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20310

AUTHORITY

C to U: 31 May 1979 per DoDD 5200.10 gp-4. C/2 to A/1 per AGO letter
dated 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
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IN REPLY REFER TO
 AGAM-P (M) (8 May 67) FOR OT

19 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 2d Battalion,
 34th Armor for Period Ending 31 January 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2D Battalion, 34th Armor for period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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(Continued on page 2)

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HEADQUARTERS
2D BATTALION, 34TH ARMOR
APO San Francisco 96266

17 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force, Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20311

The inclosed Operational Report is forwarded in compliance with
AR 1-19 and USARV Circular 870-2.

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as

Raymond L. Stailey
RAYMOND L STAILEY
LTC, Armor
Commanding

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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. Personnel:

a. Unit Strengths:

	<u>AUTH</u>			<u>ASG</u>			<u>FFD</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
HHC	19	3	277	14	3	288	13	3	237
Co A	5		87	5		88	5		86
Co B	5		87	5		84	5		84
Co C	5		87	5		77	5		75
TOTAL	34	3	538	29	3	537	28	3	492

b. Gains, Losses, and Balances:

	<u>GAINS</u>			<u>LOSSES</u>			<u>BALANCE</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
HHC	1		29	6		8	-5	0	+21
Co A	1			1		1	0	0	-1
Co B			5	1		9	-1	0	-4
Co C	1		2	1		10	0	0	-8
TOTAL	3	0	36	9	0	28	-6	0	+8

c. Battle and Non-Battle Casualties:

- (1) Battle Casualties: 78
- (2) Battle Casualties Evacuated: 10
- (3) Non-Battle Casualties: 5
- (4) Non-Battle Casualties Evac: 4

d. Mail: Mail service during the period was excellent.

e. During the period the battalion received the following R&R allocations:

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Hong Kong	-	15
Tokyo	-	18
Taipei	-	2
Manila	-	2
Penang	-	2
Hawaii	-	18
Bangkok	-	5

f. Promotions: During the period the following promotion allocations were received by the battalion:

E-7	-	0
E-6	-	4
E-5	-	20
E-4	-	178

g. Awards and Decorations: During the period the Battalion submitted the following recommendations for awards:

	<u>SUBMITTED</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>
(1) Bronze Star with V	7	2
(2) Bronze Star	24	21
(3) Army Commendation Medal	20	19

h. Miscellaneous: Religious services were conducted weekly at the base camp by the Chaplain of the 5th Bn 2d Arty. Chaplain support in field locations was spotty.

2. Intelligence:

a. Contact with enemy troops during this period was light. There were no engagements with major forces. Contact with mines and booby traps was considered heavy

b. Enemy losses: See Annex C.

c. Friendly losses:

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(1) Personnel:

- (a) KHA - 7
- (b) DOW - 1
- (c) WHA - 70

(2) Equipment:

- (a) Armored Personnel Carriers M113 - 4
- (b) Tank Combat M48A3 - 6

3. Combat Operations:

a. General. During the period covered by this report the 2d Bn 34th Armor has participated in combat operations including Operations Shenandoah, Attleboro II, Battle Creek, Lancaster, Cedar Falls, and Ala Moana. Except for a few days duration, two of the Battalion's line companies have been detached - Company "B", at PHU LOI, under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, and Company "A", at CU CHI, under operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. Each of these companies have their base camp established in the respective Division areas and operate under the control of this Battalion at infrequent periods. When committed, the Battalion (-) normally had either Cavalry, Infantry, or Mechanized Infantry attached to form a Task Force.

b. Operations Shenandoah, Attleboro II, and Battle Creek:

Operation Shenandoah was in progress at the beginning of the reporting period. The 2d Bn 34th Armor was under operational control of the 3d Brigade 1st Infantry Division. Even though each of the operations named above were different, the Battalion remained under the control of the 3d Brigade 1st Infantry Division with basically the same missions throughout. These missions included search and destroy, convoy escort and security, rapid reaction force, defense of the 3d Brigade 1st Infantry Division base camp located at LAI KHE, and reconnaissance in force. During these operations the Battalion was task organized as follows:

- (1) HHC 2/34 Armor (1-30 Nov 66)
- (2) Co B (-) 2/34 Armor (8-21 Nov 66)
- (3) Co C (-) 2/34 Armor (1-30 Nov 66)
- (4) B Trp 1/4 Cav 1st Inf Div (1 Nov 66)
- (5) C Trp 1/4 Cav 1st Inf Div (3-13 Nov 66)
- (6) 36th Ranger Bn (ARVN) (5-9 Nov 66)
- (7) 2 Co's 2d Bn 8th Regt (ARVN) (12-19 Nov 66)

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Even though only light contact was made during these operations, on occasion, the Battalion encountered several command detonated mines. Two of these mines destroyed one APC M113, and one Tank M48A3, beyond repair. Additionally, one tank was destroyed as a result of an RPG-2 rocket. As a whole, the Battalion gained extensive experience in jungle operations, convoy escort and security missions, and vehicle recovery.

c. Operation Lancaster: From 9 through 22 December 1966, the 2d Bn 34th Armor participated in Operation Lancaster under the operational control of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade in the TAY NINH area. Missions assigned were reconnaissance in force, search and destroy, convoy escort and security, and rapid reaction force. Task organization was as follows:

- (1) HHC 2/34 Armor (9-22 Dec 66)
- (2) Co A 2/34 Armor (9-22 Dec 66)
- (3) Co C 2/34 Armor (9-22 Dec 66)
- (4) Co A 3/21 Inf (9-15 Dec 66)
- (5) Co C 4/31 Inf (16-22 Dec 66)
- (6) B Btry 3/82 Arty (9-22 Dec 66)

The missions performed and experience gained during this operation was very similar to that of the previous month. However, the water table in this area was higher. Consequently, of the time spent on search and destroy missions, approximately 35-40 percent was devoted to recovering stuck or mired vehicles. No vehicles were combat losses even though antitank mines continued to be a problem. The Battalion was released from the 196th Light Infantry Brigade control and returned to base camp on 22 December 1966.

d. Operations Cedar Falls and Ala Moana:

(1) During Operation Cedar Falls, (7-26 January 1967) the 2d Bn 34th Armor (-) was placed under the operational control of the 2d Brigade 25th Infantry Division and employed generally in the area of the FIIHOL PLANTATION. The primary mission assigned was to provide a blocking force on the south bank of the SAIGON RIVER in that same vicinity. Additionally, secondary missions of conducting search, destroy, and clearing operations within the FIIHOL PLANTATION were assigned. The Battalion operated with the following task organization:

- (a) HHC 2/34 Armor (7-26 Jan 67)
- (b) Co C 2/34 Armor (7-26 Jan 67)
- (c) Co B 2/34 Armor (7-20 Jan 67)

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- (d) Co B 2/27 Inf (8-26 Jan 67)
- (e) Co B 1/27 Inf (26 Jan 67)
- (f) 1 Plt Co C 1/27 Inf (21 Jan 67)

NOTE 1: Co A 2/34 Armor remained under OPCON of the 25th Infantry Division.

NOTE 2: Co B 2/34 Armor reverted OPCON 1st Infantry Division on 21 Jan 67.

(2) From the Battalion's point of view the most significant part of the operation was the first complete clearing of the FIIHOL PLANTATION which was accomplished by this unit. The Battalion utilized no special equipment or techniques unique to Cedar Falls. Maximum use was made, however, of mine detectors and blades mounted on the front slopes of the M48A3 tanks for clearing operations. The plantation was literally crushed and, in some large areas, the vegetation was piled in long rows similar to fire breaks. Tunnels, bunkers, and spider holes were completely destroyed and filled in.

(3) Enemy losses are contained in Annex C. Friendly losses were light, however, extensive damage was incurred in the tank and personnel carrier suspension systems. In total, the Battalion's vehicles detonated sixty-eight (68) antitank mines. This required forty-six (46) road wheel arm assemblies to be replaced. Two M113 Personnel Carriers and three M48A3 tanks were damaged beyond repair due to antitank mines. Operation Cedar Falls ended on 26 January 1967. Throughout the remaining five (5) days of the month the Battalion continued operations under the control of the 2d Brigade 25th Infantry Division on Operation Ala Moana. In general, the missions assigned (except the blocking mission on the SAIGON RIVER) were the same.

e. Days Engaged in Operations: Of the ninety-two (92) day period covered by this report, the Battalion Headquarters was engaged in combat operations a total of sixty-one (61) days. The tank companies were engaged as follows:

- (1) HHC 61 days
- (2) Co A 64 days
- (3) Co B 86 days
- (4) Co C 61 days

4. Logistics (S4):

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: Three (3) days "B" rations and five (5) days "C" rations on hand. It is noted that during this period the battalion used 180,000 gallons of potable water.

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(2) Class II and IV (less repair parts) Critical Shortages:

- (a) Tank Combat M48A3 4
- (b) Truck, 5-ton 2
- (c) Trailer, 1½-ton 1
- (d) Truck, ½-ton, M151 (Co A) 2
- (e) Tube, Mortar, 4.2" 1

(3) Class III and V Expenditures

- (a) Class III: Diesel 41,500 gal
MOGAS 19,100 gal

(b) Class V:

CTG 90MM Cannister	454 rds
CTG 90MM HEAT	100 rds
CTG 90MM HET	46 rds
CTG 90MM HEP	6 rds
CTG 90MM WP	61 rds
CTG 5.56mm Ball	6800 rds
CTG 7.62mm Ball	10,400 rds
CTG 7.62 Ball Tracer	1130 rds
CTG 7.62mm 4E1	246,400 rds
CTG Cal .45 Ball	18,600 rds
CTG Cal .50 4E1	124,100 rds
CTG 40MM HE F/M79	720 rds
4.2" Mortar HE	126 rds
4.2" Mortar WP	156 rds
4.2" Mortar Illum	412 rds
Grenade, Hand Frag	441

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Grenade, Hand Incen	6
Grenade, Hand CS Riot	34
Grenade, Hand Smoke HC	24
Grenade, Hand Smoke Violet	88
Grenade, Hand Smoke Green	212
Rocket M72 (LAWS)	26
Mine M18A1 (Claymore)	96
Surface Trip Flares	220
White Star Parachute	23
Fuze M412	264
TNT 150 1-lb Blocks	750 lbs
Blasting Caps Non Elec	600
Blasting Caps Elec	740
Detonating Cord	1500 ft
Fuze Blasting Time	2100 ft
Ignitor Time Fuze	240 ft

(4) Supply Transactions:

(a) Requisitions submitted:

1. Non Expendable 92
2. Expendable 464
3. Repair parts 2316

(b) Follow-up Status: Second and, in some cases, third follow-up was taken on supply requests.

(c) IIFORCEV has been requested to give assistance to determine the status of POM requests.

(d) Forty-nine (49) items turned in as non-repairable.

(e) Abstracts of issue or turn-in: 52 actions

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- (f) Reports of Survey initiated: 18
- (g) Combat Loss items: 14
- (h) Statement of Charges processed: 7

b. Maintenance: Scheduled maintenance included forty-one (41) track vehicles quarterly service; twenty-eight (28) wheel vehicles semi-annual service; eight (8) wheel vehicles annual service.

- (1) Repair parts supply: Poor to adequate
- (2) Major assemblies or vehicles received:

(a) Tank Combat M48A3 - 1 (Co B - received from 1st Infantry Division float)

(b) Tank Combat M48A3 - 1 (Co A - received from 25th Infantry Division float)

(c) Personnel Carrier M113 - 4 (1 (Co B) received from 1st Infantry Division; 3 (HHC) received from 1st Logistical Command).

(d) Truck, tanker, 1200 gal - 4

(e) Transmission CD 850-6A - 3

(f) Engine AVDS 1790 - 2

(g) Engine AVSI 1790 - 2

(h) Transmission CMXT 14102A - 1

(i) VTR Final Drive Assembly - 1

(j) Engine, M113 - 1

(k) Road wheel arm assemblies complete (M48A3) - 46

(l) Road wheel arm assemblies complete (M113) - 7

(2), above. (3) Major assemblies used during reporting period: Same as

(4) Major items on requisition:

(a) Oil cooler transmission for M48A2 (AVLB)

(b) Idler arm assembly for M48A3

(c) Tank track, sprockets, and hubs (M48A3)

(d) Tank, Combat, M48A3 (4)

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c. Base Camp Construction: Actual work on the Battalion Base Camp commenced in the early part of November while the unit was engaged in combat operations. As of the closing date of this report approximately 40% of the base camp structures were completed. Listed below are completed structures:

- (1) Headquarters Building
- (2) Battalion Aid Station
- (3) Consolidated Mess Hall
- (4) Personnel Building
- (5) (4) shower and latrine kits
- (6) (8) Adams huts (EM quarters)
- (7) Perimeter bunkers and fence

5. Psychological Operations and Civic Action:

a. Psychological Operations: The extent of psychological operations at this level was leaflet distribution. Approximately 35,000 leaflets were dropped during Operation Cedar Falls. The delivery means was both by air (OH-23) and US troops on the ground. The themes were Chieu Hoi and surrender appeals. Actual results are unknown. Samples of the leaflets are attached as Annex B.

b. Civic Action: During this reporting period the Battalion Medical Platoon conducted five (5) MEDCAP programs in the hamlets of BUI CHU and THANH HOA. In total, 1113 patients were treated. Also, during the Christmas season (24-26 Dec 66) the Battalion sponsored a church camp-out for the children in the village of BUI CHU. Food, water, entertainment, and small gifts were provided plus giving them the opportunity to ride on combat vehicles. The program was highly successful.

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SECTION II

PART 1 - OBSERVATIONS

1. Personnel: None
2. Intelligence:
 - a. Item: VC Mining Activities

Discussion: During Operation Cedar Falls the Battalion encountered sixty-eight (68) enemy antitank mines. These mines caused extensive damage to the suspension systems of both tanks and personnel carriers. Approximately 50% of these mines were on roads and trails and were not detected with mine sweepers. The other 50% were in dense jungle areas which made the use of mine detectors impractical.

Observation: The VC are capable of interdicting any route, regardless of size, by the use of mines. They are also capable of mining jungle areas which they desire to protect.

- b. Item: Detector Set, POLAN, Individual, P153

Discussion: The mine detector presently issued to this unit is of little or no help in detecting locally fabricated mines, that is, it cannot be relied upon. On several occasions roads and trails have been carefully swept (with detectors) and yet combat vehicles detonated antitank mines as they passed through the area immediately thereafter.

Observation: VC forces place explosives in large blocks of raw rubber, in wooden boxes, in large pottery type jugs and even fill large plastic bags with blocks of TNT. Additionally, mines placed at a depth greater than 18 inches could not be detected. None of these type mines can be detected with the Detector Set, POLAN, Individual, P153.

3. Operations:
 - a. Item: Armor-Infantry tactics:

Discussion: During Operation Cedar Falls and in the vicinity of the FIHOL RUBBER PLANTATION, on several occasions it was noted that the VC would allow tanks to pass their positions and then open up with automatic weapons fire, command detonated booby traps and claymore mines on the dismounted Infantry. During these particular incidents the tanks were loading because the jungle was infested with booby traps and camouflaged punji pits. The tanks were highly successful in clearing the booby-trapped areas and preventing casualties to dismounted troops. However, the Infantry was suffering casualties from the flanks and rear as a result of the VC allowing the tanks to pass through and then firing upon the Infantry.

Observation: This tactic of the VC was overcome by having tanks

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and/or armored personnel carriers "box-in" the Infantry. Two types of formations have been successful for this purpose, (1) a square or rectangular pattern, and (2) a triangular pattern.

b. Item: Operations planning (routes for Armor elements)

Discussion: While on Operation Ala Moana, a tank company of this battalion was part of an Infantry-heavy task force for a two-day operation. There was only one route into and out of the operational area. The terrain along both sides of the route for about 3000 meters was impassable due to wet ground. The tank company cleared the route of mines as they went in, however, the route was not secured. When the tank company attempted to use the route two days later they found the route and all possible by-passes heavily mined. A few of the mines were detected by mine sweepers and removed. However, the VC employed normal CHICOM metallic mines and a type of mine that was inclosed in a huge earthen-clay jug which could not be detected with the mine detector. Results were eight vehicles disabled.

Observation: Operations planning personnel must give detailed consideration to routes into, within, and out of areas of operations. If it becomes necessary to return over a previously used route, it is imperative that the route be secured until extraction of the Armor unit is completed. The enemy will interdict the route with non-detectable mines if the route is not secured throughout the duration of the operation.

c. Item: Fire Coordination Line (FCL)

Discussion: During Operation Cedar Falls an FCL was established between the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division. In this particular area of the MAOR, the FCL was the SAIGON RIVER. This unit's primary mission was to establish blocking positions along the river and destroy any VC flushed out of the Iron Triangle by other US troops. On many occasions, targets were spotted across the river (FCL) and permission to fire was denied even though it was known that no friendly forces were in the impact area.

Observation: More enemy kills could have been realized if the FCL had been flexible enough so as to allow for different types of weapons systems. Personnel who make final decisions in the Artillery Fire Control Center should make allowances for all types and caliber weapons. Additionally, they should be made aware of the use of direct fire weapons against targets at ranges of up to 3000 meters and the impact area needed to insure troop safety. In this respect, coordination between adjacent units (FCC) must, of necessity, be thorough and timely.

4. Logistics:

a. Item: Aerial Resupply

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Discussion: During combat operations, resupply by air was often required. Some of these loads were accomplished with the use of the CH-47 helicopter. In every case, the helicopter pilots expected this unit to have slings available for the externally carried loads.

Observation: If battalion-size units are to be expected to furnish sling equipment, for air movement of heavy equipment parts, such as tank track, POL, and ammunition, some authority for requisition must be made available.

b. Item: Shortage of 5-ton Trucks

Discussion: This unit was short two (2) authorized 5-ton cargo trucks when it departed CONUS in August 1966. These trucks were to be shipped to the unit or issued from available stocks in-country. Consistent follow-up action on this situation has, to date, produced negative results.

During recent combat operations the critical need of this equipment was fully realized. The company teams were dispersed 5 to 10 kilometers from the logistical base of operations. To make matters even more critical, the battalion had to make daily supply runs to and from its base camp approximately 56 kilometers distant. On several occasions available repair parts were not forwarded from the base camp for one and two-day periods due to the shortage of trucks.

Observation: These trucks or similar substitutes should be issued to the unit as soon as possible.

c. Item: COSTAR concept - suitability of area type support in a non-linear, multi-directional, unconventional warfare.

Discussion: From this Battalion's point of view, the COSTAR concept is not being implemented as current doctrine dictates. It is felt that the situation has been caused by the type warfare being conducted in RVN at the present time. Front lines just do not exist and any type unit is subject to attack at any time. As a result, support elements (Brigade and higher) tend to remain in semi-permanent base camps often 40 to 50 KM from the Battalion area of operations. With the use of helicopters, critical supplies such as water, rations, POL and ammunition can be expected to arrive in the tactical area. However, direct support maintenance for armament, communications, and track vehicles leaves much to be desired.

In most instances, forward support maintenance units (DS and GS) seldom go outside their semi-permanent base camps. This fact alone makes it extremely difficult for combat units to get to the DS or GS unit's location for support. The majority of combat operations in which this battalion has participated have taken place in areas where there are few roads and trails (jungle). On the other hand, when land lines of communication do exist, support elements cannot move about the combat area freely without additional security from an outside combat unit due to the possibility of being ambushed.

To make matters even worse, the support units are reluctant to attach

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contact teams to the combat units.

Observation: The situation could be improved by attaching a contact team to stay with the battalion semi-permanently. This team should be composed of representatives of all necessary technical services to insure DS service at the field location. Since this unit has no organic or attached helicopters, it would be imperative that the contact team have available at all times sufficient aerial transportation to bring in repair parts when needed.

Psychological Operations and Civic Action: None

PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel: None
2. Intelligence: None
3. Operations: None
4. Logisitics: Recommend that a DS Maintenance contact team be assigned to remain with tank battalions while on combat operations in RVN. The team should be organized as follows:

- 1 Team Chief (Warrant Officer or Senior NCO)
- 2 Senior Track Vehicle Mechanics
- 1 Senior Radio Repairman
- 1 Senior Turret Mechanic

It is felt that this team will off-set the adverse effects of the area type support in this type warfare.

5. Psychological Operations and Civic Action: None

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ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL (as of 31 Jan 67)

<u>DUTY</u>	<u>NAME/BRANCH/SERVICE NUMBER</u>	<u>AUTH/ACT</u>
Bn Commander	RAYMOND L STAILEY Armor 0538298	LTC/LTC
Bn XO	GEORGE D STEVENSON Armor 02267476	MAJ/MAJ
Bn S3	RAYMOND L JONES Armor 01930944	MAJ/MAJ
Bn S1	WILLIAM M HIX Armor 05413496	CPT/CPT
Bn S2	WILLIAM G STRUNCK Armor 05017695	CPT/CPT
Bn S4	GARY L FLACK Armor 093693	CPT/CPT
CO HHC	JEFFRY D COLLITON Armor 05707395	CPT/CPT
CO Co A	HOWARD D HILL Armor 0F102347	CPT/CPT
CO Co B	CLAUDE J. CLARK Armor 090721	CPT/CPT
CO Co C	ROY D KIMMERLING Armor 02302472	CPT/CPT

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ANNEX A to Ltr, Hq 2/34 Armor, Subj: "Operational Report for Quarterly
Period ending 31 Jan 67 (RCS CSFOR-65)", dtd 16 Apr 67

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PSYCHOLOGICAL LEAFLETS

LEAFLET NUMBER 1

1. Description of Message:

- a. Theme: Warning
- b. Target: VC
- c. Quantity: 20,000
- d. Job Order: Unknown (Copied from 246-111-67 - 11th ACR)
- e. Size: 4x5
- f. Source of Requirement: 2d Bn 34th Armor
- g. Printed by: 246 PsyOps Co
- h. Means of Distribution: Air

2. English Translation:

Viet Cong Beware! There is no place to run no where to hide! The tanks and armored vehicles of the 2d Battalion 34th Armor will find and destroy you! It is too late to fight. Beware, Viet Cong, we are everywhere! Rally now under the Chieu Hoi program. It is your only hope to live.

LEAFLET NUMBER 2

1. Description of Message:



- a. Theme: Good Guys
- b. Target: Citizens
- c. Quantity: 10,000
- d. Size: 4x5
- e. Job Order: 246-140-67
- f. Source of Requirement: 2d Bn 34th Armor
- g. Printed by: 246th PsyOps Co
- h. Means of Distribution: Air and ground troops

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ANNEX B to Ltr, Hq 2/34 Armor, Subj: "Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67 (RCS CSFOR-65)". dt.d 16 Apr 67

Incl 1

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**VIỆT-CỘNG
HÃY CỎI CHỪNG!!**

TIỂU ĐOÀN 2, ĐƠN VỊ 34 KỸ BINH THIẾT-GIÁP HOA-KỲ ĐÃ ĐẾN VIỆT-NAM. NHỮNG CHIẾN XA HẠNG NẶNG CỦA HỌ SẼ TÌM RA VÀ TIÊU-DIỆT VIỆT-CỘNG ĐỂ DÀNG. KHI NÀO HỌ KHÔNG CHIẾN-ĐẤU CHỐNG ĐƠN VIỆT-CỘNG PHÁ HOẠI ĐỒNG BÀO, THÌ CÁC CHIẾN SĨ THUỘC TIỂU ĐOÀN 2, ĐƠN VỊ 34 KỸ BINH THIẾT GIÁP HOA-KỲ SẼ GIÚP ĐỠ XÂY CẬP TRƯỜNG HỌC SĂN-SÓC BỆNH-TẬT VÀ PHÂN-PHÁT THỰC-PHẨM CHO NHÂN DÂN VIỆT-NAM.

NHỮNG HỌ CHỈ CÓ THỂ GIÚP ĐỠ ĐỒNG BÀO KHI ĐỒNG BÀO GIÚP ĐỠ HỌ. KHI NÀO ĐỒNG BÀO THẤY NHỮNG BINH SĨ HOA-KỲ MANG HUY HIỆU CHIẾN XA VỚI HAI GUỒM TREÓ TRÊN MŨ HỌ, HÃY NHỚ RẰNG CHÚNG TÔI LÀ BẠN CỦA ĐỒNG-BÀO.

246-140-67

CÁN BINH VIỆT CỘNG HÃY COI CHỪNG.

CÒN ĐƯỜNG ĐÁU MÀ CHAY CÒN CHỖ NÀO ĐỂ TRỐN. ĐOÀN CHIẾN XA CỦA TIỂU ĐOÀN 2, ĐƠN VỊ 34 KỸ BINH THIẾT GIÁP HOA KỲ SẼ TÌM RA VÀ TIÊU DIỆT CÁC BẠN. CÒN ĐÁU THÌ GIỜ ĐỂ SỬA SOẠN CHIẾN ĐẤU NỮA CÁC BẠN. CÁN BINH VIỆT CỘNG HÃY COI CHỪNG. CHÚNG TÔI ĐÃ CÓ MẶT KHẮP MỌI NƠI RỒI. CÁC BẠN CHỈ CÒN MỘT HY VỌNG DUY NHẤT ĐỂ SỐNG SÓT LÀ RA HỒI CHÁNH VỚI CHÁNH NGHĨA QUỐC GIA DƯỚI CHÁNH SÁCH CHIÊU HỒI CỦA CHÁNH PHỦ.

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2. English Translation:

The 2d Battalion 34th Armor has arrived in Vietnam. They have mighty tanks which will seek out and destroy the Viet Cong. When not fighting the Viet Cong bandits who rebel their own people, the US 2d Battalion 34th Armor will be helping to build schools, treat the sick and injured, and distribute food to the people of Vietnam.

But they can only help if you help them. When you see the American soldiers wearing the tank with crossed swords on their hats, remember, we are your friends.

LEAFLET NUMBER 3

1. Description of Message:

- a. Theme: 969 Good Guys
- b. Target: Civilian Population
- c. Quantity: 5,000
- d. Size: 5x6
- e. Job Order: 246-157-67
- f. Source of Requirement: 2d Bn 34th Armor
- g. Printed by: 246th PsyOps Co
- h. Means of Distribution: Air and hand.

2. English Translation:

969 REWARD 969

The American soldiers are here in Vietnam to help your GVN bring peace and security to your country. To accomplish this task, we need your help. To protect you and other innocent people we will give rewards to anyone who gives us information on:

VC mines and weapons caches
VC tunnels
VC booby-traps and ambushes

Contact the nearest soldier of the 2d Battalion 34th Armor and give him this leaflet or Number 969. This soldier will read the reverse side of this leaflet written in English and help you report your information to the concerned authority. You will be properly rewarded for valuable information

2D BN 34TH ARMOR REWARD 2D BN 34TH ARMOR

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TIỀN THƯỞNG

Quân Đới Hoa Kỳ có mặt tại Việt Nam để giúp đỡ Chánh Phủ của Đồng Bào đem lại thanh bình và an ninh cho xứ sở. Để hoàn thành nhiệm vụ này, chúng tôi rất cần sự giúp đỡ của đồng bào. Để bảo vệ đồng bào và nhân dân vô tội chúng tôi sẽ thưởng tiền cho đồng bào nào cho chúng tôi biết tin tức về:

Mìn, hầm chôn vũ khí của Việt Cộng. Đường hầm của Việt Cộng. Cam bẫy và những trận phục kích của Việt Cộng.

Hãy liên lạc với binh sĩ Hoa Kỳ gần nhất của Đơn Vị 2, 34 Kỳ. Binh Thiết Giáp Hoa Kỳ và đưa cho ông ta tờ truyền đơn này hay là số 969. Quân nhân này sẽ đọc mặt sau tờ truyền đơn viết bằng tiếng Anh và sẽ giúp đỡ đồng bào báo cáo tin tức tại cơ quan thẩm quyền liên hệ. Đồng bào sẽ được thưởng xứng đáng về tin tức có ích lợi.

ĐƠN VỊ 2,34 KỲ. BINH THIẾT GIÁP HOA KỲ - TIỀN THƯỞNG -

TIỀN THƯỞNG

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ATTENTION AMERICAN PERSONNEL

**AMERICAN PERSONNEL WHO RECEIVE THIS LEAFLET FROM A VIET
NAMESE NATIONAL WILL COURTEOUSLY DETAIN HIM (HER) AND NOTIFY
THEIR COMMANDER. THE PERSON WITH THIS LEAFLET WANTS TO REPORT
INFORMATION REGARDING THE ITEMS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LEAF
LET. HE HAS BEEN OFFERED PAYMENT IF THE INFORMATION CAN BE
VERIFIED.**

**IF THE VIETNAMESE REFUSES TO STAY OR COME WITH YOU, OBTAIN
HIS (HER) NAME, ADDRESS, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH. THIS DATA CAN BE
FOUND ON HIS (HER) IDENTITY CARD. COPY ALL THE INFORMATION ON THE
CARD AND GIVE IT TO YOUR COMMANDER.**

246-157-67

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
VC KHA (BC)	38
VC KHA (Poss)	18
Detainees	44
AT Mines	40
AP Mines	19
RPG-2 Rockets (rds)	4
Weapons (Misc)	3
Mortar (rds)	23 (16-60MM; 6-81MM; 1-4.2)
Artillery (rds)	4 (3-105MM; 1-155MM)
Hand Grenades	51
Small Arms Ammo (rds)	30
Bombs	9 (7-250#; 1-500#, 1-CBU)
Booby Traps	68
40MM ammo (rds)	3
Rifle Grenades	1
Grenade Launcher	1
Punji Pits	23
Dynamite (lbs)	75
Tunnels	89
Huts	13
Bunkers	73
Fox/Spider Holes	63
Sampans	8

incl 1

ANNEX C to Ltr, Hq 2/34 Armor, Subj: "Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67 (RCS CSFOR-65)", dtd 16 Apr 67

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AVFBC-H (17 Apr 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

28 APR 1967


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by 2d Battalion, 34th Armor for the quarter ending 31 January 1967 is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the comments and recommendations contained therein.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


JAMES A. ULVENES
Capt. AGC
Asst. AG

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

Regulated UNCLASSIFIED

When Separated From

Classified Inclosure

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ENEMY LOSSES (Cont'd)

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Documents (lbs)	31
Medical Supplies (lbs)	5
Electronic Parts	Misc
Batteries	2
Wire (rolls)	2
Fish Sauce (Qts)	2
Clothing (lbs)	6
Commo Wire (feet)	300
Tools (assorted)	25
Food (assorted) (lbs)	5
Rice (lbs)	1100
POL (gals)	5

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN RELEASED
IN FULL AND IS NOT TO BE
REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED