicated the existence of a unit B525, a replacement and convalescent group, possibly subordinate to COSVN's 680th Training Regiment. The approximate strength of Unit B525 was given as 7,000, and its probable area of operation was given as Cambodia north-northeast of Base Area 352 (vicinity of XT 60 86). Statements from returnees indicated that elements of the CT 9 Division, which sustained heavy casualties in Operation JUNCTION CITY in April, withdrew to Cambodia, received replacements from the B525 Unit (probably including personnel from the NVA 52d Regiment, formerly subordinate to the NVA CT 7 Division) and redeployed to South Vietnam. The division left its former area in and around War Zone C in TAY NINH Province and moved to PHUOC LONG Province. At the same time the NVA CT 7 Division moved from its normal area of operations in PHUOC LONG Province to areas previously occupied by the CT 9 Division. The NVA 101st Regiment, which supported or was subordinate to the CT 9 Division, remained in War Zone C and became associated with the NVA CT 7 Division. On 12 May the BIEN HOA Air Base (XT 99 14) was attacked with 122mm rockets. Captured document and a contact on 11 May indicated that the attack was made by the VC 273d Regiment supported by the NVA 84A Artillery Regiment. After the attack, the 273d Regiment, an independent unit, returned to northern BIEN HOA Province where it became associated with the CT 9 Division. Later information confirmed its subordination to the CT 9 Division. The attack against

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BIEN HOA Air Base on 12 May was the first use of 122mm rockets in III CTZ. The airfield remained operational, but major losses included eight US killed, 76 wounded (67 US), 58 aircraft destroyed or damaged, and seven buildings destroyed. The CT 5 Division remained in north-eastern PHUOC TUY Province, probably preparing for an offensive action later in the Summer Campaign. In southeastern III CTZ, captured documents indicated that military units in the RUNG SAT Special Zone possibly were reorganizing their command structure. There were indications that two battalion-sized units had been organized to operate on the east and west banks of the LONG TAU River. Enemy plans called for all units in the RUNG SAT Special Zone to have the capability to attack shipping with recoilless rifles as well as with watermines. Throughout the corps area, Main and Local Force units continued limited attacks, sabotage and interdiction of LOC.

d. In IV Corps Tactical Zone, enemy activity during May consisted of small-unit attacks, interdiction of LOC, and terrorism directed against the Revolutionary Development Program. The BINH TUY Airfield was attacked on 7 May for the fourth time since December 1966. An unknown number of enemy placed approximately 100 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire on the installation from an estimated distance of 6,000 meters. Documents captured on 25 May included blueprints and sketches of the airfield, the IV CTZ MACV Advisory Headquarters, and other military installations in CAN THO City (WS 86 09), indicating that the airfield and installations in the area remained high-priority targets. In KIEN HOA Province statements by a returnee, lack of contact, and absence of current evidence of its existence resulted in the dropping from order of battle holdings the 271st Battalion, DT 2 Regiment. An unconfirmed VC 271st Sapper/Engineer Company occasionally had been reported in the operating area of the former 271st Battalion. In CHUONG THIEN Province, the VC 310th Main Force Battalion, subordinate to the Military Affairs Committee of Military Region 3, was accepted in order of battle holdings. Strength of the battalion was estimated to be approximately 400. During May enemy forces in IV CTZ continued attempts to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program. Seven incidents specifically against RD were reported, compared to 12 in April. According to agent reports, a meeting from 1 to 5 May in THOI BINH Village (WR 09 32) in AN XUYEN Province was held to plan activity for the Summer Campaign which was to begin 29 May. A major objective, according to the report, was to intensify destruction of RD teams in the lower Delta. In VINH LONG Province during the last week in May, probable elements of the 509th and 306th Battalions reportedly abducted 100 civilians in the vicinity of XR 25 19 to be used as

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porters. This, and the deployment of the 306th Battalion into the MANG THIEP River area, suggested plans for increased activity in reaction to the RD program. The following week an unknown-size enemy force, possibly elements of the 306th and 509th Local Force Battalions, attacked a 40-man Popular Force outpost at TRA CON Village (XS 08 07) with small arms and 82mm mortar fire. The post was destroyed; 51 were killed and seven wounded (including dependents).

2. (C) JUNE 1967

a. During June enemy forces in the DMZ area of I Corps Tactical Zone continued to recover losses and reoccupy positions destroyed by Allied operations in May. However, the losses during May probably delayed enemy plans to initiate attacks south of the DMZ near CON THIEN (YD 11 72). Ground activity near the DMZ was light during most of the month, but enemy units resumed attacks by fire against friendly installations and units. Thirteen attacks against US and ARVN units were made during the week ending 17 June. An estimated 675 rounds of 60mm, 81/82mm mortar, 85mm and 122mm artillery and 140mm rockets were fired, compared to an estimated 175 rounds in six attacks during the previous week. During the following week, twelve attacks by fire were reported in northern QUANG TRI Province. On 27 and 28 June, probable elements of the 95C Regiment, NVA 325th Division, initiated coordinated attacks by fire with 82mm mortars and 102mm rockets against KHE SANH and LANG VEI Special Forces Camps (XD 85 48/XD 84 41) and US Marines operating in the KHE SANH area. Throughout the month heavy activity was noted north of the BEN HAI River in the DMZ, indicating rapid resupply and reinforcement. In early June the NVA 270th Regiment was accepted in the DMZ area. It apparently is an independent unit responsible for the defense of the eastern VINH LINH Special Sector just north of the DMZ. Enemy activity and information on enemy intentions suggested preparations for the resumption of offensive operations. In the Northern Front area of I CTZ, continued reinforcement of units was detected. Information provided by a lieutenant returnee from the VC QUANG DA Provincial Committee (QUANG NAM Province) indicated that the Northern Front, also known as the TRI-THIEN-HUE Military Region, is a separate military region directly subordinate to the HANOI command. He also identified Major General LE CHUONG as the commander of the TRI-THIEN-HUE MR. The lieutenant's statements supported previous evidence of a separate status of the Northern Front. In mid-June a detainee identified his former unit as the 31st Battalion, NVA 32d Regiment. The 32d Regiment is carried in North Vietnamese order of battle as a subordinate of the 350th Division. This was the fourth reported instance in 1967 of the North Vietnamese units training company

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or battalion-sized units for infiltration to the Northern Front. Two other detainees said that two company-sized support units of the Northern Front were being upgraded to battalion size to meet the increased requirements of a division-sized force. Despite continued reinforcement, Northern Front forces generally remained inactive in June. A returnee from the NVA 21st Regiment said he had joined the NT 2 Division with a 700-man infiltration group in late February, indicating that the division received replacements less than two weeks after losing over 1,000 KIA. The NT 2 Division, located in southern I CTZ, and elements of the NT 3 Division were kept on the defensive by continued pressure from friendly forces. However, the units continued to conduct small-unit attacks, terrorism, harassment of IOC, and interference with the Revolutionary Development Program.

b. Enemy units of the B-3 Front in II Corps Tactical Zone continued reinforcement and limited activity. Agent reports and documents captured during June indicated that the mission of the B-3 Front was to tie down and disperse friendly forces in the Western Highlands while preparing for major offensive operations later in the Summer Campaign. Documents and detainees indicated that the NVA 33d Regiment, NT 1 Division, moved from western PLEIKU Province to DARLAC Province in November 1966 and assumed independent status under control of the B-3 Front. At the same time evidence suggested that the NVA 88th Regiment, which formerly operated independently under the B-3 Front, had replaced the 33d Regiment as a subordinate of the NT 1 Division. Major elements of the B-3 Front remained deployed along the border of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The front headquarters was reported by a detainee as being in Cambodia, 20 kilometers northwest of DUC CO (YA 84 26). The NVA 24th Regiment was identified in contact in June, the first encounter in nearly a year. Documents and a detainee indicated that the regiment was operating independently under the B-3 Front. Later information stated that the regiment's 6th Battalion was separated from the regiment and had been directed to attack New Life Hamlets in the DAK TO area (YB 99 17). An attack on DAK TO on 17 June with 122mm and 140mm rockets was the first use of these weapons in II CTZ. On 24 June enemy forces attacked DUC CO Special Forces Camp with tear gas, mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Mortar attacks on the fire support bases in DUC CO and LE THANH (YA 84 26/YA 89 29) were also conducted in June. Headquarters, NT 3 Division, the VC 2d Regiment and the NVA 22d Regiment remained near the QUANG NGAI/BINH DINH Province border area. The NVA 18th Regiment, NT 3 Division, evading in the PHU MY Valley, was contacted on 28 June. Elements of the NT 5 Division increased the level of activity in PHU YEN Province in the latter part of the month,

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indicating preparations for future offensive operations. Harassment, small-unit attacks, and interdiction of LOC continued all month throughout the CTZ.

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c. In III Corps Tactical Zone, the NVA CT 7 Division headquarters and subordinate 141st Regiment were located in TAY NINH Province. The subordination of the NVA 101st Regiment, which operated with the CT 9 Division during Operation JUNCTION CITY but remained behind when the division moved from TAY NINH Province, remained unclear. Information received during June supported the tentative conclusion reached earlier that the 101st Regiment was supporting or subordinate to the NVA CT 7 Division which moved to TAY NINH Province after Operation JUNCTION CITY. The 52d Regiment, NVA CT 7 Division, was located tentatively in War Zone C. A returnee located the unit and stated that it had provided replacements to the CT 9 Division but had not disbanded as previously suspected. The CT 9 Division, following its move from TAY NINH Province to southern PHUOC LONG and western LONG KHANH Provinces, appeared to be preparing for offensive operations. Friendly forces on Operation BILLINGS in central III CTZ established heavy contact with two battalions of the VC 271st Regiment, CT 9 Division, resulting in more than 300 enemy killed. Elements of the VC 272d Regiment may have moved eastward to reinforce the 271st Regiment. The NVA CT 7 Division and the CT 9 Division had the capability of being supported by two NVA artillery regiments, the 84A and the 69th, both unlocated in III CTZ. The possible existence of a third artillery regiment had not been confirmed. In southeastern III CTZ, considerable evidence suggested that a third regiment had been formed in the CT 5 Division. Sufficient data were not available, however, to confirm the unit, its designation, or location. The VC 275th Regiment, CT 5 Division, was reported engaged in training activities in War Zone D. On 9 June a rallier from the regiment's political section said the unit had moved to War Zone D in late May and had received many replacements from North Vietnam. Late in June a returnee said the regiment had returned to PHUOC TUY Province to join the 274th Regiment, CT 5 Division, for attacks on Australian forces. Other reports received late in June stated that the division was preparing for offensive action in a wide area extending from southern LONG KHANH Province to southern PHUOC TUY Province. In southeastern III CTZ, the RUNG SAT Special Zone was accepted as VC Special Region 10. A sapper battalion in the zone reportedly was formed into four companies; four additional companies were formed and all were placed directly under control of the region headquarters. The purpose of the reorganization apparently was to increase measures to counter use of the waterways by friendly forces.

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d. In IV Corps Tactical Zone, enemy units in June continued to concentrate on terrorism, harassment and limited attacks against outposts and lightly defended positions. Revolutionary Development cadre and activities remained priority targets. Unidentified VC forces were reported to have stored more than 100 boxes of mortar and heavy weapons ammunition south of THOI SON Island (XS 43 41) in KIEN HOA Province, supporting agent reports that Local Force units in the area were planning to shell DONG TAM Base (XS 41 42). The 21st ARVN Battalion contacted elements of the TAY DO Local Force Battalion and Local Forces on 14 June in PHONG DINH Province. Reported results included 210 enemy killed, 17 detained, 29 individual and three crew-served weapons captured. Despite the heavy losses, the battalion continued to be one of the most active units in IV CTZ. It probably was involved in an attack against the Popular Force outpost at TRA KECH (WR 68 98) in PHONG DINH Province on 27 June. The location and activity of the TAY DO Battalion and other Viet Cong units indicated that the enemy continued his attempt to isolate VI THANH City (WR 51 81) from CAN THO (WS 86 09). Two ralliers from the VC 261st Regiment, DONG THAP 1 Regiment, and an agent report confirmed the battalion's move from IV CTZ to LONG AN Province in III CTZ. The move, the second instance of a unit moving from IV CTZ to III CTZ in recent months, probably was in response to friendly operations in the unit's former location.

3. (C) JULY 1967

a. In I Corps Tactical Zone, enemy forces near the DMZ continued heavy attacks by fire and their buildup of ground forces during the early part of the month. Elements of the NVA 324B Division and the NVA 325th Division apparently prepared for a major attack in the CON THIEN area (YD 13 71). Preemptive attacks by US Marines resulted in heavy casualties which forced the enemy to withdraw to regroup and resupply. Trucks operating with headlights along Routes 101, 102 and 103 in North Vietnam and the DMZ between 3 and 9 July indicated urgent resupply activity. Available ammunition apparently was sufficient as artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks continued. During the middle and latter part of July, enemy activity was at a low level. Indications were received that elements of the 29th Regiment, NVA 325th Division, withdrew to avoid contact with friendly forces but later reoccupied positions near CON THIEN. Reliable sources also indicated that the 90th Regiment, NVA 324B Division, may have begun a withdrawal across the DMZ. However, elements of five regiments remained in the CON THIEN area at the end of July, and there were indications that a reinforcement of units in the KHE SANH area (XD 85 38) had begun. In the

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Northern Front area of I CTZ, enemy activity remained at a low level, although reinforcement apparently continued. In early July ARVN units contacted the 806th Battalion, NVA 6th Regiment. Enemy losses were 146 killed and 17 detained. A detainee later said that the 9th Regiment, NVA 304th Division, had supplied replacements to the 6th Regiment in January 1967. Reports received in July indicated that the enemy may have moved new Main Force units into QUANG NAM Province. A detainee and an agent reported that elements of the 301st Regiment, NVA 305th Division were in the area. Marine reconnaissance units also met strong resistance in the area, and an ambush of an ARVN convoy by a battalion-sized force was the first recent report of contact with a unit larger than a company. On 15 July a standoff rocket attack was made against DA NANG Air Base (BT 03 78), probably by enemy forces reported infiltrating into the area during May and June. The NT 2 and elements of the NT 3 Division continued to evade in central and southern I CTZ. The grounding and capture of an enemy trawler at CT 53 12 (40 kilometers east-southeast of DA NANG) on 15 July was a significant loss to enemy forces in the coastal areas of I and II CTZ. Captured supplies included more than 600,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and large quantities of ammunition for crew-served weapons, mines, and explosives.

b. In II Corps Tactical Zone, elements of the B-3 Front increased the level of activity during July and apparently continued preparations for possible major offensives later in the year. The B-3 Front was reported to have established a forward CP in the tri-border area to control activities in KONTUM Province. According to detainees' statements, the forward element included the 6th Battalion, NVA 24th Regiment, an artillery battalion with a 122mm rocket capability, and transportation and travel security units. The main B-3 Front headquarters, NT 1 Division and NVA 95B Regiment remained deployed along the PLEIKU Province/Cambodian border. Contacts in the Highlands and deployment of enemy forces suggested that the enemy was attempting to screen extensive battlefield preparations. New bunkers, bivouac sites, and fortifications were detected. In the QUANG NGAI/BINH DINH Province border area, elements of the NT 2 and NT 3 Divisions continued evading friendly forces. Reports indicated severe shortages of food and ammunition among units. Elements of the NT 5 Division continued limited offensive activities in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. Actions included ambushes, small unit ground attacks, and sabotage of base areas and lines of communication.

c. In III Corps Tactical Zone, the NVA CT 7 Division probably relocated to BINH LONG Province, possibly enroute to PHUOC LONG Province. A detainee captured in July indicated a possible new organization and

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designation of this division. The detainee, a captain who said he was the executive officer of the 4th Battalion, NVA 141st Regiment, first said the Division was known as the F5 Division and consisted of the 141st Regiment, designated the 147th Regiment, and the NVA 52nd and 165th Regiments, renamed the 145th and 149th Regiments, respectively. Later he claimed the division was formed of the NVA 101st Regiment (K-16), 141st Regiment (K-14) and 165th Regiment (K-21). He said during the later interrogation that the 52d Regiment had been disbanded. As a result of his conflicting statements, the division's organization, particularly the subordination of the 101st Regiment, remained unclear. The 101st Regiment was located in eastern TAY NINH Province. The 141st Regiment was contacted on 11 July in eastern BINH LONG Province. The CT 9 Division and its subordinate VC 271st Regiment were located in southwestern PHUOC LONG Province. Information received in July suggested that the division possibly would conduct offensive operations designed to attract friendly forces to battle areas in War Zone D. There were no indications that the division planned extended operations outside the zone. The VC 272d Regiment, CT 9 Division, was reported moving toward War Zone D. This move suggested possible coordination with the NVA CT 7 Division, although there was no evidence of a change in subordination. Friendly operations in BIEN HOA Province in July possibly disrupted plans of the VC 273d Regiment, CT 9 Division, to attack BIEN HOA Air Base. In southeastern III CTZ, the CT 5 Division continued to evade friendly operations and was located late in July near the PHUOC TUY/BINH TUY Province border area. Agent reports located the subordinate VC 274th Regiment in the PHUOC TUY/LONG KHANH Province border area. A contact in northern PHUOC TUY Province on 20 July tentatively identified the 1st Battalion, VC 275th Regiment, CT 5 Division, previously reported as reinforcing the 274th Regiment in PHUOC TUY Province. It was considered possible that the remainder of the 275th Regiment would relocate to southeast LONG KHANH Province upon completion of training in War Zone D.

d. Enemy forces in IV Corps Tactical Zone continued small-unit attacks, harassment, and terrorism during July. On 10 July in DINH TUONG Province, an artillery mission resulted in 50 enemy KIA by body count. The enemy unit was suspected to be the VC 514th Local Force Battalion. Elements of the TAY DO Local Force Battalion attacked a Regional Force bivouac area in PHONG DINH Province on 12 July. A counterattack resulted in 47 enemy killed and 10 detained. Reconnaissance late in the month disclosed construction of firing positions along the BA KE River (XS 12 17) and agent reports indicated that elements of the 306th Main Force Battalion moved from VINH BINH Province to the area in June. Both reports suggested that the Viet Cong intended to increase measures to counter friendly river operations

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in that area. A returnee late in the month stated that "Supply Line 65", crossing the BASSAC River about 20 kilometers southeast of CAN THO (XR 01 95), was used to transport seven tons of ammunition weekly. The route originates near DAI HAI Village in BA XUYEN Province (vicinity of WR 98 80) and terminates in VINH BINH and VINH LONG Provinces. Also late in July, 345 members of the HOA HAO religious sect returned to GVN control in CHAU DOC Province. The leader of the group ordered his remaining 50 or so followers to return to the RVN government.

4. (C) Numerous briefings were given by the Intelligence Division. Wrap-up briefings were presented twice weekly to the Deputy Commanding General and his staff. Several distinguished official visitors were briefed on the enemy situation. These included MG C. E. Hutchin, Jr, DCS (P&O), PACOM; CPT Dowd, outgoing NAVFORV ACSI, and CPT Upshur, incoming ACSI; a CONARC liaison team; Mr. Huggard, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army; and a group of military attaches assigned to various embassies in Saigon. Intelligence Division personnel participated in the monthly Command Orientation Briefings given to newly arrived USARV personnel. The Intelligence Division's Current and Special Intelligence Branch gave periodic briefings to the DCG and his staff. Escort was provided to LTC Clif Giffen, Chief of the Mapping and Geodesy Division, Directorate of Topography and Military Engineering, Office of the Chief of Engineers, DA, who came to view and assist where possible the USARV mapping and geodesy program as well as to coordinate mapping and geodesy projects currently being developed by DA. Escort was also provided to Col Jack C. Evans, Jr, and party from ACSI, DA, who were in Vietnam to assess tactical reconnaissance support.

5. (C) During the reporting period, Change 1 to USARV Regulation 381-24 (Exploitation and Disposition of Captured and Recovered Materiel) was published. Intelligence threat estimates were published on the Rice Mill Complex, TAN SON NHUT Air Base, the threat to the waterways, and the threat to the LONG BINH area. Special studies were prepared on the RPG-7 Soviet recoilless grenade launcher, hydroelectric power in South Vietnam, principal NVA/VC commanders, and a long-range intelligence estimate for a munitions planning conference. Regular weekly intelligence conferences were held except for several weeks when a facility was not available. The conferences, attended by intelligence/security personnel of USARV subordinate units, included summaries of significant operations, enemy activity, and a guest speaker who discussed a specific area of intelligence interest. Attendees were provided with written notes summarizing and highlighting significant intelligence activities

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of the week. The Conference Notes and the USARV Weekly Intelligence Review continued to be published during the time conferences were not held.

6. (U) Mapping liaison visits were made periodically to tactical units. The purpose of these visits was to view the mapping program of subordinate units, to assist with mapping problems, to solicit suggestions for improvement of topographic products and services, and to inspect map basic loads. Major units visited during the period of this report were:

- a. Hq, I FFORCEV
- b. Hq, II FFORCEV
- c. Hq, 1st Infantry Division
- d. Hq, 9th Infantry Division
- e. Hq, 25th Infantry Division
- f. Hq, 1st Aviation Brigade
- g. Hq, 1st Signal Brigade
- h. Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

7. (C) In a continuing effort to provide for the security of the command, a program, entitled "Operation Induce", was established on 4 July 1967 to encourage USARV local national employees (LN) to furnish any information which may be of potential intelligence value. Advertisement of the program is carried out through the distribution of leaflets written in both the Vietnamese and English languages. The leaflets instruct the LN to contact his American supervisor if he desires to furnish information. The English language portion of the leaflet requests the supervisor to immediately contact his S2 or Security Officer, who in turn has been instructed to contact their supporting military intelligence unit (MID). An arrangement is then made for the supporting MID unit to interview the LN concerning any information he wishes to furnish. For security reasons, identity of LN participating in this program is held strictly on a need-to-know basis. Cash payment or gifts for information provided is the responsibility of the supporting MID commanding officer. Operation Induce is only one program in a continuing effort to enhance the prospects of

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receiving timely intelligence information affecting the security of all USARV units in the RVN.


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8. (C) Security violations through loss of classified material, as well as COMSEC violations, decreased during the reporting period, continuing the downward trend. The excellent security posture of the command is directly attributable to the security consciousness of commanders at all levels. Additionally, increased combat experience has allowed commanders to attain a high level of security without sacrificing operational effectiveness. Causes of security violations, which continue to occur, are use of unauthorized transmission codes, failure to document the chain of custody for classified documents, and improper administration of classified document control.

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SALT EVACUATED AND DESTROYED
DURING REPORTING PERIOD



* AS OF 15 JULY


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
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CHIEU HOI RESULTS FOR REPORTING PERIOD



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**RICE EVACUATED AND DESTROYED
DURING REPORTING PERIOD**



*AS OF 15 JULY

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**VC/NVA - INITIATED ACTIVITIES
DURING REPORTING PERIOD**

CATEGORY	MAY 67	JUN 67	*JULY 67	TOTAL
ATTACKS	178	169	99	446
TERRORISM	188	157	95	440
SABOTAGE	71	61	35	167
PROPAGANDA	54	54	24	132
HARASSMENT	1,653	1,390	738	3,781
TOTAL	2,144	1,831	991	4,966

* AS OF 15 JULY

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D. PLANS; OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

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1. (S) Plans. During the reporting period the following significant planning tasks were accomplished.

a. A thirty minute briefing, entitled Problems Associated with the Liquidation of Hard Core Guerrillas, was written for presentation by a representative from DCSOPS, Department of the Army, at the Annual General Staff Conference, Canberra, Australia, on 18 August 1967.

b. A detailed study concerning airfield defense was prepared to assess the threat and to design protective measures and devices, both active and passive, to enhance the defenses of airfields in RVN.

c. A study was prepared that assessed the feasibility of organizing a Vietnamese Service Corps to perform some of the functions now being performed by certain combat service units in RVN.

d. The adjustment of Field Force Boundaries was studied with a view to establishing more effective boundaries delineating Field Force Areas of Operations.

2. (S) USARV Force Structure: On 19 June 1967 the SECDEF approved 1884 spaces required by MTOE/TDA and accepted 597 spaces as trade-off. This action increased the Army Program 4 strength ceiling by 1287 spaces to a total of 323,735 spaces. The USARV Force Structure projected to end July is shown in this table:

Program 4 authorized strength	323,735
Auth spaces for pers in hosp/TDY	- 4,000
Structured unit strength	<u>319,735</u>
In-country strength	280,019
Combat	71,512
Combat Supt	71,047
Combat Svc Supt	137,460
Remaining to deploy	<u>39,716</u>
TOTAL	319,735

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3. (U) Movement Planning Conference: Representatives from this headquarters attended Movement Planning Conference during the periods 4-5 May and 29-30 June at STRIKE Command Headquarters, MAC Dill AFB, Florida. The purpose of these conferences was to develop a transportation concept of movement of units to Southeast Asia through the month of October.

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4. (U) Significant Unit Arrivals:

MAY 1967

557 CS CO LT MAINT DS
533 CS CO COLL & GLASS
525 QM CO PETRL DEPOT
34 ENGR BN CONST
69 ENGR BN CONST
588 SIG CO SPT
160 SIG GP HHD
520 AG CO PER SVC TYPE C
821 CS CO HVY MATL SUP GS
20 TC CO ACFT DS
539 TC CO ACFT HWY MRS
225 AVN CO (AIR SURVL)
268 AVN BN HHD
188 AVN CO AIR MEL LT
189 AVN CO AIR MEL LT
6 FA BN 15 ARTY 105T
6 FA BN 7 ARTY 105T
92 ENGR BN CONST
147 CS CO SVC FLD FWD
191 AVN CO AIR MEL LT
240 AVN CO AIR MEL LT
137 ENGR CO LT EQUIP
205 AVN CO (MED HEL)

JUNE 1967

20 ENGR CO DIMP TRK
262 QM BN AHC (PETRL A)
3 FA BN 16 ARTY 155T
258 AG CO PER SVC TYPE A
93 ENGR BN CONST
7 FA BN 8 ARTY 8th SP
21 AVN CO LT 01 (SURVL)
51 CS CO LT MNT DS

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JULY 1967

7 FA BN 15 ARTY 8th SP
1 RR CO (CRAZY CAT)
199 AVN CO (01)(SURVL)
INF PKT A/1 INF DIV
INF PKT B/1 INF DIV
608 TC CO ACFT DS
15 ENGR CO LT EQUIP
517 ENGR CO LT EQUIP
124 TC BN MTR TRANS HHD
INF PKT C/1 INF DIV
244 AVN CO (AIR SURVL) OV-1
591 ENGR CO LT EQUIP
HQ 212 CFT AVN BN
111 ENGR CO (STR SUP)
57 TC CO LT TRK

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5. (S) Organization

a. (S) The study directed by COMUSMACV regarding reconfiguration of the 9th Infantry Division to include an airmobile capability was completed and forwarded to MACV on 3 May 1967. A briefing was conducted for Deputy COMUSMACV on 6 July 1967. It was recommended that reorganization of the 9th Infantry Division be deferred. As a result of the briefing, Deputy COMUSMACV directed USARV to conduct additional studies regarding the mechanized capability of the 9th Infantry Division and standardization of Riverine, Airmobile/Airborne and Light Infantry Battalion TOE.

b. (U) Tables of Distribution and Allowances are being prepared for the 58th, 504th and 506th Field Depots which reflect requirements for Department of the Army Civilians and Local Nationals. The action was directed by USARPAC and is to be completed by 31 August 1967.

c. (C) On 3 May 1967, COMUSMACV directed that the armored cavalry troops of the 196th and 199th Infantry Pde be reorganized and reequipped in accordance with the MACOV recommendations as expeditiously as possible. The MACOV Study recommended reorganization of the cavalry troops of the 11th ACR. Action was taken to obtain TOE equipment and personnel. MTOE's were forwarded to USARPAC on 26 May. DA approval has not been received to date.

6. (U) New Artillery Units. New artillery units arriving in RVN have strengthened the force as a whole. Deployment of artillery has been dynamic since those units continuously redeploy to maintain the best possible combat support posture.

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7. (U) Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer. Introduction of the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC) will enhance fire direction and survey procedures. The computer should also increase accuracy of fires and reduce ammunition expenditures.

8. (S) Target Acquisition Battery. A target acquisition battery has been requested for deployment in the DMZ. This unit will furnish all weather target acquisition capability and augment existing systems in locating enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket positions.

9. (S) Countermortar Radar Detachments. Trade off spaces were furnished to obtain 12 more countermortar radar detachments. To provide additional coverage as soon as possible, an additional 12 AN/MPQ-4A radars have been requested without crews. These radars will be manned by in-country cross-trained personnel. Thus, a total of 24 new detachments will be formed to assist in counteracting the increasing tempo of enemy attacks on installations and maneuver elements.

10. (S) Long Range Patrol. The long range patrol program is being emphasized as an effective tool for target acquisition. In addition to expanding the provisional units at division and brigade, a long range patrol company for each Field Force is planned for the near future.

11. (C) M16A1 Rifle. Issue of the M16A1 Rifle to all US Army combat maneuver units was completed 19 April 1967. During the month of July an additional 4,000 rifles were issued to 22 rifle companies (Inf Bn Augmentation). There are now 137,781 M16A1 rifles in hands of US troops. Approximately 2,000 rifles are in stock for replacement of battle losses.

a. (C) Due to a strike at the Firearms Division of Colt Industries Inc., M16A1 rifles are not being received on schedule. Latest production figures from DA (28 July 1967) indicate a total of 98,500 M16A1 rifles earmarked for USARV for FY-68. USARV has a requirement for approximately 140,000 rifles to equip US combat, combat support, and combat service support units in-country.

b. (C) Current commitments to RVNAF and Free World Military Assistance Forces have been satisfied.

12. (C) Relocation of Units from Saigon. Four company sized units and HQ USARV, to include the majority of Special Troops, relocated from Saigon to Long Binh during the period May-July 1967. Total number of personnel involved was 2,924. One company of 217 personnel from the 509th Radio Research Group relocated to Bien Hoa in May. Thus, the total number of personnel relocated during the period was 3,141.

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13. (C) Chemical/Biological Munitions. Chemical/Biological Munitions requirements in support of COMUSSEASTIA 1-66 and 32-64 (Phase III and Phase IV) were calculated and submitted to CINCUSARPAC for inclusion in the logistical annex.

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14. (U) Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment (ENSURE). During the reporting period fifteen ENSURE requests were submitted to DA for new and improved materiel. A list of these ENSUREs is at inclosure 10. Two newly initiated ENSURE items were directly related to the development of CS munitions and two are being staffed. This indicates an increase in the versatility of employment for CS type munitions against the enemy in RVN.

a. The trend continues toward developing equipment for use in airmobile operations and reducing the necessary combat equipment load of the individual soldier.

b. As a result of the evaluation of the fire resistant flight suit and the continuing requirement for aircraft crew protection, a request for the flight suit was resubmitted and validated by DA.

c. Operational quantities of an improved aerial polaroid camera were requested for use in combat intelligence collection. They have been requested based on evaluation reports and recommendations by Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV).

d. Operational quantities of lightweight jungle hammocks have been requested based on evaluation conducted in RVN.

15. (U) CONARC Liaison Team Training Visit. A seven man CONARC Liaison Team visited USARV units during the period 8-21 June 1967. The team consisted of a team chief from Headquarters, USCONARC and representatives from the Civil Affairs School, Missile and Munitions Center and School, Artillery and Missile School, Adjutant General School, Southeastern Signal School and Center and Fort Leonard Wood Training Center. The purpose of the visit, as with other quarterly CONARC Team visits, was to provide a basis for evaluating refinement and improvement of CONUS training of personnel deploying to Vietnam. A complete report of the teams findings has been forwarded to this headquarters.

16. (U) Physical Security Training. On 1 June Training Circular 350-7 was published outlining the requirement for a minimum of four hours of training for all individuals engaged in physical security activities. This course of action was considered mandatory to minimize the threat of terrorist activities, sabotage, mortar, rocket and ground attack by the VC/NVA.

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17. (U) Unit Proficiency Training. As a result of combat losses and the short tour of duty in Vietnam, units of this command experience a continual turnover of personnel. To insure that combat units are afforded ample opportunity to maintain highest standards of operational readiness, Training Circular 350-8 was published on 6 July. Combat units are scheduled for a seven day refresher training program each quarter, operational requirements permitting. As a minimum the training is conducted semi-annually. Basic skills and techniques are reviewed based on past unit experience.

18. (U) VC/NVA Mine and Booby Trap Confidence Courses: Mines and booby traps continue to produce an alarming number of US casualties. To provide the soldier with the most up to date information on the enemy's capability to employ such devices, confidence courses were established by all combat units during July. These courses consist of a piece of terrain containing replicas of VC/NVA mines and booby traps which is traversed by the individual soldier. Concurrently with this course, training is conducted in recognition, marking and destruction of mines and booby traps.

19. (U) Soldier - Situation - Solution Kits. Lessons 2 and 3 were forwarded to USARPAC for approval during the period. Lesson 2, the attack on LZ Bird was a good example of defense of a fire support base. Lesson 3, Operation White Wing offered an example of airmobile search and destroy operations. Three additional kits are in progress, it is anticipated that they will be forwarded during the next period.

20. (U) Vietnam Essential Elements of Analysis. During the reporting period four requirements for Vietnam Essential Elements of Analysis (VEEA) data collection have been received from USACDC. One of these was an exceptional VEEA. Two of these data collection efforts have been completed and returned. The remaining two will be completed and return on 31 August and 30 September 1967 respectively.

21. (U) Combat Lessons Bulletins. These bulletins are published on an "as required" basis to insure that appropriate subordinate commands derive maximum benefit from the combat experiences of other units in Vietnam. The Combat Lessons Bulletins cover a variety of subjects and should be timely, positive, and informative. Subjects covered during the quarter include Tunnel Warfare, Ambush and Counter-ambush Operations, Air Drop Resupply and VC Employment of Mines. Copies of the bulletins published during the reporting period are attached as separate inclosures.

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22. (S) As a result of the SECDEF visit to Vietnam in July 1967 the USARV Force Structure ceiling was raised from 323,735 to 358,133. This increase of 34,938 spaces has been carefully structured into a force package tailored to support MACV FY 68 campaign objectives. This package was submitted to OSD on 20 July and is expected to be approved by 15 September. In anticipation of SECDEF approval, representatives from HQ, USARV have been coordinating at DA to establish priorities for deployment of the major combat elements contained in the package. In addition, a capabilities conference is planned for late August at Headquarters, CINCPAC. At this time FY 68 Force Requirements will be carefully reviewed prior to submission to JCS and OSD for approval.

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E. LOGISTICS

1. (U) Materiel Readiness.

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a. A Materiel Readiness Seminar was held on 2 May at Headquarters II FFV. Current Logistics problems were discussed. Presentations were made by key logistics staff officers of HQ USARV on a wide range of relevant subjects. The role of the commanders in achievement of Materiel Readiness objectives was stressed along with encouragement to utilize the various elements of TAERS as management tools.

b. Effective 11 June, the Materiel Readiness Division was reorganized. Data Collection, Analysis, Files Maintenance, and Reporting were transferred to Plans and Operations Division along with the function of TAERS management, including processing of the DA Form 2406 and Periodic Logistics Reports. The Office, Assistant for Materiel Readiness assumes an expanded Readiness Assistance role wherein teams will be positioned in three separate field sites in RVN (Long Binh, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang).

2. (S) Supply.

a. The ORLL report period saw a general, well accelerated trend toward improvement of the medical supply system in Vietnam. With the build-up virtually completed and a basic supply system well established, much effort was spent during the report period to purify procedures, improve methods, and analyze programs and progress to date.

b. During the report period plans were finalized to transfer MEDCAP II medical supply responsibility to the US Army in II, III and IV Corps Area. This was a directed transfer in the DOD-AID realignment program. Prior to the directed change, MEDCAP supply was a responsibility of the ARVNAF medical supply system. A series of local meetings were held at MACV and USARV level to work out the details. On 1 June the actual transfer of stocks commenced with 150 days of medical supplies being transferred to the 521 Medical Depot and its Advance Platoons. The Army became responsible for the MEDCAP II medical supply on 1 July 1967. A TWX was dispatched to all commands advising them of the change in supply procedures. At the end of the report period effort was being extended to rewrite USARV Reg 40-39 to incorporate the changes in supply procedures and to include the various other changes in the MEDCAP program as directed by MACV. The new supply system for MEDCAP allows the participants in the program to use the full range of expendable medical supplies as stocked in the Army medical supply system. Previous to this they had been limited to 125 designated items. No separation of MEDCAP supplies will be required under the new system. This will allow the Medical Supply Officer to furnish MEDCAP supplies in a more convenient manner.

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c. Word was received in the early part of the report period that shipment was being made of a second MUST hospital with a Dental MUST component for use in-country. The shipment commenced to arrive shortly thereafter. Erection of the unit was started immediately and at the end of the report period the 3d Surgical Hospital was operational in the MUST assembly at Dong Tam. 40

d. Because a need existed at the 32d Medical Depot to improve supply records and storage procedures; a request was submitted to USARPAC for a technical assistance team consisting of 3 officers and 10 enlisted men to assist in these areas. This team would work in all facets of the operations, i.e., stock control, stock management, receiving, shipping and storage to train personnel and assist in improving the operation. Response and concurrence to the request was quickly forthcoming and the team soon arrived. They were allotted to the various operating sections and advance platoons and at the end of the report period the efforts of their labors were quite noticeable throughout all phases of the Depot operation. A similar team of 8 selected enlisted supply technicians was furnished by TSG in lieu of an earlier request for 8 qualified civilians for effort of a similar nature.

e. A survey was made during the report period in an effort to determine the number of customers being supported by the Medical Depot. requirement became evident when it was noted that many of the customers were unauthorized accounts or small volume supply users. The survey disclosed that the total number of accounts accommodated by the Medical Depot was exceeding its TOE capabilities. Accordingly, a satellization plan was designed which was to be placed in effect on 1 July 1967. Early in June a TWX was dispatched to all commands advising them that units without Medical Corps officers authorized or assigned would be required to draw their medical supply requirements from the medical unit providing primary medical care. Responsibility for police of the plan rested with the S-4 of the Medical Brigade for brigade units and with the medical supply points for divisional and non-Medical Brigade units. Within the Medical Brigade a similar plan had been effected earlier whereby small volume dispensaries and other medical units were satellited on hospitals for medical supply support. The satellization plan will effectively reduce the number of supply transactions processed by the Depot, yet provide the necessary supply support to the satellited units.

f. Early in May Colonel Chester C. Holloman, Assistant Chief, Supply Division, TSG and Colonel Jesse N. Butler, Deputy Director for Medical Materiel, DPSC, visited Vietnam for a 14 day TDY. The purpose of their visit was to review the entire Army medical supply system in Vietnam for the purpose of improving the system so as to provide more responsive and accurate service to all customers. They discussed the supply situation with the USARV Surgeon, USARV G-4, Chief of Staff, USARV and with personnel of various other headquarters and staff sections. Likewise, they visited

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numerous activities in the field, a number of field medical installations and spent considerable time at the 32d Medical Depot. In their written report submitted at the time of their departure, a number of recommendations and observations were presented by them with the view in mind of improving the medical supply operations. At the end of the report period a number of their recommendations had been implemented and progress was being made in other areas covered by their report.

g. A consequence of one of the recommendations made by Colonels Holloman and Butler was a 14 day TDY by LTC James Stacey, CO United States Army Medical Depot Ryukus and CPT Isaac Penso, Chief Stock Control, USAMDR, during June. They were requested to assist in the preparation of a mission essential item list. This list is to contain those items of medical supplies and equipment deemed absolutely necessary and for which adequate stocks must be on hand at all times to insure adequate field medical and hospital care for personnel of the Command. This list was to be prepared in conjunction with the Professional Consultants of the USARV Surgeons Office who would identify those items which are basic and necessary to medical treatment. After the list is compiled the items will be subjected to intensive management procedures at depot and unit level. A contingency reserve of 90 days stock would be maintained at all times in addition to the normal operating levels. At the end of the report period satisfactory progress had been made and the compilation virtually complete.

h. At 0730 hours on 7 June HQ USARV was notified that as a result of a fire of unknown origin at English Airfield in II Corps Area, all medical supplies and equipment for B Company of the 15th Medical Battalion of the 1st Air Cavalry Division had been destroyed. Immediate action was taken to effect resupply so that the unit could become operational again as soon as possible. The S-4 of the 44th Medical Brigade and the CO of the 32d Medical Depot were alerted to the situation. It was determined that 36 items of medical supply and equipment of various quantities required replacement. Six of the items were available at the Base Platoon of the Depot at Cam Ranh Bay and shipment was made immediately by air. Thirty items were passed to the USAMD RYIS with an RDD of 7161 (10 June). It was subsequently learned that the RYIS medical depot was able to effect delivery of 27 of these items on or prior to the RDD. The balance of three items required special action from CONUS for subsequent delivery. At last report the unit was operational by the following mid-week. The response by all concerned to this emergency action was outstanding.

i. Notification was received at 0800 hours on 24 July, that the 3d Surgical Hospital had undergone a mortar attack by the Viet Cong during the previous night. A visit was made to the unit to assess battle damage to the MUST assembly. All inflatable shelters had collapsed due to multiple punctures of the inner tubes caused by shell fragments. The expandable shelters were undamaged except for minor air lock punctures and scarring and scratching on the outer walls. The three in-use Utility

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Packs were virtually undamaged and were operational. The standby Utility Pack sustained damage but inspection revealed that only the air conditioner portion of the pack required repairs. SGO technical representatives were on the scene shortly after the attack to commence repairs. They indicated that the hospital would be operational again within three days. Replacement parts were being air lifted from CONUS. There were no personnel killed as a result of the attack, however, 18 personnel of the hospital complement were injured. Of the injured only 8 required evacuation. Two of those evacuated were moderately to severely injured. There were no patients injured. 42

j. A Single Sideband (SSB) Radio Conference was held at HQ USARV, per request of DA during the period 20-22 July 1967. It was attended by representatives of DA; USARPAC; USAMC; and the office of the Project Manager, Selected Tactical Radio (Proj Mgr, STR). The conference was convened principally for the purpose of clarifying MACV and USARV requirements for the new family of SSB radios, some of which have already been distributed within USARV. Production delivery is expected to increase starting in October 1967. In the interim, MACV and USARV are to report requirements over those authorized by TOE or MTOE and justify same so that Proj Mgr, STR, can program accordingly. Agreements were also reached relative to control of incoming SSB radio shipments and retrograde of replaced radios which are in critically short supply Army-wide.

k. Issue of the M16A1 rifle was suspended as a result of the Colt Arms strike. The additional requirement to equip the twenty-two Infantry Battalion Augmentation Companies has reduced the stock of M16A1 rifles to the level where only replacement of battle losses can be supported. The stock of replacement barrels is even more critical. On hand quantities are expected to last less than sixty days and additional assets are not available for the duration of the strike. WECOM is attempting to establish a barrel reclamation facility in CONUS. Intensive efforts are being made to retrograde unserviceable barrels to support this program.

l. Approval was received from DA for the initiation of an exchange program for the M102 Howitzer. This program will exchange all line howitzers and establish minimum depot stocks by January 1968.

m. 10-ton M123A1C Tractor with raised fifth wheel has been designated as a suitable substitute for the M123 Tractor for use with Tank Transporter Trailer M15 Series when used with other auxiliary equipment during loading and unloading operations. It is recognized that the M123A1C is not an optimum substitute however, it will satisfy the requirement for movement of combat vehicles.

n. Repair parts for the M109 Howitzer, M107 Gun, M110 Howitzer and M548 Recovery Vehicle have been included in Special Supply Control System. Due to the efforts of USAMC, the training teams from Ft Sill and Aberdeen Proving Ground and the increased availability of parts, the down time for the M109 has dropped about 50% since the beginning of the quarter.

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o. The XM48 Grenade Launcher is to be withdrawn from service based on the evaluation cited in last quarter ORLL. The M79 will again be the only authorized grenade launcher. Turn-in instructions are being requested from DA.

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p. The total days of Class I Supply available in USARV depots and supply points decreased by 9.9 from 82.3 days, 23 June 1967, to 72.5 days on 27 July 1967. This decrease reflects change in "A", "B", and "MCI" rations. "B" Ration has been reduced from 28.5 to 23.8 days during the period. The 70 day stockage level test will be completed 31 July 1967, results evaluated and recommendations due from 1st Logistical Command 5 August 1967.

3. (C) Ammunition Service.

a. Significant improvement was noted during the reporting period in the USARV Class V stockage position. Only three Class V items remain on Available Supply Rate (ASR) management in July as compared with 18 in April. Those items presently on ASR are as follows:

Ctg, 60MM Illum	1.5 rds/wpn/day
CTG, 60MM Smk, WP	2.0 rds/wpn/day
Sig, Illum, White Star Cluster	5.0 rds/wpn/day

All items removed from ASR during the reporting period are being monitored daily to insure sudden drawdowns do not jeopardize present favorable stockage position.

b. A USARV sponsored ammunition conference was held at Headquarters II Field Force on 7 May 1967. Attending were representatives of G3, G4 and AMC Customer Assistance Office Headquarters USARV, 1st Log Comd, II Field Force, and the division and separation brigade ammunition officers. Significant discussion topics included the rationale for applying the Available Supply Rate, turn-in of unserviceable ammunition, and future availability of experimental ammunition. It is planned that similar conferences be held with each Field Force throughout the year.

c. During the period 7-19 May 1967, Mr. McNutt of the Field Systems Agency, Headquarters USARPAC visited USARV to assist in the development of machine programs to automate Class V stock status reporting. On 13 May 1967 a master asset file of all Class V line items was submitted to USARPAC. Twice monthly updates are now being submitted via AUTODIN facilities with the card deck changes via pouch as back up. The monthly 1322 Ammunition Feeder Report will continue to be submitted until sufficient confidence has been established in the automated system.

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d. Mr. Vincent P. Huggard, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installation and Logistics) and Brigadier General Henry Rasmussen, CG, OSAM/DCSLOG visited this headquarters during the period 7-11 June to discuss increases in the consumption of certain high demand ground munitions. During their stay several working conferences were held with members of G4, G3 this headquarters and 1st Logistical Command. Information was provided on the future availability of ground munitions while USARV contributed consumption experience and forecast requirements. They also toured the Task Force Oregon area to discuss 175mm ammunition consumption and future support requirements with members of Headquarters III MAF and Task Force Oregon. 44

e. This headquarters was host to the CONARC Liaison Team during the period 8-21 June 1967. During this period COL Ervin Graham, Commandant of the US Army Missile and Munitions Center and School toured 1st Logistical Command Ammunition Facilities and representative combat elements. The purpose of these visits was to determine, through observation and interview, the adequacy of instruction in preparing ammunition personnel for duty in Vietnam. Upon his return to Saigon his impressions were discussed with members of 1st Logistical Command and this headquarters.

f. In order to gain more realistic 175mm ammunition consumption experience, the Available Supply Rate was removed on 18 June 1967. This information is required to plan future procurement and insure continuous availability. The asset position of this item is being monitored daily and will be returned to ASR management if heavy drawdowns jeopardize present favorable asset position.

g. Incidents involving the loss of Class V supplies occurred on 6 June at FSA English near Bong Son and on 20 June near Duc Pho. As a result, two inspection teams were organized from personnel of the Ammunition Division and each 1st Logistical Command Class V Depot, ASP, and FSA were visited during the period 25 June - 18 July 1967. Discrepancies noted along with recommended corrective actions were furnished each site and a final report of inspection submitted on 24 July 1967. It was found that in many instances insufficient real estate has been made available to provide the required type and class separation. These deficiencies are in the process of being corrected through a reduction in on hand tonnage and increased engineer effort.

h. The Ammunition Division participated in a USARPAC Ground Munitions Conference at Ft Shafter, Hawaii during period 10-14 July 1967. Attendees at the conference included representatives of DOD, JCS, DA, Eighth Army, AMC HQs and subordinate commands. The conference is held semi-annually for the purpose of discussing Class V logistics problems and reviewing Stockage Objective and Theater Required Supply Rates. Formal presentations were made by Ammunition Division on the Ammunition Situation in Vietnam and the preparation and processing of ammo reports. USARV

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personnel participated in working groups subsequent to the formal presentations. Topics of these working groups included; review of recommended changes to USARPAC Regulation 710-15, ammo storage facilities, requirements and programs, maintenance and renovation, Central Munitions System and weapons densities. These conferences serve a valuable purpose as the representation permits discussion in detail with ammunition counterparts at all levels on Class V Logistics problems. Next conference is scheduled for January 1968.

4. (U) Maintenance.

a. In an effort to improve medical equipment maintenance support in-country, a TWX was dispatched to all Army Commands requesting a count of medical technical equipment on hand in the using units. The purpose of this was to gain information as to the number and types of medical equipment in-country so that Depot maintenance support can be properly programmed and that adequate repair parts are requisitioned and stocked. This had been done previously in the 44th Medical Brigade for units under their command. The TWX obtained the requested information from all other commands. The extent of response was questionable, however, the information gained provided the 32d Medical Depot with valuable data for planning purposes. It is proposed to follow this survey up with subsequent surveys on an as needed basis until firm equipment density listings are complete.

b. A Closed Loop Program Conference requested by USARPAC was held at HQ USARV during the period 24-25 July 1967. Only COMMEL items, Project Code MOT, were discussed at the conference. It was attended by representatives of G4, USARPAC; HQ USARV; HQ 1st Log Comd; and the three Spt Comds. The following problem areas were discussed:

- (1) Program slippages.
- (2) Reconciliation of items received by USARV and retrograded out-of-country.
- (3) Timely reporting of items received and shipped.
- (4) Procedures internal to 1st Log Comd to better manage and control the program.

Program slippages have occurred as a result of USARV not retrograding items in accordance with the prescribed schedule and as a result of overhaul and new production slippages in CONUS. The COMMEL Closed Loop Program will be realigned so that retrograde and replacement items are scheduled according to USAMC capabilities to overhaul and produce. Receipts of "like new" items and retrograde of exchanged items could not be reconciled because of the difference in statistics maintained by USARPAC and 1st Log Comd. This deficiency will be investigated. 1st Log Comd feels the data can be aligned more closely based on retrograde shipments now being processed. 1st Log

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Comd will develop standardized procedures to improve program management and control and to insure timely reporting of receipts and shipments. A follow-on conference is to be held during the period 7-10 August 1967 at USAECOM, Philadelphia, Pa.

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5. (C) Aviation.

a. During this reporting period the aircraft availability rate in USARV remained generally good. The following are average operational ready, not operational ready maintenance, not operational ready supply and utilization percentages for the aircraft in USARV for the last quarter.

<u>ACFT</u>	<u>O/R</u>	<u>NORS</u>	<u>NORM</u>	<u>UTILIZATION</u>
O-1	87%	3%	10%	128%
U-1	82%	3%	15%	136%
U-6	72%	4%	24%	92%
RU-6	70%	4%	26%	106%
U-8F	78%	1%	21%	128%
RU-8	73%	4%	23%	105%
OV-1	65%	7%	28%	77%
OH-13	73%	7%	20%	154%
OH-23	58%	21%	21%	152%
UH-1B	74%	6%	20%	88%
UH-1C	71%	9%	20%	95%
UH-1D	75%	7%	18%	140%
CH-47	67%	8%	25%	98%
CH-54	62%	9%	29%	106%

b. During this quarter, the UH-1H has been added to the inventory. This is the standard UH-1D aircraft equipped with the T-53-L-13 turbine engine. This engine will develop up to 1400 HP which will allow the aircraft to operate at maximum gross weight, (9500 lbs) at high density altitudes such as are encountered in the highlands of Vietnam. Availability figures will be available next reporting period.

c. Also during this quarter, the T-53 and the T-55 engines became critical because of shortages in the supply system. This shortage was caused by labor strikes at Union Carbide and at the Lycoming Plant. The strike was resolved in May at Union Carbide and the Lycoming strike was resolved on 2 July 1967. At the present time there are no aircraft in USARV utilizing these engines that are "Down" for lack of an engine. USARV's "on-hand" stockage for these engines is better than it has been for the past nine months. Although the supply of T-53 engines (used in the UH-1) remains critical worldwide, the T-55 engine (used in the CH-47) has been withdrawn from the worldwide critical list.

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6. (U) Transportation

a. RVN port capability projections have reached required goals. Daily port capability for remainder of CY 1967 by ports is:

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Saigon	11,400 S/T
Cat Lai	1,500 S/T
Vung Tau	1,700 S/T
Cam Ranh	6,300 S/T
Vung Ro	750 S/T
Phan Rang	360 S/T
Nha Trang	1,100 S/T
Qui Nhon	5,400 S/T

(1) Reduction in capability of Phan Rang from 700 S/T to 360 S/T per day is commensurate with projected tonnages for the remainder of CY 1967.

(2) Increase in capability at Nha Trang from 900 S/T to 1100 S/T per day reflects a more realistic appraisal based upon performance.

b. A containership service between the US West Coast and RVN ports has been initiated. Service will be provided to the port of Da Nang. The first containership vessel departed the west coast on 10 July. Service to the ports of Cam Ranh, Qui Nhon and Saigon are contingent upon completion of pier modification and the construction of two cranes at Cam Ranh Port. Construction has begun with a projected completion date of 24 October. When fully implemented, service will provide for the arrival of a containership every 15 days at CRB and Da Nang. Tonnage arriving at CRB by containership is expected to approximate 24,000 S/T per month or approximately 18% of the cargo now arriving at CRB for discharge.

c. Berthing facilities at Newport terminal were completed on 15 July 1967. Terminal consists of four deep draft berths, two LST ships, 4 barge sites and an LCU ramp.

d. During the month of July, the 1097th - TC Medium Boat Company was transferred from Cam Ranh Bay to Dong Tam in the Delta to support combat operations being conducted by the 9th Infantry Division.

e. All 172 US Army rail cars procured and manufactured in Japan have arrived in RVN. The last of these cars, 7 ea flat cars, arrived in Saigon on 21 July 1967. In addition, the 28 refrigerator cars ordered from CONUS have arrived in-country. A breakdown of the number and type of rail cars by location is as follows:

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CAR TYPE</u>		
	<u>GONDOLA</u>	<u>FLAT</u>	<u>REFREIGERATOR</u>
Da Nang	10	10	
Qui Nhon	15	21	3
Nha Trang	10	10	12
Saigon	<u>26</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTAL	61	111	28

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f. Several segments of the VNRS continue to remain operational. The Ninh Hoa to Tuy Hoa segment of the VNRS was scheduled for rehabilitation during the first half of CY-67. During the month of July, the train had reached a point 20 kms south of Tuy Hoa. Upon completion, a 210 km stretch from Phan Rang to Tuy Hoa will be available for use.

g. Uses for the various segments of the VNRS are continually being studied. Currently under study is the feasibility of hauling supplies over the Saigon - Xuan Loc line in support of II FFORCEV units. An inquiry into the feasibility of establishing rail tank car service from the commercial POL facility at Qui Nhon to Phu Cat AFB, is being studied. Preliminary investigation found such service to be feasible and as such it will increase the flexibility of the transportation network and provide additional revenue to the VNRS.

h. As a result of emphasis being placed at all levels of command to reduce the density of RO and RO trailers in RVN during this reporting period, the RO and RO trailer density in RVN is now at an acceptable level. At the beginning of this reporting period, the density of trailers in-country was 471. Current density is 307. Nine hundred and forty-two trailers were received during this reporting period and 1106 trailers were shipped of which 756 were loaded with retrograde cargo.

i. Due to high cost of operation and inability to negotiate commercial contracts, the MAC passenger channel into Pleiku closed on 31 July. Passengers normally going into and out of Pleiku will begin using the Cam Ranh Bay passenger channel. In addition to cutting cost of operation, travel time will be less making replacement available to their units sooner.

7. (C) Support Services.

a. Class III Supply and Distribution:

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(1) Consumption of bulk petroleum by US forces, FVMAF and RVNAF in II, III and IV CTZ's reached a new high of 2,373,400 BBL's in June 1967.

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(2) Permanent steel petroleum storage increased from 738,000 BBL's to 752,000 BBL's during July. The 752,000 BBL's is 46.5% of the total 1,616,000 BBL's programmed for construction.

b. Mortuary Affairs: Mortuary operations continue as usual with the Da Nang facility in support of I CTZ and the Tan Son Nhut facility in support of II, III, and IV CTZ's. No major problems have been reported by the Da Nang Mortuary since its activation on 20 June 1967. Working conditions at the Tan Son Nhut mortuary have been improved by the subsequent reduction in workload.

c. Property Disposal Activities:

(1) Invitation for Bid (IFB) 92-112-S-68-2 was opened at 1000 hours, 27 July 1967. High bid was \$70,000 for 10,000 tons of scrap steel. This scrap steel is located at the old ASP in the Qui Nhon area.

(2) IFB 92-112-S-68-1 was opened at 1030 hours, 27 July 1967. This IFB consisted of miscellaneous vehicular, aeronautical, and vehicle spare parts, MHE, and construction equipment. Eighteen prospective bidders submitted bids in response to the IFB. One "all or none" bid was submitted for \$50,000; however, until all bids are evaluated it cannot be determined if the \$50,000 bid is high. More interest is continually being generated in property disposal items as reflected by the submission of 18 bids.

(3) DA Assistance Team visit previously requested by this headquarters arrived in country on 30 July 1967, purpose is to evaluate RVN's disposal program.

8. (C) Logistical Planning and Operations.

a. On 30 May 1967 a proposed reorganization of the USARV Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 was approved by the DCG. Especially significant were the combining of Supply and Maintenance Divisions into a Materiel Division; the creation of an Aviation Division; and the creation of the position of Assistant for Materiel Readiness. The latter replaced the Materiel Readiness Division, the functions of which were split between the Special Assistant and the Plans and Operations Division. In conjunction with the reorganization, a new G4 portion of the USARV Operations and Functions Manual was submitted to the Comptroller for future publication. Subsequently, on 5 June the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 (Military Assistance) was transferred from G4 and elevated to a separate general staff section. On 10 June, the G4 Installations Division was incorporated into the newly created Office of the USARV Engineer. The USARPAC Manpower Evaluation Team, on 29 June 1967, concurred in essence with the new G4 organization.

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b. On 1 July 1967 a centralized financial accounting system in support of US Army forces in Vietnam was put into effect. The centralized financial accounting system is a part of the overall plan for the logistical support of US forces in Southeast Asia. Under this system procurement instruments are released to the "out-of-country" supplies without reference to fund availability. Information copies of documents are furnished to the USARPAC Material Management Agency which accounts for funds used to support US Army forces in Southeast Asia. The Plans and Operations Division of G4 assisted in the development of the system for RVN and supervised its implementation within USARV. 50

c. As a part of the change of station of USARV Headquarters from TSN to Long Binh, G4 relocated to Long Binh on 4 - 5 July 1967.

d. During June a USARPAC study team visited USARV to prepare a unit-by-unit function-by-function analysis of the 1st Logistical Command. A USARV team, including members of G4, joined the USARPAC team in this extensive analysis.

e. Recent incidents causing the loss or destruction of large quantities of ammunition, fuel and other valuable supplies and equipment warranted action by this headquarters. USARV Msg AVHGC-PO 41922, dated 21 June 1967 requested commanders at all levels to review their policies and procedures regarding the handling and storage of ammunition and other supplies and to take vigorous corrective action to minimize risks of further unnecessary destruction of materiel. As a result of this review, many of the stockage levels at forward support areas have been reduced. Other corrective actions taken were conveyed to MACV by USARV letter dated 28 July 1967.

f. The US Army elements that are deployed in the Southern portion of I CTZ are logistically supported from a Forward Supply Area at Duc Pho. The Forward Supply Area receives supplies via Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) via Duc Pho. During the forthcoming Northeast Monsoon Season, this beach will not be available for use, therefore another means of support was developed. Through coordination and cooperation with CG III MAF and COMNAVFORV and the assistance of COMUSMACV, Highway 1 was opened for Chu Lai to Qui Nhon and plans for upgrading to Class 30 all weather was approved and implemented. Completion date is estimated 1 October 1967. Plans were formulated to resupply Duc Pho by highway from either Chu Lai or Qui Nhon. This is a continuing program and will be revised as troop commitments in the area are changed.

g. Support for the receipt of the Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR).

(1) During this report period the planning for the receipt and support of the RTAVR has progressed to near completion. All TOE and TA items have either been issued or placed on order. Status cards have not

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been received on each item, however, they are expected prior to 15 August. The Engineer Co arrived in VN on 15 July and moved to Camp Bear Cat without incident or accident. The Company immediately started to work on preparation of the base camp for the Regiment.

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(2) The planning group met in Bangkok 11 - 13 June and 4 - 8 July. These meetings proved very rewarding and eliminated many problem areas before they could develop. Plans are being developed for the deployment of the main body and a final coordination meeting is planned 8 - 12 August.

h. Appendix 1 to USARV Circular 210-3, dated 15 March 1967 was superseded by a new reporting format dispatched to the field by letter, AVHGD-PO, dated 16 July 1967, subject: Monthly MOOSE Report (RCS MACJ4-38). The new format provides for a simplified more meaningful report to record the details of units relocating into, within or out of the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut complex. The new format was used in submitting the July report.

i. USAID and DOB Program Realignment.

(1) MEDCAP: Effective 1 July 1967 the 1st Logistical Command assumed the responsibility for the issue of MEDCAP supplies to all US and FVMAF in II, III and IV CTZ, except for the US Air Force and Navy MEDCAP programs. The ARVN Medical Depots will continue to issue MEDCAP supplies to RVNAF MEDCAP teams. The significance of this change allows all US and FVMAF to requisition all medical supplies from one source.

(2) Operation of RVN ports: A conference was held on 12 June 1967 in the USARV Conference Room to finalize the Inter-Agency Support Agreement (IASA) providing for water terminal services, drayage and other related services for the movement of USAID cargo and USAID sponsored cargo to first destination. Representatives were present from MACV, USAID/V, USARV and 1st Logistical Command. The final IASA document was signed on 15 June 1967 and completes six months of negotiations to formalize acceptable procedures for the discharge, handling, movement, documentation and reimbursement for USAID cargos.

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F. COMMAND MANAGEMENT

1. (U) The following management surveys were conducted during the quarter: 52

a. The management/manpower survey of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 was approved by the Deputy Commanding General on 31 May 1967.

b. On 24 April 1967, the Chief of Staff directed that the Office of the Comptroller and the Office of the ACoFS, G3 conduct a joint study to determine the proper distribution of functions between Special Troops (HQ USARV), Long Binh Post and Saigon Support Command after the move to Long Binh. The Chief of Staff approved the study on 29 May 1967.

c. The management/manpower survey of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 was approved by the Chief of Staff on 20 June 1967.

d. The DCG directed the Office of the Comptroller to conduct a study of the alignment of functions between HQ MACV and HQ USARV. A study group consisting of representatives of all general staff sections was formed to conduct the study. The study has been completed and recommendations were presented to the Chief of Staff on 3 July. The study was presented to the Chief of Staff, HQ MACV on 14 July. A draft copy of the report of the HQ MACV study group was received on 24 July. The committee is awaiting further guidance from the MACV command group.

e. On 24 July 1967, the DCS (P&A) directed this office to conduct a "Command Relationships" study. The purpose of the study is to determine required changes in command relationships and realignment of functions caused by the move of HQ USARV and subordinate commands to Long Binh Post. Initial findings were presented to the DCS (P&A) on 27 July 1967.

f. On 31 July the DCS (P&A) directed that a study be conducted to determine the feasibility/desirability of converting the USAHAC R&U function to contract.

2. (U) A command letter was dispatched on 24 May 1967 to USARV headquarters staff elements, subordinate commands and the 34th General Support Group which summarized the reasons for and objectives of the world-wide Army Cost Reduction Program and the responsibilities of the US Army elements in Vietnam towards the attainment of these goals. The Comptroller has been appointed as the Cost Reduction Program Manager for USARV.

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3. (U) The Organization and Functions Manual is in the process of being updated. A DF was dispatched on 26 May requesting each staff section to review and update their portion of the Organization and Functions Manual. The revised manual is expected to be published during August 1967.

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4. (U) A representative from USARV Comptroller attended a PERMACAP (Personnel Management and Accounting Card Processor) planning conference from 9 - 11 May at Headquarters, USARPAC. PERMACAP is a system which employs UNIVAC 1005 Card Processors at division and personnel service-company level as a means of integrating their personnel and accounting procedures into the standard Army-wide personnel accounting system. The purpose of the conference was to develop and discuss possible courses of action leading to the implementation of PERMACAP. Special emphasis was placed upon the personnel and equipment required by the program. A tentative target date of 3d Qtr, FY 68 was established for implementation of the program in USARV.

5. (U) The 1st Infantry Division received its UNIVAC 1005 Card Processor as part of the world-wide punched card modernization program. The UNIVAC 1005 has replaced certain items of punched card equipment in the division which will greatly increase the unit's data processing capabilities. The 9th Infantry Division is equipped with a similar configuration and the remaining three divisions will receive their UNIVAC 1005's in future months. An adequate number of UNIVAC 1005's to equip these units will become available in 2d Qtr, FY 68 with the consolidation of three data processing units in USARV.

6. (U) The 520th Personnel Service Company (PSC), equipped with a UNIVAC 1005 and related punched card equipment arrived in May and is located at Bien Hoa. There are now five personnel service companies in USARV equipped with the UNIVAC 1005 equipment configuration and each of the PSC's is scheduled to participate in PERMACAP.

7. (U) Phase 1a of the DSU/GSU Mechanization Program to mechanize stock record accounting at selected direct support and general support units with NCR 500 Card Processors began in May. Since that time, four NCR 500 systems and one unit equipped with the NCR 500 have arrived in USARV. This raises the total number of systems in-country to 20. Phase 1a is expected to continue throughout the 2d Qtr, FY 68 with an additional 15 units (including three maintenance floats) scheduled for mechanization.

8. (U) A Senior and Intermediate Army Executive Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Orientation Course were conducted in Hawaii in May. Five field grade officers from USARV attended the courses which are designed to acquaint officers with the capabilities of data processing equipment and to provide insight into the management aspects of ADP.

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9. (U) UNIVAC completed the last of a series of 1005 Card Processor programming courses during the reporting period. Courses were conducted in Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay. All units equipped with or scheduled to receive UNIVAC 1005's were given the opportunity to send personnel to one or more of the two week training sessions.

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10. (U) Mr. Hedeon (ODCSLOG) and Mr. McLaughlin (OCA) visited USARV in June. The purpose of their visit was to review all aspects of the command's data processing to include installation of the IBM 7010/1460 at the 14th ICC, the replacement of selected items of punched card equipment with the UNIVAC 1005 (punched card machine modernization program), and contract maintenance for IBM and UNIVAC.

11. (U) During the quarter, three (3) new general staff sections were established: ACofS, Military Assistance and ACofS, Communications-Electronics, both effective 5 June 1967; and the ACofS, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), effective 21 June 1967. On 2 June 1967 the Office of the Engineer was reestablished as a Special Staff Section

12. (U) The United States Army, Vietnam was awarded the Treasury Department's Minuteman Flag in recognition of its outstanding achievement in Savings Bond participation. The flag was presented to HQ USARV by LTG E. E. Doleman, Deputy CINCUSARPAC on 9 June 1967.

13. (U) Dr. Evans, Command Analysis Center, has represented USARV on the Vietnam Telecommunications Panel since 10 June 1967. The objective of the panel is to establish a post war telecommunications system in Vietnam. The meetings have been held weekly at MACV headquarters in Saigon.

14. (U) USARV Regulation 37-19, "Reporting Non-Reimbursable Support Costs of RVNAF and FWMAF in RVN", was published and distributed in June. The regulation prescribes policies and procedures for reporting non-reimbursable support costs of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces/Free World Military Assistance Forces (RVNAF/FWMAF) in Vietnam.

15. (U) The Senate Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee arrived in Vietnam on 27 June 1967 for the purpose of continuing its investigation of the military preparedness of the command. The subcommittee departed the command in mid-July. The Comptroller was designated the USARV Project Officer for this visit.

16. (U) During the quarter, a review of HQ USARV originated reports resulted in a decrease in the number of required reports from 98 to 80.

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17. (U) During the period 1 May to 31 July 1967, thirty-six (36) audits of nonappropriated fund activities were performed as follows:

- 55
- a. Eleven (11) regular audits of USARV open messes.
 - b. Fifteen (15) regular audits of MACV mess associations.
 - c. One (1) terminal audit of a USARV open mess.
 - d. Seven (7) assistance visits.
 - e. Two (2) audits of Vietnamese Labor Funds.

18. (U) During the period 1 May to 31 July 1967, the number of USARV open messes in financial difficulty dropped from nine (9) to six (6).

19. (U) During the period May to July 1967, the US Army Audit Agency completed audits in the areas of (1) reimbursement for support furnished non-Army agencies and (2) ammunition accounting procedures. Audit of priority designators assigned to high priority requisitions has been temporarily suspended. Additionally, an audit was initiated in the area of receipt, control and distribution of materiel in Vietnam.

20. (U) During May to July 1967, the US General Accounting Office completed a survey of the balance of payment effect on offshore procurement. The survey of supply management practices continues.

21. (U) During the period, an internal review of Army leasing operations in Vietnam was conducted by the Office of the Comptroller, USARV.

22. (U) The FY 69 Initial Program and Budget Estimate (IPDE) was submitted to CINCUSARPAC in June showing total requirements of \$547,813,000 of which \$516,935,000 was for in-country costs.

23. (U) Policy guidance was received from DA that materiel acquired from OICC resulting from the demobilization of the RMK-BRJ contractor would be non-reimbursable. This action resulted in a stop of purchases. Therefore, only \$2 million of the \$25 million programmed in FY 67 for this purpose was obligated and the balance was returned to USARPAC. Later guidance received from DOD indicated that new materiel within the Approved Force Acquisition Objective would be provided on a reimbursable basis. Purchases will resume in FY 68.

24. (U) FY 67 ended with total obligations of \$306,645,000, 99.9% of the \$306.7 million Annual Funding Program.

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25. (U) The 3d Qtr, CY 67 AIK allocation of \$VN 300,000,000 (\$3,750,000) was received.

26. (U) Approximately \$VN 6,000,000 (\$75,000) CY 65 AIK funds in unliquidated obligations was withdrawn by MACV. 56

27. (U) During July, the Office of the Comptroller moved from Tan Son Nhut to the new USARV headquarters at Long Binh Post. The move was made in three increments and was completed on 15 July. All elements completed the move in good order and no major problems were encountered.

28. (U) The USARPAC Ammunition Conference was held in Honolulu, 9 - 17 July 1967. One representative from USARV was sent to present stockage objective rates for Vietnam.

29. (U) DA has approved the installation of a RCA 501/301 magnetic tape oriented computer system at Long Binh in the 2d Qtr, FY 68. The system will be operated by the combined resources of the 12th, 19th, and 56th Data Processing Units (DPU's). DA is furnishing a cadre of programmers and operators trained on the 501/301 system as a supplement to the personnel of the DPU's. The system will provide for a complete data processing service center for HQ USARV and will be used initially to perform the Standard Army Personnel Statistical and Accounting functions and will eventually provide increased support to all headquarters staff elements. The RCA 501/301 system is expected to be operational in the 3d Qtr, FY 68.

30. (U) Based on a study of automatic data processing support for the logistics system in USARV, DA approved the installation of IBM 7010/1460 tape and disk oriented computer at the 14th ICC and 506th Field Depot. Programming for the conversion from the present UNIVAC 1005 system to the 7010/1460 system is being performed by Computer Services Corporation and by personnel from the two logistical installations. That portion of the 14th ICC building at Long Binh which will house the computer was completed on 12 July 1967. Installation of the system by IBM Corporation began on 15 July 1967 and was completed on 31 July 1967. Target date for having the 14th ICC operational with IBM equipment is 1 September 1967. A new 506th Depot is being constructed at Long Binh. Delivery date of the unit's computer system has not been established.

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G. INSPECTOR GENERAL (IG)

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1. (U) Normal functions of the Office of the Inspector General continued through the 4th Quarter to include completion of 4 formal investigations and processing of 305 complaints and requests for assistance. A total of 24 Annual General Inspections were completed to include both Field Forces Headquarters, 3 Brigades, 7 Group Headquarters and 12 battalion size artillery, aviation, TC and MP units. With the exception of the inspection of the 173d Airborne Brigade, all Annual General Inspections were conducted on schedule without impact on operational commitments or degradation of inspection standards. In the instance of the 173d Airborne Brigade, immediate commitment of the Brigade to a distant area of operations required that the inspection be terminated and rescheduled for completion in July 1967. Results of inspections and comments of the unit commanders confirm the desirability and requirement for the inspections. Although the AGI is primarily to provide the major commander with an evaluation of the status of discipline, efficiency and economy of subordinate commands, in the RVN, operational environment, preparation for and the conduct of the AGI identifies and highlights deficiencies which because of operational priorities and interest have not received sufficient command attention and direction.

2. (U) Availability of qualified personnel for assignment as permanent members of the AGI teams continued to be a problem which was alleviated by the assignment of approximately 16 personnel on TDY during the period. TDY personnel were utilized primarily as technicians to support the Materiel Maintenance Evaluation program which also provides the G-4 with the necessary evaluation and documentation required for annual CMMI commitments.

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H. INFORMATION.

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1. (U) General. The 5th and 7th Public Information Detachments, FB teams, formed by the reorganization of the 5th and 7th P.I. Detachments, AE, (USARPAC General Order Number 43, dated 1 March 1967) have been re-designated the 26th and 56th P.I. Detachments respectively. The redesignation was directed by USARPAC General Order Number 95, dtated 26 May 1967.

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2. (U) Command Information.

a. During this quarter, the following materials were produced in support of the USARV Command Information program:

FACT SHEETS

Freedom Shares
Preventive Maintenance
Know Your Customs Laws
Americal Revolution
Health Hazards
Writing for Civilian Publications
USARV Anniversary - July 1967

PAMPHLETS

Play It Safe
The Choice is Yours
(Reprint)
Look Sharp, Act Sharp,
Be Shart (reprint)

POSTERS

Savings
Medic
Courtesy
Safety

b. During the quarter, the USARV command newspaper, The Army Reporter, increased its circulation from 75,000 to 80,000. The increase was necessary to insure adequate distribution of the newspaper as USARV troop strength increased. A special issue commemorating the second anniversary of USARV was published on 15 July in 140,000 copies.

3. (U) Public Information.

a. During the period, the Public Information Office began an Army Daily Summary highlighting combat and support achievements in a "yesterday" time frame. The summary incorporates the Army ground war, the direct and general support role of Army aviation elements, and as much feature and background information as can be obtained. In addition to being placed on the JUSPAO (Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office) press rack prior to the daily 1645 hours press briefing, copies of the Army Daily Summary are mailed directly to home town newspapers of soldiers mentioned in each summary. Response from in-country news media representatives and from newspaper editors in home towns across the United States has been highly enthusiastic, resulting in the US Army Vietnam story being told in major metropolitan media subscribing to the wire services, and being told in more detail at the "grass roots" level in the American community -- the home town newspaper. The distribution run of Army Daily Summaries has risen from 75 copies when the program was launched, to 250 copies in its third month.

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b. the USARV IO Clearance Branch became operational during the report period. This new branch is the central clearing agency for all Public Information releases prepared by subordinate commands and reviews media. This new system has resulted in improving the quality of material being released to external media while reducing the volume of mail-outs, and is a key factor in achieving a highly desirable, coordinated Public Information effort telling the overall story of the US Army's role and accomplishments in South Vietnam.

c. A program is now being finalized by the Information Office to insure greater emphasis in reporting to the American public the progress their Army is making in South Vietnam. This program calls for specialized feature reporting in areas such as military civic action, engineering, logistics and revolutionary development in which Army efforts are achieving high success, but remain largely unheralded because of their non-combat nature.

4. (U) Audio-Visual.

a. The request for a grant from the HQ USARV Central Welfare Fund Council for tape recorders and photographic equipment for IOs throughout USARV, submitted during the preceding quarter, was not approved. The IO is pursuing other ways to obtain this equipment.

b. Attempts were made to obtain a 69th Signal Motion Picture photographer throughout the reporting period to do motion picture home town interviews. Most requests were disapproved because photographers and cameras were not available; consequently the AVO is cross-training a still photographer within the A-V Division to do motion picture home town interviews.

c. Thirty-eight color slides were sent to 69th Signal Photo Platoon for reproduction of 100 each, totaling 3,800 slides. These were done by a Vietnamese firm in Saigon and results were poor. Correspondence was sent thru channels to determine if this situation can be corrected for future jobs.

d. Air conditioning was installed in the darkroom and the audio room in late June. The quality of negatives and photographs greatly improved, and the dust problem that affected and the sensitive tape recording equipment was eliminated.

e. A photo drum dryer was obtained from the 69th Signal Battalion Photo Platoon in July. It has not been used because of the move to Long Binh, but should improve operations in the future.

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f. A Sony Console tape recording machine was obtained thru SI and should increase the capability for dubbing and editing tapes. However, the loss of two of the four Nagra tape recorders in the A-V Division at the end of the period tends to create a problem in the taped-interview program. Attempts are being made to obtain other recorders. 60

g. The division continued to work a man in the photo lab at night periodically throughout the period. However, more work was given to the 69th Signal Photo Platoon than in the past and they provided adequate and timely photo reproduction support. This support resulted from the coordination between the IO and senior signal officers mentioned in the last ORLL report.

h. The change in policy during the preceding quarter regarding doing quality taped interviews, rather than quantity, has resulted in better acceptance of our tapes at the Army Home Town News Center and broadcast media.

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I. CIVIL AFFAIRS. **UNCLASSIFIED**

1. (U) Civic Action. During the quarter ending 30 June 1967, there were increases over the previous quarter in all areas of civic action. Donations of funds were below the FY 1967 quarterly average. This decline in funds donated is attributed to the availability of civic action funds and supplies and emphasis being placed on piaster reduction. The quarterly statistics are shown as inclosures.

61
2. (U) Civic Action Effectiveness.

a. The following trends were noted in civic action reports received by this headquarters:

- (1) An increased number of projects and activities.
- (2) A more cooperative attitude on the part of the Vietnamese toward US civic action efforts.
- (3) Incidents of villagers taking positive action against the Viet Cong.
- (4) Increased insistence on the part of US units that the Vietnamese take an active role in civic action projects.

b. These factors indicated that the program is progressing in a satisfactory manner.

3. (U) Community Relations Committees and Friendship Councils. Continuing emphasis is being provided to these vital means of communication between the US, FVMAF and GVN officials through the use of command letters, messages and civic action news-letters.

4. (U) Publications. Civic Action Newsletters 7, 8, and 9 were published during the quarter.

5. (U) Civil Affairs Organization.

a. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was established at this headquarters on 21 June 1967.

b. A change to the LOI of 1st Logistical Command assigning them the mission of operating the Civic Action Relief Supply Distribution Point was published during the quarter.

6. (U) Briefings.

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a. Informal briefings on USARV Civic Action and related activities were conducted for 24 personnel from 19 different organizations.

b. Briefings were given to General Forsythe, Assistant Deputy for CORDS, MACV and Mr. Gilleas and Mr. West, DA during the quarter. 62

7. (U) Staff Visits. During the reporting period staff visits were made to 23 units or organizations.

8. (U) Civil Affairs Highlights, April 1967 - June 1967.

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>TY-67 Qtr Average</u>	<u>JAN - MAR 67</u>	<u>APR - JUN 67</u>
Contributions (\$VN)	6,189,118	3,736,313	5,932,102
Relief Supplies Distributed (Tons)	2,557	2,766	4,124
Construction Projects Completed	4,368	5,560	7,549

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J. MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

1. (U) USARV GO 2639, dated 5 June 1967, established the Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Assistance and discontinued the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 for Military Assistance.

63 2. (U) On 8 June 1967, MACV was informed of the discontinuance of employment of Eastern Construction Company, Inc. personnel. Subsequently, a decision was made to continue the employment of ECCOI, therefore appropriate action has been initiated in order to again establish a working arrangement between US, GVN, and ECCOI.

3. (U) The first edition of the Vietnamese equivalent to the US Army PS Magazine was published. Copies of the first edition were forwarded to the US Army Maintenance Board, Ft Knox, Kentucky. The AMB was thanked for the assistance rendered to the Vietnamese by the PS Magazine staff.

4. (U) RVNAF has established and approved a Food Service Program for CY-67. The plan includes the establishment of messes in all units, improvement of the garrison and operational ration, better food service techniques and sanitation and replacement of unserviceable mess equipment. Issues of operational rations without deduction from the ARVN soldier's pay received final approval on 1 July 1967.

5. (U) Requisitions for the total quantity of material for the Self-Help Dependent Housing Program were submitted during the month of June 1967. As a result of material requirement and pricing refinements, sufficient funds were developed to enable the number of shelters planned to be raised from 404 to 440 shelters.

6. (U) JGS Memorandum No. 019363/TCTV/NQY/TL.2, dated 17 November 1965, subject: Transfer of Emergency Supplies Between ARVN and US Medical Depots, establishes the procedures whereby designated US medical units and ARVN medical units may request emergency medical supplies, expendable by US standards, from ARVN medical depots and US medical depots. As of 31 May, the ARVN depots have issued \$326,924.06 of emergency supplies to US medical units and have received \$145,934.35 from US medical units. This leaves a US deficit to ARVN of \$180,989.71. The transfer of these supplies precluded the use of priority requisitioning and transportation from CONUS.

7. (U) Camelback is the primary material used in vehicle tire recapping. Until late 1966, it was funded through MASF (MAP) and supplied by out-of-country resources. In order to utilize in-country resources, funds were allocated in the 1967 Government of Vietnam (GVN) Defense Budget, and a contract issued. However, the funds were insufficient and the supply of in-country camelback was exhausted in June of this year. Action was taken in May to initiate a new contract, but the contractor's price rose from 78 to 129 piastres per kilogram. In spite of the increased cost, it was

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determined that the price was still cheaper than the import price. Therefore, a contract was let for immediate supply of camelback (7.50x20). Negotiations are currently underway to insure that a sufficient supply of camelback will be available until 30 June 1968. No further problems are expected.

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8. (U) In April, the RVN AF Vehicle Standardization Conference was held at Department of the Army. Representatives from USARV attended. It was decided to standardize the RVNAF tactical vehicle fleet. The DA approved program calls for introduction of three types of vehicles not earlier than FY-69. They are the $\frac{1}{4}$ ton M151A1, $1\frac{1}{4}$ ton XM715, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton M35A2. Details regarding issue, repair parts supply, and maintenance training are currently held in abeyance pending receipt of firm delivery schedules, from DA.

9. (U) The M132 Flamethrower and E16 Service Unit were tested in Vietnam in August 1965 and found to be highly satisfactory against enemy-held positions. It was decided to issue two flamethrowers and one service unit to each Headquarters and Service Troop, in the Armored Cavalry Squadron. ARVN is authorized 23 flamethrowers and 12 service units. To date, 20 flamethrowers have arrived in-country. Service units are scheduled to arrive within 30 days. A MUCOM New Equipment Training Team is scheduled to begin operator and maintenance training in late August. No major problems are anticipated with introduction of flamethrower equipment into ARVN.

10. (U) The semi-annual USARPAC Ground Munitions Conference was held at Ft Shafter, Hawaii from 10 to 18 July 1967. Pertinent information pertaining to RVNAF ground munitions was presented as summarized below:

a. The RVNAF Class V Depot/ASP support system was explained. Facility locations, tonnages on hand vs safe storage capacities, RVNAF RSR's, and items controlled by JGS were discussed.

b. Factors affecting RVNAF consumption of ammunition were outlined. A letter from this headquarters which proposed an overall reduction of 20% in the ARVN Class V country-wide stockage objective was explained in detail. Reduced SO rates will permit considerable reduction of tonnage on hand. Dollar savings, based upon production costs alone, amount to \$22,223,000. Additional savings will be made because of reduced requirements for transportation, security, storage space, and renovation within RVN. Proposed reduction was approved by CINCPAC J4

11. (U) The implementation of the program permitting ARVN Signal Corps Officers to enroll in correspondence courses from Ft Monmouth is progressing. All forty-two applications previously forwarded were approved by the Department of Non-Resident Instruction as of 15 May 1967. The Signal Advisory Division received Sub-Course material on 28 June 1967 and distributed the material to the enrollees.

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12. (U) Three classes for the repair of Radio Set AN/GRC-106, being introduced into ARVN, were conducted by a team under the direction of the USARV Signal Officer, for both US and ARVN Signal repairmen. A total of seventeen ARVN Signal repairmen attended the three ten-day courses. A similar course for ARVN Signal repairmen is now in progress at the RVNAF Signal School.

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13. (U) Direct shipment from CONUS of one-half of the monthly requirement for dry batteries, BA-30, BA-48, BA-270, and BA-279 to RVNAF Signal Field Depots at Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Qui Nhon, which are near port facilities, was implemented in October 1966. This procedure proved successful and resulted in a decision to effect direct shipment of 100 percent of the requirement for these four types of batteries, beginning in May 1967. The BA-386 dry battery, used with Radio Set AN/PRC-25, will be included in the Direct Shipment Program as soon as the in-country density of the Radio Set AN/PRC-25 will justify it. This is expected during the 2d Quarter of FY-68.

14. (U) Action has been taken to obtain the use of Pier K-10, recently returned from US control to the Saigon Port Authority. This pier will give the ARVN Saigon Transportation Terminal Command a roll on roll off capability in the main port which will expedite the loading and off-loading of VNN and ROK Navy landing craft. In addition, this pier is located in close proximity to the Saigon Transportation Terminal Command warehouse, which will facilitate the staging of outbound cargo.

15. (U) In an effort to augment shipping resources available to the ARVN Transportation Corps, several conferences have been held with USAID to determine if they were in control of any coastal vessel assets in excess of their requirement. These conferences were attended by representatives from USAID, CLC, DODT and TAD. An agreement was reached, giving approval by the Ministry of Defense, which will allow ARVN Transportation Corps utilization of coastal vessels under the control of USAID on a voyage charter basis. This action should alleviate tonnage awaiting shipment to the Area Logistics Commands.

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K. COMMAND HISTORICAL PROGRAM.

(U) The Army Combat Artist Program for FY-68 includes plans for twelve volunteer civilian artists and three five-man teams of soldier artists to record Army activities in Vietnam during the fiscal year. Combat Artist Team #4 is scheduled to assemble in Vietnam on 15 August and spend 60 days observing various activities and preparing preliminary artwork. The team will go to Hawaii for an additional 75 days TDY to develop finished artwork for the Army War Art Collection. Teams #5 and #6 are scheduled to arrive about 1 November 1967 and 1 February 1968, and follow similar schedules. USARV Memorandum 870-1, Army Combat Artist Teams, was published 10 July. This directive establishes procedures for supervising and coordinating support for teams of soldier artist sent to RVN under the Army Combat Artist Program.

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SECTION II - PART I

OBSERVATIONS - LESSONS LEARNED

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A. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

1. (U) Item: Temporary Liberalization of Enlisted Promotion Policy

Discussion: Department of Army Message 816160, 24 May 67, temporarily lifted restrictions on the number of times an individual may be promoted in RVN, and also authorized accelerated promotions (TIS-TIG exceptions) for outstanding soldiers to Grades E4 thru E6 in percentages as follows: To Grade E4, 5 percent of authorized E4 strength; to Grade E5, 3 percent of authorized E5 strength; to Grade E6, 2 percent of authorized E6 strength. Reports from USARV commands reflect that of the 5635 promotions to Grade E5 and the 970 to Grade E6, during 25 May - 30 June, 795 and 97, respectively, could not have been made had these restrictions not been lifted. Further, 1236 promotions to Grade E4, 1036 to Grade E5, and 163 to Grade E6 were made using the accelerating authority.

Observation: Promotion opportunities were definitely improved for the brief period during which the liberalized policy was in effect. USARV requested by Message AVHGA-PE 45149, 3 July 1967, that DA extend the liberalized authority pending a final decision at DA as to whether restrictions will be permanently lifted. Other means of communication have been used to press for the liberalized policy which will in effect place USARV under the normal criteria contained in AR 600-200, with special authority to exempt specific percentages of outstanding promotees from TIS-TIG criteria.

2. (C) Item: Casualty Loss Rates Experience.

Discussion: Following are casualty loss rates from actual experience for the 6 month period Jan - Jun 67; the 6 month average of these months; and the 21 month average for the period Oct 65 - Jun 67:

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	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>6 MO</u> <u>AVG</u>	<u>21 MO</u> <u>AVG</u>
% of combat strength* as casualties.	2.5%	2.8%	3.9%	3.0%	3.7%	2.9%	3.1%	2.9%
% of battle casualties lost to command.	43%	47%	42%	38%	43%	40%	42%	42%
% of average strength as non-battle casual- ties.	3.6%	3.1%	3.5%	3.7%	4.0%	3.7%	3.6%	3.8%
% of non-battle casual- ties lost to command.	11%	12%	11%	10%	11%	10%	11%	12%
% of total command strength as battle casualties.	1.0%	1.1%	1.6%	1.2%	1.5%	1.2%	1.3%	1.1%

*40% of total (average) command strength is assumed to be combat strength.

Observation: Casualty loss rates continue to be relatively stable and provide a sound base for unprogrammed loss requisitions and estimated loss percentages.

3. (U) Item: Unprogrammed losses of chaplains assistants

Discussion: Every chaplain requires a highly motivated, trained enlisted assistant (MOS 71M) in the 7 day-a-week program. Programmed losses are filled by incoming personnel; unprogrammed losses can usually be filled by suitable in-country volunteers.

Observation: Since many units require several days special training and orientation for incoming EM, an overlap of replacements is highly desirable. Curtailments of current tour, other than for transportation requirements, are being discouraged.

4. (U) Item: The majority of Automatic Data Processing Equipment maintenance personnel assigned to Vietnam are recent graduates of MOS producing schools with little or no experience in the actual repair and maintenance of Automatic Data Processing Equipment.

Discussion: The maintenance of Automatic Data Processing Equipment has been a continuing problem due to environmental conditions, geographical dispersion of equipment, and the general adversities associated with operational requirements in Vietnam. This situation is improving as the Army has accelerated the assignment of military technicians to Vietnam. However, most of these personnel are recent graduates of MOS producing

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69 schools and lack the field experience needed to develop and exploit their newly acquired skills. As a result, the equipment manufacturer's customer engineer often has to be called upon to diagnose and then correct machine malfunctions that should be the responsibility of military maintenance technicians. One method to alleviate this problem is to provide for the mutual exchange of information gained by military technicians in their performance of Automatic Data Processing Equipment maintenance. The knowledge and experience acquired in day to day operations should be shared by technicians maintaining similar equipment configurations.

Observation: A program should be developed whereby maintenance problems encountered by data processing installations will be forwarded to this headquarters, along with the actual and recommended methods to solve these problems. These summaries would be reviewed by a manufacturer's representative, published, and then distributed to field units. A program providing for this is being developed by this office.

5. (U) Item: Missing Financial Data Records Folders

Discussion: On 1 April 1967 Department of the Army discontinued authorization for enlisted personnel (except E9) and officer personnel (except O4 and higher) to hand carry their personnel records when making a PCS move. Records of personnel in this category are to be mailed by their old unit to the new unit. Since that time division and area finance officers have reported a high incidence (20 percent) of missing Financial Data Record Folders upon arrival of the members in Vietnam. When a member's Financial Data Records Folder is not available when he arrives, his pay matters cannot be properly settled and financial hardship ensues. Approximately 25 percent of these cases take more than 60 days to resolve. In many instances, the Financial Data Records Folder never arrives and it must be reconstructed by the Finance Center, US Army in Indianapolis, Indiana.

Observation: A request is being prepared to seek authorization from DA to have all personnel, regardless of grade, hand carry their records on PCS moves.

6. (U) Item: Financial Supervision of Open Messes

Discussion: In December 1966, an intensified program to isolate those USARV open messes experiencing financial difficulties was put into effect in the Office of the Comptroller, HQ USARV. At the inception of the program, 13 financially deficient messes were identified. Since that time, about two messes have been added and three deleted from the list each month. In July 1967, there were six open messes which were not maintaining the minimum required financial position. Several factors account for this improving trend:

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a. The responsible commander is required to review the operation of the deficient mess and submit a plan for placing the fund on a sound financial basis to this headquarters.

b. HQ USARV Circular 230-1, "Command Supervision of Open Messes" was published in March 1967 and is proving to be a valuable aid to commanders, boards of governors and custodians in the sound financial operation of open messes. 70

c. Continuous detailed review by the Office of the Comptroller of open mess monthly financial reports.

Observation: Continuous emphasis on promoting sound financial management of open messes by this headquarters and commanders is having a worthwhile and positive effect on the financial operations thereof.

7. (C) Item: Treatment of Malaria

Discussion: A major revision in the treatment of vivax and falciparum malaria was formulated and incorporated as a change to the basic USARV Regulation 40-33. This evolved as a consequence of several trends observed over a period of several months:

a. The rising incidence of vivax malaria in excess of 10 percent of all clinical malaria, with the implication this conveyed in respect to individual malaria discipline.

b. The need to obtain factual data concerning the minimal effective treatment of falciparum malaria, in order to minimize adverse, and occasionally serious, reactions to drugs used; and to return patients to duty as soon as possible without risk of relapse and, as a consequence, to increase effectiveness among troops.

(1) In the treatment of vivax malaria, it was learned within a short time that relapses approximated 8 percent with conventional three day chloroquine therapy and reinstatement of the weekly C-P tablet. Treatment was modified to provide a radical cure in that primaquine in dosage of 15 mgm daily for 14 days was added. The relapse rate was reduced to less than 1 percent.

(2) The treatment regimen for falciparum malaria was evaluated in a study conducted at the 6th Convalescent Center. Here, 141 patients were divided into two equal groups and placed on a ten and fourteen day triple drug regimen. The dosage of quinine and of dapson was the same in each group. Daraprim was used in reduced dosage in one group (50 mgs daily for three days) and in conventional dosage in the other (75 mgm daily). The results clearly indicated that the ten day regimen was just as effective, since no relapses occurred and, equally important, there were no adverse

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reactions to drug therapy with the shorter regimen; whereas there were three complications with the longer treatment schedule.

7/ Observation: If we accept the premise that vivax malaria can be adequately suppressed with weekly chloroquine-primaquine therapy (there may be at best a 10 percent breakthrough) then we must go back to World War II for malaria lessons learned. The most important lesson was that "it is impossible to control malaria effectively in military forces engaged in highly malarious areas unless commanding officers from the highest to the lowest echelons are malaria conscious. Training and education of both medical and line officers with regard to malaria and its control is essential. Malaria discipline is absolutely essential if an Army is to engage successfully in battle. Malaria control in the Army is a military problem."

8. (U) Item: In-route Medication for Psychiatric Evacuees

Discussion: Discussion with the USAF Medical Evacuation personnel during an actual Vietnam-Japan medical evacuation flight revealed that, at times, I-C patients (ambulatory psychiatric) had been evacuated without emergency medication ordered in advance. On occasion, this imposed on the nurse present, a decision concerning medication and a change of category when such a patient became disturbed during flight.

Observation: The Army psychiatric facilities in Vietnam have been instructed to ensure that all psychiatric patients being air evacuated out of Vietnam, will have emergency medication on order as a matter of routine, and that an "as necessary" order for change of category designation be included.

9. (U) Item: Communication Among In-country Mental Health Personnel

Discussion: Over a period of several months it was noted that there was a need for better professional and administrative communication among the mental health personnel in-country, since most are relatively isolated from each other.

Observation: A two day military mental health conference was held at the 6th Convalescent Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay in May. It was attended by most of the military mental health officers in-country, including Army, Air Force, Navy, ROK, and ARVN personnel. There was considerable exchange of valuable information relevant to combat psychiatry. The benefits were obvious and further meetings are planned on a bi-annual basis.

10. (U) Item: Utilization of Division Psychiatrists in Psychiatric Evaluations

Discussion: The establishment of the USARV stockade at Long Binh tends to place a considerable burden on the nearby 935th Medical Detachment (KO) for assistance in forensic psychiatry. Meanwhile, division psychiatrists,

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all well qualified to render such assistance, are often by-passed by divisional SJA sections.

Observation: Insofar as possible, the division psychiatrist should provide the psychiatric evaluation and testimony required concerning offenders on trial from that division. If a board of psychiatrists is required, as is often the case in capital offenses, the division psychiatrist should be a member of that board and should be the one called as witness. This policy is being coordinated with USARV SJA and major subordinate headquarters. It should, in general, provide for more rapid and accurate evaluation; save time for all concerned; and be less disruptive to patient care where the KO team is concerned. 72

11. (U) Item: Mental Health Officer Personnel Utilization

Discussion: a. The number of psychiatrists authorized in-country is approximately correct, but the present authorized spaces are poorly arranged with respect to providing appropriate and efficient coverage as related to the modern concepts of military preventive psychiatry. The number of social workers presently authorized in-country is adequate.

b. At present, mental health officer personnel are authorized in-country as follows:

(1) One psychiatrist and one social worker are authorized for each combat division and this is considered satisfactory. There are two KO teams authorized in-country. Each has three psychiatrists and two social work officers capable of operating a center providing psychiatric and neurologic consultation, evaluation, treatment, and disposition. This is considered satisfactory.

(2) Each Evacuation Hospital, the 6th Convalescent Center, and the 8th and 17th Field Hospitals, are authorized a psychiatrist; the 6th Convalescent Center only is authorized a social worker and he is well utilized.

(3) A number of Evacuation Hospitals are located where there is adequate psychiatric coverage from other sources; some are located where there is little US military population; and then, there are large support troop concentrations, Cam Ranh Bay for example, where no Evacuation Hospital exists.

Observation: The concept of a small Mental Hygiene Team is proposed to afford area coverage to large concentrations of support troops — an implementation which, if approved, would provide psychiatric coverage on a more realistic footing. Such a concept is already realized in each combat division which has a psychiatrist, a social worker, and up to six enlisted mental hygiene specialists. A team of this approximate composition, equipped with a $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck, could provide appropriate psychiatric consultation, evaluation, treatment and disposition for a base population

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of 15,000 - 20,000 troops. For larger bases, two such teams could be combined. Such teams could be attached to the medical unit providing local coverage. This concept would provide not only better utilization of psychiatrists but would also provide the addition social work officers needed in a modern program of military preventive psychiatry.

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12. (U) Item: Diversion of Psychiatric Evacuees from PACOM Facilities

Discussion: During a recent liaison visit to the US Army Medical Center, Japan, the USARV Neuropsychiatric Consultant discovered that the psychiatric treatment center at the 249th General Hospital, Camp Drake had received no psychiatric patients from the Army psychiatric teams in Vietnam for approximately one month. Apparently there had been a change in the direction of psychiatric patients so that they were being designated "For CONUS." The psychiatric treatment center at the 249th General Hospital is well equipped and staffed, and is intended to perform triage and treatment at USARPAC level; In the past it had salvaged a large portion of the psychiatric evacuees for duty in Japan and Korea.

Observation: The psychiatric teams in Vietnam were instructed to designate their patients specifically "For Japan." Additionally, the USAF Casualty Staging Flights at Tan Son Nhut and Cam Ranh Bay were visited and the matter discussed with their staffs who readily agreed to designate such patients for Japan.

13. (U) Item: Requirement For In-Country Electroencephalogram Capability

Discussion: Over a period of months the neurologists at both the 935th Medical Detachment (KO) and the 98th Medical Detachment (KO) have described the need for electroencephalographic equipment to examine approximately 10-15 patients a day. Many diagnostic decisions have been made in the absence of such instrument assistance. In cases where such data was deemed absolutely essential it was necessary to evacuate the patient to Japan where it could be accomplished. On a recent liaison visit to the US Army Medical Center, Japan, their neurologist estimated that fully 50 percent of the neurologic patients received from Vietnam were for electroencephalogram only.

Observation: Two electroencephalographs have been ordered and one each will be placed at the two KO teams noted above.

14. (U) Item: Evacuation Policy for Arterial Injury Cases

Discussion: At the recent PACOM Surgical Conference held in Baguio, P.I., follow-up on Vietnam casualties revealed that, in a series of 67 limb amputations performed at Clark AF Hospital on casualties from Vietnam (from I, II, III, IV Corps Area) due to arterial failure following

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injury to that vessel, 73 percent originated in Vietnam I Corps area; 27 percent represented Army, ROK, and other services. It is well known that certain factors conspire to force the early evacuation of Marine casualties to off shore hospitals, whereas US Army patients can be retained in Vietnam much longer and be evacuated at a more stable period following surgery. By inference, it appears that major arterial repairs suffer disruptive changes with premature evacuation and that amputation of the limb is more likely than with evacuation at a more stable period. Heretofore, USARV hospitals have retained major arterial repairs for 9 - 10 days postsurgery. 74

Observation: On the basis of the comparison presented, such cases are now retained within USARV hospitals for 15 - 21 days to further enhance stabilization of the arterial repair and to further enhance limb salvage.

15. (U) Item: Evacuation Policy for Pneumothorax/Hemothorax Cases

Discussion: At a recent PACOM Surgical Conference held in Baguio, P.I., a statistically significant number of patients from all ARVN Corps areas were presented who had had chest injuries. These casualties had been evacuated to off shore hospitals shortly after chest drainage tubes had been removed. An incidence of 20+ percent of pneumothorax and of hemopneumothorax was encountered upon arrival of these casualties at Clark AF Hospital, P.I. Follow-up on Army patients with similar treatment, arriving in Japan, showed a substantially lower incidence of complications and in no instance had it been life-threatening. Until recently USARV hospitals had been advised that no patient would be evacuated to off shore hospitals sooner than 24 hours following chest tube removal. Moreover, a chest x-ray just prior to evacuation was required in order to assure that complete lung expansion had occurred.

Observation: Feeling that even these assurance might be marginal and, on the basis of the comparisons exemplified, it is felt that the time interval between chest tube removal and evacuation to off shore hospitals should be no less than 72 hours and this has been recommended. Chest x-rays will be continued to be used as before.

16 (U) Item: The Treatment of Acute Renal Failure In-Country. Vindication of An Idea

Discussion: In April 1966, a special "K" team designated as a "KP" team and represented at the 629th Medical Renal Detachment TMKP was located within the facility of the 3d Field Hospital in Saigon. The objective of this highly specialized team was to treat acute renal failure as it occurs in a variety of clinical settings and to prevent its occurrence when clinical situations arise that are most likely to precipitate it. An analysis of the team's experience for the twelve month period

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ending 30 April 1967 (in the treatment of 48 patients) attests to the success of their mission since the survival rate was 98 percent. When this data was further purified and divided into medical and post-traumatic cases, the survival rate in the former group was 81 percent, and 58 percent in the surgical group. During the Korean War, the mortality rate from acute renal failure was reduced to 68 percent, a significant reduction in a hereto fore almost uniformly fatal complication.

Observation: The experience in Vietnam demonstrates that, as medical officers become aware of the importance of early diagnosis in this area, and early referral for treatment, mortality can be even further reduced.

17. (U) Item: A problem developed in obtaining the correct documentation to ship privately owned weapons to CONUS in hold baggage.

Discussion: To ship a privately owned weapon from Vietnam, a Vietnamese export permit is required. Permits are obtained through the US embassy, Saigon, with the USAHAC Provost Marshal acting as intermediate clearing agency for the Army. Provisions exist for granting of interim clearance by USAHAC PM for shipment when 60 day time requirement cannot be met or when the Vietnamese permit has not been completed in time. Experience in units outside of the Saigon area, which must pack and ship hold baggage directly to the US, has been that personnel are normally uninformed or unable to make arrangements for weapons shipment until final few days of clearing time. Transportation difficulties make personal application in Saigon impractical.

Observation: The problem was solved by obtaining authority from the Embassy to allow all tactical and area PM's to accept the applications, forward these to Saigon, and issue the interim clearance at the local level. This allowed the individual to satisfy the requirements within the clearance time allowed by the unit.

18. (U) Item: Consolidation of CID Case Review Operations.

Discussion: CID case review operations occur from the detachment level through each step in the chain-of-command up to Department of the Army level. Quite often, due to geographical locations, considerable time is consumed in sending CID cases from one headquarters to another for the purpose of review. Obviously, when possible, efforts should be made to consolidate CID case review operations.

Observation: Concurrent with the move to Long Binh of HQ USARV, the CID case review section of PMO, HQ USARV, was consolidated with the case review section of the MP Gp (CI) (Provisional), 18th MP Bde.

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B. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (U) ITEM: Equipment issued in excess of authorized allowances. 76

DISCUSSION: During the 4th Quarter 143 items of equipment in excess of authorized allowances were approved for issue by USARV. Of this number 21 were items of significant interest as depicted below.

<u>MAJOR ITEMS</u>	<u>3D QRT</u>	<u>4TH QRT</u>
Weapons	251	0
Vehicles	351	1
Aircraft	0	0
Signal Equipment	685	20
Generators	5	0
Construction Equipment	63	0
TOTAL MAJOR ITEMS	1,355	21
TOTAL ALL ITEMS	1,417	143

OBSERVATION: Request for equipment in excess of authorized allowances and the approval of same will continue at about the present level for the foreseeable future.

2. (C) ITEM: Expansion of Long Range Patrol Program (Field Force, Division and Separate Brigade)

DISCUSSION: MACV letter, 9 April 1967, Subject: Long Range Patrols (U) approved the USARV proposed MTOE for Field Force, Division and Separate Brigade Long Range Patrols (LRP) and requested that the submission of these MTOE be expedited. Trade-off spaces were provided for the two Field Force LRP Companies and a MTOE was forwarded to USARPAC on 28 April 1967.

OBSERVATION: Although spaces have not been provided for the Division and Separate LRP Detachments, MTOE's were provided to USARPAC for review on 13 June 1967.

3. (U) ITEM: MTOE for I & II FFV.

DISCUSSION: CINCUSARPAC GPOP-BL 22 07 DTG 072008Z July 67 directed that MTOE for I & II FFV be forwarded. MTOE 52-1T for I FFV of 427 spaces and MTOE 52-1T for II FFV of 355 spaces were required, existing Program Four assets were traded off to provide for the increase.

OBSERVATION: MTOE were forwarded to USARPAC on 19 July 1967.

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C. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS

1. (U) ITEM: The Acquisition of EAM Data Cards in Moisture Proof Bags.

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DISCUSSION: Many cases of card readers "jamming" because of swollen data cards had been reported throughout the data communication system in RVN. A study was conducted by the 1st Sig Fde and the 1st Log Comd. The result of this indicated that there are two FSN's used for ordering data cards. One for data cards used in CONUS and one for data cards for use overseas. The FSN which all terminals should be using is 7530-270-6180. Correspondence is being prepared by this headquarters to USARPAC requesting that only the FSN listed above be stocked at depots serving SEA.

OBSERVATION: There should be a significant decrease in "jamming" of card readers throughout RVN. This should reduce handling times caused by malfunctions and thus speed the flow of data transactions in RVN.

2. (U) ITEM: The USARV MARS network has shown a significant growth in the past year, 60th in size and effectiveness.

DISCUSSION: USARV MARS commenced operations in December 1965 with six stations. The network has grown to thirty stations located throughout the RVN. The objective is to provide a station in each area of high troop density (brigade size). The program provides personnel phone patch and message service to COMUS on a first come/first served basis. It also provides emergency communications as required. The network completed over 1,000 phone patches for the first time in October, 1966. Since that date, there has been a sustained significant increase in the monthly totals. The network completed over 10,000 patches in April and over 12,000 in June 1967.

OBSERVATION: The USARV MARS program plays a major role in maintaining the morale of our personnel at a high level. As there is limited commercial telephone service available only in Saigon, MARS is the primary means available to our personnel to effect personal telephone calls to CONUS. In addition, MARS has available to the commander a reliable means of communications.

3. (C) ITEM: Application of Electronic Accounting Machine (EAM) methods to cataloging USARV Voice Radio Call Signs.

DISCUSSION: A constant problem is encountered by frequency control personnel in resolving frequency interference problems: that of identifying the interfering station. In an effort to alleviate this problem, each call sign reported as being used by an organization of the command is placed on an EAM punch card. The cards are then sorted by Call Sign and an alphabetical listing is printed. These listings are forwarded to the primary Army frequency managers for reference when resolving interference problems.

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OBSERVATION: This procedure has reduced the time and effort required to identify a Call Sign that has been reported by 95%, which significantly reduces the time required to resolve interference problems. Problems are still encountered with stations that have not reported their Call Signs for inclusion in the catalog. For the system to be totally effective, all Voice Radio Call Signs in use must be reported.

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4. (U) ITEM: Application of Electronic Accounting Machine Methods to Frequency Management.

DISCUSSION: The radio frequency authorizations issued by this headquarters have been placed on EAM punch cards to allow semi-automated record keeping and analysis. Each authorization is placed on a punch card which is added to the master RFA card deck. A duplicate of each card is made and forwarded to the unit concerned as interim authority to operate on the frequency concerned. Periodically, the master deck is sorted by organization and up-date listings are printed. These listings are then forwarded to the organization as consolidated authorizations. The cards are then sorted in order of frequency value and a sequential listing is printed. This listing is used by the Frequency Control Officer as the master reference file.

OBSERVATION: This technique has reduced the time and labor of preparing consolidated authorizations to subordinates by 90%, and has reduced the routine effort of maintaining the records by a similar figure. Most significantly, however, it has identified frequencies that were unused because of lost or inadequate records, and allow the immediate identification of frequencies that are available for assignment.

5. (U) ITEM: Specialized Training for Transistorized Equipment

DISCUSSION: Operators and maintenance personnel must receive specialized training before being allowed to work with transistorized equipment. The completely different configurations used in this equipment are completely foreign to the average technician. CONARC and the US Army Signal School and Center have been informed of this weakness for planning purposes. Continued attention must be devoted to this matter in this theater and local training required until such time as transistorized circuitry becomes common place.

OBSERVATION: Transistorized equipment requires specially trained operators and maintenance personnel.

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6. (U) ITEM: Damage to Communications Cable.

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DISCUSSION: Five communications cables were recently damaged by a Signal unit digging a hole to place an anchor for reinforcement of a telephone pole H frame. The personnel in charge relied on memory for exact location of the buried cable. A power operated post hole digger, was used to dig the hole. Before it could be stopped, five communications cables were damaged.

OBSERVATION: Having personal knowledge of buried cable locations is desirable, but written documents of exact locations are not subject to memory lapses. Exact cable route diagrams must be maintained. Digging in areas in close proximity to buried cable should be done manually to preclude accidental damage to buried cables.

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D. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ←

1. (U) ITEM: Handling of Captured and Recovered Materiel.

DISCUSSION: USARV Regulation 381-24 (Exploitation and Disposition of Captured and Recovered Materiel) assigned primary staff supervision for intelligence exploitation of captured and recovered materiel to G2. The regulation did not define responsibility for the use and disposal of materiel not needed for intelligence purposes. This includes assignment of priorities for disposal as training aids, war trophies, as items for unit museums, and as excess materiel through property disposal channels. 80

OBSERVATION: In accordance with MACV Directive 381-24, USARV Regulation 381-24 was changed to define further the following primary staff responsibilities: G2 retained responsibility for intelligence exploitation of captured and recovered materiel; G3 was assigned responsibility to establish priorities for the use of captured and recovered materiel not needed for intelligence purposes (training aids, trophies, unit museums, etc.); G4 was given responsibility for the disposal of excess captured and recovered materiel through property disposal channels.

2. (FOUO) ITEM: Reduction of II Orientation Time.

DISCUSSION: It was found that a considerable length of time was required to orient newly assigned imagery interpretation (II) personnel to peculiarities of terrain, enemy activity, aerial reconnaissance operations and mission requesting procedures in RVN. As a result, maximum utilization of II personnel was delayed until they had become familiar with areas of operation and procedures.

OBSERVATION: To reduce non productive orientation time, USARV established a five-day course given twice monthly by the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support) for replacement II personnel. Tactical commanders and attendees have stated that the course reduced significantly nonproductive familiarization time of newly assigned II personnel.

3. (FOUO) ITEM: Requirement for 1:100,000 Scale Maps.

DISCUSSION: Major subordinate tactical commands have indicated urgent requirements for 1:100,000 scale topographic maps of Vietnam. The requirements are based on the highly mobile, small-unit battles being fought in Vietnam which cause major unit commanders to require detailed map coverage of extensive areas. The size of a unit set of 1:50,000 scale maps often precludes their being posted in a manner to facilitate operational planning and control; 1:250,000 scale maps do not offer sufficient detail.

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OBSERVATION: USARPAC prepared an experimental 1:100,000 scale map, produced by a photo-reduction process from four 1:50,000 scale maps. Copies of the experimental map were forwarded to all subordinate commands for evaluation. Replies received were overwhelmingly favorable with practically all units indicating urgent requirements for area coverage with the prepared 1:100,000 scale maps. Many units actually preferred the reduced version over normal specification maps because of complete retention of detail at the smaller scale. On 8 July the USARV Chief of Staff signed a request for production of 1:100,000 scale map series of the photo-reduction type. The request must be validated by MACV, PACOM and DA before production of the series can begin.

4. (FOUO) ITEM: Automatic Distribution of Maps.

DISCUSSION: New and revised maps are received continuously in the USARV map depots. USARV has used several methods of notifying units when new maps become available; however, units continue to use the older maps.

OBSERVATION: As it is imperative that all units use the same and the newest maps available, an automatic map distribution system has been established whereby new and revised maps are automatically issued and implemented for use command wide. USARV Form 206 (Map Requisition) is utilized as a "standing requisition"; units indicate desired quantities of maps by scale and general area coverage. Major tactical units indicate quantities desired for their map basic load while some units request only an information copy. The completed USARV Form 206, when validated by this headquarters, represents an approved map basic load and facilitates map stock planning at all levels.

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E. LOGISTICS.

1. (U) ITEM: Batteries for Hearing Aids.

DISCUSSION: Hearing aids are provided by the Army to active duty personnel who require them. Likewise batteries for the operation of the appliance are provided through medical supply channels as an item of free issue. Usually the individual using a hearing aid waits until his batteries are worn out before making application for new ones. This, of course, presents problems to the medical supply office since the supply system cannot react immediately to situations of this sort. Additionally, stockage of batteries cannot be determined since the number of individuals in Vietnam using hearing aids is not known. The problem is compounded by the fact that there are various types and models of hearing aids generally each requiring a different type of battery.

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OBSERVATION: It was recognized that a survey was necessary to determine the number of personnel in-country who were using government furnished hearing aids. A request was submitted to the field to obtain the necessary information so that stockage could be ascertained and distribution made as required. This is not the normal method for obtaining the required information. Each individual, when issued the hearing aid at the Walter Reed Speech and Audiology Correction Center is advised to inform the MSO of the individual's duty station of his hearing aid battery requirements. This is done for each subsequent assignment and new duty station. Most usually personnel concerned do not follow the correct procedure and are caught short for batteries, as a result.

2. (U) ITEM: Silicone Foot Ointment.

DISCUSSION: Silicone foot ointment is an experimental medication being used in Vietnam for the protection of feet from immersion foot, a condition sometimes called trench foot. The ointment is in field test at present and its use is controlled by the USARV Surgeon's Professional Consultant Division. Units not involved in the test have attempted to requisition silicone foot ointment in spite of the fact that the item is non-standard, is in field test and has not yet been accepted by the Defense Medical Material Board.

OBSERVATION: Units are not aware of the fact that this medication must be properly accepted by DMMA prior to standardization and type classification. In each case where a request for the item was received, it was necessary to explain the status of the item and the procedure under which the item is currently being used in Vietnam. Only the professional consultant of the USARV Surgeon's office can approve issues of the ointment under the current circumstances.

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4. (U) ITEM: TOE's and TA's for FWMAF.

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DISCUSSION: Each FWMAF unit in Vietnam operates under a TOE or TA. When requisitions are submitted against the TOE or TA, many times copies of the tabular authority is not available at the supply point to confirm that the request is bona fide.

OBSERVATION: In each case where the situation as described above has developed, it has been necessary to contact USARV, MACV or others to obtain copies of the FWMAF TOE or TA involved.

5. (U) ITEM: Closed Loop Program.

DISCUSSION: Policy guidance and procedures pertaining to the Closed Loop Program have been disseminated through a series of conferences and correspondence. This DA program involves qualitative and quantitative get well schedules for equipments which are either in critical short supply or for which out of country maintenance assistance is required. Because of the extensive controls needed, it is becoming more apparent that DA should provide procedural guidance in the form of Army Regulations. In the meanwhile, USARV is staffing a regulation of its own based on verbal and other information now available.

OBSERVATION: DA should publish an AR as soon as possible outlining Closed Loop Program policy and procedures which will permit standardized implementation of the program at all echelons.

6. (U) ITEM: Turn-in of Equipments to be Retrograded to CONUS.

DISCUSSION: General distribution of the single side band radio family has commenced within USARV. This new equipment replaces equipment currently authorized, normally on a one for one basis. Examples of such equipments are the Squad Radio which replaces the Radio Set, AN/PRC-6, and the Radio Set AN/GRC-106 which replaces the Radio Set, AN/GRC-19. This conversion program is of particular benefit to USARV because it relieves the command of difficult situation caused by equipments which have proved to be difficult to keep in operation because of age and condition. Consequently, it is important that new equipments be issued as quickly as possible so that replaced equipments can be retrograded to the CONUS for overhaul and redistribution as expeditiously as possible.

OBSERVATION: The need is recognized for prompt exchange and expeditious retrograde of replaced equipment. This headquarters will provide command guidance requiring prompt turn-in and evacuation of replaced equipment.

7. (U) ITEM: Passing Action for High Priority Requisitions.

DISCUSSION: High priority requisitions (02 and 05) as well as requisitions for fringe items submitted to DSUs are processed IAW passing

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action procedures in AR 711-16. If the requisitions cannot be filled in-country, it passed to a CONUS supply source without being established at any supply activity in Vietnam. AR 711-16 contains procedures whereby priority requisitions previously passed can be filled from incoming replenishment stocks. This feature is not incorporated in supply procedures for activities operating under AR 725-50.

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OBSERVATION: Because dues-out are not established for high priority and fringe requisitions no supply activity in-country has a record of the requisition. It is rare indeed when a DSU fills a requisition previously passed from incoming stock. This procedure cannot be followed by the three RVN depots where most of the stocks are located. Only the requisitioner can follow up on the requisitions - and he must follow up to a source of supply 12 to 14 thousand miles away. Even when supplies are received from CONUS they are sometimes lost or delayed because no supply activity has control over them. Since many high priority requisitions are submitted, they are handled in a routine manner.

8. (U) ITEM: USARPAC Aircraft Closed-Loop Conference.

DISCUSSION: The closed-loop conferences were established by USARPAC in order to better manage assets, world-wide, between CONUS procurement and depot agencies and the unit. The second such conference was held in June with representatives from DCSLOG, ACSFOR, AMC, AVCOM, ARADMAC, USARPAC, and USARV attending. Differences in on hand and projected shipments were resolved for the following end items and subsystems:

- a. UH-1 aircraft
- b. LOH aircraft
- c. CH-47 aircraft
- d. Aircraft armament subsystems
- e. T-53 and T-55 engines

Problems relating to 1352 and 1352A reporting and depot rebuild were also resolved.

OBSERVATION: This conference is highly beneficial to all agencies concerned with supporting the aircraft in USARV and should be continued on a quarterly basis. USARV should continue to send adequate representation in all areas that are to be discussed.

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9. (U) ITEM: Contract Maintenance Personnel.

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DISCUSSION: During this quarter, USARV received 388 additional contract maintenance personnel. These personnel have been used in direct support and general support aircraft maintenance activities to supplement USARV with personnel having the ability to perform in certain highly technical skill areas such as sheet metal repairmen, hydraulics systems repairmen and airframe repairmen. Groups of these personnel have been shifted to areas where such skills are needed during emergency conditions, such as areas hit by VC mortar attacks, leaving several aircraft damaged that can be repaired on site.

OBSERVATION: The use of contract maintenance personnel to supplement support in areas where highly technical skills are needed has proven extremely satisfactory and should be continued as long as a shortage of qualified personnel exists.

10. (U) ITEM: "Project Counter".

DISCUSSION: During this quarter, the aviation supply personnel from "project counter" have been in full swing. The mission of these trained supply specialists is to inventory all PLL's (Prescribed Load List) and ASL's (Authorized Stockage List), identify and catalog parts, and recommend to unit commanders line items that should be added or deleted. This operation has been successful in assisting unit commanders with their supply problems as well as returning many critical parts back into USARV's supply system that are needed in other areas.

OBSERVATION: That teams such as the "Project Counter" teams currently in USARV be formed periodically and utilized to assist supply activities at all levels.

11. (U) ITEM: Air Shipment of UH-1 and CH-47 Aircraft from CONUS to USARV.

DISCUSSION: During this reporting period 17 CH-47's and 159 UH-1's were received in USARV by air shipment. This method of shipment has proved very valuable, saving flying hours on the aircraft (from the factory to Sharpe General Depot), 35 hours on the CH-47 and 12 hours on the UH-1. This method also eliminates processing for corrosion control at Sharpe and de-processing when received in USARV. Considering the interest rate on the investment, it is also more economical to ship attrition aircraft by air.

OBSERVATION: That all replacement and attrition aircraft for USARV be shipped by air in the future.

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12. (U) ITEM: Illegal Use of Appropriated Funds

DISCUSSION: The DOD-issued Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) provides that purchases utilizing the imprest fund method of procurement will not exceed \$100.00 (\$250.00 in cases of an emergency). Under no conditions may the \$250.00 limit be exceeded. A review of recent imprest fund transactions has revealed that Ordering Officers are violating their letter of appointment by exceeding the authorized expenditure limit. Such action makes the Ordering Officer and Imprest Fund Cashier pecuniarily liable for the amount of funds so expended.

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OBSERVATION: Commanders should be aware of the limitations placed upon an imprest fund Ordering Officer. These limitations are set forth in the guidance for imprest fund operations and contain examples of items not authorized for imprest fund procurement. USARV Reg 35-6 also contains an extract from ASPR, applicable to the imprest fund method of procurement.

13. (U) ITEM: CONEX Containers.

DISCUSSION: Due to continued retention of CONEX containers in SEA, containerized shipments have been sustained only through procurement of new ones. OSD has directed that no further procurement be undertaken unless justification is submitted. Current procurement will be completed approximately 31 July 1967. After that date, CONEX shipments can continue only by exhausting approximately 20,000 CONEX available in CONUS and by using those returned by SEA.

OBSERVATION: A USARV wide report was submitted in response to a request from CINCUSARPAC and COMUSMACV. This report covered the number and utilization of CONEX on hand in USARV and ARVN logistical units. It is anticipated that CONEX containers will become subject to tighter control as a USARV Directive covering the utilization of CONEX's will be published during August 1967.

14. (U) ITEM: Two card processor van mounted systems in Vietnam have recently deteriorated to the extent they could not be repaired in Vietnam.

DISCUSSION: Card processors and related punched card equipment are often van mounted in CONUS prior to shipment in Vietnam. The equipment is bolted inside the van and then "packaged" by the equipment manufacturer for overseas shipment. The van is then sealed by placing adhesive material around all windows, doors, and air conditioning outlets. In spite of the above precautions, two card processors were found to be inoperable and non-repairable in Vietnam shortly after their arrival in Vietnam. In both

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cases the equipment had been aboard ship for approximately 30 days. The deterioration of this equipment apparently resulted from broken seals on the vans while in transit, or from lack of environmental control in the vans soon after the systems had arrived in USARV. Condensation of moisture in the internal mechanism contributed substantially to the damage.

OBSERVATION: In order to preclude future situations of this type, the following actions should be taken when van mounted Automatic Data Processing (ADP) equipment arrives in this command.

- a. Closely inspect the vans and ADP equipment to insure sealing and/or packing have not been damaged while in transit.
- b. Notify the manufacturer's representative of the equipment's arrival and of any damage noted.
- c. Insure proper environmental control within vans in accordance with GSA schedules.

15. (U) ITEM: Excessive humidity conditions in Vietnam have resulted in rust accumulating on Automatic Data Processing (ADP) equipment in vans.

DISCUSSION: Much of the ADP equipment in Vietnam is van mounted. These vans are normally equipped with air conditioners but lack dehumidifiers to insure continuous humidity control. In addition to climatic problems, heavy moisture condensation is encountered when air conditioners are turned on after having been off for any reason, e.g., power failure. Rust has resulted in the mechanical replacement of two systems and has required excessive maintenance on other ADP equipment mounted in vans. Most ADP equipment in SEA is leased and the government can thus be held liable for damages if temperature and humidity requirements of the ADP equipment manufacturers are not complied with. Further, equipment downtime due to excessive maintenance requirements can seriously affect timely and accurate support to the combat forces.

OBSERVATION: Air conditioning equipment is not adequate to provide the climatic controls required in SEA. Units receiving van mounted ADP equipment should be equipped with one each dehumidifier for equipment van and one spare prior to use of the equipment to insure continuous humidity control. Action has been taken by this office to procure dehumidifiers for divisions and personnel service companies in USARV as equipment in excess of authorized allowances.

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16. (U) ITEM: Year-End Closing of Fiscal Accounts.

DISCUSSION: Intensive effort was undertaken throughout May and June to coordinate and expedite purification of commitments and obligations of funds. Involved, in addition to the Hq USARV Comptroller, were Hq 1st Logistical Command Comptroller and Directors, USAPAV contracting officers, 33d Fin Det (Acctg), and all obligation authority holders throughout Vietnam. Results were most favorable, and over 99.9% of the final Annual Funding Program was obligated with all requirements fully funded. 88

OBSERVATION: Year-end funding actions require close and continuous coordination of all agencies concerned. While this is normally standard procedure, extraordinary efforts are required in a combat theater due to the inherent problems of communications, personnel turnover, and urgency of requirements.

17. (C) ITEM: Mortar attack on MUST (Medical Unit Selfcontained Transportable) Hospital.

DISCUSSION: On the morning of 24 July 1967 some 12 to 15 mortar rounds landed within the 3d Mobile Army Surgical Hospital area. This was the first time that a hospital which was actively treating patients while using the MUST Equipment had been subjected to a mortar attack. None of the 28 patients in the hospital were wounded during the attack. However, the attack caused considerable damage to practically all of the inflated elements, severed the main fuel line, and damaged the structure containing the maintenance equipment and spare parts.

OBSERVATION:

a. Alternate fuel lines, preferable underground, are required to maintain a higher probability of source for fuel during this type of attack.

b. Critical spare parts and MUST maintenance equipment should be in dispersed storage areas and bunkered.

c. Consideration should be given to some type of metal ribs which would provide internal support to the inflatable element in the event of multiple punctures and/or power failure.

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F. COMMAND HISTORICAL PROGRAM

(U) Item: Employment of Military History Detachments

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Discussion: Priorities for military history functions are stated in USARV Regulation 870-1. These priorities are aligned to support DA plans for writing the official history of US Army operations in Vietnam. In consonance with these plans and priorities, the first priority function for all military history detachments with USARV is to advise on historical adequacy and preservation of records and reports. For detachments supporting divisions or maneuver brigades, the second priority function is to conduct after action interviews and write personalized, highly-detailed narrative reports on significant tactical engagements. Second priority for detachments supporting other organizations is to prepare special historical reports on significant activities not documented fully in conventional records; e.g., development of working relationships with ARVN or FVMAF organizations. In some instances, detachments attached to subordinate units have been tasked with other duties and have not satisfactorily accomplished priority functions.

Observation: It is necessary to ensure that efforts of the limited number of history detachments available are not dissipated on non-priority functions. This may be done by centralizing control of all detachments, by placing arbitrary restrictions on usage, or by a system of programming and reports. All three methods are being studied prior to revision of current directives.

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G. MATERIAL ASSISTANCE **CONFIDENTIAL**

1. (C) Item: Technical Service Units under the command of ALC's are dually subordinate to their respective Tech Service Chiefs, and the CO of the ALC's.

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Discussion: All technical service logistical units in each Corps area (Direct Support and Field Depots other than Divisional Units) are assigned to the Area Logistics Command. In theory, the resources and functions of each unit are directly under the command and control of the ALC Commander. In fact, a considerable amount of influence and direction comes directly from the unit's parent tech service. Direct control of personnel assignments, direct orders for operation of schools, issuing supplies, and requirements for direct reporting to the tech services are common. Further, the parent tech service controls the base depots and decides what resources will be provided to and through each tech service unit. As a result of this diversity in control, the tech service unit commanders work under a dual subordination system and tend to favor their tech service since this is the source of their position appointments and a major influence in their promotions, schools, etc.

Observation: The control exercised by the parent tech service results in a drain of unit resources and capabilities without the direct knowledge or concurrence of the ALC Commander.

2. (U) Item: Lack of Physical Medicine Rehabilitation care technicians within RVNAF preclude the proper care and treatment of military personnel who have sustained severe neural damage or multiple loss of limbs. The Vung Tau Convalescent Center is responsible for rehabilitating paraplegic patients as well as those individuals who have sustained severe neural damage as a result of combat wounds.

Discussion: This problem became apparent during a visit to the Vung Tau Convalescent Center in April of this year, by the Medical Advisor, III Area Logistics Command. Arrangements were made to visit the US Convalescent Center at Cam Ranh Bay. Two Vietnamese Military Doctors and two Medical Service Corps Officers, including the commander of the Vung Tau Convalescent Center, visited the US Convalescent Center at Cam Ranh Bay and the entire program of Rehabilitative Medicine was presented and explained.

Observation: Realizing that the Vung Tau Convalescent Center had neither proper equipment nor trained physical therapist personnel, the Medical Advisor, III ALC introduced the Vung Tau Convalescent Center Commander to the Commanding Officer of the US 36th Evacuation Hospital located in Vung Tau and requested their assistance. The 36th Evacuation Hospital Executive Officer introduced the Medical Advisor, III ALC and the Commanding Officer of the Convalescent Center to the US Officer (Physical Therapist) in charge of rehabilitation at the 36th Evacuation Hospital. The

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Physical Therapy Officer expressed a willingness to assist these less fortunate individuals and immediately assisted the Vung Tau Convalescent Center Commander in establishment of a treatment room and instruction of a Vietnamese Lieutenant in patient care technique.

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3. (FOUO) Item: ARVN medical treatment facilities are reluctant to utilize patients to accomplish such menial tasks as changing linen, cleaning wards and assisting other patients, even though the patients are capable of accomplishing these tasks.

Discussion: The value of using patients to perform these tasks was pointed out to the III ALC Medical treatment units by the US Advisors. This practice is acceptable in US hospitals, and helps to rehabilitate the patient and also to relieve the acute shortage of assigned ward personnel.

Observation: It has been noted that some Vietnamese Medical treatment facilities have instituted a patient utilization program with positive results of improving patient morale, cleaner facilities and has relieved the professional staff of performing housekeeping tasks.

4. (U) Item: Use of Herbicide Drums for POL.

Discussion: During CY-66 RVNAF procured over 60,000 drums for POL at a cost of approximately VN \$1,000 each (total US \$500,000 approx). Drums generated as excess by the defoliating project in South Vietnam were salvaged or distributed as barrier material. A study was conducted to determine possible use of the herbicide drums to meet RVNAF POL requirements. Results indicated suitability of selected drums for this purpose.

Observation: Completed study with appropriate recommendations was forwarded in parallel to higher headquarters by ARVN and US channels and is now being evaluated.

5. (U) Item: Transportation School Drivers' Curriculum.

Discussion: The present ARVN driver training program has not been revised since 1965. Every 2 weeks the school begins a 6 week driver training course. There are always 3 classes being conducted at the same time, each class averaging 200 students. The present system of scheduling has 400 students undergoing practical exercise training at any one time. To give these 400 students practical training the school has 56 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, utility, trucks; 52 $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, cargo, trucks; and 69 driver training instructors. The limiting factor is the driver training instructors. Advisory observations indicate that only about 70% of the instructors are available for training on any given day. The limited number of instructors has resulted in from 9 - 15 students being assigned to a vehicle for practical training. The end result is that during 6 weeks each student drives for about 14 hours. It has been recommended

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to the School Commandant:

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- (1) That the course be reduced to 3 weeks.
- (2) That only one class be conducted at a time.
- (3) That the size of each class be increased to 300 men.
- (4) That each class be divided into two 150 men sections.

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(5) That extra duties for instructors be organized to insure that 60 instructors are always available for training.

Observation: The effects of the recommendation if implemented:

a. By reducing the course to 3 weeks with no overlapping of classes and training 300 students per class the Transportation School could train 5,100 students per year. Presently 5,000 are programmed annually.

b. With 150 men sections (1 section in the classroom and 1 section practice driving) there would be 3 students per $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck and 2 students per $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck. This would result in an increase of actual driving time to 18 hours per student. Also this would eliminate time lost by students waiting to drive. This recommendation has been discussed with the School Commandant. The Commandant is now reviewing the program. Upon completion of review by School Commandant, renewed efforts to effect the revision will be taken.

5. (U) Item: Improved Organizational and Direct Support Maintenance during prolonged convoy operations.

Discussion: In the past, organizational and direct support maintenance has been difficult to perform during prolonged convoy operations. During these periods drivers became fatigued, maintenance personnel, tools and other necessary materials were not available at the required locations and time did not permit drivers to go to unit motor pools or a direct support unit to have necessary maintenance performed. This problem was resolved by:

- a. Locating a central location that was convenient to the maximum number of vehicles at the convoy's destination.
- b. Establishing both an organizational and direct support maintenance capability at that location with tools, repair parts and maintenance personnel from the direct support unit.

Observation: Direct Support Units will provide all possible assistance with maintenance personnel, tools and repair parts to assist drivers

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in performing organizational maintenance as changing tires, batteries, fan belts, radiators, etc. Direct Support maintenance will be performed on the spot, if possible, by the direct support maintenance unit.

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H. INFORMATION

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1. (U) Item: US Army Daily Summary

Discussion: Reports from in-country news media representatives and CONUS home town newspaper editors continue to stress the need for more "human interest" material in the Army Daily Summary. Such material must be provided in the daily summary input from subordinate combat and support commands in the field. With increased command support in this area, the story of US Army Vietnam and of the soldiers who give it impetus will reach an ever-increasing audience throughout the United States via Army Daily Summary distribution.

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Observation: Experience with the Army Daily Summary reveals that a principle part of the summary's enthusiastic acceptance by news media representatives lies in fleshing out bare facts, in adding names, home towns and quoted material of the men who are taking part in the reported combat and support operations.

2. (U) Item: Repair of Uher Tape Recorders

Discussion: Several IOs in USARV units reported having Uher tape recorders that needed repair, and they could not be repaired in RVN. This was investigated and confirmed by the AVO. They also reported problems with the dryfit batteries and recharging units.

Observation: After corresponding with Uher dealers, a means was established thru USARV G4 to have Uhers repaired in Hawaii. Seven Uhers, recharging units and component equipment were sent for repair during July. A request was submitted thru Special Troops S4 for nickle cadmium batteries to replace dryfit batteries.

3. (U) Item: Operation of photo lab

Discussion: The new A-V photo lab at Long Binh will not have running water, air conditioning or sewage disposal for several weeks.

Observation: In order to continue photo developing and printing operations, coordination was made with HAC personnel and the old A-V photo lab in Saigon will be kept operational until the new one is completed. One A-V photographer remains at the old lab on a permanent basis. Negatives are delivered and prints are picked up twice daily using scheduled trips for press runs, copy clearance, etc.

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SECTION II, PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

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1. (U) That authorization documents (TOE, TDA, TD) for FWMAF be distributed to all supporting elements and staff sections concerned.

2. (U) That DA expedite publication of an AR outlining Closed Loop Program policy and procedures for the purpose of standardized program implementation at all echelons.

3. (U) That each echelon of supply maintain records of requisitions passed and establish dues-out to units and activities submitting requisition. Supporting supply activities should be responsible for obtaining and providing supply status when requested. Supplies should be routed through the supply system to the users.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert C. Taber

ROBERT C. TABER
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

10 Incl

- | | |
|---|--------------------|
| 1. Distribution | |
| 2. Significant Visitors | |
| 3. Organizational Struc | |
| 4. Commander's Notes | |
| (May - Jul) | |
| 5. Combat Lessons Bul | Withdrawn, Hqs, DA |
| (8 - 15) | |
| 6. Climatic Sum for RVN | |
| (Jun - Aug) | |
| 7. Weekly Intel Review | |
| (17-67 thru 29-67) | |
| 8. Logistical Sum (4-67 | Withdrawn, Hqs, DA |
| thru 7-67) | |
| 9. Sum of Civic Action | |
| Projects (Apr - Jun) | |
| 10. ENSURE Requests-not received, Hqs, DA | |

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4	OCMH	30	G2
5-6	CG; USACDC	31	G3 (Record Copy)
7	CG, USAMC	32	SGS ATTN: AVHCS-CH
8-9	CG, USCONARC	33	G4
10-11	CINCUSARPAC ATTN: GPOP-OT	34	AG
12	CINCUSARPAC ATTN: GPOP-MH	35	Avn
13	COMUSMACV	36	CORDS
14	Comdt USACGSC	37	Civ Pers
15	COMUSMACV ATTN: SJS Hist Br	38	Compt
16	CG I FFORCEV	39	IG
17	CG II FFORCEV	40	IO
18	CG TASK FORCE OREGON	41	PM
19	CG First US Army	42	C-E
20	CG Third US Army	43	SJA
21	CG Fourth US Army	44	SurG
22	CG Fifth US Army	45	CAOV
23	CG Sixth US Army	46	MA
24	CG 1st Log Comd	47-50	AG Class Cage (Hold)
26	CG US Army Engr Comd		
27	CG 1st Avn Bde		
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GPOP-DT(15 Aug 67)

1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, U. S. Army, Vietnam (UIC: WOBRAA) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

97
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 19 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs in
the report subject to the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 4k(3), page 7: "It is recognized
that the 6% shortage of the desired Catholic Chaplain strength goal
is due to an Army-wide shortage of Catholic Chaplains, and that this
is a matter of continuing concern to the Chief of Chaplains. There
is no indication, however, that Catholic personnel of USARV are denied
essential religious care due to this shortage. This is the result of
effective utilization of available resources by the various commanders
and a general willingness on the part of Catholic Chaplains to go
beyond the normal requirement of their assigned responsibilities to
provide Catholic religious services where needed. This headquarters
will continue to review this area in coordination with Headquarters
USARV and the Chief of Chaplains."

b. Reference paragraph 4c, page 54: "Color slide reproduction
facilities are available at Central Pictorial and Audio-Visual Division,
APO 96558. While reproduction projects of the quantity mentioned may
require two or three weeks for completion, quality of the finished
product is professional in every respect. Reproduction of color slides
in smaller numbers will require proportionately less processing time.
Headquarters USARV has been notified by message of the availability
of the Central Pictorial and Audio-Visual Division's color slide
reproduction support capability."

c. Reference Item 1 - Batteries for Hearing Aids, page 77:
"AR 40-3, paragraph 114, authorizes each individual who has been
issued a hearing aid a three-month supply of replacement batteries.
Immediately upon arrival at a new camp or station the individual
concerned must contact his medical facility so future replacement
batteries can be procured in sufficient time. It is recommended that
POR of individuals who have been issued hearing aids include a check to
insure that the individual has a three-month supply of batteries in
his possession."

FOR DT RD File

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OCT 1967

inc. WOBRAA
S-67-4889

G3-S-67 2174


GPOP-DT(15 Aug 67) 1st Ind (U) 19 OCT 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, U. S. Army, Vietnam (UIC: WOBRAA) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

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
d. Reference Item 5 - Closed Loop Program, page 78: "This Headquarters concurs with recommendation that policies and procedures pertaining to the program must be consolidated into one document. Even though a DA regulation has not been published, Headquarters USARPAC is presently preparing a regulation on the Closed Loop Program. Recommendation 2, page 90, refers."

e. Reference Item 7 - Passing Action for High Priority Requisitions, page 78: "Resolution of this problem involves supply policy and procedural changes. This Headquarters will take the situation under study with USARV by separate action. Recommendation 3, page 90 refers."

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

10 Incl
nc



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HEADQUARTERS

U.S. ARMY VIETNAM

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COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

NUMBER 8

21 May 1967

GENERAL

Combat Lessons Bulletins are to be published on an "as required" basis to ensure that appropriate subordinate commands derive maximum benefits from the lessons learned in recent operations. Additional bulletins will be published as information of timely, positive, and need-to-know application to in-country units becomes available. The content of these bulletins will also be incorporated in quarterly USARV "Battlefield Reports - A Summary of Lessons Learned."

These "lessons learned" were extracted from the Operational Report of Lessons Learned prepared by the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division for the period 1 November to 31 January 1967.

TUNNEL WARFARE

Item 1: Operations within rock formations.

"Discussion: Combating the enemy within a cave is extremely difficult. Since the enemy inhabits the cave he knows where the passages lead and has the advantage of interior lines of communication to rapidly reinforce. Additionally, he has a defense plan based on a detailed reconnaissance, knowing well in advance what avenues of approach must be used by his opponents. The attacker has no way to make a reconnaissance except by fire. As it appears, the advantage is on defense; however, there are several advantages that accrue to the attacker. The attacker being on the offensive has the initiative and freedom to choose where and when to attack. Secondly, the attacker has a significant psychological advantage in that the defender harbors a great fear of being entombed alive. The final result will depend mostly on the quality of the individuals fighting the engagement.

"Observation: Maximum exploitation of the psychological effect on the enemy was employed by using a small portable loudspeaker encouraging the enemy to come out or be buried alive. In spite of the total lack of reconnaissance, which was extremely difficult to the

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extent of the rock complexes and total darkness inside, the unit conducted a coordinated attack against the many openings of the rocks complex with small independent 4 man teams. Little use can be made of demolition or fragmentary grenades once a team is within the cave, as the explosives have an equal effect on both friendly and enemy. The demolitions and fragmentary grenades affect the eardrums. Therefore, the battle within the cave rock complex is really man against man using pistols at ranges of two and three feet. Here control and leadership is difficult and the will of the individual becomes the dominant factor. Training and discipline are the only factors that can influence the action within a rock complex."

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Item 2: Organization of rock complex fighting teams.

"Discussion: The technique of rock complex fighting requires detailed planning and violent execution similar to the technique developed by the US Army for destruction of a fortified area. The main difference in the attack of a cave complex and the attack of a fortified area is the inability to conduct a reconnaissance to obtain intelligence.

"Observation: Rock complex fighting teams of three or four men were organized and normally led by an experienced NCO. One man was the point and responsible for leading the way as well as security to the front. The second man in line, normally the leader, provided observation and security to the flanks. The rear man secured the rear and was the guide in case a rapid withdrawal became necessary. The lead man carried a large flashlight used to investigate cracks and crevices. Training and practice in the attack of a rock complex are absolute necessities for successful accomplishment of the mission."

Item 3: Use of non-toxic agent (CS) within an underground complex.

"Discussion: CS agent is extremely effective in dislodging the enemy from the numerous hiding places within a cave. If the enemy is there, the CS will cause him to reveal his position or cause him to exit his hiding place. The "Mighty Mite" was unsuccessful because of the vast size of the cave and its numerous egresses. There was no way to seal the cave effectively to insure penetration of the agent when using the "Mighty Mite". Drafts and air currents were unpredictable and frequently prevented the "Mighty Mite" from forcing the agent into the lower portion of the rock cavities.

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"Observation: CS agent is extremely effective in dislodging the enemy from the numerous hiding places within a cave.

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Item 4: Use of hand grenades within rock formations.

"Discussion: All hand grenades can be effectively used at rock formation entrances but once the team is underground, the hand grenade is not practicable. The hand grenade cannot be thrown within the restricted area of the rock complex. If thrown, the effect on friend and foe alike is chaotic.

"Observation: Hand grenades can be employed while the soldiers are outside the caves but once inside only non-fragmentation grenades can be used such as white phosphorous and CW, and these must be used with extreme caution. The best technique is to employ them around corners or down in crevices."

Item 5: Use of M18A1 Anti-Personnel Mine (Claymore) within the underground complex.

"Discussion: The Claymore can be effectively employed deep within the cave because it is command detonated. The team can vacate the areas; thereby, saving the effects of the blast for the enemy. Most frequently the Claymore is employed when entering the cave complex to insure no sniper is waiting the first soldier to silhouette himself against the light background of the underground complex.

"Observation: Claymores must be placed in well-concealed positions within the underground complex and sufficient wire provided to allow the team to withdraw to a safe location outside the cave area. Additionally, the Claymore should be "booby-trapped" to prevent the enemy from disarming it while the team is withdrawing to a safe area. This can be accomplished by burying a fragment grenade beneath the Claymore and placing a taut wire between the two so that any movement of the Claymore causes the hand grenade to explode. Further, the blasting cap wire must be tied around the Claymore tightly to prevent the enemy from removing the electric cap. Lastly, the team must move rapidly to a safe area and detonate the mine before the enemy has time to disarm it. Time fuse cannot be used to detonate Claymores under these conditions. Claymores are effective but they cannot insure the enemy will not be awaiting your arrival."

Item 6: Use of demolition within the underground rock complex.

"Discussion: The most effective method of destruction of an underground rock complex is through the utilization of demolitions. Great quantities of explosives, nearly 75 tons, were required to destroy the

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underground rock complexes which were found in the 3d Brigade TF AO. 102
Transportation of the explosives proved to be a most difficult logistical
problem. Maximum use was made of sma. satchel charges by tossing them
into the cave entrance then exploding the charge.

"Observation: When underground rock complex destruction is
required a great quantity of explosives will be necessary. The trans-
portation problem was solved by using a CH47 helicopter with a 100 foot
sling to deliver the explosives directly to the rock complex entrance.
The explosives were emplaced and exploded. The technique used was to throw
the small satchel charge device into the rock complex while a soldier
stood by with a claymore firing device."

Item 7: Use of individual weapons within an underground complex.

"Discussion: Due to the size of the M60 machine gun and the
noise it created, it was impossible to use the weapon in the caves. The
identical problem exists with the M14 rifle. The XM16E1 proved to be
somewhat better than either of the other two weapons due to its light
weight and compact size; however, in the case of all weapons with a high
muzzle velocity the ricochets were so frequent and so dangerous that
our soldiers were reluctant to use them. The best weapon by far proved
to be the caliber .45 automatic pistol. Since the ranges at which most
kills were made was in the neighborhood of a few feet, there was little
need for accuracy. The tremendous stopping power of the caliber .45
pistol at close ranges more than once literally blew the enemy down as
well as killing him.

"Observation: Since the caliber .45 pistol has an extremely
low muzzle velocity and a very heavy slug there was little chance of
a ricochet hitting the firer. The big disadvantage was the report
from the pistol which often stunned the firer, and momentarily prevented
him from firing a good second shot. For future operations of this nature
silencers should be provided personnel working in such close quarters."

FOR THE COMMANDER:



FRANK D. MILLER
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

S. A. MacKENZIE
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY VIETNAM

COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

NUMBER 9

15 June 1967

GENERAL

This Combat Lessons Bulletin provides wide dissemination of the contents of "Diary of an Infiltrator" assembled by the United States Mission in Vietnam. All entries in this diary are direct actual quotations in translations from the Vietnamese. Extracts from several hundred captured diaries were screened and this composite produced. Most of the diaries were taken in the Highlands and cover the period from July 1965 to August 1966.

Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 9 departs from the previous pattern in an effort to portray the life and thoughts of an infiltrator as he trains in the north and infiltrates and fights in the south. The contents of this diary give a valuable insight into the way of life of our adversary.

Diary of an Infiltrator

I -- Xuan Mai

I was born in Qui Nhon Province (South Vietnam) in 1920 and regrouped to North Vietnam from Binh Dinh Province on November 16, 1954. I was sent by the authorities to a political indoctrination course in Hanoi, where I learned about Socialism and Communism. That was from January 1, 1955 to February 15, 1956. Then I took a Land Reform course in Thai Binh Province (North Vietnam) and served as a land reform cadre for two years in Quang Binh Province (North Vietnam). Then I became an administrative cadre in Quang Binh, married, and had a son. Now I've been ordered to Xuan Mai Training Camp (Ha Dong Province -- North Vietnam). Today I arrived at Xuan Mai for three months training.

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Most of the men at Xuan Mai are draftees, and frankly, their morale is not too high. But at the sessions the cadre explain carefully that our mission is to help the South Vietnamese people fight the Americans and their henchmen and to liberate and unify the country. Most of us do our utmost to study and work and have a high sense of responsibilities. Some of the draftees, however, are afraid of sacrifice and the difficulties ahead and are bothered by family problems. Some have even sent in official requests asking permission to return to their home villages.

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Study consists of these subjects: Policies of the Lao Dong Party; Nature of People's War; Nature of People's Army; Military Tactics; Ten Principles of Leadership; Use of the Ambush and Surprise Attack; How to React Quickly to Opportunities; Use of Explosives; Social Classes in Socialist and Capitalist Societies; Proselyting Efforts; Guerrilla Warfare.

We were shown the movie Heroic Soldiers. It was about the life of a soldier. The true revolutionary not only knows how to fight but knows how to reason.

In the South, the Catholics for the most part are reactionary and against the Southern Revolution. They use the slogan: counter Communism and protect our religion.... The Protestant church is smaller and did not develop much under Diem. It is not against the Revolution but few of its followers participate.... Most of the Buddhists are reactionary and bad elements. Many of the bonzes are VNQDD. Their leader, Thich Tam Chau, has given orders to oppose the Revolution.... The Cao Dai generally now are anti-Communist, and their priests advise youth not to join the Revolution.

Fundamental of War of Liberation: When the revolutionary force becomes stronger and stronger, the nature of the war of liberation will shift from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. Conventional warfare is much more important -- it can produce decisive victories.

The jungle of Vietnam plays an important role in the present Special War. The jungle protects our forces. Also, it can be used to attack the enemy. The jungle can be a major theater of operations in which large enemy forces are annihilated. The (Mekong) Delta theater of operations

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is important only to wear down the enemy forces. Also, the Delta is an immense source of human and natural resources for the theater of operations in the highlands.

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We revolutionary soldiers are more determined to fight the U. S. aggressors than are the Front soldiers in the South. We can endure more hardships and have more confidence in the victory of the Revolution. This is due to our better class consciousness and discipline. We cadre have greater sense of responsibility and are more effective in combat. We are more mature.

Vuong has received a letter from his daughter Tuyen in Moscow. One letter dated September 27, 1965 told of a demonstration of university students at the American Embassy in Moscow to protest the bombing of North Vietnam. The students were oppressed. But showed fearlessness. All of them told a National Liberation Front representative in Moscow they were ready to return to Vietnam any time they are needed. She says life in Moscow can easily spoil and corrupt young Vietnamese. Young Russians do not like Vietnamese people and often mistake them for Chinese. Or they flatter and praise the Vietnamese people for suffering in a protracted war. These people are really worth insulting, she said. The Vietnamese students in Moscow take up collections frequently to support the South Vietnamese. Most of the Russian people think the Vietnamese are courageous but are not well aware of the reason for the struggle. The Russian people are not very revolutionary in nature and the young enjoy too much the American way of life. Tuyen frequently explains to Russian students that the Americans did not respect the 1954 Geneva Accords. Recently all students staged a demonstration at the Belgian Embassy and ransacked it. Miss Tuyen hung a slogan which read: "American Imperialists, Get Out of Vietnam."

Morale among many trainees is not good. Most do not want to infiltrate. They are afraid of hardships, difficulties, sacrifices, and illness. Some of them have fled the camp for their home villages.

—At an indoctrination session agit-prop cadre listed these Southern achievements during the year (i.e., 1965):

Eliminated 27,787 of the enemy.

Captured 2,139 weapons of all types.

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Destroyed 89 trucks, 31 boats, and shot down 48 aircraft.

Conducted total of 133,876 meetings.

Conducted 363,321 acts of sabotage.

Induced 14,348 RVNAF soldiers to desert.

Captured total of 1,289 hamlet officials, etc.

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Graduation ceremonies were held today. We were addressed by a colonel I have never seen before. He said we should overcome all hardships and achieve outstanding performances. He wished everyone good health, good service, and brilliant victories. In an hour it was over. Now we prepare for infiltration.

Last night in the North. We celebrated.

With the support of the 17 million North Vietnamese people, and the Chinese, Russian, and other Socialist country people, and with the opposition of the pacifist countries and the American people against Johnson's policy of war in Vietnam, surely we will achieve final victory.

Some men have written on their undershirts: Sanh bac tu nam ("born in the north, will die in the south.")

II -- On the Trail

Arrived in Laos. Bivouacked in the forest. We are told that we will get mail from our families if they write to the Reunification Committee in Hanoi. Many civilian workers on this section of the trail. Mostly woodcutters widening the trail under the trees by 1.5 meters. The sun of Laos is very bright and the sky always blue.

Marched 30 kilometers today under heavy rain. Have begun to eat canned food.

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Marched 17 kilometers today through torrential rain storm. Bridges had been washed out. Fallen trees were across the trail.

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Moved 22 kilometers today. Rain has lessened but the wind is cold. Shortage of rice and other food. Troop morale is down.

Marched 12 kilometers today. Many of the slopes we must climb are 35 degrees. Rain continues. I am carrying 33 kilos. Porters with bicycles are hauling most of our food and ammunition.

Still somewhere in central Laos. More heavy rain. Mountain pass crossings are difficult. I am tired and hungry. Tired of climbing mountains and wading streams. Hungry. Legs feel like they are ready to drop off. It takes six to seven hours to prepare a meal at night. Impossible to sleep without using leaves as a mattress.

Mountain people here are very superstitious. They killed pigs and buffalo when we arrived, not for us, but as sacrifice to the gods in case we defile the earth, which they hold sacred. We have been instructed not to dig foxholes or other fortifications.

Tet draws near. My heart is stirred with memories of my family. Tears ooze from my eyes. Used the last of my toothpaste today. My whistle doesn't work any more.

Laotians come trading food for things we are carrying. It is forbidden to do, but many of the men do it anyway. Today I was caught trading some clothes for rice and was reprimanded. Then I discovered that the sack of rice I had traded my last extra pair of pants for was a sack of dirt with just a layer of rice on top.

Southern Laos. This place is miserable. The green jungle is full of birds twittering. Flies sting and sting and the holes don't stop bleeding.

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Had nothing to eat for a whole day. Found a wild vegetable which I ate. But it was inedible. I thought I would die. Food is so precious. Rice is blood. Manioc is tears. Salt is perspiration. How powerful are hunger, thirst, and weariness.

Lower Laos. Terrible hardships. Paths again steep. Heavy rains again every day. Loads we carry very heavy. Five men have died of malaria. I didn't think people died of malaria.

Physically exhausted. Some slopes today were 40 degrees. We can only move for half-hour and then must rest. Oh, My Fatherland: spring is coming to you again and my spring is vanishing.

Spring also is coming to this land of Laos, but the trees are without leaves and the grass is withered. It is cold as ice at night.

Many stragglers. More rain. Must trade personal belongings to the Laotians for food. They have only manioc or wild vegetable to trade; it is difficult to eat.

Trade more belongings for food. I don't have much left to trade.

Stricken with malaria today. I was afraid this would happen. Malaria affecting many of my comrades. Orders are to keep going, even if we must crawl.

It is good thing to be patient. But life is so short. Am I weak and less than others?

The incident took place because the Third Squad went to cut wood without telling anyone or notifying headquarters. Thus we thought it was the enemy approaching and opened fire. Four were killed and several others wounded.

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I don't know why I feel sad, discouraged, homesick, and worried about the future like I do. My homesickness is worst at sunset.

///
A memo was read to us today saying that wounded and sick soldiers on the trail should not complain nor cause trouble nor make demands. Also, that only cadre of company level and up are to be returned to the north in case of serious illness or wounds. Soldiers are to be classified by medical sections into categories according to their health:

- a. Physically fit or suffering diseases that have no noticeable effect.
 - b. Affected by a disease but incapacitated only three or four days a month.
 - c. Affected by serious or chronic diseases such as tuberculosis, heart ailment, nervous breakdown, etc.
-

III -- In South Vietnam

It was night and we started across a river by ferry. No sooner were we on the river than the enemy planes came and dropped flares and strafed us. We are now in South Vietnam.

Moved 17 kilometers through the jungle. Rained all day. Many of the men have malaria and their legs are swollen. Crossed 32 streams. It took us nearly 15 hours. Enemy planes strafed us at some of the crossings.

Crossed three streams today. Marched 24 kilometers. Stopped in forest area near village. Villagers seemed to accept our rather large contingent as normal arrival. Saw first Montagnards today. Many of the men were afraid of them.

Stopped at Station Nineteen. It has antiaircraft defenses but no underground fortifications. This is said to be the safest place on the (Ho Chi Minh) Trail. The station easily took care of 2,000 people in it.

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Last night planes kept flying over the area. First came the L-19's which observed and then the F-8's which raided us. The lead element kept moving, but the main element kept undercover all afternoon. It was a welcome rest.

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Went extra long distance today because way station we were to have stopped at was closed because it is too exposed and too subjected to air strikes. Just after we crossed a suspension bridge today an enemy plane flew in and destroyed the bridge. Then it kept circling us. Rumors in the outfit say an enemy unit is in the area. The men are uneasy.

Here we found a new portion of the trail under the trees, which runs parallel to the old one about two kilometers away. The old trail is kept up, in the hope that the Americans will bomb it and we will be safe to travel the new trail. However, a man at the station said the Americans have been bombing both trails.

Our travel movement is being slowed down by the day and night continuous air strikes.

Food situation is getting critical. Will have to cut the ration below 500 grams. The word tonight is that there is no rice at all stored at the next two stations.

Damn the Americans. They force us to sleep in the jungle with only rice and, if we are lucky, salt to eat. I am determined to fight and serve my people until my last breath.

Moved into Quang Nam. Rain continues. Troops exhausted. Many have deserted or fallen out. Comrade Dang could not keep up and had to remain.

Cadre came and talked to us today. He said enemy strength and activities have increased against us lately and that we face many difficulties now. But he said these difficulties are only temporary and that basically we are—both militarily and politically—much stronger than the enemy. He said traitors in our midst must be rooted out. And he said the notion of negotiating with the imperialists and their lackey henchmen must be eliminated. We must prepare to fight a protracted conflict, relying entirely on our own capabilities. Wars of national liberation are won by means of the class struggle.

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Station has just received rice supply from Cambodia. Troops here got 800 grams as well as 12 kilos to carry with them. What a relief!

Arrived at a (highlands) rest camp. We now will have one month to recuperate from our ordeal. We get three meals a day: rice, salt, and cooked vegetables, usually sweet potatoes. We can sometimes catch fish in the streams and eat them.

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Fear of hardships and the Americans has caused many desertions and surrenders. One of our companies had seven desertions last month (Feb 66). Southern Party officials do not realize the danger in the enemy's chieu hoi program and that it must be massively opposed. Men surrender because they lack solidarity, class consciousness, and because political indoctrination has not been sufficient.

Cadre must make subordinates see that the difficulties of the revolutionary force are only temporary. They must make them see the advantages we have and the basic weaknesses of the enemy, explaining that the enemy's strength is only temporary.

Rightism, peace illusions, subjectivism, and reluctance to make sacrifices must be fought to the utmost.

We lack revolutionary vigilance, and the enemy's chieu hoi campaign has eaten its way into our ranks. We must check this flow of desertions. Fear of the Americans is cowardice which the Revolution cannot permit to prevail.

Binh, a Southerner, refuses to return to his unit after recovering from malaria in his former village. Further, his relatives will protect him. We must discipline both Binh and his relatives.

Investigation of (Southern Viet Cong) Main Force units must answer these questions: Does the individual under investigation have any political or ideological problems that might lead him to anti-revolutionary thoughts or actions? Is he politically reliable? Investigate carefully and cover all details of an individual's life. Pay particular attention to: recruits, new Party members, AWOL's, persons who have been captured and released by the enemy, persons with relatives with the enemy, members of units in which anti-revolutionary rumors abound or from which there have been leaks in classified information.

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The Southerners and even some Northerners who have been in the south for some time fear the Americans and their planes, artillery, and strength and so try to avoid contact. They are willing to go on isolated guerrilla operations but find ways of evading concentrated large-unit actions. They say we will be surrounded if we try to mount big operations.

In An Tin many people were killed, including Comrade Hay of the PRP Youth League, and many houses damaged. 114

Some 100 people in various villages now support the enemy. They say "Death is unavoidable serving in the labor corps or in the youth assault group, for we will be killed by artillery and air strikes, so we choose to die in enemy service." The situation is very confused. People are discouraged. They refuse to serve or join or enlist.

The population at large is very much frightened by air strikes and the resulting deaths. For example, bombing of Boi Loi took a heavy toll of civilian laborers. Some bodies were buried, others were not, and the stench of decaying flesh is unbearable. Relatives of these dead workers requested permission to go to the spot to bury their dead. They were told permission would have to be granted by a higher authority. The problem is that if their requests are not honored they will complain that their relatives lie stark naked unburied. But if they are permitted to go to the place the ghastly sight will dishearten them. This problem deserves our utmost attention.

Since the day I left you, mother, to follow my companions
 To Central Vietnam through Laos,
 I've known the hardship of climbing green mountains
 Of plodding through cold rain and under searing sun.
 In this, my youth, my life should blossom like a flower,
 But gladly, I bore hardship and danger,
 For they told me it was in the name of Peace.
 Month after month I marched by day and tried to rest by night.
 My shoes wore out, my jacket is so thin the cold easily cuts through.
 Evening finds me
 Here in the heart of the Truong Son range,
 O Mother, I yearn for home.
 I miss the blue smoke, the gourd arbor,
 The butterflies, the old temple roof--
 Oh, how I miss them all!
 But I am here on foreign soil,
 And yet the South too is our country--
 Here the same green-crested coconut trees,
 The same roads perfumed with the scent of rice paddies,

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The same blue smoke tinting the evening sky,
The buffalo returning to its shelter,
The sound of the flute singing to me of home--
And I feel less estranged.
I look about and ask
What here needs "liberation"?
The market crowded with people in a festive mood?
The rice field green with the burgeoning crop?
The curve-roofed pagoda and its worship bell?
The classrooms,
Full of happy children singing in joyous chorus?
The garden
With tiny butterflies, busy on the yellow cabbage flowers?
Peace and happiness reigned all throughout this land,
Why did they order me to burn these quiet villages,
Destroy the rustic bridges,
And sow the explosive seeds of sudden death
Among the people?
How my hand trembled when I had to set a mine--
And then, I watched it do its work--
Blasting human flesh and spattering a rain of blood--
Whose blood, my mother?
The blood of people like ourselves--
My people's blood, mother--
That night my eyes streamed bitter tears,
And my sleep was filled with guilty nightmares.

We must maintain a seven-day rice ration and a one-day fried rice ration. Adequate food must be insured for the sick and wounded. During the past week we collected or purchased:

16 pigs
9 cows
78 kilograms of sugar
242 cans of milk
6 containers of salted fish
750 kilograms of salt

Rice: 33 plus 287 plus six kilograms at Toan Ninh depot and 6,222 kilograms at Pho Toan village. Coordination has been poor. Manpower has been wasted. The supply centers have not distributed food on time. This caused some units to go hungry. Improper storage of fried rice resulted in 70 percent loss during rain storm at one depot.

A tunnel is a type of secret combat pit and communication link designed to provide cover, concealment, and secrecy to guerrilla troops

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and villagers during enemy bombings, shellings, and sweep operations. It helps the guerrilla to follow the enemy closely without being detected and to attack him at his weak point. It also promotes the morale of the civilians, for it constitutes a safe hiding place for villagers. Moreover a tunnel provides effective mutual support between guerrilla units located in different hamlets or villages. Tunnels are dug zig-zag, about four meters below the surface. Each section is 1.6 meters high, 1.6 meters long, and about one meter wide. Overall length usually about seventy meters. Digging tunnels requires great amount of work and must be done by the village work force with village funds. Cadre must be patient and must motivate the people well if the tunnel digging program is to be a success. Tunnels require good drainage system, especially during the rainy season.

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Recently, Liberation Radio referred much to Uncle Ho, Party leadership, class struggle, etc. Such open propaganda is not appropriate. The Central Committee directs that propaganda should praise nationalism, patriotism, revolutionary heroism, and the role of the National Liberation Front. Indoctrination and propaganda referring to Uncle Ho, Party, class struggle, etc., should be conducted orally within internal organizations and among the people only. Party flags and portraits of Uncle Ho can be hung only in Party meetings. It is better to hang the Front flags and portraits of Nguyen Huu Tho, if available.

We are not greeted as liberators in the villages. When we enter the people come and ask us to leave, saying that if we do not the enemy planes will come and strafe the village. I feel like a leper.

IV -- Battle

I would like to set down an account of our attack against the US heliborne operational forces at Thuan Ninh hamlet. I was attached to the First Company, 95th (North Vietnamese) Battalion. The attack took place on September 18, 1965.

On arrival in the area, our company and battalion were assigned by Regiment to occupy the Phu Cu mountain pass and intercept any reinforcements coming through it. You should understand that mountains surround Thuan Ninh hamlet, which is at one end of Binh Tan village in Binh Khe district of Binh Dinh Province. On the east it is adjacent to Cat Hiep village, Phu Cat district. To the south is Bo Bo mountain pass and Binh Gian village, which is not far from National Highway 19, which runs from Qui Nhon to An Khe. There are dry paddy rice fields in the middle of the hamlet, which were used as a landing zone for the American helicopters. A large stream runs through the village. Hamlet houses are dispersed. The hamlet has one guerrilla squad composed of both men and women.

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At this time our unit was fresh from victories at Cheo Reo and Thuan Man and was high-spirited and ready for a new mission. Each squad had five or six cadre--assistant squad and platoon leaders--who had enlisted in 1962 and 1963. The majority of the soldiers had been recruited in 1964 and 1965.

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Military training had been conducted since August 5 and had stressed:

1. Annihilation of the Americans.
2. Shooting down aircraft.
3. Destroying M-113's, armored personnel carriers.
4. Accepting the most difficult missions.
5. Following the combat example of friendly units in the Ba Gia area.
6. Selecting and employing the most progressive squad leaders.

Our indoctrination discussions choose as the topic: "Dare we fight the Americans?" Upon hearing of the victories of our unit at Nui Thanh mountain and Van Tuong, our men were high-spirited. We used these victories to motivate and encourage them further. Our men, after being carefully taught about American military tactics and techniques, were very eager to engage the Americans. Many said, "We must not sit here and wait for the Americans, for the country will be reunited before we get a chance to fight." However, some comrades were afraid of the Americans because of their size as well as their aircraft and artillery.

Our unit was deployed along a large stream in Thuan Ninh hamlet, five kilometers from National Highway 19, 30 km northeast of An Khe.

The point company of the battalion was deployed 30 meters from the unit location and left of the 2d Company. The terrain is bushy, with numerous hills. There is a hill higher than others and a post formerly occupied by the French. From 15 to 20 mango trees were grown 20 meters apart. Few people live in front and on the left of the rice field.

Our unit operated in the western area for three months before moving here for refitting and military training.

Upon arrival at the location, company and battalion cadre reconnoitered counter-operation sites and troop location for the battalion.

Orders from higher echelons said our troops must maneuver to annihilate the enemy four hours after his landing.

Upon completion of reconnaissance, cadre from platoon level and up were briefed on coordination on the actual terrain.

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According to the message and directive from the regiment, the enemy would block National Highway 19 for the 1st Air Cavalry Division to move to An Khe and the western area.

Company and battalion cadre met to confirm the counter-operation site and deploy forces to each direction.

According to the people, the enemy had landed here once or twice before (in front of the 1st and 2d Co's position - the last time in April 1965 to liberate prisoners). The battalion planned to change its location.

We requested to stay there and dig deep trenches. We would be used in case of enemy landing. The battalion approved our request.

The battalion and we intended to train in the area where the battle would take place, since we could fight the enemy while under training.

We used Go Don post (formerly occupied by the French) in front of 2d Company's position as a fortification to be attacked by the battalion. Each company was assigned its own area.

After over one month of training on the attack of strongholds, raid and ambush, we received the second message saying that the enemy was planning to conduct a sweep operation in this area. During our training, now and then reconnaissance and jet aircraft flew over the area and bombed Thuan Ninh Hamlet three times.

Upon hearing that the units had gained victories at Thanh mountain and Van Tuong, we were very high-spirited. We took these examples to arouse the unit's hatred of the Americans and to urge them to kill as many Americans as possible. Dare we fight the Americans? And choose between life and death? All the comrades actively participated in the discussion. If they (the Americans) are big, we will have "two or three men against one"; we will try to act close to them to avoid their strong air and artillery support. It is not difficult to fight the Americans because if other units can, so can we.

Every night, 3-man cells conduct activities very regularly. Many comrades said they wished the Americans jumped down (from helicopters) right in this area so that they could deal them a long-remembered blow and impress the local people. (They once landed in this area before and the province unit quickly ran away. People talk a lot about this.)

Their landing from helicopters on this area will be a golden opportunity. Their landing here means certain death for them.

In brief, all units were in high spirits. Many comrades, group members, and youths repaired the camouflage nets and looked for tree branches to make AR supports to fire on aircraft. They were working and talking: "Come here (Americans). If you come here, you will never go back. Our technique and tactics are brand new. Steel is very hard."

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Squad, platoon, and company cadre reinspected the terrain and appointed positions for each squad and cell. All of us, soldiers and cadre alike, are very familiar with the terrain.

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On 15 and 16 (September 1965) enemy L-19's and jets were flying continuously over Thuan Ninh; in fact, we were very busy then. Platoon leaders and up had to report to the Regiment Commander for instructions for the battle which starts the "Autumn" campaign and simultaneously (the activity of) the division.

On 16 (September 1965) District unit informed us that the enemy was going to conduct a sweep operation in Thuan Ninh.

At 1400 hours on 17 (September) three helicopters and two L-19's were flying very low over areas likely to be selected as landing zones.

Since 16 and 17 September, we have been alerted and trained at the positions assigned. At 0500 hours, after breakfast, we completed the preparation of weapons and ammunition.

At 0600 hours on 18 September, squad leaders and up reported to the battalion headquarters for sand-table exercise on the forthcoming battle. The preparation just started when L-19's flew in and fighters dropped bombs.

Development of the Battle

At 0600 hours, two L-19's flew in and two fighters dropped bombs on our position; the 2d Company, 1st and 2d Platoons were hit. Less than 10 minutes later, 40 helicopters came and landed troops on the field where the battalion used to train our troops on attacking strongholds. Three minutes later, 40 helicopters landed troops on the training field of the 2d Company. When the enemy aircraft stopped dropping bombs, we ordered troops to move in the direction assigned by the battalion.

The 1st Platoon advanced toward the market, protecting the right flank of the battalion. It had the mission of attacking the enemy troops who landed on the market area and intercepting enemy elements coming from Bo Bo. The 2d Platoon moved on the left, close to the 2d Company; one squad occupied the hill. The 3d Platoon and the fire power platoon were deployed at the main front.

Bombs broke our telephone wire. Our unit lost contact with the battalion and throughout the day, we had to fight independently without receiving any instruction from the battalion.

While advancing we heard the platoon moving on our left, open fire and we simultaneously fired at aircraft. As we heard gunshots from the 2d Company, we were very anxious. We sent two squads and mortar section from the main front to move toward the position of the 2d Company. (At this

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moment, there were no enemy troops at the main front of the company.) These two squads encountered the enemy moving from the direction of the 2d Company. He planned to occupy the hill, but met the resistance of one of our squads deployed on the hill.

The three squads immediately attacked. In the meantime, two squads of the left flank platoon were fighting within 20 meters of the enemy. Because of a stream, neither side could advance. (After receiving the above report from the left flank platoon leader, we carried a 60mm mortar to the area and fired 8 rounds on the enemy.) The situation was very tense. The enemy was rushing toward us from the direction of the 2d Company, and helicopters landed troops for the third time. (The second landing took place right on the main front of our company.)

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At this moment, we ordered two squads of the left flank platoon to change their direction of fire with two machine guns which were positioned 80 meters apart. The distance between the 2 squads at the direction of the 2d Company and a squad on the right was 150 meters. All types of weapons spat fire simultaneously. Only 15 helicopters landed troops here. The rest flew away without landing the troops.

Over one company was landed this time. The enemy strove to cross the ricefield and occupy high terrain; we concentrated our fire at them fiercely because they rushed straight toward us. They were not far from us, 100 meters maximum distance from the 2 MG's and 2 mortars and 80 meters from our rifle squads. They stopped in the field. Enemy jets flew very low and sprayed "butterfly" bombs 40 meters from us. Helicopters fired rockets and machine guns on both our positions and the enemy's.

At that moment we had to move the two MG's back to the stream bank.

The enemy assaulted our positions and succeeded in reaching the mango grove where we had one platoon with one MG and one mortar. (Ed. note: The account of the battle breaks off at this point. It apparently was not a decisive operation to either side and appears to have been a more or less standard military "sweep" operation.)

Experiences Drawn from the Battle

The M79 has a fairly large casualty radius. If all squads and platoons knew the way to conduct front and flank attacks and make feinting in front to attack from the rear, we could immediately annihilate the enemy without suffering serious losses caused by M79.

Although aircraft are very frightening, we can reduce losses by approaching the enemy troops as closely as possible.

Secrecy must be absolutely maintained when approaching the enemy. We have to use hand signals with friendly units. If we shouted, our positions would be discovered and we would be wiped out by enemy small arms, mortars, M79, etc.

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The firing at aircraft must be started simultaneously. However, the following point must be taken into consideration. When landing, enemy helicopters fly at very low altitude, from 30 to 40 meters above the ground, and slowly. If we aim at their nose, we will hit either the engine or the pilot. If we aim at two-thirds of the aircraft, we will hit the gas tank and set the aircraft on fire.

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When examining a downed but unburned aircraft, we asked our troops where they had hit to down it. They said the aircraft was flying very low then and they fired at the door. We found that one of the aircraft was downed on the battlefield not burnt, but only pierced by bullets from one side to the other side of the fuselage. It is possible that the pilot was killed. One of four rotor blades was broken. It was therefore concluded that this aircraft was down because of its broken propeller.

Strong Points of the Battle

Plans were carefully drafted. Units were under good control and properly used throughout the battle.

The company applied the tactic of encircling and disorganizing the enemy forces in small elements and used the successful experience gained in the Ba Gia battle, main objective, secondary objective, and flank attack. Our troops fought at close range, strongly and continuously during this battle.

Gallantry of the unit was shown by the squad positioned on the hill and two squads of the 2d Platoon which had fought hand-to-hand with the enemy, using grenades to repel three enemy assaults. Combat coordination was good.

Political motivation was continuously carried out, urging the troops to materialize the slogan "one bullet for one enemy soldier."

Troops are aware of their role in the care of the wounded and burying of the dead.

Weak Points

Failure to know clearly whether the unit which was going to conduct the operation was a US unit or a puppet army one in order to motivate our troops beforehand. We knew that it was an American unit only when it landed on the battlefield.

A number of cadre and soldiers were afraid of the dangers of the battle and hesitant to move forward and strongly attack the enemy. The longer the battle lasted, the wearier they became.

We also ordered the soldiers to assault and seize enemy weapons but they did not actively carry out their mission or fire support was not

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provided for infantry units to conduct assaults. Moreover, their assaults were repelled because of enemy M79's.

A number of cadre and soldiers said that the Americans are strong, brave, and determined to remain in their positions. Moreover, it is hard to assault their positions because they have the M79's. These cadre and soldiers were afraid of enemy aircraft because of their fierce airstrikes.

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I Will Lament for Ten Thousand Graves

When the war has ended and the road is open again,
The same stars will course through the Heavens.
Then will I weep for the white bones heaped together in desolate graves
Of those who sought military honors for their leaders.

(1st entry - translator)

FOR THE COMMANDER:



FRANK D. MILLER
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

S. A. MackENZIE
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

NUMBER 10

20 June 1967

AMBUSH AND COUNTER-AMBUSH OPERATIONS

Combat Lessons Bulletins are to be published on an "as required" basis to ensure that appropriate subordinate commands derive maximum benefits from the "lessons learned" in recent operations. This Combat Lessons Bulletin departs from the previous pattern to deal in some detail with ambushes in general and points out ambush techniques which the VC/NVA forces have recently employed against Free World Forces. Included are preventive measures and actions to reduce the effectiveness of VC/NVA ambushes. While portions of this discussion are academic, this approach is necessary to understand fundamental ambush tactics so that more adequate measures can be taken to reduce the incidence and effectiveness of VC/NVA ambushes.

1. TECHNIQUES OF GUERRILLA AMBUSH:

a. General: Although information of VC/NVA tactics in employing ambushes is not complete, data is available which points out most of the techniques employed by the VC/NVA forces and which they can be expected to employ in future ambushes. These techniques are discussed below in some detail to illustrate that the ambush is not the "ultimate tactic" against which there is no defense or countermeasure. Units must have confidence in their ability to overcome the initial advantage of an ambushing force and, through prompt and determined action, defeat the VC/NVA force.

b. Types of Ambushes: Ambushes may be defined by the purpose of the ambush and by the type target against which it is directed.

(1) Classes of Ambushes by Purpose:

(a) Harassing Ambush: An ambush employed to harass and slow down the movement of personnel and vehicles of all types. No attempt is made to

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close with the enemy or destroy him. It may range in size from a single rifleman to a relatively large sized unit whose mission is to deny friendly forces freedom of movement. This type ambush can readily be overcome by bold, aggressive action since the ambushing force will normally avoid decisive combat. 126

(b) Killing Ambush: An ambush designed to destroy personnel and usually conducted by relatively large units which may or may not close with the ambushed unit. Its purpose is solely to kill personnel and destroy equipment. The actions of the ambushing force will be governed by the composition and actions/reactions of the ambushed force. Counteraction requires a high degree of training and determination since rapid and complete destruction is the VC/NVA mission.

(c) Resupply Ambush: This type ambush is frequently encountered in counter-guerrilla warfare. It is designed to equip or resupply, supply or resupply, guerrilla units which have inherent supply problems. Complete destruction of the ambushed party is not the mission of the ambushing force. Killing must be tempered on the basis that over-destruction will defeat the purpose of the resupply mission. Since the VC/NVA killing power must be well measured, counteraction or defensive measures are usually effective. The presence of "carrying parties" to retrieve and remove the supplies and/or equipment results in large numbers of less well trained personnel in the ambush site which tends to betray the presence of the ambush party. Also, counteraction is more effective and pursuit easier since bearers are slowed by the loads they are forced to carry.

(d) Prisoner Ambush: A difficult ambush to execute and the easiest to counter. Since the mission is to seize prisoners, the ambush is not primarily designed to kill or destroy. A definite target is usually prescribed: a VIP, a courier, an officer, or some specific individual, who is usually held for ransom or bargaining purposes. Because the mission is to capture a prisoner, killing power is limited and firm counteraction can be successful in defeating the ambush.

(e) Combination Ambush: One or more of the above methods may be combined, provided the missions are compatible. Enemy ambushes are rarely executed for a single purpose: Their ambushes almost invariably are designed both to kill personnel and to capture supplies. It is emphasized however, that any combination of missions makes counteraction easier because the multi-purpose ambush is more complicated to execute.

(2) Classes of Ambushes by Target:

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(a) Ambushes Against Dismounted Troops: An ambush conducted against troops either in column on trails or roads, or in a deployed formation. This ambush is the most difficult to conduct as trained units moving on foot are alert for the possibility of ambushes and have security elements preceding, following and flanking the column. Most examples of successful VC ambushes of this type are those involving targets which are small, poorly trained and poorly equipped. However, large (battalion size) units have been ambushed by the VC/NVA and have sustained heavy losses. These ambushes, however, are the exception rather than the rule. Larger units are far more difficult to ambush with near certainty of success (a prerequisite of any guerrilla operation) because they generally employ adequate security and are too large a force to be defeated in detail. Instances of successful ambushes of large units are always characterized by serious breaches of security and a failure of the commander and his troops to take rapid, positive counteraction.

(b) Ambushes Against Wheeled or Tracked Vehicles: This ambush is the easiest to conduct and one of the most difficult to counter. The speed with which vehicles move is no defense against ambush. Rather, in most cases, it is a liability which must be carefully considered. Experience indicates that although convoys have included quantities of weapons capable of heavy fire power and even vehicles whose sole purpose is to protect the convoy, there is often a failure to provide adequate point or flank security and/or sufficient interval between vehicles. Convoy organization, march control, thorough briefings, and discipline are absolute requirements for secure motor movements. When making motor moves, personnel must be assigned specific duties to perform during the move; leaders must be appointed for each vehicle and each individual must be aware of his responsibilities during the move and actions to be taken if ambushed. When the personnel making a motor move do not come from a single unit, they must be rehearsed in counter ambush drills-until they can execute the local SOP drill without hesitation. Once a "close interval" vehicular column is stopped, the reduction of the entire convoy is relatively simple. Unprepared troops involved are generally surprised, grouped in easy targets for automatic weapons and grenades, and are forced to dismount before they can effectively engage the ambush force. Only through the application of proper preventive measures and counteraction can the effectiveness of this type of ambush be reduced.

(c) Ambush of Watercraft Moving Along Inland Waterways: The ambush of boats and small craft moving along the relatively narrow inland waterways of the Delta Region of South Vietnam is, in many respects, similar to the ambush of vehicular columns. The problems are amplified by the fact that prior to any effective counteraction, troops must first reach shore - this is a very difficult task. Further, point and flank security are difficult, making this type of ambush a favorite of the VC.

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(d) Ambushes of Railroad Stock: This is a special kind of ambush which includes the elements of sabotage and is excluded from detailed discussion in this paper although many of the elements described herein are applicable.

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c. Characteristics of Ambushes:

(1) General: Climate and terrain of South Vietnam lend themselves readily to the execution of successful ambushes. Climate is not severe, permitting ambushing units to remain in position for extended periods of time without undue physical discomfort. Evidence available, indicates that the VC have occupied ambush positions as long as 48 hours prior to contact. Terrain also lends itself to the conduct of successful VC ambush. Jungles offer almost perfect concealment at the ambush site and provide concealed routes to and from the selected location. Mountainous terrain causes foot soldiers to become tired and less alert to ambush possibilities, and inexperienced drivers invariably "close up" a vehicular column on steep grades. The relatively restricted arteries of communication limit routes which can be used. Secondary roads are often closed by VC sabotage forcing the use of routes which can be easily interdicted by VC ambush. In summary, practically every geographical area of South Vietnam favors the ambush tactic.

(2) Military Characteristics of Ambushes:

(a) The first and most fundamental characteristic of guerrilla ambushes is intelligence. Although ambushes may be of the deliberate or the hasty type, the VC prefer the deliberate ambush; one directed at a specific target with a specific mission and a special organization designed to best accomplish the mission. Intelligence is fundamental to the planning of such an ambush. Without accurate and timely intelligence, no VC unit can effectively ambush because in such cases, the risks to the ambushing unit are unacceptable by guerrilla standards. Information required includes knowledge of routes, composition and time of arrival of the target to be ambushed, weapons and defensive troops which accompany the unit, and even knowledge of the unit commander - his capabilities and limitations. The state of training of the unit is always considered for if it appears that the action cannot be successfully completed, it will not be carried out.

(b) The second characteristic of guerrilla ambushes is careful site selection. Ambushes are sited at locations that are designed to appear as unlikely ambush sites, but which in reality give the ambushers a decided advantage and invariably place the ambushed unit in an unfavorable position. Uphill grades, blind curves, heavily wooded approaches, defiles, stream beds and narrow trails are all potential ambush sites and should be regarded as such.

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(c) The third characteristic of the guerrilla ambush is complete security of the ambush site until the ambush is sprung. Ambushes are difficult to detect until the ambushed party is within the killing zone. Extraordinary care is exercised by the guerrilla force to maintain the ambush site in a state of readiness completely secure - yet not revealing its presence. All around security is strictly maintained; friendly civilians who "stumble upon" the ambush site are detained until after the ambush, and entrance or exit to the site is never along routes which can be seen by the approaching unit. When mines are placed in roadways or along the "far" side of the road, access to the road is gained some distance from the ambush site, or at a cross trail, to preserve the natural appearance of the site. Recent VC actions have indicated that the ambush position may be completely prepared then the ambush party withdraws to a "safe area" nearby, there to await the force to be ambushed. Only lookouts remain in the ambush site with the main ambush party occupying the site at the last possible moment. Other variations include ambush sites which are completely underground and elaborately camouflaged. In some instances, the ambush party lies in wait under water breathing through hollow reeds. This latter technique was used with considerable success against the French and has been encountered in the Capital Military District. All of these techniques ultimately contribute to the security of the ambush site and assist in gaining complete surprise when the ambush is sprung.

(d) The fourth characteristic of the guerrilla ambush is that the organization of the ambush party is planned in detail to ensure coordination, mutual support, immediate supervision and direction. Ambush parties are specifically designed to meet the target encountered. The organization of the ambush party is predicated on assigning specific missions to each member to accomplish a prescribed action. Generally, this organization includes the following components: Command element; blocking elements, front and rear; fire units for each major element of the unit to be ambushed; and security elements. In addition there may be other elements required by the specific mission of the ambush, such as carrying parties, assault elements to kill, demolition parties to destroy, snipers to prevent escape, and any other elements required by the guerrilla commander to accomplish his mission. This organization requires close coordination and supervision to carry out its mission. To this end, current VC doctrine directs that rehearsals be conducted.

(e) The fifth characteristic of the ambush is that during the conduct of the ambush the ambushing force is extremely vulnerable to organized counteraction, especially flanking maneuvers which threaten escape routes. Once the ambush is sprung, the attention of the ambush party is necessarily directed to the accomplishment of its mission, and is therefore oriented almost exclusively to the ambushed unit. Only by providing security forces to its flanks and rear can the ambush party protect itself from being surprised. Because VC units are normally outgunned and can be outfought by the better organized and equipped Free World Forces, they will break contact when confronted with a strong counterattack or flanking maneuver force.

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(f) The sixth characteristic is that ambushes rely on a relatively simple but effective system of signals, which because of security requirements and the noise of battle tend to become difficult to execute and are subject to breakdown. In order to coordinate the action of the ambush party the guerrilla commander must have at his disposal a system of signals to control the actions of the elements of the ambush party. These signals range from the advance warning that the target is approaching to the final signal for withdrawal. Oral commands are generally ineffective in the noise of battle or because of security requirements. Hence, make-shift signals are generally employed. Any failure or compromise of the signal system will obviously hinder the attacking elements and reduce the effectiveness of ambushes.

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(g) The seventh characteristic is that ambushes are short intense actions followed by complete and rapid withdrawal. The ambush is not designed to last over extended periods. The key to successful ambushes is shock-action - the quick kill followed by equally rapid withdrawal upon completion of the mission. No attempt is made to hold the ambush site for extended periods of time. Normally, the greatest damage done in any ambush is completed in the initial 2 or 3 minutes. What follows is only mop-up and completion of any specific mission other than killing and destruction. The rapid withdrawal over multiple routes by small well dispersed elements from the ambush site is essential and it is not unusual to find VC guides stationed at rally points immediately behind the ambush site to direct members of the ambush party to safe areas, and thus evade attempts by the ambushed party or reinforcements to pursue. This is particularly true when ambushes are conducted during the hours of darkness.

2. MEASURES WHICH CAN BE TAKEN TO PREVENT AMBUSHES:

a. General: As was pointed out in paragraph 1, the guerrilla ambush is not the ultimate tactic against which there is no defense. There are proven measures and countermeasures that can be taken which will materially reduce the incidence of effective ambushes. Those suggested below stem from the military characteristics of ambushes and should be viewed as suggestive in nature to meet situations as they exist in specific units and areas.

b. Suggested Preventive Measures:

(1) Since ambushes are predicated upon accurate intelligence of routes, timetables, escorts, locations of communications equipment and leaders, counter-intelligence activities should be intensified. Denial of the requisite information will reduce the number of effective ambushes, and many deceptive measures can be taken to deceive the VC as to the true nature of the movement. Leaving departure areas with larger than required escort which drops off enroute, will tend to confuse VC intelligence efforts. Variation of formation to change the locations of communications, leaders, and automatic weapons within the unit will further complicate VC intelligence collection

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efforts. These variations may simply be formation changes for different movements or they may be changes during the conduct of one particular movement. As a deceptive measure, the VC normally insist on the maintenance of routine civilian activity in areas where ambushes are laid. Therefore, the presence of this "normal" activity should not be construed as an indication of safety. Civilians indigenous to these areas are often aware of ambushes which are set; careful interrogation of them may reveal the presence of the ambush. When it is suspected that local inhabitants have knowledge of an ambush, they may reveal the presence of the enemy by their reluctance to enter the known ambush site with the lead scouts of the friendly unit. The use of helicopters to conduct reconnaissance as well as to reinforce and position flank security units will tend to reduce ambushes. These are but a few of the measures in the fields of intelligence and counter-intelligence which can be taken to decrease the number of successful VC ambushes.

(2) As ambush sites are carefully selected and give the appearance of innocence, leaders at all levels should constantly "war game" an ambush at sites that prior map or terrain study indicates might be effective ambush sites. Special measures discussed in later paragraphs, may be employed upon entering such areas. An alert unit is a difficult ambush target. Alertness begins with the commander who maintains proper security and instills the same condition in his whole command.

(3) Since the ambush, ideally conducted, is not discovered until the ambush is sprung, the most effective preventive measure is the employment of adequate security. Alert scouts will detect ambush sites by searching out suspected areas, observing signals which herald their arrival or by drawing fire. In this regard, when moving along trails in dense jungle, movement must be made in complete silence. Since VC often occupy ambush sites for prolonged periods, they tend to become careless about noise discipline. Under such conditions, lead scouts can often hear the ambush party and circumvent the ambush site if the main body conducts its move in silence. Units can employ controlled reconnaissance by fire to include preplanned artillery concentrations and move by bounds, covering the advance by mutually supporting automatic weapons. Armored vehicles can provide security detachments and be available for mounted or dismounted flanking action. Any action which will cause the VC to either spring an ambush prematurely or reveal its presence will greatly reduce the incidence of effective ambushes.

(4) Because the ambush requires a cohesive organization, with close coordination, random changes in the organization of the column, location of supporting weapons, communications equipment, etc., will require similar changes in the organization of the ambush force. If schedules are varied and changes in patterns and formations are made at road-side halts,

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the ambush force may not be able to reorganize in time to properly engage the target, permitting the unit to either proceed without attack or rendering the ambush ineffective.

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(5) Units moving to relieve an outpost or base camp reported to be under VC attack must be especially vigilant to avoid ambush since this is a classic VC tactic. Ideally, relief forces should move by helicopter to the outpost while overland movement seeks to locate, fix and destroy the ambush party. Since this is not always possible, relief forces moving overland should be of sufficient strength to locate, fix and destroy the ambush party. Overland movement should have air cover and employ all the applicable techniques to detect the ambush or reduce its effectiveness.

(6) Units returning to "home stations" must be especially alert for VC ambushes. Return movements, by either foot or motor, must use alternate routes. VC units have permitted the outward movement of friendly forces only to ambush them as they return. This course of action capitalizes on the natural tendency of troops to "lower their guard" on return trips especially when travelling over a route which has been used safely a short time before.

(7) Although there are other methods of preventing ambush, the fundamental principle is security. Security in this sense includes all measures, both active and passive, to provide for the safety of the command. It may include dogs, vehicular mounted flamethrowers, mounted patrols, supporting weapons, air support in the form of column cover and especially an alert rifleman at the point. No available and appropriate measure should be omitted. Movement must go on; however, it must be made which is properly secured in order to prevent effective VC ambush

3. MEASURES TO COUNTER VC AMBUSHES:

a. General: It is recognized that while VC ambushes can be discouraged, they will not be completely eliminated. Units must be taught that the VC ambush can be defeated. They must realize that, if engaged in a VC ambush, there are measures which can be taken which will not only reduce the effectiveness of the ambush but will so discourage the guerrilla that the incidence of ambushes will decline. The key is early detection, followed by immediate and vigorous reflex-type counteraction, and relentless pursuit.

b. Suggested Counter Actions:

(1) Detection of ambushes is a matter of security. The premature triggering of the ambush or its detection is discussed in preceding paragraphs. Once detected, the problem becomes a matter of moving against the enemy in a manner which will force him to abandon his position - preferably moving into an area where maneuver and supporting fires can quickly and easily defeat him.

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(2) If ambushed, troops must be conditioned to react immediately and violently without orders to overcome the initial advantage gained by the enemy. Because an ambush is designed to immediately inflict maximum casualties and no attempt is made to prolong the engagement, an immediate reaction to build and retain fire superiority is the best initial defense against the ambush. The use of automatic weapons, fragmentation, smoke, and white phosphorus hand grenades, CS, and small arms fire will tend to win the initiative from the VC. Flame weapons, canister shot from large caliber weapons and claymore mines are devices which assist. A prompt, decisive initial reaction will materially reduce casualties and the ultimate effectiveness of the ambush, but, in itself, is not enough. The weak spots of the guerrilla organization must be sought out and attacked. As previously mentioned, command and control in the ambush is essential. The ambush commander will usually position himself where he can best control the ambush. Heavy fire directed at that point might cause him to become a casualty, thereby disrupting command and control. Some degree of caution must be exercised in this regard. A battle-wise enemy will often ambush, wait for reaction to develop against the ambush party and then strike from a different direction with the primary ambush force. Hence, only sufficient fire power should be employed to gain and maintain fire superiority; the remainder available should be reserved for the "primary" ambush, or, if none develops, employed to support elements which maneuver against the ambush position. Also, the success of the ambush is predicated on simple signals as described above. Duplication of signals known to have been used previously might confuse attacking VC, cause them prematurely to cease fire, withdraw or assault. This ruse should not be neglected.

(3) When ambushed, individual and unit "reflex action" to initially overcome the ambush must be followed by violent and aggressive counter action. Since the guerrilla fears denial of escape routes or flanking attack by an organized force, every effort must be made to rapidly begin an envelopment of the flank of the ambush party. Preferably this should be accomplished by an element of the unit not engaged in the ambush. The flanking force can expect resistance, but usually not a determined resistance. Once the threat is known, the VC unit will normally attempt to break contact. This flanking action should be made in combination with a frontal assault by those troops caught in the killing zone of the ambush when fire superiority is achieved.

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(4) The ambush of single vehicles is a capability which cannot be denied any organized guerrilla forces. Lacking firepower and maneuver forces, the best course of action open to a single vehicle when ambushed is to attempt to drive through the ambush site. Should this be denied by a physical roadblock, the vehicle must then attempt to escape using the route over which it entered the ambush site. 134

(5) Once the VC attempt to break contact, pursuit operations must be launched immediately. The pursuit must be relentless and contact must be maintained. The use of helicopters to position forces ahead of the withdrawing VC will normally obviate delaying ambushes. Supporting long range weapons can bring their fire power to bear on the VC. Air support to kill the VC is a must and can, during the hours of darkness, illuminate the area of pursuit. All opportunities for escape must be denied.

4. The above information is general in nature; it is intended to remind all units of the basic fundamentals and as a point of departure for further refinement. Accurate, detailed, and timely data on VC ambushes are required so that locally effective countermeasures can be developed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



S. A. MacKENZIE
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY VIETNAM

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COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

NUMBER 11

5 JUNE 1967

GENERAL

(U) Combat Lessons Bulletins are published on an "as required" basis to insure that appropriate subordinate commands derive maximum benefits from the lessons learned in recent operations. Additional bulletins will be published as information of timely, positive, and need-to-know application to in-country units becomes available.

MARINE ARTILLERY COUNTER FIRE AGAINST ENEMY
140mm ROCKETS (U)

1. (C) At 0315 hours on 27 February 1967, an unidentified NVA unit attacked the Da Nang Airbase with Soviet 140mm rockets. Twelve US service personnel were killed in this action and 99 wounded. Thirty-two Vietnamese civilians were killed and 40 wounded when a number of rounds impacted into their village adjacent to the airbase. The Soviet 140mm rockets were launched from rocket-launching tubes evidently dismantled from Soviet eight-tube, towed rocket launchers or the sixteen-tube, truck-mounted launcher, BM 14. The firing positions were located approximately eight kilometers southwest of the airbase.

2. (C) This attack represents the first time that rockets have been employed by the VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam. Since August 1966, however, there has been mention in intelligence documents of the existence of rocket units in-country. In September 1966, a rallier stated that an unknown unit, equipped with rockets, had infiltrated during the previous two months "into the mountain area southwest of Da Nang". On 21 December 1966, the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam reported the possible capability of the enemy's employing a "DKZ 66" rocket against fortified positions and installations.

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3. (C) On three separate occasions since the initial launching of the 140mm rocket in I Corps, Marine artillery units have been most effective in counter fire which has minimized effectiveness of the enemy rocket weapon system. The first successful counter-rocket fire occurred during the early morning hours of 15 March 1967 when Da Nang Airbase underwent its second attack by fire of 140mm rockets. At the time of the attack, flashes from the suspected firing positions were observed simultaneously from two artillery observation posts and by other friendly units in the area. The suspected area was among those for which firing clearance had been assured in advance and on which artillery pieces were laid in accordance with the counter-rocket/mortar plan. Counter-battery fire commenced within two minutes, with 13 missions being fired in rapid order into the suspected area. Ground reaction forces were quickly maneuvered to seal off the area and located the launch site. Twenty-four (24) rocket firing positions were found, together with 31 launchers and 11 rounds of 140mm rockets. 138

4. (C) A second successful counter-rocket plan was executed at Dong Ha during the early morning hours of 28 April 1967, when observation posts and an aerial observer on station quickly fixed the launch site. Artillery fire was on target within four minutes. The follow-up ground reaction force located 68 launch positions, from which 50 rounds had been fired, and captured one launcher and 54 rounds of 140mm rockets.

5. (C) During the early morning hours of 16 May, artillery for a third time successfully countered enemy rocket fire. Observation posts again located the target in a matter of minutes. Fire was delivered and the initial rounds bracketed the target, and the enemy was able to launch only 10 rounds from 47 firing positions before being hit. Patrols subsequently located 31 launchers and 19 rounds of 140mm rockets at the launch site.

6. (C) The success of counter-rocket battery fire within III MAF is credited to the following:

a. Pre-targeting of probable launch sites within a radius of 10,000 meters of potentially lucrative targets.

b. Establishing a visual surveillance system over the target area using observation posts and light aircraft. Observation posts are equipped with high-powered glasses, BC scopes and other simple direction-finding equipment.

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c. Programmed deployment of artillery to cover likely launch sites on a pre-planned basis.

d. Establishment of a system of readiness conditions in which stages of alert are given to gun crews and ancillary acquisition means, such as flare ships and fixed-wing aircraft.

e. Vigilance, training, rehearsal and drills, combined with alert visual observation, aid materially in the rapid detection and destruction of hostile rockets. Rocket drill procedures are held at least three times weekly and are usually conducted between 0001 and 0300 hours, since this is the time interval of previous attacks.

7. (C) Since the first rocket attack at Da Nang Airbase added emphasis has been placed on the utilization of rockets by the VC/NVA. On 12 May, at 0100 hours, an NVA artillery regiment fired Soviet 122mm rockets on the Bien Hoa Airbase, killing 6 Americans and wounding 73 others. The use of the 122mm rocket adds to the VC/NVA capability to hit key friendly installations anytime they choose. Further, the supply of these rockets to the VC/NVA indicates a complete willingness on the part of the Soviets to provide the enemy with the newest ordnance in the USSR inventory. It is imperative that all units have an effective counter-fire plan to minimize the effectiveness of the enemy rocket weapon system.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



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Major General, US Army
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COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

141
NUMBER 12

25 JUNE 1967

GENERAL

Combat Lessons Bulletins are to be published on an "as required" basis to insure that appropriate subordinate commands derive maximum benefits from lessons learned in recent operations. Additional bulletins will be published as information of a timely, positive, and need-to-know application to in-country units becomes available. This bulletin summarizes the problem areas encountered and lessons learned from air drop resupply missions conducted during OPERATION JUNCTION CITY. The information contained in this bulletin has been extracted from an After-Action Report prepared by Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, and information available to the USARV Air Drop Equipment Officer.

AIR DROP RESUPPLY

Air drop resupply in the past few months has increased considerably, and provided not only an emergency but expedient means of resupply to tactical units. During Operation Junction City (JC), (23 February - 7 April 1967), over 1,700 STONs of all classes of supply were air dropped to units in the Third Corps Tactical Zone. This tonnage was dropped from C-130 aircraft using the A-22 cargo bag, with G-12D parachute. The following paragraphs will address specific observations and lessons learned during these air drops.

1. METHOD OF AIR DROP

The Container Delivery System (CDS) was used exclusively. This system is used for the delivery of cargo, suitable for rigging in an A-22 cargo bag, in weights ranging from 700 to 2,200 pounds. The cargo is secured within an A-22 cargo bag, (commonly referred to as an A-22 container) to which is attached a G-12D or two G-13 cargo parachutes. The G-12D cargo parachute was used during Junction City. A C-130 aircraft can deliver as many as 16 each A-22's or about 16 STONs.

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2. ACCURACY OF AIR DROPS

During Junction City strike reports received indicated that very few containers of the total 1,894 missed the drop zone (DZ). In one instance a delay in extraction believably due to mechanical failure of the pendulum release system in the aircraft, resulted in 10 containers exiting the aircraft after the plane had passed over the drop zone. These supplies however were recovered. 142

3. SERVICEABILITY OF SUPPLIES AIR DROPPED

There were two reports received concerning supplies that were damaged as a result of the air drop. In both instances 40 each 5-gallon water cans were ruptured upon impact. The loss of 280 rounds of 105mm ammunition on the initial air drops was excessive and will be discussed under Malfunctions. Since supplies are prepared and rigged for air drop as prescribed in DA Technical Manuals in the 10-500 series, and DAF Technical Orders in the 1307-series, chances of supplies being damaged during air drop are rather remote.

4. MALFUNCTIONS

a. Twelve confirmed malfunctions occurred during Junction City. This is a very impressive malfunction percentage since a total of 1,006 containers were air dropped. A breakdown of the twelve malfunctions and causes are as follows:

<u>No</u>	<u>Cause</u>
9 ea	Breaking of suspension webs, and cotton components of the A-22 cargo bag (sling).

Corrective Action: Marginal suspension webs have been withdrawn from stock and salvaged. A-22 slings which are made of TYPE XV cotton webbing have been withdrawn for emergency use only, and the new type XV nylon slings put into service.

2 ea	Pilot Chute malfunctions
------	--------------------------

Corrective Action: This type malfunction is not uncommon. In a 12-month period (Oct 65 - Sep 66) in CONUS 52% of the air drop malfunctions involved this deployment - recovery phase. Emphasis on this aspect during load preparation and in-aircraft checks can serve to eliminate to a large degree this type malfunction. This type malfunction is often attributed to the flight

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profile of the aircraft during extraction which causes what appears to be a "dumping" of the containers, one on top of the other. The resulting collision of containers will often cause malfunctions in which the pilot parachute becomes damaged and cannot serve the purpose for which it is intended, i.e., to deploy the cargo parachute.

1 ea 15-foot release parachute failed to
deploy properly.

Corrective Action: An observer indicated that the release parachute fell to the extreme right of the aircraft ramp, rather than out into the slip-stream as it would normally. The action to correct this aspect of extraction is again pre-flight checks to insure that the release parachute pendulum release system is operating properly, and will not cause the release parachute to hang-up momentarily or improperly disengage from the pendulum.

b. The loss of 280 rounds of 105mm ammunition and 181 G-12D cargo parachutes during Operation Junction City resulted from the 9 malfunctions wherein the suspension webs broke and A-22 cotton slings were ripped apart by the deployment force. Although only 9 malfunctions of this type occurred, the explosion and ensuing fire started in the elephant grass by these two loads destroyed 8 other containers and air items.

5. PROBLEM AREAS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION(S):

a. Rigging of Ammunition:

(1) Reports were received from tactical units that ammunition rigged horizontally in jungle packs was becoming crimped on impact, making it impossible to extract the rounds from the canister. Rounds were then rigged vertically to prevent or reduce the crimping; however, this proved unsatisfactory since two containers rigged in this manner broke loose from the parachutes and exploded upon impact.

(2) To correct the situation rigging procedures as published in TM 10-500-53/TO 1307-18-41 have been re-emphasized. These procedures are summarized in USARV UNCLAS message AVHGD-SP 13230 dated 2 March 1967.

b. Identification of Air Drop Items

(1) Information received from tactical commanders indicated a need for a procedure to identify by class of supply containers which miss the drop zone, fall into an unsecured area, or result in a malfunction.

(2) To correct this a change to USARV Regulation 700-1, Emergency Airdrop of Supplies and Equipment was published on 5 May 1967. The change will permit the tactical commander to obtain the desired information from the combat control team who is in contact with the aircraft commander. It is recommended that all personnel responsible for requesting airdrop resupply become familiar with this procedure. 144

c. Recovery and Evacuation of Air Items

(1) Air Items used during air drop resupply like other expensive, high dollar value assemblies and components must be recovered, evacuated with care to repair facilities, and returned to the supply system. One G-12D parachute costs \$582.00 and the A-22 Cargo Bag complete is priced at \$117.00. Out of the 1,894 of each of the above used during Operation Junction City 60% of the items either were combat losses or could not be accounted for.

(2) To correct this situation, commanders have been requested to plan and organize recovery operations to insure sufficient transportation and personnel are employed to recover the air items as well as the supplies airdropped and return these items as required by paragraph 4a(6), USARV Regulation 700-1.

d. After-Action Report Messages

(1) Paragraph 4a(7), USARV Regulation 700-1 requires the requesting unit to immediately submit an after-action message (unless a malfunction officer or rigger is present on the drop zone) which describes the number of malfunctions, if any, to include the extent of damage to supplies.

(2) To assure that information concerning success or failure of the air drop is reported promptly, it is requested that the units requesting the delivery submit the after-action messages to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. It is imperative that these messages be transmitted immediately and that USARV G4 be provided an information copy.

e. Parachute Rigger Support

(1) After the airdrop of supplies and equipment is completed parachute rigger personnel are normally parachuted into the area on the next pass to provide the requesting unit with technical assistance in the recovery of air items. Airdrop Recovery Procedures are contained in TM 10-500-7/T0 13C7-1-10. Rigger personnel are experts in this field and can

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be of considerable value in rendering technical assistance to the recovery
detail in policing-up the air items from the drop zone.

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(2) Requesting units are encouraged to avail themselves of
this service to insure that recovery operations are discharged promptly
and efficiently.

6. Air drop of supplies and equipment in South Vietnam has been
recognized as an extremely efficient method, although other means such
as external helicopter lift are available. The system is, however, one
which is always changing. New and better ways are being developed; for
example, in the future the delivery of ammunition, and other heavy cargo
required by tactical units will be extracted at low level (3-5 feet above
the ground) in quantities up to 7 tons, and be immediately available, with
little or no recovery necessary for distribution at the Forward Support
Area, or Fire Support Base.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



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U.S. ARMY VIETNAM

COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

147

NUMBER 13

26 June 1967

GENERAL

A review of recent combat operations in the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) indicates a trend upward in short duration, high-volume small arms firefights in which U. S. Forces have suffered greater than normal battle losses. This bulletin is made up of a small unit action published originally by Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam. We learn through experience and by the example of others. It is for this reason that this report is reproduced herein. It is not intended in any way to be critical of combat actions or decisions now past.

SKIRMISH AT AN QUI (2)

1. On 14 February, at 1300 hours, the Company Commander of Delta 1/8 was in a scout helicopter near the village of An Qui (2). The Company Commander noted the movement of two or three possible VC. As he had found small groups of VC in the days before by the tactic of developing any contact however slight, he now radioed for his third platoon to move up and exploit the situation. In the days preceding the 14th, the company had repeated contact with small enemy elements. It had been found that to successfully exploit the situation, friendly forces must aggressively pursue over the shortest possible route or the enemy would be able to successfully evade. (Map) At about 1345 the platoon, minus a squad on another mission, arrived at a small pond on the west side of the village and started to cross. The pond and rice paddy which covered this area were extremely hard to distinguish from each other and the platoon leader, attempting to utilize the shortest route, and having received no enemy fire, sent one of his fire teams across the pond. The Company Commander, overhead, noted that the fire team was headed through what appeared to be the center of the pond and radioed the platoon leader to take the rest of his platoon and to cross into the

village by utilizing a trail to the southwest. Feeling that the fire team was in no particular danger and as they were already halfway across the lake, the platoon leader let them continue with the idea that he would link up once in the village. He now led his platoon in a file formation along the line of palm trees on the far side of the rice paddy pond to the west of the village. Still utilizing a file formation, the platoon leader crossed over toward the village on a rice paddy dike running from east to west. As he moved along the dike, he could see elements of his fire team less than one hundred meters to his front. When he was about ten meters from the edge of the village, thirty weapons, including some automatic, opened up on the platoon. Four were killed instantly including the platoon leader, the RTO, and the platoon sergeant, and four were wounded. The fire team which was in the center of the village simultaneously received intense fire, and the fire team leader was killed and two others wounded. Both of these elements of the platoon now attempted to fall back using approximately the same routes they had followed in approaching the village. However, while the main body of the platoon was pinned down by intense automatic weapons and sniper fire and forced to remain in the exposed rice paddy, the fire team was able to withdraw to the pond and, using boats along the shore, to join up with friendly reinforcing forces on the far side. Those in the rear of the platoon file then made several unsuccessful attempts to evacuate dead and wounded from the rice paddy and two more men were killed.

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2. Meanwhile, the third squad of the third platoon, which had been on a reconnaissance mission at the time the platoon was committed, now moved up to support. When he arrived at the pond, the squad leader saw that the main body of the platoon was engaged to the southeast. He also saw several enemy on the other side of the lake running to the north, and deduced that they were attempting to escape. He moved his squad along the northern edge of the pond until he found a dike which crossed over to the village. Reacting immediately, he crossed the paddy in a squad file and once on the other side deployed in squad column. Moving now toward the south to intercept any fleeing enemy and to link up with the rest of the platoon, he chose the shortest route through a relatively open area. Although some cover and concealment were available if he used a circuitous path, it would have definitely slowed his advance and he had received no hostile fire as yet. Suddenly an accurate automatic weapon and sniper fire raked his leading elements. One man was killed and two wounded.

3. The enemy strength by the estimates of the company and battalion commander was at least a company and probably a battalion of NVA regulars. The enemy was well dug in and was well disciplined. No significant enemy fires were directed at the scout ship as it circled the village and fires were withheld until friendly forces were within point-blank range,

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United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96307

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indicating a well-trained enemy force. Even after repeated ARA and artillery fires, the enemy continued to wage effective resistance and effectively broke contact with US Forces during the night. Enemy killed, including those by the second battalion, 12th Cavalry, which subsequently moved in on the hamlet from the northwest, were eleven by body count with an unestimated number of dead and wounded dragged from the village under the cover of darkness.

4. The following are considered to be contributing factors to the large number of friendly casualties.

- a. Failure to cross open terrain in widely dispersed formation.
- b. Movement of the main body across an open space before a scout element fully investigated the situation on the far side.
- c. Overanxiousness on the part of platoon members to develop the situation due to long searches with lack of significant contact.
- d. Command group should not have been in the lead element of the platoon.
- e. Failure by the third squad leader, after he had crossed open paddies and was aware of imminent enemy contact, to use the best concealment available in route selection.
- f. Excellent use of fire discipline and cover and concealment by the enemy.

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

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
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AN QUI (2)



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COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

NUMBER 14

JUNE 1967

GENERAL

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VC EMPLOYMENT OF LAND MINES

1.(C)The Viet Cong have long demonstrated that they are experts in the use of mines to attain terroristic or military goals. During the French and Viet Minh conflict, the Viet Minh used improvised explosive mines and booby traps effectively to harass, slow down and demoralize the French forces. The Viet Cong have improved upon their predecessor's techniques and are effectively using mines and booby traps to cause an increase in the number of casualties sustained by US Forces during recent months. A study of recent VC mining incidents has given some additional insight into the frequency and techniques of VC land mine employment.

2.(C)VC EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES: The VC employ mines with imagination and foresight. Instead of laying the usual type mine field, the VC generally lay mines singly or in small numbers at strategic points. Mines are most often laid along likely routes of attack and at points suitable for ambush, although some mines and boobytraps have been emplaced in a random manner with no apparent relationship to a given action. Some examples are listed below:

a. Mines have been discovered in small tunnels under the road. The tunnels were dug from the side, the mine emplaced, and wires strung from the detonator of the mine to a hiding place 100 - 200 meters away in the underbrush. There was nothing on the road surface to indicate

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the presence of mines and they were located only through accidental discovery of the wires. These mines were obviously emplaced for possible future use when they would be detonated by electrical means.

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b. The VC use mines in conjunction with ambushes. They are not only employed to stop a column but antipersonnel mines are placed in high grass along the side of the road to prevent the ambushed unit from leaving the road. These mines are positioned on the side of the road opposite the VC assault and provide support to their positions.

c. In some cases, on dirt roads the VC have dug and left holes in the road surface. After Free World Military Forces have filled in the hole with fresh dirt the VC return, reopen the hole, emplace a mine and refill. Since the Free World Military Forces themselves have recently filled in these holes, they are not suspicious of the fresh fill and the emplaced mine is very effective.

d. The VC have reportedly mined abandoned ARVN posts. These posts which are vacated during the rainy season are reoccupied or used as storage in the dry season. The VC, knowing this, have mined and boobytrapped the structures and surrounding terrain.

e. Boobytraps are employed in many ingenious ways and there are no established patterns of employment. A pull device hooked to the inside of a door will cause an anti-personnel mine to explode when the door is opened. One method which has been utilized is to cover a grenade placed in a hollowed-out portion of a tree with an insulting sign. When the sign is torn from the tree the grenade detonates. Another method is to boobytrap a poorly camouflaged dummy vehicle mine so that when the mine is moved an anti-personnel mine concealed underneath is activated.

f. The VC have ambushed helicopters by placing anti-tank mines throughout the LZ. The triggering mechanism included a vertical thin rod of bamboo connected to the fuze device on top of the mine. The bamboo rod was concealed by surrounding tall grass. As the helicopters approached the LZ, the rotor wash deflected the grass and bamboo, activating the pull fuze causing the mines to detonate and damage the aircraft while it is still in the air.

3(C) TYPES OF VC MINES: The arsenal of VC mines includes anti-vehicle, anti-tank, and anti-personnel mines. These weapons vary from the simple and sometimes crude device made of bamboo to the more

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sophisticated anti-tank mine constructed of metal parts milled to exact tolerances. Detonator methods vary from electric blasting caps to standard strike releases and pressure plates. Command type detonators activated by touching attached wires to batteries are in common use. The VC have lately been making greater use of captured mines and mortar and artillery shells.

4(C) ACTIONS TO MINIMIZE THE MINE THREAT:

- a. Sandbag Vehicles. The use of sandbags on the floors of vehicles can be effective protection against blast and fragments from pressure activated mines.
- b. Move in Dispersed Formation. By moving in well-dispersed formations the number of casualties from one mine will be minimized.
- c. Enlist the Aid of Civilians. Every effort should be made to obtain civilian aid in discovering possible VC mines.
- d. Thoroughly Reconnoiter Routes of March. There have been numerous reports of ambushes being initiated by command or mechanically detonated mines. Thorough reconnaissance of the route of march through the use of advance guards and helicopters in many cases would have resulted in the discovery of the mines and disruption of the VC ambush plan.
- e. Stagger Convoy Schedules. When convoy movements are subject to mining, the agency arranging the move should coordinate with the convoy commander to determine the advisability of staggered schedules as a defense against mines. Patterned movements of either time or route invite the VC to effectively employ mines.
- f. Secure and Sweep LZ's Prior to Landing. Continuous use of the same LZ's time after time is an invitation to disaster. Where possible and/or practical, LZ's should be secured and swept prior to landing. Counter tactics can include violent preparation of the LZ to include artillery strikes, strafing of the landing area and even delivery of 500-pound bombs set for very low air burst to detonate just above the ground. Alternate LZ's should be used particularly when mines are discovered in the primary LZ.

5.(C) FUTURE OUTLOOK ON THE MINE PROBLEM: A preliminary investigation conducted by Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) discloses that the anti-vehicular mine problem in Vietnam has never been thoroughly studied

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in its entirety. Consequently, all the variables capable of influencing countermine action have never been investigated. The majority of the past efforts have been directed at detecting or safely detonating hostile mines. Other variables in mine warfare can possibly be influenced by our countermine operations. In order to fully grasp the nature and extent of the problem, to analyze present ways of coping with it, and to propose new areas of investigation, considerable fact-gathering is needed. Accordingly, ACTIV has undertaken the task of applying its expertise to the solution of the mine problem and plans among other things to sponsor a USARV conference of the most knowledgeable personnel on mines from all major units in-country in an effort to gather and centralize all factual knowledge bearing on the mine problem and then to determine measures of progress toward the solution of the problem.

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6(C) LESSONS LEARNED:

Item: Neutralization of Command Mines.

Discussion: The 1st Engineer Battalion has developed a specific procedure to be used in the neutralization of command mines. The following procedure has proved very successful:

- a. Locate command wires leading to the mine either visually or by use of a router. If a mine is detected with a detector or probes, immediately search for lead wires.
- b. Cut the command wires.
- c. Move all but one man at least 100 meters from the mine area.
- d. One man attaches firing wire to wires leading into the road, being careful not to disturb the wire or pull it; move to a safe position, and try to fire the mine electrically. Remember that booby-traps may be present.
- e. If the mine does not detonate, sweep along the wire (one man only) toward the road, and blow any suspected mine or booby-trap locations. If unable to locate the mine, set a row of charges on the road and blow them all.
- f. After the mine has been detonated, carefully attach a piece of wire or rope to the end of the wires leading away from the road. If an armored vehicle is available, use it to pull the wire out, with

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all exposed personnel moved back to a safe area. If no armored vehicle is available, play out the wire or rope you have attached to the firing wires and pull by hand at a safe distance away. Do not pull directly on the wires or probe around the wires. This same procedure may be used for wires leading into the road.

g. If unable to pull the wire out completely, get an armored vehicle to run down the wire to its end. Above all, use care and common sense and stay alert.

Observation: The above described procedure should be used for neutralization of command mines whenever possible.

Item: Jeep Mounted Mine Detector:

Discussion: Recently the 1st Engineer Battalion field tested a jeep mounted mine detector consisting of a $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton jeep and a 6-foot mine detecting head attached to the front of the jeep and two feet in front of the bumper. This jeep may be operated with a driver or by a remote control unit 300 meters behind the jeep. When operated for mine detection the jeep moves out at 5-10 mph and will automatically come to an abrupt stop when the detecting head passes over a metallic object. This method of mine detection proved very successful in field testing. It is to be also noted that much time may be saved in using this method of mine detection rather than using the normal man operated mine detectors.

Observation: It is desirable to modify the present model so as to have a wider detecting head in front of the jeep. As a minimum 8 feet is desirable to obtain a decent sweep of one lane of the road; however, if possible, an even wider head is desirable to clear as great an area as possible in one sweep.

Item: Wearing of Armored Vests.

Discussion: In several operations unnecessary injuries have resulted due to failure to wear armored vests, and conversely, several lives have been saved due to the use of armored vests. The vest should be worn when dealing with demolitions, when sweeping for mines, and when operating engineer equipment outside of the base camp.

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Observation: All personnel dealing with demolitions or mine detection and all personnel operating vehicles and equipment in insecure areas should wear armored vests. 158.

Item: Use of Tractor-Drawn Rooters for Cutting Command Wires

Discussion: A tractor-drawn, single-tooth rooter has been found to be very efficient in cutting and/or uncovering the detonating wires to command mines. A tractor-drawn rooter should be operated on each side of the road to be cleared. The tractor should be preceded by a buttoned-up tank for security and for detonating any AP mines that may be in the path of rooting. The rooters are operated anywhere from five to fifty meters off the road shoulders, depending upon the terrain encountered. However, in an effort to combat these rooters, the VC have at times placed claymores 20 to 30 meters off the road. Every effort should be made to root at least 20 meters away from the road, and if the terrain permits, 30 to 40 meters off the road. The rooter is able to cut 24 inches below the surface of the ground, which is usually a sufficient depth to cut or uncover all detonating wires laid by the VC. This method has been used quite frequently by the 1st Engineer Battalion and has proven very successful.

Observation: Tractor-drawn rooters should be used on all road clearing operations if at all possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



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COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN

NUMBER 15

30 JUNE 1967

GENERAL

Combat Lessons Bulletins are to be published on an "as required" basis to ensure that appropriate subordinate commands derive maximum benefits from the lessons learned in recent operations. Additional bulletins will be published as information of timely, positive and need-to-know application to in-country units becomes available. The content of these bulletins will also be incorporated in quarterly USARV "Battlefield Reports - A Summary of Lessons Learned".

VC Reconnaissance for Offensive Action

(U) This bulletin summarizes lessons learned as a result of enemy activity in the vicinity of the BIEN HOA Air Base perimeter prior to the 12 May attack by fire on that installation.

(C) Between 0100 and 0115 hours, 12 May 1967, BIEN HOA Air Base was subjected to a VC attack by fire of an estimated 150 rounds of 122mm rocket, 81mm mortar, and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. On two occasions prior to the attack, enemy activity was reported on the perimeter of the air base and a wounded member of a VC reconnaissance element was taken prisoner. On the night of the attack, concurrent hand grenade explosions and small arms fire occurred on the base's east perimeter, but no penetration was reported. There was a total of 37 US and 3 RVN military casualties, 31 USAF and 27 VNAF aircraft destroyed or damaged, and widespread damage to base structures. Two firing points were located and subjected to heavy air attack. A nearby ARVN Headquarters and a US Army airfield were also subjected to VC attacks by fire the same evening.

Item 1: Perimeter Incidents. (Source: Department of Defense Information Reports 1-655-0512-67 and 1-655-0513-67)

Discussion: There were two incidents on the BIEN HOA Air Base perimeter during the few days preceding the major attack by fire. On the night of 2 May 1967, six sentry dog alerts and three sightings of

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unidentified persons along the perimeter signaled an attempted penetration of the air base. Six nights later, on 8 May 1967, a USAF K-9 security guard detected three unauthorized individuals attempting to penetrate the perimeter fence. The unauthorized persons were fired upon and a subsequent search of the area resulted in the apprehension of an individual suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. During the preliminary interrogation of the VC suspect, it was discovered that he was a member of a reconnaissance squad of the VC C238 Reconnaissance and Sapper Company. Four nights later the BIEN HOA Air Base was subjected to an attack by fire.

Observation: Evidence of increased VC reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering activities in the vicinity of an installation remains one of the best indicators of impending offensive action against that installation.

(C) Item 2: VC Reconnaissance techniques. (Source: Department of Defense Intelligence Report 1-655-0514-67)

Discussion: Subsequent interrogation of the VC suspect, Nguyen Vin TAN, involved in the 8 May penetration attempt at the air base, revealed that he had received fifteen days of explosive and demolition training during April 1967. TAN said he was ordered to penetrate the BIEN HOA Air Base perimeter with two other Viet Cong to reconnoiter and gather intelligence information to be used in preparing for an attack on the installation. Had TAN been successful in penetrating the air base undetected, he was to have counted the number of cargo airplanes on the west ramp of the base and to have determined what was contained in the 200-liter barrels in that area. Before starting on the reconnaissance mission, he and the other members of the reconnaissance team had been given a map of the base to study, which consisted of various connected photographs giving a complete picture of the installation. He said that the photographs had been taken from the vicinity of BUU LONG Mountain, located to the west of BIEN HOA Air Base. TAN claimed that he was not aware of the specific plan or date of attack on the air base.

Observation: The interrogation of TAN indicates the emphasis placed by the VC on thorough intelligence collection efforts directed against intended targets of offensive action. Specialized personnel, trained for a specific mission, conduct detailed, low-level espionage and reconnaissance of an intended target. The uncovering of such an espionage attempt is a warning of a much greater threat of attack and should be accompanied by increased vigilance on the part of friendly security forces.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

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FRANK D. MILLER
Major General, US Army
Chief of Staff

S. A. MacKENZIE
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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WEEKLY

INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW



17-67
5 May 1967

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The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data becomes available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96307.

(C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

Enemy units are reinforcing and preparing for an offensive in northern I Corps while evading friendly operations in the central and southern part of the CTZ. Rocket and mortar attacks on DONG HA (YD 23 60) and PHU RA I (YD 88 15) respectively on the night of 27 April indicate a continuing enemy pattern of harassing US and ARVN base areas in northern I Corps. In western QUANG TRI Province, the enemy has continued to be active northwest of KHE SANH Special Forces Camp (XD 84 38). A 25 April

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returnee identified his unit as the NVA 32d Regiment, which he said had a mission to attack Americans at an unknown location. The 32nd Regiment, a subordinate of the NVA 341st Division, has been unlocated since October 1966. It is possible that it is deploying in western QUANG TRI Province to attack KHE SANH. Visual reconnaissance on 24 April indicated that the road south of ASHAU (YC 49 83) splits into two tracks for at least two kilometers and that portions of the road are cordroyed with bamboo logs. Major Huynh CU, former MR 5 staff officer, stated that VC units in QUANG NAM Province are resupplied through ASHAU. This information indicates that supplies and personnel probably are moving through Laotian Base Area 611 (YD 95 15) and the ASHAU Valley to central I Corps, as well as to the Northern Front. Four kilometers south of QUE SON (BT 05 29) in central I CTZ, a contact was made during the week, probably with the NVA 3d Regiment, NT 2 Division, which resulted in at least 258 enemy KIA and 41 detained. The 3d Regiment probably will evade and await replacements and resupply before continuing with the current campaign. Elsewhere, the 21st NVA Regiment of the NT 2 Division is probably in Base Area 117 (BT 25 03), evading ARVN battalions operating west of TAM KY (BT 31 21) on Operation LIEN KET 102. There has been no indicated movement of elements of the three enemy regiments based in QUANG NGAI Province.

The enemy is capable of launching an attack in the DMZ area with three divisions. He is capable of supporting a DMZ attack with attacks in the QUANG TRI-IA VANG-HUE area in division strength and an attack against KHE SANH in regimental strength. There are indications that the enemy is continuing to prepare for coordinated attacks in the TRI-THIEN area. Attacks could occur without further warning; however, during the coming week the enemy probably will continue to prepare for operations and conduct reconnaissance and harassment of friendly installations in the DMZ, QUANG TRI City, HUE, and KHE SANH areas. In central I Corps the enemy is capable of regimental attacks against ARVN units on Operation LIEN KET 102 and possibly against installations in the QUE SON-THIEN PHUOC area. There are indications that the enemy probably will evade friendly operations while Local Force elements harass Revolutionary Development activities near HOI AN (BT 10 15) and TAM KY. In QUANG NGAI Province the enemy is capable of attacking in the southern coastal areas or US Special Forces camps at BA TO (BS 56 33), MINH LONG (BS 48 76) or GIA VUC (BS 37 25) with up to two regiments. His most probable course of action will be to evade Task Force OREGON clearing operations while ambushing small units and harassing Revolutionary Development activities, possibly in battalion strength.

II. CTZ:

Elements of the B-3 Front continued mortar attacks and mining of lines

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of communication in western PLEIKU Province while the NT 3 and NT 5 Divisions continued to evade in eastern II Corps. A rallier, CPL Le Van HUNG, of the 2d Company, 200th Artillery Battalion, stated that the B-3 Front was preparing for a large battle during the rainy season and would commit five regiments. The objective was reported to be PLEI ME (ZA 16 05) Special Forces Camp. Headquarters NT 3 Division, the VC 2d Regiment, and the NVA 22d Regiment remain near the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI Province border, while the NVA 18th Regiment is in east-central BINH DINH Province. The NVA 18th Regiment reportedly will attempt to disrupt Revolutionary Development in the PHU MY Valley. The Headquarters of the NT 5 Division and the NVA 95th Regiment are located in northwestern PHU BON and northwestern PHU YEN Provinces respectively. The NVA 18B Regiment, NT 5 Division, remains in KHANH HOA Province.

The enemy is capable of attacking in the Western Highlands with one division and two regiments. Indications are, though, that he probably will continue mortar attacks, harassment of Special Forces camps and friendly forces on operations, and interdiction of vehicular traffic on lines of communication. Concurrently, he probably will conduct reconnaissance and prepare for operations in western PLEIKU Province. The NT 3 Division can attack in up to regimental strength in BINH DINH Province, as can the NT 5 Division in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. Detainee statements indicated, however, that these divisions probably will continue to evade while they attempt to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program and counter friendly forces on operations. Main and Local Forces probably will continue acts of terrorism, attacks on logistical bases and airfields, and interdiction of lines of communication throughout the Corps.

III CTZ:

In western III Corps the CT 9 Division and VC 273d Regiment, located in northeastern TAY NINH Province and BINH DUONG Province respectively, have failed to show signs of reacting to Operation MANHATTAN, which was initiated on 23 April. Captured documents continue to indicate that the NVA 52d Regiment is providing replacement personnel to elements of the CT 9 Division. The other two regiments of the NVA CT 7 Division, the NVA 141st and NVA 165th Regiments, can no longer be located and their disposition is unknown. In the southeastern III Corps area, agent reports indicate that the VC 274th Regiment is located in Base Area 302 (YS 60 85) and the VC 275th Regiment is north of Base Area 300 (YS 75 90). Both these CT 5 Division regiments probably are preparing for future activities.

Throughout the III Corps area reports continue to indicate that attacks

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on lines of communication and against GVN/FWMAF installations are probable. TAN SON NHUT and BIEN HOA Air Bases continue to be reported as probable objectives for rocket and mortar attacks. In western III Corps the enemy has the capability to attack in regimental strength, but, because of losses sustained by the CT 9 Division and VC 273d Regiment, small-scale harassing attacks are probable while this division and regiment replace losses, resupply, and retrain in preparation for the Summer Campaign. The NVA CT 7 Division is in northwestern BINH LONG Province; its subordinate regiments are unlocated. The CT 5 Division has the capability to attack in regimental strength; however, indications are that it probably will remain in base areas preparing for future operations. Throughout the III Corps small-unit attacks on lightly defended positions and lines of communication (particularly in LONG AN Province and the RSSZ), attacks by fire on GVN/FWMAF installations, and terroristic acts to thwart Revolutionary Development and the progress of village and hamlet elections are probable enemy courses of action.

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IV CTZ:

Enemy forces in IV Corps continue to conduct small-scale attacks while avoiding engagements with major friendly forces. Elements of the US 9th Infantry Division on Operation PALM BEACH continue to make contact with small-size enemy forces in DINH TUONG and KIEN HOA Provinces. The enemy has the capability of conducting regimental-size attacks against DONG TAM (XS 43 45) Base and battalion-size attacks against friendly reaction forces. However, his most probable course of action is to attack in up to reinforced company strength against friendly forces on Operation PALM BEACH, using elements of the 263d Main Force, 514th Local Force, and possibly the 261st Main Force Battalions. Throughout the Corps the enemy probably will continue to conduct acts of harassment and sabotage, to attack posts and lightly defended areas with up to battalion-size forces in order to impede the GVN Revolutionary Development Program, and to disrupt the elections by acts of terrorism.

(C) VILLAGE COUNCIL ELECTIONS

The first phase of village elections came to a successful close Sunday, April 30. There have been Village People's Councils elected in 984 villages during the first phase. The GVN has tentatively scheduled more than 200 additional villages for elections before the end of the calendar year 1967.

During the final week of voting, the 88 percent turnout was far above the previous week's low of 67 percent and is the highest turnout to date. There were no reports of election-related VC incidents over the weekend, although two

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171 candidates were slain last week bringing the total of known assassinations to 12. Thirty-one candidates are known to have been kidnapped, some of whom have since returned to their villages.

Voter Participation by Corps Area for the week ending 30 April:

I Corps: 87 percent
II Corps: 87 percent
III Corps: 82 percent
IV Corps: 95 percent

The total nationwide voter turnout during phase one was 77 percent.
SOURCE: Strategic Resources Branch, MACV.

(C-NOFORN) GVN ANALYSIS OF VC 1966 WINTER-SPRING AND 1967 DRY SEASON CAMPAIGNS

An official Government of Vietnam report of 5 April 1967 on the Viet Cong 1966 Winter-Spring and 1967 Dry Season Campaigns considers the probable achievements of those campaigns and the effects they will have on future VC activities. The current Winter-Spring Campaign began in October 1966 and was expected to be completed by the end of April 1967. The Dry Season Campaign, named after weather conditions in western and southern SVN, extends from January to April and coincides with the last half of the Winter-Spring Campaign. The report states that VC missions during these two campaigns were aimed at self-protection, intensification of combat potential, winning over the masses, maintaining presently controlled territory, and wearing out RVN/FWMAF forces. It is expected that the enemy is now preparing and arranging for his major campaign of the year, the Rainy Season Campaign, which the GVN report predicts will occur during the southwest monsoon season (May to August).

The report analyzes the plans for the two campaigns just completed and evaluates enemy activities under two headings: (1) Combat and (2) Building of Combat Potential. In the section titled "Combat," the GVN reported that guerrilla forces were detailed to cut lines of communication; to launch attacks against air bases, storage areas, and other large fixed installations; and to frustrate the rural reconstruction program. Local Force units were detailed to carry out a policy of launching "small fight, sure success" actions to wear out the GVN and Allied forces. The plan for the Main Force

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units was to launch large-scale operations near the DMZ, massive attacks against the 1st Cavalry Division, and division-level actions directed towards SAIGON (specifically at the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions and TAN SON NHUT Air Base). The GVN report indicated that Main Force divisions were to kill 80,000 US and 200,000 ARVN troops during the seven months allotted for the two campaigns. 172

Results of VC activities during these campaigns indicate that VC Main Forces failed to gain any military victory that could influence either international or local (SVN) public opinion. On the other hand, the enemy suffered heavy losses in terms of personnel casualties and severe damage to rear service elements in most areas where the Main Forces were responsible for defense. Guerrilla activities, however, were pushed hard and gained considerable success. Main supply routes were attacked and cut and remote GVN posts and New Life Hamlets were attacked, causing heavy losses in personnel and ammunition, particularly in the MEKONG River Delta. Guerrillas also sabotaged and shelled two fuel depots, the LONG BINH ammunition dump and three major air bases -- TAN SON NHUT, NHA TRANG and DA NANG.

The plans for "Building of Combat Potential" called for the strengthening of logistical activities and the development of forces. Logistical efforts were particularly directed at collecting 1967 agricultural taxes (in kind) with the aim of reserving food supplies in the face of an intensified government rural pacification and construction program. Also in the logistical field, the plan called for intensified moving of supplies through trails and sea routes. The COSVN force development program planned to mobilize office workers, specialists, and non-combat workers; form permanent assault youth groups to serve as battlefield laborers and troop reinforcements; build units of "Army Corps" size in the Western Highlands; and employ single women in all non-combatant work in offices and workshops.

Results have been gained in the strengthening of logistical activities and, despite the US air reconnaissance and bombing missions, the enemy has kept moving his supplies down from the north, on an around-the-clock basis. In force development, the report predicted that during the seven months of the two campaigns the enemy has probably mobilized 75,000 men (approximately 30,000 being office personnel and specialists). Only one youth assault group was confirmed (in Military Region 5), but it consisted mostly of women (75%); therefore, reinforcement for the battlefield from this group will be limited.

COMMENTS: As presented above, the Winter-Spring Campaign of 1966 and the Dry Season Campaign of 1967 were aimed more at strengthening army units

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than at launching attacks and perhaps were designed to prepare for a new large-scale military campaign. With the present troop deployment and preparation of the rear services, the VC may pick their targets in mountainous battlefields during the Rainy Season Campaign.

In short, the report states that the VC, though unable to achieve their military goals, have nevertheless been able to prepare considerable supplies, troops and fire power, and with the VC policy being to gain a good military position in 1967 in order to come to a desirable political solution, the battle of the rainy season of 1967 might be very drastic, particularly in the Fronts of the Western Highlands and eastern region (NFI) of South Vietnam. SOURCE: Controlled American Source Report FVS 14,885.

(C) VC CRITICIZE US UNITS

A Viet Cong document has been captured that analyzes and describes tactics to be used against US troops. The document admits to the strong firepower and good equipment of US infantry divisions but claims that they are not equipped for close-quarter combat and that the heavy equipment of US infantry mechanized units is not suitable for jungle combat. The document also states that the character of US military leadership and lack of mobility in combat are particular weaknesses of US units. The report goes on to say that only a small percentage of combat strength is used by assault forces and that logistical requirements are too high. On the other hand, the document states that pitched battles with US infantry units are to be avoided because of their strong firepower. The best tactics against US infantry units are surprise attacks on the rear or flanks of the unit and fighting at close-quarters with vigor. COMMENT: VC criticism of US units generally follows this pattern; however, they usually qualify their criticism with a healthy respect for US firepower. SOURCE: III Corps PERINTREP No 16.

(C-NOFORN) NVA PW'S REQUEST TO STAY IN RVN

A relatively large number of NVA soldiers held in South Vietnam apparently do not wish to be repatriated. For example, only five out of 91 interviewed at a camp in III Corps said that they were willing to be sent home; in I Corps the total was two out of 82 and in II Corps, 32 out of 88. The reason given by most of them was that the North Vietnamese Government and their families would not welcome them back until the war was over. SOURCE: DIA Intsum 103-67.

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(C) CHANGE IN VC CIVILIAN LABOR POLICY

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In early February, the VC discontinued the policy of detaining residents along the supply route between the VC CENTRAL NAMBO Region (northern IV CTZ) and COSVN (northern TAY NINH Province) and forcing them to move supplies on a one-trip basis. It was found that laborers impressed for short periods were not adequately trained in methods of transportation, avoiding detection by Allied aircraft, and avoiding ambushes. Additionally, there was the requirement of providing laborers when, where, and in the quantity needed; short term impressment did not fulfill this requirement.

It has now been decided that civilian laborers will be drafted to work for ninety days each year. Each VC province is required to have from 2000 to 2500 civilian laborers of this type. Males between eighteen and forty-five years of age are to be forced into the civilian labor groups, while females can volunteer for the work. If military necessity demands, single females between fifteen and thirty years of age might be forced to work for the civilian labor groups, the basic work unit of which is the three-man cell. Laborers will be drafted in VC-controlled areas, disputed areas, and New Life Hamlets, where the GVN security system is weak. SOURCE: III Corps PERINTREP No 16.

(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

Accredited enemy strength:	<u>47,480</u>	NVA Combat Strength
	<u>61,742</u>	VC Combat Strength
	<u>24,253</u>	Administrative Services
	<u>112,760</u>	Irregulars
	<u>39,172</u>	Political
TOTAL:	285,410	

Major unit listings: 8 Divisions: 6 NVA Confirmed
2 VC Confirmed
21 (5) NVA Regiments
12 (6) VC Regiments

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional size units in RVN.

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(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

1.75 There were a total of 788 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 23 - 29 April. This compares with 857 incidents for the previous week and represents a decrease of 69. (See Annex A)

<u>ENEMY CASUALTIES:</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S WPNS LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 23-29 APR 67	1,152	*	*
PERIOD OF 16-22 APR 67	**980	**338	**28
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**25,605	**9,346	**610
SINCE JUN 65	**108,755	**33,598	**2,384

<u>FRIENDLY CASUALTIES:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 23-29 APR 67	80 (114)	279 (388)	9/0 (3/0)	19	0
PERIOD OF 16-22 APR 67	**237 **(140)	**501 **(913)	**29/0 **(12/1)	223	3
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**4,520 **(2,329)	**14,801 **(16,386)	**897/82 **(118/2)	2,782	60

RATIO (ALLIED TO VC/NVA) KHA RATIO 5.94:1 (ALLIED FAVOR) PERIOD OF 23-29 APR 67. WEAPONS LOST RATIO 1.62:1 (ALLIED FAVOR) PERIOD OF 16-22 APR 67.

Chieu Hoi figures for the period 23-30 April were not available.

* Enemy weapons for the period 23-29 Apr 67 were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

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KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
AC of S, G2

Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

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- 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
- 1 - USARV Operations Center
- 1 - Command Section
- 1 - G1
- 5 - G2
- 1 - G3
- 30 - G3 Historical Section
- 1 - G4
- 1 - Aviation
- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - Information Officer
- 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
- 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
- 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
- 5 - J2, USMACV
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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 29 APRIL 1967

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	2-8 Apr	9-15 Apr	16-22 Apr	23-29 Apr	TOTAL
ATK	55	36	35	26	152
HARASS	435	385	472	393	1,685
TERRSM	58	50	55	27	190
SABOTAGE	8	22	16	20	66
PROP	36	38	21	8	103
AA	260	248	258	314	1,080
TOTAL	852	779	857	788	3,276

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 23-29 APRIL 1967

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	11	5	3	7	26
HARASS	133	33	132	95	393
TERRSM	9	5	9	4	27
SABOTAGE	5	0	5	10	20
PROP	0	7	0	1	8
AA	211	21	41	41	314
TOTAL	369	71	190	158	788

ANNEX A

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WEEKLY

INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW



18-67
12 May 1967

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

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The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data becomes available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AVHGB-O, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96307.

(c) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I GTZ:

Enemy units in the IMZ area remain deployed generally as last week. The NVA 324B Division's 812th Regiment and possibly elements of its 90th Regiment are located north and west of CON THIEN (YD 11 72). Elements of the 31st Regiment, NVA 341st Division, continue to operate between CON THIEN and GIO LINH (YD 20 75). At least one and possibly two additional unidentified

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units are located in the northern QUANG TRI Province area. In western QUANG TRI Province US Marines have been in contact with an estimated enemy regiment identified as part of the NVA 325th Division. The 325th Division's 1st Regiment is probably located near Route 9 in Laos; the 2d Regiment is presently in contact with US Marines northwest of KHE SANH (XD 85 38); and the 3d Regiment is possibly deployed along infiltration routes from the central DMZ to the KHE SANH area. In the Northern Front area, friendly operations at the end of April and in the first week of May have probably disrupted enemy plans. It is believed that the 802d Battalion, NVA 6th Regiment, took heavy losses in a contact with three ARVN battalions eight kilometers northwest of HUE (YD 78 25) on the fourth day of this month. In central I Corps, elements of the NVA 3d and 21st Regiments, NT 2 Division, continue to evade friendly operations in QUANG TIN Province. There have been no displacements of major enemy units in southern I Corps' QUANG NGAI Province.

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The enemy is capable of attacking in the DMZ area with up to three divisions. He is also capable of launching concurrent attacks in the QUANG TRI-HUE area in division strength and in the KHE SANH area with up to one division. His probable course of action will be to continue preparing for offensive action in the DMZ area while harassing friendly positions. Units subordinate to the Northern Front probably will continue battalion-size operations in the HUE area while evading friendly operations in north-central THUA THIEN Province. In central I Corps, the enemy is capable of attacking in the THIEN PHUOC (BT 28 43) - QUE SON (BT 03 33) area with the NVA 3d and 21st Regiments. However, he probably will continue to evade friendly operations in central QUANG TIN Province while harassing coastal outposts and district towns in up to battalion strength. In QUANG NGAI Province, the enemy is capable of attacking the Summer Campaign objectives of DUC PHO (BS 80 38) and BA TC (BS 56 33) with up to three regiments. Most probably, though, he will continue to evade friendly operations while attacking isolated outposts and friendly patrols in up to battalion strength.

II CTZ:

Enemy forces in the Western Highlands continue reconnaissance, mortar attacks, and mining of lines of communication. Detainees and documents captured since 21 April indicate elements of three regiments, the NVA 66th, 88th and 95B, are located in western PLEIKU Province. The detainees indicated that DUC CO (YA 84 26) and PLEI ME (ZA 16 05) Special Forces Camps are B3 Front targets for the first month of heavy rains. On Operation FRANCIS MARION, contacts with enemy forces from squad to battalion size and the discovery of bivouac sites and supply caches near DUC CO and PLEI ME further indicate that enemy forces are preparing the battlefield for operations in western PLEIKU Province. Headquarters, NT 3 Division, the VC 2d Regiment, and the NVA 22d Regiment continue to operate near

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the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI Province boundary, while the NVA 18th Regiment reportedly is operating in the PHU MY Valley of central BINH DINH Province. Elements of the NT 3 Division continue to evade, probably in an attempt to reorganize and obtain replacements.

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The enemy is capable of attacking in the Western Highlands with one division and two regiments. The presence of elements of at least three regiments in western PLEIKU Province increases the threat of attack on DUC CO and PLEI ME. The NT 3 Division is capable of attacking with up to one division in northern BINH DINH Province and the NT 5 Division can attack in up to regimental strength in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. However, detainee statements indicate that the NT 3 and NT 5 Divisions will probably continue to evade while attempting to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program and conducting attacks on lightly defended installations. Main and Local Force units will probably continue acts of terrorism, attacks on logistical bases and airfields, and interdiction of lines of communication throughout the II Corps area.

III CTZ:

In Operation JUNCTION CITY, COSVN forces in TAY NINH Province have sustained over 2,700 casualties. In the past, such losses would require the enemy to withdraw to base areas for extended recovery periods. A returnee from the VC 272d Regiment stated, however, that the VC 271st and 272d Regiments and the NVA 101st Regiment probably withdrew to Cambodia after sustaining heavy casualties and immediately received replacements from the B525 Replacement and Convalescent Group, which probably included members of the NVA 52d Regiment. It is believed that the regiments have now redeployed to South Vietnam in preparation for offensive action. Analysis of captured documents indicates that enemy military units in the RUNG SAT Special Zone may be reorganizing their command structure. There are indications that two battalion-size units are now operating on the east and west banks of the LONG TAN River. It is the enemy plan to provide all its units in the RUNG SAT Special Zone with the capability to attack shipping with recoilless rifles as well as watermines.

Throughout III Corps, reports continue to indicate that attacks on lines of communication, particularly on shipping in the RSSZ, and against GVN/FWMAF installations are probable. TAN SON NHUT and BIEN HOA Air Bases continue to be reported as probable objectives for rocket attacks. Agent reports indicate that PHU LAM Radio Station (XS 789 890) in GIA DINH Province is also a Viet Cong objective. In western III Corps the enemy has the capability to attack in division strength. The current disposition of the CT 9 Division, and that of possibly two regiments of the NVA CT 7 Division, indicates that these units are preparing for offensive action, probably at a time when weather would

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adversely affect supporting fire of friendly units. Likely objectives are PREK KLOK (XT 28 78), TONG IE CHON (XT 64 95), CAU SONG BE (XT 57 65), and possibly DONG XOAI (YT 07 76) Special Forces Camps, as well as GVN/FWMAF bases and units along Highway 13. The CT 5 Division has the capability to attack in regimental strength. Its current disposition poses an increased threat from GIA RAY (YT 64 14) to VO XU (YT 82 38). Elsewhere throughout the III Corps, attacks by fire on GVN/FWMAF installations and terrorist attacks to thwart Revolutionary Development are probable enemy courses of action.

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IV CTZ:

Enemy forces in IV Corps continue to conduct small-scale attacks, harassment, and acts of terrorism to counter the expansion of GVN control. In DINH TUONG Province, elements of the US 9th Infantry Division and 12th ARVN Regiment are believed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the 514th Local Force Battalion in two separate contacts during the first week of May. In northeast VINH LONG Province, it was reported that one hundred civilians were kidnapped to be used as porters for enemy equipment. This incident and the recent deployment of the VC 306th Battalion to the vicinity of the MANG THIET River probably indicate increased Viet Cong activity in reaction to the Revolutionary Development Program in the area.

In IV Corps the enemy retains his capability to conduct a regimental-size attack against DONG TAM Base (XS 44 45). The most probable course of action, however, is to conduct small-scale attacks against US Forces on operations and sabotage and harassment of friendly installations. Throughout the IV Corps the enemy probably will attack ports and lightly defended areas with up to a battalion-size force and attempt to counter the Revolutionary Development Program.

(C) NVA 325th DIVISION IDENTIFIED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Interrogation of three detainees captured in the vicinity of KHE SANH (XD 85 38) determined that the NVA 325th Division had infiltrated western QUANG TRI Province and made contact with US Marines. The first detainee, a sixteen-year-old private from the 4th Battalion, 95th Regiment (an AKA for the 2d Regiment, 325th Division), stated that his regiment trained in battalion-size units in North Vietnam's QUANG BINH Province during 1965. He said the 325th Division infiltrated to base areas near Hill 805 (XD 79 68), QUANG TRI Province, in January 1966 and remained there except during TET in 1966 and June 1966, when they went to Laos. Another detainee, a twenty-year-old private, also identified his unit as the 4th Battalion, 2d Regiment. He stated the battalion left NVN on foot 1 August 1966 and arrived in SVN 28 March of this year. This second detainee further stated that the unit arrived near KHE SANH on 3 May, where he was captured during a company attack.

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The third detainee is a twenty-one-year-old named Tran Giai PHONG. He claimed to be a private from the 2d Battalion, 95A Regiment. The interrogators feel, however, that he holds a higher rank. PHONG, a native of QUANG TRI Province, defected to North Vietnam in August 1965 and enlisted in the NVA. He stated that he joined his present regiment in January 1966 and throughout the following year moved back and forth between Laos and western QUANG TRI Province. Following a two-month rest over this year's TET holidays, the regiment moved to the vicinity of KHE SANH. PHONG identified the regiments of the 325th Division as the 95A, 95B, and 95C (probably infiltration group numbers) and said the code name of the division was SONG CUU LONG. He stated that the mission of his regiment was to infiltrate eastward through QUANG TRI or THUA THIEN Provinces to attack QUANG TRI City on 22 June 1967. He described in detail an attack plan that included thirteen companies storming the city following breaching of the fortifications with demolitions and a twenty-minute artillery preparation using 82mm and 60mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles.

The three interrogations confirmed that US Marines made contact with the 2d Regiment (AKA 95th Regiment), 325th Division, during the first week in May. AKA's for the 1st and 3d Regiments were identified as the 101st Regiment and 18th Regiment, respectively. The detainees indicated that the other two regiments of the division are also in the area and that the 3d Regiment is possibly performing a screening mission from the DMZ to the vicinity north of KHE SANH. The attack plan described by PHONG is feasible and the detail in which it was described indicates he holds at least the rank of NCO. Sightings of enemy units in western QUANG TRI Province since September support PHONG's statement that his battalion, the 2d, has been in the area for a year. This battalion may have been involved in preparing elaborate fortifications in western QUANG TRI Province in preparation for infiltration by other elements of the division. SOURCE: MAGV INTSUM 125-67.

(C) MILITARY REGION 5 AMMUNITION SUPPLY

Further interrogation of Major Huyen CU, former MR 5 Training Officer, (USARV Weekly Intel Review, dtd 21 April 1967) revealed ammunition supply procedures and problems experienced in MR 5. The basic load carried by individuals assigned to the military region combat units includes 100 rounds per SIG 7.62mm semi-automatic rifle, 250 rounds per AK-47 7.62mm submachine gun, 500 rounds per RPD 7.62mm light machine gun, and 700 rounds per RP-46 7.62mm automatic rifle. Each GORUYNOV 7.62mm machine gun is allotted 1000 rounds and approximately 20 rounds are provided for each recoilless rifle. Three basic loads are considered to be an adequate divisional reserve for one campaign, but only two are usually available. The length of a campaign varies; however, one usually consists of three engagements.

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Major CU stated that a contact lasting three to five hours would normally result in the expenditure of one-third of an individual's basic load. If a battalion is surrounded and forced to fight, its ammunition could not be expected to last an entire day. A unit caught in such a predicament would be expected to fight until out of ammunition and then split into small groups to break through the encirclement. 186

To preserve ammunition during a planned raid or ambush, only two-thirds of a basic load is carried by each individual. The rest is left at the point of departure as a reserve. There are no reserves kept at company or battalion level. Regiments usually have two or three times the basic load for combat support weapons (recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns, etc.) on hand, but have negligible small arms available. Only divisions are authorized to keep a small arms ammunition reserve. Normally it takes a battalion two days to reach a division resupply depot. MR 5 divisions require twenty-five days to three months, depending on the division, to pick up ammunition at CK 7 depot (BS 25 85 to BS 28 85) and transport it back to division depots. The delay appears to be caused by the heavy loads which must be carried by foot. Combined with the weight of the ammunition, the transporters must carry enough rice to last them the duration of their journey. Major CU revealed that ammunition resupply became such a problem that the NT 5 Division exhausted its reserves by 5 March and had to discontinue its Spring Campaign. SOURCE: Combined Military Interrogation Center Report VS 400-67; J2 MACV INTSUM 116-67.

(C) CHARACTERISTICS OF VIET CONG TERRORISM

Viet Cong terrorism is designed to destroy the faith the populace has in the GVN's ability to protect their communities. It is usually directed against village and municipal officials, civil servants, military personnel (especially officers), and anyone else representing authority. A survey of attacks directed against GVN officials determined that in almost every case of assassination the victims were native to the area where the terrorism was committed. It appears that these victims might be either highly effective and popular or very corrupt and oppressive, but in almost every case they were local personalities whose loss would have the greatest effect on the populace. In addition, the growing GVN emphasis on the Revolutionary Development Program has been accompanied by an increase in terrorism directed against RD personnel.

The basic unit of most VC terrorist organizations is the three-man cell. The average age of members is around eighteen, with some as young as thirteen used to commit simple acts like throwing grenades. Seldom has an identified member of a terrorist cell been as old as twenty-five or older. The exception to this characteristic youthfulness is in a recently identified terrorist organization

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known as the TIEU TO DAC CONG (Special Activities Cell). The members of this group are more mature and are believed to be responsible for the most spectacular acts of terrorism.

187 The Viet Cong have been known to announce attacks of sabotage and terrorism in advance in an attempt to increase their prestige and bolster their own morale. Having done so, failure to follow through with their threats or successfully accomplish their mission especially damages the VC position and cause. It can be expected, then, that these highly motivated members of terrorist organizations will carry out their threats with determination. In the future, as GVN elements strengthen their control over the population of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong can be expected to take drastic measures to terrorize the populace in an attempt to erode the Government's position. SOURCE: III MAF Est 4-67; I FFORCEV Intel Est 18-66; II FFORCEV Intel Est 2-67.

(C) VIET CONG REAR SERVICES ORGANIZATION

Four documents captured during Operation JUNCTION CITY in northern TAY NINH Province have more clearly defined the organizational structure of VC rear service units. They indicated that COSVN has nine rear service groups designated as Groups 81 through 87, Group VO DAC and Group 17. Known operating areas are as follows:

- Group 81 - War Zone D (VC Area A)
- Group 82 - War Zone C (VC Area B)
- Group 83 - BINH DUONG Province (VC Area C)
- Group 84 - PHUOC TUY Province (VC Area E)
- Group 85 - BINH LONG Province (Probable)
- Group 86 - PHUOC LONG Province (MR 10)
- Group 87 - LAM DONG and BINH TUY Provinces

Group 17's operating area is probably in Cambodia, northwest of Base Area 352 (XT 60 90). Documentary evidence indicates that Group 17's funding is in Riels (Cambodian currency) and that it issues supplies to BINH LONG Province. No information is available on the operating area of Group VO DAC.

There is also documentary evidence that a recently activated transportation group, Group 18, and a 7500-man convalescent and replacement unit

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designated B525 are operating in the same area as Group 17 and are possibly subordinate to COSVN's 680th Training Group. Increased use of the Cambodian sanctuary in this area indicates that the Viet Cong probably will support the new Military Region 10 from Cambodia. SOURCE: MACV INTSUM 125-67.

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(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

Accredited enemy strength:	<u>47,480</u>	NVA Combat Strength
	<u>62,737</u>	VC Combat Strength
	<u>24,333</u>	Administrative Services
	<u>112,760</u>	Irregulars
	<u>39,175</u>	Political
TOTAL:	286,485	

Major unit listings: 8 Divisions: 6 NVA Confirmed
2 VC Confirmed
21 (5) NVA Regiments
12 (6) VC Regiments

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional size units in RVN.

(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 870 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 30 April - 6 May 1967. This compares with 788 incidents for the previous week and represents an increase of 82. (See Annex A)

<u>Enemy Casualties:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 30 Apr-6 May 67	1,903	*	*
Period of 23-29 Apr 67	**1,306	**386	**15
Since 1 Jan 67	**27,662	**9,732	**625
Since Jun 65	**110,812	**33,984	**2,399

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<u>Friendly Casualties:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 30 Apr-6 May 67	230 (124)	716 (698)	54/0 (18/0)	103	3
189 Period of 23-29 Apr 67	**80 **(181)	**279 **(1,249)	**9/0 **(7/0)	19	0
Since 1 Jan 67	**4,750 **(2,522)	**15,517 **(17,974)	**951/82 **(131/2)	2,885	63

Ratio (Allied to VC/NVA) KHA Ratio 5.5:1 (Allied favor) period of 30 Apr - 6 May 67. Weapons Lost Ratio 21.1:1 (Allied favor) period of 23 - 29 Apr 67.

Chieu Hoi figures for the period 30 April - 6 May 1967 were not available at the time of this report.

* Enemy weapons for the period 30 Apr - 6 May were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

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Annex:

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- 1 - G4
- 1 - Aviation
- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - Information Officer
- 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
- 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
- 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
- 5 - J2, USMACV
- 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
- 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH

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12 May 1967

(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 6 MAY 1967

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	9 - 15 Apr	16 - 22 Apr	23 - 29 Apr	30 Apr-6 May	TOTAL
ATK	36	35	26	37	134
HARASS	385	472	393	417	1,667
TERRSM	50	55	27	45	177
SABOTAGE	22	16	20	11	69
PROP	38	21	8	32	99
AA	248	258	314	328	1,148
TOTAL	779	857	788	870	3,294

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 29 APRIL - 6 MAY 1967

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	13	2	11	11	37
HARASS	166	42	125	84	417
TERRSM	10	10	15	10	45
SABOTAGE	3	2	1	5	11
PROP	1	27	4	0	32
AA	203	39	43	43	328
TOTAL	396	122	199	153	870

ANNEX A

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INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW



19-67
19 May 1967

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VC/NVA Casualties and Weapons Losses	8

The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data becomes available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96307.

(C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

The enemy increased activity throughout the I CTZ while preparing for a probable coordinated offensive in the northern provinces. Senior Captain LY, 1st Battalion, 31st Regiment Political Officer, who was captured in March, stated that the enemy would progressively increase the scale of offensive activity in QUANG TRI Province prior to initiating division or larger-size

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operations during the summer. Enemy activity during the last two months has followed the pattern outlined by Captain LY. In western QUANG TRI Province, enemy forces have moved to the west from Hill 881, northwest of KHE SANH (XD 85 38), but continue to resist friendly clearing operations throughout the area. Interrogation of five detainees and one returnee has confirmed the enemy force as the 95C Regiment, NVA 325th Division. The division headquarters and its other two subordinate regiments, the 101D and 18C, are accepted as possible in the LAOS/QUANG TRI border area. Although more than 800 enemy troops have been killed in the KHE SANH area since 24 April, the enemy shows no indications of withdrawal. In central I Corps, the enemy increased his activity southwest of HOI AN (BT 09 16), where five contacts were reported between 7 and 10 May. The magnitude of these contacts (friendly 78 killed, 213 wounded; enemy 176 killed) indicates that the R-20 VC Local Force Battalion, which usually operates in that area, has been reinforced, probably by elements of the NVA 3d Regiment. In QUANG TIN Province, elements of the 21st Regiment harassed TAM KY (BT 32 21) on two occasions, while in southern I Corps reliable agent reports stated that the enemy would shift operations to MO DUC District, QUANG NGAI Province, in order to counter friendly reinforcements at DUC PHO (BS 80 38). 196

The enemy is capable of attacking in the DMZ area with up to three divisions, with concurrent attacks in the QUANG TRI (YD 35 52) - HUE (YD 78 25) area in up to division strength, and in the KHE SANH - LANG VEI (XD 78 37) area with up to one division. The enemy probably will continue preparing for offensive action in the area while attacking friendly positions with artillery, mortar, and rocket fire. Units subordinate to the Northern Front will continue to be reinforced via the ASHAU Valley. Enemy forces probably will be deployed in southern QUANG TRI Province and eastern THUA THIEN Province in preparation for coordinated attacks. In central I Corps, the enemy is capable of attacking in the THIEN PHUOC (BT 28 43) - QUE SON (BT 03 33) area with up to two regiments. He probably will continue to evade friendly operations in central QUANG TIN Province while harassing coastal outposts and district towns in up to battalion strength. HOI AN and TAM KY remain the most likely objectives in central I Corps. In QUANG NGAI Province, the enemy is capable of attacking Summer Campaign objectives with up to three regiments. He probably will continue to evade friendly operations in the DUC PHO District while shifting emphasis to the reported campaign objectives of MO DUC and SON HA (BS 37 64).

II CTZ:

There are continuing indications that enemy forces are preparing for operations in western PLEIKU Province. A detainee, who was captured on 6 May ten kilometers southwest of DUC CO, stated that the headquarters of the 95B Regiment was located near the CAMBODIA/PLEIKU border (YA 76 12) as of 5 May. Three detainees, as well as infiltration passes captured since 21 April,

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indicate that elements of the NVA 66th, 88th, and 95B Regiments are operating in western PLEIKU Province. A detainee from the 66th Regiment and a detainee from the 95B Regiment reported that their units would attack DUC CO (YA 84 26) and PLEI ME (ZA 16 05) during the rainy season. Elements of the NT 3 and NT 5 Divisions continue to evade. The Headquarters NT 3 Division, the VC 2d Regiment, and the NVA 22d Regiment remain near the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI Province border while the NVA 18th Regiment is operating in the PHU MY Valley.

The enemy is capable of attacking in the Western Highlands with one division and two regiments of the B-3 Front. The current strength of the B-3 Front is 12,500. Of its fifteen subordinate battalions, seven are considered combat effective, one is not combat effective, while the combat effectiveness of the other seven is unknown. The NT 3 Division can make a coordinated attack in northern BINH DINH Province, and the NT 5 Division can attack in up to regimental strength in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. However, detainee statements and current deployment of enemy forces indicate the NT 3 and NT 5 Divisions probably will continue to evade while attempting to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program and to conduct attacks on lightly defended installations. Main and Local Forces probably will continue acts of terrorism, attacks on logistical bases and airfields, and interdiction of lines of communication throughout the Corps.

III CTZ:

In III Corps, there are continued indications that the VC CT 9 Division, possibly supported by elements of the NVA CT 7 Division and the VC 273d Regiment, is preparing for offensive action in TAY NINH, BINH LONG, and PHUOC LONG Provinces. On 12 May, BIEN HOA Air Base was attacked by 122mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire. Throughout the III Corps reports continue to indicate that attacks on lines of communication (particularly in the RUNG SAT Special Zone) and against GVN/FWMAF installations are probable. TAN SON NHUT and BIEN HOA Air Bases remain probable objectives for mortar and rocket attacks; agent reports indicate that PHU LAM Radio Station (XS 79 89) in GIA DINH Province is also a probable VC objective.

In northern III Corps, the enemy has the capability to conduct coordinated attacks with up to seven regiments. Likely objectives are PREK KLOK (XT 28 78), TONG LE CHON (XT 64 95), and DONG XOAI (YT 07 76) Special Forces Camps, and GVN/FWMAF bases and units along Highway 13. In southeast III Corps, the CT 5 Division has the capability to attack in regimental strength, but probably will evade friendly forces while seeking opportunities to harass lightly defended outposts and counter the Revolutionary Development Program. Throughout the Corps Tactical Zone, small-unit attacks on lightly defended positions, and lines of communication, attacks by fire on GVN/FWMAF installations, and terrorist attacks are the probable enemy courses of action.

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IV GTZ:

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Enemy forces in IV Corps continue to conduct small-scale attacks, harassment, sabotage, and acts of terrorism to counter the expansion of GVN control. On 7 May BINH THUY Airfield was attacked for the fourth time since December 1966. An unknown-size enemy force placed approximately 100 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire on the installation from an estimated distance of 6000 meters. Six aircraft and a hangar were destroyed. A returnee stated in December 1966 that one mission of the weapons platoon, TAY DO Battalion, was to shell BINH THUY Airfield following reconnaissance by an intelligence element of CAN THO Provincial Committee. In KIEN HOA Province--based upon the statement of a 269th Battalion returnee, the absence of contact and the lack of evidence of its existence--the 271st Battalion, DT2 Regiment, has been dropped from order of battle holdings. It had been carried with a strength of 200 since March 1966. An unconfirmed 271st Sapper Company has occasionally been reported in the operating area of the former 271st Battalion. In CHUONG THIEN Province (WR 51 64), the VC 310th Main Force Battalion, subordinate to the Military Affairs Committee of MR 3, has been accepted in order of battle holdings. The battalion was reportedly activated in July 1964 with cadre from the disbanded 01 Regiment and recruits from VC-controlled areas. Based on returnees' statements, the current strength of the 310th Battalion is estimated at 400.

The enemy retains his capability to conduct a regimental-size attack against DONG TAM Base (XS 44 45) in DINH TUONG Province. However, he probably will harass and conduct small-scale attacks against US Forces on operations in that area. Throughout IV Corps, the enemy probably will continue to conduct acts of terrorism, harassment, sabotage, and attack posts and lightly defended areas with up to a battalion-size force to counter the Revolutionary Development Program. The frequency with which airfields in IV Corps are attacked indicates that they continue to be primary targets.

(C-NOFORN): VC BORDER REGULATIONS

The following information was gained from a captured document titled "Regulations Concerning the Border," published by the Viet Cong Border Action Section as a result of a conference held 17 December 1966. It appears that this Border Action Section has jurisdiction over only a limited portion of the SVN/Cambodian boundary, probably the TAY NINH Province/Cambodian border (VC MRI). Although these comments are restricted to a limited area, they are indicative of relations between the VC and Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) and show that the Viet Cong have controlled access to Cambodia. Further, it shows that the presence of Viet Cong in Cambodia is generally tolerated

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by the RKG as long as it is on a limited basis and kept well concealed.

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The Border Action Section practically has complete authority concerning passage into Cambodia. The regulations set forth state that "all agencies or units wishing to make contact with persons on the Cambodian side of the border must first notify the Border Action Section, giving the names of the persons to be contacted and the purpose of the liaison meeting." The Border Action Section must even be given the exact date, time and location of such a meeting. The actual crossing of the border is also regulated by the Border Action Section. All exit and entry points are controlled by an "Exit and Entry Point Management Section, whose mission will be to coordinate movement of goods and food supplies to prevent confusion." The chief of the controlling element at an exit or entry point is a representative of the Border Action Section.

According to the regulations, movement by waterways and land routes are to take place only at night (between 1800 and 0500 hours) in order to avoid detection. The exception to this regulation concerns sick and seriously wounded personnel, who may be moved during daylight hours. Once in Cambodia, the Viet Cong are prohibited from building base areas to house units, schools or VC agencies. The regulation makes an exception for convalescent camps which accommodate large numbers of sick and wounded patients. Construction of such camps, however, is subject to approval of the Border Action Section. The section's authority extends even to the SVN side of the border where VC units and agencies operating in the border area must get the Border Action Section's approval to build installations or storage facilities. This regulation appears to have been initiated to prevent such VC base areas from being constructed right on the boundary line.

The regulations specify measures to be taken in the event of US/FWMAF sweep operations. "Under normal conditions only those cadre and personnel with special permission from the Border Action Section should be stationed or moved on Cambodian territory." These approved personnel are to disguise themselves and are not to carry any weapons or documents. The regulations state that "it is absolutely forbidden to use Cambodian territory as a base to destroy the enemy while he is on our (Vietnamese) territory." They are instructed, however, to coordinate with the Cambodians to fight and destroy such forces if they should cross into Cambodian territory. When preparing to return to Vietnamese territory from Cambodia, VC personnel are required to erase all evidence of having been in Cambodia. Particular attention is to be paid to destroying even the "smallest piece of paper bearing Vietnamese letters." Shelters and water wells are to be carefully concealed to be used in "subsequent escapes to safety." SOURCE: Controlled American Source Report FVS-14,942.

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(C) ENEMY RADIO INTERCEPT CAPABILITIES

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Captured documents and interrogation reports indicate that the enemy is becoming more proficient in his ability to intercept US and Allied communications and to take immediate tactical advantage of the information obtained. In 1965, the military intelligence section of COSVN was directed to establish a country-wide organization of technical reconnaissance units to serve this purpose. Because of the language barrier, initial success was primarily from monitoring Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces communications. During 1966, however, an English language capability began to emerge. Since then, documents and reports have reflected marked success in exploiting US and RVNAF communications. To further support indications of an increase in enemy intercept ability, US units have reported an increasing number of incidents of communications deception, intrusion and jamming.

A unit, reported as the D4 Technical Reconnaissance Group, illustrates the enemy's communications intercept activities. This group has five subordinate elements of possibly company-size, designated C1, C2, C4, C5, and C6. The group is responsible for intercepting communications in II and III Corps. In III Corps the C1 element has the mission of intercepting thirty nets, as well as copying press communications. It claims to have intercepted 7,745 of 7,793 messages passed in September 1966 and to have enjoyed one hundred percent success in exploiting the intercepted messages. C2 performs a similar function in II Corps; however, the degree of success there is not known. C4 appears to be the supply and service element, while C5 and C6 have missions similar to those of C1 and C2, apparently configured for tactical deployment.

Equipment used by the VC/NVA Forces for communications intercept varies from the PRC-6 to the HC-1004 radios, as well as CHICOM-furnished equipment. Much of their equipment is of US manufacture which has been captured, stolen, or even illegally purchased. Modified commercial radios such as Sony, Philips, Standard and Zenith are also used.

The enemy capability to intercept friendly radio transmissions should not be underestimated. It can be expected that increased emphasis will be placed on this method of gathering intelligence information. All indicators point to the fact that the enemy will expand and continue to improve his intercept activities in the future. SOURCE: MACV J2 PERINTREP, March 1967.

(C-NOFORN) US/PW RECOVERY EFFORTS

Information contained in the article "US/PW Recovery Efforts," page 6 of the 28 April 1967 USARV Weekly Intelligence Review, is updated as follows:

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Monetary rewards are still given for information leading to recovery of US prisoners; however, the 1 million piastre rate is no longer paid by the US Government for such information. Rewards paid are commensurate with the value of the information received.

The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), MACV, has the responsibility of coordinating and approving operations designed solely to effect the release of captured personnel. Tactical units are not permitted to conduct an operation solely for the purpose of effecting the release of US prisoners without JPRC approval and coordination. However, tactical units are permitted to attempt recapture of FVMAF prisoners any time the opportunity develops during normal operations within their tactical area of responsibility for that operation. JPRC desires to be informed in the event the above occurs.

From the time of the US troop build-up in September 1965 to 30 April 1967, the Viet Cong have returned four US military and three US civilian personnel. SOURCE: OACoFS, G2, USARV, CI Division.

(C-NOFORN) SUBVERTED US FORCES' PHOTOGRAPHY

Photographic processing firms are prime targets of foreign subversive and espionage activities. Counterintelligence investigation by the US Army Ryukyu Islands Command reflects the capability of the local leftists to exploit these firms for propaganda and intelligence collection purposes as follows:

a. Amateur photographers unwittingly provide leftists with propaganda material by submitting photographs for processing which depict war dead and can be labeled as "US atrocities." Such a photograph was recently obtained from a large processing firm which has a contract with the Okinawa Regional Exchange to process film submitted by US Forces personnel.

b. A Communist newspaper in December 1966 reported "atrocities" depicted in films processed by a major photographic processing firm on Okinawa. These films received from Vietnam were described as depicting horrors such as that of a decapitated head, severed limbs, and prisoners being hoisted into trucks with their eyes blindfolded and their legs bound. The saddest photograph was described as one which showed a woman carrying her child in search of food after she had been displaced from her home due to the devastation of the war.

c. Atrocity-type photographs have been displayed in the past at the headquarters of a local Communist organization in Okinawa. These photographs presumably were submitted for processing in Okinawa by US personnel who had returned from Vietnam.

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d. Leftists can also exploit the photographic processing industry as a source of low-level intelligence on US military forces. Pictures of military installations, equipment, construction projects, and movements submitted for processing by US Army personnel could provide this information. 202

Positive efforts are therefore required to deny to hostile elements photographs taken by US Army personnel, both military and civilian, that could be exploited for anti-US propaganda and low-level intelligence collection purposes. SOURCE: OACofS, G2, USARV, CI Division.

(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

Accredited enemy strength:	<u>52,580</u>	NVA Combat Strength
	<u>63,137</u>	VC Combat Strength
	<u>24,333</u>	Administrative Services
	<u>112,760</u>	Irregulars
	<u>39,175</u>	Political
TOTAL:	291,985	

Major unit listings: 9 Divisions: 6 NVA Confirmed 1 NVA Possible
2 VC Confirmed
24 (5) NVA Regiments
12 (6) VC Regiments

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional size units in RVN.

(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 725 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 7 - 13 May 67. This compares with 870 incidents for the previous week and represents a decrease of 145. (See Annex A)

<u>Enemy Casualties:</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>G/S LOST</u>
Period of 7-13 May 67	1,942	*	*
Period of 30 Apr-6 May 67	**2,038	**847	**50
Since 1 Jan 67	**29,739	**10,579	**675
Since June 65	**112,889	**34,831	**2,449

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<u>Friendly Casualties:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>G/S LOST</u>
Period of 7-13 May 67	266 (129)	582 (674)	19/0 (4/0)	143	4
203 Period of 30 Apr-6 May 67	**230 **(190)	**716 **(1,019)	**54/0 **(19/0)	103	3
Since 1 Jan 67	**5,016 **(2,718)	**16,099 **(19,059)	**970/82 **(136/2)	3,028	67

Ratio (Allied to VC/NVA) KHA Ratio 4.92:1 (Allied favor) period of 7 - 13 May 67. Weapons Lost Ratio 8.46:1 (Allied favor) period of 30 Apr - 6 May 1967.

The following are Chieu Hoi figures for the period 7 - 13 May 1967:

a. <u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
30	157	224	180

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 348; Political 216; Other 27; Total: 591..

c. This is an increase of 99 over the previous week.

* Enemy weapons for the period 7 - 13 May 67 were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
AC of S, G2

Annex:
A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

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- 40 - G2, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH
- 1 - LNO, USARPAC
- 1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
- 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
- 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV), BIEN HOA
- 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
- 90 - SPO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
- 1 - USARV Operations Center
- 1 - Command Section
- 1 - G1
- 5 - G2
- 1 - G3
- 30 - Historical Section
- 1 - G4
- 1 - Aviation
- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - Information Officer
- 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
- 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
- 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
- 5 - J2, USMACV
- 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
- 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 13 MAY 67

205

	16-22 Apr	23-29 Apr	30 Apr-6 May	7-13 May	TOTAL
ATK	35	26	37	57	155
HARASS	472	393	417	379	1,661
TERRSM	55	27	45	59	186
SABOTAGE	16	20	11	15	62
PROP	21	6	32	10	71
AA	258	314	328	205	1,105
TOTAL	857	788	870	725	3,240

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 7 - 13 MAY 67

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	20	5	21	11	57
HARASS	143	26	105	105	379
TERRSM	15	16	16	12	59
SABOTAGE	4	1	5	5	15
PROP	1	9	0	0	10
AA	142	17	28	18	205
TOTAL	325	74	175	151	725

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The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AVHGB-O, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96307.

(C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

The enemy continued to prepare for a coordinated offensive in northern I Corps by increasing attacks by fire and reinforcing the Northern Front. Enemy forces, in at least regimental strength, are defending

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against Marine and ARVN operations in the DMZ while continuing attacks by fire on installations at GIO LINH (YD 20 75), CON THIEN (YD 11 72), DONG HA (YD 25 60), CAM LO (YD 12 58), and CAMP CARROLL (YD 05 55) with mortars, rockets and artillery. In western QUANG TRI Province, light contact was reported with elements of the NVA 325th Division as Marines continued to clear and fortify the area around Hill 881 (XD 775 437). Marine units operating in southern QUANG TRI Province captured documents which identify the previously unidentified regiment operating in the Northern Front area as the 9th Regiment, NVA 304th Division. The documents indicate that the 9th Regiment left NGHE AN Province (NVN) on 20 January 1967, bivouacked in the DMZ from 13 to 27 February, and invaded South Vietnam on 1 March. Attacks initiated by the NVA 812th Regiment southwest of CON THIEN from 27 February to 4 March were probably to screen infiltration of the 9th Regiment. The documents indicate that the 9th Regiment had been resubordinated to the 341st Division during its movement south and that at least the regiment's 3d Battalion took part in the LA VANG (YD 34 51) attack on 6 April. A detainee captured at LA VANG on that date stated that his unit, the 9th Regiment, NVA 304th Division, was subordinate to the TRI THIEN Front, which is an AKA for the Northern Front. Vietnamese sources, primarily from the National Police Special Branch, have stated that a division was being formed in the Northern Front area. The Northern Front has possibly evolved into a separate military region with increasing capabilities and responsibilities. It presently represents a threat at least equivalent to a division. Its strategic location and increased forces, now provided with an improved resupply capability through the ASHAU Valley, make the Northern Front a key element in NVN plans to regain the northern provinces of South Vietnam. In central I CTZ, the enemy increased activity in the DANANG area, while the enemy Main Force units in southern I Corps continued sporadic contact with TF OREGON on Operation MALHEUR.

In northern QUANG TRI Province the enemy is capable of attacking with up to three divisions, defending in place, or withdrawing north of the BEN HAI River. At present, enemy reaction to newly launched friendly operations in the DMZ is unclear. The enemy is capable of attacking in the KHE SANH (XD 85 38)/LANG VEI (XD 78 37) area and the QUANG TRI (YD 35 52)/HUE (YD 78 25) area in up to division strength. Attacks in both of these areas by up to two regiments are possible. In central I Corps, the enemy is capable of attacking in the QUE SON (BT 03 33) area with two understrength regiments, but he probably will evade while regrouping his Main Force units. Local Force and sapper elements probably will continue to harass in the DA NANG, HOI AN (BT 09 16) and TAM KY (BT 32 21) areas. In QUANG NGAI Province, the enemy is capable of attacking Summer Campaign objectives with up to three regiments. Continued contact on Operation MALHEUR is probable as the enemy protects supply and base areas in southern QUANG NGAI Province. A regimental attack against SON HA (BS 37 64) is possible, and Local Force and sapper elements probably will harass Revolutionary Development activities in north-eastern QUANG NGAI Province.

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II CTZ:

21/ There are continuing indications that enemy forces are preparing for operations in western PLEIKU Province. The discovery of rice caches northeast of DUC CO (YA 84 26) and a battalion-size bivouac site north of the Special Forces Camp indicate that enemy forces are preparing the battlefield for operations. Documents associated with the 95B Regiment, captured 3 May fifteen kilometers northwest of PLEI ME (ZA 16 05) contained enemy plans for the six-month Rainy Season Campaign. The plans call for harassment of DUC CO Special Forces Camp, PHU NHON District Headquarters (AQ 85 99), THANH BINH (ZA 10 29) and Highways 14, 19, and 21.

The enemy is capable of attacking in the Western Highlands with one division and two regiments. The presence of elements of at least three regiments in western PLEIKU Province increases the threat to DUC CO and PLEI ME Special Forces Camps. In northern BINH DINH Province, the NT 3 Division can attack in up to regimental strength, as can the NT 5 Division in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. Current deployment of enemy forces indicates the NT 3 and NT 5 Divisions probably will continue to evade while attempting to disrupt Revolutionary Development activities and attack lightly defended installations. Main and Local Forces probably will continue acts of terrorism, attacks on logistical bases and airfields, and interdiction of lines of communication throughout the Corps area.

III CTZ:

In III Corps, the disposition of the NVA CT 7 Division in BINH Province and the CT 9 Division in northern WAR ZONE D possibly indicates continued preparations for enemy offensive action in the northwestern and central portions of the Corps area. The NVA 101st Regiment is probably in TAY NINH Province and it is possible that it has been resubordinated to the NVA CT 7 Division. The deployment of the NVA CT 7 Division constitutes a threat to PREK KLOK (XT 27 78) and SUOI DA (XT 33 57) Special Forces Camps, as well as DAU TIENG (XT 49 47) Headquarters, CT 9 Division and the VC 271st Regiment remain in southern PHUOC LONG and northeastern BINH JUCNG Provinces respectively. The VC 272d Regiment is probably in western BINH LONG Province; a 24 April returnee's statement indicated that the regiment possibly has a resupply mission for the CT 9 Division. Contact on 11 May with elements of the VC 273d Regiment in WAR ZONE D (YT 02 38), and captured documents stating that elements of the regiment participated in the 12 May attack on BIEN HOA Air Base indicate that the 273d Regiment has returned to northern BIEN HOA Province (YT 07 37) and possibly has been resubordinated to the CT 9 Division. The present deployment of the CT 9 Division poses a threat in central III Corps, particularly to friendly forces along Highway 13, CHI LINH (XT 93 73) and DONG XOAI (XT 08 76) Special Forces Camps, PHUOC VINH (XT 94 98), and BIEN HOA Air Base (YT 00 05). In southeastern III Corps, Headquarters, CT 5 Division and its two subordinate regiments probably remain in northeastern PHUOC TUY Province.

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A document captured by the US 25th Infantry Division on 17 May implies that all VC Main and Local Force battalions in the areas to the south and west of SAIGON will coordinate their efforts during the 1967 Summer Campaign, which will start on 29 May. The document suggests that major offensive actions are planned against specific Free World Force units and/or installations in VC Military Region II (southern III Corps and northern IV Corps). Recent intelligence indicates a build up of VC troops in the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia which is adjacent to the III and IV Corps boundary area. A coordinated effort by these enemy forces could be intended to tie down friendly forces in III and IV Corps in order to prevent them from being available for reinforcement in I and II Corps. 3/2

Throughout the Corps area, reports continue to indicate that attacks on lines of communication, particularly in the SAIGON area and on shipping in the RUNG SAT Special Zone, are probable. TAN SON NHUT and BIEN HOA Air Bases and the PHU LAM Radio Station (XS 79 89) remain probable objectives. In northwestern and central III Corps, the enemy has the capability to conduct coordinated attacks with up to seven infantry regiments supported by two, and possibly three, artillery regiments. In southeastern III Corps the CT 5 Division has the capability to attack with two regiments, but probably will continue to evade friendly forces while seeking opportunities for small-unit attacks and harassment.

IV CTZ:

In IV Corps, enemy forces continue to conduct small-scale attacks, harassment, sabotage, and acts of terrorism to counter the expansion of GVN control. The enemy retains his capability to conduct a regimental-size attack against DONG TAM Base (XS 44 45); however, he probably will harass and conduct small-scale attacks against US Forces on operations while attempting to sabotage friendly installations in that area. Throughout IV Corps, the enemy probably will increase terrorism, harassment, interdiction of Highway 4 and other lines of communication, sabotage, and attacks against lightly defended areas with up to battalion-size forces in order to counter the Revolutionary Development Program.

(C) COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AIMED AT R&R PERSONNEL

Reports reaching this command indicate an increase in anti-war propaganda aimed at American military personnel from Vietnam on R&R leave in Japan. This propaganda is primarily disseminated through leaflets printed in the

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English language and through active approaches to American military personnel by members of known Japanese Communist Party peace front groups. It is the ultimate purpose of this propaganda to promote the defection of American military personnel or, failing this, to dissuade them from fighting upon returning to Vietnam. The theme of this leftist propaganda varies from open protest of US involvement in Asia to a "soft-sell" peace line designed to convey the idea that soldiers should be at home with their loved ones rather than fighting a needless war in Asia. SOURCE: OACofS, G2, USARV, GI Division.

(C) ENEMY PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY PROVISIONS

A captured plan for procurement of military provisions indicates that Viet Cong elements in the III CTZ are experiencing critical supply problems. The document provides a plan to improve the situation and at the same time attempts to direct attention away from VC failures by pointing out alleged FWMF defeats. The enemy claims that--having suffered three consecutive defeats in 1965 and 1966--the Allied Forces are planning a drastic counterattack during the 1967 dry season in order to regain the offensive. The document predicts that the Allies will attempt to expand their control of rural areas, destroy Viet Cong crops and depots, and herd rural inhabitants into "New Life Hamlets" in order to isolate them from VC influence. It goes on to warn that the war will become "fierce, particularly in strategic areas," and that it will create extreme difficulties in the procurement of military provisions.

The document describes the Viet Cong needs as having doubled, while admitting to a shortage of provisions and food. It states that Military Region 1 (encompassing TAY NINH, BINH DUONG, BIEN HOA, LONG KHANH and PHUOC TUY Provinces) is short approximately 100,000 tons of rice. When the SAIGON-GIA DINH area is considered, the document states that the shortage reaches 600,000 tons. It also states that agricultural production has decreased 40 to 50 percent in rural areas. To cope with this seemingly desperate situation, the plan calls for the adoption of drastic measures. In an attempt to provide at least two-thirds of their food needs from VC "liberated" areas, the enemy intends to collect two-thirds of all rice produced and use it to feed Viet Cong units. Rice rations are to be imposed on both soldiers and civilians, and six to ten thousand tons of rice are to be kept in storage.

The plan calls for the COSVN Forward Supply Council to take charge of the entire task of supplying provisions. It orders a reorganization of procurement elements from COSVN down through village level in order to cope with the demands of the new plan. In conclusion, the document appeals to every Party Committee to give special attention to the task of supplying

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provisions because of its importance as a strategic requirement.
SOURCE: GDEC LOG #05-1042-67.

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(C) 130MM FIELD GUNS REPORTED IN NVN

Interpretation of aerial photography, taken 13 May, disclosed that eight 130MM field guns were located in North Vietnam, 32 kilometers north of the DMZ. The photography report is the initial identification of this caliber gun in NVN. The enemy is capable of moving these field guns by road to firing positions in the DMZ north of the BEN HAI River. From such firing positions the guns could provide a field of fire just 1500 meters short of QUANG THI City (YD 35 52) and within 600 meters of KHE SANH (XD 85 38).
SOURCE: J2 MACV WEU 20-67.

(C) CHIEU HOI ANALYSIS

In comparison to other Corps Tactical Zones, II Corps generally recorded the highest monthly total of returnees throughout 1966. During the first quarter of 1967, however, this distinction has been shared with III Corps in February (1188) and IV Corps in March (2254). II Corps had the highest total in January (812). The monthly totals are generally high in each of these three Corps during the first quarter of 1967 and progressively increase from January through March. In I Corps, the total for each month is considerably lower than in each of the other three Corps, but also shows a progressive increase in the first quarter of 1967 (209 in January, 251 in February, and 276 in March). When considered as a separate category, the military returnee rate has increased monthly since October 1966. In the political category, however, a high in November 1966 (1053) was not exceeded until February 1967 (1243). All totals for the first three months of 1967 are proportionately higher than the first three months of 1966; in many cases the 1967 figures are twice as high as those in 1966.

The lower number of returnees in I Corps can be attributed in part to the low defection rate in North Vietnamese units, which comprise the major enemy strength in I Corps. The significant increase of returnees throughout the country during the last quarter of 1966 and first quarter of 1967 is identified with the GVN political success in the Constituent Assembly elections of September 1966, the truces during the Christmas and New Year holidays, and the TET holiday period in February. The TET holiday period is particularly significant because—after returning to their homes for the holidays—the enemy soldiers were faced with the decision of rallying or

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returning to their units. It appears the future under Government control looked bright as evidenced by the record number of potential returnees who decided to rally. The underlying reason for a progressive increase in the number of ralliers during the last quarter of 1966 through the first quarter 1967 is the political stability displayed by the GVN. When viewed on a national level, there appears to be a correlation between an increase or decrease of military activity and the total number of returnees. However, when the total number of returnees in each corps or province is compared to the amount of military activity in that area, the correlation fails to hold true. Apparently, changes in political climate are the most significant factors affecting the returnee rate. SOURCE: CIGV Project 227-66.

(C) SAPPER WATERMINING OPERATIONS

When conducting a watermining operation, an eight-man sapper/watermine squad places the mines in the channel and then withdraws to the river bank. Two squads from a recoilless rifle platoon are positioned 150 to 250 yards apart along the river bank. Each squad carries one recoilless rifle and usually consists of 15 men. A machine gun cell, made up of six men and one machine gun, is positioned on the flank of one recoilless rifle squad. While the sapper squad is detonating the mine under the unsuspecting ship, the recoilless rifle platoon opens fire, usually firing no more than 15 rounds for not more than 15 minutes. To cover the sapper unit's retreat, the machine gun cell will fire on attacking aircraft.

Although watermining operations are on the increase, captured enemy documents in III CTZ indicate that a shortage of explosives may hamper the efforts of sapper units in the execution of such missions. The usual explosives, such as TNT, dynamite and melinite, are being replaced by cheddite. As a result, the quantity of explosive must be increased. VC ordnance factories are presently producing watermines of 30, 50 or 80 kilograms of cheddite. SOURCE: J2 MACV Perintrep for March 1967.

(C) CHICOM MANPACK TRANSCEIVER

Examination of a recently acquired Chinese Communist Model 63 manpack transceiver reveals it to be comparable to the US AN/PRC-10, well designed and possibly developed to replace the 71-B in regimental and battalion communications. The sophisticated set uses subminiature tubes even though Chinese transistors are known to be militarily acceptable. Its transmitting power is estimated to be about 300 milliwatts--enough to allow an operating distance of about two miles during the daytime and about four miles at night. The set is amplitude modulated and can be used for Morse or voice transmission in a frequency range of 1.5 to 6.1 megacycles. SOURCE: DIA Intbul 136-67.

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(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

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The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

Accredited enemy strength:	<u>53,940</u>	NVA Combat Strength
	<u>63,102</u>	VC Combat Strength
	<u>24,813</u>	Administrative Services
	<u>112,760</u>	Irregulars
	<u>39,175</u>	Political
TOTAL:	293,790	

Major unit listings: 9 Divisions: 6 NVA Confirmed 1 NVA Possible
2 VC Confirmed
24 (5) NVA Regiments
12 (6) VC Regiments

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional size units in RVN.

(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There were a total of 780 enemy initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 14-20 May 67. This compares with 725 incidents for the previous week and represents an increase of 55. (See Annex A)

<u>Enemy Casualties:</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 14-20 May 67	2,464	22	538	*	*
Period of 7-13 May 67	**2,080	32	**591	**562	**36
Since 1 Jan 67	**32,341	1,870	**15,472	**11,141	**711
Since June 65	**115,491	***	**28,477	**35,393	**2,485

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<u>Friendly Casualties:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 14-20 May 67	291 (179)	777 (834)	18/0 (9/0)	210	4
Period of 7-13 May 67	**266 **(230)	**582 **(1,333)	**19/0 **(8/0)	143	4
Since 1 Jan 67	**5,307 **(3,000)	**16,876 **(20,605)	**988/82 **(145/2)	3,238	71

Ratio (Allied to VC/NVA) KHA Ratio 5.24:1 (Allied favor) period of 14 - 20 May 67. Weapons Lost Ratio 4.07:1 (Allied favor) period of 7 - 13 May 67.

The following are Chieu Hoi figures for the period 14 - 20 May 1967:

a. <u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
34	211	143	150

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 343; Political 178; Other 17; Total: 538.

c. This is a decrease of 53 from the previous week.

* Enemy weapons figures for the period 14 - 20 May 67 were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

*** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. In addition, over 200 PW's are being held in II Corps division/separate brigade PW collecting points pending availability of ARVN PW camp facilities. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 January 1967.

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() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

Kenneth D. Simmet.
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

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Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents.

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- 1 - Combined Studies Division, MACV
- 3 - Director, Intelligence, 7th Air Force, TAN SON NHUT
- 5 - G2, USARPAC, San Francisco, Calif 96558
- 10 - G2, I Field Force Vietnam, NHA TRANG
- 2 - US Embassy, OSA, ATTN: CB
- 40 - G2, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH
- 1 - LNO, USARPAC
- 1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
- 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
- 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV), BIEN HOA
- 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
- 90 - SPO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
- 1 - USARV Operations Center
- 1 - Command Section
- 1 - G1
- 5 - G2
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- 1 - Provost Marshal
 - 1 - Information Officer
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 - 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
 - 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
 - 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
 - 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
 - 5 - J2, USMACV
 - 5 - J2, USMACV ATTN: MATTLO
 - 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
 - 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
 - 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
 - 1 - CO, ACTIV, APO 96243

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 20 MAY 1967

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	23-29 Apr	30 Apr-6 May	7-13 May	14-20 May	TOTAL
ATK	26	37	57	39	159
HARASS	393	417	379	369	1,558
TERRSM	27	45	59	42	173
SABOTAGE	20	11	15	25	71
PROP	8	32	10	3	53
AA	314	328	205	302	1,149
TOTAL	788	870	725	780	3,163

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 14 - 20 MAY 1967

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	20	2	6	11	39
HARASS	159	26	114	70	369
TERRSM	11	4	18	9	42
SABOTAGE	5	5	5	10	25
PROP	0	2	1	0	3
AA	163	32	65	42	302
TOTAL	358	71	209	142	780

Annex A

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
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21-67
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The USAFV Weekly Intelligence review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USAFV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USAFV and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USAFV, APO 96307.

(C-INFO) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1 CTZ:

The enemy continues to prepare for a coordinated offensive in northern 1 Corps, although friendly operations in the IICZ possibly have disrupted his time schedule. Detainees and a returnee indicate that

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enemy forces contacted in the DMZ include elements of the NVA 812th Regiment, NVA 324B Division; NVA 31st and 32d Regiments, NVA 341st Division; and the NVA 29th Regiment (probably another designation for the 18C Regiment, NVA 325th Division). Indications are that friendly forces preempted a probable assault by three regiments on CON THIEH (YD 11 72). Enemy forces initially withdrew north across the BEN HAI River in the DMZ, except for the 29th Regiment, southwest of CON THIEH, and from one to three battalions of the 31st Regiment, which were out off south of the friendly operational area. In northern I Corps, the enemy is capable of attacking with two regiments in the KHE SANH/LANG VEI area (XD 84 42). The combat effectiveness of these regiments is unknown. In the Northern Front area, a detainee from the 3d Battalion, NVA 9th Regiment, NVA 304th Division, stated that his unit joined with the NVA 808th and 814th Battalions to form a 5th Regiment. Captured documents referring to the 9th Regiment, 304th Division, indicated that only the 3d Battalion had completed infiltration to the Northern Front area. In the QUANG TRI City (YD 34 53)/HUE (YD 76 25) area, the enemy is capable of attacking with two regiments, and such an attack is probable. In central I Corps, the enemy is capable of attacking in the area of QUE SON (BT 03 33) with two understrength regiments; however, he probably will try to evade friendly forces on Operation UNION 11 while regrouping his Main Force units. Local Forces and sapper elements probably will continue to harass in the areas of DA NANG (BT 03 78), HOI AN (BT 15 58), and TAM KY (BT 31 21). In QUANG NGAI Province, a 17 May returnee indicated that the VC 48th Local Force Battalion, the VC 409th Sapper Battalion, and the 506A Local Force Company were planning to attack QUANG NGAI City (ES 65 73) by fire. The enemy is capable of attacking in QUANG NGAI Province with up to three regiments composed of ten battalions. A regimental attack against NO DUC (ES 74 53) remains possible.

II CTZ:

In II Corps Tactical Zone, there are indications that enemy forces are preparing for large-scale attacks in western PLEIKU Province. According to a captured notebook, which probably belonged to an NVA cadre of the NVA 95B Regiment, the B-3 Front plans to encircle DUC CO Special Forces Camp (YA 84 26) in May and June and to tie down, disperse, and destroy American troops in the B-3 Front area to keep them from reinforcing the coastal lowlands of MR 5. During the period 10 through 26 May, mortar attacks and contacts with elements of the NVA 32d and 66th Regiments, NT 1 Division, and the 88th Regiment, B-3 Front, north, west and southwest of DUC CO tended to confirm the indications in the captured notebook. The enemy is capable of

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attacking in the Western Highlands with one division plus two regiments. The presence of elements of three regiments near DUC CO indicates that a division-size attack against that camp is probable in conjunction with a diversionary attack on PLEI ME Special Forces Camp (ZA 15 05), or possibly LE THANH District Headquarters (YA 89 29), by elements of the 95B Regiment, B-3 Front. A detainee from the 32d Regiment, as well as the captured notebook, indicates that the enemy probably will also attempt to draw friendly forces on operations into prepared ambush sites. The NT 3 Division can attack in regimental strength in northern BINH DINH Province and the NT 5 Division can attack in regimental strength in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. However, the current deployment of both divisions indicates that they probably will continue to evade while attempting to disrupt Revolutionary Development activities and attacking lightly defended installations. Agent reports indicate that Main and Local Force units probably will continue acts of terrorism, attacks on logistical bases and airfields, and interdiction of LOC throughout the Corps area.

III CTZ:

In III Corps Tactical Zone, agent reports indicate that the NVA CT 7 Division is in central TAY NINH Province. While the status and mission of this division are undetermined, it probably has the capability to attack in division strength, reinforced by the NVA 101st Regiment. However, its suspected disposition in central TAY NINH Province indicates that coordinated regimental-size attacks against PHEM KLOK Special Forces Camp (XT 27 78), SUOI DA (XT 33 57), and DAU TIEG (XT 49 47) are a more likely course of action. Contacts and captured documents indicate that Headquarters, CT 9 Division and its subordinate VC 271st Regiment remain in southern PHUOC LONG Province. The VC 272d and 273d Regiments remain in northeastern TAY NINH and northern BIEH HOA Provinces, respectively. The division has the capability to launch three coordinated regimental attacks and is a threat to special forces camps and installations in central III Corps. In southeastern III Corps, agent reports indicate that the Headquarters, CT 5 Division and its subordinate VC 275th Regiment remain in northeastern PHUOC TUY Province and that its subordinate VC 274th Regiment has moved to western PHUOC TUY Province. The division has the capability to attack with both regiments. SUOI RAY (YS 44 98) and convoys along Route 1 and Interprovincial Route 2 are the most probable targets. TAN SON NHUT and BIEH HOA Air Bases and the PHU LAN Radio Station remain probable objectives for attacks, and five agent reports indicate that attacks on lines of communication in the SAIGON area and on shipping in the HUNG SAT Special Zone are probable.

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IV CTZ:

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In IV Corps Tactical Zone, there are indications that VC activity will increase as part of a probable country-wide Summer Campaign. A document captured in HAU NGHIA Province on 17 May indicated that the "opening day" for the 1967 Summer Campaign in VC MR 2 was 29 May. An agent has reported that the VC have planned intensified military activity in the lower Delta, with objectives being destruction of Revolutionary Development teams, interdiction of lines of communication, isolation of remote outposts, and attacks against administrative and military installations. Agent reports indicate that two LOC are primary targets: segments of Route 4 east of MY THO (XS 50 45) and between BA XUYEH and AN XUYEH Provinces, and Route 31 between CAN THO City (WS 86 09) and CHUONG THIEN Province. The frequency of VC-initiated incidents directed against Revolutionary Development in the MANG THIET River area, airfields, and PBR's on patrol indicates that they continue to be high priority targets.

(C) VIET CONG MANPOWER REPLACEMENT

The Viet Cong force structure is categorized into VC Main, Local and Irregular Forces. The Main Force units are composed of divisions, regiments and battalions directly subordinate to COSVI, and of regiments and separate battalions which operate under the control of individual military regions. VC Local Force units are listed as battalions or companies subordinate to Viet Cong provinces, or separate companies and platoons subordinate to district committees. The irregular category includes full-time guerrilla units, varying in strength from ten to fifty in VC-controlled villages; part-time village and hamlet self-defense forces in VC-controlled villages and hamlets; and secret self-defense forces within GVN-controlled villages and hamlets.

Under the VC recruitment cycle, individuals, or in some cases small units, are upgraded in their own category or to the next higher category. For example, members of hamlet or self-defense forces may be upgraded to full-time village guerrillas, while certain village guerrillas are sent to district level units to replace troops who have been transferred to provincial or regional force units. Ideally, the system allows sufficient time at each level for the replacement to receive adequate training and experience.

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A report from BINH DINH Province describes a typical recruiting and upgrading process. Members of youth groups currently including individuals 16 to 40 years old are recruited as guerrillas and assigned to either a hamlet, village or district guerrilla unit. Generally volunteers go to the district units, which are partially supported by the VC district organization with food and clothing. The rest, if deemed capable and properly motivated ideologically, are assigned to village and hamlet guerrilla units. They are supported by their respective hamlets and villages. Periodically these guerrillas are "forced to volunteer" to meet requirements for personnel levied by VC Local or Main Force units.

It appears that provincial committees regulate their own manpower re-supply programs. Neither a uniform upgrading rate nor pattern has been established that applies country-wide. There have been reports, however, indicating that a substantial number of individuals have been upgraded at the same time to meet immediate needs. A 1966 directive from Military Region V assigned 30 percent of all male and female guerrillas to regular units. The PHU YEN Youth Proselyting Section ordered 30 percent of all guerrilla and Local Force members in the province to join Main Force units and 70 percent of all youths to join Local Force units in June 1966. To meet drastic needs, complete echelons have been upgraded. For example, in HAU NGHIA Province entire units of part-time guerrillas were transferred in toto to full-time village and district units, while in northeast PHU YEN Province all district mobile forces were transferred to provincial units.

It is clear from numerous recent reports that the Viet Cong are having difficulty recruiting manpower needed to replace casualties. As a result, important VC Main and Local Force units have had to depend on supplementing their ranks with irregulars, and upgrading to higher echelons appears to be taking place at an accelerated rate. The recruitment of new guerrillas has not been able to keep pace with upgrading and the result has been a decrease in the strength and quality of irregular units. SOURCE: CIGV STUDY 67-047.

(C) COMMUNIST COUNTRIES "SPONSORSHIP" VC UNITS

Interrogation of LTC (also reported as Major) HUYNH CU, chief of military training, Military Region V, who rallied to the GVN, revealed that several Communist countries planned to provide financial assistance to specific Viet Cong units. According to CU, the program would involve "sponsorship" which would include not only financial assistance but also adoption of units for the purpose of generating widespread sympathy for the VC cause and making the people of the sponsoring countries feel the Viet Cong struggle is now their

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personal struggle. To date Algeria, the Soviet Union, North Korea and Communist China are reported to have pledged themselves to the program. Aid is to be offered in the form of military clothing and equipment, food, ordnance items, and medical supplies. CU stated that some of the sponsor countries will directly produce and transport the supplies to their final destination, whereas others will make payment on statements submitted by North Vietnam for the cost of purchasing and transporting the items to the unit in the field. 228

Algeria is committed to provide assistance to an unidentified unit located near the THU BON River in VC QUANG DA Province (GVN QUANG NAM Province). The Soviet Union is to sponsor Main Force units operating in NAMBO Region (Southern RVN) and Communist China will aid Main Force units in the northern TRI THIEN area and in the Western Highlands. CU seemed to be most familiar with the North Korean program to provide assistance to the NT 2 and NT 3 Divisions of Military Region V. He had heard that support in the form of equipment and clothing had arrived in early March 1967. His informant had received a double thickness nylon hammock, a raincoat and a set of clothes made in North Korea, but patterned after the style worn by the Viet Cong. Transportation of the equipment was reported to be the responsibility of Youth Assault units rather than regular MR V elements. The report of North Korean supplies arriving in South Vietnam conflicts with an earlier interrogation report in which LTC CU stated that North Koreans had only provided medical supplies. SOURCE: Combined Military Interrogation Center Report US 473-68 and J2 MACV INTSUM 108-67.

(C) NINE AND BOOBY TRAP INDICATORS

Whenever feasible the Viet Cong set out warnings of mines and booby traps in order to protect, and thereby retain the confidence and loyalty of, the local population. Often by observing the actions of indigenous personnel or watching for irregularities in the surrounding area, friendly forces can be alerted to impending danger. If people are seen using only one side of the road or avoiding a particular section of the road, it is possible mines have been placed in the area. In III Corps an alert soldier saved his convoy from certain disaster because he noticed fifteen children standing along the side of a road with their mouths open and fingers in their ears. An immediate halt was ordered and a search of the area produced a large pressure-type mine a few meters ahead of the lead vehicle. Physical warnings which have been used include a thorn branch laid on the ground in a half circle, cacti laying on the road or trail, and a vine tied to a tree or stump with the knot pointing towards the dangerous area. Combinations of three, such as three rocks in a pile or in a straight line, have also been used. Sometimes even more obvious signs are used such as pieces of cloth, rocks, or bamboo placed in a pattern along a road or broken trees and bushes surrounding the booby trapped area.

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The VC are extremely clever with setting booby traps and mines and they cannot be expected to place them in a standard pattern. Indicators or warning signs have not proved to be standardized either; any particular system of marking mines and booby traps will seldom extend beyond the boundaries of a village. However, if at least two hamlets of a village mark their mines and booby traps, it generally follows that they will be marked in all hamlets of the village. Even though placing out warnings or indicators appears to be a local prerogative, friendly forces can avoid many mishaps by staying alert for just such signs. SOURCE: I FFORCE V PERINTREP 19-67.

(C) VC-INSTIGATED SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSION IN SAIGON-CHOLON AREAS

A document of unknown VC origin prepared in 1966 outlines instructions for the sabotage and subversion of US and RVNAF bases in SAIGON-CHOLON, RVN, and surrounding areas. It begins with an assessment of US logistical support difficulties by describing two major problems of US logistics: (1) The lack of docks for the discharging of 700,000 metric tons of military supplies each month, and (2) the shortage of transportation means for the shipment of supplies from the docks to storage facilities. To further hinder these alleged US difficulties, the populace, especially Vietnamese civilian personnel employed by the US, are urged to conduct sabotage against US logistical facilities in the following manner: strikes, waste of materials, damage to equipment, stealing, smuggling, and arson. Effective subversion activities by the VC will complement the above activity in the form of sapper raids by VC military and para-military personnel. SOURCE: CDEC LOG # 05 - 1322 - 67.

(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

Accredited enemy strength:	<u>55,155</u>	NVA Combat Strength
	<u>63,202</u>	VC Combat Strength
	<u>24,813</u>	Administrative Services
	<u>112,760</u>	Irregulars
	<u>39,175</u>	Political
TOTAL:	295,105	

Major unit listings: 9 Divisions: 6 NVA Confirmed
1 NVA Possible
2 VC Confirmed
24 (5) NVA Regiments
12 (6) VC Regiments

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional size units in RVN.

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(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

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There was a total of 921 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 21-27 May 67. This compares with 780 incidents for the previous week and represents an increase of 141. (See Annex A)

<u>Enemy Casualties:</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 21-27 May 67	2,216	102	528	*	*
Period of 14-20 May 67	**2,386	22	**538	**477	**49
Since 1 Jan 67	**34,479	1,972	**12,715	**11,618	**760
Since June 65	**117,629	***	**40,682	**35,870	**2,534

<u>Friendly Casualties:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/A LOST</u>
Period of 21-27 May 67	241 (132)	591 (776)	34/0 (12/0)	124	1
Period of 14-20 May 67	**291 **(359)	**777 **(1,896)	**18/0 **(9/0)	210	4
Since 1 Jan 67	**5,598 **(3,344)	**17,653 **(22,510)	**1006/82 **(157/2)	3,362	72

Ratio (Allied to VC/NVA) KHA Ratio 5.94:1 (Allied favor) period of 21 - 27 May 67. Weapons Lost Ratio 4.21:1 (Allied favor) period of 14 - 20 May 67.

The following are Chieu Hoi figures for the period 21 - 27 May 1967:

a. <u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
101	134	135	153

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 325; Political 185; Other 18; Total: 528.

c. This is a decrease of 10 from the previous week.

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* Enemy weapons figures for the period 21 - 27 May 67 were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

*** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. In addition, over 200 PW's are being held in II Corps division/separate brigade PW collecting points pending availability of ARVN PW camp facilities. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 January 1967.

() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents.

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- 1 - Combined Studies Division, MACV
- 3 - Director, Intelligence, 7th Air Force, TAN SON NHUT
- 5 - G2, USARPAC, San Francisco, Calif 96558
- 10 - G2, I Field Force Vietnam, NHA TRANG
- 2 - US Embassy, CSA, ATTN: CB
- 40 - G2, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH
- 1 - LNO, USARPAC
- 1 - SPQ, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
- 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
- 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV), BIEN HOA

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- 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
- 90 - S70, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
- 1 - USARV Operations Center
- 1 - Command Section
- 1 - G1
- 5 - G2
- 1 - G3
- 30 - Historical Section
- 1 - G4
- 1 - Aviation
- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - Information Officer
- 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
- 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
- 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
- 5 - J2, USMACV
- 5 - J2, USMACV ATTN: MATTLO
- 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
- 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
- 1 - CO, ACTIV, APO 96243

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 27 MAY 1967

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	30 Apr-6 May	7-13 May	14-20 May	21-27 May	TOTAL
ATK	37	57	39	45	178
HARASS	417	379	369	488	1,653
TERRSM	45	59	42	42	188
SABOTAGE	11	15	25	20	71
PROP	32	10	3	9	54
AA	328	205	302	317	1,152
TOTAL	870	725	780	921	3,296

VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 21 - 27 MAY 1967

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	10	6	15	14	45
HARASS	208	22	120	138	488
TERRSM	17	7	8	10	42
SABOTAGE	7	2	3	8	20
PROP	0	3	5	1	9
AA	188	19	64	46	317
TOTAL	430	59	215	217	921

Annex A

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**USARV
WEEKLY
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REVIEW**



22-67
9 June 1967

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

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The USAKV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USAKV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USAKV and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USAKV, APO 96307.

(C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

Plans for Summer Campaign offensives probably have been disrupted by friendly operations. In the DMZ area, enemy units continued to reoccupy positions south of the BEN HAI River; however, loss of enemy personnel

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and destruction of positions in the southern DMZ and CON THIEN area (YD 11 72) probably have delayed plans to initiate attacks in the area. The enemy is capable of attacking with two divisions and an additional division equivalent in the DMZ area. Their combat effectiveness has been downgraded to an unknown degree by friendly air and ground operations, and contact has been broken by the NVA 90th and 803d Regiments, NVA 324B Division. Sporadic contact was made in western QUANG TRI Province northwest of KHE SANH Special Forces Camp (XD 85 38). A Marine base camp near KHE SANH received approximately 20 rounds of mortar fire late in the evening of 6 June. A nearby supporting radio station was attacked by ground forces about an hour later. There was no evidence of change of location of two regiments of the NVA 325th Division. The enemy is capable of attacking with two regiments in the KHE SANH area; present dispositions of the 325th Division indicates that an attack in regimental strength is more probable. Elements of the Northern Front were active, attacking three outposts on 28 May and HUE City (YD 78 25) on 29 May. Actions by the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion resulted in at least 164 enemy deaths in the NVA 806th Battalion, NVA 6th Regiment, reducing the battalion's estimated combat effectiveness to marginal. US and ARVN units continued to contact NT 2 Division elements in QUANG TIN Province, further reducing the combat strength of its subordinate NVA 21st and 3d Regiments. At least 1,575 enemy have been killed in the area since 17 April. US and ARVN units contacted an estimated enemy regiment in the area on 2 June. In QUANG NGAI Province, where TF OREGON continued search and destroy operations, contact with the 6th Battalion, VC 1st Regiment, was confirmed on 27 and 28 May. At least 87 enemy were killed. Although capable of attacking with three regiments, a returnee's statement and lack of current contact indicate that the enemy probably will evade friendly forces while possibly harassing in the QUANG NGAI City (BS 65 72) area. Contact throughout I CTZ on 4 and 5 June was described as light to moderate.

II CTZ:

There were indications that enemy forces in western PLEIKU Province have been reinforced and are continuing preparations for large-scale attacks in the Western Highlands. Two detainees captured 22 May said they were part of an infiltration group of 200-250 replacements for the NVA 66th Regiment, NT 1 Division. This is the first evidence of replacements from North Vietnam to units of the B-3 Front since August 1966. A detainee, captured 21 May, said the 32d Regiment, NT 1 Division, had received "heavy casualties" from artillery and B-52 strikes. Small-unit contacts and limited mortar attacks

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possibly indicate that enemy forces are unable to continue attacks without reorganization and resupply. The enemy is capable of attacking in the Western Highlands with one division plus two regiments. Seven of the sixteen battalions of the B-3 Front are considered combat effective; the effectiveness of the other nine is unknown. Friendly operations possibly have delayed plans to stage large-scale attacks against DUC GO Special Forces Camp (YA 84 26). Detainees' statements indicate that high priority will continue to go toward disrupting the Revolutionary Development Program while attempting to tie down friendly forces in the Highlands. Headquarters NT 3 Division, VC 2d Regiment, and NVA 22d Regiment continue attempts to evade near the RINH DINH/QUANG NGAI border area. Detainees also indicate that the NVA 18th Regiment, NT 3 Division, is evading in the PHU MY Valley.

III CTZ:

Enemy units in the III Corps Tactical Zones remained relatively stable, apparently preparing for major offensives later in the Summer Campaign. Numerous terrorist incidents were reported, including a mortar shelling of a CHIEU HOI camp in LONG AN Province. An ARVN infantry company was attacked by small arms and automatic weapons in BIEN HOA Province on 2 June. A returnee from the NVA 141st Regiment, NVA CT 7 Division said his unit, now training for one to two months, was to replace elements of the CT 9 Division in TAY NINH Province. Its primary objective is PREK KLOK Special Forces Camp (XT 27 78) and secondary objective is SUOI DA (XT 33 57). The returnee's statements indicate that the Headquarters, NVA CT 7 Division, and the NVA 141st Regiment are deployed in TAY NINH Province. The enemy has the capability to launch attacks with up to seven infantry regiments supported by two, or possibly three, artillery regiments in northwestern and central III Corps. There are no indications at this time, however, that he will adopt this capability. More probable are limited attacks by fire and interdiction of Highways 4, 13 and 16. The CT 5 Division remains a threat in southeastern III Corps. Throughout III CTZ, the enemy continues selective terrorism of local officials and Revolutionary Development teams. Agent reports indicate that attacks on LOC in the SAIGON area and on shipping in the RSSZ are probable. TAN SON NHUT and BIEN HOA Air Bases and PHU LAM Radio Station remain probable objectives.

IV CTZ:

Enemy activity continued to be characterized by harassment, small-unit attacks, and terrorism. ARVN units completed an operation in KIEN HOA Province 7 June which resulted in light contact, but capture of an unusual assortment of materiel, including 30 infantry weapons, nine crew-served weapons, one full

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1,000-gallon POL drum, 800 gallons of a phosphorous chemical, 4,000 two-meter sections of metal tubing and several vehicle engines. Two sampans, several buildings and 225 tons of rice were destroyed. An agent from the 9th ARVN Division reported that the Viet Cong are offering rewards for the destruction of RD headquarters, projects, and teams, indicating that these continue to be primary targets. Capture of a blueprint and sketches of the IV CTZ MACV Advisory Headquarters, BINH THUY Airfield (WS 79 15) and other permanent military installations in CAN THO City (WS 86 09) confirms that these remain high-priority targets. Throughout the CTZ, the enemy probably will continue terrorism, harassment, interdiction of LOC, sabotage and attacks against PBR's, airfields, district towns and lightly defended areas with up to battalion-size forces. 240

(C-NOFORN) TENSION BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THE VIET CONG

Tension between the Viet Cong and ostensibly neutral Cambodia is reflected in a 10 May 1967 decree by Prince SIHANOUK closing the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border to unauthorized persons. Possible motives, according to an agent report, include an attempt to control smuggling, enforce tax collection, and demonstrate Cambodia's independence from Viet Cong influence. Effective control of the border is impossible, however, and it is unlikely that the decree will affect Viet Cong infiltration of supplies or use of Cambodia as a sanctuary. Viet Cong dissatisfaction with negotiations over territorial borders was reflected in a number of documents captured recently. One document, dated 6 September 1966, accused the Cambodians of "prolonging the parley in an attempt to promote their own advantage at the expense of our political goals. They compel us to sign an agreement on the basis of the map that offers the most (territorial) gains". Viet Cong policy is apparently not to permit disagreements to interfere with their efforts in South Vietnam. "South Vietnam's revolution should be given prime consideration as it is a matter of crucial importance," the document states. "We should not haggle with them simply for a few feet of land. Instead, we should take an approach which is consistent with the changing situation. In this connection we will recognize the boundary as it was delineated in 1954 and we will discuss the undelineated areas on the basis of mutual friendship." Viet Cong policy toward Cambodia, according to another document, is "to try to maintain good relations with Cambodia in its anti-American activities and to avoid increasing friction." SOURCE: Controlled American Source Reports, FVS 14,942, FVS 15,035.

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(C-MOFORN) VC/NVA POLICY TOWARD ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS (PART I OF IV PARTS)

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From experience the communists have developed a well-defined doctrine to win the support of minority groups. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese have applied this doctrine to minority groups in South Vietnam.

General policy statements of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) echo the nondiscriminatory provisions of the North Vietnamese Constitution. This policy has been amplified with "Ten Concrete Policies": (1) to unite the separate races behind the VC against the Americans; (2) to form autonomous zones; (3) to raise minority economic standards; (4) to raise minority cultural standards; (5) to respect beliefs, customs and habits of minorities; (6) to develop and exploit the historical hatred of foreign oppressors; (7) to foster male-female equality; (8) to persuade members of minorities to desert the service of the GVN; (9) to recruit minority cadres; (10) and to handle minorities with patience. The policies are evidently designed to create useful allies among the minorities and to facilitate an eventual integration of ethnic groups into a Vietnamese communist state.

In practice, the policy means that ethnic minority cadre will be used among their own people and local grievances will be exploited against the GVN. The VC approach the principal minorities in South Vietnam through front organizations under the control of the local party apparatus. Social and economic gains are promised under a future Viet Cong government and, in some cases, measures are taken to improve the lives of members of minority groups. Where persuasion fails, selective coercion is employed.

Despite the official policy, which is to preserve ethnic autonomy, VC practice often requires drastic alteration in the minority groups' lives to further the communist effort and to prepare the minorities for their integration into a communist state. The encouragement of national unity among minorities receives strong emphasis; however, the national sentiments that inspired the Viet Minh are much less effective—and in some cases ineffective—among the more important minority groups.

The Cham are unusual because they have been largely left out of the current conflict. Those Cham remaining in South Vietnam are a pathetic remnant of a former civilization which has declined steadily for several centuries. The Cham live in poor, isolated villages apart from Vietnamese society, primarily in BINH THUAN, NINH THUAN and TAY NINH Provinces. They are a timid, retiring people and do not constitute a significant force. Although both the VC and

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GVN have made token efforts to achieve Cham support, neither has achieved much success. The Cham have manifested no desire to take sides in the current conflict, and neither side is expected to make any major efforts to enlist the aid of such a weak, politically inert group. 242

Subsequent issues of the USAKV Weekly Intelligence Review will consider the VC/NVA policy toward the Montagnards, the Khmer and the Chinese.
SOURCE: CIGV Study 67-019.

(C) RPG - 7 ANTITANK GRENADE LAUNCHER

An RPG-7 antitank grenade launcher, the newest Soviet weapon of its type, was captured on 6 May 1967 by the 2d ARVN Division near QUE SON (BT 03 33). It is a significant improvement over the earlier RPG-2. The 80mm projectile is spin-stabilized at launch. Several meters beyond the muzzle, the rocket motor ignites. At that time a casing at the rear of the grenade burns away, releasing a fin assembly which takes over stabilization. The initial muzzle velocity is approximately 100 meters per second. After the rocket motor is activated, the velocity increases to about 300 meters per second. The rocket assist gives the projectile greater range, a flatter trajectory and increased accuracy. The fuze on the warhead has a self-destruct mechanism. The launcher has front and rear folding mechanical battle sights similar to those on the RPG-2. The rear sight has three apertures for distances of 50, 100 and 150 meters. An optical sight, with an electrically illuminated reticle, also is provided for more accurate aiming up to 500 meters. When using the optical sight, the mechanical sights are folded. An infrared night-sighting device, NSP-2, is reportedly available for night firing. The launcher requires a crew of two men, is hand loaded at the muzzle end, and is recoilless. This weapon is the standard squad-level antitank weapon of the Soviet and satellite countries. Extent of distribution of the RPG-7 in South Vietnam is unknown. The launcher and four grenades captured earlier near the ASHAU Valley were evacuated to CONUS for further exploitation. SOURCE: USAKV G-2 INTEL DIVISION STUDY.

(C-NOFORN) VIET CONG TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PW'S

Analysis of captured Viet Cong documents reveals that the enemy stresses careful handling and treatment of captured US personnel. According to the documents, the intent of this policy is to exploit prisoners for intelligence purposes, to gain favorable world opinion in possible future negotiations, and to attempt to convert them to communism.



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

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RPG-7 Launcher



weight of launcher	15 lbs
length of launcher	3.4 feet
barrel diameter	40mm

RPG-7 Projectile



weight of projectile	5.1 lbs
maximum effective range	500 meters
armor penetration	11½ - 12½ in.
warhead diameter	80mm

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Prisoners usually are moved quickly from the battle area to preliminary interrogation sites or aid stations. Traveling is generally done at night, but if daylight movement is required, prisoners are blindfolded or their view is restricted to prevent them from identifying landmarks and terrain features. Confusion measures include traveling in circles and covering the same route several times. For security purposes, prisoners are usually positioned in the center of a single file, often with hands tied behind their backs and ropes around their necks.

Semipermanent camps are maintained, but usually they are moved monthly. The VC follow a stringent policy of prisoner dispersal and segregation by rank. If possible, no more than four or five prisoners are kept at one location. Prisoner camps are usually in remote areas and are closely guarded. Captives follow a planned and closely supervised schedule which includes digging trenches, sharpening punji stakes and sometimes teaching English classes. Prisoners seldom perform duties out of the camp except to prepare new compounds.

After prisoners are evacuated and issued the standard peasant garb of black "pajamas" and rubber sandals, they undergo interrogation for order of battle data and information of tactical importance. Force is seldom used, but prisoners have been severely punished for refusing to complete questionnaires or prepare propaganda material. Chaining in one position and isolation in a dark hole for as long as a week have been reported as punishments. Other reports indicate that villagers have beaten US PW's while they were paraded in towns. However, torture is not commonly employed since the VC want prisoners alive and well, if only as pawns in future negotiations.

Although the VC attempt to keep prisoners as healthy as possible, inadequate medical facilities and an improper diet often cause or aggravate disease and wounds. Malaria, dysentery, stomach ailments and skin infections are common. However, a prisoner who is in good health and not seriously wounded at time of capture has a good chance of surviving his imprisonment. SOURCE: Controlled American Source Report FVS 14,703; and CICV Study ST 67-043.

(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

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Accredited enemy strength: 55,155 NVA Combat Strength
63,202 VC Combat Strength
24,813 Administrative Services
112,760 Irregulars
39,175 Political
TOTAL: 295,105

Major unit listings: 9 Divisions: 6 NVA Confirmed
1 NVA Possible
2 VC Confirmed

24 (5) NVA Regiments
12 (6) VC Regiments

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional size units in RVN.

(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 691 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 28 May - 3 June 67. This compares with 921 incidents for the previous week and represents a decrease of 230. (See Annex A)

<u>Enemy Casualties:</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PM's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>G/S LOST</u>
Period of 28 May-3 June 67	2,420	326	475	*	*
Period of 21-27 May 67	**2,209	**102	528	**461	**92
Since 1 Jan 67	**36,892	**2,298	**13,190	**12,078	**852
Since June 65	**120,042	***	**41,157	**36,331	**2,626

<u>Friendly Casualties:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>G/S LOST</u>
Period of 28 May-3 June 67	250 (91)	816 (597)	55/0 (3/0)	115	5
Period of 21-27 May 67	**241 **(239)	**591 **(1,297)	**34/0 **(13/0)	124	1
Since 1 Jan 67	**5,848 **(3,552)	**18,469 **(23,781)	**1061/82 **(161/2)	3,477	77

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Ratio (Allied to VC/NVA) KHA Ratio 7.17:1 (Allied favor) period of 28 May - 3 June 67. Weapons Lost Ratio 4.42:1 (Allied favor) period of 21 - 27 May 67. 246

The following are Chieu Hoi figures for the period 28 May - 3 June 1967:

a.	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
	49	114	147	15

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 316; Political 113; Other 46; Total: 475.

c. This is a decrease of 64 from the previous week.

- * Enemy weapons figures for the period 28 May - 3 June 67 were not available at the time of this report.
- ** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.
- *** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 January 1967.
- () Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
AC of S, G2

Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents.

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 - 40 - G2, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH
 - 1 - INO, USARPAC
 - 1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
 - 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
 - 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
 - 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV), BIEN HOA
 - 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
 - 90 - SPO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
 - 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
 - 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
 - 1 - USARV Operations Center
 - 1 - Command Section
 - 1 - G1
 - 5 - G2
 - 1 - G3
 - 30 - Historical Section
 - 1 - G4
 - 1 - Aviation
 - 1 - Provost Marshal
 - 1 - Information Officer
 - 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
 - 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
 - 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
 - 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
 - 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
 - 5 - J2, USMACV
 - 5 - J2, USMACV ATTN: MATTLO
 - 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
 - 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
 - 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
 - 1 - CO, ACTIV, APO 96243
 - 6 - G2, Task Force Oregon, APO 96374

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 3 JUNE 1967

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	7 - 13 May	14 - 20 May	21 - 27 May	28 May-3 June	TOTAL
ATK	57	39	45	30	171
HARASS	379	369	488	330	1,566
TERRSM	59	42	42	33	176
SABOTAGE	15	25	20	10	70
PROP	10	3	9	17	39
AA	205	302	317	271	1,095
TOTAL	725	780	921	691	3,117

VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 21 - 27 MAY 1967

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	12	3	6	9	30
HARASS	127	42	94	67	330
TERRSM	6	16	5	6	33
SABOTAGE	3	2	1	4	10
PROP	1	14	2	0	17
AA	186	21	28	36	271
TOTAL	335	98	136	122	691

Annex A

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**USARV
WEEKLY
INTELLIGENCE
REVIEW**



23-67
16 June 1967
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96307.

(C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

Contact was sporadic in the DMZ area of northern I Corps Tactical Zone. Two enemy regiments in the western QUANG TRI Province/Laos area have had one month to receive replacements and supplies. Increasing

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contact during the week indicates the enemy is preparing to resume offensive actions in that area. Enemy forces in the immediate DMZ area include the 803d, 812th and 90th Regiments of the NVA 324B Division; 31st Regiment of the NVA 341st Division; the probable 18C Regiment of the NVA 325th Division; and the probable NVA 270th Regiment, a newly identified unit, apparently independent and responsible for defense of the eastern VINH LINH Special Sector, just north of the DMZ. Locations of two infantry regiments and one artillery regiment of the 341st Division are unknown, but they are probably deployed northward along the coast of southern MR IV (North Vietnam). A detainee from the 95C Regiment, NVA 325th Division, captured northwest of KHE SANH Special Forces Camp (XD 85 38) on 6 June, stated that the 325th Division had just receive orders from North Vietnam to gather supplies for relocation to the DA NANG area in July. The detainee said the division, which he described as under the control of Headquarters, Northern Command, located north of the DMZ, would come under control of Military Region 5 after the move. Interrogation of two other detainees captured near KHE SANH Special Forces Camp (XD 85 38) indicates that two company-size support units are being upgraded to battalions to meet the increased requirements of a division-size force in the Northern Front area. Translation of a document captured 1 May indicates that the Northern Front was granted full Military Region status on or before September 1966. The document contained the resolution of the first conference of the TRI-THIEN-HUE MR (Northern Front) party committee which was held during the period 15-19 September. Documents captured prior to this period referred to the Northern Sub-region or TRI-THIEN Sub-region Party Committee. In central I CTZ, the NVA 3d and 21st Regiments, NT 2 Division, continued to evade friendly forces. In QUANG NGAI Province, local forces, probably from the 48th LF Battalion, attacked Popular Force units northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 70 79), and to the south three Main Force regiments continued to evade friendly forces on Operation MALHEUR I. The enemy is capable of attacking with two divisions and a division equivalent in the DMZ area but probably will resupply and replace his losses while harassing and ambushing friendly forces in battalion strength. He is capable of attacking with two regiments in the KHE SANH area but disposition of forces indicates that an attack in regimental strength is more likely. Northern Front units are capable of attacking the HUE City/QUANG TRI City area (YD 78 25 - YD 34 53) but probably will continue to evade allied operations in central I CTZ. An attack with up to three regiments is possible in QUANG NGAI Province, but continued evasion of US Forces Operation MALHEUR II is probable.

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II CTZ:

153 In II Corps Tactical Zone, the B-3 Front probably continues to prepare for attacks in western PLEIKU Province. The enemy threat in DARLAC, PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces has increased. Documents captured in April and May indicate that the NVA 33d Regiment relocated from western PLEIKU Province to DARLAC Province in November 1966 and is operating independently. The regiment is probably operating with one full-strength battalion and one company-strength battalion. The K2 Battalion, NVA 33d Regiment, carried with a strength of 500 men, was dropped from order of battle holdings. There are indications that the NVA 88th Regiment, which formerly operated independently under the control of the B-3 Front, has replaced the 33d Regiment as a subordinate of the NT 7 Division. In the Western Highlands the enemy is capable of attacking with one division plus one regiment; however, continued preparations for attacks in western PLEIKU Province are likely. Headquarters, NT 3 Division, VC 2d Regiment and NVA 22d Regiment continued to evade near the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI Province border. The lack of contact with the NVA 18th Regiment indicates that it is evading in the PHU MY Valley. Documents captured on a senior captain in BINH DINH Province indicate that in December 1966 the 300th Sapper Company, NT 3 Division, was upgraded to a sapper battalion with a total strength of 264 men. The detainee stated that three companies of the battalion reinforced the 18th Regiment, while the fourth company is operating southeast of QUANG NGAI City in I CTZ. Another detainee, captured 15 kilometers northwest of BONG SON (BR 85 95) on 7 June, indicated that the strength of the 400th Mortar Battalion has been increased. The detainee said that the battalion, which was dropped from MACV OB holdings in April 1967, had received 330 replacements in late April or early May and now has a strength of 500 men. Current deployment of the NT 3 Division indicates that it probably will continue to evade. The NT 5 Division is capable of regimental attacks in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. Documents, detainee statements and attacks on Revolutionary Development teams and their security forces indicate that the enemy will continue to attack RD personnel and activities. Main and Local Force units are expected to continue acts of terrorism, attacks on logistical bases and airfields, and interdiction of LOC throughout the CTZ.

III CTZ:

In northwestern III Corps Tactical Zone, the NVA CT 7 Division has the capability to attack in division strength, supported by the NVA 101st Regiment. However, continued harassment and limited attacks by fire on friendly installations and formations in central and eastern TAY NINH and western BINH DUONG Provinces

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are probable. In central III CTZ, a detainee reported the CT 9 Division was preparing for an unspecified mission. The division is capable of attacking with three regiments; however, attacks by fire and interdiction of Highway 13 are probable courses of action. In southeastern III CTZ, a female from the political section of the VC 275th Regiment, who rallied 9 June, said that the regiment had been relocated in War Zone D (YT 21 49) since 31 May. She explained that the move was for the purpose of conducting extensive training and indoctrination of NVA replacements who were recently infiltrated. She also said that additional replacements will be integrated into a third regiment being formed in the CT 5 Division. The new regiment is to be completed in approximately two months. Attacks with two regiments of the CT 5 Division are possible, but more likely are attacks and harassment of friendly units and bases, particularly SUOI RAM (YS 44 98), and interdiction of Highways 1 and 2. Continuation of selective terrorism, including a program of assassination directed against US military officers, throughout III CTZ is probable. Attacks against Revolutionary Development teams indicate continued enemy recognition of this program as a serious threat. Agent reports and enemy action suggest continued emphasis on attacks against lines of communication in the SAIGON area.

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IV CTZ:

Small-scale acts of terrorism continued throughout the IV Corps Tactical Zone. Unidentified VC forces were reported to have stored over 100 boxes of mortar and heavy weapons ammunition south of THOI SON Island (XS 43 41) in KIEN HOA Province, supporting agent reports that elements of the 514th and 516th LF Battalions plan to shell DONG TAM Base (XS 41 42). Limited attacks, terrorism and sabotage are probable, particularly against RD personnel and activities. The enemy probably will increase activity in the Plain of Reeds before the annual floods limit his offensive capability in that area.

(C-NOFORN) VIET CONG METHODS OF COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE

The Viet Cong employ a multitude of covert and overt methods of collecting information. Primary sources of information that have been mentioned in captured enemy documents during the past two years include military and quasi-military intelligence units, "legal" and "illegal" agent nets, monitoring of Allied Forces communications nets, as well as mass media publications and broadcasts, and interrogation of defectors and captives. The Viet Cong usually employ mutual and overlapping collection efforts in their quest for information; attempts are made to verify information by one or more additional intelligence gathering methods.

There are basically two types of military intelligence agent networks: city security organizations, which are responsible for collecting information

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255 on GVN and FVMAF political, military and economic activities; and VC espionage organizations, which are concerned with collecting strategic intelligence and carrying out counterespionage activities. These two organizations work together and are mutually supporting. The principal means of collecting information by both is the use of agents within the target areas.

Agents are referred to as "legal" or "illegal." "Legal" refers to an agent who has a legitimate cover, such as an actual employee of the government or a businessman. "Illegal" refers to a person who uses a bogus background and who presents the appearance of being a member of the community. All activities of these agent networks are carried out in strict secrecy. The persons involved remain clear of outward involvement in any communist activity. Many instances of the employment of agents have been noted and a definite security threat has developed from the enemy's efforts to place agents within US facilities, bases, and organizations, as well as within RVN military and government organizations.

The Viet Cong rely on Peoples' Military Intelligence Nets (Peoples' MI) to collect the bulk of their "low-level" intelligence—that information which gives indications of RVN and FVMAF military capabilities and plans. In areas formerly VC-occupied, Peoples' MI agents were recruited and trained and then activated when those areas came under the control of the GVN. Peoples' MI Nets also exist in areas which have never been under VC domination. For example, the VC intelligence activities in the SAIGON area include a Peoples' MI Net. Techniques used by the Peoples' MI are observation, listening, reading and conversation with Allied personnel. A captured VC training lecture clearly states the rationale for these nets: "Where the enemy is, there are people; therefore, the enemy's activities cannot be concealed."

Combat intelligence detachments, known as reconnaissance units, collect tactical intelligence in response to specific requirements concerning enemy military activities and military geographic data. The mission of military reconnaissance personnel is to collect all available information concerning enemy strength, disposition, and capabilities before, during, and after an operation or campaign. In executing their mission, reconnaissance personnel contact local VC agents and coordinate with local VC authorities to utilize properly all available VC intelligence assets. Reconnaissance units are armed and organized as battalions, companies, platoons, squads, and teams. Aside from the mission of operating as uniformed reconnaissance units, they may operate as disguised reconnaissance teams used to gather information near GVN or FVMAF installations.

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The enemy's fastest growing intelligence capability appears to be communications intelligence. They are known to have an English language monitoring capability, and what was an effort to intercept only RVN transmissions in the past has been expanded to monitoring and exploiting all FVMAF transmissions. This capability has enabled the enemy to avert successfully military sweeps and airstrikes. It has also been used to lure strike aircraft and medevac helicopters into traps. The VC also glean a wealth of information from the "Stars and Stripes" and Armed Forces Radio and TV broadcasts. A document captured in 1966 contained accurate and detailed order of battle information which was collected from authorized MACV press releases.

The VC intelligence system is well developed, well organized, and effective. It draws on a wide variety of sources and has a multiplicity of collection methods. The enemy's capability for collection, collation, and accurate analysis of data and the production of timely intelligence must be accepted as established fact. SOURCE: MACV Perintrep for April 1967.

(C) CAMBODIA GRANTS DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO NORTH VIETNAM

Cambodia apparently has granted full diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam.

According to PHNOM PENH press reports, Chief of State Sihanouk stated on 13 June that North Vietnam's diplomatic mission had been upgraded to an embassy as a result of HANOI's statement on 8 June recognizing Cambodia's territorial integrity within its "present borders." One of Sihanouk's major objectives in recent years has been to obtain such recognition. Sihanouk also said that the Viet Cong's Liberation Front soon would be accorded "diplomatic status" in PHNOM PENH because it had issued a similar statement on 31 May. Moscow and Peking have fallen into line during the past few days. East Germany, France, and Malaysia have already given Cambodia this measure of recognition.

The Vietnamese statements were apparently in response to Sihanouk's call last month for international recognition of Cambodia's borders. There is no indication that the communists have made any concessions on the actual delimitation of Cambodia's "present borders," however. Last fall the Vietnamese refused to sign an agreement defining the border, claiming they were unwilling to delimit the border until the end of the Vietnam war and were unable to meet other Cambodian demands.

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The present broad statements of recognition, however, will help the communists offset the effects of SIHANOUK's current campaign against the Cambodian left, which has been accompanied by frequent allusions to the malevolent influence of the "Viet Minh." They will also serve to reinforce SIHANOUK's belief that Cambodia has more to gain in working with the communists than with an unresponsive South Vietnam. SOURCE: DIA INTSUM 141-67 and other G2 USARV sources.

(C) CHARACTERISTICS OF VC LOCAL FORCE UNITS

There are two distinct categories of Local Force units: battalions under the operational control of province committees, which operate throughout their assigned province; and independent companies, which confine their operations to a specific district within a province. There is no command relationship between the two categories of units, but they do frequently coordinate to provide mutual support during operations. Both organizations depend on local economies for support. The local populace is often taxed, but some funds to buy food are obtained through political channels.

The two primary missions of independent Local Force companies are to resist Allied Forces in their assigned districts and to wear down the enemy's potential while developing guerrilla warfare. The latter mission is accomplished by carrying out campaigns of attrition, countering sweep operations, sabotaging strategic hamlets, enlarging "liberated" areas, and supporting political struggles. Local Force battalions have similar missions which are more general in nature and usually more military than political. The battalions may be moved anywhere in the province to provide support for district companies or Main Force units. Another mission assigned both categories of Local Force units is to "prepare the battlefield" for Main Force units by providing intelligence, transportation, and logistical support.

Local Force unit tactics are based on the following principles of guerrilla warfare: stay close to the enemy; assemble and disperse quickly; use speed, surprise, and secrecy; coordinate with local guerrillas and the people. In recent months these principles have been adjusted to meet a specific objective--countering Allied sweep operations. The VC believe the Allies are conducting what they describe as a "two-pincer strategic plan," one pincer being military operations in VC-controlled areas and the other being rural pacification operations in contested and/or GVN-controlled areas. Since the enemy considers sweep operations to be the first step in applying the pincers, they place a high priority on countering sweeps. By dispersing to avoid decisive contact, the VC can quickly reestablish themselves in sufficient strength when the Allied sweep has passed to prevent entry of GVN pacification cadre.

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An increasingly important mission of Local Force units is to provide a manpower pool for Main Force units (USARV Intelligence Review, 2 June 1967). In recent months, soldiers from the lowest echelons have been ordered to higher priority units as replacements. As this continues, the size, morale and combat efficiency of Local Force units may be expected to decrease. SOURCE: II Field Force PERINTREP Number 22. 258

(C-NOFORN) VC/NVN POLICY TOWARDS ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS (PART II OF IV PARTS)

Generally good relations have been maintained between the Vietnamese and the 400,000 to 500,000 Khmer (Cambodians) living in South Vietnam. At the present time there is little active dissidence among the Khmer, who live primarily in TAY NINH, VINH BINH, and BA XUYEN Provinces and along the Vietnamese/Cambodian border, but a number of grievances exist which could possibly provide fertile ground for VC exploitation. The Khmer are conscious of what they consider to be discriminatory actions taken against them by several South Vietnamese governments. They are offered few educational opportunities (only one high school teaches the Khmer language) and insufficient political representation (currently no post higher than district chief is held by a Khmer; however, there are four Khmer representatives from IV Corps in the National Constituent Assembly). The Khmer have not been fully assimilated into the mainstream of Vietnamese culture. They are very devout in their faith, Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) Buddhism which prevails in Cambodia. When given the option of accepting Vietnamese citizenship or registering as aliens during the DIEM regime, they chose to retain their Cambodian citizenship.

Despite the grievances with the GVN, VC propaganda and proselyting activities among the Khmers in South Vietnam have failed. The primary reason for this failure is that the two most lucrative areas for VC exploitation--Khmer chauvinism and the religious differences--do not conform with basic communist doctrine which is anti-nationalistic and anti-religious in theory. The VC may give "lip service" to a policy of autonomy for ethnic minorities and respect for their customs and beliefs, but it is reasonable to assume that they would require drastic alteration of the Khmers' culture and goals in order to facilitate the war effort and integrate the minority group into a communist state.

The Viet Cong do persist in their efforts to win over the Khmers, however. Recently they have made attempts to gain the support of the Khmer Kampuchea Krom, an organization which advocates the return of the MEKONG Delta to Cambodia. There is also evidence that the VC are probing public opinion among the Khmer

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with regard to a VC plan to seize provinces heavily populated by Khmer. The plan includes VC promises to allow Khmer self-rule according to their own customs. The Viet Cong have also taken advantage of GVN mistakes, such as an unfortunate bombing of a Khmer pagoda in VINH BINH Province in 1964. The VC exploited the propaganda resulting from the incident and achieved control over the congregations of 17 out of 137 Khmer pagodas in the province. VINH BINH is the only province in which a VC "religious" approach has received any notable success. Overall, however, the Viet Cong have not found an effective approach to gain the loyalty of the Khmer. SOURCE: CICV Study 67-019.

(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

Accredited enemy strength:	<u>53,415</u>	NVA Combat Strength
	<u>63,447</u>	VC Combat Strength
	<u>24,813</u>	Administrative Services
	<u>112,760</u>	Irregulars
	<u>39,175</u>	Political
TOTAL:	293,610	

Major unit listings: 9 Divisions: 6 NVA Confirmed
1 NVA Possible
2 VC Confirmed

25 (6) NVA Regiments
12 (6) VC Regiments

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional size units in RVN.

(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 682 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 4 - 10 June 67. This compares with 691 incidents for the previous week and represents a decrease of 9. (See Annex A)

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<u>Enemy Casualties:</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 4-10 June 67	1,156	20	485	*	*
Period of 28 May-3 June 67**	2,425	326	475	**525	**60
Since 1 Jan 67	**38,053	2,624	13,675	**12,605	**912
Since June 65	**121,203	***	41,642	**36,858	**2,686

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<u>Friendly Casualties:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 4-10 June 67	233 (77)	522 (467)	38/0 (7/0)	154	3
Period of 28 May-3 June 67 **	250 (198)	**816 (1,101)	**55/0 (13/0)	115	5
Since 1 Jan 67	**6,081 (3,738)	**18,991 (24,855)	**1099/82 (178/2)	3,631	80

Ratio (Allied to VC/NVA) KHA Ratio 3.73:1 (Allied favor) period of 4 - 10 June 67. Weapons Lost Ratio 4.89:1 (Allied favor) period of 28 May - 3 June 67.

The following are Chieu Hoi figures for the period 4 - 10 June 1967:

a. <u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
102	127	134	122

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 296; Political 155; Other 34; Total: 485.

c. This is an increase of 10 from the previous week.

*. Enemy weapons figures for the period 4-10 June 67 were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

*** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 January 1967.

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() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

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Kenneth D. Sirmet
KENNETH D. SIRMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

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- 1 - LNO, USARPAC
- 1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
- 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
- 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV), HIEN HOA
- 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
- 90 - SFO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
- 1 - USARV Operations Center
- 1 - Command Section
- 1 - G1
- 5 - G2
- 1 - G3
- 30 - Historical Section
- 1 - G4
- 1 - Aviation

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- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - Information Officer
- 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
- 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
- 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
- 5 - J2, USMACV
- 5 - J2, USMACV ATTN: MATTLO
- 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
- 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
- 1 - CO, ACTIV, APO 96243
- 6 - G2, Task Force Oregon, APO 96374

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 10 JUNE 1967

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	14 - 20 May	21 - 27 May	28 May-3 June	4 - 10 June	TOTAL
ATK	39	45	30	44	158
HARASS	369	488	330	361	1,548
TERRSM	42	42	33	40	157
SABOTAGE	25	20	10	23	78
PROP	3	9	17	8	37
AA	302	317	271	206	1,096
TOTAL	780	921	691	682	3,074

VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 4 - 10 JUNE 1967

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	17	7	11	9	44
HARASS	139	27	78	117	361
TERRSM	17	5	9	9	40
SABOTAGE	12	0	1	10	23
PROP	2	6	0	0	8
AA	137	19	22	28	206
TOTAL	324	64	121	173	682

Annex A

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WEEKLY
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REVIEW**



24-67
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96307.

(C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

In northern I Corps Tactical Zone, enemy units continued to rebuild and reoccupy positions in and around the IMZ. Ground contact was light, but stand-off attacks by fire increased significantly. Thirteen attacks

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against US and ARVN units were made during the week ending 17 June. An estimated 675 rounds of 60mm, 81/82mm and 120mm mortar, 85mm and 122mm artillery and 140mm rockets were fired, compared to an estimated 175 rounds in six attacks during the previous week. Resumption of the attacks indicates that enemy fire support units have reoccupied positions destroyed in May by friendly ground and air operations. It may also indicate the enemy is preparing to resume offensive operations. A report stated that approximately 3,000 NVA troops moved south from the lowlands of VINH LINH District, QUANG BINH Province (NVN), to positions in the DMZ north of the BEN HAI River (vic YD 13 78) during the period 4-8 June. The source of the information stated that they were to infiltrate into SVN and attack the DONG HA Marine Base (YD 23 60). The enemy is capable of attacking in the DMZ area with two divisions and a division equivalent. No contact was reported in the KHE SANH area (XD 85 38), but friendly guerrilla teams reported seeing two enemy bivouac areas, two enemy companies, and at least 17 trucks near the tri-border area (XD 70 67). The activity may be related to infiltration continuing farther south, but it is possible that elements of the NVA 325th Division near KHE SANH are receiving replacements or reinforcements. The enemy is capable of attacking with two regiments in the KHE SANH area but probably will continue to avoid major contact while preparing for future operations. A senior lieutenant returnee from the VC QUANG DA Provincial Committee (RVN QUANG NAM Province) supports previous information that the Northern Front, also known as the TRI-THIEN-HUE Military Region, is directly subordinate to HANOI. He was the sixth source to identify MG LE CHUONG as the region commander. The presence of a major general as commander also supports the probable independent status of the Northern Front. Northern Front units equivalent to a division are capable of attacking in the HUE/QUANG TRI City area (YD 78 25 - YD 34 53), but probably will attack district headquarters in up to battalion strength while harassing ARVN outposts by fire. A raid by sapper units in QUANG TRI City is possible. In central I CTZ, the NVA 3d and 21st Regiments, NT 2 Division, continued to evade. A returnee from the 21st Regiment said he had joined the NT 2 Division with a 700-man infiltration group in late February, indicating that the division received replacements less than two weeks after losing over 1,000 KIA during the period 13-19 February. In QUANG NGAI Province, three enemy regiments continued to evade TF OREGON forces on Operation MALHEUR II. The enemy is capable of attacking with two understrength regiments in central I CTZ, but probably will continue to evade Allied operations in QUANG TIN Province. In QUANG NGAI Province, he is capable of attacking with up to three regiments, but probably will continue to evade friendly forces on Operation MALHEUR II.

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II CTZ:

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In II Corps Tactical Zone, elements of the B-3 Front probably have withdrawn to Cambodia. A detainee from the NVA 32d Regiment said his unit withdrew to Cambodia after attacks against elements of the 4th Infantry Division on 20 and 26 May. He said further that the B-3 Front Headquarters was located in Cambodia 20 kilometers northwest of DUC CO (YA 84 26). Reconnaissance and mortar attacks on installations indicate that the enemy is continuing to prepare the battlefield in western PLEIKU Province while possibly attempting to divert friendly forces to secure installations in the PLEIKU City area (AR 78 46). Enemy forces are capable of attacking in the Western Highlands with one division plus one regiment. He is possibly preparing to attack DUC CO Special Forces Camp (YA 84 26) or LE THANH Fire Support Base (YA 89 29) with up to three regiments in conjunction with a possible diversionary attack against PLEI ME Special Forces Camp (ZA 15 05). Current deployment of elements of the NT 3 Division indicates that they probably will continue to evade in the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI Province border area. Documents captured in northeastern BINH DINH Province indicate that there will be an increase in VC engineer activities directed against mechanized forces. The NT 5 Division is capable of regimental-size attacks in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces, but current disposition of the NVA 95th Regiment and 30th Main Force Battalion indicates that only battalion-size actions are probable. The 4th Battalion, NVA 95th Regiment, was identified in a contact with ARVN elements guarding a Revolutionary Development hamlet seven kilometers west of TUY HOA (CQ 113 466) on 16 June. Agent reports, documents and recent contacts indicate that Main and Local Forces will continue acts of terrorism and attacks on logistics bases, airfields and LOC throughout the corps area.

III CTZ:

In northwestern III Corps Tactical Zone, Headquarters, NVA CT 7 Division, NVA 141st Regiment and NVA 101st Regiment remain in central TAY NINH Province. A returnee from the NVA 101st Regiment indicated that the NVA 52d Regiment provided some replacements to the CT 9 Division but was operating as a unit in War Zone C. The subordination of the NVA 101st Regiment is unknown, but its location suggests that the regiment is supporting, if not subordinate to, the NVA CT 7 Division. The division, supported by the 101st Regiment, is capable of a coordinated attack, but attacks by elements of the division against lightly defended outposts and Special Forces camps, particularly PREK KLOK (XT 27 78), are likely. Headquarters, CT 9 Division, and the VC 271st Regiment remain in southern PHUCC LONG Province. The VC 272d Regiment remains in Base Area 352

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(XT 59 94), and the VC 273d Regiment remains in western LONG KHANH Province. Elements of the division probably will continue to evade while preparing for future operations. In southeastern III CTZ, Headquarters, CT 5 Division, and the VC 274th Regiment remain in northeastern PHUOC TUY Province. The VC 275th Regiment is unlocated but may be in War Zone D training replacements. It was reported that two battalions of the VC 274th Regiment and an U/I Local Force unit were located in southern LONG KHANH Province (vic YT 47 15) with the mission to attack GVN/US installations near XUAN LOC (YT 49 09) and along Highway 1 from XUAN LOC to GIA RAY (YT 63 13). The CT 5 Division is capable of attacking with one regiment, but probable courses of action are small-unit attacks and ambushes along Interprovincial Route 2 and Highway 1. Agent reports and terrorist incidents indicate the enemy probably will continue countering the RD program and GVN efforts at hamlet and village level. 270

IV CTZ:

In IV Corps Tactical Zone, enemy activity continued to be characterized by harassment, attempted sabotage, small-unit attacks, and terrorism. In DINH TUONG Province, an agent report and enemy activity indicate a continuing threat to DONG TAM (XS 40 42). The 514th Battalion will reportedly attack DONG TAM about 1 July following a period of intensive training, resupply and integration of Local Force personnel. A detainee captured 15 May said the 514th Battalion had received 96 replacements from CAI LAY District and GO CONG Province. The 21st ARVN Division contacted elements of the TAY DO Local Force Battalion and other U/I Local Forces on 14 June in PHONG DINH Province. Reported results included 210 enemy killed, 17 detained, 29 individual weapons, two 60mm mortars and one 57mm recoilless rifle captured. The operation may have preempted harassing attacks in the CAN THO area (WS 86 09). The location of the TAY DO Battalion and recent attacks indicate that the enemy is continuing in his attempt to isolate VI THANH City (WR 51 81) from CAN THO. Throughout the corps area, the enemy probably will continue terrorism, harassment, interdiction of LOC, sabotage and attacks against PBR's, airfields, district towns and lightly defended areas with up to battalion-size forces. The frequency of VC-initiated incidents directed against RD teams indicates that they will continue to be high priority targets.

(C-NOFORN) VC/NVN POLICY TOWARDS ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS (Part III of IV Parts)

The Chinese are the largest (1,100,000 people) and most important ethnic minority group in South Vietnam. They are concentrated almost entirely in the cities, especially the CHOLON area of SAIGON, where their commercial importance

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21/ vastly exceeds their numbers. Maintaining an attitude of clannishness and ethnic superiority, they are a society apart from the Vietnamese. Their attitude toward the governments of South Vietnam, past and present, has been that of disaffection. Under the regime of President Ngo Dinh DIEM, they were reluctantly pressured into becoming citizens of South Vietnam. The Chinese minority's preoccupation with business and their apolitical attitude have worked against both the VC and GVN. Since many are practicing capitalists, they find little appeal in communist ideology.

The Chinese control 80% of the import/export business, 90% of retail trade, 100% of drug wholesale and 70% of rice wholesale. Their primacy in business is the result of their national traits and characteristics, coupled with the fact that under French rule Chinese were given a favorable position in commerce and industry. In September 1956 President DIEM decreed that if members of ethnic minorities in South Vietnam did not become Vietnamese citizens, they would have their business licenses revoked. The Chinese reluctantly became citizens if for no other reason than to keep their licenses. Their attitude of political disaffection with the GVN continues, although relations are improving. CHOLON, predominantly Chinese, is now an electoral district with five seats in the Constituent Assembly. Three of the Constituent Assembly members are Chinese. On 17 June 1967, Premier Nguyen Cao KY announced that Chinese property confiscated by the DIEM government would be restored to the Chinese community.

Enemy efforts to generate sympathy for the VC cause have failed, especially among the Chinese merchants and upper classes, because these people realize that they could not benefit by a Viet Cong takeover of the government. Propaganda appeals, claiming that the VC are "champions of the working class," have failed to entice any significant VC support. However, attempts to infiltrate some Chinese labor unions and organizations have succeeded. The VC have made an unsubstantiated claim that they control four of the 22 Chinese workers unions (approximately 5,000 workers) and have limited influence over ten others.

In recent months, the VC reportedly have intensified their efforts to lure draft-age Chinese youths to join their ranks in order to avoid service in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Young Chinese men are told that they will be given missions according to their capabilities or that they may continue their studies and will not be inducted into military service. In reality, though, after reaching VC-controlled areas, most of the Chinese are sent to production units where they receive training and at the same time participate in missions in base areas. Later they are assigned to combat units.

Captured documents reveal that the VC are well aware of the difficulties


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they face in winning the support of the Chinese. There is even increasing evidence that the Viet Cong proselyting cadre working in CHOLON are becoming disgusted with their lack of success and are resorting to terror to intimidate anti-communist Chinese leaders. The VC refuse to accept the apparent attitude of non-involvement of the Chinese community and will continue to carry out programs to enlist Chinese support. SOURCE: CICV Study ST 67-019 and PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 17-67.

(C) EFFECTS OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY BOUNDARIES ON OPERATIONS (SEE MAP)

The area of South Vietnam is divided into smaller areas for political and military purposes by both the GVN/Allied Forces and the VC/NVA. The GVN has established province boundaries and has divided the country into four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ's). Both ARVN and FVMAF combat units are deployed within these CTZ's, and they normally do not cross the CTZ boundary while on operations. The movement of units from one CTZ to another does occur, but these movements are coordinated at high levels. Allied forces are also limited by their inability to cross international borders into North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

The VC/NVA have established their own province boundaries, which often do not correspond with GVN boundaries. The enemy has also divided the country into Military Regions (MR's), each controlled by an MR Headquarters. It seems evident that these MR boundaries were determined so that they would provide the best tactical and strategic advantage to the enemy. When the MR boundaries are changed, it is apparently done to enhance the enemy's political, economic and military control. For example, the recent establishment of MR 10, made up of areas previously located in MR's 1 and 2, was reportedly accomplished to consolidate an area used for the infiltration of troops and supplies from Cambodia.

While the enemy forces rigidly observe their own political and military boundaries, they also take significant advantage of similar restrictions on friendly forces. This is especially true of the military boundaries, since the boundaries of the four GVN Corps Tactical Zones vary widely from the boundaries of the VC MR's. For example, VC MR 5 takes in an area which is split by the I CTZ-II CTZ boundary. This fact provides the enemy with "safe havens" along the CTZ boundary, caused by the difficulty in coordinating friendly operations which could cross the boundary in pursuit of the fleeing enemy forces. The Headquarters of MR 5 is normally located along this boundary and can move back and forth at will to evade friendly operations. The Headquarters of MR 6, located along the

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boundary separating III CTZ from II CTZ, enjoys the same advantage. Military units can also evade friendly forces by crossing CTZ boundaries. Early in 1967 two regiments of the NVA 3d Division crossed from BINH DINH Province in II CTZ into QUANG NGAI Province in I CTZ, still remaining within the confines of VC MR 5. Also in 1967 the VC 267th Battalion of the Dong Thap 2 Regiment moved from III CTZ to IV CTZ but did not cross the VC MR 2 boundary. 294

In areas where pursuit by friendly forces cannot be hindered by CTZ boundaries, the enemy often takes advantage of international borders. This type of evasion is regularly practiced by the DMZ Front Headquarters, located in the DMZ area; the B-3 Front Headquarters, located along the border between PLEIKU Province and Cambodia; and COSVN Headquarters, located near the border between TAY NINH Province and Cambodia; as well as by combat units subordinate to these headquarters. Although there have been reports that Cambodian border patrols attempt to limit movements by VC/NVA units into Cambodia, the enemy apparently continues widespread use of Cambodia as a refuge from friendly operations.

The locations of enemy base areas are apparently determined by military considerations (cover, concealment, difficulty of access into the area by friendly forces, responsiveness of the population, and proximity to established logistical systems) and are not based on political or military boundaries. For example, the area of War Zone D includes portions of both MR 10 and MR 1. In the past enemy units have used these "secure" areas for training, resupply, and recuperation, after which they returned to offensive operations. However, increased friendly air strikes and sweep operations in these formerly safe areas have disrupted the enemy's ability to use them as havens. SOURCE: OACofS G2 USARV, Intelligence Division.

(C) VIET CONG 10TH SPECIAL REGION

The 10th Special Region (SR 10) has been accepted as directly subordinate to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) by COMUSMACV. Located in the RUNG SAT Special Zone (RSSZ) southeast of SAIGON, the region has been arbitrarily designated "SR 10" to differentiate it from the recently accepted Military Region (MR) 10 (QUANG DUC, PHUOC LONG, and BINH LONG Provinces). There are no indications whether this reorganization will be permanent, but its primary purpose is probably to improve the enemy's capability to disrupt the flow of supplies on the main shipping channel to SAIGON. The SR 10 Headquarters apparently exercises political and administrative control throughout the RSSZ.

According to available information, the enemy unit that usually operates in the area -- the 400-man C-225 VC Battalion (formerly known as the 225th Amphibious

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Sapper Battalion) -- now operates as four separate 100-man company-size Main Force sapper elements under the control of SR 10 Headquarters. The battalion organization has been dropped from COMUSMACV's order of battle holdings. Four additional Main Force sapper companies have been formed (each with a strength of 100), thereby placing eight sapper companies under SR 10 control. These units were reportedly issued a number of 81mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, K-44 rifles with telescopic sights, and B-40 antitank rocket launchers in January. SOURCE: DIA INTSUM 144-67.

(C-NOFORN) IMPACT OF THE RICE SHORTAGE ON THE VC

The war in South Vietnam has greatly affected the production and distribution of the country's primary staple, rice. Not only has the war upset normal marketing of rice in GVN-controlled areas, but it has also resulted in the partial denial of rice to the enemy. While the denial of rice as a food source to the insurgents is impossible in the MEKONG Delta, evidence exists that rice can be denied them in the traditional rice-deficit northern areas. In those areas, the localized seizures of large quantities of subsistence commodities such as rice are extremely significant. When the normal privations and hardships of guerrilla life are magnified by inadequate subsistence, the VC soldier is bombarded by psychological pressures which tend to undermine and destroy his willingness to fight. In a weakened physical state, he becomes subject to a wide variety of diseases and his motivation is difficult to maintain. There is evidence that rice shortages have contributed to the willingness of some enemy soldiers to desert their units or return to GVN control under the Chieu Hoi Program.

Seizures of large quantities of rice within a particular locality can lead to postponement or cancellation of enemy operations due to the lack of provisions. It may also put a severe strain on the enemy logistics system, forcing retaxation of rice in the area of the captured caches. This, in turn, may lead to a flow of refugees from areas where they are forced to pay taxes and work as porters for the VC. If the VC are forced to purchase rice, owing to Allied seizures and rice-deficit conditions, enemy operations may further be curtailed because of the resulting lack of funds. The production and marketing of rice in itself is a major source of revenue for the VC. Rice grown for sale in VC-controlled areas is taxed during production, transport to processing, milling, transport to market, marketing, transport from marketing, and exporting. Denial of rice results in the denial of a major source of VC income.

Operations by Allied Forces show signs of effectiveness. Reports of food shortages are becoming more common in traditional rice-deficit areas where continuous herbicide operations, increased seizures of caches, and GVN-protected rice harvests are having a marked effect on enemy logistical problems. SOURCE: MACV J2 Study, THE RICE SITUATION IN RVN.

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23 June 1967

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(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

276

Accredited enemy strength:	<u>53,715</u>	NVA Combat Strength
	<u>64,252</u>	VC Combat Strength
	<u>24,813</u>	Administrative Services
	<u>112,760</u>	Irregulars
	<u>39,175</u>	Political
TOTAL:	<u>294,715</u>	

Major unit listings: 9 Divisions: 6 NVA Confirmed
 1 NVA Possible
 2 VC Confirmed

25 (6) NVA Regiments
 12 (6) VC Regiments

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional-size units in RVN.

(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 752 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 11 - 17 June 67. This compares with 682 incidents for the previous week and represents an increase of 70. (See Annex A)

<u>Enemy Casualties:</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>FW's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 11-17 June 67	1,852	51	474	*	*
Period of 4-10 June 67	**1,153	20	485	**370	**26
Since 1 Jan 67	**39,902	2,675	14,148	**12,975	**938
Since June 65	**123,052	***	42,115	**37,228	**2,712

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<u>Friendly Casualties:</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
Period of 11-17 June 67	235 (89)	609 (395)	14/0 (26/0)	115	3
Period of 4-10 June 67	**233 **(109)	**522 **(802)	**38/0 **(12/0)	154	3
Since 1 Jan 67	**6,316 **(3,863)	**19,600 **(25,615)	**1,113/82 **(205/2)	3,746	83

Allied to VC/NVA KHA Ratio 5.72:1 (Allied favor) period of 11-17 June 67. Weapons Lost Ratio 2.52:1 (Allied favor) period of 4-10 June 67.

The following are Chieu Hoi figures for the period 11 - 17 June 1967:

a.	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
	61	89	159	165

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 319; Political 125; Other 30; Total: 474.

c. This is a decrease of 11 from the previous week.

* Enemy weapons figures for the period 11-17 June 67 were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

*** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 January 1967.

() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

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 - 1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
 - 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
 - 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
 - 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV), BIEN HOA
 - 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
 - 90 - SPO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
 - 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
 - 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
 - 1 - USARV Operations Center
 - 1 - Command Section
 - 1 - G1
 - 5 - G2
 - 1 - G3
 - 30 - Historical Section
 - 1 - G4
 - 1 - Aviation :
 - 1 - Provost Marshal
 - 1 - Information Officer
 - 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
 - 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
 - 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
 - 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
 - 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
 - 5 - J2, USMACV
 - 1 - J2, USMACV ATTN: MATTLO
 - 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
 - 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
 - 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
 - 1 - CO, ACTIV, APO 96243
 - 6 - G2, Task Force OREGON, APO 96374

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 17 JUNE 1967

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	21-27 May	28 May-3 June	4 - 10 June	11 - 17 June	TOTAL
ATK	45	30	44	49	168
HARASS	488	330	361	385	1,564
TERRSM	42	33	40	37	152
SABOTAGE	20	10	23	13	66
PROP	9	17	8	11	45
AA	317	271	206	257	1,051
TOTAL	921	691	682	752	3,046

VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 11 - 17 JUNE 1967

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	9	16	9	15	49
HARASS	122	62	112	89	385
TERRSM	3	15	14	5	37
SABOTAGE	5	2	0	6	13
PROP	0	9	2	0	11
AA	166	21	36	34	257
TOTAL	305	125	173	149	752

Annex A

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INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW

25-67
1 July 1967

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
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The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96307.

(C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

In northern I Corps Tactical Zone, the enemy continued attacks by fire on friendly units and installations near the DMZ. Attacks by fire in northern QUANG TRI Province indicate that the enemy is continuing to rebuild and reoccupy positions destroyed by friendly operations in May. The attacks also may indicate that enemy units are preparing to resume offensive operations in the area. In the DMZ area the enemy probably will continue to resupply

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and replace his losses, attack friendly units and installations by fire, and harass and attack friendly forces in up to battalion strength. An 82mm mortar and 102mm rocket attack on 27 June marked the resumption of enemy activity in the KHE SANH area (XD 85 38). Enemy units in that area probably will continue to avoid major contact, however, while preparing for future operations. In the Northern Front area, in I CTZ, enemy units continued to evade. A detainee identified his former unit as the 31st Battalion, NVA 32d Regiment. The 32d Regiment is carried in North Vietnamese order of battle as a subordinate of the 350th Division. This was the fourth reported instance in 1967 of North Vietnamese units training, company- or battalion-size units for infiltration to the Northern Front. Northern Front enemy forces are capable of attacking with a division equivalent in the HUE/QUANG TRI City area (YD 76 25/YD 34 53), but probably will attack district headquarters in up to battalion strength while harassing and attacking ARVN outposts by fire. In QUANG NAM Province an agent reported that elements of a Viet Cong division which had been located in Laos moved into the TRUNG MANG (ZC 160 650) area in preparation for attacks against DA NANG (BT 03 78). The attacks reportedly are to take place prior to 20 July. This is the second report of VC activity in the TRUNG MANG area. A previous agent report indicated that 1,000 - 2,000 VC had occupied the area. In southern I CTZ, elements of the NT 2 Division and NT 3 Division continued to evade friendly forces in Operation MALHEUR II. The enemy is capable of an attack with up to three understrength regiments in the area but probably will continue to evade friendly forces.

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II CTZ:

In II Corps Tactical Zone, enemy activity in the Western Highlands conforms to their stated objectives to disperse, tie down and destroy friendly forces and to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program. An attack on DAK TO (ZB 01 21) on 17 June with 22mm and 140mm rockets was the first use of these weapons in II CTZ. Mortar attacks on friendly fire support bases in the DUC CO/LE THANH area (YA 84 26/YA 89 29) indicate that elements of the P 3 Front probably will increase offensive action in western PLEIKU Province. In Pleiku Province the US 173d Abn Brigade was involved in a 24 June contact with the 6th Battalion, NVA 24th Regiment, which probably reduced significantly that enemy unit's combat strength (106 KIA). The enemy is capable of attacking in that province with the remaining two battalions of the NVA 24th Regiment plus the 304th VC Local Force Battalion. In northeastern II CTZ, elements of the NT 3 Division continued to evade in the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI Province border area. A report was received that the VC 50th and E 210 Local Force

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Battalions are planning a mortar attack on PHU CAT Airfield (BR 91 48) on 20 August. Participation by two battalions indicates that the plans may also include a coordinated ground attack. Elements of the NT 5 Division maintained a high level of activity in PHU YEN Province, indicating preparations for future offensive operations. Detainees' statements and attacks on RD security teams suggest that RD personnel and facilities remain high-priority targets.

III CTZ:

In III Corps Tactical Zone, the enemy displayed increased determination to maintain current dispositions in PHUOC LONG, PHUOC TUY and LONG AN Provinces. This may indicate he is deployed in areas he desires to hold in order to implement plans for summer operations. In northeastern III CTZ, elements of the NVA CT 7 Division and the NVA 101st Regiment remained in stable positions. Current deployment and activities suggest they probably will conduct attacks by fire against friendly installations and Special Forces camps, particularly FREK KLOK (XT 27 78). Friendly forces in Operation BILLINGS in central III CTZ established heavy contact with the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 271st Regiment, CT 9 Division, resulting in over 300 enemy KIA. An agent report described a 700-man force moving rapidly eastward across Highway 245 (XT 69 75) in southwestern BINH LONG Province on 19 June, suggesting that elements of the 272d Regiment may have been moving to reinforce the 271st Regiment. In southeastern III CTZ, activity among elements of the CT 5 Division remained at a high level. Two detainees reported that a third regiment was being formed in the division and was engaged in intensive training. It is possible that such a regiment exists now or is forming, but there is insufficient evidence to confirm its existence or location at this time. The CT 5 Division is capable of attacking with one reinforced regiment, but probable courses of action are attacks and ambushes along Interprovincial Route 2 and Highway 1 in up to battalion strength. In southwestern III Corps two ralliers reported on 21 and 22 June that the 261st Battalion, VC DONG THAP 1 Regiment, is now located in LONG AN Province (vic XS 70 58). The 261st Battalion was last reported in KIEN HOA Province in IV Corps. One rallier reported that the battalion, with a strength of 200, was preparing to attack the military base at BEN LUC (XS 62 76). It was also reported that on 25 July 1967 attacks will be conducted simultaneously against major Allied air bases in SVN. Both TAN SON NHUT and BIEN HOA Air Bases are supposedly included in the attack plans. Throughout III CTZ, enemy forces probably will continue attempts to counter the RD Program and efforts to install local GVN administration.

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IV CTZ:

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Enemy forces in IV CTZ continued to conduct small-scale attacks, harassment, sabotage and acts of terrorism to counter the expansion of GVN control. Navy Seal Teams uncovered an estimated three tons of rice in KIEN HOA Province. The location of the cache between reported commo-liaison routes and VC Base Areas 470 (XS 12 52) and 474 (XS 45 15) indicates the area probably is used as a commo-liaison station. It was reported that 50 South Vietnamese Viet Cong military cadre who had regrouped to North Vietnam were reinfilitrated from Cambodia in June and assigned to the AN GIANG VC Province Committee. It is possible the committee requested these individuals to fill leadership positions in an effort to bolster the faltering enemy effort in the province. Throughout the corps area, the enemy probably will continue terrorism, harassment, interdiction of LOC, sabotage and attacks against patrol boats, airfields, district towns and lightly defended areas with up to battalion-size forces. DONG TAM Base (XS 40 42) remains a probable target for harassing attacks.

(C-NOFORN) VC/NVN POLICY TOWARDS ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS (Part IV of IV Parts)

The Montagnards are a primitive mountain-dwelling people who constitute five percent of South Vietnam's population and occupy sixty percent of its land, primarily in the Western Highlands. They are, for the most part, a passive, nonparticipating and physically separated minority element which identifies neither with the nation nor with the interests of the dominant Vietnamese. They are collected into 43 tribes which are only loosely associated on the basis of linguistic and cultural similarities, but completely lack political unity. The village is the real political, administrative, and social unit and is governed by a local tribal chief who shares power and authority with sorcerers. Oppressed and despised by the lowland Vietnamese, the Montagnards greeted the Caucasian French colonizers with unabashed joy and relief. In general, the French treated them fairly, and even today an American's best introduction to the Montagnards is the color of his skin.

Of all the ethnic groups in South Vietnam, the Montagnards have been the principal target of VC proselyting and organizational activity. They are also the minority group with which the VC have achieved their most notable successes. The most effective disseminator of propaganda has been the VC cadre who take up residence among the Montagnards, following the doctrine of "eat together, work together, live together." Once having obtained the trust of Montagnards, the VC have maintained a favorable

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propaganda position among the people who have little knowledge of the outside world. When other methods fail, coercion is used to frighten the Montagnards into listening to VC propaganda and acting in accordance with their directives. Aware that their wooing of the Montagnards is part of a long-range strategy, however, the Viet Cong use coercion selectively and attempt to keep it minimum. The principal VC propaganda theme is that the Montagnards are oppressed by the GVN and that a Communist government will be able to grant them a better life in an autonomous state.

Montagnards have been integrated into predominantly ethnic Vietnamese enemy units as well as formed into units of their own. They are employed primarily at the guerrilla and Local Force level and may be led either by Vietnamese or Montagnard cadre. Viet Cong attempts to integrate Montagnards into all the cadre ranks appear to be genuine, and Montagnard officials have been found as high as VC province level.

In VC-controlled areas, attempts are made to increase Montagnard agricultural production, partly by establishing farming cooperatives and partly through introduction of more fruitful agricultural techniques. One source has indicated that the VC have had little success with farming cooperatives in the Western Highlands. Despite this failure, though, production has increased in some areas with the introduction of more advanced techniques. The Viet Cong's major economic problem involves their attempt to apply the same policies to Montagnards as to other Vietnamese ethnic groups. The Montagnards resent paying VC taxes because they had not been taxed by previous South Vietnamese governments.

The major problem faced by both the GVN and VC in dealing with the Montagnards is their mistrust of all Vietnamese and their desire to remain separate. FULRO (United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races) was founded by the Montagnards in 1957 with the goal of attaining complete Montagnard autonomy. In September, 1964, 500 Montagnard tribesmen in DARLAC and QUANG DUC Provinces revolted in the name of FULRO and seized the city of BAN ME THUOT (AQ 78 02). Fifty Vietnamese were killed and demands for autonomy were made over the captured radio station. US Special Forces officers averted what might have been a full-scale revolt by convincing armed Montagnards in five training camps and BAN ME THUOT that their grievances would be presented to Premier Nguyen KHANH. The Viet Cong attempted to capitalize on the FULRO movement, but FULRO's campaign for an autonomous Montagnard state, affiliated with neither the North nor South Vietnamese, is in conflict with VC aims. SOURCE: CICV STUDY 67-019.

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(C) COORDINATED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN II CTZ:

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Captured documents and recent enemy activity possibly indicate that the B-3 Front and MR 5 are coordinating offensive action in II CTZ. A notebook captured on 3 May near FLEI ME Special Forces Camp (ZA 16 05) stated, "B-3 will coordinate its actions with all battlefields of the Region," probably meaning the highland and coastal battlefields of Military Region 5. During May and June elements of the B-3 Front and the NT 5 Division have increased offensive action in KONTUM, PLEIKU and PHU YEN Provinces. Between 0200 and 0400 on 16 June, enemy forces launched what appeared to be coordinated attacks in the general vicinity of TUY HOA (CQ 19 45) and DONG TRE (BQ 92 71). Also during the early morning hours of 16 June, enemy forces attacked TAN CANH and HQ 24th Special Tactical Zone in KONTUM City with mortar and rocket fire, possibly indicating that the attacks in PHU YEN and KONTUM Provinces were coordinated. Documents captured on 22 June near DAK TO (ZB 01 22) indicate that during May and June, MR 5 was to provide logistical support to elements of the NVA 24th Regiment. A 31 May 1967 entry in a notebook indicates that an unidentified company, probably the 13th Company, 6th Battalion, NVA 24th Regiment, stopped at "DON's warehouse," possibly a reference to Brigadier General DOAN who was the Commander of MR 5 until August 1966 when he reportedly was replaced by Major General THAI. Another notebook, with an entry dated 31 May - 7 June 1967, indicates that POW's would be evacuated to SON BAC, probably referring to HQ MR 5. MACV J-2 COMMENT: It is probable that MR 5 and the B-3 Front are coordinating activities, within a broad time frame, throughout their areas of responsibility. The B-3 Front's mission to prevent reinforcement in the coastal delta is a reliable indication that HANOI's primary concern in MR 5 is control of the rice-rich, populous, coastal areas. SOURCE: J2 MACV INTSUM 178-67.

(C) VC/NVA SUPPLY SYSTEM

The VC/NVA supply system can best be described as an area supply system. Logistical units (rear service groups) are responsible for supplying combat units in a particular area and are similar to what might be termed an area support command. These groups work very closely with forward supply councils located at the province, district, and village levels of the Viet Cong infrastructure. Generally the rear service groups control storage and transportation of supplies, while the forward supply councils are responsible for procurement. There are, however, variations in this VC/NVA supply system that are caused primarily by factors of geography and agriculture which are unique to a particular area.

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289 In I Corps rear service sections of the two major headquarters, Military Region 5 and the Northern Front, procure supplies from base areas in Laos, sources north of the DMZ, and from the coastal provinces (USARV Weekly Intelligence Review, 21 April 1967). Food and manpower support are obtained from the various forward supply councils. Conscripted labor or organic division transportation units move the supplies over trails or along streams to the receiving unit's base area where they are cached or distributed to subordinate elements in accordance with approved request slips. In areas near South Vietnamese or FWMAF tactical areas of responsibility, some supplies may be stored with friendly locals to prevent capture, rather than cached by the using unit.

In the Western Highlands of II Corps, the B-3 Front has established a complex logistical support system in which NVA combat units are required to transport a portion of their supplies from Cambodia, which provides a secure storage area. In the coastal area of II Corps, NVA combat units obtain foodstuffs and medical supplies locally by purchase or taxation. Elements of the NT 5 Division which operate in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces produce their own rice. Movement of supplies is usually accomplished by locally recruited personnel, who travel lines of communication established between base areas to provide for the interchange of provisions.

In III Corps the system of area supply is probably best demonstrated. The COSVN rear services groups (81 through 87) supply Main Force units in their respective areas of responsibility. The group in whose area the tactical unit's rear base is located is responsible for the day-to-day support of that unit as well as the stockpiling of supplies in selected areas to support campaigns. For example, Rear Service Group 82 is responsible for regular support of the NVA CT 7 Division, whose rear base area is in TAY NINH Province. However, if the CT 7 Division were assigned a tactical mission in neighboring BINH DUONG Province, it would be supplied by Rear Service Group 83. Combat units also maintain an internal structure for logistical support. At division level there is a rear service staff (usually designated B3) whose make-up varies, but usually has medical, finance, quartermaster, and ordnance sections. A rear service staff is also found at regimental and battalion level. A medical, armorer and a food service NCO are available at company level. Normally ammunition is not stockpiled by units, but is positioned by the rear service groups responsible for the area in which an operation is to take place. Before the operation is launched, supervision of these stockpiles is turned over to the tactical unit staff. In addition to their combat support mission, rear service units have the production mission of growing vegetables, raising small animals and preparing medicines to make them as self-supporting as possible.

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In IV Corps, least representative of the area supply system, depots and base supply areas have been established to provide weapons and ammunition. The supplies are usually transported by boat from the military region depot to the regimental and battalion supply points. Rice and other foodstuffs are plentiful in IV Corps and most are purchased from the economy or grown locally by the unit. 190

It is evident that each CTZ encompasses geographical features and natural resources which affect the NVA/VC resupply activities. The area supply system has been particularly well adapted to the enemy organization and topography in III Corps. In other areas this basic system is modified to take advantage of border sanctuaries, the demarcation line, the sea coast, and highly productive rice areas. SOURCE: PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 21-67

(C-NOFORN) VC ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHIEU HOI RETURNEES

A captured document prepared by the VC BINH DUONG Province cadre in charge of civilian proselyting expressed concern over the number of Viet Cong who rallied to the GVN following Operation CEDAR FALLS in January 1967. The official figure for Chieu Hoi returnees during the operation is 530. A large number of these were VC cadre who took the opportunity to surrender to the GVN because of personal dissatisfaction with the Viet Cong. The captured document enjoins subordinate cadre to form a counter-rally effort at province level to effect the return of the ralliers to VC control.

The Chieu Hoi returnees are classified into three categories: ralliers who surrendered to the GVN, not because of hatred toward the VC, but because of moral confusion; ralliers who refused to cooperate with the GVN while attending Chieu Hoi studies and training; and ralliers who cooperated with the GVN. Those in the first two categories are not to be considered enemies because it is felt they rallied because of moral weakness and fear of death. They are to be encouraged to return to their villages to be re-educated. Those in the third category, however, are to be exterminated. Attempts are made to coerce their families to plead for their return to villages in VC-controlled areas where they can be subsequently liquidated.

The VC attitude towards Chieu Hoi returnees is one of willingness to rehabilitate those who were merely weak in a time of danger. It seeks to exact harsh retribution, however, from those who turned against the Viet Cong cause. SOURCE: CAS Report FVS-15,157

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(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

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ACCREDITED ENEMY STRENGTH: 53,575 NVA COMBAT STRENGTH
63,872 VC COMBAT STRENGTH
24,813 ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
112,760 IRREGULARS
39,175 POLITICAL
TOTAL: 294,195

MAJOR UNIT LISTINGS: 9 DIVISIONS: 6 NVA CONFIRMED
1 NVA POSSIBLE
2 VC CONFIRMED

25 (6) NVA REGIMENTS
12 (6) VC REGIMENTS

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional-size units in RVN.

(C) VC/NVA CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 660 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 18 - 24 Jun 67. This compares with 752 incidents for the previous week and represents a decrease of 92. (See Annex A)

ENEMY CASUALTIES:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>Pw's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 18 - 24 JUN 67	1,905	160	528	*	*
PERIOD OF 11 - 17 JUN 67	**1,801	51	474	**416	**44
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**41,756	2,835	14,676	**13,391	**932
SINCE JUN 65	**124,906	***	42,643	**37,644	**2,756

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FRIENDLY CASUALTIES:

	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>	292
PERIOD OF 18 - 24 JUN 67	134 (120)	355 (611)	39/0 (25/0)	105	0	
PERIOD OF 11 - 17 JUN 67	**235 **(152)	**609 **(958)	**14/0 **(31/0)	115	3	
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**6,450 **(4,048)	**19,955 **(26,800)	**1152/82 **(235/2)	3,851	83	

Allied to VC/NVA KHA Ratio 7.50:1 (Allied favor) period of 18 - 24 Jun 67. Weapons lost Ratio 3.90:1 (Allied favor) period of 11 - 17 Jun 67.

The following are Chieu Hoi figures for the period 18 - 24 June 1967:

a.	<u>I CTZ</u> 67	<u>II CTZ</u> 96	<u>III CTZ</u> 179	<u>IV CTZ</u> 186
----	--------------------	---------------------	-----------------------	----------------------

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 348; Political 129; Other 51; Total 528.

c. This is an increase of 54 from the previous week.

* Enemy weapons figures for the period 18 - 24 Jun 67 were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

*** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 January 1967.

() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

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 - 2 - US Embassy, CSA, ATTN: CB
 - 40 - G2, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH
 - 1 - LNO, USARPAC
 - 1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
 - 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
 - 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
 - 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV) BIEN HCA
 - 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
 - 90 - SPO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
 - 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
 - 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
 - 1 - USARV Operations Center
 - 1 - Command Section
 - 1 - G1
 - 5 - G2
 - 1 - G3
 - 30 - G3, DST Division
 - 1 - Historical Section
 - 1 - G4
 - 1 - Aviation
 - 1 - Provost Marshal
 - 1 - Information Officer
 - 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
 - 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
 - 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
 - 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
 - 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
 - 5 - J2, USMACV
 - 1 - J2, USMACV ATTN: MATTLO
 - 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
 - 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
 - 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
 - 1 - CO, ACTIV, APO 96243
 - 6 - G2, Task Force OREGON, APO 96374

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 24 JUNE 1967. 294

	28 May-3 Jun	4-10 Jun	11-17 Jun	18-24 Jun	TOTAL
ATK	30	44	49	33	156
HARASS	330	361	385	308	1,384
TERRSM	33	40	37	35	145
SABOTAGE	10	23	13	12	58
PROP	17	8	11	4	40
AA	271	206	257	268	1,002
TOTAL	691	682	752	660	2,785

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 18 - 24 JUNE 1967.

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	16	7	-4	6	33
HARASS	154	18	64	72	308
TERRSM	15	6	9	5	35
SABOTAGE	5	2	0	5	12
PROP	0	4	0	0	4
AA	172	29	31	36	268
TOTAL	362	66	108	124	660

ANNEX A

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USARV

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WEEKLY

INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW



26-67
8 July 1967

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APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



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 NVN Cadre Attempt to Tighten Control over VC Ranks 4
 VC Methods of Disseminating Intelligence 5
 VC Guerrilla and Militia Recruiting Drive. 6
 Order of Battle. 7
 Casualties and Weapons Losses. 7

The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV, and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AVHGB-O, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96307.

(C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

Enemy units in northern I Corps Tactical Zone continued attacks on friendly units and installations south of the DMZ and increased activity in the KHE SANH area (XS 85 48). On 27 and 28 June, probable elements of the 95C Regiment, NVA 325th Division, initiated coordinated attacks by fire with 82mm mortars and 102mm rockets against US Marine elements operating in the KHE SANH area and against KHE SANH and LANG VEI Camps (XD 84 41). On the morning of 2 July elements of the 1st Battalion, 9th US Marines, contacted at least two enemy battalions 15 kilometers east-northeast of CON THIEN at YD 130 708. The enemy broke contact that evening after engaging

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In heavy fighting which resulted in 58 US and 83 enemy killed. During the morning of 3 July, the enemy used 130mm field guns for the first time in an attack by fire on the military complex at DONG HA (YD 212 600). Enemy units in the Northern Front area in central I CTZ continued to evade friendly forces. Probable course of action for Northern Front forces is to avoid major contact, but possibly to attack district headquarters in up to battalion strength while harassing and attacking ARVN outposts by fire. Reports from three detainees indicate that enemy troops are being infiltrated into QUANG NAM Province from Laos via the ASHAU Valley. Agent reports referring to new or unidentified enemy units in the QUANG NAM area have also increased during the month of June. Although the exact size of the buildup cannot be determined, it is probable that the enemy is increasing his Main Forces in QUANG NAM Province, which is the only province in I Corps where a Main Force regiment has not operated extensively in the past. The NVA 3d and 21st Regiments, NT 2 Division, continued to evade friendly units in south-central I CTZ. Lack of contact in southern I CTZ indicated that the VC 1st Regiment, NT 2 Division, and the VC 2d and NVA 22d Regiments, NT 3 Division, continued to evade friendly forces on Operation MALHEUR II. Enemy units in the area probably will continue attempts to evade friendly forces on search and clear operations.

II CTZ:

In II Corps Tactical Zone, enemy forces continued offensive activity in KONTUM, PLEIKU and PHU YEN Provinces. Documents dated May 1967 and a detainee captured near DAK TO (YB 99 17) indicate that the NVA 24th Regiment is operating independently under control of the B-3 Front. The detainee stated further that the 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment, had been separated from the regiment for several months and had been directed to attack New Life Hamlets in the DAK TO area. He indicated also that the battalion was regrouping and transporting its wounded to a base camp near the tri-border area. Harassment of friendly installations indicates that elements of the B-3 Front continue to prepare the battlefield in western PLEIKU Province. The enemy is capable of attacking with one division plus one regiment in western PLEIKU Province and probably is preparing to attack DUC CO Special Forces Camp or LE THANH Fire Support base (YA 89 29) with elements of two regiments, in conjunction with a possible diversionary attack against PLEI ME Special Forces Camp (ZA 16 05). Headquarters, NVA 22d Regiment, and Headquarters, NT 3 Division, continued attempts to evade in the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI border area. A contact on 28 June 15 kilometers northwest of PHU MY (DR 98 84) indicates that the NVA 18th Regiment is in the PHU MY Valley. A soldier from the 8th Battalion, 18th Regiment, stated that the regiment's support units were reduced from company to platoon size and that his battalion had not received any replacements since they infiltrated into SVN in April 1966, giving further indication that the 18th Regiment is understrength. Elements of the NT 3 Division probably will continue attempts to avoid friendly forces while continuing small-unit attacks and ambushes and interruptions of the Revolutionary Development Program.

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III CTZ:

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In III Corps Tactical Zone, an increased threat may have developed in PHUOC TUY Province. A returnee said the 1st Battalion, VC 275th Regiment, CT 5 Division; had deployed to PHUOC TUY Province to join the 274th Regiment, CT 5 Division, for attacks against Australian forces. The statement substantiates agent reports that Australian units were to be targets of attacks by elements of the CT 5 Division. Other statements from returnees and detainees and agent reports indicate the CT 5 Division is preparing for offensive actions in a wide area extending from southern LONG KHANH Province to southern PHUOC TUY Province. These indications support previous statements of the formation of a third regiment in the CT 5 Division. Operations in such a large area probably would require significant reinforcements. A returnee's statements indicate the 275th Regiment, CT 5 Division, minus its 1st Battalion, is in War Zone D in western LONG KHANH Province. He indicated the 1st and 2d Battalions had preceded the 3d Battalion into the zone and that the 1st Battalion had since left to join the 274th Regiment. In northwest III CTZ, there were no detected changes in dispositions of the 141st Regiment, NVA CT 7 Division, or NVA 101st Regiment. The 52d and 165th Regiments, NVA CT 7 Division, remain unlocated. In southwestern III CTZ two returnees from the VC 261st Battalion, DONG THAP 1 Regiment, rallied at TAN AN (XS 55 65). The presence of elements of the 261st Battalion in LONG AN Province is the second recent instance of enemy units moving from IV CTZ into III CTZ. The moves probably were in response to friendly operations in the units former areas.

IV CTZ:

Enemy forces in IV Corps Tactical Zone continued to conduct small-scale attacks, harassment, sabotage and acts of terrorism to counter expansion of GVN control. In PHONG DINH Province on 27 June, an unknown enemy force, possibly elements of the TAY DO Local Force Battalion and district forces, attacked the Popular Force outpost at TRA KECH (WR 68 98). A document captured during Operation DAN CHI 289A indicated the TAY DO Battalion commander intended to increase the number and intensity of attacks on GVN installations during June and July. Although the battalion is believed to have sustained at least 150 KIA during Operation DAN CHI 289A, it continues to be one of the most active Local Force battalions in IV CTZ. Throughout the corps area the enemy probably will continue terrorism, harassment, interdiction of LOC, sabotage and attacks against PBR's, airfields, district forces, and lightly defended areas with up to battalion-size forces.

(C) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ENEMY AND US PROTEST MOVEMENTS

Two captured documents have indicated a working relationship between the enemy and unidentified protest groups in the United States. Enemy soldiers have been instructed to gather souvenirs and personal effects found on US dead, wounded or captured. These personal effects are then

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to be forwarded to American protest groups to be used as propaganda to oppose the war and possibly to harass and intimidate the families of servicemen. Personal items of US servicemen which have been found on captured or dead enemy soldiers indicate the program is probably in effect.

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An enemy directive dated 25 January 1967, which was turned in by a rallier in KIEN TUONG Province on 6 March 1967, reminds unit and village party chapters as well as political and troop proselyting sections to collect US soldiers' personal effects and forward them directly to the COSVN Troop Proselyting Section. The directive indicates these articles will be forwarded to American people in the US who are participating in the antiwar movement. The personal articles are also supposed to be used by the enemy to make a study of US troops and to conduct international propaganda activities. Items of interest include ID cards, pictures, personal papers, notebooks, diaries, letters, etc.

Another document, dated 21 April 1967, was taken from Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Hang PHUOC, a member of the Military Proselyting Section, NVA 18th Regiment, who was captured by elements of the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, on 1 June 1967. This directive also calls for the collection of personal effects of US soldiers and indicates that special command emphasis would have to be made by all unit commanders to achieve good results from the program. It specifically mentions that such articles are requested by American organizations which protest against the US government's "aggressive" policy in Vietnam. Although distribution of the document was not indicated, it is believed that specific knowledge concerning the intended purpose of the program would be known by political officers as low as battalion level.

The success of this enemy program cannot be evaluated at this time, but it possibly could be quite successful due to the comparative ease with which personal effects can be removed from the battlefield. SOURCE: CDEC LOG #04-1039-67; 1st Air Cavalry Division Confidential Message AVDAGI FO6-25357.

(C-NOFORN) NVN CADRE ATTEMPT TO TIGHTEN CONTROL OVER VC RANKS

On 20 May 1967 LE HUY, the representative of the Party Affairs Section, People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), and North Vietnamese "coordinator-advisor" to the Viet Cong BINH THUAN Province Committee, presided over a meeting of VC cadre from several districts of BINH THUAN Province. Also present at the meeting were chairmen of Village Liberation Fronts and People's Autonomous Committees, as well as chiefs of PRP chapter committees. The meeting was called to discuss the establishment of a Confederation of South Vietnamese Liberation Labor Unions (SVNLLU). The SVNLLU is to

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be established to develop organization among the masses and to prevent further disruption of VC ranks due to the GVN Chieu Hoi Program. LE HUY appealed to all the cadre of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) to enlist in the PRP and thus combine the "strength and minds" of all the leadership in a unique block under the command of the North Vietnamese-controlled party. He said that the internal controls in the Viet Cong ranks were not strong enough and that the "cruel and cunning" GVN Chieu Hoi Program had disrupted VC activities. To counteract VC internal weaknesses, LE HUY called for a strengthening of the political structure of the liberation movement.

In October 1966 LE HUY revealed that increasing numbers of NVN political cadre were being sent to South Vietnam to replace ethnic South Vietnamese Viet Cong cadre to ensure NVN guidelines are followed in the conduct of the war. The urging of greater participation in the PRP and establishment of labor unions indicate that the NVN cadre intend to assume and hold the leadership in the Viet Cong ranks for the duration of the war. SOURCE: Controlled American Source Report FVS-15,236.

(C) VC METHODS OF DISSEMINATING INTELLIGENCE

The Viet Cong are able to draw upon a variety of intelligence dissemination techniques to ensure that information is delivered quickly and safely to those who need it. They use all the standard operational techniques, including radio, courier, and letter drops. Communications equipment available to the VC includes various types of CHICOM radio and telephone equipment and captured US radios. They are required and able to disseminate encrypted messages concerning Allied positions no later than 12 to 24 hours after collection. If radios are not available, an on-call courier, accompanied by a guard detail, can be used to forward the message.

For delivery of special material there is a COSVN FLASH communications line from COSVN headquarters to MR 1 and MR 4. This ensures the rapid delivery of MAT (SECRET) reports and documents not exceeding seven kilograms in weight. The couriers used by the VC are known as commo-liaison agents and the routes they take as commo-liaison routes. They carry important or classified correspondence between points and escort prisoners of war or party cadre and infiltrators from place to place. Couriers, assuming innocent, routine and frequently legitimate covers, such as peddlers or bus drivers, meet their contacts in congested areas to avoid detection. The commo-liaison agent is informed only of his next contact, thus assuring the security of the system if an agent is captured. In the past, most couriers were restricted to foot travel because of limited financial resources.

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Now, however, bicycles and motorbikes are commonly used. In addition to courier operations, live and dead letter drops are used. Secret writing, using various chemicals for the writing fluid and developer, also is often used.

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There is a complete Viet Cong postal system in South Vietnam which is controlled by the Communications Office, COSVN. The Viet Cong also have been known to use GVN postal facilities, telephone service and newspaper advertisements to disseminate coded messages. The enemy is clever and capable of devising ingenious techniques to avoid detection. His communications methods range from the relatively sophisticated to quite primitive and often have proven to be extremely effective. SOURCE: MACV PERINTREP, April 1967.

(C) VC GUERRILLA AND MILITIA RECRUITING DRIVE

A Viet Cong TOP SECRET document captured in CHAU DOC Sector outlines recruiting goals for guerrilla and militia units. It states that guerrillas have assisted VC Main and Local Force units in the conduct of successful operations, but admits that the guerrilla movement has not been consistently effective throughout South Vietnam. Recruitment is as low as two percent of the total population in disputed and "liberated" areas of Military Regions 2 and 3, and is up to only nine percent in many parts of MR 5. There is even a wide variance in the effective employment of guerrilla units. Only 14 percent of the guerrillas in PHUOC LONG Province, MR 10, remain inactive, but 70 percent of those in BINH THUAN Province of MR 6 are unable to operate. The document candidly lists the major factors hindering the development of the movement as the failure on the part of VC cadre at various levels to master the "principles of a people's war and the military policy of the party" and the failure to motivate the populace into stepping up the guerrilla movement. The document stresses the importance of these political factors in the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

The document directs that both the size of the forces and quality of the personnel be improved. A two-thirds increase in present guerrilla strength is directed and two-thirds to 100 percent strength increase in militia units is called for. To achieve the above results, people between 16 and 50 years of age (up to 45 years for women) are to be recruited into guerrilla or militia units. In "liberated" areas nine or ten percent of the total population are to be recruited, while four to four and one-half percent are to be recruited in disputed areas. In towns and cities emphasis is to be placed on strengthening secret guerrilla and secret self-defense units.

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The present missions of the guerrillas are to protect "liberated" areas, wear down Allied war potential, and attack Allied forces and lines of communication. As an individual goal, each guerrilla is instructed to kill, wound or capture two FVMAF Allied personnel a year. SOURCE: MACJ261 Confidential Message 18778 dated 9 June 1967.

(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

ACCREDITED ENEMY STRENGTH:	<u>54,075</u>	NVA COMBAT STRENGTH
	<u>65,122</u>	VC COMBAT STRENGTH
	<u>24,813</u>	ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
	<u>112,760</u>	IRREGULARS
	<u>39,175</u>	POLITICAL
TOTAL:	295,945	

MAJOR UNIT LISTINGS: 9 DIVISIONS: 6 NVA CONFIRMED
1 NVA POSSIBLE
2 VC CONFIRMED

25 (6) NVA REGIMENTS
12 (6) VC REGIMENTS

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional-size units in RVN.

(C) CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 349 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 25 Jun - 1 Jul 67. This compares with 492 incidents for the previous week and represents a decrease of 143. (See Annex A)

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ENEMY CASUALTIES:

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	<u>KIA</u>	<u>FW's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 25 JUN-1 JUL 67	1,331	65	*	*	*
PERIOD OF 18 - 24 JUN 67	**1,992	160	528	369	50
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**43,174	2,900	14,676	**13,760	**1,032
SINCE JUN 65	**126,324	***	42,643	**38,013	**2,806

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES:

	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 25 JUN-1 JUL 67	161 (92)	521 (198)	28/0 (1/0)	108	0
PERIOD OF 18 - 24 JUN 67	**134 **(226)	**355 **(1,167)	**39/0 **(25/0)	117	0
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**6,611 **(4,147)	**20,476 **(27,024)	**1180/82 **(236/2)	3,961	83

Allied ~ VC/NVA KHA Ratio 5.30:1 (Allied favor) period of 25 Jun - 1 Jul 67.
Weapons lost Ratio 3.58:1 (Allied favor) period of 18 - 24 Jun 67.

* Enemy weapons and Chieu Hoi figures for the period 25 Jun - 1 Jul 67 were not available at the time of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

*** FW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN FW camps. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 January 1967.

() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

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Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

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- 2 - S2; 509th RR Group, SAIGON
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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 1 JULY 1967.

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	4-10 Jun	11-17 Jun	18-24 Jun	25 Jun-1 Jul	TOTAL
ATK	44	49	33	33	159
HARASS	361	385	308	240	1,294
TERRSM	40	37	35	37	149
SABOTAGE	23	13	12	23	71
PROP	8	11	4	16	39
TOTAL	476	495	392	349	1,712

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 25 JUN - 1 JUL 67.

	I	II	III	IV	TOTAL
ATK	13	5	3	12	33
HARASS	93	39	23	85	240
TERRSM	6	12	8	11	37
SABOTAGE	1	10	0	12	23
PROP	3	12	1	0	16
TOTAL	116	78	35	120	349

Note: Antiaircraft incidents have been eliminated from the reported list of enemy-initiated incidents in this publication. It has been determined that antiaircraft incidents are a result of the number of friendly aircraft seeking out the enemy rather than enemy-initiated activities.

Annex A

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(C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

Losses in the LNZ area probably have forced the enemy to regroup, resupply, and replace personnel prior to further large-scale offensive action. However, eleven battalions of five enemy regiments remain in the COB THIEK (YD 11 72) area and continue to pose a threat to friendly forces. There have been no indications of changes in the disposition of enemy forces in the K. E SAK (XD 85 36) area. A detainee has confirmed the presence of the 8th Battalion, NVA 29th Regiment, NVA 325th Division,

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operating northeast of KHE SANH. The division's NVA 95C Regiment remains northwest of KHE SANH. On 8 July an ARVN battalion operating 15 kilometers east of DONG HA (YD 25 60) contacted an enemy battalion, probably one of the subordinate units of the NVA 5th Regiment. The ARVN battalion killed 146 and detained 17 enemy in an exceptionally successful action. Elsewhere in the Northern Front area enemy units remained inactive. Interrogation of a detainee indicated that in January 1967 the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, NVA 304th Division, and at least one regimental support company provided replacements to the Northern Front's NVA 6th Regiment. In May 1967 the 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, was confirmed as a subordinate unit of the NVA 5th Regiment, also a subordinate of the Northern Front. In central I CTZ the enemy possibly is moving new Main Force units into QUANG NAM Province. One NVA detainee and one agent report provide possible identification of a 30th Battalion, 301st Regiment, 305th Division. The detainee also stated that the 305th Division CP was located in LAOS, west of the ASHAU Valley. The NT 2 Division and elements of the NT 3 Division continue to evade in central and southern I CTZ.

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II CTZ:

In II Corps the threat in KONTUM Province and enemy offensive action in the coastal areas continue. Detainees' statements indicate that the B-3 Front has established a forward CP with support units in the Tri-Border area to control offensive action in KONTUM Province. A detainee from the 6th Battalion, NVA 24th Regiment, stated that his battalion plus an artillery battalion with a 122mm rocket capability, a transportation battalion, and two security companies were located near the B-3 Front forward CP. It was reported that elements of the B-3 Front had withdrawn from the DAK TO (ZB 10 23) area, probably to central KONTUM Province and the Tri-Border area. The NT 1 Division and NVA 95B Regiment of the B-3 Front were deployed along the PLEIKU/CAMBODIA border from the PLEI TRAP Valley in the north to CHU PONG Mountain (AQ 89 76) in the south. Enemy reconnaissance continued in the DUC CO (YA 84 26), LE THANH (YA 89 29), and PLEI ME (ZA 16 05) areas. The NT 3 Division continued to evade major friendly forces in the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI Province border area, but launched several attacks against friendly support bases and lightly fortified positions. The NVA 18th Regiment continued to evade in the PHU MY Valley. Elements of the NT 5 Division continued offensive action in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. In KONTUM Province the enemy is capable of attacking with one regiment plus one Local Force battalion; however, current deployment and present activities indicate that the enemy probably will conduct harassments and attacks in up to company strength. The enemy threat in western PLEIKU Province

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consists of one division plus one regiment. He is probably preparing to attack DUC CO or LE THAIH fire support base with elements of two regiments in conjunction with a diversionary attack against PLEI ME. The current deployment and present activities of the NT 3 Division indicate that it probably will continue to evade large-unit contacts while conducting harassment attacks in up to company strength. In PHU YEN Province, the disposition of the NVA 95th Regiment and 30th Main Force Battalion indicate that battalion-size attacks and ambushes are probable. The NVA 18B Regiment probably will continue attempts to disrupt Revolutionary Development activities in KHANH HOA Province.

III CTZ:

In III Corps enemy elements have been directed to conduct offensive operations in compliance with a COSVN order for a country-wide offensive campaign. In northwestern III Corps, there are no confirmed changes in the disposition of HQ, NVA CT 7 Division, the NVA 141st Regiment, or the NVA 101st Regiment. The NVA 52d and 165th Regiments remain unlocated, the latter probably in PHUOC LONG Province. In central III Corps, HQ, CT 9 Division, and HQ, VC 271st Regiment, remain in southwestern PHUOC LONG Province. The VC 272d Regiment is in Base Area 352 (XT 60 94) and HQ, VC 273d Regiment, is in Base Area 360 (YT 16 25). In southeastern III Corps, HQ, CT 5 Division, and HQ, VC 274th Regiment, remain in southwestern PHUOC TUY Province. Returnees' statements indicate that the 2d and 3d Battalions, VC 275th Regiment, were last located in War Zone D. The 1st Battalion, 275th Regiment, possibly has joined the VC 274th Regiment in PHUOC TUY Province, as reported earlier. A notebook captured on 29 June in LONG AN Province indicates that COSVN has ordered an offensive campaign throughout South Vietnam. July objectives appear to have been assigned to the companies of the VC 5th Local Force Battalion. The objectives are GVN administrative agencies, small outposts, GVN personnel, and pacification projects in eastern LONG AN Province. Other reports indicate that the VC 267th Main Force Battalion is located in Base Area 368 (XT 45 15). The current location of this unit increases the threat to friendly installations and movements along Highway 1 in the TAY NINH/HAU NGHIA Province border area. In northwestern III Corps elements of the NVA CT 7 Division and NVA 101st Regiment probably will conduct attacks by fire against friendly installations, particularly PREK KLOK Special Forces Camp (XT 27 78). In central III Corps there are no indications of impending offensive operations by elements of the CT 9 Division. In southeastern III Corps elements of the CT 5 Division probably will evade friendly forces, but countersweep operations are possible, to include ambush of isolated friendly units conducting sweeps and diversionary attacks.

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IV CTZ:

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In IV CTZ, enemy small-unit attacks and harassment continue. Enemy units attacked and overran lightly defended outposts in KIEN HOA, VINH BINH, CHUONG THIEN, and BAC LIEU Provinces. An agent report states that elements of the VC 261st Main Force Battalion are preparing for an attack on CAI LAI (XS 25 50), DINH TUONG Province, within the next few weeks. Also participating in the attack will be the 514th Local Force Battalion. Elements of both battalions are located in a base area within 15 kilometers of CAI LAI. Throughout IV Corps small-unit attacks and harassment will continue.

(C-1:OFORN) VC PROPAGANDA AIMED AT US SOLDIERS

The purpose of enemy propaganda directed against US soldiers is to lower their morale and to lessen their desire to fight. The most common method of dissemination of this propaganda is the leaflet; Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio also direct propaganda broadcasts at the US soldier. The VC have often chosen particular target groups within the US Forces, for example, the Negro servicemen or the men of a particular division. Most of the propaganda is, however, directed at the US soldier in general.

The themes most commonly used in relation to the US soldier are anti-US policy and the inevitability of a VC victory. The enemy has also attempted to create the impression that the US soldier is being used as a tool for the "aggressive goals" of the "Johnson - McNamara regime." The enemy further claims that the Vietnamese people are determined to drive the Americans out and to "liberate" their country. A parallel is often drawn between the American Revolution, which is lauded as a just war of which the world approved, and the present struggle in Vietnam. The enemy states that today the US is violating the principles of that revolution by suppressing the efforts of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. The VC monitor political developments in the US, using any antiwar sentiment in an attempt to show the American soldier that the American people at home do not support the war. One leaflet which has appeared quite frequently has on one side a picture of an antiwar demonstration, ostensibly somewhere in the US, and a picture of an American helmet on a cross marking a grave. On the reverse side are two anti-Vietnam policy statements by United States Senators Morse of Oregon and Gruening of Alaska, alleging the futility of US soldiers giving their lives in South Vietnam. Another leaflet has photographs of Americans who have supposedly demonstrated antiwar sentiment. Included are David Miller, who burned his draft card in New York, and Norman Morrison of Baltimore, who set himself on fire in front of the Pentagon to

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protest the Vietnam war. These men are portrayed by the VC as men of courage who stood up and took action against the "unjust" US policy in Vietnam.

The following three slogans appear most frequently in large type at the bottom of the various leaflets directed at the US soldier: "Oppose the US aggressive war in South Vietnam," "Peace for Vietnam," and "Repatriate the US Expeditionary Corps." Other slogans found on enemy leaflets include the demand that the US withdraw all troops and arms from South Vietnam and let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs and that American troops refuse to obey all orders to carry out mopping-up operations to kill the Vietnamese people or to attack their armed forces. Another theme suggests to US Forces that they sympathize with and support the "just" struggle of the Vietnamese people.

Propaganda aimed at the Negro soldier portrays the US "aggressors" as the common enemy of both the Negro and the Vietnamese. These leaflets stress racial injustices in the US in an effort to get the Negro soldier to sympathize with the VC cause and to question his support of the American effort.

Some of the leaflets also serve as safe-conduct passes. At the bottom of these leaflets, written in both Vietnamese and English, is the following quotation: "NOTE: When you leave your rank or surrender anywhere, present this bill to the people or combatant of the Liberation Front, you will be welcome and good treated."

The apparent objective of this type of propaganda, in both leaflets and radio broadcasts, is to drive a wedge between the US serviceman and his leader, to urge him to refuse to obey orders sent down from the "aggressive Johnson-McNamara regime," and to demand repatriation. A secondary aim could be to discredit the SAIGON government in the eyes of the Americans. There is, however, no concerted effort to discredit the fighting ability of the US soldier.

VC propaganda against US soldiers, though apparently ineffective, has greatly improved in its methods, content, and presentation. While occasionally there still appears a poorly done leaflet, the trend is for the enemy to utilize standard leaflets of high-quality printing, incorporating correct grammar and spelling, and often including a reproduced picture with propaganda value. The VC approach is becoming quite sophisticated, often presenting the same rational arguments put forth by antiwar spokesmen at home. It is pointed out in the propaganda that some Americans have taken action against the war and therefore the American serviceman should do the same. SOURCE: CIGV STUDY ST 67-056.

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(C) ENEMY USE OF CIVILIANS TO COLLECT INFORMATION

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On 8 May 1967 an alert soldier discovered nine unclassified photographs of signal vans under the shirt of a Vietnamese civilian worker at the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) base camp. The laborer found the photographs in the trash and claimed he only wanted them for souvenirs. Reportedly, there have been instances of unclassified material being found on civilian employees. Questioning of the employees revealed that while they had not been specifically recruited to collect this type of information, they apparently were aware of VC interest in information on US forces and installations. The active collection of this type of material indicates a market exists for low-level information, which probably is evaluated at a central collection point. The VC are thus provided with an effortless intelligence system using little time and few personnel to sift through the material on the chance some items of value will be found. The system also provides a simple method of assessing workers for formal recruitment as agents, depending on the type of material they present for examination. SOURCE: USMACV Perintrep for May 1967.

(C) CAMPAIGN PLANNING IN MR 5

Interrogation of Lieutenant Colonel Huynh CU, Chief of Military Training Staff Office, Military Staff Department, Military Region 5, revealed the following information concerning campaign planning:

While campaigns were not originally given formal designations, the use of seasons (Winter-Spring Campaign, Summer Campaign) and place names where victories occurred (BA GIA Campaign) has become popular. Campaigns are not given seasonal names, however, to indicate they started on the first day of that season. Preparation for a campaign usually takes one to three months because of the amount of planning at military region (MR) level that is required to provide complete staff work and guidance. Political guidance, which determines all military activity, is disseminated as a directive from the party committee at each echelon. In all military regions, guidance necessary to plan a campaign is provided by the next higher military party committee to the military party committee of the military region concerned. MR 5 receives guidance from both HANOI and COSVN. LTC CU briefly saw a document in November 1966 which outlined the military goals assigned to MR 5. He remembered the following: Wipe out two US and three ARVN divisions (not specific units but their numerical equivalent) and retrieve two-thirds of all weapons of these units. The overall objective or target is always assigned at a higher level; however, the higher the echelon, the broader the requirement.

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The overall requirements formulated by the military region party committee are disseminated to subordinate unit party committees. To plan the actual operation, the Chief of Staff, after meeting with all department and staff office chiefs, designates a suspense date for all staff studies. The studies, which are approved by the Commander, contain the following elements: enemy situation (submitted by the Intelligence Staff Office), friendly situation (Intelligence Staff Office), missions of participating units (Operations Staff Office), objectives and time required to complete the mission (Operations Staff Office), concept of the campaign (Operations Staff Office), coordination orders and preservation orders. The orders are then disseminated to the subordinate commands to be executed.

In LTC CU's opinion, requirements were often beyond MR 5's capabilities, but they had to be levied on subordinate elements. Certain deviations are allowed, however, if they are approved by an MR 5 representative who acts as liaison with the divisions. Changes are allowed at division and regimental level only, never at battalion level or lower. If a commander fails to accomplish his mission, he is faced with two alternatives--submit a personal criticism or be relieved immediately from command. The former disciplinary action is usually carried out, but if relief from command is decided upon, both the political and military officers are affected. SOURCE: Combined Military Interrogation Report US 685-67.

(C) FROGMAN ACTIVITIES IN DA NANG HARBOR

Reports of VC frogmen proselyting, training and conducting surveillance in the DA NANG area indicate that the VC pose a threat to the harbor and that they recognize the potential destructive force of well-trained underwater demolition units.

In January 1967 the VC conducted a frogman training course in XUAN THIEN Hamlet (AT 94 83) for 30 trainees. Nineteen were graduated and divided into two teams, both of which were initially deployed to DA NANG Harbor to conduct reconnaissance. There have been subsequent reports of frogman reconnaissance and training near DA NANG and one of the teams underwent additional training at THANH HOA (WG 81 89), North Vietnam.

On 13 April 1967 an eight-foot reinforced concrete piling of the CAU DE River Bridge (AT 942 848) was demolished by 1,000 to 1,500 pounds of TNT. An operation of this magnitude required extensive planning and reconnaissance.

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An instance of two VC entering XUAN THIEN to recruit fishermen who could swim well and who were willing to engage in anti-American activities was reported in April 1967. During the same month, an enemy directive was captured which stated that laying watermines should have priority and new frogman training course should begin immediately. This course reportedly started on 1 May 1967 in THUA THIEN Province.

Another captured document indicates the DA NANG teams are studying a watermine called the V-R215. Despite their weight (2,000 Kg), these double-fused, command-detonated mines are commonly used by the VC and they offer greater target selectivity and adequate detonation time. SOURCE: PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 23-67.

(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

ACCREDITED ENEMY STRENGTH:	<u>54,075</u>	NVA COMBAT STRENGTH
	<u>65,122</u>	VC COMBAT STRENGTH
	<u>25,313</u>	ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
	<u>112,760</u>	IRREGULARS
	<u>39,175</u>	POLITICAL
TOTAL:	296,445	

MAJOR UNIT LISTINGS: 9 DIVISIONS: 6 NVA CONFIRMED
1 NVA POSSIBLE
2 VC CONFIRMED

25 (6) NVA REGIMENTS
12 (6) VC REGIMENTS

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional-size units in RVN.

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(C) CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 481 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 2 - 8 Jul 67. This compares with 349 incidents for the previous week and represents an increase of 132. (See Annex A)

ENEMY CASUALTIES:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 2-8 JUL 67	2,114	101	419	*	*
PERIOD OF 25 JUN-1 JUL 67**	1,597	65	500	**482	**46
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**45,554	3,001	15,597	**14,242	**1,078
SINCE JUN 65	**128,704	***	43,562	**38,495	**2,852

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES:

	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 2-8 JUL 67	167 (161)	408 (703)	29/0 (7/0)	135	1
PERIOD OF 25 JUN-1 JUL 67	**159 **(120)	**521 **(952)	**28/0 **(3/0)	**108	**0
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**6,776 **(4,444)	**20,884 **(29,046)	**1,209/82 **(245/2)	**4,106	**84

Allied to VC/NVA KHA Ratio 6.44:1 (Allied favor) period of 2-8 Jul 67.

Allied to VC/NVA Weapons Lost Ratio 4.88:1 (Allied favor) period of 25 Jun-1 Jul 67.

The following are Chieu Hoi figures for the period 2-8 July 67:

<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
66	63	150	140

The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 273, Political 121, Other 25, TOTAL: 419.

This is a decrease of 61 from the previous week.

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- * Enemy weapons figures for the period 2-8 Jul 67 were not available at the time of this report. 318
- ** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.
- *** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 January 1967.
- () Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall totals.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

DISTRIBUTION:

- 30 - DIA Dissemination Center (DIACO-3)
- 5 - CG, USAINTS, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
- 1 - CG, Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC 28307
- 1 - Combined Studies Division, MACV
- 3 - Director, Intelligence, 7th Air Force, TAN SON NHUT
- 5 - G2, USARPAC, San Francisco, Calif 96558
- 10 - G2, I Field Force Vietnam, NHA TRANG
- 2 - US Embassy, OSA, ATTN: CB
- 40 - G2, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH
- 1 - INO, USARPAC
- 1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
- 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
- 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV) BIEN HOA
- 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
- 90 - SPO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
- 1 - USARV Operations Center
- 1 - Command Section
- 1 - G1
- 5 - G2
- 1 - G3

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- 30 - G3, DST Division
- 1 - Historical Section
- 1 - G4
- 1 - Aviation
- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - Information
- 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
- 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
- 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
- 5 - J2, USMACV
- 1 - J2, USMACV ATTN: MATTLO
- 5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
- 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, Hq. USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
- 1 - CO, ACTIV, APO 96243
- 6 - G2, Task Force OREGON, APO 96374

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 8 July 1967. 320

	11 - 17 Jun	18 - 24 Jun	25 Jun - 1 Jul	2 - 8 Jul	TOTAL
ATK	49	33	33	44	159
HARASS	385	308	240	362	1,295
TERRSM	37	35	37	49	158
SABOTAGE	13	12	23	14	62
PROP	11	4	16	12	43
TOTAL	495	392	349	481	1,717

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 2 - 8 JULY 1967.

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	25	9	3	7	44
HARASS	143	42	100	77	362
TERRSM	5	14	13	17	49
SABOTAGE	2	0	7	5	14
PROP	1	11	0	0	12
TOTAL	176	76	123	106	481

Annex A

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375



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The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96375.

(C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

Enemy units in northern I CTZ have had time to resupply and receive replacements and probably are preparing for a resumption of offensive activity. Continued attacks by fire are likely. Agent reports and visual reconnaissance indicate the enemy possibly is preparing to resume activity in the KHE SANH area (XD 85 38). There has been no detected change in unit locations. In the Northern Front area of I CTZ, enemy forces remained inactive. Northern Front forces probably will continue

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reinforcement and can be expected to continue harassment in the QUANG TRI/HUE (YD 35 52/YD 78 25) area. The enemy probably has reinforced in central I CTZ. Marine reconnaissance elements met strong resistance from unidentified enemy forces in that area. Enemy forces involved in the 15 July attack on DA NANG Air Base (BT 03 78) have not been identified but probably were part of those forces reported infiltrating into the DA NANG area during May and June. The NT 2 Division and elements of the NT 3 Division continued to evade in central and southern I CTZ. At 150100H July, coastal surveillance forces intercepted and forced a steel-hull trawler aground as it attempted to land at CAPE BATANGEN (BS 79 85). Salvage operations resulted in the capture of 2,000 crew-served and automatic weapons and large quantities of ammunition and explosives. The NT 2 and elements of the NT 3 Division probably will continue to evade in their present locations.

II CTZ:

In II Corps Tactical Zone, the discovery of new trenches, bunkers and bivouac areas in western KONTUM Province supports previous indications that the enemy is preparing for offensive action. There is evidence that elements of the NVA 101C Regiment possibly are operating in western KONTUM Province subordinate to the B-3 Front. Infiltration data from a detainee captured 10 July indicate his unit probably is a remnant of the NVA 101C Regiment which reportedly dispersed in October 1966. Although he said his regiment had three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion, documents captured in February suggest it is battalion size. In KONTUM Province, the enemy is capable of attacking with four, possibly five, battalions; however, he probably will harass and attack in no more than company strength while preparing to attack DAK SEANG or DAK TO Special Forces Camps (YB 89 40/ZB 01 21) in up to battalion strength. Of the twelve B-3 Front battalions in the PLEIKU Province border area, nine are estimated to be near or at full strength and combat ready. Heavy contacts southwest of DUC CO (YA 84 26) indicate the enemy is establishing a reconnaissance screen probably to shield battlefield preparations from friendly patrols. Offensive operations in the DUC CO/LE THANH area (YA 84 26/YA 89 29) with three to five battalions are likely. Coordinated attacks in western PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces are possible. The NT 3 Division headquarters and NVA 22d Regiment continued to evade friendly forces in the BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI Province border area. The NVA 18th Regiment probably will continue to evade friendly forces on Operation PERSHING in the PHU MY Valley. Elements of the NT 5 Division in PHU YEN Province continued limited offensive activity, including ambushes, interdiction of roads and sabotage.

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III CTZ:

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In III Corps Tactical Zone, the NVA CT 7 Division probably has relocated to BINH LONG Province, possibly enroute to PHUOC LONG Province. A detainee, who said he was the executive officer of the 4th Battalion, 141st Regiment, NVA CT 7 Division, stated that the division was now known as the F5 Division. He claimed further that the 141st Regiment is now designated the 147th Regiment and that the 52d and 165th Regiments are called 145th and 149th Regiments respectively. He said his regiment was located west of HON QUAN (XT 89 85) in BINH LONG Province. The NVA 101st Regiment probably is in eastern TAY NINH Province and poses an increased threat to friendly forces in the DAU TIENG area of BINH DUONG (XT 44 53) Province. The 52d and 165th Regiments remain unlocated. The NVA CT 7 Division and 101st Regiment probably are preparing for attacks by fire on friendly installations. Likely objectives are DAU TIENG (XT 44 53) and TONG LE CHON (XT 27 98) Special Forces Camps. In central III CTZ the CT 9 Division possibly will conduct offensive operations designed to attract friendly forces to battle areas in War Zone D. There are no indications that the division plans extended operations outside the zone. Relocation of the 272d Regiment, CT 9 Division, from Base Area 352 (XT 60 94) to BINH LONG Province may indicate coordination with the NVA CT 7 Division, but there is no evidence of change of subordination. The 272d Regiment may continue moving to new locations in War Zone D. There are no indications of impending offensive action by this unit. In southeastern III CTZ elements of the CT 5 Division probably will continue to evade. Countersweep operations are possible, however.

IV CTZ:

Enemy forces in IV Corps Tactical Zone continued small-unit attacks, harassment and terrorism. On 10 July in DINH TUONG Province, an artillery mission resulted in 50 enemy KIA by body count. The enemy unit was suspected to be the VC 514th Local Force Battalion. The following day in CHAU DOC Province, 80 HOA HAO followers returned to government control. This was the largest return of HOA HAO followers in at least a year. Elements of the TAY DO Local Force Battalion attacked a Regional Force bivouac area in PHONG DINH Province on 12 July. A counterattack resulted in 47 enemy killed and 10 detained. Throughout IV CTZ small-unit attacks and harassment will probably continue.

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(C-NOFORN) VC PRODUCTION (PART I OF III PARTS)

In an effort to attain self-sufficiency, the VC produce their own supplies to reduce their reliance on sources outside South Vietnam and the local economy. The immediate objective of the VC production program is to assist in meeting materiel requirements of all military units and political agencies. The program is designed to make VC-controlled areas independent of GVN-controlled areas and to encourage civilians in VC areas to produce a surplus of goods to aid the insurgency.

The logistical system the VC have established to administer the production, purchase, issuance, and storage of food, clothing, medicines, and ammunitions is directed by three agencies: Finance and Economic Section, Rear Services Agency, and Forward Supply Council. The Finance and Economic Section is a political agency which serves both the military and political arms of the insurgency. The Rear Services Agency is the principal supply agency for military units, while the Forward Supply Council operates as a political agency and coordinates between military and political logistical efforts.

Production is the responsibility of both political agencies and military units. Generally, specific plans and goals are set by the Finance and Economic Section at region and province levels in accordance with broad directives issued by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Most combat units are expected to provide at least a portion of their materiel requirements each year through self-production. Support units and political agencies are expected to provide most of their own requirements plus a surplus which is to be used for supplying combat units. Production requirements are levied on units according to their mission. For example, an active combat unit would have fewer requirements than a political agency or a support unit. Because the surplus food is probably not sufficient to meet all military requirements, the political agencies are expected to guide the civilian production effort in VC-controlled areas. Civilians are repeatedly urged to grow a surplus of food and turn it over to the VC.

Although the self-sufficiency production program is concentrated on food and munitions, the VC manufacture a substantial amount of clothing and smaller amounts of other items. Clothing production workshops, operated under either a Finance and Economic Section or the Quartermaster Section of a Rear Services Agency, are often nothing more than a few sewing machines operated by a few tailors in huts or private homes. Although there have been no reports of large clothing factories, the combined output of many such small shops may represent a significant

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amount of clothing.

The Viet Cong rely heavily on captured US- and foreign-manufactured signal equipment, but a small percentage of captured VC signal equipment appears to have been constructed by hand in South Vietnam. These items are sometimes crude, but probably serve their intended purposes fairly well. Some captured radio sets were apparently assembled from components which were shipped into South Vietnam from abroad.

Other areas of production include junks and sampans, medicine, gas masks, and even paper. The medicines are manufactured from natural sources such as herbs and the sap and roots of trees. The insurgents have embarked upon an ambitious program of production in keeping with their stated goal of self-sufficiency. The major production efforts to provide food and munitions will be discussed in Parts II and III of this series of articles. SOURCE: CIGV Study ST 67-022.

(C) ENEMY USE OF CS GAS

Reports have been received from field sources indicating that the VC have been using chemical agents since at least April 1963. However, the first substantiated use of chemical agents was on 10 November 1966, against a patrol from 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. Since that time, reports of VC use of CS gas have been sporadic. Methods of dissemination vary with each report of its use. The VC have used the "stick" grenade with CS replacing the explosive filler. They have tied plastic bags filled with CS to hand grenades, and have taken plastic bags of CS and shaken them into the wind to be blown into Allied positions. One instance has been recorded where the VC employed a plastic bag of CS as a booby trap.

The many variations in use indicate no definite policy or established tactical doctrine on the use of chemical agents. A possible enemy source for the agent is captured US stores. The use of the agent, however disseminated, has always been on a small scale in small-unit actions. The lack of a dependable protective mask and large quantities of agent precludes use of CS on a large scale and it is considered an unpredictable facet of the overall Viet Cong strategy. SOURCE: USMACV Intelligence Bulletin 7-67.

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(C-NOFORN) THE ROLE OF THE NVA/VC MAIN FORCE UNIT POLITICAL OFFICER

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In the Communist system the military is controlled by the party in the person of the political officer who is responsible for political and ideological training of the unit to which he is assigned. The political officer of an NVA or VC Main Force unit is highly indoctrinated, politically conscious and usually well educated. An unmarried political background and membership in either the LAO DONG (NVN Communist Party) or People's Revolutionary Party (SVN Communist Party) are prerequisites for the position.

It is mandatory that the political officer be knowledgeable in military science, for only with a sound military background will he be able to fulfill his political training mission. For example, a captured document revealed that an outstanding political officer should be able to explain such things as these (1) Why the party must lead the armed forces. (2) What the party must do in order to accomplish its historical mission of leading the armed forces. (3) Why submission to the absolute, direct and all-embracing leadership of the party is the basic principle of the building of the armed forces. The political officer is secretary of the unit military party committee and chairman of the unit political section. All Main Force units from division to battalion level have a Military Party Committee, elected by the unit's party members, which controls political indoctrination within that unit. As secretary of the Military Party Committee, the political officer is responsible for implementing political indoctrination programs.

Indoctrination programs are organized and administered by the Propaganda Training and Indoctrination Subsection which is subordinate to the Political Section. The political officer has highly trained and specialized political cadre to assist him with his mission. Overall training guidelines require that the training program be consistent with the party line, realistic, and geared toward improving the soldiers' and cadre's morale. Training subjects are scheduled progressively, leading from facts that are familiar to new facts and from easily understood subjects to complex subjects.

The Communists consider political and ideological motivation to be the key to success in insurgency movements. The VC/NVA have developed a formal, disciplined political and ideological training apparatus, complex in structure, yet flexible in operation. The unit political officer is the key figure in the apparatus, providing political guidance to military commanders and administering political training. SOURCE: CICY Study ST 67-054.

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(C) VC REACTION TO GVN ID CARD PROJECT

A captured letter dated May 1967 indicates that the Government of Vietnam (GVN) identity registration project (USARV Weekly Intelligence Review, 10 March 1967) has apparently been successful in reducing the amount of movement that can be accomplished by persons without ID cards. The GVN program will ultimately register an estimated 9,000,000 persons over 15 years of age within a three-year time frame which started in January 1967. The registrants receive a card with an improved numbering system and other safeguards against counterfeiting and unauthorized duplication or alteration which the previous cards did not have.

The improved identification system apparently has left the VC confused as to what they can do to counter it. There have been reports of VC cadre preventing the populace from obtaining identification cards while other cadre destroyed the cards once they were issued. The captured letter, prepared by the Current Affairs Committee of F/3 (unidentified), lists these countermeasures: The people are to be allowed to keep ID cards so their "legal" status can be maintained; additional cards should be obtained whenever possible; and actions are to be planned to force the GVN to make "gratuitous" ID card-issues to the populace.

It appears that the Viet Cong feel they can most effectively disrupt GVN control of the populace by collecting as many of the new ID cards as they are able to obtain. For this reason, increased efforts can be expected by the VC to obtain GVN ID cards by both legal and illegal means. SOURCE: II FFORCEV PERINTREP Number 27.

(C) ORDER OF BATTLE

The data contained herein are based on preliminary reports and are subject to modification in light of later, more complete information and analysis.

ACCREDITED ENEMY STRENGTH:	<u>54,815</u>	<u>NVA COMBAT STRENGTH</u>
	<u>64,737</u>	<u>VC COMBAT STRENGTH</u>
	<u>25,313</u>	<u>ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES</u>
	<u>112,760</u>	<u>IRREGULARS</u>
	<u>39,175</u>	<u>POLITICAL</u>
TOTAL:	296,850	

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MAJOR UNIT LISTINGS: 9 DIVISIONS: 6 NVA CONFIRMED
1 NVA POSSIBLE
2 VC CONFIRMED

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25 (6) NVA REGIMENTS
12 (6) VC REGIMENTS

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional-size units in RVN.

(C) CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS LOSSES

There was a total of 510 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN for the period of 9-15 Jul 67. This compares with 481 incidents for the previous week and represents an increase of 29. (See Annex A)

ENEMY CASUALTIES:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 9 - 15 JUL 67	1,877	127	423	*	*
PERIOD OF 2 - 8 JUL 67	**2,150	101	419	**371	**26
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**47,467	3,138	16,018	**14,613	**1,104
SINCE 1 JUN 65	**130,617	***	43,985	**38,866	**2,878

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES:

	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 9 - 15 JUL 67	227 (100)	589 (541)	34/0 (9/0)	114	3
PERIOD OF 2 - 8 JUL 67	**167 **(244)	**408 **(1,195)	**29/0 **(7/0)	135	1
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**7,003 **(4,688)	**21,473 **(30,154)	**1,243/82 **(254/2)	4,220	87

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ALLIED TO VC/NVA KHA RATIO 5.44:1 (ALLIED FAVOR) PERIOD OF 9-15 JULY
67. ALLIED TO VC/NVA WEAPONS LOST RATIO 2.92:1 (ALLIED FAVOR) PERIOD OF 2-8
JULY 67.

The following are CHIEU HOI figures for the period 9-15 July 1967:

a. I CTZ II CTZ III CTZ IV CTZ
 24 42 114 243

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 313;
Political 97; Other 13; Total 423.

c. This is an increase of 4 from the previous week.

* Enemy weapons figures for the period 9-15 July 67 were not available at the time
of this report.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

*** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners
of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. Accurate statistics
are not available for the period preceding 1 Jan 67.

() Figures in parentheses are US figures and are not included in the overall total.

GP-3.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

Annex:

A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

DISTRIBUTION:

30 - DIA Dissemination Center (DIAGO-3)
5 - CG, USAINTS, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
1 - CG, Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC 28307
1 - Combined Studies Division, MACV

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- 3 - Director, Intelligence, 7th Air Force, TAN SON NHUT
- 5 - G2, USARPAC, APO 96558
- 10 - G2, I Field Force Vietnam, NHA TRANG
- 2 - US Embassy, OSA, ATTN: CB
- 40 - G2, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH
- 1 - LNO, USARPAC
- 1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
- 5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
- 30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV) BIEN HOA
- 22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
- 90 - SPO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
- 6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
- 1 - USARV Operations Center
- 1 - Command Section
- 1 - G1
- 5 - G2
- 1 - G3
- 30 - G3, DST Division
- 1 - Historical Section
- 1 - G4
- 1 - Aviation
- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - Information Officer
- 3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group
- 6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
- 2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
- 10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
- 1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
- 5 - J2, USMACV
- 1 - J2, USMACV, ATTN: MATTLO
- 5 - S2 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
- 1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
- 15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
- 1 - CO, AGTV, APO 96243
- 10 - G2, Task Force OREGON, APO 96374

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(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 15 JULY 1967

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	18 - 24 Jun	25 Jun-1 Jul	2 - 8 Jul	9 - 15 Jul	TOTAL
ATK	33	33	44	55	165
HARASS	308	240	362	376	1,286
TERRSM	35	37	49	46	167
SABOTAGE	12	23	14	21	70
PROP	4	16	12	12	44
TOTAL	392	349	481	510	1,732

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 9 - 15 JULY 1967.

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	17	6	18	14	55
HARASS	150	46	80	100	376
TERRSM	7	8	14	17	46
SABOTAGE	1	6	7	7	21
PROP	1	9	1	1	12
TOTAL	176	75	120	139	510

Annex A

GP-3.

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INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375



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TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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MR 4 Intellectual Proselyting Section.	5
Organization of VC Local Force Infantry Battalions	6
VC Discontinue Motorbike Assassination Tactic.	7
Order of Battle.	8
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The USARV Weekly Intelligence Review is intended to report significant Viet Cong activity which occurred during the preceding week. It is further intended to present current, timely and pertinent items of information concerning Vietnam and Southeast Asia, selected from various sources, which would otherwise not be available to USARV units.

The information presented is digested from those intelligence sources which are available to Headquarters, USARV and is subject to modification as more complete data become available. Suggestions and comments are solicited and should be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AVHGB-0, Headquarters, USARV, APO 96375.

(C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

I CTZ:

In I Corps Tactical Zone, enemy forces avoided contact while probably continuing preparations for future offensive operations. In the DMZ area, ground activity was light and artillery and mortar attacks decreased. Elements of the NVA 29th Regiment, NVA 325th Division, withdrew to avoid contact with US Marines on Operation HICKORY II but later reoccupied positions southwest of CON THIEN (YD 11 72). Friendly units contacted elements of the probable NVA 270th Regiment southeast of GIO LINH (YD 20 75). Reliable sources indicate that the 90th Regiment, NVA 324B Division, may be withdrawing north

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of the DMZ. Such a withdrawal would reduce the probability of an imminent ground attack. Enemy forces in the DMZ area probably will continue to avoid contact while continuing reinforcement and resupply. There are indications that the enemy will increase activity in the KHE SANH/LANG VEI area (XD 85 38/ XD 78 37). Reconnaissance and agent reports indicate enemy presence and probable reinforcement. In the Northern Front area of I CTZ, enemy forces continued a low level of activity. Reports indicate that 200 NVA infiltrators have joined the 806th Battalion, NVA 6th Regiment, as replacements. It is possible that elements of the 9th Regiment, NVA 304th Division, which reinforced the 802d Battalion, NVA 6th Regiment, in March 1967 also reinforced the 806th Battalion. Normal harassment probably will continue. In southern I CTZ reliable sources indicate that the VC 1st Regiment, NT 2 Division, possibly is displacing to western QUANG NGAI Province. A detainee from the VC 2d Regiment, NT 3 Division, said his unit had no large-scale offensive plans during the current dry season. Evasion and harassment noted during the reporting period probably will continue.

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II CTZ:

In II Corps Tactical Zone, enemy forces in the Western Highlands continued attempts to disperse and tie down friendly forces while preparing for later offensives. Present dispositions indicate that DUC CO Special Forces Camp (YA 84 26) remains the most likely objective. In PHU YEN Province, friendly forces continued to contact elements of the NVA 95th Regiment, NT 5 Division. Detainees' statements and contacts indicate that subordinate battalions of the 95th Regiment are operating throughout PHU YEN Province. Attacks by fire, ground attacks and harassment suggest that the enemy is continuing his attempts to gain control of the coastal areas of the province. NT 3 Division support units and the subordinate NVA 22d Regiment continued to evade friendly forces in the BINH DINH, QUANG NGAI Province border area. The NVA 18th Regiment continued to evade in the PHU MY Valley. These activities are likely to continue.

III CTZ:

In III Corps Tactical Zone, enemy activity and unit relocations indicate implementation of offensive plans. Further interrogation of an officer detainee of the NVA CT 7 Division provided additional information on the possible current organization of the division. The detainee now claims that the division consists of the NVA 101st Regiment (K-16), NVA 141st Regiment (K-14) and NVA 165th Regiment (K-21). He said the NVA 52d Regiment had been disbanded. The 101st

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Regiment was located in contact on 11 July in eastern BINH LONG Province and possibly has relocated to northeastern BINH LONG Province. The division probably will conduct limited offensive operations in eastern TAY NINH, BINH LONG and PHUOC LONG Provinces with friendly installations along Highway 13 and Special Forces camps as objectives. The CT 9 Division headquarters and VC 271st Regiment remain in southwestern PHUOC LONG Province. The VC 272d Regiment possibly is moving south to War Zone D. The VC 273d Regiment remains in northwestern BIEN HOA Province. Friendly operations in the area may have disrupted plans of the 273d Regiment to attack BIEN HOA Air Base. The CT 9 Division headquarters and 271st Regiment probably will remain in or near their present locations. The VC 273d Regiment is likely to conduct limited attacks in eastern BINH DUONG Province. In southeastern III CTZ, the CT 5 Division headquarters evaded friendly operations and now is located near the PHUOC TUY/VINH TUY Province border area. Agent reports locate the VC 274th Regiment in the PHUOC TUY/LONG KHANH Province border area in the vicinity of YS 55 90. A contact in northern PHUOC TUY Province on 20 July tentatively identified the 1st Battalion, VC 275th Regiment, previously reported as reinforcing the 274th Regiment in PHUOC TUY Province. The remainder of the 275th Regiment possibly will relocate to southeastern LONG KHANH Province upon completion of training in War Zone D. The CT 5 Division probably will conduct offensive operations against friendly forces in central LONG KHANH and central PHUOC TUY Provinces, particularly along Highways 1, 2, and 20. A report was received that after 20 July the operational area and designation of the VC 269th Battalion, DONG THAP II Regiment, would be changed and the VC 267th Battalion, DONG THAP II Regiment, would be sent to KIEN TUONG Province in IV CTZ, indicating that the regimental headquarters no longer exists. Throughout III CTZ, Local Forces probably will concentrate on opposition to GVN programs.

IV CTZ:

In IV Corps Tactical Zone, enemy small-unit attacks, harassment and terrorism continued at a low level. Reconnaissance disclosed the construction of firing positions along the BA XE River (XS 12 17), and agent reports indicated that elements of the 306th Main Force Battalion moved from VINH BINH Province to that area in June. Both reports suggest that the VC intend to increase measures to counter friendly river operations in the area. A returnee stated that "Supply Line 65," crossing the BASSAC River about 20 kilometers southeast of CAN THO (XR 01 95), is used to transport about seven tons of ammunition weekly. The route originates in BA XUYEN Province and terminates in VINH BINH and VINH LONG Provinces. Within the reporting period, 345 members of the HOA HAO religious sect returned to GVN control in CHAU DOC Province. The leader of the group has ordered his remaining approximately 50 followers to return to the RVN government. Throughout IV CTZ small attacks and harassment are likely to continue.

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(C-NOFORN) VC PRODUCTION (PART II OF III PARTS)

The Viet Cong goal to obtain self-sufficiency includes the production of munitions. Although the enemy obtains most of his weapons and ammunition from sources outside South Vietnam, he is capable of producing limited amounts of munitions to supplement what is received from abroad. The reliance of the VC upon locally produced munitions varies from area to area. Reports suggest that guerrilla units are more dependent on self-produced munitions than are Main Force units. 340

Insurgent ordnance production is normally limited to reloading cartridges, repairing damaged weapons, and manufacturing small arms, grenades, and mines. In some areas reloaded cartridges account for a significant percentage of VC ammunition stocks. Moreover, recent reports indicate that the VC are manufacturing mortar and artillery rounds. The mines produced by the VC include antipersonnel, antitank, water, and claymore mines. They also fabricate many different types of booby traps, detonators and explosive devices. The firearms manufactured by the Viet Cong normally have smooth bores and are generally inaccurate.

Most of the self-made weapons and ammunition used by the VC are produced by subsections, or workshops, are most prevalent at province and district level and are divided into small cells with particular specialties, such as engineering, molding, reloading, forging, repairing, or lathing. VC facilities may be mobile or stationary. Many small workshops are completely mobile and can displace rapidly to new locations. Usually, however, ordnance production facilities are either underground or in huts well camouflaged under jungle canopy or in dense woods.

The number of personnel, the amount of equipment and the degree of technology that exist in insurgent ordnance installations vary widely. Although most of the items manufactured are the "home-made" variety, it is a mistake to classify VC production methods as primitive or crude. The VC frequently employ generators, drill presses, lathes and electric motors in their workshops and are reported to have foundries for casting metal for mines and grenades. Other tools and equipment found at insurgent ordnance facilities include ammunition reloading presses, hacksaws, blowtorches, vises, grindstones, jeweler-type blowpipes, and precision balances.

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Most of the material used by the VC in the production of munitions is infiltrated into South Vietnam from abroad. Scrap iron is purchased or taken from local dealers or recovered from the battlefield. A possible indication that the Viet Cong are experiencing difficulty in obtaining the materials necessary for production is their increased emphasis on the collection of war booty. The VC extract gunpowder from dud~~s~~ and even use metal from the wings and fuselages of downed aircraft and aluminum bomb casings in the manufacture of explosive devices.

As the buildup of the insurgent force and the increased tempo of the war impose greater requirements for weapons and ammunition, the VC can be expected to expand the number and output of their ordnance facilities. If the inflow of munitions from their primary sources of supply outside the country were reduced, the VC would be forced to resort to greater self-sufficiency in ordnance production. Their ability to increase self-production of munitions, however, may be restricted by limited in-country sources of raw materials and a shortage of trained technicians. SOURCE: CICV STUDY ST 67-022.

(C-NOFORN) MR 4 INTELLECTUAL PROSELYTING SECTION

The Intellectual Proselyting (IP) Section, Military Region 4 Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party, was established in mid-1966. The purpose of this section is to win over various influential personalities and religious leaders to the Viet Cong cause. According to the deputy chief of the section, who was arrested by GVN authorities on 26 May 1967, the IP Section directs the efforts of eleven agents and twenty-one sympathizers in MR 4 (SAIGON/GIA DINH area). The agents carry out proselyting activities for the organization or provide support such as food, lodging and transportation. Their primary targets are influential South Vietnamese who, though basically bourgeois and anti-Communist, are also nationalistic and opposed to "foreign intervention" and are thus susceptible to appeals to work for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN). These sympathizers are considered by the VC to be "conceited, prideful and self-satisfied," but because they have prestige, social position and enjoy the respect of the GVN, their cooperation is sought.

To gain the confidence of sympathizers, IP Section members and agents agree to any form of cooperation and apply only light pressure. Propaganda and education through discussion and debates are the primary means used to win intellectuals to the Viet Cong cause. Special care is taken with those who have the potential,

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through position, prestige and capability, to become members of a future government. Generally they are not asked to campaign among the masses, but rather to work through legal organizations.

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The principal objective of the IP Section is to prepare for the future political situation, namely the possibility of a cease-fire and negotiations intended to establish a coalition government. Should negotiations begin, the intellectuals are to be used either to negotiate in the name of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) or, if they are overtly anti-Communist and pro-American but covertly VC sympathizers, to demand a government which will be broad enough to allow all factions to participate. Although the latter group cannot openly espouse the VC cause, they will be able to use their influence to mute anti-Communist elements. In the event of negotiations, it is planned that several sympathizers will be in position to represent the GVN, but actually will be under the control of the Viet Cong. SOURCE: Controlled American Source Report FVS-15,308.

(C-NOFORN) ORGANIZATION OF VC LOCAL FORCE INFANTRY BATTALIONS

Viet Cong Local Force infantry battalion replacements are recruited or conscripted from the province or district in which the unit operates. In IV CTZ the VC-controlled population base is sufficient to maintain battalions with an average strength of 550 to 600 each; in II and III CTZ's an average strength of 400 is maintained. Captured documents having a date of information prior to 1966 indicate that Local Force battalion strengths then were uniformly greater, usually totaling 600. During the last twelve months, however, Local Force battalion strengths have declined to the averages listed above.

Documents captured recently indicate that VC Local Force infantry battalions with strengths of 400 to 500 have seven-man squads, and those exceeding 600 have nine- to ten-man squads. This indicates that when the strength level of 600 cannot be maintained, the third cell in each squad is eliminated. The exception to this is the reconnaissance/sapper platoon, organic to each Local Force infantry battalion, which retains a three-cell configuration. Infantry platoons are composed of three two-cell squads (three three-cell squads in IV CTZ) and companies consist of three infantry platoons and a combat support platoon. Average infantry company strength in IV CTZ is 149, while the average in the other three corps is 113. Each Local Force battalion has one combat support company to support its three infantry companies. The strength of this unit varies from 104 in IV CTZ to 77 in the remaining three corps areas.

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Viet Cong Local Force infantry battalions are being equipped with the "new family" of SOVIET/CHICOM weapons. Of the 37 Local Force battalions in-country, sixteen (ten in III CTZ, 6 in IV CTZ) reportedly have received at least some of these weapons. The "new family" weapons are being issued to replace older type bolt-action weapons or weapons for which the VC are unable to maintain an acceptable level of ammunition supply. In the "new family" series are the Soviet 7.62mm Assault Rifle, AK 47, type 56; the Soviet 7.62mm Carbine SKS, type 56; the Soviet 7.62mm Light Machine Gun, RPD; and the Soviet Light Machine Gun, SGM, type 57. Heavy weapons include a 75mm recoilless rifle and two 60mm mortars in the infantry company combat support platoon, three 75mm recoilless rifles and three 81/82mm mortars in the battalion combat support company, and various caliber Soviet, CHICOM and US heavy machine guns. SOURCE: CICV Study ST 67-063.

(C) VC DISCONTINUE MOTORBIKE ASSASSINATION TACTIC

It is Viet Cong policy to launch two or three terrorist attacks and then discontinue using a successful technique before it can be effectively countered by the opposition. This appears to be the case with the motorbike assassination tactic which plagued the SAIGON/CHOLON area during June and the first half of July 1967. A document, carried by two VC female communication liaison cadre who were captured on 13 July, indicates that a SAIGON-based VC sapper organization, TU/A51, carried out the terrorist program. The captured document contained a request from TU/A51, probably an element of the C10 Sapper Battalion, to Military Region 4 to change the operational technique used in carrying out assassinations. It states that the VC terrorists feel the tactic of using a rider on the back of a motorbike to assassinate persons out on the street "is subject to close scrutiny by Vietnamese security elements." The document also states that during April emphasis was placed on enlisting and training agents to increase terrorist activity during the period 15-30 July.

It appears that the assassinations in the SAIGON/CHOLON area have been discontinued for the time being and that the planned 15-30 July increase in terrorist activities failed to materialize. The last assassination took place 12 July in SAIGON when three men on a motorbike shot a Vietnamese civilian. During June and July at least one American was killed and several wounded by terrorists, the most notorious being the woman on the back of a red Honda. It is possible that the VC finished training their agents and launched the planned terrorist campaign earlier than expected. Though there is a temporary lull in terrorism, the Viet Cong can be expected to resume terrorist activities in the near future, implementing new tactics and techniques. SOURCE: J2 MACV INTSUM 201-67.

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	<u>24,863</u>	<u>ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES</u>
	<u>112,760</u>	<u>IRREGULARS</u>
	<u>39,175</u>	<u>POLITICAL</u>
TOTAL:	297,150	

MAJOR UNIT LISTINGS: 9 DIVISIONS: 6 NVA CONFIRMED
1 NVA POSSIBLE
2 VC CONFIRMED

25 (6) NVA REGIMENTS
12 (6) VC REGIMENTS

Note: The figures in parentheses represent those regiments not presently subordinate to divisional-size units in RVN.

(C) STATISTICS

(C) There was a total of 494 enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN during the period of 16-22 Jul 67. This compares with 510 incidents for the previous week and represents a decrease of 16. (See Annex A)

(C) ENEMY PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW's</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 16 -22 JUL 67	1,702	66	576	*	*
PERIOD OF 9-15 JUL 67	**1,995	127	423	**1,676	**100
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**49,287	3,206	16,018	**16,289	**1,204
SINCE 1 JUN 65	**132,437	***	43,985	**40,542	**2,978

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(C) FRIENDLY PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS:

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	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MIA/DET</u>	<u>SA LOST</u>	<u>C/S LOST</u>
PERIOD OF 16-22 JUL 67	191 (65)	534 (488)	34/0 (4/0)	143	4
PERIOD OF 9-15 JUL 67	**227 **(164)	**589 **(1,015)	**34/0 **(9/0)	114	3
SINCE 1 JAN 67	**7,194 **(4,819)	**22,007 **(31,212)	**1277/82 **(258/2)	4,363	91

(C) ALLIED TO VC/NVA KHA RATIO 6.65:1 (ALLIED FAVOR) PERIOD OF 16-22 JUL 67.
ALLIED TO VC/NVA WEAPONS LOST RATIO 15.18:1 (ALLIED FAVOR) PERIOD OF 9-15 JUL 67.

(U) The following are CHIEU HOI figures for the period 16-22 July 1967:

a.

<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
56	84	135	301

b. The total for the period is broken down as follows: Military 477;
Political 56; Other 43; Total 576.

c. This is an increase of 153 from the previous week.

* Enemy weapons figures for the period 16-22 July 67 were not available at the time of this report. The significant increase of captured enemy weapons for the period 9-15 July 67, is a result of the cache found on the enemy trawler captured at CAPE BATANGEN on 15 July 1967.

** These figures include corrections for the previous weeks.

*** PW statistics noted in this section pertain to US-captured prisoners of war who have been evacuated to ARVN PW camps. Accurate statistics are not available for the period preceding 1 Jan 67.

GP-1.

Kenneth D. Simmet
KENNETH D. SIMMET
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

Annex:
A - VC/NVA Initiated Incidents

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29 July 1967

DISTRIBUTION:

- 30 - DIA Dissemination Center (DIACO-3)
5 - COMDT, USAINTS, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
1 - CG, Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC 28307
1 - Combined Studies Division, MACV
3 - Director, Intelligence, 7th Air Force, TAN SON NHUT
5 - G2, USARPAC, APO 96558
10 - G2, I Field Force Vietnam, NHA TRANG
2 - US Embassy, OSA, ATTN: CB
40 - G2, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH
1 - LNO, USARPAC
1 - SPO, Headquarters Area Command, SAIGON
15 - S2, 1st Aviation Brigade, SAIGON
5 - 18th MP Brigade, LONG BINH
30 - US Army Engr Comd, Vietnam, (PROV) BIEN HOA
22 - S2, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), SAIGON
90 - SPO, 1st Logistical Command, SAIGON
2 - S2, 507th Transportation Group, SAIGON
6 - S2, 34th General Support Group, SAIGON
1 - USARV Operations Center
1 - Command Section
1 - G1
5 - G2
1 - G3
30 - G3, DST Division
1 - Historical Section
1 - G4
1 - Aviation
1 - Provost Marshal
1 - Information Officer
3 - S2, 97th Artillery Group
6 - S2, 89th Military Police Group, SAIGON
2 - S2, 509th RR Group, SAIGON
10 - S2, 525th Military Intelligence Group, SAIGON
1 - S2, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SAIGON
5 - J2, USMACV
1 - J2, USMACV, ATTN: MATTLO
5 - S2, 15th Support Brigade, LONG BINH
1 - 702d MI Det, SAIGON
15 - S2, Hq USA LONG BINH Post, LONG BINH
1 - CO, ACTIV, APO 96243
10 - G2, Task Force OREGON, APO 96374

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29 July 1967

(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 22 JULY 1967

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	25 Jun-1 Jul	2 - 8 Jul	9 - 15 Jul	16-22 Jul	TOTAL
ATK	33	44	55	48	180
HARASS	240	362	376	338	1,316
TERRSM	37	49	46	36	168
SABOTAGE	23	14	21	*52	110
PROP	16	12	12	20	60
TOTAL	349	481	510	494	1,834

(C) VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 16 - 22 JULY 1967.

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	12	8	24	4	48
HARASS	167	58	68	45	338
TERRSM	17	11	2	6	36
SABOTAGE	9	8	7	28	*52
PROP	2	17	1	0	20
TOTAL	207	102	102	83	494

* The significant increase in sabotage incidents during the reporting period is a result of enemy road cratering activity in IV CTZ.

Annex A

GP-3.

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9 June 1967

SUBJECT: Weekly Intelligence Review (U)

(C) TOTAL VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR RVN - FOUR WEEK PERIOD ENDING 3 JUNE 1967

3/8

	7 - 13 May	14 - 20 May	21 - 27 May	28 May-3 June	TOTAL
ATK	57	39	45	30	171
HARASS	379	369	488	330	1,566
TERRSM	59	42	42	33	176
SABOTAGE	15	25	20	10	70
PROP	10	3	9	17	39
AA	205	302	317	271	1,095
TOTAL	725	780	921	691	3,117

VC/NVA INCIDENTS BY CTZ FOR THE WEEK OF 21 - 27 MAY 1967

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
ATK	12	3	6	9	30
HARASS	127	42	94	67	330
TERRSM	6	16	5	6	33
SABOTAGE	3	2	1	4	10
PROP	1	14	2	0	17
AA	186	21	28	36	271
TOTAL	335	98	136	122	691

Annex A

CONFIDENTIAL

Reporting Period; 1-30 April 1967		Army Component Units	Construct'n Projects Completed (a)	Nurses/Aids Trained (a)	Swamps Drained (a)	Tool *Brick Kits (a/machine)	Building Materials (b)	Tin Sheets (a)	Lumber (b ft)	Health Kits (a)	School Kits (a)	School Supplies (b)	Food Clothing (b)	Soap	Agriculture Tools (a)	Agriculture Supplies (b)	Recovered Food (c)	Recovered Medicine (b)	Recovered Livestock (head) (d)	Recovered Salt (c)	Education Classes (a)	Students (a)	Contributions (\$M)
I PFORCEV			125	20	-	4	14,365	176	8079	101	195	440	19,284	-	-	5	137	37	84	.75	130	2814	1,56740
II PFORCEV			382	33	1	*2	347,000	745	1,023,143	253	3,661	395	236,241	56	-	-	71.2	7	12 chickens 28 pigs	.25	154	11,879	304,580
1 Avn Bde			6	-	-	-	2,500	-	-	75	170	150	1,3887	-	-	-	58	-	-	-	7	304	5,2100
1 Log Comd			55	9	1	*1	22,080	100	113,000	-	635	-	3,6875	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	130	6,018	11,76318
1 Sig Bde			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	922	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	55	3,0750
5 SFC Includes Mar & Apr			2,098	378	-	261	5,386,282	2,728	6,098,833	1,174	3,0712	372	17,904,82	169	17,648	-	-	-	-	-	458	3,613	-
18 MP Bde			-	-	-	-	-	-	750	-	-	-	340	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38,236
23 Arty Gp			6	3	-	-	-	-	600	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	175	12,500
34 Gen Spt Gp			4	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	4,956	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	56	-
54 Arty Gp			-	2	-	-	-	-	400	-	-	-	1,862	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	480	-
97 Arty Gp			5	-	-	-	10,000	182	4,000	-	900	-	14,50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	-
507 Trans Gp			Negative Rpt																				
525 MI Gp			Report not rec'd																				
Rear Comd Includes Mar & Apr			31	-	-	-	15,750	250	-	-	-	-	424	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	150	18,000
USA HQ Area Comd			3	-	-	20	1,200,600	605	293,000	800	1,220	-	5,110	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	230	890,161
HQ USARV Sp Trps													5,142	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	200	1,533,70
TOTAL			2715	445	2	288	11,170,383	2,9436	11,943,174	6,742	8,953	1,357	20,579,75	225	17,653	266.2	44	130 other 112	1	954	25,990	2,842,755	

USARV Local Form 138 (21 Apr 67) REPLACES USARV Form 239 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(a) - number (b) - pounds (c) - tons (d) Cattle

SUMMARY OF ARMY COMPONENT CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM APO 97

Reporting Period;	Construction Projects Completed (a)	Nurses/Aids Trained (a)	Swamps Drained (a)	Tool Kits (a)	Building Materials (b)	Tin Sheets (a)	Lumber Plywood (bd ft)	Health Kits (a)	School Kits (a)	School Supplies (r)	Food Clothing (b)	Soap	Agriculture Tools (a)	Agriculture Supplies (b)	Recovered Food (c)	Recovered Medicine (b)	Recovered Livestock (head)	Recovered Salt (c)	Education Classes (a)	Students (a)	Contributions (RM)	
1-31 May 1967																						
Army Component Units																						
I FFORCEV	259	9	-	74	36983	2339	5350	235	-	-	61943	-	-	-	100.85	-	152	32	160	11531	419106	
II FFORCEV	345	34	1	7	110722	295	41794	1651	707	305	57674	-	3	-	217.15	-	7	-	270	6540	244701	
1 Avn Bde	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	252	-	300	6682	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	200	30402	
1 Log Comd	21	-	1	-	134861	130	78800	310	375	260	45380	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61	3557	320022	
1 Sig Bde	18	-	-	-	-	-	2300	-	5	-	2675	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	180	170508	
5 SFC	1713	396	-	763	125623	23322	24242	20233	27197	-	1351913	40	1495	-	-	-	-	-	493	24263	-	
10 MP Bde	-	-	-	-	-	-	1000	-	-	-	601	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10430
23 Arty Gp	11	3	-	-	790	-	1000	-	-	-	80	-	-	210	-	-	-	-	10	150	10030	
34 Gen Spt Gp	2	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	780	11725	
54 Arty Gp	-	1	-	-	-	-	3200	-	-	-	350	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	240	-	
97 Arty Gp	65	-	-	-	600	-	7800	-	-	-	4300	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	388	-	
507 Trans Gp	Negative report																					
525 MI Gp	1	-	-	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	4791	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12410
Engr Comd	27	-	-	-	1720	-	600	-	-	-	2175	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5500
USA HQ Area Comd	56	-	-	-	118000	245	47200	-	60	-	23372	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	432	164347	
HQ USARV Sp Atps	2	-	-	-	227	-	1280*	-	1	200	4474	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	160	1280	55106	
TOTAL	2522	443	2	864	1660206	26531	224766	22681	28345	1065	2086410	40	1708	-	318	-	159	32	1248	19561	1475287	

USARV Local Form 138 (21 Apr 67) REPLACES USARV Form 239 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(a) - number (b) - pounds (c) - tons

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SUMMARY OF ARMY COMPONENT CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM AFU 963

Reporting Periods	Army Component Units	Construction Projects Completed (a)	Nurses/Aids Trained (a)	Swamps Drained (a)	Block Tool machines Kts (a)	Building Materials (b)	Tin Sheets (a)	Lumber (bd ft)	Health Kts (a)	School Kts (a)	School Supplies (b)	Food Clothing (b)	Soap Agriculture Tools (a)	Agriculture Supplies (b)	Recovered Food (c)	Recovered Medicine (b)	Recovered Lintlocks (head)	Recovered Sale (c)	Education Classes (a)	Students (a)	Contributions (\$M)
1-30 June 1967	I FFORCSV	415	43	7	67	431240	2370	35575	38	86	-	109432	*15	-	49.7	400	#287 1405	7.5	253	2135	23640
	II FFORCSV	409	43	1	*1	57150	360	82100	1486	690	380	153233	*1	-	33.3	-	-	-	87	2821	485665
	1 Avn Bde	8	-	-	-	10000	-	-	159	71	80	30259	-	-	14.0	-	-	.5	190	9494	110967
	1 Log Comd	133	16	-	12	53770	274	41864	4525	213	-	36190	-	-	-	-	-	-	214	5449	219403
	1 S1g Bde	12	-	-	-	-	-	10000	-	250	140	5891	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	111	95730
	3 ETC	1030	255	-	1503	341233	8043	18654	18924	13112	-	1089767	971	38955	-	-	-	-	204	1354	-
	16 MP Bde	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	960	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	36	13000
	23 Arty Op	Report not received																			
	34 Con Spt Op	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	15	-	5255	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	50	23135
	54 Arty Op	42	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17700
	97 Arty Op	227	1	-	-	4500	-	4100	-	-	-	3926	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	116	-
	507 Trans Op	Negative report																			
	525 MI Op	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	3680	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6435
	Engr Comd	10	-	-	-	22500	250	-	253	-	-	3788	-	5	-	-	-	-	16	780	172906
	USA HQ Area Comd	9	40	-	-	216762	380	17000	-	-	255	4653	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	213	303587
	HQ USARV Sp Supt	-	-	-	-	185	-	21200	-	200	-	11949	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	380	35892
TOTAL		2312	335	8	1583	137938	1717	230493	25429	14637	855	1458963	971	38960	97.6	400	#287 1405	8	991	29269	↓

USARV Form 239 (Revised 29 Dec 66) PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

(a) - number (b) - pounds (c) - to \$

1,614,060