Mutually Assured Survival: Deterring Inadvertent Conflict Escalation Through Strategic Restraint Signaling

The ability to understand escalation dynamics around foreign military interventions is of vital interest to any major power that believes it will intervene in a foreign war in the future. Major powers, which often take part in risky military interventions on the periphery of their empire, want to avoid escalating war with other major powers. This thesis explores the dynamic of restraint signaling as a means of avoiding conflict escalation. The thesis demonstrates four restraint signals present in the case studies that potentially helped reduce the risk of an inadvertent escalation. They are: restraining weapons shipments and other military aid, restraining the timing of arms shipments, restraining what type of military forces, advisor vs combat soldier that were deployed, and placing geographic and/or targeting restraints on forces. A theory that avoids escalation is useful as a tool for policymakers and strategic planners to understand the impact that foreign military interventions have on the possibility of an inadvertent conflict escalation. It also allows those charged with planning an intervention to develop a strategic plan that uses the appropriate level of support of clients without escalating the conflict.