An Assessment of Contractor Personnel Security Clearance Processes in the Four Defense Intelligence Agencies

Our objective was to assess a how, or if, substantiated investigations of misconduct were reported to Agency Clearance Adjudication Facilities CAF and to the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility DODCAF b if the referred investigations had been adjudicated and c the results of those security adjudications. What We Found 1. There was a lack of effective personnel security policy. 2. There was a lack of effective record keeping. 3. There was an avoidance of personnel security adjudication for contractor personnel involved in misconduct. 4. There was a lack of personnel security information sharing. 5. There was a lack of connectivity between the Defense Central Index of Investigations DCII and the oint Personnel Adjudicative System JPAS. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USDI develop overarching policies governing operation of DCII and JPAS expedite publishing new security policy and advocate revising EO 12968 to require that personnel security clearance adjudicative and due process actions continue, even if the contractor employee no longer has access to classified information. USDI concurred with these recommendations. We redirected revision of one directive to Office of General Counsel, DoD. We recommend that the Offices of Security of the Defense Intelligence Agency DIA, National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency NGA, National Reconnaissance Office NRO, and National Security Agency NSA, Offices of Security, develop formal procedures to ensure that reports of investigation into misconduct by contractor personnel are reported to the appropriate adjudicative organizations and ensure that the appropriate security databases are populated with personnel security adjudicative determinations. The Agencies concurred with some of these recommendations and non-concurred with others. See the report and Appendices D- G.