North Vietnam's Military Logistics System: Its Contribution to the War, 1961-1969

Military logistics were extremely important to North Vietnam especially during the period of major United States involvement from 1961 to 1969. This paper seeks to determine the extent to which the Communist logistics system contributed to the war effort and to answer in part the question of why U.S. forces, in spite of their ability to conduct a series of successful military campaigns, could not defeat a foe greatly inferior in numbers and technology. Although Policymakers in Washington recognized the importance of the North Vietnamese armys logistics system to the prosecution of the war in the South, policy consistently emphasized the demand that North Vietnam desist rather than pressing for adoption of decisive measures to prevent Hanoi from supporting the war. This attempt at dissuasion was translated into the military strategy of a war of attrition on the ground, and, in the air, bombing which was intended to force Hanoi to negotiate on terms favorable to the U.S. Even after authoritative studies reported that air interdiction had no effect on North Vietnams ability to conduct the war in the South, the bombing continued. The original ground and air strategies, although bankrupt, were retained.