Understanding and Reducing the Ability of Violent Nonstate Actors to Adapt to Change

Violent nonstate actors (VNSAs)including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); the Afghan Taliban (the Taliban); al-Qaida; various drug trafficking organizations or cartels; and manifold other criminal, terrorist, or insurgent organizationsare increasingly part of the environment in which the Army and other government forces operate. Such VNSAs pose durable and direct threats to U.S. security interests and to the forces charged with protecting these interests. The capacity of VNSAs to wage war, inflict violence, and engage in vast transnational criminal activity make them a persistent danger. Countering these organizations is difficult because they are generally flexible and structured in ways that facilitate their ability to adapt to changes occurring within their operational environments and, in some cases, beyond. Two VNSAsISIS (and its predecessors) and the Talibanstand out for their durability in the face of continued U.S. and coalition pressure. Despite various setbackssome severeboth VNSAs continue to adapt, evolve, and survive even though significant resources have been applied to ensure these groups demise over the course of many years. While the United States is now shifting its focus from counterinsurgency and counterterror operations to the threats that near-peer competitors pose, it continues to recognize the threat of VNSAs. A key part of being able to counter this threat is understanding how these groups adapt to changes in their operational environments and over time. An awareness of the variables (e.g., changes in the operational environment) associated with VNSA adaptations and the frequency of these adaptations is critical to understanding how and when a VNSA is likely to adapt and, accordingly, to formulating a strategy to counter these groups.