Better Oversight Needed for the National Guard's Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams

We evaluated the planning and reporting of the National Guards Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams WMD CSTs in response to intentional or unintentional release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives and natural or man-made disasters. The four WMD CSTs reviewed had plans for each phase of operation pre-operational, operational, and post-operational identified in the Army Field Manual 3-11.22, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team Operations, December 2007. Those plans should improve the WMD CSTs ability to prepare, prevent, protect, and respond to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives and natural or man-made disasters. However, the four WMD CSTs reviewed did not fully meet the reporting requirements to keep the National Guard Bureau aware of their movements and operations. Specifically, the WMD CSTs did not provide required termination, situation, and after action reports, nor complete information for after action reports. Also, the National Guard Bureau records showed that the WMD CSTs conducted 409 response, stand-by, and assist missions from FY 2008 through FY 2011, while the teams records showed a total of 640 missions for the same time period. This occurred because National Guard Bureau-J3, Domestic Operations Directorate personnel did not clarify reporting expectations or adequately oversee how the WMD CSTs implemented the reporting requirements identified in the National Guard Regulation 500-3Air National Guard Instruction 10-2503, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management. As a result, the National Guard Bureau did not have situational awareness of WMD CSTs ability to immediately respond to a release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives and natural or man-made disaster.