Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

The capacity and transparency of Afghan governance are crucial to the success of a planned transition from U.S.-led NATO forces to Afghan leadership by the end of 2014. The capacity of the formal Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but nepotism is entrenched in Afghan culture and other forms of corruption are widespread. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anticorruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. At a donors conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan s economy through at least 2017, provided Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption. On July 26, 2012, Karzai appeared to try to meet his pledges to the Tokyo conference by issuing a decree on administrative reforms a document of sweeping policy directives intended to curb corruption. Even though the government is weak, President Hamid Karzai has tried to concentrate authority in Kabul through his constitutional powers of appointment at all levels. Karzai has repeatedly and publicly denied assertions by opposing faction leaders that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014 expiration of his second term, but there are concerns he plans to use state election machinery to support the election of a successor. International efforts to curb fraud in two successive elections for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010 largely failed and Afghan efforts to improve election oversight for the 2014 election are behind schedule, although the issue is being closely watched by Afghan civil society groups. Organized opposition political parties are working together to ensure a fair election.