An Intricate Internal Network: The Untold Story of U.S. Mid-Level Officials in U.S.-Soviet SALT I Negotiations

With the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (PRC) seeking to project influence throughout the globe, fear of nuclear war is more present today than in recent years. The years preceding the historic Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I, specifically 1969-1972, offer a historical glimpse into a unique era of cooperation and arms control between two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This thesis adds to the current scholarship on arms control treaties by analyzing the role that academics and mid-level officials (that is, political scientists and State Department officers) played in shaping SALT negotiations. While not discounting the role of President Nixon and the composition of the bi-polar international system, this thesis sheds light on the untold story of the impact that academics and mid-level officials had on U.S. foreign policy during the SALT era. Utilizing primary source State Department internal memorandums as well as correspondence between U.S. and Soviet intellectuals, I argue that the network of U.S. mid-level officials played a pivotal role in influencing U.S. arms control policy during this period by creating an atmosphere conducive to constructive internal debate and relationship-building across ideological lines.