Levels of Failure: Why the Three Levels of Warfare Model Fails to Achieve its Purpose

Originally introduced in the U.S. Army's 1982 version of FM 100-5, the operational level of war and subsequently the three levels of warfare concept was developed to link tactic actions to military strategic objectives. Over time, the purpose of the three levels of warfare concept expanded to model the relationship between tactics and national policy objectives, and inadequately demonstrates this relationship because of the expansion of strategy beyond the military domain, mission creep of three levels of war beyond the conceptual realm, and the changing nature of the military art. The author presents a new model the three levels of effort that better demonstrates the relationship between tactical actions and policy objectives. These levels of effort national, operational and tactical describe the three distinct levels at which the nations overall grand strategy is implemented. Unlike the three levels of warfare concept, it delineates and explains the most critical link between military and policy objectives the civil-military relationship. If implemented, the alignment of efforts across the instruments of national power towards policy objectives will occur at the most logical level the national level and military commanders could focus solely on the development of military operational objectives.