Resolving the Enigma: Thomas Jefferson and the Navy Reconsidered, 1774-1807

For decades, historians have debated the contradictory appearance of President Jefferson's naval policies and strategy. As U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary to France and Secretary of State, for instance , Jefferson's first-term approaches to naval administration and appetite for parsimonious coastal defense measures is often considered antinavy. However, much of the evidence used to argue that Jefferson was averse to establishing a navy comes from a narrow chronological window. Moreover, the marshalling of such evidence fails to recognize the global security environment and the centrality of maritime commerce as key factors in Jefferson's understanding of the navy and naval diplomacy. Consequentially, the centrality of maritime commerce and the influence of the international "half-time" created by the end of the Quasi War and the Peace of Amiens are new contributions to the debate surrounding Jefferson's use of naval power, particularly as it relates to Jefferson's first-term use of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean. These two factors help resolve existing interpretations of Jefferson's thinking about the navy.