Strategic Choice in Cyberspace: The Fait Accompli and Persistent Engagement

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Abstract:

This essay demonstrates how a lesser studied strategic bargaining concept the fait accompli better describes cyber behaviors short of armed conflict than does coercion and signaling. Moreover, because the strategic logic behind the fait accompli aligns with the structural imperative and strategic incentives identified by cyber persistence theory, it provides additional grounds for committing to a strategic approach of persistent engagement and adopting its core strategic principle of seizing the initiative in setting the conditions of security as an anchor for national cyber strategy.

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A - Approved For Public Release
Distribution Statement: Public Release.
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Collection: TRECMS
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