Transportation Infrastructure: A Critical Component for Deterrence in Europe

The United States and NATO allies are unable to project combat power in Eastern Europe to the magnitude required to defeat Russia in a conventional conflict. As the US Army transitions away from actions focused on counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), military planners are reframing the operational environment in Poland and Eastern Europe. Much of the road and rail networks in Poland and Eastern Europe were developed to meet the logistical requirements of the Soviet Military during the Cold War. This infrastructure is not capable of supporting large-scale deployments of armored formations which are critical in deterring Russian aggression in Europe. This monograph evaluates the critical shortfall in transportation infrastructure in Eastern Europe and its effect on power projection for NATO and US militaries as they prepare for future multi-domain operations. Following World War II, the US and Central European states rapidly repaired and built new critical infrastructure which ushered in a period of remarkable economic growth. New transportation infrastructure, developed under military oversight, also enabled the rapid movement of personnel and equipment critical in deterring Warsaw Pact forces in the German Democratic Republic. The methods of infrastructure development introduced after WWII provide prescient insights into Europe, NATO, and US efforts to prevent hostility. These insights provide considerations and tools for policymakers and military commanders involved in the deployment of forces abroad.