An Information Warfare Theory of Victory

This thesis explores the challenge of assessment in information warfare and its relationship to perceptions of winning in the information environment. It argues that misaligned incentives and organizational biases lead to inadequate assessments that fail to meet the knowledge demands of stakeholders. An information warfare theory of victory is introduced that argues the concepts of Vision, Truth, Perception, and Volume should be leveraged to achieve the desired information goals. An information wargame and associated simulation was developed to test the theory, which indicated that volume plays a key role in determining subjective perceptions of victory. The thesis makes three key recommendations: 1) leaders with responsibility for information activities should incentivize volume, 2) alternative methods of demonstrating success should be employed and experimented with, and 3) the friendly-force effects of information activities should be included in comprehensive information assessments. This thesis recognizes the inherent challenges in implementing the recommendations and calls for bureaucratic bravery to overcome them.