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**EMPLOYMENT OF A
SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (U)**

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
REPORT OF EVALUATION BY DIRECTOR, JRATA

This evaluation, though meeting the parameters stated in the evaluation plan, has failed, in my opinion, to portray the full impact of the Special Forces effort. The report dwells on the point that the Special Forces personnel could, in fact, advise; however, no reference is made as to the quality, quantity, or effects of this advice. Also, no comparison is made with comparable US advisory units. Had some effort been made to place the Special Forces by comparison vis-a-vis other advisory elements, more meaningful data could have been compiled. As is, the report contains a great deal of information as to how the SFG operated, but has neglected to point out the effectiveness of that organization.

I believe, that in spite of this omission, the report portrays what may be considered typical problem areas, and that using this information as a point of departure, additional studies on the employment of Special Forces in a counterinsurgency environment could well depict the true value of such a specialized organization.

I concur in the recommendations of the report and additionally recommend that a further study be made to determine the full effects of Special Forces in a counterinsurgency role.

Approved:



JOHN K. BOLES, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Director

25 April 1966

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ARMY CONCEPT TEAM IN VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

FINAL REPORT

**EMPLOYMENT OF A
SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (U)**

JRATA Project No. (1B-154.0)

20 April 1966

Approved:

Merrill G. Hatch

MERRILL G. HATCH
Colonel, Artillery
Chief

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Letter, AGAM-P(M) (17 Jul 64) ACSFOR, DA,
31 Jul 64, subject: Army Troop Test Pro-
gram in Vietnam (U), as amended.

CINCPAC message DTG 150258Z July 64

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Army Concept Team in Vietnam is
indebted to the following for their
help in the evaluation:

1st Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st
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I. (C) PREFACE

A. ABSTRACT

The purpose of this project was to:

- 1) Evaluate the capabilities of the US Army Special Forces Group in Vietnam to advise and provide planning, training, material, and operational assistance to selected indigenous military and paramilitary forces.
- 2) Determine modification, if any, in the organization, equipment and concepts of employment of US Army Special Forces Group, required to enhance its contribution to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam.

The evaluation consisted of an analysis of the organization, command relationships, roles, and functions of the Special Forces Group in Vietnam, based on evaluator observations of Group headquarters and the activities of 40 detachments in all four corps tactical zones of the Republic of Vietnam; interviews of 1st and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) personnel and senior US advisors; and examination of official records and reports. Data collection covered the period from October 1964 through April 1965.

During the evaluation the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) detachments were under operational control of corps senior advisors, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Also during this period the temporary duty A detachments from out-of-country were largely replaced by permanent change of station detachments assigned to the Group for 1-year tours of duty.

The Group was capable of advising and providing planning, training, materiel, and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces but it had a limited capability to provide operational intelligence and psychological warfare planning and assistance. The effectiveness of operational detachments was seriously limited by a lack of personnel with proficiency in the languages of the area of operations. The highly responsive logistical system used by Special Forces in Vietnam should be considered for application in counterinsurgency situations elsewhere.

B. OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

1. Objective 1 - Command and Control Capabilities

Determine the capability of the command and control elements of

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the Special Forces Group in Vietnam to provide planning and operational advice and assistance, materiel support, and training for selected indigenous military and paramilitary forces.

This objective was accomplished by the use of questionnaires at C, B, and A detachments, interviews at Group headquarters, evaluator observations, and review of Group operating procedures and periodic reports. Analysis was based on summarization and comparison of data collected at operational detachments and at command and control elements.

2. Objective 2 - Operational Detachment Capabilities

Determine the capabilities of the Special Forces operational detachments in Vietnam to organize and train military and paramilitary units, provide operational planning and assistance, obtain and maintain logistical support, provide operational intelligence, perform civic action functions, and provide psychological warfare planning and assistance.

Methods used to accomplish this objective were the same as for objective 1.

3. Objective 3 - Border Control/Surveillance and Internal Guerrilla Capabilities

Determine the capability of the Special Forces Group to perform border control/surveillance and internal guerrilla roles in the Republic of Vietnam.

Methods used to accomplish this objective were the same as those for objective 1.

4. Objective 4 - Evaluation of the Individual Survival Kit

Determine the environmental compatibility and user acceptability of the newly developed individual survival kit.

No data were collected by ACTIV because a 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) evaluation appeared to satisfy the requirement.

5. Objective 5 - Adequacy of Logistical and Communications Support

Determine the adequacy of current logistical and communications support provided by the US Army Special Forces Group in Vietnam.

Methods used to accomplish this objective were the same as those for objective 1.

C. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The command and control elements of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)

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are capable of providing planning and operational advice and assistance to selected military and paramilitary forces and providing logistical support to these units and the deployed detachments of the Group. The Special Forces A detachments are capable of training military and paramilitary units, obtaining and maintaining logistical support for these units from resources of the Group, and performing civic action. The A detachments are not fully capable of providing operational intelligence or psychological warfare planning and assistance. The effectiveness of operational detachments is seriously limited by a lack of personnel with proficiency in local languages. It is too early to determine if organizational modifications accomplished in April 1965 are adequate for the requirements of the Group's counterinsurgency mission. Non-Special Forces augmentation personnel with intelligence, civic action, and psychological operations skills have, however, enhanced the Group's capabilities. The Group's capability to perform border control/surveillance and internal guerrilla roles is limited by the nature of the border area, a lack of recruitable personnel, the difficulties of employing paramilitary forces outside their home areas, the status of training and limited fire power of the Group's paramilitary assets, and the indefinite term of service of paramilitary forces members recruited by Special Forces. The Group's supply system is adequate for present requirements and has the flexibility and responsiveness to meet any foreseeable needs. It is recommended that the intelligence capability of operational detachments be further improved, that greater emphasis be placed on psychological operations training for operational detachment personnel, and that greater emphasis be placed on language and area study for all personnel involved or to be involved in counterpart relations. It is also recommended that consideration be given to the expansion of proficiency pay incentives to include Special Forces operational personnel required to speak foreign languages in the accomplishment of their mission. It is further recommended that the logistical system currently employed by US Army Special Forces in Vietnam be considered for application in other counterinsurgency situations.

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II. (C) INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this project was to:

- 1) Evaluate the capabilities of the US Army Special Forces Group in Vietnam to advise and provide planning, training, material, and operational assistance to selected indigenous military and paramilitary forces;
- 2) Determine modifications, if any, in the organization, equipment and concepts of employment of US Army Special Forces Group, required to enhance its contribution to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam.

B. BACKGROUND

United States Army doctrine holds that successful pacification of subversive insurgency requires the isolation of the insurgent from internal and external support. Measures adopted to accomplish these objectives are: population control, area organization and control, and denial operations. The military and paramilitary forces of a country are involved to a varying extent in the implementation of each of these measures. In Vietnam, US Army Special Forces (USASF) personnel have been primarily committed to providing training, operational advice, and assistance to indigenous paramilitary forces. By definition, paramilitary forces are distinct from the regular armed forces of a country but resemble them in organization, equipment, and mission. Specifically, Special Forces have been involved with primitive tribes in distant and remote areas, people in rural areas, and minority ethnic and religious groups. The paramilitary forces have been organized, trained, and equipped to provide local security for their own hamlet or village and, when appropriate, have also functioned as search and destroy units, trail watchers, and border surveillance patrols.

The principal organizational entity through which Special Forces have pursued counterinsurgency objectives in Vietnam is the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program. This program, which involved creation of paramilitary forces and civic action projects, was originally conceived and organized by the Combined Studies Division, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in the fall of 1961. It was not a part of the Military Assistance (MAP). Separate Special Forces detachments were employed on TDY to staff the training and operational bases of the CIDG program from its inception. The CIDG program began with the objective of attracting the aboriginal Montagnard tribes of the central highlands

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to the side of the Government of Vietnam (GVN). United States policy in this area was directed towards encouraging Vietnamese central government interest in improving Montagnard living standards, education, and economic opportunity, thus engendering in them a sense of loyalty and a willingness to resist Viet Cong (VC) that would replace the prevailing distrust and withheld allegiance. Personnel from the Presidential Survey Office (PSO), a quasimilitary political intelligence apparatus of the Diem regime, were established as the Vietnamese counterpart camp commanders through whom US Special Forces advice and assistance were to be channeled to the Montagnards. The present Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) grew under the auspices of the PSO. They still perform the counterpart role with USASF although they have yet to live down the onus of their earlier activities in political repression. Their Vietnamese name is now Luc Lung Dac Biet (LLDB).

Sparked by the aggressiveness of the USASF detachment commanders and the readily available arms and funds provided by the Combined Studies Division, MACV, the CIDG program spread rapidly through the Montagnard areas of II Corps, although not without the misgivings of Vietnamese authorities who believed that armed Montagnards were as capable, with very little provocation, of directing their new found power against the government as against the VC insurgents. In June 1962, the Department of Defense decided to transfer operational responsibility for CIDG from the Combined Studies Division to Department of the Army with a Special Forces Group Headquarters as the in-country manager of the program.

In July 1963, turnover of the CIDG assets to US Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam was fully accomplished, although Special Forces had assumed operational responsibility for CIDG in all four corps areas by January of that year. The Border Surveillance Program previously supported by Combined Studies Division became the operational responsibility of Special Forces in November 1963 and was absorbed into, and considered a part of, the CIDG program. Thus, Special Forces had assumed control of a country-wide, minorities-oriented, area control and border surveillance program. The program at that time included advising and training paramilitary units having a total strength of approximately 20,000 men and a budget of approximately \$10 million per year for in-country direct support of CIDG facilities and personnel.

Because of the significant influence of CIDG operations upon the outcome of overall counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam, COMUSMACV assigned operational control of Special Forces A detachments to the corps senior advisors in May 1964. By this time the CIDG program included in its ranks minority groups other than Montagnards as well as ethnic Vietnamese. The corps senior advisors were to exercise their operational control through the Special Forces B detachments, of which there was one in each corps area. In October 1964, the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) (5SFAG) replaced US Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam as the Special Forces headquarters and operational element in Vietnam. Shortly thereafter, C

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detachments became operational and B detachments became an intermediate command and control element, normally capable of controlling as many as six A detachments.

In conformance with guidance from COMUSMACV regarding the integration of CIDG operations with existing corps area counterinsurgency programs, Headquarters 5SFGA published a letter of instruction in November 1964 which outlined the Special Forces/CIDG program. This program's civil-military objectives were stated as follows: destroy the Viet Cong and create a secure environment; establish firm governmental control over the population; and enlist the population's active and willing support of, and participation in, the government's programs.

Beginning in February 1965, Special Forces B and A detachments undertook a phased integration into the additional co-equal mission of MACV sector (province) and sub-sector (district) advisory detachments. This mission required Special Forces personnel to provide advice and limited direct assistance to the civil government and MAP supported Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) territorial units. As of 30 April 1965, one B detachment was performing the sector advisory mission and 11 A detachments were acting in sub-sector advisory capacity.

In addition, 5th Special Forces provided advice and assistance for the Delta Project, an in-country counter guerrilla force; for a sensitive operation of the MACV Studies and Observation Group (SOG); and furnished a four-detachment element performing a purely sub-sector advisory mission training and operating with RF/PF in a critical area of eastern Binh Dinh province. This evaluation did not attempt to cover the RF/PF or SOG missions of 5SFGA because they represented such a small portion of the overall effort.

Evaluation of US Army Special Forces activities and capabilities in a setting involving a counterinsurgency effort was first contemplated by agencies of the Department of the Army in 1963. The US Army's responsibilities for organizing and equipping forces for counterinsurgency operations and for conducting research and development in support of unconventional warfare, psychological warfare, and counterinsurgency operations pointed up the desirability of evaluating the employment of a special forces group in a situation where the stress was placed on counterinsurgency operations rather than on unconventional warfare operations which was the original raison d'etre. While the evaluation was originally to have included only the period from October 1964 it became apparent that the reorientation of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) towards a civil-military counterinsurgency program, as opposed to a purely tactical attempt to destroy VC units, required an extension of the evaluation period through April 1965.

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C. SCOPE

1. Definition of the Project

The first aim of the project was to evaluate the capability of command and control elements of the US Army Special Forces Group operating in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to provide selected friendly military and paramilitary forces with planning advice and assistance, training, materiel, and operational advice and assistance. The second aim was to evaluate the capability of the Special Forces A detachments operating with the Montagnards and other minority elements in RVN to organize and train paramilitary units, provide operational and planning assistance, obtain and maintain logistical support, provide operational intelligence, perform civic action functions, and provide psychological warfare planning and assistance. Also to be evaluated were the capability of Special Forces to perform assigned border control/surveillance and internal guerrilla roles in Vietnam, and the adequacy of logistical and communications support provided by US Special Forces in Vietnam.

2. Setting of the Project

a. Environment

United States Army Special Forces elements selected for the evaluation were located throughout the four major geographical regions of RVN: the northern highlands, the central highlands, the coastal plains, and the Mekong River Delta. A detailed description of the project setting is included in annex A.

b. Military Elements

The principal unit involved in the evaluation activity was the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). Some of the operational detachments covered by the evaluation were provided by 1st Special Forces Group (Abn).

3. Definition of Terms

Definitions are taken from the Special Warfare Glossary, US Army Special Warfare School, 20 January 1964, unless otherwise noted.

a. Civic Action - Any action performed by military forces of a country, utilizing military manpower and skills, in cooperation with civic agencies, authorities, or groups, and which is designed to improve the economic or social betterment of that country. Civic action programs can enhance the stature of indigenous military forces and improve their relationship with the population. Thus, such programs can be a major contributing factor to the elimination of insurgency.

b. Clandestine Operations - Activities to accomplish intelligence,

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counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of the operation. (See also Covert Operations.)

c. Community Development Program - The program accomplished at, and primarily by, the local community in which the efforts of the people are united with those of governmental authorities to improve economic, social, and political conditions, integrating these communities into the life of the nation, and enabling them to contribute fully to national progress.

d. Counter guerrilla Warfare - Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas.

e. Counterinsurgency

(1) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by, or in conjunction with, the government of a nation to defeat subversive insurgency.

*(2) Those activities instituted by a national government that are directed toward preventing, if possible, an insurgent movement, or, if such prevention is not possible, eliminating the insurgency. An insurgent movement is the broad category of opposition to an existing government, including political, economic, social, and military actions, within which the terms revolution, rebellion, and insurrection can be used interchangeably..

f. Counterpart - The advisee. The person to whom operational assistance is rendered as a matter of assigned duty. (From FM 31-23, Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency, April 1965)

g. Covert Operations - Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operations.

h. Guerrilla Warfare - The conduct of combat operations inside a country in enemy-held territory on a military or paramilitary basis by units organized from predominantly indigenous personnel. The aim is to weaken the established government of the target country by reducing the overall morale and will to resist.

*Terms marked with an asterisk have been developed for use in resident and nonresident instruction at the United States Army Special Warfare School.

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i. Insurgency - A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

j. Paramilitary Forces - Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of a country, but resemble them in organization, equipment, training, and mission.

k. Population and Resources Control - That aspect of the counter-insurgency effort designed to control human and material resources. Objectives of this effort are to sever the relationship between the population and the guerrilla; to identify and neutralize the insurgent apparatus and activities within the population; and to create, within the population, a secure physical and psychological environment.

l. Psychological Operations - This term includes psychological warfare and, in addition, encompasses those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

m. Special Action Force - The Special Action Force (SAF) is a specially trained, area oriented, partially language qualified, ready force, available to the commander of a unified command for the support of cold, limited, and general war operations. Special Action Force organization may vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements. (From FM 31-22, US Army Counterinsurgency Forces, November 1963).

n. Strike Force - A tactical element composed of CIDG personnel, normally organized in company-sized units.

o. Unconventional Warfare - Includes the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, and subversion. Such operations are conducted in enemy-held or controlled territory and are planned and executed to take advantage of or to stimulate resistance movements or insurgency against hostile governments or forces. In peacetime, the United States conducts training to develop its capability for such wartime operations.

D. EVALUATION DESIGN

1. Methodology

a. Data collection methods

Data were collected by means of questionnaires, evaluator observation, personal interviews, and review of SSICA operational summaries,

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standing operating procedures, and staff studies and correspondence. The distribution of respondents to the Special Forces evaluation questionnaire is shown in figure 1, below. The comments of corps senior advisors (CSA) interviewed during the evaluation are summarized in annex D. In addition to these interviewees, principal staff officers, Headquarters 5SFCA served as a major source of data through interviews and briefings.

	SF A Det	SF B Det*	SF B Det**	SF C Det	CSA***
I Corps	6	1	-	-	-
II Corps	14	-	1	1	1
III Corps	7	-	1	-	1
IV Corps	7	1	-	1	1
Totals	34	2	2	2	3

(U) FIGURE 1. Distribution of respondents to Special Forces evaluation questionnaire.

b. Analysis Methods

Data collected by questionnaires were used as the basis for comparative analysis as well as to describe and evaluate organizational structure and capabilities. Material from documentary sources, interviews, and observations provided additional qualitative measurements which were analyzed in relation to data obtained from questionnaires.

2. Limitations and Variables

a. Limitations

Relocation and rotation of many of the Group's operational elements and their transition from TDY (USASFPV) to PCS (5SFCA) caused frequent rescheduling of evaluation activities.

The isolation of certain detachment camp sites and the time required to enter and return from these areas adversely affected travel

*When functioning in role of present C detachment.

**Also functioned in role of MACV sector or sub-sector advisor.

***MACV corps senior advisor, or his deputy.

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planning and sometimes curtailed questioning and discussion.

The changing role and organizational structure of Special Forces in Vietnam during the evaluation adversely affected the pertinence of data collected during the earlier phases of the evaluation.

b. Variables

Relocation of operational detachments and the transition from TDY to PCS status resulted in questionnaire respondents and interviewees having significantly different area knowledge and operational experience.

Type of mission assigned to detachments, peculiarities of the operational environment, and problems in counterpart relationships differed among and within corps tactical zones (CTZ).

The separation of command and operational control responsibilities between the Special Forces Group commander and the corps senior advisor resulted in differing personal relationships affecting organizational accomplishments.

3. Support Requirements

Command support of the evaluation was directed by MACV letter, JRATA 3120, 15 August 1964, subject: Employment of a Special Forces Group. Two field grade and two company grade officers of the combat arms were provided as evaluators on TDY from CONUS for a period of 120 days. Two enlisted clerk-typists were furnished by the 25th Infantry Division to assist with administrative requirements. The US Army Combat Developments Command provided TDY funds. Equipment, other than that available from the TOE assets of the 5SFCA, was not required.

4. Time Schedule

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| a. Evaluation Plan submitted to CG, Combat Developments Command | 24 Apr 64 |
| b. Evaluation Plan submitted to CINCPAC by ACSFOR | 25 Jun 64 |
| c. CINCPAC Approval | 15 Jul 64 |
| d. MACV command support letter | 15 Aug 64 |
| e. Data collection commenced | 15 Oct 64 |
| f. Data collection completed | 1 Feb 65 |
| g. Data analysis completed | 1 Mar 65 |

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h. First draft report submitted by project officer	5 Apr 65
i. Preliminary review of draft report completed	5 May 65
j. Supplemental data collection completed	10 Jun 65
k. Revised draft report completed	10 Aug 65

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III. (C) DISCUSSION

A. OBJECTIVE 1 - COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES

1. Description of Command and Control Elements

The command and control elements of the United States Army Special Forces (USASF) in Vietnam were the Group headquarters, the C detachments, and the B detachments.

Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (5SFAG) was organized under the unit staff concept. The functional sections, located geographically to facilitate support of the deployed detachments and to provide direct access to United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), were the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in Saigon, the Administration and Logistics Center (A&LC) in Nha Trang, and the Communications Center (CC) also in Nha Trang. The Group headquarters in Vietnam exercised command less operational control of its detachments. The 5SFAG was a major subordinate command of United States Army Support Command, Vietnam (now United States Army, Vietnam - USARV) and was under the operational control of Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). The major portion of 5SFAG headquarters work was concerned with the commitment of logistical and personnel resources, but the headquarters also established priorities and the commander served without charter as special staff advisor to COMUSMACV on matters pertaining to USASF employment. The Delta project was the only operation directly advised and coordinated by Group headquarters.


As shown in figure 2, the headquarters staff of 5SFAG was divided into two echelons, each of which retained elements of the four unit-staff functions. In Saigon, TOC was predominately concerned with operations and intelligence. At Nha Trang, A&LC was responsible for the administrative, supply, and signal functions. This arrangement made the necessary portions of the headquarters accessible and responsive to COMUSMACV, and placed at the staging and supply distribution center those portions of the staff responsible for providing logistical and administrative support to the subordinate detachments. The Deputy Commander of 5SFAG normally commanded the TOC, the Executive Officer (A&L), the A&LC, and the Group Commander went where he was needed although his nominal headquarters was with A&LC at Nha Trang. In September 1965, TOC was relocated to Nha Trang, leaving only a liaison officer in Saigon.

There were no instances reported when command and control functions were handicapped for the lack of personnel. Although no attempt was made to perform a complete inventory of headquarters personnel, it became apparent during the evaluation that discrepancies existed in authorized strengths, in what the Group personnel office reported the

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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)



(C) FIGURE 2. Organization of Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). April 1965

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
sections should have had, and in the operating strengths reported by some of the sections themselves. The 5SFCA Troop Unit Change Request (TUCR), approved 1 April 1965, established the allocation of MOS's within the Group. With no change in overall strength, the TUCR brought about a revision of the MOS structure such that operating detachments gained intelligence, civic action, and psychological warfare capabilities through retraining within the Group, and strength of the Headquarters Company was increased by 14 at the expense of the operational detachments. The Logistical Support Center (ISC) at Nha Trang had personnel over-strength which could not be identified as an assigned over-strength from out-of-country or as a reallocation of personnel within the Group TOE strength. The 5SFCA was not organized in accordance with the conventional TOE of a Special Forces group nor was it manned according to the latest TUCR. The Group allocated personnel resources from within the Group and from external sources on a continually changing basis as required to accomplish its mission.

Operational control of the Special Forces detachments was delegated to MACV corps senior advisors and exercised through the senior Special Forces detachment commander in each Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) corps tactical zone (CTZ). There was one C detachment in each CTZ. Each of these four detachments was organized in accordance with the TOE as modified by TUCR dated 1 April 1964 (figure 3). They were located near the corps headquarters and exercised command supervision over the subordinate SF detachments in that CTZ. While technically command echelons, the C detachments in Vietnam were more realistically manipulators of logistical and personnel resources, with the B detachments exercising operational control to a greater degree. The C detachment commander served as the Special Forces staff officer for the corps and was the principal advisor to the co-located Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) C detachment commander. Special Forces organization and relationships within each CTZ are shown in annex B. As a rule, C detachments related to corps; B detachments to sectors (provinces) or division tactical zones (DTZ); and A detachments to sub-sectors (district). Though USASF command, less operational control, in most cases extended from Group headquarters to A detachment, MACV guidance for both military and civic action was injected at each echelon of the Special Forces organization by comparable echelons of the MACV advisory establishment.

Of the 10 B detachments, 7 were almost identically organized, as shown in figure 4, and these commanded the A detachments, except for two A detachments in III CTZ. Each of the remaining three B detachments were modified to perform special command, control, training, and advisory missions. These three were the Delta Project B Detachment, the VNSF Training Center B Detachment at Dong Ba Thin, and the Studies and Observations Group (SOG) B Detachment. Organization charts for the first two of these are shown in annex B. The B detachments functioned more in the command and control role than did the C detachments. In addition, they served in an advisory capacity to the co-located VNSF B detachments, and in one case (B-22 at An Tuc) the corps senior advisor (CSA) assigned the detachment's CIDG force a road security mission under operational control of

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
Detachment is usually augmented by: 1 - O, 11 - E

- 1 Medical Officer
- 1 Imagery Spec
- 1 Photo-Interpreter
- 1 OB Spec
- 2 Area Spec
- 2 Pchtr Riggers
- 2 Medic
- 3 RTT Opr

(C) FIGURE 3. Typical C Detachment, 5th Special Forces Group
(7bn) (organized accordingly to TUCR, 1 April 1965)

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(C) FIGURE 4. Typical B Detachments, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) (organized according to TCHUR, 1 April 1965)

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ARVN. Of the four B detachment commanders contacted during the evaluation, two rated the B detachment organization as adequate for planning and supervising the operations of up to eight subordinate detachments and the other two rated the organization as marginal. Deficiencies in liaison aircraft availability, limitations on surface movement capabilities, and limited communications personnel were reported as the major problems affecting B detachment command and control capabilities at the time of the evaluation.

2. Dimensions of the Effort

The magnitude of the 5SFGA command and control responsibilities during the evaluation may be better appreciated with a knowledge of the number of personnel and the amount of funds committed to Special Forces operations. United States Army Special Forces personnel in-country during 1964-1965, including PCS and TDY, varied from 1112 in October 1964 to 1465 in March 1965. Of the total USASF strength, 58 percent were assigned to A, B, and C detachments in the CTZ in October 1964, while 66 percent were assigned to detachments by the end of April 1965. Distribution of USASF personnel assigned to A, B, and C detachments is shown in figure 5.

Strength of the CIDG Strike Force during the evaluation is shown in figure 6. In-country expenditure of US dollars from CIDG Program funds dropped from \$1,913,808.00 in October to \$1,049,027.00 in April 1965. The decline in expenditures reflected a tightening of CIDG personnel administration policies which led to a decrease in assigned strengths, a temporary

		Oct 64	Nov 64	Dec 64	Jan 65	Feb 65	Mar 65	Apr 65
Corps	I	18/76	20/76	20/76	23/93	29/109	24/111	26/100
	II	50/213	64/257	63/251	64/228	64/264	66/263	64/240
	III	30/124	30/118	35/139	37/159	37/139	45/139	46/176
	IV	30/105	27/102	41/153	42/155	53/199	50/194	50/191
Total		128/518	141/553	159/619	166/635	183/711	195/738	186/707
Grand Total		646	694	778	801	894	993	893

Note: Columns read officer/enlisted

Source: 5SFGA Monthly Operational Summaries

(C) FIGURE 5. USASF strengths in A, B, and C detachments, by corps areas.

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budget freeze from December 1964 to February 1965, and the imposition of closer controls over CIDG funds expended for camp construction, maintenance expenditures, and hiring of civilian employees.

	Oct 64	Nov 64	Dec 64	Jan 65	Feb 65	Mar 65	Apr 65
Strength	19,260	19,753	20,322	18,427	17,260	18,192	19,842
Changes from previous month	+1,442	+ 493	+ 569	-1,895	-1,167	+ 932	+1,650

Source: S-3, 5SFGA

(C) FIGURE 6. CIDG Strike Force effective strengths,
October 1964 to April 1965.

3. Management of CIDG Fund Expenditures

Funds for the CIDG program, amounting to over \$30,000,000.00 (US) for Fiscal Year 1965, were provided directly by Department of the Army from Department of Defense contingency funds. This did not include the cost of weapons, ammunition, or vehicles, which were bought from Procurement, Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA) funds, nor did it include the cost of USASF TOE equipment or pay and allowances for US personnel.

The 5SFGA program objectives were worked out in conjunction with MACV J-3, but no other outside agency or activity regulated or restricted the management of CIDG program funds, and 5SFGA performed the only audit of these funds by any military agency in Vietnam.

During FY 1965, the 5SFGA significantly increased, on its own initiative, the managerial controls over CIDG fund expenditures. These fiscal improvements included a cost accounting system, decentralization of program management, and budgetary control of funds. The decentralization of program management was accomplished by imposing on C detachments strict limitations on fund expenditures by functional category, based on anticipated needs of all detachments. Within this budgetary limitation, the detachment commanders became the money managers in their camp development, operations, and troop buildup.

A reform instituted by 5SFGA during this period was the stringent enforcement of agent officer accounting procedures. Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP; dated 1 January 1965 provided specific guidance to detachment commanders

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for managing CIDG funds, and is shown in annex F of this report. Controls were generated within the 5SFCA rather than effected by the direction of higher authority. As a result the average monthly amount of CIDG funds spent in-country for a CIDG camp decreased from \$30,727.00 for the first quarter of FY 1965 to \$20,868.00 during February, March, and April 1965. During that time the number of camps increased from 44 to 56, and the monthly average cost per man in camp dropped from \$72.50 to \$59.50--the last figure in spite of a 20 percent CIDG pay raise in March 1965. The group commander's principal assistants in effecting improved management of these funds were the group finance officer and the group CIDG Budget Committee, composed of key staff officers of group headquarters.

4. Providing Planning Advice and Assistance

The USASF command and control elements provided planning advice and assistance to the VNSF and, through VNSF, to the CIDG. The VNSF was a component of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and paralleled the USASF in structure and general mission. Its detachments were located with or near corresponding USASF detachments and were under the command of VNSF High Command in Nha Trang. The ARVN corps commanders exercised operational control over these detachments through the C detachments in each CTZ. In contrast to their USASF counterparts, VNSF A and B detachments did not serve in province or district advisory roles, nor did they come under the operational control of either the province or district chiefs or of ARVN division or regimental commanders. Operational detachments of the VNSF were engaged primarily in camp management and CIDG training and operational employment. Personnel of the CIDG Strike Force were recruited by VNSF or other GVN officials and as a rule were trained and employed in no larger than company-size units within their own native regions.

Planning advice and assistance were provided at the B and C detachment level by means of joint participation of USASF and VNSF commanders and staffs in the daily planning and conduct of operations, and by liaison visits when the counterpart detachments were not co-located. At the highest USASF-VNSF headquarters levels the provision of planning advice and assistance was through direct contact among the USASF and VNSF commanders and staff and through the exchange of permanently assigned liaison officers. This inter-staff relationship did not extend to logistics and fiscal matters since CIDG supply responsibility as well as USASF funding of CIDG facilities and salaries were unilaterally US and because VNSF supplies originated in MAP. This advice was provided quarterly at the joint Special Forces commanders' conference and monthly at meetings with staff counterparts. At the group level, the provision of planning advice and assistance was facilitated to some extent by the partial integration of a VNSF captain (serving as liaison officer) as assistant S-3 of the 5SFCA. In this capacity he served as an action officer not only on USASF-VNSF joint matters but on some purely USASF projects as well. The 5SFCA liaison officer to VNSF headquarters was not similarly integrated. A qualified observer

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estimated that no more than 10 percent of the 5SFGA headquarters effort involved providing planning advice and assistance to VNSF.

Usually, MACV gave very general guidance with respect to the SF planning advice and assistance for VNSF. Most USASF planning advice and assistance to VNSF was self-generated, stemming from USASF training and knowledge of special forces operations. One example of specific MACV guidance during the evaluation period was the MACV directed SF camp relocation study, which USASF performed. Informed of the results of the study, VNSF recognized the need for certain relocations, and accepted the changes. Another example was the MACV recommendation in January 1965 to gradually convert CIDG into Regional and Popular Forces. Again VNSF was informed of the proposal and though not completely in accord, reluctantly agreed to trial conversions in II Corps area.

The VNSF was generally amenable to USASF planning advice and assistance, even when not solicited. Planning advice and assistance was acted upon more effectively above the A detachment level, probably because of the presence of more mature, better educated, and more experienced VNSF officers at the higher levels. Acceptance and effectiveness of USASF planning advice and assistance were reflected in the joint compilation of bi-lingual area assessments for Delta Project operations and in the encouragement of integrated US-Vietnamese work facilities in the A detachment camps. Integrated work facilities were used in all B detachments having CIDG missions and in all but one C detachment. Vietnamese Special Forces acceptance of USASF advice to reduce certain Delta Project incentives funded by CIDG reduced the FY 1966 projected budget by \$157,000.00 over the previous year.

A critical aspect of providing planning advice and assistance to the Vietnamese was that of advising and instructing the USASF detachments themselves. The tools employed by command and control elements to accomplish guidance objectives were: the Group standing operating procedures, letters of instruction, command and staff visits, conferences, schools, the Daily Situation Report, (compiled by C detachments using reports from A detachments) and the Weekly Intelligence Summary. Though these were ample means, and apparently effective, the concept of influencing the Vietnamese to do the job in place of the Americans might have been stressed more to subordinate detachments. For example, 5SFGA Letter of Instructions Number 1, dated 1 January 1965 (shown in annex F), which was the most important single mission statement provided subordinate detachments by the Group, referred to the VNSF only twice, and did not mention the USASF role in advising and coordinating with them.

5. Training Indigenous Military and Paramilitary Forces

In practice, the USASF command and control elements provided only management and direction of the irregular forces training programs. The B detachments had organic to them the operational skills required for

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training military or paramilitary personnel but they did not engage in the actual training. The C detachments lacked personnel with operational MOS's but were still capable of managing a training program. The extent of the VNSF High Command training capability was overall management, determination of policy, and direction.

Command and control element staff sections played a limited part in the role of training friendly forces. The USASF did not conduct intelligence schools for VNSF. There was a noticable lack of standardized marksmanship training for CIDG as well as a lack of training standardization from corps to corps. Aware of the lack of quality and uniformity in training, the USASF S-3's tried to get VNSF counterparts to recognize these deficiencies and correct them. In I and III Corps, centers were established after January 1965 for individual and up to company-size Strike Force unit training. These centers gave standardized training programs and instruction, and improved the quality of units and fillers. Strike Force training was pointed toward patrolling and camp defense. The CIDG received little unit training, it was generally untrained in company level tactics, and its leaders lacked the training necessary to control supporting fires.

A slight advantage in the competition for manpower was enjoyed by the CIDG. The recruitment and compensation of CIDG personnel differed from those of ARVN and RF/PF, and favored CIDG in that it had no contracted term of service and offered better rations, equipment, and medical care both to the Strike Force soldier and his family. Also, most CIDG units served in their home areas, an attraction to the Vietnamese, who usually have strong family ties. The CIDG pay was lower, but with USASF providing the funds and overseeing their disbursement, the CIDG member was sure of getting all his pay.

In some cases, where detachments had sector/subsector roles, MACV authorized the expenditure of CIDG funds and supplies to support RF/PF. This was done on a reimbursable basis primarily for the construction or improvement of training sites on district property.

Within the CIDG program, training by VNSF was usually standardized only in respect to basic elements of course content but the quality varied widely depending upon the A detachment's success in counterpart relations and the capability of VNSF instructors. The US and VN staff supervision was marginal and failed to provide standard minimum levels of training proficiency (marksmanship, individual combat skills, unit readiness), or a schedule of systematic training inspections capable of revealing the status and quality of training throughout the country. Some improvement in supervision was noted during the evaluation with the increase of B detachments and the stepped-up training supervision by S-3's at all levels. Standardization was more properly achieved by C and B detachment supervision than by the group headquarters, which addressed itself to overall policy and to the training program.

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6. Providing Material

Logistical planning was done unilaterally by the 5SFGA and involved the entire group headquarters staff. Basically, the S-3 selected the number, location, and strengths of camps and forces based on the assigned mission and existing conditions, and the S-4 programmed the equipment, clothing and supplies costed out for the annual budget submitted to Department of the Army through COMUSMACV.

The command and control element's role in material distribution was essentially that of establishing priorities. An example of group headquarters action during the evaluation was the steps taken to expedite camp construction in the Mekong River Delta area so as to have camps completed before the onset of the rainy season. To do this, group headquarters diverted the necessary supplies, air transport, and support personnel to complete the job.

Discretionary authority was delegated to B and C detachments to manage their own operations within limits. To this end, group headquarters placed dollar limitations on camp construction, and it established a limit on the amount each A detachment could spend per month on civic action and psychological operations (CA/PO). The dollar amount which could be spent on CA/PO at each level of pacification was: phase II - \$280.00, phase III - \$900.00, phase IV - \$500.00. See annex F for description of the phases of pacification.

Though C detachments were being provided a \$1000 per month CA/PO backup fund, the amount allocated A detachments was adequate, with the average CA/PO expenditure being \$250 to \$300 per camp, not including the use of USOM-provided materials. It was not necessary for the camp commanders to request permission to spend within the stated limits but they were required to record and report all such expenditures.

On many items of equipment group headquarters instituted a one-for-one issue and turn-in system to reduce paper work and improve supply economy. A further saving was effected by the use of central purchasing by logistical support center when it was determined that camp local purchase prices exceeded the combined costs of price and transportation from Nha Trang, Saigon, or Da Nang.

No shortcomings which adversely affected operations were noted in the material distribution system. The system of logistical support used by USASF in Vietnam was responsive and was considered to be adequately staffed to perform the mission.

7. Providing Operational Advice and Assistance

The command and control elements provided operational advice and assistance mostly in the medical, intelligence, civic action, and

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psychological operations areas, and to a lesser degree in the tactical and engineer areas. Examples of this advice and assistance were the continuing pressure exerted by USASF intelligence staffs on their VNSF counterparts to increase and improve use of CIDG intelligence and reconnaissance (I&R) platoons and the USASF assistance to VNSF CA/PO staffs in providing US-conceived propaganda material to capitalize on CA accomplishments.

Operational advice and assistance were more effective at the lower than the higher levels. After February 1965, the improvement in combat intelligence acquisition was a good example of effective advice and response, especially in III and IV CTZ. In those areas CIDG combat intelligence predicted a VC regimental-size attack on a district capital and in other instances enabled CIDG strike forces to surprise and overwhelm VC camps in Kien Giang and Darlac Provinces. An example of high level failure to heed USASF advice was the ARVN order to move Rhade Montagnard CIDG companies from their native region of Darlac and their employment for an extended period more than 100 miles away in western Binh Dinh. After several months, the Rhade refused to go on patrols or offensive operations and had to be returned to Darlac, where many then enlisted in ARVN or Regional and Popular Forces.

Operational advice and assistance was provided the same way as planning assistance, except that technical assistance was usually given directly since medical, signal, and engineer skills were lacking in the VNSF and CIDG.

8. Findings

- a. The major portion of the Group command and control element's work was the management of personnel, materiel, and fiscal resources.
- b. The Commanding Officer, 5SFGA, served without charter as special staff advisor to COMUSMACV on matters pertaining to USASF employment.
- c. The operation of the Tactical Operation Center/Administration and Logistic Center required an over-strength of USASF personnel, even after approval of the 1 April 1965 troop unit change request.
- d. As a result of the command relationships established by COMUSMACV, 5SFGA commander did not have operational control of his detachments.
- e. The Delta Project was the only operation directly advised and coordinated by group headquarters.
- f. Operational control of the Special Forces detachments was delegated to MACV corps senior advisors and usually exercised by them through the senior Special Forces detachment commander in each CTZ.

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g. Two of the four B detachment commanders interviewed reported that transportation and communications available to B detachments resulted in a marginal capability to supervise planning and operations of up to eight subordinate detachments.

h. The portion of 5SFGA personnel in Vietnam assigned to A, B, and C detachments increased during the evaluation from 55 percent to 66 percent.

i. There was a significant reduction in per capita and per camp cost of operations of the CIDG program during the evaluation.

j. The Group command and control element delegated approval authority for certain levels of expenditure to subordinate detachments.

k. The 5SFGA instituted new accounting procedures and stricter control of CIDG funds beginning in the second quarter of FY 1965.

l. End use of CIDG program goods and services, amounting to a value over \$30 million (US) in FY 65, was managed in-country by the 5SFGA.

m. Providing advice and planning assistance to VNSF was a minor portion of the work effort of the group headquarters staff.

n. Letter of Instruction Number 1, Headquarters 5SFGA, to operational detachments, did not stress the USASF advisory role or the importance of working through the VNSF.

o. Training indigenous military and paramilitary forces was not normally a function of the command and control elements at Group headquarters or B and C detachment levels but a special B detachment conducted training at Dong Ba Thin VNSF Training Center.

p. The command and control elements of 5SFGA did not establish minimum standards of CIDG proficiency, especially in regard to marksmanship, individual combat skills, and unit readiness.

q. There was no system of scheduled training inspections of the A detachments by the B and C detachments.

r. During the evaluation command and control element advisory emphasis on intelligence increased with respect to both quantity and quality.

s. The command and control elements had sufficient personnel with the training and experience to provide advice and planning assistance to those indigenous military and paramilitary forces within the scope of their authority.

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t. Civilian Irregular Defense Group members were paid under US supervision on a monthly basis and were not under obligation to serve for any specified period of time.

B. OBJECTIVE 2 - OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT CAPABILITIES

The A detachment was the basic operational unit of Special Forces. In concept, the A detachment performed its mission under the command of the B detachment to which it was subordinate. In Vietnam, however, operational control of A detachments emanated from MACV sources, whether the A detachment was serving strictly within the CIDG program or had a co-equal role as the MACV sub-sector advisor. The standard strength of an A detachment for an unconventional warfare mission was 2 officers and 10 enlisted men. The two officers were the detachment commander and the executive officer, while the enlisted personnel were distributed on the basis of two each in the areas of operations-intelligence, weapons, demolitions, medical aid, and communications. In the counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, the A detachment required additional capabilities in CA/PO and intelligence. Demolitions, for which there was little requirement, was de-emphasized. In contrast to B and C detachments, the operations of A detachments brought working level US military personnel into daily contact with the population, who were the ultimate objective of the counterinsurgency effort.

1. A Detachment Operational Objectives

The A detachment's operational objectives were described in 5SFGA Letter of Instructions Number 7, dated 3 November 1964, and revised in Letter of Instruction Number 1, dated 1 January 1965. These instructions specified in detail the execution of each of the five phases of the Special Forces counterinsurgency program: preparation, clear, secure, develop, and civilian control. The concept of A detachment operations was essentially that of "clear, hold, and build". It was fundamental that CIDG personnel be recruited from the area of operations in order to provide an exploitable entree to the populace which, in turn, would facilitate military-civil relations. Further, this concept stated that no population area which had been "uncommitted" or which had been Viet Cong dominated could be won to the government of Vietnam until: (a) the Viet Cong had been destroyed or neutralized, and (b) a Government of Vietnam infrastructure, to which the populace was committed, had been established to replace that of the Viet Cong. Each A detachment was to implement the concept within its area of responsibility while performing any of the three military missions of border surveillance and control, operations against infiltration routes, or operations against VC war zone bases.

2. A Detachment Organization

For the performance of the I and II phases (preparation and clear), the A detachments involved in the Special Forces Counterinsurgency Program,

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for either CIDG or MACV, retained a strength of 2 officers and 10 enlisted men. The two officers were the team leader and the executive officer as in the unconventional warfare situation but the distribution of enlisted skills was changed to one operations NCO, two intelligence NCO's, two weapons NCO's, two medical NCO's, two communications NCO's, and one combat engineer NCO. In phase III (secure) the ideal A detachment was to have 3 officers and 9 to 12 enlisted men, as required by the situation. However, there were no such detachments in phase III during the evaluation. The additional officer was to be concerned with CA/PO. The enlisted personnel were to be: one operations NCO, one to two intelligence NCO's, four weapons NCO's, two medical NCO's, one to two communications NCO's, and one CA/PO NCO. In phase IV (develop) the A detachment was to be composed of two officers (one each for command and control and CA/PO) and six or seven enlisted men. The enlisted personnel were to be distributed as follows: one operations NCO, one intelligence NCO, one or two weapons NCO's, one medical NCO, one CA/PO NCO and one communications specialist. When phase V (civilian control) was reached, few if any military forces were to remain in the area. If the A detachment remained in the area, they were to take over advising and assisting the civil authorities, police, and paramilitary units.

The proportion of each of the skills present in any given "A" detachment was not necessarily reflected in the specific assignments of individuals because most Special Forces personnel were cross-trained in at least one other skill in addition to that in which they were primarily employed. Thus, each A detachment had additional capabilities in basic skills although the level and use of cross-training were variable. Experience showed that demolitions personnel were not normally required during any of the phases of the counterinsurgency program except during the initial phase of establishing camp defenses. They were shifted to weapons, intelligence, engineer, and CA/PO tasks. Headquarters, 5SFGA provided 1-week orientation courses for enlisted personnel taking over CA/PO or intelligence assignments at the A detachment level. Since all school qualified Special Forces personnel had been exposed to the basic concepts of intelligence and CA/PO, these "courses" when combined with on-the-job training and a few months' experience were considered adequate to the requirements of most situations. Intelligence and CA/PO competence at the A detachment was reinforced by TDY personnel from the 441st Intelligence Corps (INTC) Detachment, the 97th Civil Affairs Detachment, and the Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific, who operated with and in support of A detachments while attached to B and C detachments.

3. Organizing Military and Paramilitary Forces

Special Forces A detachments did not directly organize paramilitary units on a face-to-face basis. The actual organization on the ground was almost invariably accomplished by Vietnamese Special Forces, ARVN, or Government of Vietnam civil authorities (or a combination of the three). Special Forces A detachments advised on the timing and scope of organization,

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
on screening of recruits for purposes of security and assessment of capacity to perform, on selection of leaders, on weapons and equipment to be issued, and on establishment of procedures for pay, quarters, and care of wounded and dependents. Commanders of A detachments were instructed not to take direct control of these military or paramilitary units but they exercised varying degrees of influence through a VNSF or ARVN counterpart. A listing of military or paramilitary units with which A detachments (and in a few cases B detachments) performed an organizing mission as described above were:

<u>Identification</u>	<u>Type of Unit</u>	<u>Units/Personnel (Apr 65)</u>
CIDG Strike Force companies	Paramilitary	320
CIDG Strike Force combat recon platoon	Paramilitary	45 (approx)
Nung Reaction Force (platoons) (Da Nang, I Corps)	Paramilitary	10
Nung training cadre (at several camps)	Paramilitary	750 men (approx)
Delta Project reconnaissance teams	Military	6
Delta Project airborne ranger companies	Military	3

Because of the country-wide aspect of the CIDG program and the number of personnel involved, organization was standardized to such an extent that the A detachments had very little to say about what form units would take or how the program would be accomplished. The Strike Force had a standard form of organization and issue of equipment, as did the 2-squad, 18-man combat reconnaissance platoon. See figure 7 for the organizational structure and equipment of the typical Strike Force company, also called CIDG Guerrilla Company, Light. Because of the limitations on personnel available for or willing to accept recruitment, and the requirements of the operational situation, the number of Strike Force companies at any A detachment camp was usually not subject to any great influence by the detachment commander. Further limitations on the organizational capability of the detachment in Vietnam were the lack of a strong Vietnamese or tribal dialect language capability on the part of almost all USASF personnel and the controlling factor of political considerations imposed at a level higher than the A detachment. Therefore, the CIDG Program offered only a limited opportunity for the independent employment of the organizational capabilities of the A detachment, no matter how well-qualified individual detachment personnel might have been

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Equipment

Carbine, caliber .30 M1	103	Mortar, 60MM	3
Pistol caliber .45	1	IMG, caliber .30	3
SMG, caliber .45 M3	29	Radio, TR-20	4
Rifle, automatic, caliber .30	18	Radio, HT-1	22

(C) FIGURE 7. Organization and equipment, CIDG light guerrilla company (Strike Force Company)

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for this task by virtue of school training or operational experience in a less restrictive situation.

4. Training Military and Paramilitary Units

The major training effort of the Special Forces A detachments in Vietnam was directed toward the CIDG Strike Force companies. Training of conventional military units, other than those in Project Delta, was not a Special Forces mission, nor were mobile training teams (MTT's) employed by USASF during the evaluation. Units of the CIDG were normally trained in the camps where they were recruited, although centralized training facilities were established in I and III Corps during the evaluation. Of the 34 A detachments contacted, 26 reported conducting some kind of CIDG training or retraining. Basic training cycles for the CIDG at these detachments ranged in length from 2 to 8 weeks, with 4 weeks being the most common training period. A corps area breakdown of the 12,857 trainees completing training courses at 5SFGA camps and training facilities during the evaluation is shown in figure 8.

The typical A detachment CIDG training program included five subject areas: weapons, individual combat training, small unit tactics, reaction drill, and specialties such as voice communications, crew-served weapons, and elementary medical aid. This program of instruction was adequate for training Montagnard or other minority groups for employment

	Oct 64	Nov 64	Dec 64	Jan 65	Feb 65	Mar 65	Apr 65	Total
I Corps	359	214	30	869	768	813	265	3,318
II Corps	694	1157	726	215	441	635	1082	4,950
III Corps	86	443	191	125	61	479	150	1,535
IV Corps	35	193	747	304	725	430	620	3,054
Monthly Total	1174	2007	1694	1513	1995	2357	2	12,857

Source: 5SFGA Monthly Operational Summaries

(C) FIGURE 8. Trainees completing courses at 5SFGA camps and facilities.

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as guerrillas or counter-guerrillas but was not intended to train first line troops for conventional operations. The bulk of basic individual training was actually given by the counterpart VNSF A detachment present in the CIDG camps, while USASF personnel gave instructions (through interpreters) in the specialist areas. With the exception of weapons training, the subject areas listed above were not universally included in the training program of the 34 A detachments contacted. Five of the training programs excluded reaction drill and only six offered specialist training.

In daily practice the role of USASF in CIDG camp training programs was to train instructors as well as to train paramilitary units. A main objective was to bring the capability of VNSF A detachment personnel to a level where they could conduct an effective training program with a minimum of dependence on US advice and assistance. This objective was accomplished by a combination of school training at the Dong Ba Thir Special Forces Training Center and on-the-job training in A detachments. The US personnel assisted counterparts in preparing instruction, observing and assisting in presentations, critiquing performance of instructors and students, and encouraging VNSF personnel to strive for high standards of professionalism. The inability to communicate directly in a common language with many of the counterpart VNSF enlisted personnel handicapped the training effort and further enhanced the prestige and influence of interpreters who already enjoyed special status because of the indispensable service they rendered to US personnel.

Training accomplishments at the A detachment level were difficult to evaluate. The 5SFCA did not have a standardized, country-wide basic program of instruction for CIDG camps, nor did it have a system of reporting staff training inspections. Corps senior advisors had been charged by MACV with the responsibility for monitoring CIDG training but how this function was accomplished did not fall within the scope of the evaluation. Furthermore, direct USASF participation in CIDG training varied from camp to camp and depended largely upon the extent of training ability and initiative demonstrated by the VNSF A detachment which was nominally responsible for the training task. However, a rough measure of USASF/VNSF training accomplishment in the CIDG program may be taken from a comparison of enemy and friendly combat losses. During the evaluation the ratio of Viet Cong killed in action to the combined CIDG/VNSF/USASF killed in action was 3.2 to 1. For purposes of comparison this ratio is approximately 33 percent better than that achieved by Regional and Popular Forces and approximately 12 percent less than that achieved by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam from December 1964 through April 1965.

A major difficulty encountered in the USASF training program was the low level of literacy and technical comprehension on the part of most CIDG trainees, which required that the subject matter be presented at a very basic level. Tactics above the company level were not generally given and technical training was limited to such subjects as the operation

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of voice radio and rudimentary first aid.

Apart from student abilities, further limitations on the level and type of instruction given by A detachments resulted from government of Vietnam political restrictions on the force composition capabilities of units composed of members of ethnic, religious, and political factions. Finally, operational requirements which generally committed two-thirds of a camp's available force to patrol missions or camp security at any given time reduced the number of both cadre and trainees available for more extended periods of instruction. Considering the intensive training and previous experience of the average US Army Special Forces enlisted man in relation to the level of training offered to CIDG, the potential of the trainees, and the requirements of the tactical situation, Special Forces A detachment personnel generally possessed tactical and technical skills in excess of those required to perform the CIDG mission.

5. Providing Operational Planning and Assistance

The basic combat role of Special Forces A detachments was to provide planning and operational advice and assistance to CIDG units through the VNSF A detachment commander. Combat operations were undertaken by 33 of the 34 A detachments observed by ACTIV evaluators. Objectives of combat operations were training, security, reconnaissance and attacks on enemy positions or movements. The basic combat force, the CIDG guerrilla company (or Strike Force company), was best suited for camp defense, patrolling, raids, ambushes, denial, and reaction operations. It was not intended that Strike Force units become involved in extended confrontation with main force Viet Cong units which were normally more heavily armed and better trained.

Vietnamese Special Forces personnel were on site at all 34 A detachment camps visited by the evaluators. Strengths of the VNSF at these camps ranged from one officer to as many as 16 officers and men. The counterpart relationship was complicated by the fact that at 15 of the camps an ARVN officer or some official other than the VNSF detachment commander was the camp commander. This meant that the US detachment commander had to maintain cordial working relations with three separate groups: Strike Force, VNSF, and ARVN. In all but two of these camps USASF reported that they maintained satisfactory relations with the camp commander. The nature of advice and assistance given ranged from suggestions to near total direction.

Except for the ground rule requiring that two thirds of the available strike force be retained within the area of the camp and the other third operating actively beyond the area, the USASF detachment commander retained a high degree of latitude in offering operational advice. Subject areas for advice included offensive operations, camp defense, intelligence, communications, and CA/PO. Enlisted specialists in the USASF

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maintained close working relations with their VNSF counterparts. Tactical planning initiative was often exercised by the USASF detachment commander. The first step in operational planning advice was to suggest a course of action to the VNSF commander and camp commander. This often had to be followed up with a partial plan which could be used as a basis for guiding the counterpart through the pre-execution stages of the operation.

Because of limitations in organization, mission, and the tactical competence of both leaders and troops, Strike Force units did not usually operate away from bases in units larger than company size. In certain operations requiring use of larger units, ad hoc command groups of VNSF and USASF personnel provided the required staff planning, coordination, and operational control. The degree of advice and assistance required on an operation varied with the competence of the counterpart. Tactical leadership was in some cases beyond the capability of the VNSF A detachment commanders, even though many of them were captains. When required, USASF personnel on combat operations gave instructions directly to Strike Force leaders. Forces employed outside the camp area usually numbered about 100 CIDG accompanied by 2 or 3 USASF and VNSF personnel. At the time the A detachment camps were visited by ACTIV evaluators, 15 of 34 camps had operations away from the base in progress and 30 had operations in the planning stage. However, some camps experienced difficulty in keeping one-third of their CIDG strength involved in effective offensive operations and, in one month during the evaluation not one VC was reported killed by the USASF, VNSF or CIDG in one of the corps areas.

Operational assistance which could be provided directly or indirectly by USASF detachment commanders included artillery support, air fire support, air resupply, and air evacuation. Use of aircraft or ARVN artillery was normally obtained through US corps advisory group channels. This support was shared with other US and Vietnamese elements based on priorities established by US CSA and the CTZ commander. The average duration of off-site operations by 34 camps ranged from 1 to 20 days with more than two-thirds lasting less than 1 week. Operational assistance provided from within the detachment for missions away from the base camp included patrol to camp communications, competent on-the-spot medical aid, and assistance in crew-served weapon employment.

Air resupply was requested for operations away from base by 13 camps and was reported successfully accomplished by 10 of these. Pre-planned air strikes were requested for 10 operations and approved for 7. Immediate air strikes were requested in 23 cases and approved in 16. Effectiveness of air strikes was rated by USASF as satisfactory in 12 of the 16 operations for which it was provided. Elapsed time for arrival of strike aircraft over target was usually less than 1 hour after the request.

Operational advice and assistance also extended to defensive

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operations. Of the 34 camps visited, 28 were reported to be permanent in nature. All but five were constructed by USASF detachments. All CIDG camps were required to be capable of withstanding a battalion-size attack. This required advice in planning camp layout and in siting weapons, bunkers, trenches, and perimeter obstacles. Camp defensive plans had to be prepared as did intelligence and counterintelligence plans. Operational assistance in this area included weapons and combat engineer personnel from within the detachment, US Navy Seabee technical assistance teams (STAT) for large scale construction requirements, coordination of US aerial fire and illumination support, and provision of additional crew-served weapons not in the Strike Force TOE. Of the 34 A detachments contacted, 27 (79 percent) rated camp defense as satisfactory. Only one of the detachments had actually been involved in a major defensive operation.

In order to facilitate the provision of planning and operational assistance, USASF and VNSF higher headquarters directed the integration of VNSF and USASF duties at the A detachment level. Of the 34 detachments contacted, 24 reported having accomplished this during the evaluation. All functions were integrated by 20 of the detachments while the other 4 had integrated only certain staff or technical functions. Integration apparently stopped at the office door, as only 1 of the 34 A detachments reported sharing quarters and mess facilities with their VNSF counterparts. However, in the case of non-integrated quarters, all but three were reported to be similar in accommodation. As in the training situation, interpreters played a key role in providing communication among USASF and VNSF personnel. An average of five interpreters were employed by USASF at each A detachment camp. Of these, 36 percent were reported to be performing satisfactorily. Requirements for additional interpreters were reported by 10 of the camps.

In evaluating mission accomplishment, 22 of 34 detachments reported they were successfully accomplishing their mission. However, accomplishment may have had a rather narrow meaning as 29 detachments reported their area of influence did not extend beyond the immediate area of the camp, while only five reported having influence over a widespread area. Interestingly, 25 of the 34 detachments reported that their mission could have been accomplished by other US non-Special Forces personnel such as MACV advisory detachments. Only seven detachments felt a split A detachment could have accomplished the mission. In only five instances was it reported that VNSF could have accomplished the mission alone, while in only three cases was it reported that ARVN could have accomplished the mission. It was reported by 74 percent of the operational detachments that their involvement in a static counterinsurgency mission had no adverse effect on their unconventional warfare capability.

In commenting on how the A detachment's operational capability could be improved, one senior Special Forces officer offered the following

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suggestions:

- a) Improved individual language capability is required. All USASF personnel should be required to learn a useful native language. This is particularly necessary to enhance counterpart relationships. A monetary incentive might be employed to encourage language learning.
- b) Pre-mission training should emphasize skills required in counterinsurgency as well as unconventional warfare employment of Special Forces. Officers should be especially well informed in the strategy and tactics of Communist-inspired "wars of national liberation", and should organize their thought processes toward countermeasures appropriate to the phase of insurgency with which they are confronted as well as the succeeding phases.
- c) Following from b) above, both officers and men should be aware of the US Army's role in the propagation of democratic ideals at the "rice root" levels. All USASF personnel must have a strong faith in progress and individualism and be able to convey this to counterparts in developing societies.

6. Obtaining and Maintaining Logistical Support

The A detachment CIDG camps were almost entirely dependent upon Special Forces channels (principally Group headquarters and C detachments) for logistical support. This support included TO&E items for the detachment, camp property, and items of issue for CIDG personnel. See annex E for a list of camp property available to detachments. The only items that might not have been brought into camp were food and materials for construction of shelters, but in some cases even these were not available in the immediate area. The A detachments were not responsible for providing logistical support to the VNSF personnel in their camps. However, USASF capability to provide continuing logistical support for CIDG units had a direct bearing on maintenance of CIDG morale, fighting effectiveness, and ultimate survival. United States Army Special Forces detachment commanders did, however, provide short term logistical support to VNSF counterparts when it was required to accomplish the CIDG mission. Because the Special Forces logistical system was designed for direct US controlled support of paramilitary operations in isolated areas on a quick response basis through the use of radioed or air courier delivered requisitions and air shipment of supplies, the A detachments enjoyed a unique advantage in comparison with other MACV advisory teams.

Receipt of requisitioned supplies (described in annex E) was

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reported to have been accomplished without undue delay by 32 of the 34 A detachments contacted during the evaluation. The average time between requisition and receipt of supplies ranged from 3 to 30 days, with 53 percent of the camps reporting average times of 10 days or less, and 73 percent reporting average times of 15 days or less. Of the 34 A detachments contacted, 16 reported having submitted a total of 39 requests for emergency resupply. Elapsed times reported for emergency resupply ranged from 4 hours to 7 days. The majority of elapsed times reported for emergency deliveries were less than 24 hours but there were two instances reported of unsatisfactory responses to emergency requests. Where emergency resupply was airdropped, 90 percent of the material was recovered in useable condition by the receiving unit. See annex E for a comparison of proportions of supplies delivered by air and surface means.

Of the 34 detachments, 27 reported having their TO&E property on hand at the camp sites. Of these 27, eight reported breakdowns or wearing out of team equipment. Breakdown or wearing out of USASF team equipment was also reported by three of the seven detachments not having all team equipment on hand. Changes in A detachment TO&E property were recommended by detachment commanders to ACTIV evaluators at 10 of the 34 detachments contacted. Detachments reported CIDG equipment breaking down or wearing out in three categories, as follows: communications at 2 detachments, clothing/boots at 28 detachments, and vehicles/mechanical equipment at 4 detachments. Breakdowns and wearing out of CIDG equipment were reported as excessive by 23 detachments. Serious maintenance problems were attributed to material failure, weather, terrain, shortage of repair parts, and shortages of operators/mechanics. Figure 9 shows experience in maintenance problems with specific types or items of USASF TO&E and TA equipment in each of 34 detachments. Maintenance problems occurred most frequently in motor vehicles and next in camp electric power generators.

Prior to moving to the camp site, incoming A detachments received a logistics briefing at Group headquarters. Among the 34 A detachments contacted, 28 reported this briefing to be accurate and adequate. Deletions or additions to CIDG or detachment TO&E property were reported as having been made by 16 of the 34 detachments. Recommendations that changes be made on amounts of equipment issued to CIDG and Special Forces were received from 11 A detachments. In summary, logistical support was evaluated as outstanding by 5 detachments, as excellent by 12 detachments, as good by 12 detachments, and poor by 5 detachments.

7. Providing Operational Intelligence

Typically, a Special Forces A detachment CIDG camp was an isolated base in the midst of enemy territory where the enemy could not be denied the capability to move potentially overwhelming forces at will. Thus, the A detachment depended upon a flow of timely and accurate intelligence for its survival. The intelligence collection function went beyond the

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DETACHMENT																	
CAUSE OF PROBLEM	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
MATERIEL FAILURE	HT-1			HT-1			HT-1						GEN	VEH			
WEATHER																	HT-1
TERRAIN			VEH								VEH	VEH		VEH		UNIP	
REPAIR PARTS				GEN					GEN	VEH	VEH	VEH		VEH	VEH		
OPERATOR/MECHANICS	HT-1	WPNS	VEH	GEN	CHAIN SAW	HT-1	GEN	VEH				VEH			VEH		

DETACHMENT																	
CAUSE OF PROBLEM	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
MATERIEL FAILURE		CHAIN SAW			VEH				VEH		WPNS			VEH		COMM	
WEATHER						VEH			VEH			CLOTH			COMM		
TERRAIN						VEH								VEH			
REPAIR PARTS	GEN	RADIO	VEH				WPNS	WPNS	VEH	GEN	OB	MTRS	MTRS	VEH	OB		
OPERATOR/MECHANICS	GEN	RADIO	VEH						VEH	GEN	OB	WPNS	MTRS	MTRS	MTRS		

KEY: HT-1 - A walkietalkie type of portable AM radio
 GEN - Gasoline driven generators used as camp power source
 VEH - Vehicle
 OB MTRS - Outboard motors
 CLOTH - Clothing
 COMM - Communications equipment, type unspecified

(U) FIGURE 9. Causes of maintenance problems in 34 A detachments. Showing types of materiel.

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provision of advice to a counterpart: it was a unilateral responsibility of the detachment commander, as well. Sources of intelligence included in the evaluation of A detachments were: patrols, agents (of GVN and US intelligence), GN/US district and sector staffs, USASF B detachments, aerial photography, aerial visual reconnaissance, and other. The use of these sources by the 34 camps is shown in figure 10. The use of more than one source is normally required to insure verification and thoroughness of coverage. Use of multiple sources by 34 A detachments is shown in figure 11.

In 14 of the 34 camps contacted, the Vietnamese camp commander (VNSF or ARVN) operated an "intelligence system" employing military or civilian agents. Military agents were employed in 10 camps and civilian agents were employed in 17. A local informant net had been established in 18 of the camps. (See item 15, annex D.) Civilians in the camp area often became voluntary intelligence sources, especially after effective CA/PC programs were instituted. United States Army Special Forces personnel rated Vietnamese intelligence personnel at the district and province level as follows: satisfactory (8), unsatisfactory (6), and of unknown quality (20). Intelligence collection plans had been established by 24 camps, while 26 had some type of order of battle files.

On the counterintelligence side, 30 of the camps reported having a counterintelligence plan, although the effectiveness of some of these might be questioned since 6 camps reported security investigations of Strike Force members performed by the Vietnamese Military Security Service (MSS) to be unsatisfactory. The Strike Force investigation was rated satisfactory by 11 camps and of unknown quality by 17 camps. A counterintelligence screening of Strike Forces trainees was reported to be in effect at 23 camps. Known or suspected Viet Cong penetration of the Strike Force was reported by 11 camps, while 7 reported incidents of sabotage and espionage.

The capability of the A detachment to provide operational

SOURCE:	PATROL	AGENT	DISTRICT	SECTOR	B-DET	AIR PHOTO*	AIR VISUAL**	OTHER
Camps Using	24	18	7	8	8	16	20	16


*At least one photo mission requested

**At least one visual recon performed

(C) FIGURE 10. Use of intelligence sources by 34 A detachments

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(C) FIGURE 11. Use of multiple intelligence sources by 34 A detachments.

intelligence was based to a large extent upon the intelligence training of its personnel. This took two forms: (1) fundamental intelligence training included in all US Army Special Forces officer and enlisted schools or unit training courses and (2) specialized intelligence training given to the team's intelligence NCO's at the US Army Intelligence and Special Warfare Schools. As an adjunct to intelligence training, an area language qualification (French or Vietnamese in this case) would have been highly desirable, if not essential. Normally the A detachment intelligence NCO's of the 5SFCA had taken either the US Army Intelligence or Special Warfare School courses. During the evaluation, the A detachment intelligence NCO's assistant, if he had one at all, was likely to be an ex-demolitions specialist who came to his new duties with little more intelligence qualification than what he remembered from his basic Special Forces training and what he had learned in the one-week intelligence course given at Group headquarters. The language capability of intelligence personnel could not be ascertained by the evaluators but an indication of lack of strength in this area might be taken from the fact that one C detachment commander counted less than 5 men in his command who spoke French or Vietnamese fluently enough to use it operationally. This deficiency left the intelligence specialists dependent upon an interpreter or the English speaking capability of his counterparts and sources.

Despite less than ideal conditions, the 5SFCA S-2 reported a marked improvement in the number and quality of intelligence reports

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from A detachments since December 1964. The number of successful friendly initiated combat actions based upon intelligence reports also increased during the evaluation. These improvements were attributed to the appointment of 5SFCA PCS personnel at the detachments who had an advantage in continuity and attitude over TDY personnel, and to the accomplishments of 441st INTC Detachment augmentation personnel at the detachment level.

Two factors which blocked successful intelligence efforts at the A detachment level were the length of time required to obtain air photo reconnaissance and the duplication of intelligence organizations attempting to run agent operations in the field. Only 13 out of 25 photo reconnaissance requests were reported by A detachments as being completed on time. Air photo support was arranged by the C detachments through the USAF air liaison officer (ALO) assigned to each corps advisory group. Special Forces requests had no inherent priority and awaited availability of aircraft and suitable weather. It was reported that air photo requests took 2 weeks or longer to be satisfied in two different corps areas.

In the matter of agent operations, it appeared at first glance that with his 10,000 piastre per month allocation for intelligence purposes the detachment commander would have had an advantage in conducting clandestine collection and counterintelligence operations. However, the familiar problem of lack of source control arose in many areas. Since at least five Vietnamese and probably as many US agencies conducted similar agent operations in Vietnam without effective source control, it became very profitable for agents to sell information to as many takers as possible. While coordination among staff officials of these agencies at province and higher levels may have been adequate, the A detachment intelligence NCO's were often in the dark as to who was or was not to be contacted or recruited. This confusion was complicated by a lack of explicit 5SFCA policy on whether USASF personnel would engage in direct recruitment of confidential informants or would work through VNSF, and whether or not they would include VNSF personnel in their lists of informants and targets. The ambiguous position in which detachment commanders and intelligence NCO's found themselves is reflected in the fact that 47 percent of the detachments contacted did not report agent operations as a source of intelligence. Pertinent agent reports were received by A detachments from US clandestine sources.

A team of 16 intelligence personnel from the 441st INTC Detachment was attached to 5SFCA on TDY in March 1965 and was deployed to B and C detachments. These personnel, whose specialties were in the areas of positive intelligence collection, counterintelligence, order of battle, imagery interpretation, and combat intelligence, were to be employed in an advisory status rather than in operations, i.e. they were to train US Army Special Forces personnel in intelligence techniques. While they did this to the extent possible, the situation was such that they were required to become involved in operations.

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Among the more pertinent suggestions received for improving 5SFGA intelligence operations were:

- a) Assistant intelligence NCO's at the A detachments should be brought up to the same level of training as the intelligence NCO.
- b) Continue the augmentation of trained intelligence personnel (assigned or attached) at levels higher than the A detachments.
- c) Continue to improve support in aerial surveillance both in acquisition of information and in interpretation.
- d) Stress to detachment commanders and intelligence personnel the need to continuously improve the intelligence consciousness of their VNSF counterparts.

8. Performing Civic Action Functions

As organized for the civil-military roles involved in the Special Forces Counterinsurgency Program in Vietnam, the A detachment had a strong capability to perform civic action. The A detachment performed civic action either as a strictly CIDG operation or in the co-equal role as the MACV sub-sector advisory team. Objectives and procedures for A detachment civic action operations were outlined in annex 5 to 5SFGA Letter of Instruction Number 1, January 1965. Personnel with civic action capabilities in the fields of combat engineering, medicine, communications, and operations intelligence were provided within the detachment organization for each phase of the program. Between January and March 1965 the existing 5SFGA A detachments' civic action capabilities were enhanced by the addition of 10 CA/PO executive officers. Six were in-house trained and four were on TDY from 97th Civil Affairs Detachment. Also added to the A detachments during this period were 16 CA/PO NCO's who had passed through 5SFGA training in CA/PO. See figure 12 for a list of 5SFGA CA/PO personnel at all echelons.

The A detachment's personnel strength represented the largest US commitment to combined military-civil operations at the district level and usually exceeded the strength of MACV district advisory teams by 100 percent or more. Figure 13 shows a comparison of MACV district (sub-sector) advisory team and USASF A detachment skills applicable to civil military operations.

The A detachment's civic action capabilities were applied in coordination with those of other US and Vietnamese agencies operating in the detachment's area of responsibility. The executive officers for

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Category of Personnel	5SPCA	97th Civil Affairs Det.	Broadcasting & 1st Special File Acty. Det. (Rm)	Aggregate Assignment
November 1964:				
CA Officers	2	6		6
PO Officers	2		4	4
CA/PO Officers				
CA Enlisted	2			
PO Enlisted	2			
CA/PO Enlisted		4		4
Total: 22	8	10	4	14
March 1965:				
CA Officers	2	6		6
PO Officers	3		5	5
CA/PO Officers	6	5	1	6
CA Enlisted	2			
PO Enlisted	3			
CA/PO Enlisted	16	3		3
Total: 52	32	14	5	20

(C) FIGURE 12. 5SPCA civic action and psychological operations personnel, organic and attached

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<u>GVN District Chiefs Functions</u>	<u>MACV Subsector Team Advisory Skills</u>	<u>USASF A Det Advisory Skills</u>
Public Admin		
Pacification		3 CA/PO
Information	2 officers (also Mil Opns)	1 Off
Education		2 NCO's
Youth		
Health	1 Med NCO	1 Med NCO
Police Security		1 Intel NCO 1 Opns NCO
Mil Opns (RF/PF)	1 Opns NCO 1 Comm NCO	1 Comm NCO 1 Wpns NCO
<u>CIDG Functions</u>		<u>A Det Advisory Skills</u>
Mil Opns		2 Off (CO also in dist CA/OP & Mil opns)
Intel		1 Wpns NCO 1 Intel NCO
Comm		1 Comm NCO
Medical		1 Med NCO
CA/PO		1 Engr NCO (Plus above skills)

Note: All NCO's function as weapons NCO's in military operations.

Source: 5SFGA

(U) FIGURE 13. Comparison of MACV Advisory team
and USASF A detachment skills.

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CA/PO had district officials rather than VNSF as their counterparts. Close liaison was maintained with the local US Operations Mission (USOM) (now USAID) representative, both for program coordination and to obtain USOM commodities and building materials for distribution by USASF. Since USOM did not usually have full-time representation at the district level, USASF could also provide continuing direction for local USOM supported projects. The civic action staff at group headquarters maintained liaison with CARE and religious charities in Saigon so that relief goods from these sources could be obtained for A detachment projects, especially for emergency care of refugees.

In addition to his personnel assets, each detachment commander had CIDG fund support in the amounts of \$280.00 (phase II), \$900.00 (phase III), or \$500.00 (phase IV) per month (depending upon the phase of the program) for materials, equipment, and other costs of civic action projects. Individual projects costing in excess of \$100.00 required approval by higher headquarters. There was no limit on individual projects provided the projects could be accomplished within the monthly fund allocation. The detachment's civic action funds could be applied to a wide variety of projects as long as the objectives of the project contributed to the furtherance of the CIDG program. This permitted flexibility in supporting projects originated by the detachment as well as those originated nationally or locally by other agencies such as USOM or GVN ministries.

At all times stress was to be laid upon stimulating the populace to originate and participate in self-help civic action projects. United States Army Special Forces personnel were informed of the need to insure that credit for civic action accomplishments was given to the Government of Vietnam, and especially to the local officials of the government. (In this regard Letter of Instruction No. 1, and the 5SFGA SOP (annex F) did not include any mention of how USASF civic action functions were to be coordinated with the VNSF counterpart detachment commander or how he was to be encouraged to have his team actively engage in civic action. At the same time non-participation in civic action was one of the principal complaints leveled against VNSF personnel by USASF personnel who were interviewed during the evaluation.) By training and inclination, many VNSF officers were oriented more toward unconventional warfare than the civic action which had become an essential element of the CIDG program.

Accomplishments of the USASF civic action projects in terms of their contribution to Rural Reconstruction (formerly the Pacification Program) were not systematically reported to the MACV staff in Saigon during the evaluation. Therefore, it was difficult to assess the impact of the USASF activities on the overall counterinsurgency effort. Statistics reported by the A detachments to Headquarters 5SFGA generally listed projects initiated, projects completed, projects cancelled, and projects continued, but did not classify by category such as dispensary

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construction, school construction, agricultural improvement, or transportation improvement. From October 1964 through April 1965, A detachments in the four CTZ reported initiation of 1125 civic action projects and completion of 1007 projects. As of the end of April 1965, 60 projects were reported as continuing. Although the number of civic action projects completed in April was 176 greater than in October, the number of patients treated by USASF dispensaries and medical patrols decreased from 94,792 in October to 51,682 in April. While at first this seems contradictory, since medical civic action was reported to be highly popular, one explanation offered was that the populace feared VC reprisal for individual contact with Americans (sick call) but were not afraid to participate in a community project such as building a school, presumably because the onus of "collaboration" would fall largely upon the village leadership.

The effective employment of the civic action capabilities depended upon a combination of factors, among which were: the emphasis given to the program by the detachment commander, the attitude and ability of district officials, the extent of VC control of the population, and the desire of the people to improve their living conditions and to contribute their labor to bring about desired changes. Whether or not the average detachment could devote sufficient managerial talent and operational personnel to prosecute vigorously a continuing civic action program and at the same time continue military operations depended to a large extent on the enemy's military strength in the area of operations.

9. Providing Psychological Warfare Planning and Assistance

At the beginning of the evaluation, the capability of the A detachment to provide psychological warfare planning assistance in psychological operations was nil. There were no CA/PO officers or NCO's in the detachment, although each C detachment had a TDY psychological operations officer to provide advice and assistance to subordinate units. The 10 executive officers for CA/PO and the 10 CA/PO NCO's assigned to A detachments by March 1965 enhanced psychological operations capabilities to a limited extent. In April, the executive officers of six B detachments became CA/PO officers with additional duty as executive officer. Whether or not this strengthened A detachment psychological operation capabilities depended upon the training and experience of the officers and the time each could devote to supporting psychological operations as such. An additional 14 CA/PO officers and 7 NCO's were added to A detachments in May.

Higher headquarters guidance for conducting psychological operations was contained in the Group SOP, letters of instruction, a psychological operations program, and theme guidance. In contrast to annex F, 5SFGA SOP on civic action, the psychological operations annex of the SOP emphasized the role of USASF personnel as advisors to VNSF in the conduct of psychological operations and required coordination with Vietnamese

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military and civilian agencies conducting psychological operations. Even so, a certain amount of unilateral activity was necessary to provide impetus for the program. To implement the guidance, A detachments could employ CIDG funds, although no project costing in excess of \$100 could be undertaken without B detachment approval. The principal psychological operations techniques employed were face-to-face contact with counterparts and other opinion molders, leaflet distribution, gift distribution, heliborne loudspeaker missions, and movies. Psychological operations were at all times to be integrated with civic action, intelligence collection, and combat operations. Propaganda themes were to concentrate on positive accomplishments of GVN and US actions rather than attempting to counter VC propaganda attacks on the US and Vietnamese governments.

Effects of psychological operations were probably the most difficult to measure of any type of operation conducted by USA3F. Those USA3F units closest to the problem, the A detachments, gave an indication of the attitudes of the people in their area of operations. Of the 34 A detachments contacted, 30 reported the attitude of the populace as satisfactory toward the United States. The same 30 detachments also reported local attitudes towards the CIDG program as satisfactory. No determination was made as to attitudes toward the Government of Vietnam.

Reporting of psychological operation accomplishments was a required element of monthly operational summaries but, in the three categories reported quantitatively (loudspeaker missions, leaflet missions, and leaflets distributed), reporting was so inconsistent that no meaningful measure of accomplishment could be made. For instance, in the month of October 1964, it was reported that 641,000 leaflets were distributed in the four corps areas, after which there were no distributed figures reported until February 1965. Problems affecting the accomplishment of the A detachment's psychological operations mission were:

- a) Lack of trained psychological operations personnel comparable in skill to other detachment specialists.
- b) Insufficient use of audio visual equipment as part of a continuing program of information dissemination in and around A detachment camps.
- c) Lack of adequately responsive leaflet printing support from Group headquarters.
- d) Lack of sufficient aircraft support available to B or C detachments for leaflet distribution and heliborne loudspeaker missions in response to A detachment requests.
- e) Lack of adequate skill in local languages for purpose of face-to-face communication.

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10. Findings

- a. 5SFGA Letters of Instruction number 7 and number 1 provided for a flexible A detachment organization, varying the number and concentration of skills in the detachment as the operational area progressed through the five phases of pacification.
- b. The A detachment performing the civil-military counterinsurgency mission had little requirement for its demolitions specialists.
- c. The A detachment performing a civil-military counterinsurgency mission required additional capability in civic action, psychological operations, and intelligence.
- d. Intelligence and CA/PO capabilities of A detachments were reinforced by TDY personnel from the 441st Intelligence Corps Detachment, 97th Civil Affairs Detachment, and the Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific attached to C and B detachments.
- e. The A detachments usually did not directly organize paramilitary forces on a face-to-face basis.
- f. Sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and degree of training to instruct indigenous military and paramilitary forces were available in the A detachments.
- g. There was no directed mission for A detachments to train conventional military forces during the evaluation.
- h. Camp training programs for the CIDG were not standardized throughout the country.
- i. A significant handicap in USASF training and advising of the VNSF was the lack of personnel with proficiency in Vietnamese or other area language.
- j. Limitations were placed on the level of CIDG training because of GVN reluctance to fully train forces composed of members of ethnic, religious, and political factions of questionable loyalty to the Government of Vietnam.
- k. Special Forces A detachment personnel generally possessed tactical and technical skills in excess of those required to perform the CIDG mission.
- l. Strike Force companies were not trained or equipped to engage main force VC units.
- m. The nature and extent of USASF advice and assistance to VNSF

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varied widely from camp to camp, ranging from occasional suggestions to near total direction.

n. When visited by the evaluators, approximately 50 percent of the A detachments camps had off-site operations in progress and approximately 95 percent had operations in planning stages.

o. Tactical control of CIDG elements was assumed by USASF advisors in the event of emergencies beyond the leadership capabilities of the VNSF commander.

p. The 5SFGA SOP required that two-thirds of the available CIDG Strike Force be kept within the immediate secure area of the camp, and that one-third of the force be employed in offensive operations beyond the secure area of the camp at all times.

q. United States Army Special Forces detachment commander provided operational assistance directly or indirectly in the form of ARVN artillery support, air fire support, air resupply, air evacuation, on-the-spot medical aid, and assistance in crew-served weapons employment.

r. Operational air support such as photo reconnaissance or air fire support given to the A detachments depended upon priorities established by MACV corps senior advisors.

s. Operational advice and assistance in camp defense included participation by weapons specialist and combat engineer personnel from within the detachment, large scale construction assistance from STAT teams, request and coordination of air or artillery fire and illumination support when available, and provision of additional crew-served weapons not in the CIDG TOE.

t. An average of 5 interpreters were employed at each A detachment camp, and 10 camps reported requirements for additional interpreters although 5 of these camps already had 5 or more interpreters.

u. Of the 34 detachments visited, 22 reported mission accomplishment; however, 29 reported that their area of influence did not extend beyond the immediate area of the camp, and only 5 reported having influence over a widespread area.

v. Only 20 percent of the A detachment commanders contacted believed that a split A detachment could have accomplished the same mission.

w. Of the 34 A detachments contacted, 74 percent reported that their mission could have been accomplished by other than Special Forces personnel.

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x. A detachments were trained, organized, and equipped with the necessary communications, transportation support, and storage facilities to obtain and maintain logistical support for themselves and the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups.

y. The A detachment had a dual requirement for intelligence: to provide for its own security and to provide advice and assistance to the VNSF.

z. Of the 34 A detachments contacted, 80 percent made use of at least three sources of intelligence.

aa. The Vietnamese CIDG camp commander operated an intelligence collection system employing agents at only 40 percent of the A detachments contacted.

bb. Only 50 percent of the A detachment camps had established local informer nets.

cc. Of the 34 detachments contacted, 24 percent had no order of battle files and 30 percent had no intelligence collection plan.

dd. Intelligence collection at A detachments was hampered by the length of time required to obtain air photo reconnaissance.

ee. There was a lack of coordination among the A detachments and the several US and Vietnamese intelligence agencies operating in the field.

ff. There was a lack of explicit guidance to the A detachments regarding local recruitment of intelligence agents.

gg. Many of the A detachment assistant intelligence NCO's were former demolition specialists who had been sent to a 1-week intelligence course at group headquarters.

hh. As tailored for each phase of the Special Forces counter-insurgency program, the A detachments had personnel with combat engineering, medical, communications, and operations-intelligence skills applicable to civic action.

ii. As of 31 March 1965, 38 percent of the CA/PO personnel in the 5SFCA were augmentations from other organizations.

jj. The number of primary duty CA/PO personnel in the A detachments increased from zero in November 1964 to 28 in March 1965.

kk. Each A detachment in the co-equal, sub-sector advisory role had twice as many personnel to perform the sub-sector mission as did

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MACV advisory teams and also had a wider variety of skills applicable to their mission.

ll. The 5SFQA SOP and Letter of Instruction Number 1 did not contain explicit guidance to the A detachments regarding the coordination of civic action operations with VNSF.

mm. The A detachment capability in psychological operations was less than that in civic action, principally because there were no personnel assigned at the A detachment level who possessed psychological operations training and experience comparable to that of team members employed in civic action.

nn. Explicit guidance for psychological operations coordination with VNSF and GVN authorities was provided to the A detachments in 5SFQA SOP.

oo. Though reporting of psychological operations accomplishments was a required element of monthly operational summaries, quantitative reports were so inconsistent that no meaningful measure of accomplishment could be made.

C. OBJECTIVE 3 - BORDER CONTROL/SURVEILLANCE AND INTERNAL GUERRILLA CAPABILITIES

United States Army Special Forces did not have a mission to conduct border control/surveillance or internal guerrilla operations on a unilateral basis during the evaluation. In October 1964, MACV assigned 5SFQA the mission of employing CIDG assets in border control/surveillance and against VC infiltration routes, war zones, and bases. Whether or not CIDG forces so employed could be described as being internal guerrilla or counter guerrilla depended primarily on the extent of enemy control in the particular area of operations. Border control/surveillance and attacks on routes and bases consisted of employing units ranging in size from squads to a few companies operating from camps and forward operational bases (FOB). The USASF capability to train, support and advise friendly paramilitary forces was as applicable to these missions as it was to area and population control. (The military-civil objectives of area and population control outlined in 5SFQA LOI Number 1, January 1965 (shown in annex F) were to be achieved concurrently by CIDG camps performing border surveillance or interdiction missions.)

Border surveillance operations were conducted in a zone of operation up to 5 km of the border and in a zone of influence up to 15 km from the border. The basic strategy in the accomplishment of the border control/surveillance and routes/bases missions was divided into four component elements. The first element of the strategy required a limited attempt at border surveillance and interdiction of infiltration routes along the

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I CTZ boundary with Laos. The second element called for interdiction of north-south infiltration routes in the mountainous terrain along the boundary of I and II CTZ (the Do Xa area). This was to be backed up by CIDG camps farther to the south within II Corps. The third element of the strategy was to interdict VC routes between VC War Zones C and D in III Corps and later to ring both war zones with a series of increasingly constricting CIDG positions. The fourth element envisioned a series of CIDG border surveillance camps in every province along the IV CTZ and southern III CTZ boundaries with Cambodia. Because of the flat terrain in this area these camps would have no gaps between their assigned zones of responsibility. This would permit continual close surveillance and present frequent opportunities for interdiction of infiltration and ex-filtration.

1. Border Surveillances and Control

The most promising area for employment of CIDG in a border surveillance role was in the IV Corps area. Here the level and open terrain of the Mekong Delta lent itself to establishment of a series of CIDG camps with forward outposts and patrol bases along the entire corps area boundary with Cambodia. Of the nine A detachment camps in IV Corps, eight had a border surveillance mission during the 7-month period of the evaluation. Reported CIDG strength averaged approximately 4000 men during this period and there were 310 contacts with the VC, of which approximately two-fifths were VC initiated. The CIDG units in IV Corps accomplished 4440 patrols and 10,154 ambushes, including those around CIDG camps. All operations during the period accounted for only 192 VC killed (not necessarily all involved in border crossing) and 106 captured. While this works out to approximately one VC killed or captured for each contact, it required almost 50 friendly initiated patrols or ambushes per contact (and this without taking into account the VC attacks on friendly camps and outposts). Even though this may not be impressive statistically, the main accomplishment was the establishment of an increased government capability employing local resources and having the potential to apply increasing limitations on enemy activity, especially when it was effectively combined with conventional unit operations.

Although there was no decline in the urgency of the missions of border control/surveillance between October 1964 and April 1965, employment of CIDG units in border surveillance missions decreased during the evaluation. Whereas 29 camps were listed as having border surveillance missions in October 1964, by February 1965 this had dropped to 25 camps. The four camps closed were all in the II CTZ, although six of the remaining II CTZ CIDG camps retained border surveillance missions as late as March 1965. The camp closings resulted from the following causes:

- a) Friendly population in the border area was insufficient to provide enough local recruits for the required CIDG force structure.

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- b) Montagnard CIDG units brought into the area to operate the camps were less effective than normal because of lower morale and lack of familiarity with the area.
- c) The number of fixed camps which could be established, given the CIDG forces available, was insufficient to provide thorough surveillance and control over the length of border involved (approximately 430 km). The enemy could sidestep any small area under CIDG control.

In I Corps, all five A detachment camps and a 10-platoon Nung reaction force were involved in border surveillance and interdiction. The problems were essentially the same as in II Corps and the border surveillance and control operations were carried on with the realization that they could be of only limited effectiveness against the overall enemy strength in the area. However, there was no advantage to be gained in abandoning viable highland outposts and thereby losing government controlled areas to the enemy.

2. Internal Guerrilla Operations

The III CTZ operations were more concentrated on interdiction of VC infiltration routes and attack of VC bases than on border surveillance, although 6 of the 11 A detachment camps in III Corps were listed as having a border surveillance mission during the evaluation. Considering the strength and composition of enemy forces in the two major VC secret base areas located in the CTZ, the ability of CIDG units to interdict inter-zone movement or to attack VC bases in such a manner as to inflict significant damage appeared to be problematical. Reported Strike Force strength in III Corps averaged approximately 4500 men during the evaluation, with a high of 5071 men in October 1964. Confirmed enemy killed as a result of Strike Force actions (including employment in a heavily contested route security role) averaged 48 per month during the same period, while enemy captured by CIDG averaged only 29 per month.*

During the evaluation III Corps CIDG had 445 contacts with the enemy which resulted from 2819 patrols and 5892 ambushes as well as many enemy initiated actions. Approximately 17 friendly initiated patrols or ambushes were required per contact. Slightly over one VC was killed or captured for each contact made. While this in no way reflects adversely by comparison with other friendly force accomplishments, it appeared that CIDG platoon and company-size operations in themselves were only a minor threat to the VC military operations which could mass attacking forces on the order of reinforced regiments in the same area of operations. However, establishment of CIDG camps did restrict enemy expansion

*Strike Force strengths and operational statistics have been taken from 5SFGA Monthly Operational Summaries for the period from October 1964 through April 1965.

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and channelized movement onto axes and into concentrations where employment of heavy conventional firepower could inflict serious casualties.

In addition to CIDG capabilities, 5SFCA applied the assets of the Delta Project to interdiction of infiltration routes and attacks on VC base areas. This project, which was under control of Group headquarters, was staffed with one modified USAF B Detachment, three ARVN airborne ranger companies, and six reconnaissance teams. Employment of Delta assets was requested jointly by ARVN corps commanders and their MACV advisors through channels to RVNAF High Command and COMUSMACV. If the request were approved, planning and operational advice and assistance for the mission was provided by USASF. The usual concept of employment was for reconnaissance teams accompanied by USASF advisors to be clandestinely air-infiltrated into the target area to find suitable targets for a reaction force which would subsequently be moved rapidly into the area, normally by air. After the mission was accomplished, exfiltration of both reconnaissance and reaction forces would be by air or ground means.

The Delta Project, which employed a combination of reconnaissance and strike units, was first conceived for external employment. Early attempts in this area failed because assets were committed before they received adequate training and tactical experience, but subsequent in-country employment of Delta Project assets was more successful. Air infiltration and exfiltration methods were improved and reconnaissance units became more adept in locating targets on the ground. The remaining problem of bringing reaction forces into timely contact with the enemy had not been completely solved as of April 1965. Although Delta Project had conducted successful operations against war zone targets, a continuing limiting factor was the lack of sufficient numbers of trained personnel in a situation where competent manpower was critically short. This restricted employment to only a few operations each month and placed a low upper limit on expansion of the project.

3. Findings

- a. In I and II CTZ there was insufficient friendly population from which to create adequate locally recruited CIDG forces for border control/surveillance.
- b. In II CTZ, paramilitary forces deployed from interior areas did not function as well in the unfamiliar, rugged terrain along the Laotian and Cambodian borders as in their native regions.
- c. In III CTZ, where the VC maneuvered units of regimental strength during the evaluation, CIDG operations emphasized interdiction of interior routes and attack of VC secret bases rather than border surveillance.

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d. The flat, open terrain found in IV CTZ permitted CIDG to maintain outposts and patrol the Cambodian border area with a commitment of 8 A detachments and approximately 4000 CIDG personnel.

e. Delta project assets of six reconnaissance teams and three airborne ranger companies were committed to a nation-wide program of selective interdiction of infiltration routes and attacks on secret bases.

D. OBJECTIVE 4 - EVALUATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SURVIVAL KIT

The Individual Survival Kit (FSN 6545-782-2821) consisted of two components: the operational packet (for daily use) and the reserve packet (for survival situations). The kit was designed by Limited War Laboratory, Aberdeen, Maryland but has since come under the cognizance of the Surgeon General of the US Army. Late in 1964, 5SFCA received 300 kits, which were issued to personnel in operational detachments and to headquarters personnel required to travel frequently by air. On 24 May 1965, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, submitted an evaluation of the Individual Survival Kit to the Chief, Supply Division, Office of the Surgeon General, Washington D.C. This evaluation, which was compiled on the basis of comments from USASF operational detachments in Vietnam, is contained in its entirety in annex I. No data on the Individual Survival Kit were collected by ACTIV because the Special Forces Group evaluation seemed to satisfy the requirement.

E. OBJECTIVE 5 - ADEQUACY OF LOGISTICAL AND COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

1. Dimensions of the Logistical Task

During the evaluation the 5SFCA operated its own logistical system for the complete support of approximately 1300 USASF personnel and an average of 19,000 members of CIDG. The system provided over 9,000 line items of all classes of supplies for as many as 58 Special Forces CIDG camps and other installations located throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The average monthly expenditure in Vietnam during the period was \$1,300,000. A rounded average of 2,000 tons of supplies were distributed each month from the 5SFCA Logistical Support Center (LSC) at Nha Trang. See annex E for monthly tonnage movements to and from the LSC.

2. Logistical Organization and Functions

The USASF organization managing the country-wide distribution of supplies and maintenance of equipment was the Logistical Support Center at Nha Trang. The LSC was a part of the Administration and Logistics Center (A&LC), was directed by the group S-4, and had the group S-4 section as its nucleus. Though the group S-4 section had an authorized strength of 2 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 22 enlisted men, the LSC was staffed by 4 officers, 4 warrant officers, 52 enlisted men, and

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approximately 250 civilians (mostly indigenous). The civilian personnel were hired as drivers, carpenters, stevedores, clerks, and maintenance personnel. See annex E for a functional chart of the LSC and for a list of indigenous personnel employed at the LSC. The LSC furnished everything USASF or CIDG personnel used, except for rations, POL (which was obtained from ARVN stocks on a coupon basis), and some construction materials which were purchased locally by A detachments. The CIDG and 5SFCA were the only major forces supplied by this special logistical system. The VMSF was supported by the Military Assistance Program (MAP) but in practice obtained some supplies such as clothing or equipment through the USASF A detachments when operational urgency required an expedient solution. A qualified observer stated that the existing logistical organization could support up to 200 CIDG companies (30,000 men), but a mission increase beyond that would require some increase in labor and air transport.

The C detachments exercised command supervision over the logistical support of all subordinate detachments in their CTZ. In addition they stocked a limited quantity of ammunition, medical supplies, and signal equipment to support their A and B detachments. During the evaluation, a third echelon signal maintenance capability, along with a float of the proper radios and repair parts, was added at the C detachments in order to reduce downtime for repair of operational detachment radios. This signal repair work was done by one or two Filipino contract civilian maintenance personnel of the Eastern Construction Company, Incorporated (ECCOI). The B detachments were charged merely with insuring that all supplies and equipment received in support of the CIDG program were used properly. The C detachment S-4 sections had one officer and four enlisted men, and at the B detachment there was one supply sergeant and one officer who doubled as S-1/S-4.

3. Sources and Levels of Supply

The logistical operation of the 5SFCA was funded by Department of Defense contingency funds administered by Department of the Army. The unit obtained about 90 percent of its required supplies from the Counterinsurgency Supply Office (CISO) in Okinawa. Signal repair parts and (indirectly) POL were obtained through US Army Support Command, Vietnam (now US Army, Vietnam). Other items, such as uniforms and some construction materials, were locally contracted for or purchased. Rations for USASF included C rations drawn from the LSC, A and B rations purchased from US commissaries, and locally purchased A rations. The LSC maintained a 60-day stock level at Nha Trang and a 60-day level in Okinawa. Stocks levels and the procurement program were based on the previous 4-month demand. Supplies and equipment were delivered from the LSC by air, IST, and road convoy to all detachments in the country with the exception of A detachments in I Corps. Because of uncertain weather in that area, the C detachment in Da Nang acted as a forward supply point (FSP), receiving supplies by IST from Nha Trang. (See annex E for tonnage of supplies processed by the LSC.) Though the Group SOP stated

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otherwise, the C detachments in the other three corps served as FSP's. From October 1964 to May 1965 each of the FSP's at the four C detachments distributed an average of 261 tons of supplies a month, as shown in annex E. They maintained on-hand certain emergency supplies and acted as collection and redistribution centers for excess supplies which developed from time to time at subordinate detachments.

4. Supply Operations

The 5SFGA supply system was completely US-controlled and was highly responsive to the user. There were three classes of requisitions: routine, priority, and emergency. Selection of one of these was based on the requestor's evaluation of the urgency for resupply. Nominal delivery times from receipt of requisition at the ISC were 15 days for routine, 7 days for priority, and 3 hours for emergency. The 34 A detachments contacted, however, reported no faster response to an emergency requisition than four hours and as great a delay as 30 days for priority or routine. Nevertheless, 73 percent of the A detachments reported average waiting times of 15 days or less for priority and routine requisitions and the majority of emergency requisitions were filled in less than 24 hours. About 5 percent of all requisitions were emergency requisitions, 30 percent were priority, and the remaining 65 percent routine. Emergency requisitions were usually requested by radio and were generally restricted to ammunition, weapons, medical, and signal items. Both the ISC and C detachments kept emergency supplies pre-packed for air drop or low-level extraction. Routine and priority requisitions were submitted through C detachments to ISC, and emergency (radio) requisitions to ISC were followed up in writing through C detachments. The C detachment did not consolidate or re-requisition but reviewed the requisitions for correctness of format and justification and then forwarded them with minimum delay to ISC. The stock records section of the ISC maintained a property status record for each detachment and checked all routine and priority requisitions against this before complying with the request. Only about 2 percent of the standard requisitions required further justification. To familiarize A detachments with the operation of the logistical system, 5SFGA furnished them SOP's and supply memoranda. Thus, each A detachment knew what they were authorized to have, what was available, and how to get it when they needed it. The familiarity of all echelons with the system and the adherence of requestors to the requisition criteria were major factors contributing to the efficiency of the logistics operation.

5. Outside Support

Since the 5SFGA had no organic aircraft, the successful operation of the USASFV logistical system depended upon the regular commitment of air transport from the US Army and Air Force. At Nha Trang, the 310th Air Commando Squadron (315th Air Commando Group) allocated eight C-123B's for the 5SFGA, five of which were available each day. Also at Nha Trang,

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because of the heavy traffic loads they were justified as a CIDG program expenditure.

The command voice net (AN/FRC-93) being installed during the evaluation period provided single sideband (SSB) insecure radio telephone operating 24 hours a day. The primary use was by commanders and key staff officers for direct contact and coordination. Equipment used in this net permitted phone patches at 5SFGA, TOC, and C detachments, and also permitted direct SSB communication with A and B detachments. This system relieved pressure on CW operators at B detachment level who had been overburdened with traffic on the AN/GRC-109 net.

The emergency net (AN/GRC-109 and AN/FRC-93) provided an emergency voice and CW net monitored by base and subordinate stations 24 hours a day. It was used as an emergency alternate system for operational detachments to reach SFOB or TOC rapidly when they were unable to contact their controlling headquarters. It was also used for aerial resupply coordination between SFOB and the operational detachments. The AN/GRC-109 was the primary CW communication means for A detachments.

Annex J shows the possible communication links among the various SF echelons, the C-2 Detachment radio net used in II CTZ, and the radio communication equipment authorized at each detachment.

Because of the extensive deployment of SF detachments throughout the country and the variety of equipment it employed, the 5SFGA communications system was highly responsive. It also provided excellent backup for the MACV communications system.

7. Findings

a. The 5SFGA S-4 section controlled the Logistical Support Center and managed the entire CIDG and USASF logistical system.

b. The Logistical Support Center was manned by approximately 250 Vietnamese civilians, 8 Filipino contract civilians, 4 US officers, 4 US warrant officers, and 52 US enlisted men. Authorized strength for the Group S-4 section was 2 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 22 enlisted men.

c. Except for locally purchased rations, POL, and some construction materials, all subordinate detachments and CIDG members were wholly dependent upon 5SFGA Logistical Support Center and Forward Supply Points for their support.

d. A detachments received 93 percent by weight of all supplies by air delivery.

e. All second and higher echelon maintenance of mechanical and electronic equipment, except for cryptographic devices, was done by a

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team of 48 Filipino contract civilians at an annual cost of approximately \$350,000.

f. Forward supply points delivered 34 percent by weight of all A detachment supplies.

g. The Logistical Support Center was dependent upon the daily commitment of eight USAF C-123B's and three US Army CV-2B's for air transport. Additional logistical air transport was received on call as required at Nha Trang, and Forward Supply Points at Da Nang, Pleiku, Saigon, and Can Tho.

h. Camp construction and improvement assistance was provided 5SFGA from US Navy Seabee STAT teams at an annual expense to the CIDG program of \$175,000 to \$200,000.

i. Radio was the primary means of communication for 5SFGA, with three separate and independent nets at the SFOB and B and C detachment levels, and two nets among A detachments and higher levels.

j. The 5SFGA had extensive augmentation of TOE radio communication equipment at all levels.

k. There were no reported cases of communication failures among command and control and operational detachments.

l. During the evaluation 5SFGA had the ability to supply its operational and command and control detachments and approximately 19,000 members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Reportedly this capability was adequate to support up to 30,000 Civilian Irregular Defense Group members without significant expansion of facilities or support personnel.

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IV. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that:

1. With respect to selected indigenous military and paramilitary forces, the command and control elements of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam are capable of:

- a) Providing planning and operational advice and assistance.
- b) Providing materiel support.

2. Since the organizational changes brought about by the recent Troop Unit Change Request had not been in effect for a sufficient time at the close of the evaluation period, it was not possible to say whether those modifications would be sufficient, although at the time of the evaluation, they appeared to have enhanced the Group's capability to perform its counterinsurgency mission.

3. Given their present functions and responsibilities, the command and control elements of the Special Forces group in Vietnam are not capable of training indigenous military or paramilitary forces, although they are capable of managing such programs that are being conducted by subordinate operational detachments.

4. The non-Special Forces augmentation personnel with intelligence, civic action, and psychological warfare skills attached to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) enhanced the Group's capabilities.

5. The Special Forces A detachments in Vietnam are capable of:

- a) Training military and paramilitary units
- b) Obtaining and maintaining logistical support from the resources of the Group
- c) Performing civic action functions.

6. The Special Forces A detachments are not fully capable of:

- a) Providing operational intelligence

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- b) Providing psychological operations planning and assistance.

7. As long as the Special Forces Group is involved in countrywide paramilitary operations, operational detachments are properly employed in the MACV sector/sub-sector advisory roles as a co-equal mission. At the time of the evaluation, the Special Forces A detachment represented potentially the most effective US military or civilian element operating at the sub-sector level.

8. The capability of the Special Forces A detachments to organize military and paramilitary units cannot be assessed because United States Army Special Forces operational detachments did not usually directly organize such units during the evaluation.

9. The effectiveness of United States Army Special Forces operational detachments is seriously limited by a lack of personnel who could speak the language of the area of operations.

10. The concept of employment which requires, for security purposes, the presence in or near fixed bases of two-thirds of the effective CIDG strength, materially reduces the tactical effectiveness of the paramilitary forces trained, advised, and supported by US Special Forces operational detachments.

11. The Special Forces Group capability to perform border control/surveillance and internal guerrilla roles is limited by:

- a) The nature of the border itself, which is long, ill-defined, and often located in rugged, inaccessible terrain
- b) Insufficient friendly population from which to recruit paramilitary forces in the area of operations
- c) The difficulties of employing CIDG forces effectively outside their home areas
- d) The state of CIDG training and lack of firepower which makes it unwise for them to be committed to operations in which they may encounter VC main force units
- e) The lack of a specific term of service, which in effect permits the CIDG soldier to serve at his own discretion.

12. The existing logistical support and equipment are adequate to the assigned mission, and the supply system as it is presently organized has the flexibility and responsiveness to provide any additional equipment

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that may be required.

13. To evaluate whether the present concept of employment is proper in a strategic sense would require detailed consideration of third country unconventional warfare operations which is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. The intelligence capability of A detachments be further improved through increased training of A detachment officer and enlisted personnel, increased collection and production support from higher headquarters, and increased command emphasis on intelligence.
2. Training of A detachment personnel place greater emphasis on theory and practice of psychological operations.
3. Increased command emphasis be given to insuring that Special Forces personnel have the psychological adaptability and understanding of cultural patterns required to perform operational tasks in Vietnam.
4. Language proficiency pay incentives be expanded to include Special Forces personnel required to use a foreign language or dialect to accomplish their mission.
5. The logistical system currently used by the United States Army Special Forces in Vietnam be considered for application in other counter-insurgency situations.

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(C) ANNEX A

SETTING OF THE EVALUATION

1. ENVIRONMENT

The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) occupies a crescent-shaped area of about 67,000 square miles on the southeastern edge of the Indochina Peninsula. Although only 45 miles wide at the 17th parallel, its demilitarized northern border with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), it has a seacoast of 1,500 miles on the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam, and western borders with Laos and Cambodia of about 900 miles. The land borders are poorly defined and drawn through difficult and inaccessible terrain.

a. Terrain

There are four distinct geographical regions: The highlands located in the north and central portion, the plateaus of the central highlands, the coastal plain, and the Mekong Delta in the south. See figure A-1.

The northern two-thirds of the RVN is dominated by a chain of broken mountains and rugged hills extending in a northwest-southeast direction and terminating on the northern edge of the delta plain about 50 miles north of Saigon, the capital. The area is characterized by steep slopes, sharp crests, narrow valleys, and dense vegetation. It is sparsely populated, mainly by primitive and nomadic tribes, and it contains few roads or trails.

The central highlands adjacent to the Laos-Cambodia border contain extensive plateau areas. Here, the mountains give way to more impenetrable tropical forests and jungles, which often have two dense overhead layers of foliage at heights of about 40 and 125 feet. The southern portion is typical savannah country, with large open expanses covered by tropical grasses and open forests. This region is more heavily populated than the northern highlands and has more roads and trails.

The coastal plain, varying from 10 to 25 miles in width, extends from the 17th parallel to the Mekong Delta. At several places mountain spurs jut out to the sea, cutting the plain into a series of compartments roughly at Mui Dinh, Mui Ke Ga, Quang Ngai, Da Nang, and Hue, north of which the spurs become more frequent. The area is characterized by sandy beaches and dunes, backed by rice fields, fertile areas, and marshes extending to the mountains. It contains many small cities.

A-1

ANNEX A

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(U) Annex A-1 Geographical regions, RVN

ANNEX A


A-2.

The southern third of the country is part of the large delta plain formed by the Hau Giang, Mekong, Vam Co, Saigon, and Dong Nai rivers. The Hau Giang flows directly to the South China Sea. The huge Mekong splits into four branches, and the Vam Co and Dong Nai enter the Saigon river before reaching the sea. In addition to these major tributaries, the area is cut by a number of smaller streams and a dense network of canals. The plain is relatively flat with few points exceeding an elevation of 20 feet above sea level. It is a very fertile area with more than 9,000 square miles under rice cultivation. Drainage is effected chiefly by tidal action, with the difference between ebb and flood as much as ten feet in some areas. The southernmost tip of the delta, known as the Ca Mau Peninsula, is covered with dense jungles, and mangrove swamps are found at the shoreline and on river estuaries. The eastern portion of the delta plain is heavily forested. The Plain of Reeds, a large marshy area covered with tall reeds and scrub trees, is located in the center of the delta region adjacent to the Cambodian border. During the rainy season, a major portion of the entire area is completely inundated.

b. Climate and Weather

The climate is hot and humid, subtropical in the north and tropical in the south where the monthly mean temperature is about 80 degrees Fahrenheit. The annual rainfall is heavy in most regions and torrential in many. It is heaviest at Hue which has an annual average of 128 inches. The low of 28 inches at Mui Dinh, a small cape on the eastern coast some 62 miles south of Nha Trang, results from the presence of hills in the area. At Saigon, rainfall averages 80 inches annually. See figure A-2.

Seasonal alternation of monsoon winds profoundly influences the weather throughout the year, although geographical features alter patterns locally. The winter monsoon blows generally from the northeast from early November to mid-March and often brings floods to the northern portion of the RVN. This is the period of the dry season in the delta, which usually lasts from December through March. The winds begin to shift in March, and with the exception of the coastal plain, high temperature and humidity prevails in all of the RVN from April to mid-June. The summer monsoon blows generally from the southwest from mid-June to late August or early September, bringing to the delta region heavy and frequent rains, high humidity, tropical temperatures, and maximum cloudiness. Mountains cause clouds to pile up and deposit moisture before the clouds reach the coastal plain or the northern highlands, which areas are dry during this period. In September the winds begin to shift again, and the coastal plain receives its maximum amount of rain and cloud cover, including severe tropical storms and typhoons.



(U) FIGURE A-2. Annual precipitation, RVN.

c. Communications

Roads throughout the RVN are few in number, poorly cared for, and narrow. Road travel to major areas in the north is often stopped completely when bridges and narrow places are destroyed, either by natural causes of the Viet Cong (VC). In the delta region, 2,500 miles of navigable inland waterways ease somewhat the communication burden placed on the 1,200 miles of primary and secondary roads in the region.

A single-track, narrow gauge railroad connects Saigon with the northern provinces by way of the coastal plain. The system and equipment is old and frequently damaged by the VC.

There is no wire telephone communication among the major centers of population. What radio telephone service is available is at the mercy of the often unstable atmospheric conditions over the RVN. Telephone equipment used in major cities is antiquated or makeshift.

In effect, rural areas are virtually isolated. It is not unusual for a VC act of terrorism or sabotage to take place in an outlying delta area and be reported in Saigon a week or more later. Most incidents accounted for take at least two or three days to get into the situation reports to Saigon.

d. Population

The RVN has a population of approximately 15.7 million, with an average density of 234 per square mile. The highland region is generally the least settled of the geographic areas of the RVN, and the coastal plain contains the most people. About 90 percent of the people live on the 13 percent of the land best suited for rice cultivation: the delta and the small river basins of the coastal plain.

Racially, the population is composed of 85 percent ethnic Vietnamese, 6 percent Chinese (who have established a great influence on the economy of the RVN), 5 percent Montagnard (the nomadic aboriginal tribe people living in the highlands), 3 percent Khmer-Cham (of Cambodian descent), and 1 percent European, Indian, and other small groups.

Religiously, about 80 percent profess Buddhism, about 10 percent profess Catholicism, and the rest profess Muhammedanism, Hinduism, Protestantism, Cao Daism, or Hoa Haoism (two local sects).

Socially, there is an upper class composed of old mandarin families, landed gentry, government officials, professional men, intellectuals, clergy, and wealthy businessmen; an urban middle class of civil servants, teachers, and small businessmen; and a lower class, mainly composed of farmers, but with a growing group of urban workers. Mobility upward within the structure is possible but difficult, especially

from the lowest.

2. MILITARY ELEMENTS

a. Friendly

The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated in the Republic of Vietnam on 1 October 1964 by General Order Number 188, Headquarters, US Army, Pacific, dated 1 October 1964. This was the only military unit involved in the evaluation. Elements of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam were visited for coordination and comparison purposes, and provided data pertinent to the evaluation. Deployment of Special Forces detachments in April 1965 was as shown in figure A-3. Ethnic composition of indigenous units at each detachment is shown in figure A-4.

b. Enemy

It is a well documented fact that the Communist apparatus in the RVN is an extension of the Communist party of North Vietnam, and that direction and materiel and personnel support is received from the North. Supreme authority in the VC political and military organization in the RVN is the Central Office South Vietnam located in Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border. Subordinate thereto are five military regions and one special zone (corresponding roughly to the capital area), each of which has a subordinate series of provincial, district, and village-commune party committees.

(1) Units

The VC military forces can be divided into 3 operational categories: main force, local force (together about 75,000 troops), and militia units (100,000 to 120,000 soldiers). The main force consists of full-time units controlled by the military region. Local force units are controlled by province and district committees. They are well-organized, and the personnel are well-trained and well equipped. Militia units are full- and part-time local armed groups responsible to district, village, and hamlet authorities. Personnel of these units are used frequently as intelligence gatherers, porters, or as reinforcements for main and local force units. They may replace losses in the local force.

A VC battalion is planned for 400 to 500 men, but in reality may consist of as few as 250. A company averages 100 men, and a platoon about 30. Personnel may be acquired voluntarily, by kidnapping, or by impressment using blackmail or threats of violence. There is evidence that large numbers (a total of about 45,000 in four years since 1960) of native-born North Vietnamese have infiltrated from North Vietnam through Laos into the RVN. Recent indications are that the numbers of infiltrators have greatly increased.

Viet Cong forces are in general lightly equipped and have

[illegible]

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<u>DET</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>
C-1	Da Nang	Nung
A-112	Gia Vuc	Hre
A-102	Ashau	Vietnamese
A-323	Khe Sanh	Vietnamese, Bru
A-104	A Ro	Vietnamese
A-324	Ba To	Hre
B-11	Kham Duc	Vietnamese
A-322	Kham Duc	Vietnamese
C-2	Pleiku	Nung, Rhade, Vietnamese
A-501	Hoai An	Vietnamese
B-21	Kontum	Jarai, Bahnar
A-211	Dak Pek	Sedang, Halang, Vietnamese, Jeh
A-212	Plei Mrong	Jarai, Bahnar, Rhade, Vietnamese, Sedang
A-213	Plei Djereng	Jarai, Bahnar
A-214	Plateau Gi	Sedang, Bahnar, Mnong, Jarai, Rongao, Vn
A-224	Duc Co	Jarai, Vietnamese
A-216	Plei Do Lim	Jarai, Bahnar, Vietnamese
A-313	Plei Me	Jarai, Nung, Bahnar, Vietnamese, Hre
B-22	An Tuc	None
A-221	Kannack	Bahnar, Rhade, Mier, Vietnamese, Nung, Hre, Mnong
A-222	An Tuc	Rhade, Mnong, Vietnamese, Bahnar, Sedang
A-223	Plei Ta Nangle	Bahnar, Jarai
A-432	Buon Beng	Jarai, Bahnar
B-23	Ban Me Thuot	Vietnamese, Rhade
A-231	Dong Tre	Vietnamese, Ha Roi
A-232	Buon Brieng	Rhade
A-233	Buon Mi Ga	Rhade, Monong, Jarai
A-431	Phey Srunh	Koho, Ma, Chil, Mnong, Cru, Cambodian
C-3	Bien Hoa	None
A-301	Ben Cat	Vietnamese, Nung
A-302	Thu Duc	None
N/A	Nui Ba Den	Cambodian
B-31	Phuoc Vinh	None
A-325	Bu Dop	Stieng, Vietnamese
A-311	Bu Dop	N/A
A-312	Phuoc Vinh	Cambodian, Nung, Vietnamese
A-313	Bu Gia Map	Vietnamese, Stieng, Cambodian
A-314	Loc Ninh	Vietnamese, Cambodian
B-32	Tay Ninh	Vietnamese, Cambodian
A-321	Minh Thanh	Vietnamese, Cambodian
A-322	Suoi Da	Vietnamese, Cambodian
A-323	Trang Sup	Vietnamese, Cambodian

(C) FIGURE A-4. Composition of Special Forces Strike Force Camps.

ANNEX A

A-8

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<u>DET</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>
A-324	Ben Sci	Vietnamese, Cambodian
C-4	Can Tho	Vietnamese
B-41	Moc Hoa	None
A-411	Don Phuoc	Vietnamese, Hoa Hao, Cambodian
A-412	Dan Chu	None
A-413	Binh Thanh Thon	Hoa Hao, Cambodian
A-414	Moc Hoa	Vietnamese, Cambodian
A-415	Moc Hoa	None
A-425	An Long	Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hoa Hao
B-42	Long Xuyen	Vietnamese, Nung
A-421	To Chau	Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hoa Hao
A-422	Vinh Gia	Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hoa Hao
A-331	Tinh Bien	Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hoa Hao
A-424	An Phu	Hoa Hao
A-426	Xom Duong Dong	None
B-51	Dong Ba Thin	Vietnamese, Cham, Tuong, Mien
B-52	Nha Trang	Vietnamese
A-521	Nha Trang	None
A-522	Dong Ba Thin	Vietnamese, Cham, Tuong, Mien
B-53	Nha Trang	None
A-502	Nha Trang	Vietnamese, Cham, Rhade, Raglai, Nung
A-601	Long Thanh	None

(C) FIGURE A-4. Composition of Special Forces Strike Force Camps.

a commensurate degree of cross-country mobility. In addition to individual weapons, they have a large number of automatic weapons, and light crew-served weapons. The larger units are equipped with mortars and recoilless rifles. Supplies are obtained through capture, local procurement, taxation, and infiltration. Food staples such as fish, rice, and manioc are readily available.

(2) Capabilities

Because of support rendered by the country people, familiarity with the area, lack of responsibility for life and property, and the nature of guerrilla organization, equipment, and tactics, the VC are able to move virtually at will throughout much of RVN. They are able to exploit as necessary the differences in race, religion, class, economic condition, and cultural background of their targets. They have a well-developed intelligence system, good discipline, and a usually effective security system.

Viet Cong military operations have the advantages of speed, surprise, deception, and infiltration. Training, accomplished in small,

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local areas by well-indoctrinated cadre, properly emphasizes selection of the most vulnerable targets, night operations, movement as small units until concentration is required, terrorism and propaganda, use of weapons, employment of terrain and weather, and infiltration. The VC objective is not, at the present stage of their insurgency, to hold terrain, but rather to inflict losses on government forces, to capture weapons and materiel, and to convince the people that the government in Saigon cannot protect them and will eventually be defeated.

(3) Limitations

Viet Cong limitations stem from their need for strong security and the largely clandestine nature of their activities. Although the people among whom they live afford them a high degree of protection, active and passive, force must often be used, and support based on threats and fear endures only as long as pressure is brought to bear. Primitive living conditions add to the strain of avoiding government troops until the right moment. The VC are vulnerable to air and artillery attack, and less so to armor attack. Limited logistical capability, lack of communications, and insufficient medicine are other weaknesses.

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(C) ANNEX B

ORGANIZATION CHARTS

Annex B includes:

	<u>Page</u>
1. I Corps - USASF Command Relationships	B-2
2. II Corps - USASF Command Relationships	B-3
3. III Corps - USASF Command Relationships	B-4
4. IV Corps - USASF Command Relationships	B-5
5. VNSF - Training Center B Detachment	B-6
6. Delta Project B Detachment, February 1965	B-7

Organization charts, as of February 1965, are not necessarily intended to correlate with detachment locations shown in Figure A-4.


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ANNEX B

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1. I CORPS - USASF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, FEBRUARY 1965




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2. II CORPS - USASF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, FEBRUARY 1965




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ANNEX E

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3. III CORPS - USASP COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, FEBRUARY 1965




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4. IV CORPS - USASF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, FEBRUARY 1965




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ANNEX B

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5. VNSF TRAINING CENTER B DETACHMENT, Dong Ba Thin, MAY 1965



ANNEX B


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6. DELTA PROJECT B DETACHMENT, FEBRUARY 1965

7 - O
33 - E



*S2 officer and enlisted man are in Saigon.
They act as liaison to MACV and also work
as targeting unit.

B-7

ANNEX B

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(U) ANNEX C

OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT DATA BASE

This annex presents the questionnaires used as a method of data collection at 34 A detachment operational sites, and also a series of charts showing the replies to the questions obtained by ACTIV evaluators. The majority of the data have been included in summarized form in the discussion of Objective 2 - Operational Detachment Capabilities. They are included in this annex in chart form for the benefit of interested personnel at the Special Warfare School and in Special Forces training units. The questionnaires are shown in pages C-3 through C-20. The data base, which was developed from the questionnaires, is shown on pages C-21 through C-36. Subject areas in the data base are as follows:

<u>Subject Areas</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Sources of detachment training	C-21
2. Detachment strength	C-21
3. Detachment missions	C-21
4. Operational site description	C-21
5. VNSF strengths on-site, quarters comparison and duties integration	C-21
6. Commander's evaluation of mission suitability and accomplishment	C-22
7. Pre-mission training and orientation	C-22
8. Evaluation of mission accomplishment potential of other units	C-23
9. Effects of CIDG mission on detachment's JW capability	C-23
10. Combat operations	C-23
11. Nature of operations	C-23
12. Camp defense	C-24
13. USASF personnel administration	C-25
14. Intelligence factors	C-25

	<u>Page</u>
15. Intelligence operations	C-26
16. Counter-intelligence operations	C-27
17. Enemy casualties inflicted by detachment operations	C-28
18. Camp command relationship and administration	C-29
19. CIDG training	C-29
20. Camp area of operational influence	C-30
21. CIDG supply	C-30
22. Evaluation of CIDG weapons effectiveness	C-31
23. USASF TO&E Property	C-32
24. Maintenance	C-32
25. Supply procedures	C-32
26. Evaluation of USASF logistics support	C-33
27. Communications efficiency and problem areas	C-33
28. Close air support	C-34
29. Air reconnaissance support	C-35
31. Air logistical support	C-35

UNCLASSIFIED unless filled in

Section I

"A" Detachment Check List

Place _____ Date _____

Unit _____ Evaluator _____

Code _____ Phase _____

Location - Coordinates _____

Detachment Commanded by _____

Detachment Operationally controlled by _____

ORGANIZATION OF SITE

1. Detachment trained by B- _____ (Other) _____
at SWC _____ Okinawa _____.

2. Detachment strength _____ Percentage of original
strength remaining _____.

3. Number of replacements required since arrival _____ number
received _____. Current vacancies (list by MOS) _____

4. Detachment mission - CIDG _____ BS _____ (both) _____
(other) _____.

5. Site location - (new) _____ (old) _____ (temporary) _____
(permanent) _____. Type construction - ("French Fort") _____
(Team constructed) _____. Brief description: _____

6. Are VNSF on site - (yes)_____no_____(How many)_____.
VNSF Commander (Rank)_____. Camp or site commander - (VNSF)_____
(ARVN)_____ (Other):_____.

7. If VNSF on site are quarters integrated_____separated_____
_____. Apparently similar (yes)_____(no):_____.

8. Are USSF - VNSF duties integrated (yes)_____(no)_____.
List areas of functional integration:

MISSION

9. USSF Detachment Commanders Mission Statement: _____

(attach enclosure if additional space is needed). Comparison of
Detachment Commanders Mission Statement with missions assigned by B
detachment - (Correct)_____. (Incomplete)_____(Incorrect)_____
_____(Comment if incomplete or incorrect):_____.

10. (Length of Time Mission in effect)_____. Is mission being accomplished adequately - Detachment Commander (Yes)_____ (No)_____. (If no - comment:)_____

Evaluators note: Detachment Commanders opinion will be compared to statement submitted by US Advisor maintaining operational control.

(Advisor Questionnaire - Project officer responsibility)

11. Mission Training. Was mission training at (SWC)_____ (Okinawa)_____ adequate for present mission (Yes)_____ (No)_____.

Describe deficiencies_____

(Attach if necessary).

12. Did the Detachment Commander know what his general mission was before arrival in-country (Yes)_____ (No)_____. In his opinion, would prior knowledge have been of sufficient benefit to over-ride security precautions? Did he know his present Detachment prior to leaving (SWC)_____ (Okinawa)_____ (Yes)_____ (No)_____. When did he receive first knowledge of mission and general location:_____

Was his detachment trained for this mission as part of a B Detachment or separately (B)____(Sep)____. Would augmentation of his detachment materially assist him in accomplishment of his mission (Yes)____(No)____. Comment: _____

Could his present mission be accomplished by a split detachment?

(Yes)____(No)____. By a Non-USSF MTT (Yes)____(No)____
By VNSF alone (Yes)____(No)____. By other ARVN alone (Yes)____(No)____. Comment: _____

13. Mission effect on detachment's ability to conduct basic SF mission. Has this or previous mission(s) adversely affected the detachment's ability to accomplish basic SF A detachment mission (Yes)____(No)____. If yes, what skills are involved - explain: _____

14. What is the current status of mission accomplishment in this detachment, and what is the estimated completion date? _____

15. If a future mission is anticipated, does the Detachment Commander have sufficient information to begin mission preparation? (Yes)_____
_____(No)_____(N/A)_____.

16. Has this detachment conducted combat operations? (Yes)_____
(No)_____. Nature of operation (training)_____(Security)_____
(Recon)_____(Offensive)_____. Dates of last operation_____
_____. Is an operation now in the planning stages (Yes)_____
(No)_____. Evaluator's note: Complete the attached Operations Analysis
Form (SUPA) After-action Report covering the most recent planned operation.

17. Describe the composition of Off-Site offensive forces.

18. What is the average duration of Off-Site offensive operations_____
_____. Has air drop resupply been utilized (Yes)_____(No)_____.
Was air-drop Prearranged____Requested____. Successful_____
Unsuccessful_____.

19. Is Off-Site operational strength governed by the site security
requirement (Yes)____(No)____. What percentage of present site
strength is available for Off-Site actions?_____.

20. Has this detachment been engaged in a significant defense action
since arrival? (Yes)____(No)____. If yes, list the date(s), place,

names or coordinates, friendly strength, estimated enemy strengths, and result. Was this action reported to the B Detachment (during the action) _____ (After the action) _____. Was assistance required (Yes) _____ (No) _____. If yes, describe offensive _____ Defensive _____

Was assistance given (Yes) _____ (No) _____. Time required for assistance to arrive _____. Were communications maintained with the B Detachment during the action? (Direct) _____ (Via base camp on Site) _____ . Was the action successful (Yes) _____ (No) _____. What element(s) of the site force performed inadequately during the action (USSF) _____ (VNSF) _____ (CIDG) _____ (ARVN) _____ (Other) _____ (None) _____. Evaluator's note: Correlate this action with the after-action report submitted by the Detachment Commander to higher headquarters. Method _____ Message date-time group _____ Addressee _____

EVALUATOR COMMENT

21. Describe the general location of the site. It is in a reasonably good defensive position? Are required defensive measures completed or underway? (A sketch of an approved site defense is attached to this check list). Has this site complied, or is it complying? What is your general impression of this detachment?

22. Complete section II of the check list by interview with the Detachment Commander and appropriate detachment specialists. Confirm the responses with the Detachment Commander prior to leaving.

ADMINISTRATION

USSF EVAL

A Detachment Check
List - Section II.

1. What recurring problems did your detachment have in the following matters, and what recommendations do you have for improvement of these matters in your operational areas?

- a. Administrative in-processing:
- b. Postal service:
- c. Military pay:
- d. Casualty reporting:
- e. Hiring of local nationals:
- f. Discipline, law and order:
- g. Decorations and awards:

2. Are there other support problems in administration which could be improved?

INTELLIGENCE

1. Weather and terrain. Discuss only aspects that would affect the accomplishment of your mission to include man made features when they place either side in an advantageous or disadvantageous position.

- a. Seasonal changes.
- b. Amount of precipitation.
- c. Cloud cover, overcast, and/or fog.

d. Topography.

2. Enemy situation:

a. Order of battle. (What major VC units are, or usually are, in your area of responsibility?)

b. Habitual enemy activity directed against the SF Program in your area.

c. Methods of operation.

d. Viet Cong capabilities:

(1) Present:

(2) Projected:

3. Intelligence operations:

a. Sources of information in order of importance.

b. Discuss camp commander's intelligence system.

c. Discuss local informant nets. If none established, explain.

d. Evaluate District/Province intelligence personnel and reliability of information.

e. Peculiarities affecting your detachment intelligence operations.

f. Collection plan, file system for OB, and counterintelligence plan.

g. Recommendations to improve the collection effort.

4. Counterintelligence operations:

- a. Discuss VC penetration/attempted penetration into training program or Strike Force.
 - b. What is your evaluation of the security investigation of trainees by Province or District authorities?
 - c. What measures are taken to keep trainees under surveillance during the training program?
 - d. Briefly summarize sabotage and espionage attempts that have occurred in your area.
 - e. What was the propaganda theme used by the VC? How effective was it?
 - f. Discuss any problem areas connected with AWOL or defections concerning the trainees and Strike Force.
 - g. Discuss problem areas concerning weapon and population control.
 - h. Discuss outstanding counterintelligence problems and what can be expected in the near future.
5. Discuss your relationship with, and the effectiveness of, GVN officials. (Cover VNSF, GVN and ARVN)
6. What is the attitude of the populace toward Americans and the CIDG program.
7. What, if any, foreign nationals were active in your area?
8. Were established unidentified aircraft routes observed? (Give time, direction and frequency of flights)

9. Conclusions and lessons learned.

10. What were the total number of confirmed enemy casualties inflicted by your unit?

a. KIA:

b. WIA:

c. Captured:

OPERATIONS

1. Administrative areas pertaining to operations and training:

a. VNSF at camp site: (Explain working relationship as far as training, operations, and camp management. Include name and rank of VNSF)

b. District Chief: (Explain working relationship, support received, and any additional comments you feel valid. Include name and rank of District Chief).

c. Province Chief: (Explain working relationship, support received, and any additional comments you feel valid. Include name and rank of Province Chief).

d. Camp site: (Describe the camp site with regard to number of buildings, capacity of buildings, cost of construction, approved buildings not completed and plans for buildings still pending. What additional construction will be necessary to continue the program in the future).

e. Interpreters: (What effect did the language barrier have on your training and operations? Did you have sufficient interpreters to adequately conduct training and operations? Are an adequate number of interpreters currently employed?)

2. Training:

a. Pre-mission training: (Explain what areas should be deleted, increased, or incorporated into the pre-mission training).

b. Training complete by your detachment.

<u>DATE</u> <u>TRAINING STARTED</u>	<u>DATE</u> <u>TRAINING ENDED</u>	<u># TRAINEES</u>	<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>WPNS ISSUED</u>
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				

c. Training cycle: (Give a brief description of the POI used on a weekly basis. If you conducted advance training or specialized training for Strike Forces, explain the program).

3. Operations:

a. Raids, ambushes, patrols and company size operations: (Explain any of those operations that were conducted under your control that provided valuable training lessons and those that were proved to be most effective. Also discuss coordinated operations with ARVN RF/PF.

b. Area of influence: (Explain how effective you feel your program was and what area GRVN now has a definite influence over. Also give the following information that now applies to area of influence).

HAMLETS TRAINED: _____

HAMLETS IN TNG: _____

HAMLETS TO BE TRAINED: _____

DISP IN OPN: _____

DISP PLANNED: _____

c. Potential of camp: (In your opinion, how long can this camp be used in the future and still have an effective program? Explain.)

4. Additional area pertaining to operations and training: (if desired by Detachment Commander or team member).

a. CIDG Supply:

(1) Was the logistical briefing and instruction given you upon entry into country accurate and adequate? If not, how might they be improved?

(2) Was it clear to you what your authorized allowances were for Strike Force/Border Surveillance units and for camp property?

(3) What additions and/or deletions do you feel should be made to the current unit and camp property allowances?

(4) What changes should be made in the amounts now authorized?

(5) What weapons, individual and crew-served are considered most effective in the hands of indigenous personnel? Least effective?

b. TOE Property:

(1) Were you able to maintain on hand in the proper amounts all equipment authorized your team by TOE? If not, why? What equipment?

(2) Do you recommend any changes in the team equipment authorized by TOE?

(3) What team equipment tends to break down or wear out too quickly, or is otherwise considered less than satisfactory?

c. Maintenance:

(1) What CIDG equipment tends to break down or wear out most quickly as a result of normal usage? Do you consider this break down or wear out rate excessive?

(2) What equipment caused you the most serious maintenance problem? Was this caused by material failure, weather conditions, terrain conditions, or lack of repair parts?

d. Supply Procedures:

(1) Did the requisitioning procedures in use cause you undue delay in making your needs known to the appropriate supply agency?

(2) Do you consider the time lapse between date of request for supplies and date of delivery by the ISC excessive? What is your best estimate of the average delay?

(3) Were you adequately alerted of scheduled resupply missions? If not, how can the notification procedure be improved?

(4) Were you adequately supported as regards expendables; i.e., batteries, repair parts, office supplies, etc?

e. Summary:

(1) What is your overall evaluation of the quality of the logistic support provided to your detachment during your tour?

(2) What specific recommendations for improvement, other than those stated in answer to previous questions, do you wish to make?

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communications between A and B detachments: (Discuss problems regarding the number of daily contacts, QRX times, signal strength and readability of stations, interference, etc.)

2. Communications between your detachment and Nha Trang (and/or TOC) (As above).

3. Problems and recommendations regarding communications within your own area (to include air-to-ground):

a. FM Voice (PRC 10):

- b. Wire:
 - c. TR-20, HT-1 and TR-35:
 - d. Gonsett Air/Ground set:
 - e. GRC-109:
 - f. GRC-9 (GRC-87) if applicable:
 - g. Marker Beacon (MRT 2):
- 4. Maintenance support (Repair/replacement):
 - 5. Spare parts (Any problems in procurement):
 - 6. Dry Battery consumption rate by type per month and resupply:
 - 7. Storage battery and recharge problems:
 - 8. Crypto problems and recommendations:
 - 9. What type of antenna did you use? With what radios? What results were achieved and what recommendations do you have?
 - 10. What type of communications training did you provide for indigenous personnel?
 - 11. Have any electronic warfare measures been used against you? If so, was JAMEEP submitted? To whom?
 - 12. Was SFOB SOI adequate for use?

AIR OPERATIONS

1. Close Air Support.

- a. Number of pre-planned strikes requested:
- b. Number of immediate strikes requested:
- c. Number of pre-planned strikes approved/disapproved; reasons for disapproval if known.
- d. Number of immediate strikes approved/disapproved; reasons for disapproval if known.
- e. Statement on effectiveness of air strikes:
- f. Elapsed time for immediate CAS requests; reasons for delays if known.
- g. Problem areas:
- h. Recommendations:

2. Reconnaissance Support.

- a. Number photo/visual reconnaissance requests:
- b. Were missions completed by desired time?
- c. Were photos satisfactory?
- d. Reasons for non-completions if known (weather, etc.).
- e. Recommendations:

3. Logistical Air Support.

- a. Was supply support satisfactory (Army & USAF)?
- b. Number of emergency supply requests submitted:
- c. Elapsed time for each delivery of emergency supplies:
- d. Effects of airdrops on materials damaged, off DZ, lost, etc.

MEDICAL PROGRAM

Each medic will answer questions thoughtfully and completely. The completed form will be returned to Surgeon, this headquarters.

Name:

Date:

Team Number: Arrived:

Date Departing:

Location(s) of team: (Specify if split)

Type of training conducted by team:

Keeping in mind that this questionnaire is oriented toward improving the medical program in Vietnam, please comment on the following:

1. Medical supply: What could be done to improve it? Where do the problems appear to be, if any?

2. Medical Training of local national personnel: What suggestions do you have to improve and/or facilitate the medical training? What were your main problems?

3. Sanitary conditions at the campsite: What were the main difficulties? What lessons did you learn that would be of benefit to others? What sanitary supplies or equipment items were lacking?

4. Pre deployment briefing: What could be added to the pre-deployment briefing to facilitate your mission of paramilitary support?

5. Pre-mission training: What medical pre-mission training should be added at the group level? What would your advice be to a medic who was training for duty in Vietnam?

6. Surgeon's office: From your personal experience, state what could be done by the surgeon or B detachment medical personnel to improve the Special Forces medical program in Vietnam?

7. Give the Detachment Commander the Medical Information and Intelligence Report Form and remind him of instructions received from CO USSF C(P)V.

[illegible]

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		A. DETACHMENT SIZES																																		TOTAL	PERCENT	
	SUBJECT AREA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	TOTAL	PERCENT	
7	MISSION TRAINING AND ORIENTATION (CONT'D)																																					
	TRAINING/DETACHMENT																																				0	
	TRAINING/OPERATE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	34	100	
	ADAPTATION-YES																																			19	55.88	
	ADAPTATION-NO	X	X																																	15	44.11	
8	MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT POTENTIAL OF OTHER UNITS																																					
	SPLIT DETACHMENT-YES																																				7	20.58
	SPLIT DETACHMENT-NO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	27	79.41		
	NON-DESP MIT - YES	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	25	73.52		
	NON-DESP MIT - NO																																			9	26.47	
	WSP - YES																																			5	14.70	
	WSP - NO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	1	2.94		
	ANVS - YES																																			3	8.82	
	ANVS - NO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7	20.58		
9	EFFECTS OF CIND MISSION ON CAPABILITY																																					
	YES																																					
	NO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2	5.88		
	FUTURE MISSIONS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A			
10	COMBAT OPERATIONS																																					
	YES	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	33	97.05		
	NO																																			1	2.94	
11	NATURE OF OPERATIONS																																					
	TR-INFO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	18	52.94		
	SECURITY	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	30	88.23		
	RECON	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	31	91.17		
	OFFENSIVE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	31	91.17		
	DATE OF LAST OPERATION	11 NOV 64	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont	cont			
	OPERATION IN PLANNING - YES	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	30	88.23		
	OPERATION IN PLANNING - NO																																			4	11.76	
	OFF-SITE FORCE																																					

[illegible]

A. ATTACHMENT DATES

REPORT AREA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	TOTBL	PERCENT
14 INTELLIGENCE FACTORS (CONT'D)																																				
14.1 SITUATION																																				
14.2 ORDER OF BATTLE (CDS)																																				
14.3 BATTLELINE SITUATION																																				
14.4 ORDER																																				
14.5 COMBAT																																				
14.6 METHODS OF OPERATION																																				
14.7 ELEMENTS OF CAMP																																				
14.8 AMMUNITION																																				
14.9 SIZING OF TROOP/TRAIS																																				
14.10 SUPPLY																																				
14.11 PROPAGANDA																																				
14.12 TACTICS																																				
14.13 ACTIONS/HARDS VILLAGES																																				
14.14 OTHER																																				
14.15 THE CDS CANALIZATION																																				
14.16 FORTIFY - MGS																																				
14.17 COMPANY																																				
14.18 BATTALION																																				
14.19 REGIMENT																																				
14.20 DIVISION																																				
14.21 FORTIFIED AREA																																				
14.22 COMPANY																																				
14.23 BATTALION																																				
14.24 REGIMENT																																				
14.25 DIVISION																																				
15 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS																																				
15.1 SOURCES OF INFORMATION																																				
15.2 AGENTS																																				
15.3 PATROLS																																				
15.4 DISTRICT																																				

[illegible]

[illegible]

ANNEX C

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[illegible]

A 3000																																			
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[illegible]

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[illegible]

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(C) ANNEX D

COMMENTS OF CORPS SENIOR ADVISORS

At various times during the evaluation, all four MACV senior advisors to ARVN corps were invited to respond to the questionnaire used by field evaluators in gathering information of the Special Forces group and to submit such other comments as they wished. In addition, project officers interviewed three of the senior advisors.

This annex presents a resume of the remarks of the officers interviewed.

1. OBJECTIVE 1 - Capability of command and control elements of the Special Forces group in Vietnam to provide planning and operational advice and assistance, materiel support, and training for indigenous military and paramilitary forces.

a. Comments By Advisor A

The B detachments were formerly co-located with corps while operational planning is mostly done at Division and sector. Coordination has been unsatisfactory. Introduction of C detachments and downgrading of B detachments may cure the problem.

With regard to the exercise of operational control of Special Forces detachments by MACV or by Special Forces group, only one of the systems is either feasible or acceptable--under operational control of the corps senior advisor. The effectiveness would be even better if the B detachments operated under the operational control of division senior advisors.

Their (SF) uniqueness in performing any mission stems from the monetary and materiel support received, not from peculiar talents and training. It is my opinion that non-Special Forces personnel could do the job equally well if equally supported with assets. Certainly the job could be done better if there were more cooperation and coordination, regardless of who is doing it. In my opinion, the best way to get this required cooperation and coordination is to put operating units under the lowest possible echelon of command. In my opinion, in Vietnam, the SF units (or whoever does the job) should be subordinate in every sense to the division commander with the US advisors subordinate in every sense to the division senior advisor.

b. Comments By Advisor B

Operational control of the Special Forces teams employed as sector and sub-sector advisors is best accomplished by the corps senior

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advisor through the B and C detachments. This is being done now. I believe it would be better to further decentralize this control such that divisions control operations through the B detachments. I have recommended this, but I doubt that it will be approved.

In the counterinsurgency situation that exists now in Vietnam, with operational Special Forces teams committed to a counterinsurgency mission, the only proper mission left for the group headquarters is that of providing administrative and logistical support to the deployed teams. In any event, Group should not interfere in the operational control of the teams. I don't believe Group is any better qualified to control the present civic action and intelligence operations than is MACV, since the Vietnam operation is a unique mission for Special Forces.

c. Comments By Advisor C

Addition of the C detachment at corps level added considerably to the operational efficiency of Special Forces units carrying out MACV assigned missions.

2. OBJECTIVE 2 - Capability of the Special Forces operational detachments in Vietnam to organize and train military and paramilitary units, provide operational planning and assistance, obtain and maintain logistical support, provide operational intelligence, perform civic action functions, and provide psychological warfare planning and assistance.

a. Comments By Advisor A

Under the system where SF A detachments were rotated every 6 months, each incoming detachment felt a necessity to retrain its CIDG. From this I conclude that under the 6-month tour, the time required for the quality achieved was unacceptable.

Montagnards are found in many different units -- ARVN, RF, and PF. This is good. Special Forces segregation of Montagnards into CIDG companies is not in keeping with the overall objective. There are many other elements of MACV which are doing as good or a better job militarily in assisting Montagnards. For example, from 1963 to 1964, the majority of the men of the 22nd Division were Montagnards.

Operational intelligence is marginal. This is mostly due to over-reliance on agent reports as opposed to combat intelligence derived from scouting and patrolling. But this criticism is valid throughout Vietnam, and Special Forces have enjoyed neither more nor less success than others.

Housekeeping is what Special Forces mostly do in Vietnam. If 1000 out of 4900 CIDG personnel are operating in my corps, we have had a good turnout.

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If the question is "Are SF personnel adequately trained in their MOS?", then the answer is "Yes". If the question is "Do we have the right skills represented in the detachment?", then the answer is "To a degree". The average A detachment lacks the experience and maturity for what they are doing in Vietnam.

In civic action functions only the medical specialist is effective in Vietnam. Medical care, regardless of how simple, is our most effective program.

While serving as corps senior advisor, I felt that the main accomplishment of Special Forces with the Montagnards rested almost solely in the hamlet development and civic action areas. Special Forces did an outstanding job of this. I have never had any great respect for Montagnard CIDG as paramilitary forces

b. Comments By Advisor B

I would not distinguish between the MACV advisor teams and the Special Forces detachments serving as advisors. So far as I am concerned, they are equally effective in this role. Any differences you might encounter would be due to differences in individuals. The same thing applies to Special Forces B detachments and MACV teams in the sector advisor role.

In the civic action area, the A detachments have an edge because of the specialists organic to the team; i.e., the more highly trained medic, the engineer NCO, and the training all members have had that is designed to enable them to deal with indigenous groups. In psychological operations, however, MACV advisory teams have an edge because of the more extensive, centrally supported, psychological warfare backup of MACV.

I believe that in the border surveillance role the A detachment is over-structured; that is, they were capable of doing much more than required of them by their mission. The addition of the sector and sub-sector advisory mission is making more use of the A detachment skills, though an intelligence augmentation is needed, and it is a much more realistic role for the Special Forces operational detachments here.

c. Comments By Advisor C

In providing training and operational assistance for small military and paramilitary units, Special Forces detachments sometimes achieve better results than would MACV advisory teams because of the logistical support available through Special Forces channels.

Special Forces operational detachments are able to provide and maintain better logistical support than MACV teams because of the daily allocation of aircraft for transport of supplies, direct access to the supply base, and short requisition lead time.

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The Special Forces are extremely competent, by virtue of organic skills and special training in dealing with various indigenous groups under tense conditions, to enter and operate in remote or contested areas where the government presence is required.

It is our position that man-for-man, Special Forces personnel and MACV combat area advisory personnel are identical in effectiveness when providing advice and training to indigenous personnel. Special Forces detachments sometimes produce better results because of the better logistical support available to them; the Special Forces A detachment has a somewhat greater capability to advise and train because it has 12 men as compared with the standard 5-man MACV advisory team. Special Forces detachments are especially well-suited to train and provide operational assistance to the Montagnards because of the special training given Special Forces in dealing with indigenous groups.

3. OBJECTIVE 3 - Capability of the Special Forces group to perform border control/surveillance and internal guerrilla roles.

a. Comment By Advisor A

To perform their classic mission of organizing willing guerrillas behind enemy lines, hopefully from a sympathetic population, I guess the B detachment grade levels are about right. To operate in a separate chain of command organizing mercenaries in a civil war, I believe the teams lack the necessary experience and maturity. Presumably increased rank might provide this if it were decided that hiring, training, and leading mercenaries in a civil war was an appropriate mission for Special Forces.

b. Comment by Advisor B

I don't believe the use of CIDG as strike forces is a particularly good idea; they are not trained, led, or armed to cope with regular VC units in the conventional ground combat that the fighting here has become. To begin with, by virtue of the fact that they can lay down their weapons and quit any time they want to, they are not soldiers. I believe it would be better to recruit and train these same people through the RF/PF program.

4. OBJECTIVE 4 - Individual Survival Kit

No comments solicited from corps senior advisors.

5. OBJECTIVE 5 - Adequacy of logistical and communications support provided by 5SFGA.

a. Comment By Advisor A

Special Forces supply system now airland or airdrop supplies

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at locations where the commodity is already on hand, simply to preserve the Special Forces system. On the other hand, the Special Forces system is probably more responsive when a valid emergency exists although there is another large emergency airlift system in existence which could probably do just as well if called upon to do so.

b. Comment by Advisor B

The Special Forces logistic system in RVN should be immediately overhauled. It is wasteful of assets because in most cases other more efficient systems predating the SF system are available.

Both fixed and rotary wing aircraft are now wasted by Special Forces to perpetuate their separate supply system. What their bonafide requirements really are is undetermined because no one has attempted to use other systems.

c. Comment by Advisor C

The Special Forces supply system has been necessary for them in their border control/surveillance program wherein they have had to relocate existing camps and build new ones so as to provide the necessary disposition of bases from which to operate. Actually, they are using both the Special Forces and the MACV supply systems to do this. I don't believe the almost complete reliance on air transport is realistic. In this corps area it means that aircraft may be employed to transport relatively low priority supplies to a Special Forces camp when higher priority supplies for other consumers must go by slower ground transport. In effect, the Special Forces system of air supply gives them a built-in priority for aircraft.

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(C) ANNEX E

LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATIONS, PROCEDURES, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), OCTOBER 1964-APRIL 1965

Annex E includes:

	<u>Page</u>
A. Requisition Procedures	E-2
B. Camp and Team Property	E-3
C. Logistical Support Center Functional Organization, April 1965	E-9
D. Functional Use of Indigenous Employees at the Logistical Support Center, April 1965	E-10
E. Supplies (In Tons) Handled By Logistical Support Center, Nha Trang, October 1964 to April 1965	E-11
F. Supplies (In Tons) Delivered By Forward Supply Points, October 1964 to April 1965	E-12

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A. REQUISITION PROCEDURES

EMERGENCY:

1. Detachment sends request directly to Logistical Support Center (LSC) by fastest electrical means: RTT, SSB, CW or telephone.
2. LSC checks location of detachment. If a Forward Supply Point (FSP) has air transport immediately available and can deliver sooner than LSC, that FSP is given the mission. If not, the necessary supplies are loaded and delivered by air directly to the detachment from Nha Trang.
3. LSC contacts appropriate C detachment when plane is airborne. The C detachment assumes coordination control of aerial resupply mission, informs detachment requesting emergency resupply ETA of aircraft, and issues necessary recognition and DZ marking instructions.
4. Detachment secures DZ and picks up supplies. At some later date it returns air delivery equipment and submits follow-up written requisition.

ROUTINE AND PRIORITY:

1. Detachment fills out standard 5SFGA requisition form in six copies from the stockage list furnished by LSC, prepares a separate requisition for each class of property and air mails the package to C detachment.
2. C detachment checks requisition for sufficiency of justification, endorses with minimum delay, and air mails to LSC.
3. Upon receipt at LSC, editing clerk determines that items requested are in the system, are authorized for the requesting detachment, and by checking against the detachment hand receipt file, determines the amount requested is not excessive.

Stock control clerk checks to see if items are in the warehouse. If not on hand, marks requisition "Due out" and either requisitions from Counterinsurgency Supply Office (CISO), Okinawa, or purchases locally. If on hand, he sends requisition to the appropriate warehouse and informs air movement officer by telephone.

4. Warehouses are stocked with supplies according to class of property. Warehouse fills requisition, packs it into appropriate container, seals the package against pilferage, marks destination and designation of requesting detachment on outside, and places the container on pallets which are then moved by fork lift to the air movement section.

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5. Air movement officer, upon earlier notification, has determined method of air delivery (airlanded, air drop, or low-level extraction, and rigs container accordingly. Rigged container is placed on ready line where it awaits consolidated aircraft load, subject to time limitation on type of requisition. Air movement section loads the pallet on aircraft and a team accompanies the delivery flight. The team recovers and returns packing and rigging material if the aircraft lands and also picks up any turn-ins or repair items for return to ISC.

B. CAMP AND TEAM PROPERTY

11 November 1964

	<u>A Det</u>	<u>B Det</u>	<u>C Det</u>
Comparator clr chlor	1	1	1
Boat assault plastic hull	For special requirements only		
Boat recon inflatable 15-man	For special requirements only		
Boat recon inflatable 3-man	For special requirements only		
Kit repair boat plastic	1 per 4 plastic boats		
Engine outboard 25hp	For special requirements only		
Chain saw 18 inch blade	2	1	0
Chain saw 36 inch blade	For special requirements only		
Kit repair chain saw	1 per 3 chain saw		
Sprayer hand operated 2-gal cap	3	1	1
Bag water	5	2	1
Generator 30 kw ac	0	0	2
Generator 10 kw ac	2 Note 1	2	0
Generator 5 kw ac	2 Note 1	0	0
Generator 1.5 kw ac	1	1	1
Charger battery 1.5 kw dc	1	1	1
Water purification set	1	1	1
Compass	12	23	24
Flashlight	12	23	24
Holder suture needle 7 inch	2	2	4
Catheter 8 FR	4	4	24
Catheter urethral 16 FR	4	4	24
Forceps dressing str 5½ inch	1	1	6
Forceps hemostatic curved 6½ inch	1	1	6
Forceps hemostatic str 5 inch	1	1	6
Forceps hemostatic str 7½ inch	1	1	6
Forceps gauze pad holding 9½ inch	1	1	6
Forceps tissue tweezers str 5½ inch	1	1	6
Handle surgical knife no. 3	2	2	8
Retractor gen operating	1	1	6
Handle bone cutting wire saw	1	1	3
Scissors gen surgical str 7 inch	2	2	4
Scissors on PT. sharp 5 inch	2	2	6

SOURCE: Annex 1, Memorandum Number 73, 5SFGA

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	<u>A Det</u>	<u>B Det</u>	<u>C Det</u>
Spygmomanometer	1	1	2
Splint litter bar	1	1	2
Splint support foot rest	1	1	2
Splint leg (Thomas halfring)	1	1	2
Stethoscope combination	2	2	4
Tube duodenal 16 FR	3	3	4
Otoscope and ophthalmoscope set	1	1	3
Airway pharyngeal adult-child	6	6	4
Cannula tracheotomy size 6	6	6	4
Crutch wood adj	1	1	6
Case morphine plastic	6	6	12
Elevator root noot no. 345	1	1	4
Explorer dental no. 6	1	1	4
Forceps tooth extracting no. 150	1	1	4
Forceps tooth extracting no. 151	1	1	4
Excavator dental black no. 65	1	1	4
Excavator dental black no. 66	1	1	4
Mirror mouth exam glass	1	1	4
Handle mouth exam mirror	1	1	4
Scissors crown & collar 4 1/2 inch	1	1	4
Drape surgical (eye sheet)	4	4	12
Tube irrigator 7 feet	1	1	6
Tip irrigator rectal	1	1	12
Bag hot-water ice	4	4	8
Basin emesis CRM	2	2	12
Irrigator CRM 2 qt	1	1	6
Jar forceps CRM	4	4	12
Jar surg dressing w/metal top	4	4	12
Litter nylon folding	2	2	12
Litter pole rigid	4	4	6
Tray instrument CRM	2	2	6
Case Med instrument no. 3 empty	2	2	4
Surgical instrument & supply set combat	1	1	2
Case med no. 5 empty	2	2	4
Dental instrument supply set	1	1	2
Surg instrument set minor surg	1	1	8
Towel hand	6	6	12
Pail w/lid 12 qt	1	1	4
Can waste step on type	2	2	4
Basin wash 4 1/4 qt	2	2	12
Stove gasoline 2 or 1 burner	1	1	8
Pressure cooker-canner 21 qt	1	1	8
Brush scrub	4	4	12
Razor safety class w/o blades	1	1	8
Book emergency war surgery	1	1	1
Book Merck manual	1	1	1
Hand book on pediatrics	1	1	1

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	<u>A Det</u>	<u>B Det</u>	<u>C Det</u>
Book control communicable disease	1	1	1
Hand book medical treatment	1	1	1
Book drugs in current use	1	1	1
Gun machine cal .30 M1919A6	As required		
Mount tripod cal .30 M2	As required		
Rifle 57mm	As required		
Mortar 60mm	As required		
Mortar 81mm	As required		
Truck ambulance $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	0	1	1
Truck $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	2	3	4
Truck $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	1	1	2
Truck $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton	Note 2	5	3
Pistol cal .45	12	23	24
Watch wrist	12	23	24
Trailer water $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton	1	1	0
Mount truck pedestal $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	2	1	1
Binoculars	6	7	7
Demolition and equipment set no. 2 elec	1	1	1
Launcher grenade 40mm M79	4	4	4
Rifle M16	12	23	24
Shotgun 12 gauge	6	6	6
Heater immersion	4	4	0
Can 32 gal cap	4	4	0
Parachute cargo	0	0	Note 3
Container A21	0	0	Note 3
Sling A7A	0	0	Note 3
Parachute personnel troop T-10	0	0	200
Parachute personnel reserve	0	0	200
Kit bag flyer	0	0	200
Bag message drop	0	0	10
Hook brush	10	5	2
Axe chopping single bit	10	5	2
Shovel long handle	5	3	1
Shovel D-handle	15	7	5
Post hole digger	2	2	1
Pick mattock	10	5	2
Tool set carpenters	1	1	1
Tool kit TE 33	3	3	3
Tool set general mech	1	1	1
Desk typewriter	0	1	Note 4
Desk single pedestal	0	4	Note 4
Desk double pedestal	0	1	Note 4
Chair desk	0	Note 5	Note 5
Filing cabinet 5 drawer	0	1	4
Filing cabinet 2 drawer	1	0	0
Cooler water	0	1	2
Finger print kit	1	1	1

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	<u>A Det</u>	<u>B Det</u>	<u>C Det</u>
Safe field comb	1	1	2
Padlock comb Sargent & Greenleaf	As required		
Cash box	1	1	1
Chest ice	1 Note 6	1 Note 6	1 Note 6
Clock alarm	2	3	3
Can gasoline 5 gal	Note 7	Note 7	Note 7
Can water 5 gal	As required		
Lantern Gasoline	As required		
Machine duplicating	1	1	1
Machine adding	1	1	1
Refrigerator	2	3	3
Spout can gasoline flexible	Note 7	Note 7	Note 7
Tool set armorers	1	1	1
Strapping kit	0	1	1
Scales weighing	0	0	1
Tent CP Med	Note 8	Note 8	Note 8
Panel marker	14	7	7
Brief case	1	2	4
Cot folding metal	Note 9a	Note 9a	Note 9a
Pillow	Note 9a	Note 9a	Note 9a
Pillow case	Note 9b	Note 9b	Note 9b
Sheet bed	Note 9c	Note 9c	Note 9c
Blanket wool	Note 9b	Note 9b	Note 9b
Stove cooking outfit field	1	1	1
Kit barber	1	1	1
Cook set field	4	0	0
Stove gasoline one burner	4	0	0
Tableware outfit field	2	3	3
Typewriter portable	1	1	1
Typewriter non-portable 11 inch carriage	1	3	4
Typewriter non-portable 18 inch carriage	0	1	1
Trousers combat tropical	3 per US	personnel	
Coat combat tropical	3 per US	personnel	
Boot tropical DMS	2 per US	personnel	
Liner poncho	1 per US	personnel	
Net general purpose	1 per US	personnel	
Rucksack light weight	1 per US	personnel	
Poncho	2 per US	personnel	
Sweater light weight	1 per US	personnel	
Cover canteen nylon	1 per US	personnel	
Bladder canteen nylon	1 per US	personnel	
Rations combat	12 meals	per US personnel	Note 10
Belt pistol	1 per US	personnel	
Suspenders pack	1 per US	personnel	
Pouch ammo universal	2 per US	personnel	
Helmet steel para	1 per US	personnel	
Liner helmet para	1 per US	personnel	

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	<u>A Det</u>	<u>B Det</u>	<u>C Det</u>
Mattress air pneumatic	1 per US personnel		
Case first aid	1 per US personnel		
Dressing combat small	1 per US personnel		
Survival Kit	1 per US personnel		
Bar insect	1 per US personnel		
Hammock light weight nylon	1 per US personnel		
Boat camouflage	2 per US personnel		
Trousers camouflage	2 per US personnel		
Hat camouflage	1 per US personnel		
Antenna RC 292	1	2	2
Antenna Group GRA-4	2	2	2
Beacon HRT 2A	1	2	2
Camera set still picture KS-15	1	1	1
Camera polaroid	1	1	1
Climbers LC-240	1	1	1
Telephone TA-312	12	16	24
Telephone TA-1	12	12	12
Generator GN-43	2	2	2
Generator UGP-12	1	1	1
Lamp SE-11	1	2	2
Projector 16mm AS-2	1	1	1
Radio set AN/FRC-93 (ILO TR-35)	1	2	2 Note 11
Radio set AN/GRC-26	0	1	1 Note 12
Radio set AN/GRC-109	2	2	2
Radio set AN/GRC-87	1	1	1
Radio set AN/PRC-10	5	5	5
Radio set AN/PRC-25	3	3	3 Note 13
Reel unit RL-39	4	3	4
Belt LC-23	1	1	1
Switch board SB-22	1	2	2
Switch board SB-993 GT	1	2	2
Terminal box TA-125	1	2	2
Terminal strip TM-184	5	7	10
Test set FS-1	0	0	1 Note 14
Test set TS-505/U	0	0	1 Note 14
Tube tester TV-7/U	0	0	1 Note 14
Wire WD-1 (MX-306)	22	20	24
Spocl DR-8 empty	12	16	20
Test set TS-20/35	0	0	1 Note 14
Camera 35mm half frame	10	6	0 Note 15

NOTATIONS: Any combination of two, two 10kw, two 5kw, or one 10 kw and one 5 kw.

2 One per Strike Force company.

3 As required for emergency resupply only.

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- 4 As required.
- 5 One per desk.
- 6 Authorized when ice is available.
- 7 One per vehicle generator and one per three outboard engines.
- 8 Authorized on temporary loan only.
- 9a Authorized 12 per dispensary and one per US personnel.
- 9b Authorized 12 per dispensary and two per US personnel.
- 9c Authorized 12 per dispensary and four per US personnel.
- 10 To be used for emergency use only.
- 11 Two additional AN/PRC-93's operated at "C" detachment level by the Group Signal Company.
- 12 One additional AN/GRC-26 operated at "C" detachment level by the Group Signal Company.
- 13 AN/PRC-25 radios due out to Special Forces Group (Abn) issue upon receipt.
- 14 One complete field maintenance van operated at C detachment level by the Group Signal Company.
- 15 All cameras have been deleted from TO&E, CIDG Guerrilla Company (light), dated 19 March 1964. These will be the only cameras authorized on site.

Equipment of special requirements and operations will be requested as needed.

*ANNEX # 1 supercedes Camp Property Portion of Memorandum Number 73 dated 18 September 1964.


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C. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CENTER, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN), FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION, APRIL 1965



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D. FUNCTIONAL USE OF INDIGENOUS CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AT THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CENTER, APRIL 1965

<u>S-4 OFFICE</u>	(9)	<u>UTILITY SECTION</u>	(13)
Stock Control Supervisor	1	Headman	1
Admin Clerk	1	Mason	2-2
Stock Control Clerk	3	Plumber	4
Clerk Typist	2	Electrician	4
Driver, Light Truck	1	Laborer	2
Janitor	1		
<u>SUPPLY WAREHOUSES</u>	(37)	<u>CARPENTER SHOP</u>	(30)
Headman	3	Quarterman	1
Leadingman	3	Carpenter	28
Warehouseman	23	Sign Painter	1
Forklift Operator	6		
Office Equip Repairman	2	<u>AMMO DUMP</u>	(13)
		Quarterman	1
<u>ROUGH TERRAIN FORKLIFT SECTION</u>	((5)	Ammo Handler	11
Leadman	1	Forklift Operator	1
Forklift Operator	4		
<u>POL SECTION</u>	(3)	<u>RIGGER SECTION</u>	(59)
POL Handler	3	Riggers	59
<u>MOTOR POOL OFFICE</u>	((7)	<u>MAINTENANCE SECTION</u>	(25)
Quarterman	1	Leadman	1
Timekeeper	1	Automotive Mechanic	21
Dispatcher	1	Welder	2
Stock Control Clerk	1	Automotive Electrician	1
Clerk Typist	1		
Tool Room Attendant	1	<u>TRANSPORTATION SECTION</u>	(31)
Janitor	1	Heavy Truck Driver	9
		Light Truck Driver	14
<u>GENERATOR SECTION</u>	(7)	Automotive Serviceman	6
Power Plant Operator	3	Service Station Atten-	1
Power Plant Attendant	2	dant	
Generator Mechanic	2	Painter	1
<u>ELECTRICAL SECTION</u>	(5)	<u>REFRIGERATION SECTION</u>	(3)
Electrician	5	Refrigeration Mechanic	3
<u>FILTRATION PLANT</u>	(4)		
Water Plant Operator	4	<u>TOTAL EMPLOYEES</u>	251

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E. SUPPLIES IN TONS HANDLED BY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CENTER, NHA TRANG
OCTOBER 1964 TO APRIL 1965

Tons Received	Oct 64	Nov 64	Dec 64	Jan 65	Feb 65	Mar 65	Apr 65
IST from USARV'S	1,700	900	390	530	870	2,850	1,600
AIR from USARV'S	630	33	4*	24	70	64	97
IST from Saigon	107	27	69	80	98	123	35
AIR from Saigon	4	8	*	120	92	17	23
Total	2,441	968	463	754	1,130	3,130	1,755
Tons Delivered							
Air	1,137	1,542	1,057	2,376	1,758	2,600	3,018
Surface							
Vehicle	164	133	—	263	129	—	—
Boat	33	—	—	—	—	238	10
Total	1,334	1,675	1,057	2,639	1,887	2,838	3,028

*Includes all airlift

Source: Monthly Logistic Summaries, 50RGA

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F. SUPPLIES (IN TONS) DELIVERED BY FORWARD SUPPLY POINTS, OCTOBER 1964 TO APRIL 1965

FSP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR
Da Nang	Air	906	446	216	489	(2)	530
	Truck	-	-	(1)	-	-	-
	Boat	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	906	446	216	489	(2)	530
Pleiku	Air	4	4	1	28	(2)	75
	Truck	72	25	(1)	134	36	22
	Boat	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	76	29	1	162	(2)	97
Saigon	Air	207	193	138	181	(2)	108
	Truck	58	32	(1)	50	45	51
	Boat	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	265	225	138	231	(2)	159
Can Tho	Air	155	149	54	114	(2)	125
	Truck	61	109	(1)	79	48	65
	Boat	36	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	252	258	54	193	(2)	190

Source: Monthly Logistic Summaries, 5SFGA NOTES: (1) A total of 72 tons was shipped by truck by all FSP's
(2) Not reported

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(C) ANNEX F

INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATIONAL DETACHMENTS

Annex F includes:

	<u>Page</u>
1. 5SFGA Letter of Instructions Number 1, 1 January 1965	F-2
2. Propriety of Expenditures	F-30
3. CIDG Fund Cost Codes	F-41

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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96243

ASFCO

1 January 1965

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 1 (FIRST REVISION)

SUBJECT: The Special Forces Counterinsurgency Program

TO: Commanders
A, B, & C Operational Detachments

1. Definition: The SF Counterinsurgency Program is a phased, and combined military-civil counterinsurgency effort designed to accomplish the following objectives: (a) destroy the Viet Cong and create a secure environment; (b) establish firm governmental control over the population; and (c) enlist the population's active and willing support of, and participation in the government's programs.

These objectives are accomplished while executing any one of three possible assigned missions; (1) border surveillance and control (2) operations against infiltration routes, or (3) operations against VC war zones and bases.

2. Concept of the Operation: This is essentially a clear, secure, and develop operation. A fundamental point in the counterinsurgency Program is that, where possible, the Strike Force personnel should be locally recruited in order to provide an exploitable entree to the populace which, in turn, facilitates military-civil relations. No population area which is "uncommitted" or which has been Viet Cong dominated can be won to the government of Vietnam until:

- a. The Viet Cong have been cleared from the area.
- b. The Viet Cong organization and infrastructure have been neutralized or eliminated.
- c. The GVN infrastructure, to which the populace is committed, has been established to replace that of the Viet Cong. In remote areas the task is to introduce the GVN infrastructure for the first time.

3. Phases: Ideally, the role of an A detachment in a given area will progress through four general phases. In phase V the A detachment

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LOI 1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

has accomplished its objectives in the area - it has done itself out of a job. The local civilian element of the GVN has taken over the area.

a. Preparation Phase: Inventory, assessment and planning.

b. Clear Operations: The establishment of the necessary degree of physical and psychological security to permit unobstructed and sustained progress toward the objectives of clear and hold, free from Viet Cong violence and intimidation. This phase is primarily military in nature.

c. Secure Operations: The (re)-establishment of governmental control. In the Montagnard areas, the task is establishment, whereas in the Delta, it is reestablishment.

d. Develop Phase: Consolidation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. This phase is primarily civil in nature.

e. Civilian Control: USSF A Detachment has departed. The area is under civilian control.

4. Phase I - Prepare Phase: During this phase, the following major actions occur:

a. Delineation of the area to undergo clear, secure, and develop operations.

b. Collection of data and information of area and possible camp sites.

c. Estimate of resource requirements to include a Special Forces area assessment.

d. Preparation of clear, secure, and develop operation plan. Considerations in the plan are:

(1) Police force, popular force, regional force and other paramilitary units.

(2) ARVN units.

(3) Coordination or joint training with police, paramilitary, and civil administration authorities.

(4) Registration and identity cards.

(5) Existing civilian government in villages, sub-sector and sector.

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LOI 1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

(6) Status of essential public service.

(7) Note: In remote and/or Montagnard areas, all of the above will probably be non-existent.

5. Phase II - Clear Operation:

a. Objectives:

(1) To build a secure camp that can be defended against a battalion sized attack with minimal forces so that maximum forces may be committed to offensive operations.

(2) To deny the VC the capability to function at will in the area.

(3) To establish the physical presence of government (CIDG) throughout the area.

(4) To establish firm security in the area under the protective shield of CIDG troops.

(5) To commence CA/Psy Ops activities to win the people; conduct short range CA projects which show tangible results within 30-90 days.

(6) Coordinate military, and CA/Psy Ops operations with sector and/or sub-sector advisor and, where possible, assist him in his mission.

(7) Initiate military intelligence efforts. Select individuals and train them as agents.

b. Concept:

(1) Initial operations by CIDG forces will be a combination of offensive operations (saturation patrolling, area ambushes, area denial operations), and "reaction" operations.

(2) These counter guerrilla operations must not be considered as "seizure of terrain, assaults, or mahunts." The movement of CIDG forces into a populated area and within the area once it is occupied, will be quiet and friendly unless intelligence indicates the presence of superior VC forces.

(3) In areas where the prime VC means of obtaining population support is through intimidation and fear, continuous patrolling is

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EOI:1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

necessary in order to prevent or defeat this VC technique.

(4) The CIDG counterguerrilla forces clear the VC from the area by driving them out or destroying them; however, as long as the VC politico-administrative apparatus for building, organizing and directing local population support remains intact, it may be used among other services it performs - to fill up or replace VC units which have suffered losses or have been destroyed. This apparatus, or a substantial part of it, must remain in place and, therefore, constitutes a static or relatively fixed target. Accordingly, the dismantling or destruction of the apparatus should be a prime target of clear and hold operations. It cannot be neutralized or destroyed by counterguerrilla combat action, but combat action can leave it unprotected, thus making its identification and destruction possible by population and resources control forces.

(5) If appropriate, CIDG forces in conjunction with local civil authorities will initiate population and resources control measures. These surveillance and restriction measures are applied in a graduated program of governmental control over the population and the area in order to:

(a) Sever the relationship between the VC and the supporting and directing organization.

(b) Identify and neutralize or eradicate the VC organization within the population.

(c) Provide a physical and psychological environment of security within the population free from fear of reprisal through violence or terrorism.

NOTE: Camps in uninhabited areas may never advance beyond this phase. KHAM DUC and PLEI TA NANGLE are examples of this type. Camps operating against war zones will normally remain in phase II longer than border surveillance or interior route camps.

6. Phase III - Secure Operations:

a. Objectives:

(1) To establish firm governmental control over the area and the people in the vicinity of the camp site; extend sector and sub-sector programs and efforts to the vicinity of the camp.

(2) To assist in developing local capability for area security.

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LOI 1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

(3) To replace the VC political apparatus by one of the government's own.

(4) In remote areas, to create for the first time a GVN Political Apparatus.

(5) Assist in population and resource control, continue short range and start long range CA projects.

(6) Intensify civil and military intelligence effort.

b. Concept:

(1) In this phase, the military will take positive and continuous steps to integrate its efforts with, and support the programs of the local GVN Civil apparatus - villages, sub-sector and/or sector.

(2) Introduction of elements of other agencies of government as the area is made secure and the resources to back up these agencies' work.

(3) Thorough population screening to determine VC elements and to uncover local leadership.

(4) Through area assessment or survey, in conjunction with local leadership, to determine precise and current needs, resources, etc., of the area. An Area Security Coordination Center may be formed for this purpose.

(5) Motivation of the population so that they come to the point of wanting to reconstruct their area and to defend the rehabilitated area against attack by the VC. In this phase, A detachments may be de facto or actual sub-sector advisors if sanctioned by Senior Corps Advisor. A & B detachments will coordinate with and assist sub-sector and sector in executing pacification plan in vicinity of camp.

(6) As part of this motivation, the offer of governmental help, if the people show themselves willing to work on reconstruction, as they have planned it, and to defend what they have done.

(7) A progressively greater diversion of the effort of some of the CIDG forces to civic action.

(8) Graduated effort to develop a national consciousness among the people of the area and rapport between the government and the people.

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LOI 1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

(9) Designation and allocation of CIDG troops for continuous offensive counter guerrilla operations.

(10) Firm governmental control over the area and its people cannot mean repression. The objective must be willing identification of the people with the objectives of the government; the means to this end are community development and self-defense through which the people are involved in working toward objectives they themselves set and then defending - with the firm support of government forces - their work against VC depredations.

7. Phase IV - Develop:

a. Objectives:

(1) To turn primary responsibility for local security and government over to the local population.

(2) To maintain an atmosphere of complete security, including offensive patrol activities against VC.

(3) To continue the local reconstruction effort.

(4) To continue the development of national consciousness.

b. Concept:

(1) Redeployment of some SF/CIDG forces for operations in an adjacent or other high priority area. Sufficient SF/CIDG forces will remain to assist the other locally developed forces such as police, popular force, customs officials, etc.

(2) Maintenance of a firm capability by government military forces to support the local defense effort in the event of raids by insurgents.

(3) Further development of the process of community development and the extension of national development programs into the area.

(4) Continued emphasis on the development of rapport between the government and the people of the area through the mechanism of popularly supported and responsive local self-government.

(5) Through Psy Ops, assist in motivating the population to the point of wanting to reconstruct their area.

8. Phase V - Civilian Control - - Community turned over to Established GVN Political Apparatus.

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LOI 1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

9. Since A detachments in all phases will normally be working at Sub-sector Advisory Team level, it is pertinent to know that unit's mission and organization.

a. Mission: Accompanies Regional/Popular forces on operations; advises on organization, training, tactics; extends USOM and USIS capabilities; assists with planning and execution of educational, economic, agricultural, public works, health and sanitation and information programs.

b. Composition of Sub-sector Advisory Team:

Sub-sector Advisor	Maj/Capt
Asst Sub-sector Advisor	Capt/Lt
Opn/Intel Sgt	E-6
Medical Advisor	E-5
Radio Operator	E-5/4

10. The SF/CIDG program is a unique operation. No other US military organization in the world has such a broad variety of tools available to influence and assist native military and civilian agencies and personnel in counterinsurgency operations. These tools are funds for Civic Action/Psy Ops, funds for local purchase to stimulate economy, funds for intelligence, flexible and responsive supply system, extensive communications, entree to populace through medical assistance and local recruits, highly trained and motivated US Special Forces personnel, and the largest US military representation at the lowest level of military-civil operations. Study and learn to use the leverage that these resources give you.

11. The aggregate of the above tools provides the A team with vast capabilities to execute the combined military-civil counterinsurgency effort defined in paragraph 1, above. The degree of success of the operation is limited only by your professional competence, energy, imagination, patience, tenacity and persuasiveness. Remember, we are here to change the people's minds. While it may be necessary to kill rather than convert a number of hard core VC, the vast majority of the lesser committed people can be converted by proper use of tools available.

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LOI 1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

12. The attached annexes contain more detailed suggestions to assist in implementation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ANNEXES:

1. Type "A" Detachment
Organization by Phase
2. C/G Opns in BS
3. C/G Opns against interior
infiltration routes
4. C/G Opns against war zones and bases
5. CA/Psy War (To Be issued later)
6. "The Next Step" (To Be issued later)

JOSEPH H. JOHNSON
Captain, Infantry
Assistant Adjutant

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TYPE "A" DETACHMENTS BY PHASE			PHASE III - SECURE		
PHASE I - PREPARATION			PHASE II - CLEAR		
FUNCTION	REQD PERS	LOCAT TION	REQD FUNCTION	PRIOR- NO	LOCAT TION
DELIMITATION OF FUTURE AREA, COLLECTION OF INFORMATION OF AREA AND POSSIBLE CAMP SITES, ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS, ASSEMBLE AND TRAIN ASSETS.	CMD & CONTROL	1 2 Off 1 NCO	CMD & CONTROL	1 2 Off 1 NCO	A
	COMMO	1 2 NCO A	COMMO	1 2 NCO A	A
	INTEL	1 2 NCO A	INTEL	1 1-2 NCO A	A
FUNCTION PERFORMED BY TEAM REQUIRED IN PHASE II.	TACTICS (DEVEL DEFENSE, BASIC TNG & LOCAL PATROLLING)	1 NCO (Engt) 2 NCO 1 (WPN) A	TACTICS(BASIC TNG, LOCAL & LONG RANGE PATROLLING)	1 2 NCO A	A
	MEDIC (+MED G/A)	2 2 Med A	MED (+MED G/A)	2 1-2 NCO A	A
	CIVIL AFFAIRS/ PSY OPS	3 2 Off 1 NCO Addl Dy	CIVIL AFFAIRS/ PSY OPS	1 Off 2 1 NCO A	A
	LONG RANGE PATROLLING	4 N/A Addl Dy	ADVISE LOCAL SECURITY FORCE PF/RF AND POLICE	3 1-2 NCO A	A
	ADVISE LOCAL SECURITY FORCE (PF/POLICE)	5 N/A N/A	MAINTAINING DEFENSES	4 N/A Addl Dy	A
	RECAP "A" TEAM - 2/10		RECAP "A" TEAM - 3/9-12		

2 Off
1 Opns NCO
2 Intel NCO
2 Wpns NCO
1 Engr NCO
2 Med NCO
2 Commo

ANNEX 1 LOI 1

3 Off
1 Opns NCO
1-2 Intel NCO
4 Wpns NCO
2 Med
1-2 Commo
1 CA/PSY WAR NCO

NOTE: 2 NCO's Cross
trained in
Psy Ops Civil Affairs

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PHASE V - CIVILIAN CONTROL

PHASE IV - DEVELOP

RCD PRIOR-NO LOCA-
FUNCTIONS ITY PERS TION

CMD & CONTROL	1	1 Off 1 NCO	A
INTEL	1	1 NCO	A
CIVIL AFFAIRS/ PSY OPS	1	1 Off 1 NCO	A
COMMO	2	1 NCO	A
ADVISE LOCAL SECURITY FORCE (PF/RP AND)	2	1-2 NCO A	
POLICE	4	1 NCO	A
MED			
TACTICS (BASIC TRNG, LOCAL & LONG RANGE PATROLLING	3	N/A	Addl Dy A
MAINTAIN DEFENSE	5	N/A	B/C Addl Dy A

FLW IF ANY MILITARY FORCES REMAIN
IN AREA: ONLY POLICE, CIVILIAN
INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND
SOME PARA-MILITARY UNITS REQUIRED

NOTE: INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE THE REQUIRED
FUNCTIONS WILL BE PERFORMED BY
PERSONNEL CURRENTLY ASSIGNED
TO "A" DETACHMENTS THIS WILL
REQUIRE SOME CHANGES IN
PRIMARY DUTIES OF SOME
PERSONNEL

ANNEX 1 LOI 1

RECAP "A" TEAM - 2/6 or 7

2 Off
1 Ops NCO
1 Intel NCO
1 CA/PSY WAR NCO
1 COMMO
1-2 Wpns NCO
1 Med

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ANNEX 2 (Counter guerrilla Opns in Border Surveillance) to LOI 1, 1 Jan 65

1. Definition: Border Surveillance and control is the sealing of the international border by stopping Viet Cong (VC) border crossing attempts.

2. Mission: Establish bases along the western land border from which border surveillance and control operations can be conducted to block major VC infiltration routes.

3. Concept of Operations: CIDG forces will conduct border surveillance/control missions through the use of small, highly trained units, utilizing guerrilla techniques operating out of camps along the western land border of Vietnam by ambushing and raiding VC crossing parties, way stations and mission support sites.

Execution:

a. Phase I - Preparation:

(1) Establish a zone of operation along the national border of Vietnam.

(a) Zone of responsibility: Extending from the national border inland to a depth of approximately five kilometers.

(b) Zone of influence: Extending from the border back to a depth of approximately 15 kilometers.

(2) Select camp site.

(3) Recruit and train Strike Force, if required.

(4) Plan intelligence assets.

(5) Establish rapport with local population.

(6) Initiate Psy Ops plan.

(7) Coordinate air support plan.

b. Phase II - Clear

(1) Establish strong intelligence net.

(2) Deny key areas to the VC.

(3) Begin to seal off border.

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ANNEX 2 to LOI (Continued)

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- (4) Initiate guerrilla type operations within operational zone against VC controlled areas.
- (5) Identify VC infiltration routes, MSRs, way stations and officials.
- (6) Assist in enforcing population control.
- (7) Increase CA/Psy War activity.

c. Phase III - Secure

- (1) Increase degree of border control through squad and platoon size activity constantly on the move to avoid "pattern".
- (2) Encourage local capacity, i.e. RF/PF, to aid in border control.
- (3) Conduct operations to dislodge VC-controlled officials to include assassinations.
- (4) Prepare expansion plans.
- (5) Establish mutual and overlapping defense and border patrol plans between all units in zone.
- (6) Reduce VC assets within zone of responsibility.

d. Phase IV - Develop

- (1) Develop cross-border intelligence assets.
- (2) Continue small unit actions to continue to deny Laos/Cambodia sanctuary to the Viet Cong by continuous aggressive border surveillance and border patrolling.

5. Summary: There can be no one single solution to effective border surveillance and control. Population control, harrassment, ambush, aggressive patrol action coupled with individual initiative, a desire to fight and a will to win can make the operation too costly for the insurgent elements to pursue further.

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ANNEX 3 (Counter guerrilla Operations Against Interior Infiltration Routes) to LOI 1, 1 Jan 65

1. Definitions: C/G operations against interior infiltration routes are those operations (conventional and unconventional) conducted by CIDG forces to disrupt the infiltration routes of the VC within RVN and pacify the area surrounding the camp.

2. Mission: Establish CIDG camps as directed initially on known and suspected routes and conduct operations against the infiltration routes in accordance with the guidance outlined below:

3. Concept of Operations: CIDG forces will conduct clear and hold, patrol and ambush type operations to seal off, interdict and pacify areas through which the infiltration routes run. Concurrently with the above, small and highly trained units, utilizing counter guerrilla techniques will be operating out of the camps, deep along the routes, ambushing, raiding, sabotaging and committing acts of terrorism against known VC personnel.

4. Execution:

a. Phase I - Preparation:

- (1) Select camp site.
- (2) Establish contact with USOM, USIS, CA/Psy War for support of operations.
- (3) Prepare operations plan to include support plan by USOM, USIS and CA/Psy War.
- (4) Recruit and train Strike Force if required prior to establishment of base camp.
- (5) Establish CIDG Camp with a joint USASF/VNSF operations center.
- (6) Recruit and train local personnel for Strike Force.
- (7) Establish intelligence nets and train agents.
- (8) Establish friendly rapport with local population.
- (9) Initiate CA/Psy War plan before entry.

b. Phase II - Clear

- (1) Seal off area to be pacified.

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ANNEX 3 to LOI 1 (Continued)

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- (2) Conduct sweeping operations.
- (3) Conduct saturation patrolling actions.
- (4) Conduct ambush operations along routes.
- (5) Deny the VC the capability to function in the assigned area of operations by staying on the offensive.
- (6) Identify and destroy the VC infrastructure among the local population.
- (7) Establish population control.
- (8) Deny all relations between the VC and local population.
- (9) Step up CA/Psy War activities.
- (10) Initiate counter guerrilla type operations into VC controlled areas and along the routes that are the target for expansion.
- (11) Establish intelligence nets throughout the operative area.

c. Phase III - Secure

- (1) Provide for firm GVN control of area.
- (2) Develop local capability for self-defense (Hamlet Militia, Popular Force, etc).
- (3) Establish and/or replace the VC political and administrative apparatus with that of GVN.
- (4) Conduct vigorous and continuous combat operations.
- (5) Prepare to turn over pacified area to Provincial control.
- (6) Prepare and coordinate expansion plans.

d. Phase IV - Develop

- (1) Turn primary responsibility for area over to Provincial officials.
- (2) Discharge necessary CIDG forces for service in local militia, Popular force etc.

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ANNEX 3 to LOI 1 (Continued)

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(3) Establish mutual and overlapping defense and patrol plans between the old and new areas of operation.

(4) Initiate expansion plans.

5. Summary: The overall objective of the program is to interdict VC movement on routes and establish rapport between the GVN and the population in those areas through which the VC infiltration routes run. Concurrently, GVN control will be established. It is a long term process for which no time table can be fixed for either the program as a whole or its various phases. Months or years may be required in the application of the techniques outlined above.

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ANNEX 4 (Counter Guerrilla Operations Against War Zones and Bases) to LOI 1, 1 Jan 65

1. Definition: Counter Guerrilla operations against the war zones are those operations (Conventional & Unconventional) conducted by CIDG forces to pacify and eliminate the war zones and Viet Cong secret bases.

2. Mission: Establish CIDG camps as directed initially on the periphery of the war zones and conduct operations against the war zones and VC secret bases in accordance with the guidance outlined below.

3. Concept of Operation: CIDG forces will conduct clear and hold type operations to seal off and pacify assigned areas. When pacification has been completed the pacified area will be turned over to province control and the CIDG forces will move deeper into the war zone and repeat the process. Concurrently with the above, small highly trained units, utilizing counter guerrilla techniques will be operating out of the camps, deep into VC controlled areas, ambushing, raiding, sabotaging and committing acts of terrorism against known VC personnel.

4. Execution:

a. Phase I - Preparation

- (1) Select camp site.
- (2) Establish contact with USOM, USIS, CA/Psy War for support of operations.
- (3) Prepare, clear and hold operations plan to include support plan by USOM, USIS, CA/Psy War.
- (4) Recruit and train Strike Force if required prior to establishment of base camp.
- (5) Establish CIDG camp with a VNSF/USASF joint operations center.
- (6) Recruit and train local personnel for strike force.
- (7) Establish friendly rapport with local population.
- (8) Establish intelligence nets and train agents.
- (9) Initiate CA/Psy War plan before entry.

b. Phase II - Clear

- (1) Seal off area to be pacified.

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ANNEX 4 to LOI 1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

- (2) Conduct sweeping operations.
- (3) Regroup population into secured villages and hamlets.
- (4) Deny the VC the capability to function in the assigned area of operations by staying on the offensive.
- (5) Identify and destroy the VC infrastructure among the local population.
- (6) Establish population control.
- (7) Deny all relations between the VC and local population.
- (8) Step up CA/Psy War activities.
- (9) Initiate guerrilla type operations into the VC controlled areas that are the target for expansion.
- (10) Establish intelligence nets in VC controlled areas.

c. Phase III - Secure

- (1) Provide for firm GVN control of area.
- (2) Develop local capability for Self Defense (Hamlet Militia, Popular Forces, etc).
- (3) Establish and/or replace the VC political and administrative apparatus with the GVN's own.
- (4) Conduct vigorous and continuous offensive combat actions.
- (5) Prepare to turn over pacified area to provincial control.
- (6) Prepare and coordinate expansion plans with CTZ and this headquarters.

d. Phase IV - Develop

- (1) Turn primary responsibility for area over to provincial officials.
- (2) Discharge necessary CIDG forces for service in local militia, Popular Forces, etc.

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ANNEX 4 to LOI 1 (Continued)

1 January 1965

(3) Establish mutual and overlapping defense and patrol plans between the old and new areas of operation.

(4) Continue expansion plans.

5. Summary: It must be remembered that the overall objective of the program is the establishment of support between the VN and the population of the VC dominated war zones and the establishment of GVN control in these areas. It is a long drawn out process for which no time table can be fixed for either the program as a whole and its various phases. Months/years may be required in the application of the techniques outlined above.

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ANNEX 5 (Civil Affairs/Psychological Operation to LOI 1, 1 Jan 65)

1. (C) General

This annex contains general guidance for the conduct of civic action, civil affairs, and psychological operations in support of the Special Forces counterinsurgency program. It is expected that commanders and Psy War/CA advisors at the C, B, and A detachments will use this general guidance to develop specific courses of action, programs, objectives, themes, and methods of operations to be executed at all levels with emphasis at the A detachment level. This program has as its target the establishment, re-establishment, and building of local responsive government through Vietnamese officials, and cannot therefore, be restricted to a geographical, or military area. In the three related activities of civic action, civil affairs, and psychological operations the target is winning the loyal, and active support of the people to the established government of Vietnam. The greatest success can be met at the sub-sector, or "grass roots level" where the people are most affected by the government. Special Forces units when located in the vicinity of a populated, (government or refugee) area represent a valuable asset in the overall pacification program of the Republic of Vietnam. With organic highly trained, motivated professional soldiers skilled in command, operations, communications, intelligence, basic engineering, sanitation, tactics, weapons, and its medical capability, coupled with cross training in psychological operations, civic action, and civil affairs the C, B, and especially the A detachment can advise local Vietnamese officials in the establishment of effective local government which offer to the people security and a democratic way of life. Emphasis should be placed on self protection, an information program, sanitation, welfare, medical services, an effective and just legal system and tax system, transportation, public works and popular representation in the government. At all times psychologically the people must understand that it is their, the legal government of Vietnam, that is helping them. When the people see tangible evidence that the GVN best serves their interest, and this evidence is exploited, (publicized) by psychological operations, then they will separate themselves from the Viet Cong.

2. (C) Definitions

a. Civil Affairs: Those phases of the activities of a Vietnamese commander, or government official (advisor), which embrace the relationship between the military forces, and the civil authorities and people in an area where military forces are present, and may be limited to self defense, military capabilities and governmental operations which is the ultimate goal in the Republic of Vietnam. In many cases this will include the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial authority; for example, here in the Republic of Vietnam where the province, district, and sub-district chiefs are military officers and commanders.

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b. Civic Action: An aspect of civil affairs and psychological operations (propaganda of the deed): Specifically it is any action performed by military forces utilizing military manpower and skills, in cooperation with civil agencies, authorities or groups, that is planned, and designed to improve the economic, psychological or social betterment of the country. Civic Action programs, when properly planned, executed, and exploited psychologically should enhance the status of indigenous military forces, (ARVN, Regional forces, Popular forces, CIDG forces) and improve their relationship with the population. Thus, such programs can be a major contributing factor to the elimination of insurgency. Civic Action is most successful when it is performed by the local populace themselves, with the military forces, or GVN officials providing basic construction material, and supervision as required. Emphasis should be placed on a maximum of "Self Help" projects which will produce the greatest psychological impact.

c. Psychological Operations: Includes psychological activities and psychological warfare and encompasses those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in enemy (Viet Cong), or friendly groups, (the people of South Vietnam, both the military, and the civilian), the emotions, attitudes or behavior favorable to the accomplishment of the national policies and objectives of the government of Vietnam. It is assumed the national policies and objectives of the United States support the GVN. The mission of the advisor in the Republic of Vietnam is to advise, and assist the military and government in planning, and executing an effective, and credible psychological warfare program. It must be realized in this counterinsurgency program that it's the Vietnamese Government which must win the uncommitted people, maintain allegiance of the population it already holds, and convince the Viet Cong, and other enemies that they must cease resistance, that their course is not in the interest of the Nation, and the people. The US Advisor should understand that the government of Vietnam combines the activities of political indoctrination of its soldiers in ARVN, popular, and regional forces, and the CIDG program, information and education, troop community relations, propaganda against the enemy, and civil affairs under its psychological warfare program. At groups, and division level the staff is titled G-5, at the sector (Province) level the staff agency is the S-5.

3. (C) Goals

a. The formation of a stable government within the Republic of Vietnam requires the defeat of the Viet Cong and the people's identification with their government.

b. The Viet Cong must be isolated from the people physically and ideologically.

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c. Change, or modify the attitudes of the people towards their government and towards each other by creating in them emotions, attitudes, and behavior favorable to the achievement of their military goals and the establishment of a stable government by the Vietnamese.

d. Special Forces working at the sub-sector level endowed with their organic skills can do a great deal to assist and advise the government at the lowest levels in realizing effective, responsive government which when tied in with an effective provincial, and National governmental establishment will extend Government to the most important area, at the "grass roots" level, to the people themselves.

4. (C) Target

a. The target for civil affairs assistance is the appointed, selected, or apparent leadership of a population group, or established government structure. (Sector, or sub-sector). Civil affairs may be employed by the Vietnamese military for a group of refugees where a government structure, is established based on economic, political, psychological, and security factors. Special Forces advisory personnel may request that a local District Chief include and provide governmental services and protection for refugees who come into his advisory area of responsibility as a result of VC action, psychological operations, or natural disaster, or for security reasons. Coordination should be affected with all US advisors on such an endeavor to include, but not be limited to, sub-sector advisor, if present, sector S-5 advisor, sector advisor, Province USOM representative, Regional, or Province USIS advisor.

b. In some situations a detachment (A or B) may be assigned as the sub-sector advisory team, either on a permanent or additional mission basis. When this is the case, normal sub-sector advisory duties will be accomplished. These functions include, but are not limited to:

(1) Command the sub-sector advisory team which includes advisory functions for such specialized functional areas as operations and intelligence, medical procedures, communications, weapons training, information, civil affairs, civic action, and psychological operations activities.

(2) Provide advice to the sub-sector commander and his subordinates on the following military or military related matters:

(a) Preparation and execution of plans for the elimination of the enemy political/military structure from the sub-sector and the adoption of effective, long lasting security measures.

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(b) Integration of military pacification activities with civilian pacification programs.

(c) Establish sound command, control and communication procedures.

(d) Organization, training, administrative and logistical support, and tactical employment of paramilitary forces assigned to sub-sector (RF/PF forces).

(e) Tactical employment of military or paramilitary forces under operational control of the sub-sector.

(f) Systems for requesting and employing artillery and air support.

(g) Collection and dissemination of intelligence.

(h) Preparation and execution of sound psychological warfare operations and civic action plans and programs.

(i) Establishment of effective population and resources controls.

(3) Monitor the requisitioning, receipt, use and care of US military aid equipment and materials.

(4) Maintain records, and fund accounting for CIDG funds as established by 5th SF Group Psy War/CA staff officers, plan projects and programs that are charged against cost code 907 Psy War/CA, and maintain expenditures, keeping in mind that funds must be expended in support of the CIDG program either directly or indirectly.

(5) Coordinate sub-sector advisory activities with all US advisors, USOM representative, USIS field personnel, not subordinate to but operating in the sector.

(6) Develop an understanding of all aspects of the sub-sectors commander's (or district chief's) non-military duties.

(7) Evaluate and submit required or special reports on sub-sector military or military related plans, programs and activities.

(8) Develop an understanding of the scope and nature of the role of other US agencies operating in-country (Embassy, USOM, USIS, CARE).

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(9) In the absence of representatives of other US agencies, advise the district chief on any matter in which US mission interests are involved. Advice on programs normally under the purview of other US agencies must be consistent with the policy of the agency concerned.

(10) Make reports and recommendations to the provincial committee, through the sector advisor, on expenditures from the province release agreement.

(11) Take appropriate measures to insure the safety of all US mission personnel in the area of responsibility.

c. The target for civic action and psychological operation is the individual Vietnamese, Montagnard, Cao Dai, Nung, Hoa Hao, Cham, Catholic, etc. Our goal is to advise and assist the Vietnamese government, to create in the individual, the group, or organization the emotions, attitudes, and behavior favorable to the achievement of GVN military goals, approved by US mission in accordance with US National policy, aims, and objectives, and the establishment of a stable, responsive government in the Republic of Vietnam.

d. Civil Affairs: Civil affairs and psychological operations must be integrated, planned, and considered during all phases of the Special Forces counterinsurgency program. Different approaches may be required for each target, ethnic, political, economic, or religious group considering geographical location, and friendly and enemy capabilities to include not only physical, but psychological control.

5. (C) Phase I - Prepare Phase-the conduct of civil affairs, civic action and psychological operations must be planned and controlled with the same care and thoroughness given to combat operations during this phase the following must be accomplished.

a. The area of operations must be surveyed to accumulate as much data concerning its demographic profile; land tenure, facilities, government structure, and VC infrastructure, as well as its present and potential economy.

b. Based on the information attained during the survey of the area, considering the factors in paragraph a. above, a psychological estimate of the situation must be prepared.

c. A civil affairs plan based on present GVN structure, potential government control, to include refugees must be prepared and coordinated with US mission and Vietnamese Governmental agencies.

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d. A civic action and psychological plan must be prepared to exploit the target elements in all subsequent phases in the area.

(1) A detailed and specific mission for each area must be deduced.

e. Propaganda should be pre-planned, prepared and disseminated within the objective area to prepare for arrival of SF/CIDG forces.

6. (C) Phase II - Clear Operations; during this phase Psy Opns/CA planning will continue, limited short range immediate reaction civic action programs will be initiated, and full scale psychological operations will be implemented.

a. Short range civic action projects designed and executed for their psychological impact are best suited for phase II which show tangible results in a short period of time, 30 to 90 days.

b. Surveys, area assessments, and estimates will be conducted, and data acquired during phase I will be updated as new data is determined.

c. Psychological operations will be designed to support combat operations.

d. Viet Cong captives will be interrogated to determine effectiveness of psychological operations, to include Chieu Hoi returnees.

e. Civic action projects will be initiated near CIDG Camps then extended as the area of influence is extended. These projects should be tied in with sector (Province) plans for Pacification.

f. Propaganda will be employed to encourage CIDG recruitment.

g. Tactical success will be exploited by propaganda.

h. VC atrocities will be exploited.

i. Armed propaganda, and medical patrols should be planned, and executed, toward uncommitted audiences influenced by VC influence, propaganda, and terror.

j. Some of the other short range, high psychological impact civic action programs that can be carried out in this phase are:

(1) Insect and rodent control.

(2) Set up and operate a camp dispensary for outpatient treatment.

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- (3) Medical patrols, to nearby villages.
- (4) Obtaining potable water sources for the population.
- (5) Demonstrating health and sanitation measures.

7. (C) Phase III - Secure Operations

During this phase effort will be given to the following, in certain situations USSF teams in this phase may receive additional responsibility as sub-sector advisors. This additional mission will probably be in addition to the advisory and assistance function to the Vietnamese Special Forces, and the CIDG program, and represents only an extension of skills and capabilities which takes nothing away from the CIDG program, but enlarges their capabilities and role in the coordinated pacification picture.

a. Propaganda and intelligence will be employed to detect VC infrastructure within the area.

b. As in Phase II, VC atrocities will be exploited by propaganda, both written and verbal.

c. Propaganda will emphasize national unity and "togetherness" between the people and their government.

d. As stated in Paragraph 4, sub-sector b. The detachment may be in a sub-sector advisory role. Functions are outlined in paragraph 4 and sub-paragraph b above. However, many of the advisory duties and capabilities covered may be carried out by a USSF detachment when augmented with a Psy Opns/CA capability as an additional extension of effort in a populated area when the CIDG camp and area are in phase III.

e. In this phase an educational and information program should be carried out to the maximum extent possible. Schools should be set up, bulletin boards, information booths, radio extended by loudspeaker, cultural teams recruited locally to perform for the local populace, and financed if necessary by PO/CA funds.

f. USSF should assist in the establishment of local responsive government. Coordination on military operations should be effected between VNSF, ARVN, local District and by military leaders of the popular and regional forces. USSF can assist in the USOM and USIS extension of effort to minority groups.

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g. Some of the Civic Action programs that can be planned, and executed are:

- (1) Increase or improve production of animals and crops.
- (2) Transportation.
- (3) Construction of irrigation and drainage systems.
- (4) Harvesting of crops.
- (5) Experimental crop production (Model Farms).
- (6) Construction of housing, dispensaries and schools.
- (7) Construction, repair or improvements of roads and bridges.
- (8) Further improvement of sanitary standards, personal hygiene and first aid measures.
- (9) School supplies, playgrounds and recreation facilities.
- (10) Development of "Surplus Economy" appreciation.
- (11) Determine, and develop local resources, and economy.
- (12) Establish cooperatives for goods, to include clothing, comfort items, food, etc....
- (13) An effective legal system. Understood by all, and fair and just.
- (14) Basic education to military forces.

8. (C) Phase IV - Build Phase

In this phase, as combat missions decrease and CIDG forces, and USSF advisors are being phased out, emphasis will be placed on reconstruction and unity.

a. CIDG forces will take a more active part in civic action projects.

b. Some, if not most, CIDG personnel may be recruited into the local popular forces, or a local police force to secure the area.

c. Some of the CIDG personnel may be absorbed by the area as

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farmers, merchants, or other avocations, since the area normally represents their home, and they will want to remain with their families.

d. If the USSF team is acting in a sub-sector role the area may be turned over to a Vietnamese Government control, and military officials, after their demonstration of control in the area, coupled with the confidence of the people in them. [sic] The sector advisor team will then extend their advisory capability to the nearby pacified area.

e. Civilian financial assistance, civil affairs, civic action, and Psy War capabilities will increase.

f. Local Governmental officials and regular military units will start assuming complete financial and active sponsorship for civil affairs, civic action, and psychological operations.

g. Propaganda will emphasize unity between the people and their government (local, province, national).

h. Government assistance for the local population will be fully exploited by all means.

9. (C) Phase IV - Civilian Control

The community is turned over to the established GVN political apparatus.

a. Appropriate ceremonies will be planned and executed by GVN officials.

b. An established, representative, responsive GVN government apparatus is present.

c. Self protection, and security has been firmly established.

d. The people are psychologically confident that the local government is representative, free from graft, responsive to their needs, and will do everything human to secure their safety.

e. The VC infrastructure has been completely destroyed, and VC capability to re-establish a VC infrastructure is almost impossible, since it is assumed the people themselves will resist, and report its activities.

10. (C) In summary, the Viet Cong are fighting a political war, whereas the military is only employed for political or psychological purposes. If the enemy is met on the battle ground for this was for "men's minds" on

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equal terms, he will be defeated. The Viet Cong employ civil affairs (their infrastructure), civic action (tangible evidence that they have the people's interest at heart), and psychological warfare (exploit weaknesses in the legal government, their limited success, agitation, terrorism, and intimidation in all forms of media and actions) to accomplish their subversive mission to destroy or discredit the legal government. An effective, planned, well executed civil affairs, civic action, and psychological operations program at all levels, but especially the "grass root" level where the USSF works most effectively with remote, isolated, ethnic minority groups can materially, physically, and psychologically assist the loyal Vietnamese defeat the Viet Cong on his own terms.

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65

1. General:

a. No CIDG funds will be expended for the benefit of U.S. personnel except for austere construction of team houses, furnishings, and welfare of Special Forces personnel.

b. Authorized expenditures of funds may include, but are not limited to, judicious disbursement for: construction of team houses and mess halls; screening such buildings, concrete floors for mess, barracks and shower facilities; fortifications; dispensary buildings; pumps; wells; administrative labor (payroll clerk, interpreters etc.); purchasing intelligence information; food for paramilitary forces (Strike Force, Village Health Workers and Popular Force personnel when in training); and rewards as otherwise authorized.

c. Unauthorized expenditures include, but are not limited to: Strike Force border surveillance pay; isolation pay; hazardous duty pay; excessive construction costs; painting of other than dispensary buildings; purchase of food for U.S., ARVN, VNSF and military personnel other than the Strike Force members; distinctive insignia; and luxury and recreation items for US personnel.

2. Authority:

a. Detachments are not to make any payments on the basis of documents issued by VNSFHC which do not indicate written concurrence and/or approval by this headquarters.

b. Approval by Headquarters, 5th SFG: All disbursements of operational funds will be closely monitored by this Headquarters. Instances of injudicious or excessive expenditures will be disallowed and the responsible Detachment Commander will be made liable for such expenditures. When any doubt exists as to the propriety of an expenditure and no danger to life or property is imminent, commanders are encouraged to obtain guidance of the next higher command to preclude subsequent disallowance.

3. Claims: Claims by VN citizens against U.S. personnel for destruction of property are to be made through appropriate claims channel. CIDG funds are not to be used for claims purposes unless extreme conditions govern the expenditure of same and then only upon written approval of this Headquarters.

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

4. Construction:

a. Cost should be held to an absolute minimum with maximum effort given to utilizing local labor and/or Strike Force personnel without cost on a cooperative basis.

b. Annual maintenance and repair costs should be limited to no more than 10% of the cost of construction of the camp or \$500 (USD), whichever is greater. Individual projects exceeding \$100 (USD) must be submitted through the "C" Detachment for consideration. Excess of \$500 (USD) will be submitted through Hq 5th SFG for approval.

c. Construction standards: Higher priority will be given toward meeting acceptable construction standards in the following areas: defense, mess facilities for all personnel and living facilities for U.S. personnel.

(1) The standards for living quarters of Strike Force personnel will be comparable to those to which these personnel are normally accustomed. Buildings with thatch roofs, thatch sides and dirt floors are appropriate. These buildings may be expected to last two to three years with proper maintenance. The guideline cost for such a building is between 7,000\$00VN and 24,000\$00VN.

(2) U.S. billets, kitchen and mess facilities should normally be in one building. If these U.S. facilities now exist in more than one building, there is no requirement to modify the arrangement. Buildings for US personnel should normally have tin roofs, concrete floors and mud-brick and screen sidings. U.S. facilities should satisfy the health and standards required by personnel staying for a 12 month tour. The cost may vary, but normally will be between 59,000\$00VN and 70,000\$00VN. Such buildings should be serviceable for five to eight years if properly maintained.

(3) Since the Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) are supported by the Military Assistance Program (MAP), LLDB facilities will be obtained through the appropriate Corps Area Logistical Center (CALC). Standards will be in consonance with those for ARVN troop units.

d. Advantages of bricks over sand bags. A survey indicates that locally made mud-bricks offer many advantages over sand bags. In erecting a vertical wall, one brick occupies approximately the same space as one sand bag. A sand bag costs about 30¢ and needs to be replaced twice a year. Mud-bricks can be conveniently made in many parts of Vietnam, cost

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

only 4¢ to 8¢ each, and need not be replaced. Bricks offer the same protection from small-arms fire as sand bags. Bricks are normally better than sand bags due to their permanence and lack of maintenance cost.

5. Approval of Expenditures (Construction Projects): Recommended expenditures of more than five hundred U.S. dollars per project will be submitted to the Hq 5th SFG at Nha Trang for approval. The practice of letting many small contracts in an attempt to remain within the project limitation will not be condoned. Correspondence will be addressed to this Headquarters, ATTN: Executive Officer (Administration and Logistics).

6. Local Procurement of Non-Consumable Items: Non-Consumable supplies will not be locally procured unless permission to do so has been granted by S-4. Non-consumable items are defined as any items of non-consumable supply having a standard unit price of \$200 U.S. (14,000\$00VN) or more, and which do not lose their separate identity upon use. A complete list of locally procured non-expendable items will be furnished this Headquarters (ATTN: S-4) on a monthly basis in order for control procedures to become effected.

7. Intelligence Expenditures: There is a limit to the amount of CIDG funds that may be expended for the purpose of intelligence activities. This limit is set at 10,000\$00VN per month per detachment. Amounts may be transferred from one camp to another within a Corps Zone, provided there is no carry over from one month to the next. Amounts not used within a Corps area may be transferred within country by S-2, as long as there is no carry over from one month to the next. In all cases, Agent Finance Officers forwarding vouchers representing intelligence expenditures in excess of 10,000\$00VN will attach the authorization of the "C" Detachment to exceed this amount and the designation of the detachment from which the funds were transferred.

8. Civic Action (See Gp SOP)

9. Camp Celebrations: The following are considered appropriate occasions warranting expenditures for celebrations in amounts as indicated:

- a. Opening of CIDG Camp - up to 50\$00VN per person.
- b. Closing of CIDG Camp - up to 50\$00VN per person.
- c. Joint VN-USSF Conferences - up to 150\$00VN per VN participant per day.

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

d. Successful Combat Operations - up to 25\$00VN per person (not more than once in a 60 day period).

e. Graduation exercises for courses of instruction - up to 25\$00VN per person.

10. Rewards for Capture of Weapons: Rewards are offered for the weapons and in the amounts indicated below:

a. Mines (less than 12 kilos)	150\$00VN
b. Mines (12 kilos or more)	300\$00VN
c. Homemade Firearms	300\$00VN
d. Pistol/Shotgun	800\$00VN
e. Rifle, Carbine	1,000\$00VN
f. Rifle, M-1	1,200\$00VN
g. Sub-Machine Gun	2,000\$00VN
h. Automatic Rifle	3,500\$00VN
i. 60mm Mortar	6,300\$00VN
j. 81mm Mortar	8,000\$00VN
k. Light Machine Gun	5,000\$00VN
l. Heavy Machine Gun	6,300\$00VN
m. Rocket Launcher (3.5)	12,000\$00VN
n. Recoilless Rifle (57)	15,000\$00VN
o. Recoilless Rifle (75)	20,000\$00VN
p. Foreign-made Grenade *	50\$00VN

*Foreign manufactured or home-made ordnance equipment is defined as explosive-type devices not manufactured in the United States or territories, nor in the Republic of South Vietnam. A brief description of ordnance equipment captured is required to substantiate the propriety of each payment.

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

- | | |
|---|----------|
| q. Home-made Grenade* | 50\$00VN |
| r. Booby-trap device * | 50\$00VN |
| s. Miscellaneous ordnance device of an
explosive type employed by the VC * | 25\$00VN |

11. Subsistence (General):

a. Food may be purchased and dispensed to the following:

- (1) Strike Force members
- (2) Village health workers, intelligence trainees, Popular Force trainees, and similar trainees not being paid by other U.S. or RVN sources (this would exclude RVN troops, VNSF, administrative personnel, interpreters etc).
- (3) Refugees and destitute persons (as civic action).
- (4) Strike Force members and other personnel (interpreter, etc.) while on combat operations away from base camp.

b. Subsistence expenditures normally amount to 20-30 VN\$ per man per day depending on the area. Every effort will be made to obtain the lowest possible rate when dealing with food contractors.

c. "C" Detachments will monitor the food contractor rates within their respective corps areas as a means of preventing over-spending by detachments under their control.

d. All expenditures for subsistence supplies (food, charcoal etc.) must be substantiated by receipts from merchants or Certificates in Lieu of Receipt executed by USSF personnel.

e. In those instances where a mess is operated by a caterer, receipts by the caterer stating basis for charge (i.e.) (rate per meal for number of personnel fed) are acceptable when full details are provided.

12. Payroll Procedure:

a. The Individual Earnings Record (ASFFI Form 6A) is an individual permanent record of all payments, allowances, adjustments and

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

deductions made from personnel during a calendar year and will substantiate the payments made on the skeletonized payroll for personal services (ASFFI-6). New Individual Earnings Records will be established each fiscal year and upon initial entry for all personnel. At the end of each fiscal year, and upon completion of preparation of new Individual Earnings Record for the subsequent fiscal year, those Individual Earnings Records for the prior fiscal year will be forwarded to the Finance Officer for necessary auditing and forwarding to higher authority (Example J-7).

b. All postings will be made to the Individual Earnings Records prior to preparation of the payroll. At the close of each pay period, the gross earnings through net pay columns of all pay records will be totaled and balanced. Since the skeletonized type of payroll used does not provide space for explanation of payments, it is necessary that accurate and reconciled information be shown on the Individual Earnings Records.

c. The payroll listing will be prepared from the Individual Earnings Record; after those records have been balanced. The net amount due will be shown on the Continuation Form (ASFFI Form 6) opposite the line number, grade, identification number and name of employee. In all cases the signature or index finger print will be affixed. Individuals not paid will be appropriately noted on the payroll by "Red-Lining". Payrolls forwarded with the fund reports indicating signature as "KY" or "X" will be suspended. A separate payroll for each of the four categories, i.e., civilians, Strike Force, Nungs and STAT (Sea Bee) will be utilized.

d. It will be noted that the summary breakdown of the items of pay and deductions is taken from the Individual Earnings Record recapitulation and placed on the payroll for Personal Services Summary (ASFFI-6), together with deductions. The cost code detail breakdown will be affixed.

13. Nungs (Training Cadre) Pay and Allowances:

a. The following table indicates the rates of pay for Nungs, and will be strictly adhered to:

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>BASE PAY</u>	<u>FAMILY ALLOWANCE</u>
Commanding Officer	Lt (1)	6,500\$00VN	300\$00VN
Executive Officer	Lt (2)	5,900\$00VN	300\$00VN

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>BASE PAY</u>	<u>FAMILY ALLOWANCE</u>
Platoon Leader	Lt (3)	5,500\$00VN	300\$00VN
Platoon Sergeant	M/Sgt	4,700\$00VN	300\$00VN
Squad Leader	SGT	4,200\$00VN	300\$00VN
Asst. Squad Leader	Cpl	4,100\$00VN	300\$00VN
Machine Gunner	Cpl	4,100\$00VN	300\$00VN
Mortar Gunner	Cpl	4,100\$00VN	300\$00VN
Radio Operator	Cpl	4,100\$00VN	300\$00VN
Rifleman	Pvt/Pfc	3,900\$00VN	300\$00VN
Cook		3,900\$00VN	300\$00VN

b. Tet Bonus: On the last pay day preceding the beginning of the Lunar Year, each eligible employee shall be paid a "Tet Bonus". An employee who has been on the payroll for one year prior to payment of the bonus will be entitled to the full bonus which will include one-twelfth the annual value of his family allowance. All items making up the Tet Bonus shall be computed on the basis of his pay status as of his last pay period.

c. Other Bonuses: Nungs are eligible to receive Weapons Capture and Heroic Action Bonuses on the same basis as Strike Force personnel. No other bonuses are authorized.

d. Medical and Hospitalization Allowance (See J-4-8).

e. Death Gratuity and Disability Payments (See J-4-9).

f. Subsistence will be provided at a cost not to exceed 20\$00VN per member per day from the detachment operational fund. No deductions from the Nung salary will be made for subsistence.

14. Strike Force Pay and Allowances:

a. The following table, indicating the rates of pay for Strike

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

Force personnel, will be strictly adhered to:

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>BASE PAY</u>	<u>FAMILY ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>RESIDENCE ALLOWANCE</u>
2d Lt	3,580\$	*	1,000\$
MSG 1 Cl	2,620	*	600
MSG	2,300	*	600
Cpl 1 Cl	2,420	*	600
Cpl	1,331	**	S 200 C 250
PVT-1	1,217	**	S 200 C 250
PVT-2	1,116	**	S 200 C 250

*Family Allowance - 300\$00VN for wife and 200\$00VN per child for first three (3) children only.

**Family Allowance - 100\$00VN for wife and 50\$00VN per child, no limitation.

S - Southern Zone (III & IV Corps).

C - Central Zone (I & II Corps).

b. Strike Force Reenlistment Bonus

(1) A CIDG Strike Force member who reenlists upon termination of present enlistment and is discharged under honorable conditions, is entitled to a bonus computed at the rate of one (1) month base pay.

(2) Payment will be made in two (2) increments. Half of the bonus will be paid upon entry, and the balance will be paid after six (6) months on the new enlistment.

(3) A reenlistment bonus is not authorized to be paid to any member who has a break in service.

c. Heroic Action Bonus. Amounts up to 300\$00VN are authorized

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG 'Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

to be expended by "A" and "B" Detachment Commanders for cigarettes, candy, fruit, etc.) for minor acts of valor. "C" Detachment Commanders are authorized to purchase small transistor radios, inexpensive wrist watches and the like for more important achievements or acts of valor by Strike Force personnel. Heroic action bonus will not be paid specifically for killing or capturing enemy personnel. The group S-3 may authorize such payments for specific feats of heroism or valor. It is possible that killing of enemy personnel may be incidental to the heroic action; however, the manner of performance is the predominant factor for the payment of the bonus.

d. Strike Force Subsistence. The pay of all SF personnel will be reduced by 300\$00VN per month or 10\$00VN per day for subsistence when a mess is provided and utilized. A subsistence allowance of 20\$00VN per day per man is authorized to be advanced when members are on combat operations, and rations in kind are not issued. If the total advance payment exceeds 200\$00VN per individual, payment must be receipted for by the member. For advances under 200\$00VN per man, a certificate in lieu of receipt may be used. Under these circumstances no subsistence deduction as described above will be made.

e. Medical and Hospitalization Allowance. Upon receipt of information directing CIDG Strike Force members to be hospitalized, an allowance of 100\$00VN per day is authorized to be advanced to the individual to defray costs of hospital care. This advance may be made for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days and will be used to defray cost of hospital care and subsistence. In situations where the CIDG member is admitted to a hospital free of charge and adequate care would otherwise be obtained, the allowance should not be made. The experience, knowledge of hospital conditions and judgement of the Detachment CO concerned will govern. This is an additional allowance to defray hospital expenses only, and has no effect on regular monthly pay due the individual while hospitalized.

f. Strike Force Missing in Action. The next of kin of Strike Force members missing in action shall be paid twelve (12) months base pay under the same provision as death gratuity, after the member has been missing 90 days and if missing status is the result of combat operations. If the missing member subsequently becomes a confirmed KIA, this payment covering missing in action shall be considered payment of death gratuity.

g. Strike Force POW's. The next of kin of Strike Force members who are confirmed prisoners of war shall be paid monthly the member's base pay for a period of twelve (12) months. At the end of this period,

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

and if the member has not been confirmed as a KIA or returned to camp, the twelve months base pay paid shall be considered as payment of death gratuity.

h. Death Gratuity.

(1) The next of kin of Strike Force members who are killed in action or who otherwise die shall be paid twelve (12) months basic pay. Death gratuity vouchers will be submitted in duplicate and in all cases will bear the signature of the next of kin and a statement by the next of kin substantially as follows: (See Example J-9)

"This payment reflects full settlement of Death Gratuity and the United States Government is hereby released from any future claim arising from this incident."

(2) Burial expenses to include cost of caskets are not authorized expenditures when death gratuity payments have been made. These expenditures are authorized only when there is no next of kin.

15. Civilian VN Personnel Pay and Allowances. (See Civilian Personnel SOP):

a. Interpreters and Radio Operators. In addition to the provisions governing salaries as stated in the Civilian Personnel SOP, an allowance of 150\$00VN per day is authorized for participation in combat operations.

b. Nurses and Health Workers. There is no authority for payment of nurses and health workers unless specifically approved by the Civil Affairs Officer, 5th SFG, as a CA project. Other funds made available through USOM and the Province Chiefs are also available for this purpose, and, if they fall within the category, should be provided and financed by them. Strike Force dispensary employees are not considered nurses within the intent of this paragraph, and payment to them is authorized.

c. Travel and Transportation Allowances. The only extra allowance authorized for civilian personnel and Strike Force members performing duty away from their normal duty station is a ration allowance of 20\$00VN per person per day. No other allowances, including per diem, are authorized unless specifically stated elsewhere in this document.

d. Death Gratuity for Civilians. (Same as Strike Force).

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Appendix 4 (Propriety of Expenditures) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

e. Popular Force. No basic pay or resident allowance will be paid.

16. Permanent Disability Payments: All indigenous and paramilitary personnel employed by USSF who are permanently disabled in the line of duty will be paid disability allowance. The amount of payment will be based on the percentage of disability as set forth in instructions forwarded to the "C" Detachment medical officer from the 5th SF Group Surgeon's Office.

17. Cost and Performance Reporting:

a. With the ever increasing spiral of expenditures under the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, it has become necessary to establish a cash budget limitation for the "C" Detachment within each corps.

b. This is not to say that the necessary resources have not been provided to fulfill the assigned mission, but rather that a careful analysis of past experience and anticipated conditions will be predicted. In this manner the advances of cash from the Finance Officer will be restricted to meet your immediate needs, normally on a monthly basis. Only through the Operational Reports can this Headquarters estimate cash budget requirements and develop financial plans and policies. Such modifications and adjustments as are necessary will be made as mission changes dictate such changes.

c. A preferred procedure is to require each "C" Detachment Commander to accumulate all the facets of costs attributable to the cash budget advance. However, since cost accounting is cumbersome and time consuming this burden cannot be placed on the "C" Detachment Commander; instead data will be accumulated by this Headquarters from information derived from each of the Operational Reports submitted by the "A", "B", and "C" Detachments on a monthly basis.

d. Copies of Monthly Summary of Actual and Budget Amounts will be furnished your Detachment indicating whether an over or under position exists.

e. It must be pointed out that cash budget projections as authorized will require periodic review to determine that funds are being utilized properly and efficiently.

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Extract, par 6b, Appendix 2 (Disbursing) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

COST CODE

DESCRIPTION

901 - STRIKE FORCE PAY & ALLOWANCES

Used for all pay and allowances of CIDG Strike Force, to include residence allowance and family allowance in accordance with grade structure contained in TO&E.

902 - SUBSISTENCE

Used for the purchase of subsistence supplies for feeding CIDG Strike Force members. It also includes procurement of additional subsistence to accommodate civilian employees on a reimbursable basis, where civilian accommodations are not available. Civilians will reimburse at the actual cost of meal, i.e., expenditure of 20\$00VN per day for subsistence results in reimbursement at the rate of 20\$00VN per day.

903 - ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL SERVICES

Reflects the pay and allowances of civilian personnel to include interpreters, laborers, drivers, cooks, typists and clerks.

904 - TRAINING CADRE

This code reflects the cost of Nungs utilized as training cadre with regards to pay, allowances, and subsistence.

905 - SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

This includes all items of a logistical nature not provided through normal channels but rather those which are procured locally. These items include but are not limited to furniture, beds, lumber, cooking and eating utensils, office supplies, special personal equipment and items of hardware.

906 - CAMP CONSTRUCTION

Includes the costs of materials, labor and overhead utilized in connection with initial, new or expanded camp construction. Not to be misconstrued to include repair & maintenance costs.

907 - PSY WAR AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

Used to record the costs of Civic Action and Psychological Warfare projects in consonance with the particular camp phase as coordinated with the CA/Psy Ops officers.

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Extract, par 6b, Appendix 2 (Disbursing) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

908 - TRANSPORTATION AND VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

Includes all costs related to movement of troop units or individuals, vehicle repair and maintenance contracts, and POL purchases on the local economy where supply of these items from official channels is unavailable. The rental of boats, elephants, horses, mules, water buffalo and trucks is included, as well as travel allowances for occasional Air Vietnam tickets for official business for interpreters, etc., when government air is not available.

909 - STAT TEAM (NAVY SEABEES)

Used to record expenditures involving reimbursement for TDY, equipment maintenance, materials, supplies, laborers and overhead incurred by Sea Bee construction teams in the development of projects at Special Forces camp locations.

910 - REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE OF FACILITIES

This code includes the cost of normal restoration of facilities due to the effects of weather and to the result of enemy action.

911 - DEATH GRATUITY PAYMENTS

Twelve months basic pay which is payable to next of kin of members who are killed in action, die in the line of duty (accidental or natural) or become a confirmed MIA.

912 - INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES

See Group SOP P. J-4-3

913 - STRIKE FORCE REENLISTMENT BONUS

See Group SOP P. J-4-7

914 - HOSPITALIZATION AND DISABILITY PAYMENTS

Includes reimbursement to ARVN medical facilities for the care and treatment of patients at a rate not to exceed 100\$00VN per day.

915 - WEAPONS CAPTURE BONUS

See Group SOP P. J-4-4

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Extract, par 6b, Appendix 2 (Disbursing) to Annex J (CIDG Fund Operation) to 5th SFG (Abn) SOP dtd 1 Jan 65 (Cont'd)

916 - HEROIC ACTION BONUS AND CAMP CELEBRATION

Bonuses for minor acts of valor in the form of cigarettes, candy, fruit, etc., and appropriate occasions for camp celebrations as indicated in Group SOP P. J-4-8

. . . . Extract

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(C) ANNEX G

SUMMARY OF AUGMENTATION AND SUPPORT AS OF MARCH 1965

In addition to the USASF personnel (PCS and TDY), the personnel and support listed below were used to maintain the operational capability of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). With the addition of US Army intelligence and CA/PO skills, US Army and Air Force aviation support, and third-country (in lieu of US) technicians for equipment maintenance, the 5th Special Forces Group resembled a Special Action Force in all but unit designation. It is also interesting to note that for every USASF officer and man assigned or attached to the Group approximately two indigenous employees were carried on the payroll for administrative and support duties. Example: In March 1965 USASF strength was reported as 1465, while indigenous employees on the CIDG payroll numbered approximately 2500, a ratio of 1.7 to 1.

1. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS

Temporary duty from the 441st INTC Det, Okinawa 14

2. CIVIC ACTION/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SPECIALISTS

Temporary duty from 97th Civil Affairs Det, Okinawa 14

Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific 5

3. CONTRACT CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS

Provided by Eastern Construction Company, Inc
Manila, Philippines 48

4. VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS

Personnel hired locally, using CIDG funds, at headquarters and all detachments. Includes more than 250 employed at ISC. 2500 plus

Early in the evaluation the total number of Vietnamese civilians employed by 5SFGA exceeded 3000, but following the budget cut and certain employment control measures effected by C detachments, this figure had dropped to 2415 by April 1965.

5. STAT TEAMS

Technical advisory teams from US Navy construction battalions were in Vietnam to assist USOM, but also supported 5SFGA in airfield and camp construction with about three teams during the evaluation.

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6. AIR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Allocated for the 5SFCA on a daily basis at Nha Trang were eight USAF C-123B's and three US Army CV-2B's. Although not allocated on a daily basis, one or two USAF C-123B's were provided each day for logistical transport at Saigon and Da Nang. Additionally, but not daily, Army air transport was provided on request of the FOP's at Da Nang, Pleiku, Saigon, and Can Tho.

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(U) ANNEX H

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO U.S. FORCES 96243

ASF-D

24 May 1965

SUBJECT: FSN 6545-782-2821 Survival Kit, Individual Hot-Wet Environment

TO: Surgeon General of the Army
Chief Supply Division
Directorate of Plans, Supply and Operations
Washington 25, D.C.

1. The following evaluation of the Survival Kit, Individual, FSN 6545-782-2821 has been compiled from Special Forces Operational Detachments in Vietnam.
2. This command received 300 Operational and Reserve packets about six months ago. They have all been issued to field detachments with the exception of kits that were issued to personnel in the headquarters that are required to do extensive traveling by air over hostile territory.
3. There have been no instance that required an individual to utilize the survival kit for its intended purpose. However, in many cases, some of the items have been used to relieve pain and undue suffering. Replacement items were obtained through regular SF Supply Channels. In one case, for the purpose of this evaluation, a set was used as a supplement on patrol for medical items (Tetracycline tablets, Salt tablets, Dextro-Amphetamine, Spensin tablets, Benzalkonium Chloride Tincture, etc.) There were two additional items recommended by this detachment: one, a powder be added for use against foot and/or groin irritation; two, the addition of a drying agent such as calamine lotion for weeping dermatological conditions. Otherwise, detachment's experience with its use from a medical standpoint indicated that it was satisfactory.
4. The suitability of components in each packet to meet the needs of survival will actually depend on the circumstance, type of injuries and length of exposure.
 - a. The strip packing of tablets, capsules and the use of plastic to cover other items is an excellent method of packing.

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24 May 1965

SUBJECT: FSN 6545-782-2821 Survival Kit, Individual Hot-Wet Environment

b. Labeling of the components is adequate. The labels show no sign of fading or rubbing off.

c. "Unettes" packing of ointment is the ideal method for this particular purpose. No deterioration or loss of contents was noted.

d. Adhesive used to secure components to the box is suitable and durable.

5. The legibility of instructions on the outer container is good.

6. Configuration of the present container is satisfactory. However, it is recommended that instead of a plastic lid for an outer container, a light metal alloy be substituted so one could use it as a cooking utensil or a drinking utensil. The plastic cover, Waterproof Pistol, should be of a heavier material to make a more durable canteen in which to carry water. A seamless bag is recommended for added strength. Fishing line can be used to pucker the top of the bag and to attach the bag to ones belt leaving the hands free to work. Instructions for the use of the bag should be printed on the bag. If a metal lid is substituted the instruction on the outer box could be transferred to the foldable inner box.

7. Type and quantity of components in each packet.

a. Recommended an oil skin map of the country or area in which survival is anticipated to be included in the kit.

b. Recommend the elimination of one bottle of water purification tablets and substitute heat tablets. Many times in a wet jungle it is hard to find material that is dry enough to burn.

c. Enclosed is a report and a suggested substitute kit from Detachment B-22, 5th SFG (Abn), APO San Francisco 96295. This detachment evaluated and compared the kit with the survival kit issued to Army Aviation Personnel in Vietnam. The suggested kit is made up of the suitable items of the two types of kits.

d. A tablet or bar should be included for quick energy and nourishment.

e. A better method of packing the insect repellent should be devised. In one case, the top came off inside the packet and ruined the kit. In another case, a puncture rendered the whole kit useless.

8. It is more desirable to have the two present Operational and Reserve packets, as opposed to having one packet containing medical

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ASF-D

24 May 1965

SUBJECT: FSN 6545-782-2821 Survival Kit, Individual Hot-Wet Environment

components and one packet containing non-medical components. Recommend a more distinctive marking be used to differentiate between the Operational and Reserve packs.

9. The survival kits are turned-in when individuals leave country and, if the kit is not damaged, it is reissued.

10. Most kits are complete. ~~Some~~ kits may be missing a few items expended on combat operations. None have been turned in for replacement due to incompleteness. The only replacement orders that have been received are for lost kits. Presently, 500 kits are on requisition.

11. Criteria for issue is one kit per individual.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl

1. Report on Survival Kit
2. Sample Survival Packet

/s/Arthur W. Reed, 1/Lt, Arty, Asst Adj
/t/IRWIN M. JACOBS
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

DETACHMENT B-22
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO U.S. Forces 96295

22 April 1965

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Issue Survival Kit and Recommendations for
Modifications

TO: Commanding Officer
Det C-2, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF
APO U.S. Forces 96295

1. Submitted, as requested, is an evaluation of the Survival Kit currently being issued to U.S. Special Forces.

a. The kit, containing two packets, one operational and one replenishment, is too bulky to be readily carried from day to day.

b. The kit contains more items than are necessary for short term survival in a hot-wet climate.

c. Present packaging methods within the kit lends to overall bulk.

d. The present kit does not contain a map of the country in which survival is anticipated.

2. To support the evaluation of the kit issued to U.S. Special Forces, an evaluation has also been made of the Survival Kit issued Army Aviation personnel in this country. The kit submitted for further evaluation has been made up of the best of the two types of issue kits.

3. Recommendations for modification of the kit are as follows:

a. The present nylon outer container be retained in present size and configuration.

b. The plastic bag to be retained in its present size and configuration.

c. The heavy plastic container with fold away sides to be retained in its present $4\frac{3}{4}$ " X $3\frac{1}{4}$ " X $2\frac{1}{4}$ " size.

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22 April 1965

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Issue Survival Kit and Recommendations for Modifications

- d. All pills and tablets to be packaged in plastic vials.
 - e. All salves and ointments to be packaged in plastic squeeze bottles to eliminate possibility of breakage.
 - f. An oil skin map of the country or area in which survival is anticipated be included in the kit.
4. A sample kit is submitted for evaluation with contents and suggested methods of packaging. Suggested methods are:
- a. 1 each bandage, gauze, elastic compress. Present size acceptable.
 - b. 1 each sewing kit. Present size and contents acceptable.
 - c. 1 each fishing kit. Present size and contents acceptable.
 - d. 1 each flare pistol. Add one flare. Present size and contents acceptable.
 - e. 1 each fire starter. Present size and contents acceptable.
 - f. 1 each compass. Present size and type acceptable.
 - g. 1 each 4" hacksaw blade, as packaged. This will replace the present chain saw which is reported to be of insufficient strength to withstand prolonged use.
 - h. 1 each razor-knife, as packaged.
 - i. 1 each signal mirror. Present size acceptable.
 - j. 1 bottle water purification tablets. Present size acceptable.
 - k. 1 roll adhesive plaster. Present size acceptable.
 - l. 1 200 bottle Benzalkonium Chloride Tincture. Present size acceptable.
 - m. 1½ ounce bottle Betadine solution. Present size and packaging acceptable.
 - n. 1 vial of 8 Chloroquine Phosphate tablets. Present size and packaging acceptable.

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SUBJECT: Evaluation of Issue Survival Kit and Recommendations for
Modifications

n. 1 vial of 25 Oxytetracycline tablets. Present size and packaging acceptable.

p. 1 vial of 12 salt tablets. Present method of packaging unacceptable.

q. 1½ ounce plastic squeeze bottle of Bacitracin Neomycin ointment. Present method of packaging unacceptable.

r. 1 vial of 25 Spensin tablets. Present method of packaging unacceptable.

s. 1 vial of 10 Dextro-amphetamine tablets. Present methods of packaging unacceptable.

t. 1½ ounce plastic squeeze bottle of Fungicidal ointment. Present method of packaging unacceptable.

u. 1 vial of 10 Darvon Compound, # 65 tablets. Present method of packaging unacceptable.

v. 1 vial of 4 Bouillon cubes. Present method of packaging unacceptable.

w. 1 each oil skin map of the country or area in which survival is anticipated. Scale: 1:1,000,000.

5. The above items are found to fit conveniently in the plastic box provided. Packaging as recommended would allow room for the insertion of the mosquito net and mittens. Recommend the present insect repellent be substituted with a less pungent or odorless repellent, such as: 6-12, a commercial repellent, in stick or plastic bottle container. The present repellent emits an undesirable odor which could lead to eventual capture. It may be concluded that personnel in a survival situation will have canteen and cup and a sheath knife. Personnel in such a situation will be expected to live off the land, thereby, eliminating the need for additional rations in a survival kit.

1 Incl

1. Sample Survival Packet

/s/Charlie W. Brewington
/t/CHARLIE W. BREWINGTON
Major Infantry
Commanding

ANNEX H

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(C) ANNEX I RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

Annex I includes:

1. Radio Communications Links, 5SFGA	<u>Page</u> I-2
2. Example of C Detachment Radio Links, April 1965	I-3
3. Radio Equipment Authorized Detachments	I-4

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ANNEX I



AN/PXC-93 SSR Command

. . . . AN/PXC-109 AM Command


- - - - AN/PXC-26 RTT (On-line crypto
to C Det)

-----AN/PXC-87 AF Sector voice net

← -----AN/PXC-10 FM Air-ground net

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2. EXAMPLE OF A C DETACHMENT RADIO LINKS, APRIL 1965



——— CW and voice SSB (AN/GRC-87, AN/GRC-109, AN/FRC-93)
 - - - RTT (AN/GRC-26)
 Group CW, RTT w/crypto, & voice SSB (AN/GRC-87, AN/GRC-109, AN/GRC-26, AN/FRC-93)

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3. RADIO EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZED DETACHMENTS, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AFN)

	C Det	B Det	A Det + CIDG (1)	A Det + SS (2)	A Det + RF/PF (3)	
AN/GRC-26	A*	1	-	-	-	AN, RTT command message net emergency net (CW)
AN/PRC-10	5	5	5	5	5	RV, voice, air-ground
AN/PRC-93	3	3	1	1	1	SSB, voice, command voice net, emergency net (Voice)
AN/GRC-109	2	2	2	2	2	AN, CW, command message net emergency net (CW)
AN/GRC-87	2	2	2	2	2	AN, CW, voice, MACV sector advisor net
TR-20	-	-	1 per CIDG Co	-	-	AN, voice tactical
HT-1	-	-	20 per CIDG Co	-	-	AN, voice tactical

*AN/GRC-26D, On Line Crypto

Notes: (1) A detachment with CIDG mission
 (2) A detachment with Sub-sector mission
 (3) A detachment with RF/PF mission

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(FOUO) ANNEX J

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3. Troop Disposition List, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) APO San Francisco 96240, for 24 Oct 64, 25 Nov 64, 7 Dec 64, 17 Feb 65, 15 Mar 65, (C).
4. Letter of Instruction Number 7, subject: The Special Forces/CIDG Program, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), APO San Francisco 96243, dated 3 Nov 64, (C).
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6. Staff Study, subject: The Future Role of US Special Forces in Vietnam, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), APO San Francisco 96243, dated 25 Feb 65, (S).
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11. Report on CIDG Financial Operation, Finance Officer, United States Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, 1 Jul 64, (U).

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19. Letter, subject: Personnel Data, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, (Abn), APO San Francisco 96243, 28 May 65, (U).
20. Briefing Notes and Memo for the Record, subject: Briefing for COMUSMACV, Status Report, CIDG Camp Location Study, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), APO San Francisco 96243, 24 Jan 65, (S).
21. Letter of Instruction, (Defines missions and responsibilities of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) and Senior Corps Advisors for CIDG and other Special Forces activities in Vietnam), MACV J32, 16 Oct 64, (S).
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24. USASF Detachments in Sub-Sector Advisory Role, II Corps Advisory

ANNEX J

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34. TOE 31-105E, Special Forces Group (Abn), (U).
35. TOE 31-106E, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Special Forces Group (U).
36. TOE 31-107E, Special Forces Company, (U).

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