The Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) as an Insurgency

This monograph demonstrates that the Quebec Liberation Front FLQ was an insurgency by verifying four characteristics common to five definitions of insurgency. Theorists like Bard E. ONeill argue that governments hold the advantage while an insurgency is in development. However, ONeill also states that governments show complacency by judging an insurgency at the proto-insurgency stage as too small to warrant any immediate action. The Canadian government avoided that road and chose a more proactive approach to the FLQ, which is why the FLQ insurgency failed to grow past the proto-insurgency stage. Actions taken by the central and provincial governments made organizing, self-sustainment, and growing impossible for the FLQ. As a result, the FLQ insurgency failed. Studying insurgencies at the proto-insurgency level reveals a lot about what an insurgency is and how a government can influence its growth. A study case like the FLQ further highlights how the odds of a government defeating an insurgency are greater when an insurgency is identified and understood early on. However, governments must be proactive and willing take some risks, including the use of coercive countermeasures, to improve the odds in its favor.