Defeating the Integrated Air Defense System: A Quest for Combined Arms Maneuver

This monograph demonstrates both an Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) problem and a unique historical example of a solution. As part of the analysis, this paper makes the assumption that US Army ground forces may operate in a contested environment without the protection and support of the air domain that has been the predominant requirement for ground maneuver since the Second World War. Therefore, the monograph explores the problem that land forces may face when confronted with the need to fight without air superiority and the conditions for regaining air superiority. The central argument of this monograph is that success of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) for the US Army may have the requirement in the future to attempt to eliminate the enemy's air defense systems through ground maneuver by maximizing other domain means. The study analyzes and compares two historical cases: the Yom Kippur War and the German Mortain offensive of WWII. These case studies provide context on how operational commanders may attempt to employ ground forces in an environment in which maneuver occurs without attendant air superiority. They are examples of success and failure in modern war when faced with an inability to support ground maneuver by air. In both cases, the criteria of deep maneuvers, fires, and air superiority provide a means to analyze and interpret how theater commanders succeeded or not in their quest for combined arms maneuver in conditions that denied the air support assumed essential in modern war.