

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD386365	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	UNCLASSIFIED
FROM:	CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 27 JAN 1966. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20301.	
AUTHORITY	
AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

**IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652**

THIS DOCUMENT IS:

CLASSIFIED BY _____

**Subject to General Declassification Schedule of
Executive Order 11652-Automatically Downgraded at
2 Years Intervals-DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1974.**

BY

**Defense Documentation Center
Defense Supply Agency
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314**

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

CONFIDENTIAL

AD 386365

DDC FILE COPY

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

⑥ Lessons Learned,

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND [U].
APO US Forces 96307

AVIC TA-HIS

⑪ 27 January 1966

SUBJECT: ⑨ Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965.

THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
APO US Forces 96307

⑫ 43p.

⑱ OACSFOR ⑲ OT-RD-650084

TO: Commanding General
USARV
APO US Forces 96307

DDC
JAN 15 1968
RECEIVED

1. Major personnel changes which have taken place within the headquarters staff presented in chronological order are as follows:

a. 4 October 1965, Capt. Henry A. Pridgen - PCS to Hqs 4th Transportation Command to become Commanding Officer of Headquarters Company from Commanding Officer of the 82d Transportation Company at Cam Ranh Bay.

b. 9 November 1965, Lt. Col. Norman L. Kirby - PCS from Hqs 4th Transportation Command (S-3) to become Commanding Officer of 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) at Qui Nhon. Major Thomas R. Taylor, the Assistant S-3 became the S-3, and Major Herbert F. Coen, the 4th Transportation Command Movements Control Officer became the Assistant S-3.

c. 10 November 1965, Lt. Col. Thomas P. Emery - PCS from CO, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) to Hqs 4th Transportation Command to become Deputy Commander. Lt. Col. Barnet Faverman, DCO, 4th Transportation Command placed on TDY to 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) as Saigon Army Terminal Operations Officer.

d. 15 November 1965, Lt. Col. Eugene T. Johnson (Chaplain) - PCS from this Headquarters to Saigon Logistics Area.

e. 22 November 1965, Major William H. Merts (Chaplain) - PCS from CONUS to 4th Transportation Command to become Chaplain.

2. The 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck), commanded by Lt. Col. Henry Goodell, arrived at Qui Nhon and assumed command of the following units on 27 October 1965:

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OT RD
650084

Incl 1 msh(003650)

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

- a. 58th Transportation Company (Lt Trk)
- b. 151st Transportation Company (Lt Trk)
- c. 541st Transportation Company (Lt Trk)
- d. 597th Transportation Company (Med Trk)
- e. 2d Transportation Company (Med Trk) (Comp)
- f. 61st Transportation Company (Med Trk) (POL)

3. The 116th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) and the 285th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) on 16 December 1965 were attached to the 4th Transportation Command from USARYIS on TCS at Qui Nhon under the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal). Other new transportation units that were assigned to the command during the quarterly period by date assigned and battalion were:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE ASSIGNED</u>	<u>BATTALION</u>
380th T Det (Team FM)	7 Oct 65	10th T Bn (TML)
347th T Co (LARG V)	21 Oct 65	10th T Bn (TML)
159th T Det (BA) (AMPH) (DS)	21 Oct 65	10th T Bn (TML)
169th T Det (ID) (MAIN)	21 Oct 65	10th T Bn (TML)
27th T Bn (TRK)	22 Oct 65	Qui Nhon
554th T Plt (BARC)	28 Oct 65	394th T Bn (TML)
268th T Det (BA) (SUPPLY)	28 Oct 65	394th T Bn (TML)
444th T Co (Lt Trk)	28 Oct 65	27th T Bn (TRK)
396th T Det (FD)	29 Oct 65	394th T Bn (TML)
556th T Co (Med Trk)	4 Nov 65	11th T Bn (TML)
124th T Co (TS)	27 Nov 65	11th T Bn (TML)
474th T Det (FH Reefer Barge)	7 Dec 65	394th T Bn (TML)
472d T Det (FG) (45' Tug)	19 Dec 65	11th T Bn (TML)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE ASSIGNED</u>	<u>BATTALION</u>
473d T Det (FG) (45' Tug)	19 Dec 65	11th T Bn (TML)
481st T Det (FG) (45' Tug)	19 Dec 65	11th T Bn (TML)
267th T Det (FD) (Liquid Barge)	19 Dec 65	10th T Bn (TML)

4. Personnel replacement flow for the 4th Transportation Command and its four (4) battalions was inadequate during this period, creating an adverse effect upon maximum performance in accomplishment of mission requirements. As of 31 December 1965, the command had a shortage of 478 personnel with projected losses of 752 personnel for the next 90 day period. Analyzing present input replacement factors as a criteria, personnel shortages could present a problem in the near future. Major shortage is in stevedore personnel.

5. The 4th Transportation Command was understaffed to provide adequate command and control over assigned units.

a. At full strength this command is authorized sufficient personnel to command, plan, supervise, and coordinate activities of the following:

- (1) From two (2) to three (3) Battalions.
- (2) From five (5) to ten (10) companies.
- (3) Working four (4) to six (6) ships simultaneously.
- (4) Unloading 86,000 to 130,000 S/T of cargo per month.

b. During the past quarter, this command exercised command and control over the following:

- (1) Four (4) Transportation Battalions.
- (2) Thirty-Two (32) transportation companies plus about thirty (30) separate detachments and platoons.
- (3) A combined strength in excess of 7,000 personnel.
- (4) Working twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) ships simultaneously.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

(5) Unloading 180,000 to 215,000 S/T of cargo per month.

6. The transportation battalions of this command are not staffed to provide adequate command and control over assigned units.

a. Under the TOE, terminal battalions are staffed and equipped to command up to four (4) company sized units (Terminal Service, Amphibian, or Boat).

b. Each of the three (3) terminal battalions are presently commanding units and detachments equivalent to more than eight (8) company sized units.

c. Truck support in port and beach clearance, local haul and LOC operations is best accommodated by having truck units assigned to truck battalions. The assignment of truck units to terminal battalions operating large ports such as Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay diverts and dilutes the management capability of the terminal battalion headquarters from it's primary mission.

d. The 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) at Cam Ranh Bay and the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) at Saigon are each commanding three (3) and five (5) truck companies, respectively, in addition to terminal service, boat, and amphibian type units. Truck operations in the Qui Nhon area are more easily managed and more efficient with the truck units being assigned to the 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck).

7. The 82d Transportation Company (AGS) became fully operational on 15 October 1965, with a mission to provide up to limited Depot Maintenance support and marine supply responsibility for all TC floating craft and amphibians in-country. In addition to normal TOE equipment, the 82d has been augmented with a floating machine shop (FMS) and a warehouse parts barge, both of which have greatly increased 82d maintenance and supply capability. In addition, a floating dry dock is scheduled to arrive in-country for the 82d within the next few months. The 82d Transportation Company is based under the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) at Cam Ranh Bay but has the capability of providing contact teams for maintenance throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In late December the Commanding Officer of the 82d, Captain Gerald Gould, requested an augmentation to his company in order to handle the increased requirements made on his unit. An additional 81 EM, one officer, and two warrant officers as well as one DA civilian GS-13 (Ship Surveyor) and two DA civilians GS-12 (Ship Surveyors). The major military augmentation would be in the areas of marine supply, electrical repair, and a diving section.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

Statistics pertaining to 82d Transportation Company (AGS) work orders and number of vessels handled during this quarter are attached as Inclosure #1.

8. Request was made for improvement of roads at Cam Ranh Bay from the port to the POL and ammunition areas. Work has been initiated by the engineers but is progressing slowly (about 1/8 of the project is complete). *EN* The poor roads and total sand blanket throughout the area has created additional maintenance problems for mission essential vehicles.

9. Lack of spare parts continued to be the critical maintenance problem area during the quarter; however, the establishment of the "RED BALL EXPRESS" system in early December is expected to improve the deadline situation in the next quarter. To date, five-hundred and thirty (530) line items have been processed and forwarded to the 1st Logistical Command from thirty-one (31) units and detachments of this command. Requests are continuously being forwarded as deadline reports are required. Items of equipment which have been designated by the 1st Logistical Command as top priority are prevalent within this command. These include 2 1/2 Ton and 5 Ton trucks at Cam Ranh Bay, MHE (forklifts and cranes), and lighterage. Command total deadline percentages for mission essential equipment are attached as Inclosure #2. *111*

10. In order to expand port capabilities to meet increased present and projected requirements additional lighterage and cargo handling equipment were requisitioned on a priority (02) basis. The following critical items were requisitioned:

- a. 60 each - Barge deck cargo NP, 130 ton, 81' sectionalized design 7001. *SV*
- b. 1000 each - Pontoon sectional 5' 3/8" X 7' X 5' 3/8" high, Mark P-1.
- c. 200 each - Pontoon sectional 7' lg X 7' wd X 5' 3/4" high, Mark P-2 (To manufacturer 20 each 5' X 12' barges).
- d. 16 each - Barge 231A, 585 tons, 120 tons, 120 feet long.
- e. 5 each - 65' Tug Boats.
- f. 4 each - 45' Tug Boats.
- g. 4 each - 100' Tug Boats.
- h. 2 each - Barge, Dry cargo.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

- i. 2 each - Barge, Liquid cargo.
- j. 25 each - Barge, cargo
- k. 2 each - Conversional kit deck enclosure (for barge, day cargo).
- l. 32 each - 400 lbs Low Mast Gasoline Forklifts.
- m. 16 each - 6000 lb Gasoline forklifts.
- n. 18 each - 400 lb Low Mast electric forklifts.
- o. 9 each - Battery chargers.
- p. 1 each - 100 ton crane.
- q. 18 each - Boat Picket.

11. Operational control of the Saigon Military Port, Vung Tau port and the Nha Be ammunition discharge site was assumed by the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), a subordinate unit of this command, on 15 November 1965. These facilities were previously operated by the US Navy Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon. The 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) is operating these ports utilizing two terminal service companies, five truck companies and commercial contract stevedores and trucks. A Table of Distribution for 40 Officers, 9 warrant officers and 311 enlisted men was prepared and submitted in December 1965. If the Table of Distribution is approved the new organization will assume operational responsibility for the Saigon Army Terminal, Vung Tau port, Nha Be ammunition discharge site and all ammunition barge sites in the Saigon area. The 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) will then be released for employment elsewhere. A study is presently being conducted to determine in what area and in what capacity the headquarters, 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) could best be utilized.

12. The Army assumed financial responsibility for port operations as a result of the Army takeover on 15 November 1965. An original draft copy of the agreement stated the Navy would still fund the port operations or as directed by Department of the Army and Navy. However, the final agreement read otherwise. The 4th Transportation Command's Fiscal Officer conferred with the 1st Logistical Command's Comptroller and P&C Officer for guidance on how to fund this operation and legally obligate funds. The Navy had no contract or letter agreement with the stevedore companies at Saigon, and was obligating appropriated funds with the assumption that a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) could be made with each contractor

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

and would authorize obligation of appropriated funds.

13. A sub-port at Phan Rang was opened in November 1965 by elements of the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) at Cam Ranh Bay. This sub-port was opened to support the construction and operation of an Air Force Base at Phan Rang.

14. A Delong pier was placed into operation at Cam Ranh Bay on 15 December 1965. The first vessel berthed at the new pier was the USNS Comet. This pier provides berthing space for two deep draft vessels. However, due to the size of the pier, 90 ft by 300 ft, most of the time only three hatches on each ship can be worked simultaneously.

15. Tonnage handled at the Vung Tau port increased from 2,296 S/T in October 1965 to 7,248 S/T in December 1965. This increase has been handled by providing additional military and civilian stevedores and lighterage from the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) at Saigon.

16. Selective discharge of Air Force special express ammunition ships has proven to be undesirable because of the non-productive time involved in opening and closing hatches each time a selective discharge is required. Instructions have been given all subordinate units that selective discharge will be made only in the event of a tactical emergency. Once a special Express ship is started, discharge will continue until all cargo destined for that port has been discharged.

17. Changes of in-country unit destinations have been made in numerous cases after the unit equipment and personnel have departed CONUS. These changes have dictated that a very detailed analysis be made of manifests and stow plans to determine the correct sequence for ports of discharge. This close analysis has resulted in the material reduction of inter-coastal shipping of unit equipment and supplies.

18. Progress in the implementation of Automatic Data Processing systems for transceiving and printing vessel papers has been negligible. An evaluation of the problem has determined that the terminals can only make minimum use of the preprinted Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD). TCMD's which are printed for bulk shipments, ie, multiple line item entries cannot be used for further movement of the commodity when the shipment must be split for transshipment. Since most of our port and beach clearance is accomplished by truck, the problem occurs quite often. Specifically, the major factors affecting the entire program are:

a. Inexperienced personnel: The programmers and operators are

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

well equipped to operate the machines, but are not sufficiently familiar with MILSTAMP to evaluate the quality of the data processed or judge the accuracy of information.

b. Inadequate equipment to meet the requirements: The machines used are of a basic design which limits their usefulness to simple sorting and printing. Consequently, a trial and error method must be employed to modify our requirements in accordance with the machines capabilities. The situation has developed to a point where the personnel concerned must evaluate, modify, and correct the data while attempting to operate the system in response to all user agency requirements.

c. Workload is too great for the machine time available: Since we are not the sole agency placing requirements upon the resources, the machine time must be proportionately budgeted among all users. It is not sufficient for our needs. There is no time available for testing our plans. Breakdowns in the machines causes such a backlog in all areas that the intended timely dissemination of ship's data is completely lost. The manual breakout and analysis of bulk manifests has proved faster and considerably more accurate.

19. A summary of port performance by area is attached as Inclosure #3. The after action reports for the two major troop movements into country during October and November are attached as Inclosures #4, #5, and #6. The Korean Division was discharged at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay which resulted in two different operations and reports.

20. Motor transport and terminal service has been provided in support of numerous tactical operations. Cargo moved by 4th Transportation Command trucks is included as Inclosure #7. Each time support is provided, port movement of normal cargo is reduced because of the limited resources available in-country. Support has been provided for the following units:

- a. 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) from An Khe to Pleiku.
- b. 1st Inf Div from Saigon to Bien Hoa.
- c. 101st Abn Bde from Qui Nhon back to Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang.
- d. 173d Abn Bde in Saigon-Bien Hoa area.
- e. ROK Troop units discharged at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

Tactical support requirements have been particularly heavy in the Cam Ranh Bay area.

21. The major developments in the cargo accounting area for RVN ports during the quarterly period concerned, centered around three (3) items:

a. The outloading ports in CONUS did not fully utilize the commodity code descriptions when preparing the ship's manifest. Particular interest should be directed to the excessive use of GENNOS (700) which is "general cargo not otherwise stated". The use of this code gives port and supply personnel in RVN no idea what cargo is aboard a ship. Further the use of SUBNOS (861) "subsistence not otherwise stated" and CANNOS (509) "can goods not otherwise stated" in manifesting rations makes it impossible to determine what vessels have "C" rations aboard. The meal-combat-individual (MCI) is the basic ration for combat units committed to tactical operations. In order to determine how much re-supply is readily available on ships in port or enroute, a specific commodity code for MCI's must be developed.

b. With the agreement of the Director of Supply at the 1st Logistical Command, arrangements were made to discharge all automatic re-supply items at the port manifested. Problems were created in the past with the intra-country movement of brigade size units and their re-supply arriving at their old location which required the ship to be diverted or the items transshipped. Hundreds of tons of cargo was backlogged for transshipment in RVN ports because of this situation. The new agreement calls for the cargo to be placed in support command stockage where delivered. This decision could only be made after enough stockage was in RVN support commands to cover changes in local requirements.

c. It has been noticed that the majority of cargo arriving by surface into RVN is being sent correctly manifested for the proper area. While a problem of mis-manifested cargo still exists, the situation is purifying itself with the implementation of improved documentation procedures throughout the supply system.

22. This command has experienced a continuous backlog of vessels awaiting discharge. This situation increased sharply in November and December. Attached as Inclosure #8 is the weekly backlog data by tons from 22 November 1965 to 31 December 1965. The tonnage awaiting discharge includes that which is aboard ships waiting at ports in country, and cargo on ships in holding areas outside RVN or enroute from CONUS.

23. Communications by telephone and radio teletype to higher and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

lower headquarters has been a problem which has adversely affected operations of this command. The communication system is improving but at a slow rate. On 10 November five (5) trunk lines were installed from the Tiger switch. This addition provided a total of 9 trunk lines, 4 from Lion and 5 from Tiger. On 28 December 1965 work commenced on the installation of 30 subscriber lines from the Tiger switch which will place the entire headquarters on subscriber service. As of 31 December 1965 the work was 80% complete. This will result in an improved telephone communication system. On 17 November 1965 a sole-user teletype circuit was opened from this headquarters to the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) in Qui Nhon. On 28 November 1965 a similar circuit was opened to the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) in Cam Ranh Bay thereby providing direct communications to all up-country ports. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in keeping these circuits operational. This has been primarily due to a low restoration priority given these circuits.

24. Weather has affected discharge capability in all RVN ports. This is particularly true in the case of Qui Nhon which is wide open to the elements. Operations have been curtailed considerably and at times have come to a complete halt. Rough seas, high winds and a heavy surf action make a lighterage operation extremely difficult and there are no deep water berths at Qui Nhon at the present time.

25. This command has not been able to obtain reliable information with which to plan future workload requirements. The lack of firm tonnage data has had the following affects:

- a. Inability to plan effectively for resource and facility requirements.
- b. Prevented the timely development of plans for future operations.
- c. Initial location of in-country units in areas necessitating relocation at a later date.
- d. Inadequacy in programming for transportation units and the need to obtain units and equipment from out of country resources to reduce port congestion.
- e. Inability to develop a movements program for intra-theater tonnages with a resultant loss in transportation efficiency.

26. The greatest and most important problem that faces this command is that of port congestion. This problem is in itself of a multitude

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

of lesser problems. Each level of command has demonstrated a great concern to alleviate the situation and numerous studies have been made and conferences held on the subject to determine appropriate courses of action. There was no single agency within the theater that had knowledge of the theater's input tonnages requirements. Agencies such as the United States Operations Mission (USOM). Officer in charge of Construction Contractors (OICC), Raymond, Morrison, and Knudson (RMK), and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), all independent of US Military control measures are ordering supplies, material and equipment in vast quantities from CONUS and third country sources. These orders have been placed without regard for either their own receiving capabilities or US Army port capacities. The flow of ships carrying material into RVN has far exceeded the marginal port facilities available to discharge and transport the material to destination. As a result a number of vessels began to backlog in August 1965 not only in RVN ports but also in out of country holding areas. This backlog continued to increase until it peaked in the middle of December. Another contributing factor, which prevented the theater from obtaining a firm grip on the overall situation, was the failure to recognize the limited throughput capabilities of the RVN ports. There was a wide divergence of opinion as to port capabilities among the various echelons of command within the theater. Factors used in computations such as inter-theater shipments, intra-theater shipment inbound and outbound, values of terminal service and lighterage unit capabilities, and terrain limitations were neither fully considered nor properly evaluated. A further reason that compounded the situation was the fact that the demanded resources to support the buildup were not physically available within a reasonable time frame. An example is that Phase I planning called for the input of certain types and quantities of transportation units. The need for the units were recognized but since they were not immediately available they could not be furnished. In another situation a requirements study revealed the need for number of units with supporting detachments and equipment to reduce the backlog of ships when that problem developed. Although the need was recognized by higher headquarters, the required resources were not available when requested.

27. An MSTS contract with Alaska Barge Company is being negotiated and will provide and inter-coastal capacity of approximately 175,000 S/T per month. Alaska Barge will provide all lighterage, labor, management and will prepare their own beach sites where necessary. First tugs and barges are expected to arrive in RVN in early February 1966. Primary cargo will consist of construction material for OICC. Approximately 35 barges, 4 LST Hulls and 17 tugs will be utilized in the operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-TA-HIS

27 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965

SECTION II: Commander's Recommendations

1. Ships at the outloading ports in CONUS should assure that vessels are properly manifested for single ports of discharge in RVN. *ackd - SV
Tch*

2. The number of non self sustaining ships sent to RVN should be reduced to a minimum and those sent should only be manifested for ports capable of handling the vessel. *ackd - SV
Tch*

3. All RVN U. S. Army ports, CONUS ports, AMC Depots, and ICP's should be informed immediately of any troop destination changes in RVN. *ackd - SV
Tch*

4. Complete re-evaluation of the ADP program with a view toward complete establishment of this system for terminal use. Maximum machine time must be allocated and experts in the field will be required to insure a successful implementation. Responsibility for this program should be firmly established with a transportation agency having sufficient personnel and resources to successfully execute the mission. *ackd - SV
Tch*

5. CONUS outloading ports should make maximum use of existing commodity codes when preparing a manifest. Further consideration should be given to expanding the present group of codes to include more particular descriptions of much of the cargo that falls under GENNOS (700). Also, a specific code for "C" rations should be developed. *ackd - SV
Tch*

6. In the future more extensive and experienced planning should be made when developing a logistical program in a war zone. The problem of matching supply requirements against port discharge and clearance capabilities must be settled before any major commitment is started. ✓

7. This document is regraded unclassified when separated from the classified Inclosures.

8 Incl
as

R. W. Aronson
R. W. ARONSON
Colonel, TC
Commanding

Copies furnished:

CG, USCONARC - 2

CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH - 1

CG, USARV, ATTN: G3 - 1

CG, 1st Log Comd, ATTN: AVLOG-GO-0 - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

15 Oct 65 - 30 Dec 65
82d Marine Maintenance Statistics

VESSEL	WORK ORDERS RECEIVED	WORK ORDERS COMPLETED	WORK ORDERS O/H END PERIOD	VESSELS REMOVED FROM DEADLINE
LARC-V	348	169	179	36
BARC	1	0	1	0
LCU	75	61	14	34
LCM	115	56	59	20
MISC	<u>41</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>9</u>
	580	320	260	99

PERIOD ENDING	WORK ORDERS O/H START PERIOD	WORK ORDERS RECEIVED	WORK ORDERS COMPLETED	WORK ORDERS O/H END PERIOD	VESSELS REMOVED FROM DEADLINE
22 Oct	0	37	10	27	2
29 Oct	27	28	11	44	3
5 Nov	44	25	30	39	13
12 Nov	39	53	24	68	11
17 Nov	68	155	50	173	23
26 Nov	173	53	29	197	9
3 Dec	197	50	36	211	12
10 Dec	211	18	13	216	5
17 Dec	216	50	33	252	13
23 Dec	252	27	32	247	3
30 Dec	247	65	52	260	5

Incl #1

COMMAND
WEEKLY PERCENT DEADLINE COMPARISON
REPORTING PERIOD 0001 FRIDAY TO 2400 THURSDAY

NOMENCLATURE	AUTH	ON HAND	OCTOBER				NOVEMBER				DECEMBER				
			14	21	28		4	11	18	25	2	9	16	23	30
LARC-V	70	65	47	57	56		53	41	49	51	40	51	44	59	61
LARC-V MNT FLOAT	30	35						100	100	97	83	73	97	90	100
BARC	8	10	50	50	50		50	25	25	25	25	38	38	25	20
LCM-8	57	57	32	35	33		28	28	30	32	30	25	21	23	33
LCU	12	12	0	17	0		8	25	25	17	17	33	8	33	58
TRK, CGO, 2½ TON	548	540	13	17	18		20	19	15	13	17	16	17	19	21
TRK, TRCTP, 5 TON	427	420	24	22	21		22	20	20	21	21	20	20	20	23
TRCTP, FT, BULLDOZER	24	19	17	17	21		29	36	43	50	43	50	57	39	42
FORKLIFT (RT) 6000	46	56	68	66	61		61	60	54	58	67	77	71	54	50
FORKLIFT (RT) 10000	53	43	54	71	63		62	58	70	80	84	79	74	73	72
FORKLIFT (COML) 3500	0	10	36	27	45		45	64	45	30	50	50	40	40	40
FORKLIFT (COML) 6000	45	31	11	17	13		18	32	28	36	33	24	38	31	29
FORKLIFT (COML) 15000	18	36	17	17	31		27	38	35	35	38	42	38	34	28
CRANE, TRK, MTD, 20 TON	22	25	42	50	56		59	45	40	37	32	37	37	33	28
CRANE, CRTR, 10 TON	27	27	27	29	35		39	50	39	42	32	40	45	45	26
CRANE, CRTR, 40 TON	9	8	50	50	67		50	50	50	75	75	50	50	25	25
CRANE, FLT, 60 TON	2	2	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50

INC #2

NOMENCLATURE	AUTH	ON HAND	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
CRANE, FLT, 100 TON	1	1	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
TUG, 45'	0	2	50 50 50	50 50 0	0 0 0
TUG, 65'	3	2	50 50 50	0 50 50	50 0 0
TUG, 100'	-	-	- - -	- - -	- - -
TUG, 143'	-	-	- - -	- - -	- - -
PATROL BOAT	2	2	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 50
GEN SET 5 KW	73	65	56 73 61	49 65 51	44 47 47
GEN SET 10 KW	3	3	33 67 33	25 50 50	67 25 33
GEN SET 30 KW	4	4	25 25 0	0 0 0	0 0 25

PORT PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

		<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
SAIGON	Discharge S/T	82,397	97,445	85,706
	M/T	254,861	242,347	200,484
	Handled S/T	109,363	116,965	112,213
	M/T	301,235	301,175	243,961
NHA BE	Discharge S/T	22,918	15,100	19,383
	M/T		16,300	15,989
	Handled S/T		16,022	18,438
	M/T		16,777	17,145
VUNG TAU	Discharge S/T	1,798	3,916	6,732
	M/T	3,968	6,140	15,160
	Handled S/T	2,296	3,823	7,248
	M/T	6,447	6,735	17,070
CAM RANH BAY	Discharge S/T	39,959	44,688	38,975
	M/T	94,147	93,816	69,845
	Handled S/T	42,341	49,505	45,197
	M/T	110,908	108,233	84,947
PHAN RANG	Discharge S/T	Port Opened by 4th TC units Nov 1965	9,818	2,922
	M/T		18,763	6,198
	Handled S/T		10,059	3,052
	M/T		19,356	7,004
NHA TRANG	Discharge S/T	12,803	11,364	10,597
	M/T	26,288	18,029	20,768
	Handled S/T	12,828	11,706	11,031
	M/T	26,338	19,817	23,159

Incl # 3

PORT PERFORMANCE SUMMARY CON'T

		<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
QUI NHON	Discharge S/T	29,202	32,190	34,358
	M/T	79,639	66,464	73,316
	Handled S/T	30,716	37,813	35,124
	M/T	88,230	97,424	76,330
 <u>TOTAL</u>				
ALL PORTS	Discharge S/T	189,077	214,224	196,673
	M/T	481,821	461,859	401,760
	Handled S/T	220,462	245,893	232,303
	M/T	556,076	569,517	469,616

Total passengers discharged during period was 29,323.

	<u>SAIGON</u>	<u>VUNG TAU</u>	<u>NHA TRANG</u>	<u>CAM RANH</u>	<u>QUI NHON</u>
TROOP SHIPS	1	15	1	8	10
NO. OF TROOPS	874	19,646	142	3,084	5,577

HEADQUARTERS
4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TERMINAL A)
APO US Forces 96307

AVLC-TA-S3

28 November 1965

SUBJECT: Operation "BIG RED" After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Logistical Command
APO US Forces 96307

1. References:

a. Operation Plan 2-65, Headquarters 1st Logistical Command, dated 061300 September 1965.

b. Change 1 to Operation Plan 2-65, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, dated 251500 September 1965.

c. Operation Order 9, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command (Terminal A), dated 221600 September 1965.

d. Change 1 to Operation Order 9, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command (Terminal A), dated 021800 October 1965.

e. Letter, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, AVLC-GO-P, Subject: Operation BIG RED After Action Report, dated 10 November 1965.

2. Planning for Operation "BIG RED" began on 4 September 1965 and was accomplished as a joint effort with a representative of the 1st Logistical Command Transportation Office. This proved to be invaluable as ideas and information were freely exchanged and close liaison between the two headquarters was maintained. No major problem areas were encountered in the planning phase. It was planned to discharge each vessel and clear the cargo and equipment from the ports within 24 hours after each vessel was berthed. Personnel, cargo and equipment was to be discharged and transported to a staging area where the units would prepare for the move to forward areas. The move to the forward areas was a division operation augmented with transportation and MHE from this command. Except for a few minor variations, operation "BIG RED" was executed as planned. The 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) performed the discharge and transport of supplies, equipment and personnel in support of the operation which was supported from three geographically separated sites which were: Saigon Port (Berths KO - KI), Vung Tau sub-port

INCL#4

28 November 1965

SUBJECT: Operation "Big Red" After Action Report

and a highway movement from Bien Hoa airfield to the Bien Hoa staging area. Inclosure 1 attached, compares programmed vessel arrival versus actual arrival times, vessel time in port, 'conex's and vehicles discharged, tonnages discharged and programmed versus actual tonnages.

3. Saigon Port Operations: All cargo vessels were discharged at berths KO - KI Saigon Port and are indicated in Inclosure 1. Total tracked vehicles discharged were thirty-two (32) M48 A3 tanks, eight (8) M88 VTR's, five (5) M110 8" Howitzer SP, one-hundred fourteen (114) M113 APC's, eight (8) M577 Command Post Vehicles, and ten (10) D8 Bulldozers. Movement of tracked vehicles through Saigon City could not be affected as a result of heavy traffic congestion during the hours of 0600 - 2300, and possible damage to asphalt road surface incurred by steel cleated tank treads. The D8 Bulldozers and 18 APC's were moved to the Bien Hoa Staging Area by 25 ton "Lowboy" trailers. The remainder of the tracked vehicles were discharged in LCM MKVIII's of the 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) and transported to "G" or "M" ramp of the Vietnamese Navy Yard. These tracks were driven to a convoy assembly area for movement to the Bien Hoa Staging Area between the hours of 2400 - 0500 (Saigon curfew Period) in avoidance of city traffic. Wheeled vehicles (total 2190) were staged outside the port in elements not exceeding fifteen vehicles and dispatched in thirty minute intervals to final destination. A total of 138 convoys were dispatched from the port during the operational period. Highway escort was provided by the 89th Military Police Group from the Saigon Port to the Highway 1A Bridge over the Dong Nai River and from there on to the Staging Area by security elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, on a twenty-four hour basis. Vehicles were serviced at pier side by the 79th Ordnance Group Contact Team. Fueling was provided by the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) with two (2) 5,000 gallon tanker trailers - one with Diesel, the other with MOGAS. A total of 3,000 gallons of MOGAS and 4,400 gallons of Diesel was dispensed during the operation. Port control was exercised through a mobile van, staffed 24 hours per day with personnel of the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) having wire communication forward to Division. In addition, briefing charts were available to visitors to give an accurate status of the "BIG RED" operation as it progressed. Four major problem areas were encountered which if corrected will greatly enhance future operations of this nature.

a. There was a shortage of MHE in the staging area. The inability of the division supply points and units to receive (off-load) equipment and supplies in the staging area caused an excessive loss of time for line haul trucks waiting to be off-loaded.

AVIC-TA-S3

28 November 1965

SUBJECT: Operation "BIG RED" After Action Report

b. Poor communication between Bien Hoa airfield and staging area.

c. Prime movers were over stowed with trailers on some Vessels which caused congestion in the limited port vehicle holding area.

d. In many instances, priority "BIG RED" equipment and cargo was over stowed with cargo destined for other consignees thereby interrupting the smooth flow of cargo to the staging area.

4. Vung Tau Operation: The Vung Tau Sub-port Operation consisted of moving passengers from the below listed troop ships to the 8th Aerial Port, Vung Tau Air Field, for air transshipment to the Bien Hoa Air Field.

<u>DTD</u>	<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>PAX</u>
6 Oct 65	Sultan	2303
13 Oct 65	Mann	2828
15 Oct 65	Blatchford	3504
18 Oct 65	Barrett	2296

Passengers and personal baggage were transported ashore with three (3) LCU's of the 97th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat). They were then moved from the beach to the air field by a squad of 2½ ton trucks from the 120th Transportation Company (Light Truck). The bulk of TAT was transhipped aboard IST's to Saigon Port and trucked to the Bien Hoa Staging Area. No significant problems were encountered in this portion of the operation.

5. Bien Hoa Air Field to Bien Hoa Staging Area: Five (5) S & P personnel transporters (modified M-127 trailer for 55 passengers) and twenty (20) 2½ ton trucks made 39 round trips from the Bien Hoa Air Field to the Staging Area. March tables computed prior to this part of the operation were 96 percent accurate. However, irregular arrival of aircraft resulted in slight delays for troops awaiting truck transportation to the staging area.

6. Line Haul and Supply: Total Class I delivered to the Bien Hoa Staging Area amounted to 186 S/T. Class V deliveries exceeded 7,100 S/T during the period which was sufficient to sustain Division initial requirements. In addition, 1,574 S/T of unitized Class II & IV was moved to the staging area. Potable water resupply was effected at approximately

AVIC-TA-S3

28 November 1965

SUBJECT: Operation "BIG RED" After Action Report

20,000 gallons per day using two (2) 5,000 gallon tankers.

7. Recommendations for future large unit moves:

a. That in future operations of this nature division S & T Battalions and MHE be loaded aboard the first vessel arriving at the destination port.

b. Maximum use of direct line VHF phone patch between all key areas. Land lines through commercial or military switchboards should be avoided.

c. Prime movers should not be overstowed with trailers.

d. Organizational equipment and supplies loaded on a vessel with cargo for other consignees should be stowed so as to permit uninterrupted discharge of organizational cargo.


8. Conclusions: The entire operation was, for the most part, highly successful. A minimum of time was used in processing troops, equipment and supplies through the ports to the staging area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

/s/L. A. O'CONNELL
/t/L. A. O'CONNELL
Major, AGC
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY:


PATRICK E. REA
2nd Lt, QMC
Historical Officer

VESSEL	PROGRAMMED ETA	ATA AND DATE STARTED	DATE COMPLETED	VESSEL TIME IN CONEXES PORT (HOURS)*	VEHICLES	M/T	S/T
American Chieftan	02 Oct 65	04 Oct 65	05 Oct 65	29	281	12070	3558
American Commander	04 Oct 65	05 Oct 65	06 Oct 65	26	169	5078	1181
American Charger	03 Oct 65	07 Oct 65	09 Oct 65	43	44	341	1410
Mormac Vega	04 Oct 65	09 Oct 65	11 Oct 65	42	188	1364	4431
American Contractor	07 Oct 65	11 Oct 65	12 Oct 65	28	103	1552	7525
Mormac Draco	12 Oct 65	12 Oct 65	14 Oct 65	48	81	4421	1021
Jean Lykes	15 Oct 65	16 Oct 65	17 Oct 65	29	104	3138	781
Mormac Lynx	14 Oct 65	17 Oct 65	18 Oct 65	18	204	4380	891
USNS Robinson	17 Oct 65	20 Oct 65	21 Oct 65	23	414	5250	1207
Sheldon Lykes	17 Oct 65	22 Oct 65	23 Oct 65	27	199	6510	1580
Solon Thurman	23 Oct 65	25 Oct 65	27 Oct 65	41	98	3020	750
Santa Monica	25 Oct 65	31 Oct 65	02 Nov 65	51	95	979	255
Doctor Lykes	23 Oct 65	28 Oct 65	30 Oct 65	45	152	5558	1325
USNS COKE (Aircraft Carrier)	17 Oct 65	30 Oct 65	07 Nov 65	N/A	72 Rotary Wing A/C Off loaded at Saigon 4 OV-1 Off loaded at Subic Bay		

* Includes time required to discharge other consignee cargo and receipt of sailing orders

NOTE: Original planning indicated over 93,688 M/T of cargo would be involved. Actual discharge and clearance figures quoted above plus the TAT aboard PAX vessels totals approximately 55,846 M/T of cargo.

INC 1 #1 to INC 1 #4

VESSEL	PROGRAMMED ETA	ATA AND DATE STARTED	DATE COMPLETED	VESSEL PORT (HOURS)*	IN CONEXES	VEHICLES	M/T	S/T
American Chieftan	02 Oct 65	04 Oct 65	05 Oct 65	29	69	281	12070	3558
American Commander	04 Oct 65	05 Oct 65	06 Oct 65	26	6	169	5078	1181
American Charger	03 Oct 65	07 Oct 65	09 Oct 65	43	19	44	341	1410
Mormac Vega	04 Oct 65	09 Oct 65	11 Oct 65	42	0	188	1364	4431
American Contractor	07 Oct 65	11 Oct 65	12 Oct 65	28	88	103	1552	7525
Mormac Draco	12 Oct 65	12 Oct 65	14 Oct 65	48	0	81	4421	1021
Jean Lykes	15 Oct 65	16 Oct 65	17 Oct 65	29	203	104	3138	781
Mormac Lynx	14 Oct 65	17 Oct 65	18 Oct 65	18	14	204	4380	891
USNS Robinson	17 Oct 65	20 Oct 65	21 Oct 65	23	31	414	5250	1207
Sheldon Lykes	17 Oct 65	22 Oct 65	23 Oct 65	27	96	199	6510	1580
Solon Thurman	23 Oct 65	25 Oct 65	27 Oct 65	41	0	98	3020	750
Santa Monica	25 Oct 65	31 Oct 65	02 Nov 65	51	0	95	979	255
Doctor Lykes	23 Oct 65	28 Oct 65	30 Oct 65	45	8	152	5558	1325
USNS CORE (Aircraft Carrier)	17 Oct 65	30 Oct 65	07 Nov 65	N/A	72 Rotary Wing A/C Off loaded at Saigon 4 OV-1 Off loaded at Subic Bay			

* Includes time required to discharge other consignee cargo and receipt of sailing orders

NOTE: Original planning indicated over 93,688 M/T of cargo would be involved. Actual discharge and clearance figures quoted above plus the TAT aboard PAX vessels totals approximately 55,846 M/T of cargo.

Incl #1 to Incl #4

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
394TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
APO US Forces 96238

AVLC-QUI-394-S3

✓ 2 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report "OPERATION GOODFRIEND" (U) ✓

TO: Commanding Officer
4th Transportation Command (Terminal A)
ATTN: AVLC TA-OPN
APO US Forces 96307

1. (U) References:

a. Letter, your headquarters, 20 November 1965, subject as above (C).

b. OPORD 10, your headquarters, 021400 October 1965 (S).

2. (C) Narrative Description: The 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) was given the mission to debark and clear personnel and equipment of one Republic of Korea (ROK) Army Division and associated nondivisional troops through the port of Qui Nhon to marshalling and destination areas. The operation began with the arrival of the troop ship USNS Geiger at 071015 October 1965. The ROK military elements arrived and were processed in three increments, with the final vessel, LST 815, being completed on 10 November 1965. As in the previously executed "OPERATION HIGHLAND", three beach landing areas were utilized. LST's arriving were discharged at either the LST beach or the LST ramp on Red Beach. Deep draft vessels were discharged in the stream utilizing both Army and Navy lighters, bringing passengers to Blue Beach; general cargo and vehicles to Red and the LST Beach. Once ashore, troops and cargo were cleared to marshalling areas or final destinations utilizing US and ROK wheeled vehicles and rail transportation.

3. (C) Terminal Operations:

a. Lighterage:

(1) Both lighterage assigned to the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) and that organic to the US Navy APAs and AKAs were utilized to discharge deep draft vessels in the stream. Navy lighterage was controlled by the Primary Control Station, USS Merrick with Army lighterage remaining under the control of the 394th Transportation Battalion Harbormaster.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl #5

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-QUI-394-S3

2 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report "OPERATION GOODFRIEND" (U)

(2) Initially, the "company beach" concept was employed, with all cargo from one ship being discharged on one beach operated by one terminal service company. However, surf conditions became extremely hazardous, causing three of the Navy's LCM-6's to broach on Red Beach during the first day of operation. Due to the surf and beach conditions, it was determined that only LCM-8's and LCU's were capable of working Red Beach, with the smaller LCM-6's discharging at the more protected LST Beach. In view of the number of vehicles to be discharged which exceeded the capability of the LCM-6, that craft was assigned to transport general cargo only to the LST Beach, with the larger craft ferrying vehicles and weapons to Red Beach. This required the terminal service units to have shore platoon representation on both beaches to insure accuracy of documentation.

(3) Tactical support missions during "OPERATION GOODFRIEND" adversely affected the lighterage capability of the battalion. On 25 October a support commitment was met with three LCU's and 4 LCM-8's for a coastal run to Tuy Hoa. A further commitment to Tuy Hoa, requiring two LCU's and two LCM-8's, was accomplished on 31 October 1965.

(4) Maintenance support capability was not significantly changed from the earlier "OPERATION HIGHLAND". Average availability was:

LCU - three

LCM-8 - fourteen

LCM-6 - six (US Navy)

LARC - thirteen

BARC - two

(5) During the reported period, the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) also employed personnel and lighterage on the following non-GOODFRIEND vessels:

(a) Pan Oceanic Faith

(b) Patrick

(c) Gordon

(d) American Hunter

(e) Herkimer

(f) Comet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-QUI-394-S3

SUBJECT: After Action Report "OPERATION GOODFRIEND" (U)

2 December 1965

- (g) Island Skipper
- (h) Mormac Lynx
- (i) Brinton Lykes
- (j) Navajo Victory
- (k) James Lykes
- (l) African Crescent
- (m) Young America
- (n) Antinous
- (o) Esparta
- (p) Buckner

b. Cargo Discharge:

(1) Upon arrival of the second increment, containing the APAs and AKAs, it was found that, contrary to earlier indications, the US Navy was not capable of accomplishing the discharge of ships with assigned personnel. Terminal service units of this command were assigned to discharge vessels, to be augmented when required by ships personnel. This augmentation, along with the additional lighterage, allowed a greater number of ships to be worked concurrently. This policy of dispersion resulted in a longer off loading time per ship, however, had minimum effect on the overall time frame of the operation. Operations were delayed several times due to wind, rain and heavy seas, and was slowed appreciably due to tactical support requirements for lighterage.

(2) Off loading of lighterage on the beach was an area of delay. The augmentation of the ship gangs by Naval personnel and the additional lighterage resulted in the cargo handling capability of the shore platoon being exceeded. Additional personnel for the shore platoon were obtained through coordination with the 27th Transportation Battalion (Motor Transport), partially alleviating the situation. MHE deadline was a major factor in the delay of lighterage discharge. Maintenance support and spare parts availability remain critical in this area. Further delay was due to the small beach front available on the LST Beach. Lighterage on many occasions

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-QUI-394-S3

2 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report "OPERATION GOODFRIEND"

were required to wait in the stream for space on the beach. Maximum emphasis is needed in the areas of personnel replacements and maintenance/spare parts for MHE.

(3) Some problems were encountered when, at the request of ROK authorities, selective discharge was accomplished on certain items. On the Beloit Victory, immediately upon arrival, maximum emphasis was placed on the discharge of artillery and prime movers. Wheeled vehicles located in Number 1 lower hold, required for immediate use, were overstowed by slow moving drums of POL. This may have been precluded by stowing in precedence of discharge at the port of origin.

(4) Documentation procedures are not employed by the US Navy on these operations, according to the Staff Combat Cargo Officer, Comphibron 7. Maximum coordination was required to insure that Navy light-erage, under the control of Primary Control Station was not shifted between ships without notification to the appropriate shore platoon, so that TCMD flow remained within the same company for accurate tally. A shortage of blank TCMD's prevailed throughout the reported period. No manifests were received on incoming vessels, and classified TWX messages giving cargo tally were not received in many cases before the vessel was completed. Cubes and weights were listed in Metric measurements, creating a conversion problem for statistical records. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining signatures on TCMD's indicating receipt of cargo. This was due in large part to the language problem existing and the utilization of ROK clearance trucks. Although a ROK Transportation Officer was assigned as liaison, his duties were many and various and he was unable to remain in close contact with the Operations Section at all times. In future third country moves, recommend that a liaison officer be assigned specifically to the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal).

(5) Passenger discharge was accomplished across Blue Beach via LCU, where trucks were waiting. The discharge was delayed slightly by parades and receptions. This organization was unable to expedite troop discharge in accordance with transportation capabilities and limitations, but rather in accordance with administrative restrictions. Troop discharge normally began around 0900, although the norm in this area is 0630. This resulted in highway transportation being involved longer than necessary for troop transport, detracting from beach clearance capabilities. Rail was used to good advantage for troop transport, allowing a fast turn around for trucks and subsequent release for cargo clearance. Rail utilization was coordinated by the 27th Transportation Battalion (Motor Transport).

c. Port and Beach Clearance:

(1) Storage space for intransit cargo is extremely limited in the Qui Nhon area. Although every effort was expended to insure maximum

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC-QUI-394-S3

2 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report "OPERATION GOODFRIEND" (U)

emphasis on beach clearance, cargo inevitably began to backlog on the beach. This problem area became more pronounced when surf conditions restricted the use of Red Beach, requiring all general cargo to be cleared across the very small IST Beach. Truck availability was adversely affected by the requirements for troop transport, the long turn-around time necessitated by clearance directly to destination, and the road limitations restricting the use of S&P's in some instances.

(2) For security reasons and at the request of the ROK Army, all vehicles enroute to destination required an escort vehicle. Delay was encountered to assemble approximately 20 vehicles per convoy, increasing the turn around time. This was later reduced to 10 trucks per convoy.

(3) Movement between the port area and destination could be accomplished during daylight hours only, the roads being insecure after dark. The result was that all trucks loaded after 1600 hours were held overnight in a marshalling area and convoyed to destination at first light, the following day. The vehicles returned from destination and were available for further loading at approximately 1000 hours, a turn around time of 18 hours. Due to this requirement, available trucks were usually exhausted by 0100, with all subsequent cargo off loaded from lighterage being placed in beach storage.

(4) When beach congestion became critical later in the operation, space was allocated in the depot complex for temporary storage of selected items of cargo. MHE was shifted to these areas and S&P's were utilized to clear cargo from the beach at night, so that any light trucks under load could remain loaded for early morning convoy. This gave temporary relief from beach congestion but required double handling of cargo.

(5) To support beach clearance operations ROK Army wheeled vehicles were made available in varying amounts from 10 to 40 trucks daily.

d. Recommendations:

(1) Planning phase: If feasible, conduct preplanning conference at a lower level than the planning group conducted during "GOODFRIEND". Planning conference should include review of stow plans and manifests for incoming vessels, priorities for vessels, disposition of cargo when ashore. In-transit storage areas determined, location of and requirements for MHE, special clearance and handling procedures should be discussed. Primarily, names and locations of third country receiving personnel who will render decisions on cargo disposition can be ascertained.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-QUI-394-S3

2 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report "OPERATION GOODFRIEND" (U)

(2) Execution Phase: During the execution, liaison personnel of sufficient rank to make immediate decisions pertaining to deviations from planned procedures should be readily available. Tactical support missions placed against lighterage should be limited during major operations. The slowest moving cargo was drums of POL, approximately 11,500 each. Prestocking or other means of resupply of POL would expedite discharge.

2 Incl

1. Summary of Debarkation
2. Troop List

/s/Norman L. Kirby
/t/NORMAN L. KIRBY
Lt. Col., TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY:



PATRICK E. REA
2/Lt., QMC
Historical Officer

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF DEBARKATION - OPERATION GOODFRIEND

<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>DEBARKATION COMPLETED</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>VEH</u>	<u>HOW OR RR</u>	<u>CARGO L/T</u>
LSD 22 CABILDO	19 October	19 October	144	122		544.5
ISD 2 BELLE GROVE	23 October	25 October	153	125		709.3
AKA 96 MATHEWS	22 October	26 October	88	97		1647.3
AKA 97 MERRICK	22 October	26 October	86	128		1225.9
GEIGER	7 October	8 October	647	---		17.5
APA 32 BAYFIELD	23 October	25 October	888	243		202.5
APA 33 CALVERT	22 October	24 October	1398	39		342.6
APA 199 MC GOFFIN	23 October	25 October	1557	21		150.3
ELTINGE	20 October	24 October	2985	---		41.8
LST 809 ROKN	9 October	10 October	---	---		255.5
LST 813	9 October	9 October	---	---		255.6
BELOIT VICTORY	24 October	2 November	6	76	24	2897.3
APA 248 PAUL REVERE	1 November	3 November	1776	3		436.7
LST 1157 TERNELL CTY	2 November	2 November	259	43		-----
LST 1159 TOM GREEN CYT	2 November	2 November	403	---		-----

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl #1 to Incl #5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF DEBARKATION - OPERATION GOODFRIEND

<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>DEBARKATION COMPLETED</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>VEH</u>	<u>HOW OR RR</u>	<u>CARGO L/T</u>
LST 1161 VERNON CYT	2 November	2 November	383	41	12	210.3
LST 1170 WINDHAM CTY	2 November	3 November	361	27		248
LST 1168 WEXFORD	2 November	3 November	405	33		241
LST 1167 WESTCHESTER	2 November	2 November	372	37	12	193.9
LST 813 ROKN	10 November	10 November	192	---		1.7
LST 815 ROKN	10 November	10 November	195	---		2.2
		TOTAL:	12298	1035	48	9623.9

2
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TROOP LIST OF UNITS ASSIGNED TO 394TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
OPERATION GOODFRIEND

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal)

71st Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

119th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

155th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

344th Transportation Company (LARC)

1098th Transportation Company (Medium Boat)

355th Transportation Detachment (BC)

168th Transportation Detachment (TM)

585th Transportation Detachment (FL)

253d Transportation Detachment (Amph Maint)

14th Transportation Platoon (BARC)

274th Transportation Detachment (TME)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl # 2 to Incl # 5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
10TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
APO US Forces 96312

AVLOG-TA-10-3

10 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report "Operation Goodfriend" (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
4th Transportation Command (Terminal "A")
ATTN: S-3 Operations
APO US Forces 96307

1. (U) Attached as Inclosure #1 is a copy of the after-action report on "Operation Goodfriend". This report was submitted to Commanding Officer, Cam Ranh Bay Logistics Area, APO US Forces 96312 on 20 October 1965.


2. (U) This letter is regarded unclassified upon separation from its classified inclosure.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

/s/ROBERT G. HAID
/t/ROBERT G. HAID
1st Lt, TC
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY


PATRICK E. REA
2nd Lt, QMC
Historical Officer

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl #6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS

10TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
APO US Forces 96312

AVLOG-TA-10-3

10 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report "Operation Goodfriend" (C)

TO: Commanding Officer
4th Transportation Command (Terminal "A")
ATTN: S-3 Operation
APO US Forces 96307

1. (C) The movement of troops and cargo in support of Operation Goodfriend was conducted in four (4) phases.

a. Phase I - Discharge of troops and cargo from the USNS General Eltinge from 9 October 1965 to 10 October 1965 per Incl #1.

b. Phase II - Discharge of troops and cargo from the USNS Geiger from 9 October 1965 to 10 October 1965 per Incl #2.

c. Phase III - Discharge of troops and cargo from the five (5) Korean Navy LST's from 9 October 1965 to 10 October 1965 per Incl #3.

d. Phase IV - Discharge of drivers and cargo from USNS Comet from 8 October 1965 to 15 October 1965. The Comet had 2,234 long tons of cargo which included one-hundred and thirty-four (134) vehicles and general cargo.

2. (C) Equipment used.

a. 2 - Tugs.

b. 2 - BC Barges.

c. 6 - LCM's.

d. 60 - 2½ ton trucks.

e. 15 - 12 Ton S & P Truck Trailers.

f. 16 - ½ Ton Trucks, 8 to VIP's and 8 to control.

g. 1 - Bulldozer.

h. Material Handling Equipment.

i. 1 - J-Boat.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl #1 to Incl #4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLOG-TA-10-3

10 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report "Operation Goodfriend" (C)

- j. 6 - VRC-10 Radios.
- k. 2 - LARC V's.
- 3. (C) Personnel.
 - a. Boat Crews - 60 men.
 - b. Truck Drivers - 150 men.
 - c. Control personnel - 9 Officers, 18 EM.
 - d. Stevedores - 6 gangs of 12 men each = 72 man shift and two shifts per day.
- 4. (C) Problem Areas Encountered. A possible problem area which was solved by the ROK Marine Advance Party was the destination of the cargo and the troop debarkation plan. The problems encountered were always quickly taken in hand by the ROK Advanced Party and quickly resolved. The willingness and eagerness of the advance party to cooperate made possible the flow of troops and cargo to their assembly areas. Without this cooperation, most of our efforts would have been in vain.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incl
as

/s/ROBERT G. HAID
/t/ROBERT G. HAID
1st Lt, TC
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

MOVEMENT PLAN PHASE I

9 October 1965

Ser #	Pier SP	Veh #	Pers #	Unit	East Ferry CP1	West Ferry CP2	RP
1	0900	10	207	9th Co	0921	0945	1000
2	0930	10	207	10th T Co	1000	1020	1035
3	1000	10	207	11th T Co	1030	1047	1100
4	1030	11	221	3rd Bn Hq Co	1054	1107	1114
5	1100	10	207	5th Co	1120	1137	1152
6	1130	10	207	6th Co	1150	1210	1220
7	1200	10	207	7th Co	1220	1242	1257
8	1230	11	221	2nd Bn Hq Co	1252	1304	1315
9	1300	11	227	BDE Hq Co	1320	1340	1355
10	1330	6	22 82	22nd Avn Co Sec Co	1350	1405	1410
11	1400	12	121 121	Army 155 Unit Army Engr Unit	1422	1435	1457
12	1430	10	200	Army Log Supt Grp	1450	1503	1531
13	1500	9	182	Army Log Supt Grp	1521	1537	1546
14		5	107	Army Log Spt Grp	Drivers for COMET		

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl #1 to Incl #14 to Incl #6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MOVEMENT PLAN PHASE II

10 October 1965

Ser #	Pier SP	Veh #	Pers #	Unit	East Ferry CP1	West Ferry CP2	RP
1	0900	10	91 100	Hvy Wpns Co 6th Arty Btry	0921	0940	0950
2	0930	10	100 101	7th Arty Btry Hq Btry	0953	1004	1025
3	1000	10	162	Service Co	1021	1036	1045
4	1030	3	47	Coll & Clear Co	1052	1107	1125
5	1100	10	207	1st Co	Cam Ranh Bay		1120
6	1130	10	207	2nd Co	Cam Ranh Bay		1145
7	1200	10	207	3rd Co	Cam Ranh Bay		1213
8	1237	11	221	1st Bn HQ Co	Cam Ranh Bay		1255
9	1300	5	96	5th Arty Bn	Cam Ranh Bay		1310

Total Passengers discharged: 1538

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl#2 to Incl#1 to Incl#6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LST STATUS

LST #	PERS #	VEH #	CGO WT	TIME START	STATUS	TIME FINISH
815	141	62	30 S/T	091130 Oct	Comp	101500 Oct
816	141	57	30 S/T	091500 Oct	Comp	091900 Oct
807	141	65	31 S/T	091615 Oct	Comp	102000 Oct
810	141	61	30 S/T	091600 Oct	Comp	101845 Oct
808	141	55	30 S/T	090730 Oct	Comp	101030 Oct

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl #3 to Incl #4 to Incl #6

SHORT TONS MOVED BY TRUCK
(Includes Local and Line Haul)

	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
Saigon (11th T Bn (Tml))	66,561	47,758	66,090
Cam Ranh Bay (10th T Bn (Tml))	14,623	20,864	56,341
Qui Nhon (27th T Bn (Trk)) (394th T Bn (Tml))	65,458	59,475	72,378
TOTALS:	145,732	128,097	194,809

CONFIDENTIAL

AVLC GO-H (27 Jan 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965. (U)
RCS CSGPO-28 (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND, APO US Forces 96307 22 FEB 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVC (Historical Officer), APO US Forces 96307

1.(U) Forwarded in accordance with AR 525-24, dtd 29 Oct 59, is the Quarterly Command Report of the 4th Transportation Command.

2.(U) Concur with the recommendations of the commander.

3.(U) Reference paragraph 12 Section I: New stevedore contracts were negotiated and became effective on 1 January 1966. Funding requirements for operations prior to 1 January were funded with assistance in kind (AIK) resources and beginning 1 January forward will be OMA funded.

4.(U) Reference Section II: Commanders Recommendations: This headquarters has recommended to MMMS that a single port of discharge be planned to the maximum extent possible. Manifest distribution now includes all ports and in-country distribution is being accomplished.

5.(U) Valuable time is lost at the Sai on Army Terminal in waiting for overstowed commercial cargo to be discharged from ships containing both military and commercial cargo. The use of commercial vessels for small amounts of military cargo should be reduced to an absolute minimum for economy of operation in RVN ports.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


EVERT R. HOUSE
1st Lt AGC
Asst Adj Gen

8 Incl
nc

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWN CLASSIFIED
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

on route and.
Measurement Tons Awaiting Discharge

	22 Nov	29 Nov	6 Dec	13 Dec	22 Dec	29 Dec
Saigon	288530	233235	285353	334774	272131	298095
Nha Be	34451	37560	47756	62795	88365	49354
Vung Tau	15653	8060	17792	12962	7909	718
Cam Rahn Bay	87209	68692	94137	100282	90191	80579
Nha Trang	17132	18766	28016	24810	27059	23071
Qui Nhon	<u>90345</u>	<u>84338</u>	<u>124791</u>	<u>120096</u>	<u>113679</u>	<u>104405</u>
Total	533320	450651	597845	655719	599334	556222

15646
63
m r

CONFIDENTIAL

AVC (27 Jan 66)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965,
RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307 **MAR 05 1966**

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH,
APO US Forces 96558

(U) Concur with the 4th Transportation Command Commander's recommendations and with the first indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for JX Terry Capt AGC

HENRY L. DENNEY
CWO USA
Asst Adj Gen

"This document may be regraded "UNCLASSIFIED"
when separated from classified inclosure"

CONFIDENTIAL

3-028

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-MH (27 Jan 66)

3d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965,
RCS CSGPO-28 (R1) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

1 APR 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army,
Washington D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Command Report of the 4th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 December 1965 is forwarded herewith. This is a highly informative report, the value of which is enhanced by the attachment of supporting documents.

2. (C) The following comments are keyed to paragraphs of the basic Command Report:

a. Paragraph 5a & 6. Concur. Appropriate additional control Headquarters are to be considered to meet future requirements.

b. Paragraph 9. Establishment of Red Ball Express (RBE) in December 1965 has a noticeable effect on percent of deadline equipment since the end of the reporting period.

c. Paragraph 21a. This problem is under active study and has been brought to the attention of appropriate agencies. It is believed that a solution or at least significant improvements will be forthcoming.

d. Paragraph 22. This condition does not now exist. Improved conditions, facilities competence have reduced ships backlog and waiting time to a point where efforts are being devoted to increase the number of ships in RVN ports.

e. Paragraph 25. To improve this situation this Headquarters has obtained from 1st Logistical Command their forecast port capabilities, monthly tonnages desired, and number of ships desired working and waiting. This information has been passed to MMTS and AMC with a request that shipping be geared to meet 1st Logistical Command requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D. A. HARRISON
Capt, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

63
MH

AVC (31 Dec 65) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965
(RCS CSGPO-28 (R1))

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

MAR 18 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH,
APO US Forces 96558

1. (U) Concur with the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 17th Artillery,
Commander's recommendations and with the first three indorsements.

2. (U) Reference paragraph 2, 3d Indorsement: Subject letter has
been forwarded by this headquarters to MACV Training Directorate for
concurrences and/or comments. This recommended action will involve
training considerations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



HENRY L. DENNEY
CWO USA
Asst Adj Gen

GPOP-MH (31 Dec 65) 5th Ind (U)


HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 APR 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army,
Washington D.C. 20310

The Command Report of the 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery, for the
quarterly period ending 31 December 1965 is forwarded herewith.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

2 Incl
nc



D. A. HARRISON
Capt, AGC
Asst AG

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED -
UNCLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

3-92