Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process

A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft. These post-mortem reports have been issued by Agency leaders and components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and non-governmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance. Starting with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the post-Cold War period presented new challenges to intelligence. The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the DI in the new century. The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing effective analyst-policymaker relations. It reviews five post-mortem critiques 1 Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of Intelligence, In from the Cold 1996 2 Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter The Future of U.S. Intelligence 1996 3 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence 1996 4 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 1998 5 Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence 1996.